Petitioner Memorial SOEL

ULC-1
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF ARYAVARTA
XXII ALL INDIA

NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2018.
CASE CONCERNING THE MAINTAINABILITY OF THE PETITIONS FILED, THE

VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, THE VALIDITY OF THE NOTIFICATION
AND THE LOSS OF PROFITS SUFFERED.
BETWEEN
AZS MINING PVT. LTD. CO (MINING COMPANY)
(“PETITIONER NO.1”)
VS.
THE UNION GOVERNMENT OF ARYAVARTA
(“RESPONDENT NO.1”)
ALONG WITH
WORKERS UNION
(“PETITIONER NO.2”)
VS.
GOVERNMENT OF HODU
(“RESPONDENT NO.2”)
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

XXII ALL INDIA NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2018
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CONTENTS PAGE.
NOS.
1. TABLE OF CONTENTS 2-3
2. TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS 3-4
3. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 5-6

Indian Cases 5-6
Foreign Cases 6
Books referred 6
4. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 7
5. STATEMENT OF FACTS 8-9

6. ISSUES RAISED 10
7. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS 11-12
8. PLEADINGS 13-33
1. The Writ Petitions filed by the petitioners are maintainable.
1.1. The Writ Petitions are maintainable as it involves violation of fundamental
rights under Part III of the Constitution of Aryavarta.
1.2. Respondents have acted arbitrarily, violating the principles of natural
justice.
1.3. Arguendo, even if Alternative Remedy exists, remedy under Art. 32 will take
precedence over it.
2. The doctrine of frustration is applicable.
2.1 Circumstances of applicability of Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel.
3. The order passed vide notification dated 09/11/2017 is not valid.
3.1. Respondent No. 1 is not empowered to legislate upon matters related to minor
minerals under The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act,
1957:
3.1.1. Demarcation of powers between union and the States under Schedule VII of the
Constitution.
3.1.2. Respondent No.1 Cannot Legislate in the State field as no special circumstances
exist.
3.2. Respondent No.1 failed to observe the Principles of Natural Justice.
3.3. Report submitted by International NGO, is not valid.
2
4. The mining project is in violation of Art. 21 of the Constitution. 26-29
4.1. Crux of Sustainable Development. 26
4.2. Breach of Contract and Notification are violative of Article 21 of the 27-28
Constitution
28-29
4.3. The Notification is in violation of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
5. The Respondents are liable to pay compensation to the Petitioners.
30-33
5.1. Petitioner No.1 must be compensated for the loss of profits.
31
5.2. Petitioner No. 2 must be compensated for their loss of employment.
32-33
9. PRAYER 34
3
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
A.C. Appeal Cases
A.I.R. All India Reporter
A.P Andhra Pradesh
Art. Article
cl. Clause
Co. Company
ed. Edition
Gau Guwahati
I.L.L.J Indian Labour Law Journal
Ker Kerala
K.L.T Kerala Law Times
E.P.A Environment Protection Act

M.M.R.D. Act Mines and Mineral (Regulation and Development)
Act, 157
MNC Multi-National Companies
N.G.T National Green Tribunal
p/pg. Page
S.C. Supreme Court
S.C.C. Supreme Court Cases
S.C.R. Supreme Court Reporter
U.P. Uttar Pradesh
V Versus
4
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES REFERRED
INDIAN CASES
1. Amritlal Nathubhai Shah v Union Government of India, (1976) 4 S.C.C. 108.
2. Ashif Hamid v State of J. & K., A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1899
3. B.N. Nagarajan v State of Mysore, A.I.R. (1966) S.C. 1942.
4. B.P Sharma v Union of India, (2003) 7 S.C.C. 309.
5. Baijnath Kadio v State of Bihar, (1969) 3 S.C.C. 838.
6. Bar Council of Delhi v Surjeet Singh, 1980 A.I.R. 1612.
7. Bhoop Singh v Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana, A.I.R. (1977) P.H. 40 (India).
8. Buffalo Traders Welfare Assn. v Maneka Gandhi, (1996) 11 S.C.C. 35.
9. Central Airmen Selection Board v Surinder Kumar, (2003) 1 S.C.C. 152.
10. Century Spinning & Mfg. Co. Ltd v Ulhasnagar Municipal Council, A.I.R. (1971) S.C.
1021.
11. Chintaman Rao v State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. (1951) S.C. 118.
12. D.K.Trivedi & Sons v State of Gujarat, (1986) 1 S.C.R. 479.
13. DM Wayanad Institute of Medical v Union of India, (2016) 2 S.C.C. 315.
14. Ekta Shakti Foundation v Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2006) 10 S.C.C. 337.
15. Goa Foundation v Union of India, (2004) 6 S.C.C. 590.
16. Himmat Singh Shekhawat v State of Rajasthan, (2014) S.C.C. OnLine. N.G.T. 2535
(India).
17. Hindustan Sugar Mills v State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. (1981) S.C. 1681.
18. Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v State of Orissa, (1961) 2 S.C.R. 537.
19. Joygit Das v State of Assam, A.I.R. (1990) Gau. 24.
20. K.K. Kochunni v State of Madras, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 725.
21. Kharak Singh v The State of U.P., 1964(1) S.C.R. 332 (India).
22. Khatri v State of Bihar, 1981 A.I.R. 1068.
23. Liberty Oil Mills v Union of India A.I.R. (1984) S.C. 1271.
24. Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v The Union of India,1961 A.I.R. 532.
25. M.C. Mehta v Union of India, (1996) 4 S.C.C. 750.
26. M.C. Mehta v Union of India, (1997) 1 S.C.C. 388.
27. M.C. Mehta v Union of India, (1999) I.L.L.J. 612 S.C. (India).
28. M/S. Ajar Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. v Satyanarayan Somani, 2017 S.C.C. OnLine S.C. 997
(India).
5
29. M/S Sharma Transport v Government of A.P., A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 322.
30. Madhu Kishwar v State of Bihar, 1996 A.I.R. 1864.
31. Mahesh Chandra v Regional Manager, U.P. Financial Corporation, A.I.R. 1993 S.C.
935.Mohinder Singh Gill v Chief Election Commissioner, A.I.R. (1978) S.C. 851.
32. Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd v Union of India, (2012) 11 S.C.C. 146.
33. Motilal Padmat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v Union of India A.I.R. (1979) S.C. 621
34. N.D Jayal v Union of India, A.I.R. (2004) S.C. 867 (Supp).
35. Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation, A.I.R. (1986) 180.
36. Romesh Thapar v Union of India, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 124
37. Secretary, Kerala Granites and Stone Association v State of Kerala, (2004) 2 K.L.T.
227.
38. Senior Divisional Commercial v S.C.R Caterers, (2016) 3 S.C.C. 582.
39. State of Kerala v M/S Kerala Rare Earth & Minerals, (2016) 6 S.C.C. 323.
40. State of Kerala v United Shippers and Dredgers Ltd., A.I.R. 1982 Ker. 281 (India).
41. State of Orissa v M.A. Tulloch and Co., (1964) 4 S.C.R. 461.
42. State of West Bengal v Union of India, (1964) 1 S.C.R. 371.
43. The State of Karnataka v Shri Ranganatha Reddy, A.I.R. (1978) S.C. 215.
44. The State Trading Corporation v The Commercial Tax Officer, 1963 A.I.R. 1811.
45. Vijay Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh, (2005) 2 A.W.C. 1191.
FOREIGN CASES
1. Lapointe v L'Association, (1906) A.C. 535(539).
BOOKS REFERRED
1. 5 DHARMENDRA S SENGAR, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2009, Delhi).
2. 8 DD BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (8th ed. 2016).
3. BATUK LAL, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (6th ed. 2012)
4. DR. G. INDIRA PRIYA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2010)
5. G. W PATON, A TEXT BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE (Oxford, 4th ed. 1972).
6. MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7th ed. 2014).
7. PEET, R. THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT, RAWAT PUBLICATIONS (2005).
8. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE
(Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1987).
6
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of India exercises its jurisdiction conferred on it by the virtue of Article
32 of the Constitution of India wherein a writ petition can be filed by a citizen whose
fundamental rights have been violated.
Further under Article 139.A the Supreme Court of India has been conferred with the power to
transfer certain cases which involve the same or substantially the same questions of law as
are pending before it and one or more High Courts.
7
STATEMENT OF FACTS
INTRODUCTION
1. Aryavarta (“Respondent No.1”) is a developing country with 29 states. It has rich natural
resources and historical heritage. Hodu (“Respondent No.2”) is a state in Aryavarta which
is also called as a historical state. Pumpa Nagar is one of the oldest cities in Hodu with a
large reservoir of rare granite known as ‘Magma Black’.
2. AZS Mining Pvt. Ltd. (“Petitioner No.1”) is a mining company with a profit motive
which uses hi-tech mining technology that is imported.
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE RESPONDENT NO. 2 AND PETITIONER NO.1
3. Respondent No.2 called for bids to extract granite through a tender. Since the process for
extracted was advanced, Petitioner No.1 procured the tender after entering into a Joint
Venture agreement (“JV Agreement”) with an MNC. The MNC contributed 51% of the
investment towards the JV agreement. Petitioner No. 1 was then awarded the contract for
15 years to extract the granite, under lease of 50 acres.
4. Respondent No.2 handed over only 20 acres of the leased land to Petitioner No.1, the
remaining 30 acres was not handed over.
5. The mining operation required a large amount of man power due to the use of high
calibre explosives and therefore generated employment for about 200 people from the
surrounding villages.
DECLARATION OF ECO- SENSITIVE ZONE
6. During this time, the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change declared a part
of the region where the mining was carried on as an Eco-Sensitive Zone.
GRIEVANCE OF THE WORKERS UNION
7. Since the remaining 30 acres of land was not handed over by Respondent No.1, the MNC
threatened to exit the JV Agreement. This put the livelihood of 200 workers at risk. In
apprehension, the 200 workers formed a Union (Petitioner No.2) and filed a petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking the Court to direct Respondent No.1 to hand
over the remaining 30 acres of land.
ADVERSE EFFECTS OF MINING ON THE ANCIENT MONUMENT
8. The area of the mining operation was in the proximity of an ancient monument which was
known for its architecture. This also made it a popular tourist attraction and contributed to
the economy of the state. Further the area also had several hotels and small-scale
8
shopping centres. Apart from this the monument also held a significant religious and
cultural value to the residents.
9. An international NGO, ‘International Environmental and Ancient Monument Preservation
Organisation’ conducted a research and found that the monument was deteriorating. Even
though the mining activity was reasonably far away, the explosives and the chemicals had
an adverse effect on the monument. The reports submitted were further examined and
confirmed by another NGO, ‘MCM Heritage Protection Organisation’.
10. This was brought to the notice of Petitioner No.1 and when there was no response from
them, it was taken to the Union Government of Aryavarta (“Respondent No.1”).
NOTIFICATION BY RESPONDENT NO.1
11. After conducting sufficient enquiry, Respondent No.1 took into consideration, the
deteriorating heritage, health of the people, declining income from tourism due to excess
noise and air pollution from the explosives, land and water pollution from the chemicals.
12. They passed an order vide Notification dated 09/11/2017, to stop all mining and
quarrying activity immediately around the city.
GRIEVANCE OF PETITIONER NO.1
13. Due to the notification, the mining activity had to stop within 5 years of being awarded
the tender instead of 15 years, which was the tenure. Aggrieved by this, Petitioner No.1
filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court, questioning the Notification dated
09/11/2017. They also claimed a violation of their fundamental rights and an inability to
recuperate the investments made.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE APEX COURT
14. Petitioner No.1 asked for clubbing the petition before the High Court with the Writ
Petition filed before the Supreme Court. The same was permitted and matter was posted
for final arguments.
9
ISSUES RAISED
1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITIONS FILED BY THE PETITIONERS ARE

