Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
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*
G.R. No. 146364. June 3, 2004.
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* FIRST DIVISION.
493
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494
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495
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496
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497
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498
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499
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
1
Before us
2
is a petition for review of the 21 June 2000
Decision and 14 December 2000 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43129. The 3
Court of Appeals set
aside the 11 November 1996 decision of 4
the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City,5 Branch 81, affirming the 15
December 1995 decision 6 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 31.
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500
The Antecedents
‘A) vacate the house and lot occupied by the defendant or any
other person or persons claiming any right under him;
‘B) pay unto plaintiff the sum of THREE HUNDRED PESOS
(P300.00) monthly as reasonable compensation for the use
of the premises starting from the last demand;
‘C) pay plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00 as and by way of
attorney’s fees; and
‘D) pay the cost of suit.
501
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7 Rollo, p. 41.
8 Ibid., p. 49.
9 Ibid., p. 221.
10 Ibid., p. 224.
502
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11 Ibid., p. 60.
12 Ibid., p. 73.
503
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The Issues
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505
Procedural Issues
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13 Rollo, p. 134.
14 Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 358 Phil. 245; 297 SCRA 602 (1998).
15 Ibid.
506
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16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 227 Phil. 606; 143 SCRA 643 (1986).
19 G.R. No. 101132, 29 January 1993, 218 SCRA 193.
507
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20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
110003, 9 February 2001, 351 SCRA 436.
23 City of Manila v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100626, 29 November
1991, 204 SCRA 362.
24 Castilex Industrial Corporation v. Vasquez, Jr., 378 Phil. 1009; 321
SCRA 393 (1999).
508
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25 Refugia v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 982; 258 SCRA 347 (1996).
26 Ibid.
27 Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 703;
297 SCRA 30 (1998).
28 Ibid.
1
509
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510
they are mere squatters. Will the defense that the parties
to the ejectment case are not the owners of the disputed lot
allow the courts to renounce their jurisdiction over the
case? The Court of Appeals believed so and held that it
would just leave the parties where they are since they are
in pari delicto.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals.
Ownership or the right to possess arising from
ownership is not at issue in an action for recovery of
possession. The parties cannot present evidence to prove
ownership or right to legal possession except to prove the
nature of the possession when 36
necessary to resolve the
issue of physical possession. The same is true when the
defendant asserts the absence of title over the property.
The absence of title over the contested lot is not a ground
for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an
ejectment case.
The only question that the courts must resolve in
ejectment proceedings is—who is entitled to the physical
possession of the premises, that is, to 37the possession de
facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even 38
matter if a party’s title to the property is questionable, or
when both parties intruded into public land and their
applications to own the land have
39
yet to be approved by the
proper government agency. Regardless of the actual
condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable
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511
property
42
until a person with a better right lawfully ejects
him. To repeat, the only issue that the court has to settle
in an ejectment suit is the43 right to physical possession.
In Pitargue v. Sorilla, the government owned the land
in dispute. The government did not authorize either the
plaintiff or the defendant in the case of forcible entry case
to occupy the land. The plaintiff had prior possession and
had already introduced improvements on the public land.
The plaintiff had a pending application for the land with
the Bureau of Lands when the defendant ousted him from
possession. The plaintiff filed the action of forcible entry
against the defendant. The government was not a party in
the case of forcible entry.
The defendant questioned the jurisdiction of the courts
to settle the issue of possession because while the
application of the plaintiff was still pending, title remained
with the government, and the Bureau of Public Lands had
jurisdiction over the case. We disagreed with the
defendant. We ruled that courts have jurisdiction to
entertain ejectment suits even before the resolution of the
application. The plaintiff, by priority of his application and
of his entry, acquired prior physical possession over the
public land applied for as against other private claimants.
That prior physical possession enjoys legal protection
against other private claimants because only a court can
take away such physical possession in an ejectment case.
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While the Court did44 not brand the plaintiff and the
defendant in Pitargue as squatters, strictly speaking,
their entry into the disputed land was illegal. Both the
plaintiff and defendant entered the public land without the
owner’s permission. Title to the land remained with the
government because it had not awarded to anyone
ownership of the contested public land. Both the plaintiff
and the defendant were in effect squatting on government
property. Yet, we upheld the courts’ jurisdiction to resolve
the issue of possession even if the plaintiff and the
defendant in the ejectment case did not have any title over
the contested land.