MAINTAINABLE?
2. WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IS APPLICABLE?
3. WHETHER THE ORDER PASSED VIDE NOTIFICATION DATED 09/11/2017 IS

VALID?
4. WHETHER THE MINING PROJECT IS IN VIOLATION OF ART. 21 OF THE

CONSTITUTION?
5. WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS ARE LIABLE TO PAY COMPENSATION TO THE

PETITIONERS?
10
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
1. THE WRIT PETITIONS FILED BY THE PETITIONERS ARE MAINTAINABLE.
It is humbly submitted that the writ petitions filed by the Petitioners are maintainable in law
and facts. The petition involves a gross violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under
Article 21 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. It is contended that the actions of the
Respondents have been arbitrary and have violated the principles of natural justice, therefore
the Petitioners have approached the right forum for seeking remedy and arguendo, even if an
alternative remedy did exist, a petition under Art. 32 will take precedence over it, as it
involves violation of fundamental rights. Therefore, due to the reasons mentioned above, the
Writ Petition is maintainable under Art. 32.
2. THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IS APPLICABLE.
It is contended that, that the contract in question is valid as it has met all the requisites under
Article 299 of the Constitution which is a formality to be complied with in order to bind the
government with contractual liability and can hence be enforced like any other contract under
the Contract Act, 1872. Further, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable to present
case, which binds the Respondents to their legal obligations and does not absolve them of
their liability.
3. THE ORDER PASSED VIDE NOTIFICATION DATED 09/11/2017 IS NOT VALID.
It is contended that the order passed vide the Notification dated 9/11/2017 is invalid.
Respondent No.1 is not empowered to make rules upon matters related to minor minerals
according to The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act of 1957
(hereinafter referred to as MMDR Act). Further, the Respondent No.1 had failed to abide by
the principles of natural justice while passing the impugned order.
4. THE MINING PROJECT IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION.
It is humbly submitted that, in the instant case, the mining project is not violative of Article
21 as due importance was given to the principle of Sustainable Development. The principle
reiterates balancing the need for development with the need for protection of the
environment. Further, it is contended that the notification is a violation of Right to livelihood
of Petitioners and the notification was also a violation of Art.19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
5. THE RESPONDENTS ARE LIABLE TO PAY COMPENSATION TO THE PETITIONERS.
The Petitioners are entitled to be compensated for the damages and injuries undergone by
them owing to their high investment, suffered due to the notification, ordering the stoppage
all mining activities in and around Pumpa Nagar on account of the unlawful acts of the
11
Respondents. It is contended that Respondent No. 1 is liable to pay compensation to the
Petitioners on account of loss of profits due. It is also the humble submission of the Petitioner
No.2. that the Respondent No.2. ensures that they are compensated.
12
PLEADINGS
1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITIONS FILED BY THE PETITIONERS ARE MAINTAINABLE?
6. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the writ petitions filed by the
Petitioner No.1 and No.2, under Article 32 and Article 226 are maintainable in law and
facts. Firstly, the petition involves a gross violation of fundamental rights guaranteed
under Article 21 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution (1.1). Secondly, the actions of
the Respondents have been arbitrary and have violated the principles of natural justice
(1.2). Thirdly, the Petitioners have approached the right forum for seeking remedy and
arguendo, even if an alternative remedy did exist, a petition under Art. 32 will take
precedence over it, as it involves violation of fundamental rights (1.3). Owing to the
above mentioned reasons, the Writ Petition is maintainable under Art. 32.
6.1. THE WRIT PETITIONS ARE MAINTAINABLE AS IT INVOLVES VIOLATION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER PART III OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ARYAVARTA.
7. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Article 32 provides a “guaranteed”
remedy for the enforcement of fundamental rights, and this remedial right is itself made a
fundamental right by being included in Part III. This Hon’ble Court is thus constituted as
the protector and guarantor of fundamental rights, and it cannot, consistently with the
responsibility so laid upon it, refuse to entertain applications seeking protection against
infringements of such rights.1
8. The right to approach this Hon’ble Court under Art. 32 in itself is a fundamental right
guaranteed under Art. 32 and this right conferred being a fundamental right cannot be
abrogated, abridged or taken away. Art. 32 cannot be amended as well, as it forms the
basic structure of the Constitution of Aryavarta. The power of this Hon’ble Court under
Art. 32 has been extended to issuing orders and directions for the enforcement of
fundamental rights.
9. This Hon’ble Court in Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation2, implied that the
expression ‘right to livelihood’ is born out of ‘right to life’ and that no person can live
without the means of living. It was further held that if the right to livelihood is not
treated as a part and parcel of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving
a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the
point of abrogation.3
1
Romesh Thapar v Union of India, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 124.
2
Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation, A.I.R. 1986 S.C.180.
3
Madhu Kishwar v State of Bihar, 1996 A.I.R. 1864.
13
10. The principles contained in Articles 39(a) and 41 must be regarded as equally
fundamental. If there is an obligation upon the State to secure to the citizens an adequate
means of livelihood and the right to work, it would be sheer pedantry to exclude
the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life. Any person, who is deprived
of his right to livelihood except according to just and fair procedure established by law,
can challenge the deprivation as offending the right to life conferred by Article 21.4
11. Therefore, unimpeachable is the evidence of the nexus between life and the means
of livelihood. The right to work is the most precious liberty because, it sustains and
enables a man to live and the right to life is a precious freedom.5 Any person of
Aryavarta can approach an appropriate High Court to protect his rights against any
person, authority or any Government if his fundamental right or any other right is
infringed by the said person, authority or Government.6
12. If there is any threatened invasion by the State of the fundamental rights guaranteed
under Article 21, the petitioner who is aggrieved can move the Court under Article 32 for
a writ to grant injunction against such threatened invasion and if there is any continuing
action of the State which is violative of the Fundamental Right under Article 21, the
petitioner can approach the court under Article 32 and ask for a writ striking down the
continuance of such action.7
13. The fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution are available not merely to
individual citizens but to corporate bodies as well except where the language of the
provision or the nature of the right compels the inference that they are applicable only to
natural persons. An incorporated company, therefore, can come up to this Court
for enforcement of its fundamental rights.8
14. In the instant case, it is the contention of the Petitioner No. 2 that Respondent No. 2
acted unfairly and in breach of its contract with Petitioner No.1 by not granting the
remaining 30 acres of land for the purpose of mining. The livelihood of 200 workers has
been put at risk as the MNC party to the joint venture threatened to exit, being unable to
recoup its investments due to the act of inefficiency by the Government. Therefore, the
writ petitions filed by the Petitioners are maintainable so as to enforce their fundamental
rights.
4
Senior Divisional Commercial v S.C.R Caterers, (2016) 3 S.C.C. 582.
5
Kharak Singh v The State of U.P., 1964(1) S.C.R. 332 (India).
6
Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v The Union of India,1961 A.I.R. 532.
7
Khatri v State of Bihar, 1981 A.I.R. 1068.
8
The State Trading Corporation v The Commercial Tax Officer, 1963 A.I.R. 1811.
14
1.2. RESPONDENTS HAVE ACTED ARBITRARILY, VIOLATING THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
JUSTICE.
15. This Hon’ble Apex Court in DM Wayanad Institute of Medical v Union of India9,
settled the law, declaring that the Court under Article 32 will not interfere with an
administrative order unless and until it is challenged on the ground of contravention of
fundamental rights. In light of the above-mentioned principle, it is evident that this
Hon’ble Court has the power to decide upon the validity of the order passed vide
Notification dated 9/11/2017, by the Respondent No. 1. The said Notification violates the
Petitioner No. 1’s fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g), to carry on its
business while it violates the worker’s rights to livelihood guaranteed under Article 21.
16. Furthermore, it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that while exercising the
power of judicial review of administrative action, the Court is not the appellate authority
and the Constitution does not permit the Court to direct or advise the executive in matter
of policy or to sermonize any matter which under the Constitution lies within the sphere
of the Legislature or the executive, provided these authorities do not transgress their
constitutional limits or statutory power.10
17. However, the scope of judicial enquiry is confined to the question whether the decision
taken by the Government is against any statutory provisions or is violative of the
fundamental rights of the citizens or is opposed to the provisions of the Constitution.11
18. In the instant case, the breach of contract by Respondent No.2 is arbitrary and void of
any bona fide reasons. Furthermore, the stopping of all mining activity in and around
Pumpa Nagar, by the Respondent No. 1 is ultra vires the constitution as in grossly
infringes on the fundamental rights of the Petitioners. The violation of fundamental
rights by the Government brings the Notification under the scope of judicial enquiry.
19. Arbitrary action was recently defined by this Honb’le court as:
“In order to be described as arbitrary, it must be shown that it is not reasonable and
manifestly arbitrary. The expression “arbitrarily” means: in an unreasonable manner,
as fixed or done capriciously or at pleasure, without adequate determining principle, not
founded in the nature of things, non-rational, not done or acting according to reason or
judgment, depending on the will alone.”12
9
DM Wayanad Institute of Medical v Union of India, (2016) 2 S.C.C. 315.
10
Ashif Hamid v State of J. & K., A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1899
11
Ekta Shakti Foundation v Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2006) 10 S.C.C. 337.
12
M/S Sharma Transport v Government of A.P., A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 322.
15
20. An arbitrary action is ultra vires. It does not become bona fide and in good faith merely
because no personal gain or benefit to the person exercising discretion should be
established. An action is mala fide if it is contrary to the purpose for which it was
authorized to be exercised.13
14
21. A public body cannot act arbitrarily or at its own whims. The provision does not
embody an absolute or indefeasible right of renewal. Further it was held that while
deciding whether or not to renew the lease, its decisions must be guided by public
interest. Public interest postulates both protecting the interests of the authority and
ensuring fairness to the leaseholder who may have constructed on the land in pursuance
of the leasehold.
22. The Notification is an arbitrary act undertaken by the Respondent No.1, devoid of any
adequate considerations. It is an invalid act and must therefore be struck down.
1.3. ARGUENDO, EVEN IF ALTERNATIVE REMEDY EXISTS, REMEDY UNDER ART. 32 WILL
TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER IT.
23. It is humbly submitted, that the Petitioners have the fundamental right to approach this
Hon’ble Court to seek for remedial measures under Art. 32. This Hon’ble Court has held
that existence of an alternative relief is no bar to grant of remedy under Art. 3215.
24. In Bar Council of Delhi v Surjeet Singh16, the principle was laid down that if
the alternative remedy fully covers the challenge raised then that remedy and
that remedy alone must be resorted to. But if the nature and the ground of the challenge
is such that the alternative remedy is no remedy in the eye of law to cover the challenge
or, in any event, is not adequate and efficacious remedy then the remedy of writ petition
is still available.
25. In the present case, the contentions of the Petitioners are based on the breach of contract
by Respondent No. 2 and the loss arising due to the invalid Notification passed by
Respondent No. 1. But these are coupled with the gross violation of fundamental rights
of the Petitioners, making the Supreme Court the rightful forum to have come before.
26. In the instant case, any other alternate remedy would not be an adequate one to settle the
violation of fundamental rights. Furthermore, it being well settled that the existence of an
13
Mahesh Chandra v Regional Manager, U.P. Financial Corporation, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 935.
14
M/S. Ajar Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. v Satyanarayan Somani, 2017 S.C.C. OnLine S.C. 997 (India).
15
K.K. Kochunni v State of Madras, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 725.
16
Bar Council of Delhi v Surjeet Singh, 1980 A.I.R. 1612.
16
alternative remedy is not an absolute legal bar to the issuance of a writ 17, the writ
petitions filed by the Petitioners are maintainable in law and facts.
2. WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IS APPLICABLE?

27. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the contract in question is valid as it
has met all the requisites under Article 299 of the Constitution which is a formality to be
complied with in order to bind the government with contractual liability and can hence be
enforced like any other contract under the Contract Act, 1872.
28. Estoppel under the Evidence Act, can be defined under Section 115 as “when one person
has, by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person
to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative
shall be allowed, in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his
representative, to deny the truth of that thing.”18
29. In the instant case, there was a valid mining tender granted to Petitioner No.1 by
Respondent No.2. However, only 20 acres of land as per the contract was handed over to
the Petitioners. The Respondent No.2 did not hand over the remaining 30 acres of the
contracted land and has hence breached the contract, putting the mining project and the
livelihood of the workers in jeopardy.
30. In the case of, Motilal Padmat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v Union of India19 ,Bhagawati, J.,
defined the doctrine as follows:
“where on party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear an unequivocal
promise or assurance which was intended to create legal relations or to affect the legal
relationship between them and to be acted upon accordingly then, once the other party
has taken him at his word and acted upon it, the one who gave the promise or assurance
cannot afterwards be allowed to revert to their previous legal relations as if no such
promise or assurance had been made....”
31. The basic rule of estoppel is whereby a party is precluded from denying the existence of
some state of facts which he had previously asserted and on which the other party has
relied on or is entitled to rely on20. In the present case, the Petitioner No.1 had acted upon
the terms of the contract for a period of five years, before seeking the Court to direct the
Respondent No. 2 to hand over the remaining 30 acres of land.
17
Bhoop Singh v Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana, A.I.R. (1977) P.H. 40 (India).
18
Sec. 115 Evidence Act, 1872.
19
Motilal Padmat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v Union of India A.I.R. (1979) S.C. 621.
20
Central Airmen Selection Board v Surinder Kumar, (2003) 1 S.C.C. 152.
17
32. Public bodies are as much bound as private individuals to carry out representations of
facts and promises made by them, relying on which other person have altered their
positions to their prejudice. The obligation arising against an individual of his
representation amounting to a promise may be enforced ex-contractu by a person who
acts upon the promise21.
33. Once an agreement is validly executed by the government, it should honor its legal
obligation arising out of the contract and not drive the citizen concerned to file a suit for
recovery of the amount. In a democratic society governed by rule of law, it is the duty of
the State to do what is fair and just to the citizen and should not seek to defeat legitimate
claim of the citizen.22 In the present case, the government is estopped from denying their
inadequacy to honor its legal obligations arising out of the contract which is to hand over
the remaining 30 acres of the mining land to the Petitioners.
34. It is further submitted that a mere claim of change of public policy would not be
sufficient to exonerate the government from its liability23. Where the government granted
license to petitioner to establish a saw mill, the petitioner acting on license invested huge
amounts for establishing the mill. The government subsequently took a decision to stop
issuing of license to more mills and cancelled the license of the petitioner. The court held
enforcement of promise made by government will not produce any inequitable results; the
Government was bound to re-grant the license.24
35. In the instant case, declaration of the Eco-Sensitive Zone by the Ministry of
Environment, Forest and Climate Change, in a part of the region where mining project
was carried on does not absolve the Respondent No. 2 of its obligation to abide by the
terms of the contract. Further, failure to abide by the terms of the contract would be
inequitable and prejudicial to the interests of the Petitioners.
2.1. CIRCUMSTANCES OF APPLICABILITY OF DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL.
36. In the case of, Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd v Union of India25 there were certain
principles laid down by this Hon’ble Court in addition to those laid down in the case of
MP Sugar Mills v Union of India26, the principles are as follows:
“(i) The doctrine of promissory estoppel may be applied against the Government where
the interest of justice, morality and common fairness dictate such a course.
21
Century Spinning & Mfg. Co. Ltd v Ulhasnagar Municipal Council, A.I.R. (1971) S.C. 1021.
22
Hindustan Sugar Mills v State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. (1981) S.C. 1681.
23
8 DD BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, (8th ed. 2016).
24
Joygit Das v State of Assam, A.I.R. (1990) Gau. 24.
25
Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd v Union of India, (2012) 11 S.C.C. 146.
26
Motilal Padmat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v Union of India, A.I.R. (1979) S.C. 621.
18
(ii) The doctrine of promissory estoppel can by itself be the basis of action.
(iii) For invocation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, it is necessary for the
promisee to show that by acting on promise made by the other party, he altered his
position. However, it is not necessary for him to prove any damage, detriment or
prejudice because of alteration of such promise.”
37. Applying the principles laid down in the instant case, it is evident that when the
Petitioners began carrying out their mining operation, they were doing so in furtherance
of the unambiguous contract with Respondent No. 2. Therefore, it is undoubtedly clear
that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable in the present scenario.
3. THE ORDER PASSED VIDE NOTIFICATION DATED 09/11/2017 IS NOT VALID.

38. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the order passed vide the
Notification dated 9/11/2017 is not valid. Firstly, Respondent No.1 is not empowered to
make rules upon matters related to minor minerals according to The Mines and Minerals
(Development and Regulation) Act of 1957 (hereinafter referred to as MMDR Act) (3.1).
Secondly, the Respondent No.1 had failed to abide by the principles of natural justice
while passing the impugned order (3.2).
3.1. RESPONDENT NO. 1 IS NOT EMPOWERED TO LEGISLATE UPON MATTERS RELATED TO
MINOR MINERALS UNDER THE MINES AND MINERALS (DEVELOPMENT AND
REGULATION) ACT, 1957:

3.1.1. DEMARCATION OF POWERS BETWEEN UNION AND THE STATES UNDER SCHEDULE VII
OF THE CONSTITUTION.
39. The Constitution of Aryavarta in Part XI lays down the relation between the Union and
the States. Art. 246 demarcates the legislative fields with precision and emphasizes the
exclusive power of the Union and the States to make laws in respect of the matters
enumerated in the lists in the Seventh Schedule and allotted to the Union or the States,
respectively.27 Article 246 (3) confers an exclusive power on the States to make laws with
respect to the matter enumerated in the State List. In the instant case, it was Respondent
No.2 and not Respondent No.1 which has the power to make rules in respect of minor
minerals under The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957.
40. Section 3(e) defines “minor minerals” as:
27
State of West Bengal v Union of India, (1964) 1 S.C.R. 371.
19
“(e) "minor minerals" means building stones, gravel, ordinary clay, ordinary sand other
than sand used for prescribed purposes, and any other mineral which the Central
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a minor mineral;”
41. The Petitioners in the instant case was carrying on the mining of a rare granite called
Magma Black and it has been held in Secretary, Kerala Granites and Stone Association
v State of Kerala28 that granite is a minor mineral. Also, apart from defining “granite”
under Section 3(h) of the Rules, rule 52 of the Granite Conservation and Development
Rules, 1999, framed by the Central Government, provides as follows:
"52. Applicability of the provisions of Minor Mineral Concession Rules framed by the
State Government. - The provisions of the Minor Mineral Concession Rules or any other
rules framed by the State Government under Section 15 of the Act shall be applicable to
granite quarry leases to the extent they are not repugnant to or inconsistent with these
rules."
42. Section 15 of the Act states that:
“15. (1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules
for regulating the grant of quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions in
respect of minor minerals and for purposes connected therewith.”
43. It is in accordance with the powers conferred by Section 15 of the Act that the Hodu
Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1994 was passed. These rules govern the matters
relating to minor minerals of the State of Hodu. Therefore, the order passed vide the
Notification by the Respondent No.1 is not in accordance with the rules. Additionally,
Section 70 of the Hodu Land Revenue Act of 1964 provides that:
“70. Right to mines and mineral products to vest in Government.— 1 [Notwithstanding
anything contained in] any law in force before the commencement of this Act or under
the terms of any grant made or of any other instrument of transfer executed, by or on
behalf of the Government for the time being, the right to mines, minerals and mineral
products, shall vest absolutely in the State Government and the State Government shall,
subject to the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act,
have all the powers necessary for the proper enjoyment or disposal of such rights.”
44. Also, Section 4A of the MMRD Act, 1957 deals with termination of mining leases and
sub-section 2 of the same states that:
28
Secretary, Kerala Granites and Stone Association v State of Kerala, (2004) 2 K.L.T. 227.
20
“(2) Where the State Government is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of
regulation of mines and minerals development, preservation of natural environment,
control of floods, prevention of pollution, or to avoid danger to public health or
communications or to ensure safety of buildings, monuments or other structures or for
such other purposes, as the State Government may deem fit, it may, by an order, in
respect of any minor mineral, make premature termination of prospecting licence or
mining lease with respect to the area or any part thereof covered by such licence or
lease.”
45. In the instant case, an immediate ban on the mining activities in and around Pumpa Nagar
resulted in the termination of the lease granted to the Petitioner No.1 and this right is not
vested in Respondent No.1 but Respondent No.2 according to Section 4A of the Act.
Even under Section 30 of the Act which deals with the powers of revision by Central
Government, it is only allowed to revise any order made by a State Government or
authority with respect to minerals other than a minor mineral.
46. Furthermore Section 14 of the MMRD Act, 1957 states that:
“14. The provisions of sections 5 to 13 (inclusive) shall not apply to quarry leases,
mining leases or other mineral concessions in respect of minor minerals.”
47. Sections 5-13 deals with matters regarding termination and restriction of mining leases,
the area and periods for mining leases may be granted or renewed, payments, application
and powers of Central Government to make various rules are said to not apply to minor
minerals. What is intended by such a provision is that, in matters contained in these
sections, so far as they concern minor minerals, it will not be controlled by the Central
Government but by the concerned State Government by exercising its powers under
Section 15. The distinction of minor minerals from major minerals is because minor
minerals are used in the local areas for local purposes while major minerals are used for
the industrial development for the National purpose which is why matters relating to
minor minerals have been left by Parliament to the State Government while reserving
matters relating to minerals other than minor minerals to the Central Government.29
48. It is pertinent to note that it is settled legal proposition that executive instructions cannot
override the statutory provisions.30 Executive instructions cannot amend or supersede the
statutory rules or add something therein, nor the orders be issued in contravention of the
statutory rules for the reason that an administrative instruction is not a statutory Rule nor
29
D.K.Trivedi & Sons v State of Gujarat, (1986) 1 S.C.R. 479.
30
B.N. Nagarajan v State of Mysore, A.I.R. (1966) S.C. 1942.
21
does it have any force of law.31 Therefore, the order passed by Respondent No.1 is not
valid.
3.1.2. RESPONDENT NO.1 CANNOT LEGISLATE IN THE STATE FIELD AS NO SPECIAL
CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST.
49. Aryavarta being a federal state has its legislative and executive authority partitioned
between the Centre and the State. They are autonomous in their own sphere allotted by
the Constitution of Aryavarta. According to Article 246 and under Schedule 7 of the
Constitution, the Union and the States are vested with separate powers upon which they
have exclusive powers of legislation.
50. Entry 54 of Union List and Entry 23 of State List prescribes their respective powers with
regards to regulation of mines and minerals. The Union, is empowered to legislate with
respect to a matter in the State List in certain special circumstances which are specified in
the Constitution in Art. 249, 250, 252 and 253. In these cases, the Parliament is
empowered to legislate on a State subject in the following situations:
(a) in national interest by obtaining a resolution from the Council of States to that effect,
or
(b) during a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, or
(c) when two or more states consent, or
(d) to enact such Legislation for the implementation of treaties or international
agreements respectively.
51. It is relevant to note that none of these special circumstances are present in the instant
case and hence Respondent No.1 is not justified in passing an order upon a subject which
is within the exclusive domain of a State.
52. Arguendo, Respondent No.1 took control in public interest but it was held in K.C.
Gajapati Narayan Deo v The State of Orissa32, that the word ‘regulation’ in Entry 54
would not include ‘prohibition’ and should not be confused with ‘restrictions’, occurring
under Article 19(2) to (6) of the Constitution of Aryavarta. Apart from that, Entry 54
specifies that the powers are vested in Union only to the extent to which such regulation
and development under the control of the Union is declared by the Parliament by law. In
the instant case, the MMRD Act, 1957 is the law passed by the Parliament conferring
powers on the Union also specifically states that the State Government is vested with the
powers to deal with Minor Minerals.
31
Vijay Singh v State f Uttar Pradesh, (2005) 2 A.W.C. 1191.
32
Himmat Singh Shekhawat v State of Rajasthan, Principal Bench, N.G.T. New Delhi, 123 OF 2014.
22
53. In Baijnath Kadio v State of Bihar33, the Constitution bench of this Hon’ble Court
referred to two earlier decisions of this Hon’ble Court in Hingir Rampur Coal Co. Ltd v
State of Orissa34 and State of Orissa v M.A. Tulloch and Co.35 while dealing with
Section 2 of the MMDR Act stated that:
“14. The declaration is contained in Section 2 of Act 67 of 1957 and speaks of the taking
under the control of the Central Government the regulation of mines and development of
minerals to the extent provided in the Act itself. We have thus not to look outside Act 67