Courts must not abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the
issue of physical possession because of the public need to
preserve the
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42 Ibid.
43 92 Phil. 5 (1952).
44 Ibid.
512
The question that is before this Court is: Are courts without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of possessory actions involving
these public lands before final award is made by the Lands
Department, and before title is given any of the conflicting
claimants? It is one of utmost importance, as there are public
lands everywhere and there are thousands of settlers, especially
in newly opened regions. It also involves a matter of policy, as it
requires the determination of the respective authorities and
functions of two coordinate branches of the Government in
connection with public land conflicts.
Our problem is made simple by the fact that under the Civil
Code, either in the old, which was in force in this country before
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45 Ibid.; Reynoso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 49344, 23 February 1989, 170
SCRA 546; Aguilon v. Bohol, G.R. No. L-27169, 20 October 1977, 79 SCRA 482.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
513
514
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48 Art. 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause
or object of the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both
parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no action against each
515
The rule of pari delicto is expressed in the maxims ‘ex dolo malo
non eritur actio’ and ‘in pari delicto potior est conditio defedentis.’
The law will not aid either party49 to an illegal agreement. It leaves
the parties where it finds them.
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other, and both shall be prosecuted. Moreover, the provisions of the Penal Code
relative to the disposal of effects or instruments of a crime shall be applicable to
the things or the price of the contract.
This rule shall be applicable when only one of the parties is guilty; but the
innocent one may claim what he has given, and shall not be bound to comply with
his promise.
Art. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not
constitute a criminal offense, the following rule shall be observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may
recover what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the
performance of the other’s undertaking;
(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover what
he has given by reason of the contract, or ask for the fulfillment of what
has been promised to him. The other, who is not at fault, may demand the
return of what he has given without any obligation to comply with his
promise.
516
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52 Ibid.
53 Dizon v. Concilia, 141 Phil. 589; 303 SCRA 897 (1969); Cine Ligaya v.
Labrador, 66 Phil. 659 (1938).
517
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54 Rollo, p. 54.
518
55
In Pitargue, we ruled that courts have jurisdiction over
possessory actions involving public land to determine the
issue of physical possession. The determination of the
respective rights of rival claimants to public land is,
however, distinct from the determination of who has the
actual physical possession
56
or who has a better right of
physical possession. The administrative disposition and
alienation of public lands 57should be threshed out in the
proper government agency.
The Court of Appeals’ determination of Pajuyo and
Guevarra’s rights under Proclamation No. 137 was
premature. Pajuyo and Guevarra were at most merely
potential beneficiaries of the law. Courts should not
preempt the decision of the administrative agency
mandated by law to determine the qualifications of
applicants for the acquisition of public lands. Instead,
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519
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520
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(1) If neither the duration of the contract nor the use to which the
thing loaned should be devoted, has been stipulated; or
(2) If the use of the thing is merely tolerated by the owner.
521
69
the termination of the lease. The tenant’s withholding of
the property would then be unlawful. This is settled
jurisprudence.
Even assuming that the relationship between Pajuyo
and Guevarra is one of commodatum, Guevarra as bailee
would still have the duty to turn over possession of the
property to Pajuyo, the bailor. The obligation to deliver or
to return the thing received attaches to contracts for
safekeeping, or contracts
70
of commission, administration
and commodatum. These contracts certainly involve 71
the
obligation to deliver or return the thing received.
Guevarra turned his back on the Kasunduan on the sole
ground that like him, Pajuyo is also a squatter. Squatters,
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522
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523
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524
82
sive adjudication on the merits on the issue of ownership.
The owner can still go to court to recover lawfully the
property from the person who holds the property without
legal title. Our ruling here does not diminish the power of
government agencies, including local governments, to
condemn, abate, remove or demolish illegal or
unauthorized structures in accordance with existing laws.
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525
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*
G.R. No. 115324. February 19, 2003.
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* SECOND DIVISION.
652
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653
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3 Id. at p. 37.
4 Ibid.
654
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655
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I.
II.
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8 Id., at p. 63.
9 Id., at pp. 35-47.
10 Id., at pp. 54-55.
656
III.
IV.
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V.
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657
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15 Id., at p. 21.