of 1957 to determine what is left within the competence of the State Legislature but have
to work it out from the terms of that Act.”
54. It is pertinent to note that Section 2 states that the control of Union is only to the extent
provided in the Act itself and it is the very same Act which vests the State Government
with power to regulate upon minor minerals. Therefore, Section 2 must be construed or
interpreted in such a manner as to preclude interference by the Union Government with
the operations of the State Government with relation to minor minerals. In the instant case
the order of Union of Aryavarta is invalid as the power is vested in Government of Hodu
under MMDR Act, 1957.
55. In the federal structure, State Governments are the owners of the mines and minerals
located within the territory of the State concerned.36 In Amritlal Nathubhai Shah v
Union Government of India,37 held that while dealing with the scope of the MMDR
Act 1957, the State Government is the owner of minerals within its territory and minerals
vest in it and there is nothing in the MMDR Act or the MC Rules to detract from this
basic fact.
56. Therefore, Respondent No.1 by passing the impugned order has traversed the
Constitutional Limitations as the impugned order does not fall under Entry 54 of Union
List (i) nor can the Union resort to the residuary power. Furthermore, there are no special
circumstances evident from the fact sheet which empower the Union to legislate in State
field and as such Respondent No.1 lacked the competence to pass the impugned order.
3.2. RESPONDENT NO.1 FAILED TO OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE.
57. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Tribunal that Respondent No.1 has failed
to obey the Principles of Natural Justice while passing the order vide Notification dated
33
Baijnath Kadio v State of Bihar, (1969) 3 S.C.C. 838.
34
Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v State of Orissa, (1961) 2 S.C.R. 537.
35
State of Orissa v M.A. Tulloch and Co., (1964) 4 S.C.R. 461.
36
State of Kerala v M/S Kerala Rare Earth & Minerals, (2016) 6 S.C.C. 323.
37
Amritlal Nathubhai Shah v Union Government of India, (1976) 4 S.C.C. 108.
23
09/11/2017 and the ban on mining operations in Pumpa Nagar should be set aside.
Respondent No.1 while passing the order failed to observe the most important principle
of natural justice, ‘Audi Alteram Partem’, which means the rule of fair hearing. The
Petitioners were not given an opportunity to present their side with regards to the mining
activities being conducted in Pumpa Nagar.
58. The principles of natural justice have now assumed the importance of being “an essential
inbuilt component” of the mechanism through which decision making process passes, in
matters touching the rights and liberty of the people. It ensures a strong safeguard against
any judicial or administrative order or action, adversely affecting the substantive rights of
38
the individuals. In the instant case, the immediate ban on mining activities affects the
Fundamental Rights of the Petitioners guaranteed by the Constitution of Aryavarta.
59. In para 43 of the judgment of this Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh
Gill v Chief Election Commissioner39, may be usefully quoted:
“Indeed, natural justice is a pervasive facet of secular law where a spiritual touch
enlivens legislation, administration and adjudication, to make fairness a creed of life. It
has many colours and shades, many forms and shapes and, save where valid law
excludes, it applies when people are affected by acts of authority.”
60. Further, in Lapointe v L'Association40, it has been observed:
“The rule (Audi alteram partem) is not confined to the conduct of strictly legal tribunals,
but is applicable to every tribunal or body of persons invested with authority to
adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences to individuals." Therefore, it is
clear that the Principles of Natural Justice are very flexible and the apart from the
judicial and quasi-judicial actions, the administrative actions also come within its ambit.
61. In the instant case, even if it is assumed that Respondent No.1 has the power to pass such
an order in public interest, it has failed to give the Petitioner a fair chance to present them
as they passed the order immediately after receiving the National NGO’s report.
Therefore, there is a clear violation of the Principles of Natural Justice which requires that
a fair hearing be given to the party whose rights are bound to be affected by such an
action.
62. Further, Section 4A of the MMRD Act, 1957 deals with premature termination of mining
licences if it is considered by the State Government to be expedient in the interest of
38
Justice Brijesh Kumar, Principles of Natural Justice, Judge, JUDICIAL TRAINING AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE
(Jul. – Sept. , 1995), http://ijtr.nic.in/articles/art36.pdf .
39
Mohinder Singh Gill v Chief Election Commissioner, A.I.R. (1978) S.C. 851.
40
Lapointe v L'Association, (1906) A.C. 535(539).
24
protection of environment and the development and regulation of mines and minerals.
Even though it gives the power of termination to the State Government with regards to
Minor Minerals, the Central government while exercising powers which were not vested
in it failed to follow the rule specified under sub-section 3 of Section 4A of the Act which
states that:
“(3) No order making a premature termination of a prospecting licence or mining lease
shall be made except after giving the holder of the licence or lease a reasonable
opportunity of being heard.”
63. Also, Rule 5 of the Environment Protection Rule deals with the power of the Central
Government to prohibit or restrict industries and processes or operations taking into
consideration certain conditions specified under sub-rule (1). While doing so, the Central
Government is required to follow the procedure laid down under sub-rule (3) of Rule 5.
The sub-rule includes giving notice of the intention of the Central Government to prohibit
such operations and also provides for an opportunity to be given persons interested to file
objections against the imposition of such prohibition or restriction. These procedural
checks were included because such an action of the Central Government is bound to have
serious consequences on the rights of different parties. In the instant case, it is will be the
Petitioner carrying on the mining activity and an approximate of 200 workers employed
in the carrying on of mining activity in the area who will be affected.
64. It was held in Goa Foundation v Union of India41 that unless the Central Government
follows the procedure laid down in sub-rule 3 while issuing a notification to prohibit
mining operation in a certain area, there can be no prohibition under law to carry on
mining activity beyond 1 km. of the boundaries of National Parks or Wildlife Sanctuaries.
The same is applicable to Eco-Sensitive Zones as well. In the instant case, the impugned
order was passed vide notification stating an immediate ban on the operations and no
opportunity was given to the Petitioner to file an objection against the prohibition and
therefore the order must be declared invalid.
65. Therefore, it is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court that the
Notification is invalid and should be set aside as Respondent No.1 neither has the power
to deal with matters relating to minor minerals nor have they adhered to the Principles of
Natural Justice while passing the impugned order.
3.3. REPORT SUBMITTED BY INTERNATIONAL NGO, IS NOT VALID.
41
Goa Foundation v Union of India, (2004) 6 S.C.C. 590.
25
66. Report submitted by the International NGO, International Environmental and Ancient
Monument Preservation Organization is not valid. In scientific matters of complex nature
such as the impact of mining activities being conducted at a reasonably far site from the
Monument and other related Environmental issues, reference has to be made to a
specialized expert body or committee42 to examine the matter if all relevant
considerations have been taken note of.
67. The entire claim of the mining activity carried out by the Petitioner being a major
contributor towards the deterioration of the Monument is based on the report released by
an NGO, not supported by any substantial or significant scientific data other than a mere
confirmation of the report by a geologist Mr. X, to impute its validity. Therefore, without
any substantial evidence, the Petitioner cannot be held liable for causing deterioration of
the Monument or the other related environmental impact.
68. Arguendo, if it needs to be established that the Petitioner is a major pollutant in and
around Pumpa Nagar, then the Court may appoint an expert committee, for gathering
facts and data in regard to the complaint of breach of fundamental right and the
deterioration of the Monument and also to look into the legitimacy of the report released
by the NGO.
69. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Respondent No. 1 were
erroneous in acting upon the invalid report of the International NGO and were also
outside their jurisdiction in passing the order vide Notification dating 9/11/2017.
4. WHETHER THE MINING PROJECT IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21 OF THE
CONSTITUTION?
70. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that, firstly, the mining project is
not violative of Article 2. Secondly, the breach of contract and the impugned order passed
vide the Notification is violative of Article 21 (4.2) and thirdly, the impugned order by
Respondent No. 1 also violates Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution (4.3),
71. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that in M.C. Mehta v Union of India43,
this Hon’ble Court expressed the view that, a delicate balance between industrialization
and ecology has to be maintained and while development of industry is essential for the
growth of the economy, at the same time the environment as well as ecosystems is
42
The State of Karnataka v Shri Ranganatha Reddy, A.I.R. (1978) S.C. 215.
43
M.C. Mehta v Union of India, (1997) 1 S.C.C. 388.
26
required to be protected. This is known as sustainable development and this is being
complied with in the instant case.
72. In the words of Paton44, “We cannot have an absolute right to an unspoiled environment,
for modern industry must at least in some areas destroy rural beauty. The best that the
law can do is to curb the worst excesses of industrialization by town planning. Noise and
pollution are two of the greatest offenders- the latter affects air, water, natural growth
and health of humanity.”
73. Setting up of an industrial unit is a must for the development of a State45.It is true that
every industrial activity causes some kind of deterioration in environmental quality and
we cannot claim so much purity of environment as can be expected in a pre-industrial
society. As development is essential to fulfil increasing human needs, a change in
lifestyle that entails going back to the age of pre-industrial revolution, is inconceivable.46
74. In N.D Jayal v Union of India47, this Hon’ble Court held sustainable development to be a
fundamental right in order to justify constructions of a dam as a symbol of wholesome
development. Equitable access to basic resources48 is an ingredient of the right to
development. Development does not mean development of the elite and urban rich alone
but also the masses, people living in the villages, mountains, hills, forests, slums and so
on.
75. In the instant case, if the mining project is not allowed to be carried out in the state of
Huda, considering that Aryavarta is a developing country with rich natural resources, it
will be a hurdle to industrial growth in turn taking a toll on the economy of Aryavarta,
also infringing this right to development and equitable access to basic resources.
4.1. CRUX OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT.
76. Sustainable development is most commonly defined as “development that meets the needs
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs.”49 In short, it means ‘development that is sustainable.” Development can be
defined as a collective process of change toward improvements in quality of life for
human beings and their communities, and sustainability can be seen to refer to the need
44
G. W PATON, A TEXT BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE, (Oxford, 4th ed., 1972).
45
INDIA CONST. art. 51A, cl. g..
46
5 DHARMENDRA S SENGAR, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2009, Delhi).
47
N.D Jayal v Union of India, A.I.R. (2004) S.C. 867 (Supp).
48
The United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development 1986, Art 8 (1) imposes on the member states
an obligation to undertake all necessary measures for the realisation of the right to development, and to ensure
that there’s equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic resources.
49
WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE (Oxford. Oxford
University Press, 1987).
27
for development to be integrated, socially, economically and environmentally sound,
oriented to the long-term, and hence, able to last.
77. Right to development is crystallized as a rule of international law because General
Assembly has adopted ‘Declaration on the Right to Development’ 50. Article 8(1) of the
Declaration provides that the right to development is inalienable human rights by virtue
of which every human being and all people are participate in, contribute to and enjoy
economic, social cultural and political development, in which all fundamental freedoms
can be fully realized. And it is the duty of the States, at the national level to take effective
measure to realize the right to development.51
78. In the present case, the mining project balanced out the right to development in order to
contribute to the economic growth of the country. The right to development is also a right
that is recognised by the General Assembly and cannot be termed as a violation of
fundamental rights under Article 21.
79. Moreover, in any discussion on right to development, it is important to locate the current
debates on ‘economic growth’ and ‘sustainable development’. According to Peet (2005)
development differs from economic growth in that it pays attention to the conditions of
production, for example, the environments affected by economic activity, and to the
social consequences, for example, income distribution and human welfare. He goes on to
expand that development entails human emancipation, one by use of science and
technology to liberate from vicissitudes of nature and two self-emancipation through
control over social relations. In both senses development entails economic, social and
cultural progress, finer ethical ideals and higher moral values.52
4.2. BREACH OF CONTRACT AND NOTIFICATION ARE VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21 OF THE
CONSTITUTION
80. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that, the actions of the Respondents are
violative of the right to livelihood guaranteed under Art. 21 of the Constitution of
Aryavarta.
81. This Hon’ble Court in Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation53, implied that the
expression ‘right to livelihood’ is born out of ‘right to life’ and that no person can live
without the means of living. Further, this Hon’ble Court has also held that if the right to
livelihood is not treated as a part and parcel of the constitutional right to life, the easiest
50
Resolution 41/128 dates 4th December 1986 of General Assembly.
51
Declaration on the Right to Development art. 1.
52
PEET, R. THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT. RAWAT PUBLICATIONS (2005).
53
Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation, A.I.R. (1986) 180.
28
way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of
livelihood to the point of abrogation. The Court also held that:
“No person can live without the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not
treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest ways of depriving a person
of his right to life would be to deprive him of his right to livelihood.”
82. Referring to the Directive Principles of State policy, this Hon’ble Court has taken
recourse to Art.39 (a) to interpret Art.21 and to include therein the right to livelihood and
has stated that if these Directive Principles obligate the State to secure to the citizen an
adequate means of livelihood and the right to work it would be sheer pedantry to exclude
the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life.
83. The Notification which arbitrarily bans the process of mining not only affects the
livelihood of the 200 employees deriving their income from the mining project but also
the investors of the said company as well as the company itself.
4.3. THE NOTIFICATION IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 19(1)(G) OF THE CONSTITUTION.
84. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that, Art 19(1)(g) guarantees to all
citizens the right to practice any profession or carry on any occupation, trade or
business.54 The guarantee of Art.19(1)(g) extends to practice any profession or to carry
on any occupation, trade or business. In the instant case, it is the fundamental right of the
Petitioners herein to carry out their business which is the mining operation and to earn
their livelihood.
85. The provision is however subject to certain restrictive conditions. These conditions are
called as reasonable restrictions and are embodied under Art. 19(6) of the Constitution.
The reasonable of restriction is to be determined in on objective manner. In determining
whether there is any fairness involved, the nature of the right alleged to have been
infringed, the underlying purpose of the restriction involved, the extent and urgency of
the grievance sought to be remedied and the disproportion of the imposition must all be
taken into account.55
86. Further reasonableness of a restriction has to be tested from both procedural as well as
substantive aspects of the law. In the case of Chintaman Rao v State of Madhya