16 Id., at p. 22.
17 Id., at pp. 24-27.
18 Id., at p. 23.
19 Id., at p. 28.
658
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659
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660
goods and to have the very same goods returned at the end
of the period agreed upon, the loan is a commodatum and
not a mutuum.
The rule is that the intention of the parties thereto shall
be accorded primordial consideration
27
in determining the
actual character of a contract. In case of doubt, the
contemporaneous and subsequent acts 28
of the parties shall
be considered in such determination.
As correctly pointed out by both the Court of Appeals
and the trial court, the evidence shows that private
respondent agreed to deposit his money in the savings
account of Sterela specifically for the purpose of making it
appear “that said firm had sufficient capitalization for
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661
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xxx
But the scheme could not have been executed successfully
without the knowledge, help and cooperation of Rufo Atienza,
assistant manager and cashier of the Makati (Buendia) branch of
the defendant bank. Indeed, the evidence indicates that Atienza
had not only facilitated the commission of the fraud but he
likewise helped in devising the means by which it can be done in
such manner as to make it appear that the transaction was in
accordance with banking procedure.
To begin with, the deposit was made in defendant’s Buendia
branch precisely because Atienza was a key officer therein. The
records show that plaintiff had suggested that the P200,000.00 be
deposited in his bank, the Manila Banking Corporation, but
Doronilla and Dumagpi insisted that it must be in defendant’s
branch in Makati for “it will be easier for them to get a
certification.” In fact before he was introduced to plaintiff,
Doronilla had already prepared a letter addressed to the Buendia
branch manager authorizing Angeles B. Sanchez and company to
open a savings account
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662
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knew before hand that the money deposited did not belong to
Doronilla nor to Sterela. Aside from such foreknowledge, he was
explicitly told by Inocencia Vives that the money belonged to her
and her husband and the deposit was merely to accommodate
Doronilla. Atienza even declared that the money came from Mrs.
Vives.
Although the savings account was in the name of Sterela, the
bank records disclose that the only ones empowered to withdraw
the same were Inocencia Vives and Angeles B. Sanchez. In the
signature card pertaining to this account (Exh. “J”), the
authorized signatories were Inocencia Vives &/or Angeles B.
Sanchez. Atienza stated that it is the usual banking procedure
that withdrawals of savings deposits could only be made by
persons whose authorized signatures are in the signature cards-
on file with the bank. He, however, said that this procedure was
not followed here because Sterela was owned by Doronilla. He
explained that Doronilla had the full authority to withdraw by
virtue of such ownership. The Court is not inclined to agree with
Atienza. In the first place, he was all the time aware that the
money came from Vives and did not belong to Sterela. He was also
told by Mrs. Vives that they were only accommodating Doronilla
so that a certification can be issued to the effect that Sterela had a
deposit of so much amount to be sued in the incorporation of the
firm. In the second place, the signature of Doronilla was not
authorized in so far as that account is concerned inasmuch as he
had not signed the signature card provided by the bank whenever
a deposit is opened. In the third place, neither Mrs. Vives nor
Sanchez had given Doronilla the authority to withdraw.
Moreover, the transfer of fund was done without the passbook
having been presented. It is an accepted practice that whenever a
withdrawal is made in a savings deposit, the bank requires the
presentation of the passbook. In this case, such recognized
practice was dispensed with. The transfer from the savings
account to the current account was without the submission of the
passbook which Atienza had given to Mrs. Vives. Instead, it was
made to appear in a certification signed by Estrella Dumagpi that
a duplicate passbook was issued to Sterela because the original
passbook had been surrendered to the Makati branch in view of a
loan accommodation assigning the savings account (Exh. “C”).
Atienza, who undoubtedly had a hand in the execution of this
certification, was aware that the contents of the same are not
true. He knew that the passbook was in the
663
hands of Mrs. Vives for he was the one who gave it to her.
Besides, as assistant manager of the branch and the bank official
servicing the savings and current accounts in question, he also
was aware that the original passbook was never surrendered. He
was also cognizant that Estrella Dumagpi was not among those
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31 Rollo, pp. 43-47, citing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, pp.
5-8.
32 Castilex Industrial Corporation v. Vasquez, Jr., 321 SCRA 393
(1999).
33 18B Am. Jur. 2d, p. 947, Corporations § 2125, citing Pittsburgh, C.C.
& S.L.R. Co. v. Sullivan, 40 NE 138.
664
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665
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ARELLANO, C. J.:
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541
542
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________________
543
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546
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547
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Judgment reversed.
548
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TORRES, J.:
149
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150
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151
152
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Judgment affirmed.
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11/14/2018 G.R. No. L-17474
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EN BANC
PADILLA, J.:
The Court of Appeals certified this case to this Court because only questions of law are raised.
On 8 May 1948 Jose V. Bagtas borrowed from the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Animal Industry
three bulls: a Red Sindhi with a book value of P1,176.46, a Bhagnari, of P1,320.56 and a Sahiniwal, of P744.46, for
a period of one year from 8 May 1948 to 7 May 1949 for breeding purposes subject to a government charge of
breeding fee of 10% of the book value of the bulls. Upon the expiration on 7 May 1949 of the contract, the borrower
asked for a renewal for another period of one year. However, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
approved a renewal thereof of only one bull for another year from 8 May 1949 to 7 May 1950 and requested the
return of the other two. On 25 March 1950 Jose V. Bagtas wrote to the Director of Animal Industry that he would pay
the value of the three bulls. On 17 October 1950 he reiterated his desire to buy them at a value with a deduction of
yearly depreciation to be approved by the Auditor General. On 19 October 1950 the Director of Animal Industry
advised him that the book value of the three bulls could not be reduced and that they either be returned or their book
value paid not later than 31 October 1950. Jose V. Bagtas failed to pay the book value of the three bulls or to return
them. So, on 20 December 1950 in the Court of First Instance of Manila the Republic of the Philippines commenced
an action against him praying that he be ordered to return the three bulls loaned to him or to pay their book value in
the total sum of P3,241.45 and the unpaid breeding fee in the sum of P199.62, both with interests, and costs; and
that other just and equitable relief be granted in (civil No. 12818).
On 5 July 1951 Jose V. Bagtas, through counsel Navarro, Rosete and Manalo, answered that because of the bad
peace and order situation in Cagayan Valley, particularly in the barrio of Baggao, and of the pending appeal he had
taken to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the President of the Philippines from the refusal by
the Director of Animal Industry to deduct from the book value of the bulls corresponding yearly depreciation of 8%
from the date of acquisition, to which depreciation the Auditor General did not object, he could not return the animals
nor pay their value and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
. . . sentencing the latter (defendant) to pay the sum of P3,625.09 the total value of the three bulls plus the
breeding fees in the amount of P626.17 with interest on both sums of (at) the legal rate from the filing of this
complaint and costs.
On 9 October 1958 the plaintiff moved ex parte for a writ of execution which the court granted on 18 October and
issued on 11 November 1958. On 2 December 1958 granted an ex-parte motion filed by the plaintiff on November
1958 for the appointment of a special sheriff to serve the writ outside Manila. Of this order appointing a special
sheriff, on 6 December 1958, Felicidad M. Bagtas, the surviving spouse of the defendant Jose Bagtas who died on
23 October 1951 and as administratrix of his estate, was notified. On 7 January 1959 she file a motion alleging that
on 26 June 1952 the two bull Sindhi and Bhagnari were returned to the Bureau Animal of Industry and that
sometime in November 1958 the third bull, the Sahiniwal, died from gunshot wound inflicted during a Huk raid on
Hacienda Felicidad Intal, and praying that the writ of execution be quashed and that a writ of preliminary injunction
be issued. On 31 January 1959 the plaintiff objected to her motion. On 6 February 1959 she filed a reply thereto. On
the same day, 6 February, the Court denied her motion. Hence, this appeal certified by the Court of Appeals to this
Court as stated at the beginning of this opinion.
It is true that on 26 June 1952 Jose M. Bagtas, Jr., son of the appellant by the late defendant, returned the Sindhi
and Bhagnari bulls to Roman Remorin, Superintendent of the NVB Station, Bureau of Animal Industry, Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya, as evidenced by a memorandum receipt signed by the latter (Exhibit 2). That is why in its objection
of 31 January 1959 to the appellant's motion to quash the writ of execution the appellee prays "that another writ of
execution in the sum of P859.53 be issued against the estate of defendant deceased Jose V. Bagtas." She cannot
be held liable for the two bulls which already had been returned to and received by the appellee.