Pradesh56, this Hon’ble Court laid down that a limitation of a right imposed on a person
in enjoyment of a right should not be arbitrary or excessive in nature.
54
INDIA CONST. art. 19, cl. 1. sub. cl. g.
55
MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7th ed., 2014).
56
Chintaman Rao v State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. (1951) S.C. 118.
29
87. In the instant case, the order passed vide Notification was arbitrary, excessive in nature
and unreasonable on the part of the Government. The reasons that were put forth by
Respondent No. 1 were ones that should have been reasonably foreseen during the
Environmental Impact Assessment which was assumed to have been duly conducted by
Respondent No. 2 before grant of the mining tender.
88. In a few instances, it has been construed that restriction may even amount to prohibition;
however a total prohibition on a person from carrying on his profession by the
Government would not be a reasonable restriction unless special reasons are shown to
exist. The Court also expressed the view that the freedom of on a profession should be
enjoyed by the citizen to its fullest extent without putting ‘shackles ‘of avoidable
cobwebs of rules and regulations putting restrictions in the enjoyment of such freedoms.57
89. Applying the principle above, to the instant case, the restriction or rather the prohibition
that was imposed on the Petitioners via the Notification was unreasonable as there was no
exceptional cause for stopping the mining activity. The reasons that were put forth by the
Respondent were ones that should have been reasonably foreseen during the
Environmental Impact Assessment which was assumed to have been duly conducted by
the Government before grant of the mining tender. The same reason cannot therefore be
considered valid for the Notification to stop all the mining activity
90. Further in the case of Liberty Oil Mills v Union of India58, this Hon’ble Court has laid
down that such an order cannot be made without due investigation and without giving a
reasonable opportunity to the affected party. Procedural fairness embodying natural
justice is to be implied whenever an action is taken affecting the rights of the parties.
91. In the instant case, the order made without giving a reasonable opportunity to the affected
party who are the Petitioners herein, is not only violative of the principles of natural
justice but also their Fundamental Right to carry on trade and occupation.
5. WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS ARE LIABLE TO PAY COMPENSATION TO THE
PETITIONERS?
The Petitioners are entitled to be compensated for the damages and injuries undergone
by them owing to their high investment, suffered due to the notification, ordering the
stoppage all mining activities in and around Pumpa Nagar on account of the unlawful
acts of the Respondents. Firstly, Respondent No. 1 is liable to pay compensation to the
57
B.P Sharma v Union of India, (2003) 7 S.C.C. 309.
58
Liberty Oil Mills v Union of India A.I.R. (1984) S.C. 1271.
30
Petitioners on account of loss of profits due (1.1). Secondly, it is the humble submission
of the Petitioner No.2. that the Respondent No.2. ensures that they are compensated
(1.2).
5.1. PETITIONER NO.1 MUST BE COMPENSATED FOR THE LOSS OF PROFITS.
92. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the order passed vide Notification
dated 09/11/2017 was passed without any jurisdiction. Respondent No. 1 was not
competent to pass an order stopping the process of mining of Minor Minerals. Therefore,
the order is invalid and they must compensate Petitioners No.1 for all the losses of profit
and damages suffered by them due to the stoppage in mining activities.
93. “Loss” in the normal sense involves a material loss. “Damage” means injury or any loss;
injury not per se, but with some material consequence. While “compensation” is
something that constitutes an equivalent or recompense; making things equivalent;
satisfying or making amends.59
94. In the instant case the stopping of mining activities directly and severely affects the
business of the Petitioner No.1. The mining activity was highly complicated and required
advanced techniques of extraction and procuring, for the purpose of which the Petitioner
No.1 entered into a joint venture with an MNC that promised to contribute 51% of
investment.60 The said mining project was undertaken for profit motives.61 Putting an end
to the project instantly makes it impossible for them to recover the amount of investment
made by them. Further it impairs any profit that the business could have earned.
95. Under Section 56 of the Contract Act, 1872, compensation to a promisee must be granted
for any loss sustained by him through the non-performance of the promise, if the
promisor had knowledge or with reasonable diligence might have known, to be
impossible to perform. In the instant case, Respondent No.2 awarded the tender for
mining activities in the region of Pumpa Nagar, only after conducting sufficient enquiries
regarding the region. It cannot be said that Respondent No.2 had no knowledge of the
presence of the endangered species of birds and animals.
96. The declaration of the eco-sensitive zone that led to the breach of contract by Respondent
No. 2 and the subsequent notification passed by Respondent No.1 are acts void of any
bona fides and the loss caused to the Petitioners must be compensated for by way of
special damages.
59
State of Kerala v United Shippers and Dredgers Ltd., A.I.R. 1982 Ker. 281 (India).
60
Fact dossier, para 4.
61
Fact dossier, para 3.
31
5.2. PETITIONER NO. 2 MUST BE COMPENSATED FOR THEIR LOSS OF EMPLOYMENT.
97. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Petitioner No 2. pray for
Respondent No. 2 to grant the remaining 30 acres of land as per the contract between
them and the Petitioner No. 1. Without the grant of such land, the MNC which has made
51% investment into the project threatened to withdraw from the same that puts the
livelihood of 200 workers at stake. Therefore, it is prayed that the land be handed over to
them.
98. It is further submitted that the order passed by Respondent No. 1 vide Notification dated
9/11/2017, caused the entire mining project to cease instantaneously, leaving the workers
to be thrown onto the streets, jobless. In order to protect the right to livelihood of the
workmen and in balancing out the industrial development and environment protection, it
is essential that due attention must be paid, to their continuity of service and payment
with full wages upon such closure of mining project as effected by the Notification.
99. This Hon’ble Court in Buffalo Traders Welfare Assn. v Maneka Gandhi,62 to mitigate
the hardship to the employees of industries due to their closure/shifting/ relocation
specified the rights and benefits to which workmen employed in these industries must be
entitled to. Subsequently, they also also issued the package of compensation for workmen
employed in industries which are not relocating/ shifting or are closing down as per
directions of the Supreme Court.
100. In the above-mentioned case, the Court made provisions for the continuity of
employment of workers at the new town and place where the industry is shifted without
any alteration to their employment. Further the period between the closure of the industry
and its restart at the place of re-location was to be treated as active employment and the
workmen were to be paid their full wages with continuity of service.
101. Further in M.C. Mehta v Union f India,63 it was held that:
“(d) The workmen employed in the industry which fail to relocate and the workmen who
are not willing to shift along with the relocated industries, shall be deemed to have been
retrenched. They shall be paid compensation in terms of Section 25-F(b) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. These workmen shall also be paid, in addition, one year's wages as
additional compensation.
(f) The gratuity amount payable to any workmen shall be paid in addition."
62
Buffalo Traders Welfare Assn. v Maneka Gandhi, (1996) 11 S.C.C. 35.
63
MC Mehta v Union of India, (1996) 4 S.C.C. 750.
32
102. This Court modified the direction under (d) relating to payment of back wages as "six
years' wages" instead of one year's wages in case the industry decided to close down.
That would mean that in the event of non-relocation, the workmen would have to be paid
6 years' wages and not merely 1 year's wages.64
103. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that in case of closure of
industry, the workers be paid adequate retrenchment compensation.
64
MC Mehta v Union of India, (1999) I.L.L.J. 612 S.C. (India).
33
PRAYER
In the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced, and authorities cited it is most humbly
prayed before this Hon’ble Court to hold, adjudge and declare that:
Or Pass any other order that this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the interest of Justice and
Good Conscience.
For this act of kindness, the Counsel for the Petitioner shall duty bound forever pray.
All of which is most humbly submitted.
Counsel for Petitioner Sd/-
34