The appellant contends that the Sahiniwal bull was accidentally killed during a raid by the Huk in November 1953
upon the surrounding barrios of Hacienda Felicidad Intal, Baggao, Cagayan, where the animal was kept, and that as
such death was due to force majeure she is relieved from the duty of returning the bull or paying its value to the
appellee. The contention is without merit. The loan by the appellee to the late defendant Jose V. Bagtas of the three
bulls for breeding purposes for a period of one year from 8 May 1948 to 7 May 1949, later on renewed for another
year as regards one bull, was subject to the payment by the borrower of breeding fee of 10% of the book value of
the bulls. The appellant contends that the contract was commodatum and that, for that reason, as the appellee
retained ownership or title to the bull it should suffer its loss due to force majeure. A contract of commodatum is
essentially gratuitous.1 If the breeding fee be considered a compensation, then the contract would be a lease of the
bull. Under article 1671 of the Civil Code the lessee would be subject to the responsibilities of a possessor in bad
faith, because she had continued possession of the bull after the expiry of the contract. And even if the contract be
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commodatum, still the appellant is liable, because article 1942 of the Civil Code provides that a bailee in a contract
of commodatum —
. . . is liable for loss of the things, even if it should be through a fortuitous event:
(3) If the thing loaned has been delivered with appraisal of its value, unless there is a stipulation exempting
the bailee from responsibility in case of a fortuitous event;
The original period of the loan was from 8 May 1948 to 7 May 1949. The loan of one bull was renewed for another
period of one year to end on 8 May 1950. But the appellant kept and used the bull until November 1953 when during
a Huk raid it was killed by stray bullets. Furthermore, when lent and delivered to the deceased husband of the
appellant the bulls had each an appraised book value, to with: the Sindhi, at P1,176.46, the Bhagnari at P1,320.56
and the Sahiniwal at P744.46. It was not stipulated that in case of loss of the bull due to fortuitous event the late
husband of the appellant would be exempt from liability.
The appellant's contention that the demand or prayer by the appellee for the return of the bull or the payment of its
value being a money claim should be presented or filed in the intestate proceedings of the defendant who died on
23 October 1951, is not altogether without merit. However, the claim that his civil personality having ceased to exist
the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case against him, is untenable, because section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court provides that —
After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30)
days, or within such time as may be granted. . . .
and after the defendant's death on 23 October 1951 his counsel failed to comply with section 16 of Rule 3 which
provides that —
Whenever a party to a pending case dies . . . it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of
such death . . . and to give the name and residence of the executory administrator, guardian, or other legal
representative of the deceased . . . .
The notice by the probate court and its publication in the Voz de Manila that Felicidad M. Bagtas had been issue
letters of administration of the estate of the late Jose Bagtas and that "all persons having claims for monopoly
against the deceased Jose V. Bagtas, arising from contract express or implied, whether the same be due, not due,
or contingent, for funeral expenses and expenses of the last sickness of the said decedent, and judgment for
monopoly against him, to file said claims with the Clerk of this Court at the City Hall Bldg., Highway 54, Quezon City,
within six (6) months from the date of the first publication of this order, serving a copy thereof upon the
aforementioned Felicidad M. Bagtas, the appointed administratrix of the estate of the said deceased," is not a notice
to the court and the appellee who were to be notified of the defendant's death in accordance with the above-quoted
rule, and there was no reason for such failure to notify, because the attorney who appeared for the defendant was
the same who represented the administratrix in the special proceedings instituted for the administration and
settlement of his estate. The appellee or its attorney or representative could not be expected to know of the death of
the defendant or of the administration proceedings of his estate instituted in another court that if the attorney for the
deceased defendant did not notify the plaintiff or its attorney of such death as required by the rule.
As the appellant already had returned the two bulls to the appellee, the estate of the late defendant is only liable for
the sum of P859.63, the value of the bull which has not been returned to the appellee, because it was killed while in
the custody of the administratrix of his estate. This is the amount prayed for by the appellee in its objection on 31
January 1959 to the motion filed on 7 January 1959 by the appellant for the quashing of the writ of execution.