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ULC-1

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF ARYAVARTA

XXII ALL INDIA

CASE CONCERNING THE MAINTAINABILITY OF THE PETITIONS FILED, THE

AND THE LOSS OF PROFITS SUFFERED.

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

2. TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS 3-4

3. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 5-6

5. STATEMENT OF FACTS 8-9

7. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS 11-12

A.I.R. All India Reporter

A.P Andhra Pradesh

I.L.L.J Indian Labour Law Journal

K.L.T Kerala Law Times

E.P.A Environment Protection Act

N.G.T National Green Tribunal

S.C. Supreme Court

S.C.C. Supreme Court Cases

S.C.R. Supreme Court Reporter

U.P. Uttar Pradesh

1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITIONS FILED BY THE PETITIONERS ARE

2. WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IS APPLICABLE?

3. WHETHER THE ORDER PASSED VIDE NOTIFICATION DATED 09/11/2017 IS

4. WHETHER THE MINING PROJECT IS IN VIOLATION OF ART. 21 OF THE

5. WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS ARE LIABLE TO PAY COMPENSATION TO THE

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER PART III OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ARYAVARTA.

TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER IT.

2. WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IS APPLICABLE?

3. THE ORDER PASSED VIDE NOTIFICATION DATED 09/11/2017 IS NOT VALID.

REGULATION) ACT, 1957:

4. WHETHER THE MINING PROJECT IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21 OF THE

5. WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS ARE LIABLE TO PAY COMPENSATION TO THE

All of which is most humbly submitted.

Counsel for Petitioner Sd/-

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