Special proceedings for the administration and settlement of the estate of the deceased Jose V. Bagtas having been
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Q-200), the money judgment rendered in favor of the appellee
cannot be enforced by means of a writ of execution but must be presented to the probate court for payment by the
appellant, the administratrix appointed by the court.
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of execution appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
Barrera, J., concurs in the result.
Footnotes
1 Article 1933 of the Civil Code.
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*
Nos. L-80294-95. September 21, 1988.
________________
* FIRST DIVISION.
516
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GANCAYCO, J.:
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September 8, 1977, filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review,
docketed as G.R. No. L-46872, entitled, ‘Heirs of Juan Valdez and Pacita
Valdez vs. Court of Appeals, Vicar, Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano and
Amable O. Valdez.
On January 13, 1978, the Supreme Court denied in a minute
resolution both petitions (of VICAR on the one hand and the Heirs of
Juan Valdez and Pacita Valdez on the other) for lack of merit. Upon the
finality of both Supreme Court resolutions in G.R. No. L-46832 and G.R.
No. L-46872, the Heirs of Octaviano filed with the then Court of First
Instance of Baguio, Branch II, a Motion For Execution of Judgment
praying that the Heirs of Octaviano be placed in possession of Lot 3. The
Court, presided over by Hon. Salvador J. Valdez, on December 7, 1978,
denied the motion on the ground that the Court of Appeals decision in
CA-G.R. No. 38870 did not grant the Heirs of Octaviano any affirmative
relief.
On February 7, 1979, the Heirs of Octaviano filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus, docketed as CA-G.R. No.
08890-R, entitled ‘Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano vs. Hon. Salvador J.
Valdez, Jr. and Vicar.’ In its decision dated May 16, 1979, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition.
It was at that stage that the instant cases were filed. The Heirs of
Egmidio Octaviano filed Civil Case No. 3607 (419) on July 24, 1979, for
recovery of possession of Lot 3; and the Heirs of Juan Valdez filed Civil
Case No. 3655 (429) on September 24, 1979, likewise for recovery of
possession of Lot 2 (Decision, pp. 199-201, Orig. Rec.).
“In Civil Case No. 3607 (419) trial was held. The plaintiffs
Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano presented one (1) witness, Fructuoso
Valdez, who testified on the alleged ownership of the land in
question (Lot 3)
520
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effect declared the plaintiffs the owners of the land constitute res
judicata.
“In these two cases, the plaintiffs argue that the defendant
Vicar is barred from setting up the defense of ownership and/or
long and continuous possession of the two lots in question since
this is barred by prior judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 038830-R under the principle of res judicata. Plaintiffs
contend that the question of possession and ownership have
already been determined by the Court of Appeals (Exh. C,
Decision, CA-G.R. No. 038830-R) and affirmed by the Supreme
Court (Exh. 1, Minute Resolution of the Supreme Court). On his
part, defendant Vicar maintains that the principle of res judicata
would not prevent them from litigating the issues of long
possession and ownership because the dispositive portion of the
prior judgment in CA-G.R. No. 038830-R merely dismissed their
application for registration and titling of lots 2 and 3. Defendant
Vicar contends that only the dispositive portion of the decision,
and not its
2
body, is the controlling pronouncement of the Court of
Appeals.”
_______________
2 Decision in CA-G.R. No. CV Nos. 05148 and 05149 dated August 31,
1987; pp. 112-117, Rollo.
521
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522
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the plaintiff, retaining for his benefit the three gas heaters
and the four electric lamps.
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IMPERIAL, J.:
that she call for the other furniture from the said Sheriff of
Manila at her own expense, and that the fees which the
Sheriff may charge for the deposit of the furniture be paid
pro rata by both parties, without pronouncement as to the
costs.
The defendant was a tenant of the plaintiff and as such
occupied the latter's house on M. H. del Pilar street, No.
1175. On January 14, 1936, upon the novation of the
contract of lease between the plaintiff and the defendant,
the former gratuitously granted to the latter the use of the
furniture described in the third paragraph of the
stipulation of facts, subject to the condition that the
defendant would return them to the plaintiff upon the
latter's demand. The plaintiff sold the property to Maria
Lopez and Rosario Lopez and on September 14, 1936, these
three notified the defendant of the conveyance, giving him
sixty days to vacate the premises under one of the clauses
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Judgment modified.
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