c
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b.1 Executive Immunity
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 82585. November 14, 1988.]
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN vs. THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR
Facts:
Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel
Petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit".
if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing
affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the
bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues
an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as
the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible
or perjury.
Issues:
1.Ê Îhether or not the President of the Philippines, under
may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners
complaint-affidavit. If she may initiate, what are the
initiation
2.Ê CantoBeltran
her executive immunity?
invoke the executive immunity of the
defense?
Held:
First Issue:
Yes. The rationale for the grant to the President of the
immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential
free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being
Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring
Second
holder'sIssue:
time, also demands undivided attention.
No. But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the
of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the
other person in the President's behalf Thus, an accused in a
which the President is complainant cannot raise the
Moreover,
defense to there
preventis nothing
the caseinfrom
our laws that would
proceeding prevent
against such the
waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may
afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction.
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
person.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001.]
†  





  

Facts:
Estrada argued that he cannot be criminally prosecuted
covered by the executive immunity during the entire period of
he should be removed through impeachment first before he
Issues:
Îhether the president is immune from suit during his
president.
Îhether impeachment is a conditio sine qua non to his
Held:
First Issue:
No. This is in accord with our ruling in In re: Saturnino
"incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being
during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not
the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process
has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency,
cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal
Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term
the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment
term means the time during which the officer may claim to
right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents
one another. The tenure represents the term during which the
actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term
within or beyond the power of the incumbent. 50 From the
intent
Indeed,ofpetitioner's
the framersstubborn
is clear that thecannot
stance immunitybutof the the
bolster
concurrent
at bar wereonly
filedwith his tenure
not really and not his
for petitioner to term.
reclaim the
take advantage of the immunity attached to the presidency
investigation of the criminal cases pending against him in the
The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in
Ombudsman.
involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no
imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries
penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a
president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court
President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-
from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an
liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that
officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts
Second
such butIssue:
stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.
No. Îe reject his argument that he cannot be
that he must first be convicted in the impeachment
impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the
prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the
February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83
the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio." Since the
functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he
impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted.
granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution.
has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better
non-sitting President who has not been subjected to
and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure,
the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 152259. July 29, 2004.]

 
 

 ! "#$
 
%



"
 Petitioner was charged in an Information for violation of
the Anti-Graft Law for intervening in a sale between the
Steel Corporation, a government-owned and controlled
Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company, a private
stocks of which were allegedly owned by his brother-in-law,
Marcos. In this petition, petitioner alleged that the
dismissing the criminal case on the ground that, among others,
derivative immunity, because he allegedly served as a high-
Issue:
Ͷ specifically, as naval aide-de-camp Ͷ of former President
Îhether the petitioner is immune from criminal
Held:
No. In Estrada v. Desierto, this Court exhaustively traced
executive immunity in order to determine the extent of its
explained therein that executive immunity applied only during
of a President. It could not be used to shield a non-sitting
prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in
of petitioner must therefore fail, since he derives his immunity
no longer sitting as President. Verily, the felonious acts of
their close relatives "are not acts of the State, and the officer
is not acting as such but stands on the same footing as any
 #
&
'() ))$*

[G.R. No. 95367. May 23, 1995.]    † 


 
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c
+"!,     

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
subpoena duces tecum and orders issued by respondent
petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant
custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and
(EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services
1988 and all evidence such as vouchers (salary) for the whole
Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the
1988" and to enjoin him from enforcing his orders.
Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal
The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in
his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds
from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed.
purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB
citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies
government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman.
questioned the issuance of the said subpoena on the ground
documents asked for are classified. They argued that
documents relative to its Personal Services Funds and its
necessarily [lead to] knowledge of its operations, movements,
strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being" and this
EIIB."
Issue:
Îhether petitioners can be ordered to produce
personal services and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the
documents are classified.
Held:
Yes. At common law a governmental privilege against
recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on military,
similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of
importance as in and of itself transcending the individual
citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff
The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of
legal rights.
conversations and correspondence, like the claim of
deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we
the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the
protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even
opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and
must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping
making decisions and to do so in a way many would be
except privately. These are the considerations justifying a
for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental
On the other hand, where the claim of confidentiality
of the government and inextricably rooted in the separation of
the need to protect military, diplomatic or other national
the Constitution .
a general public interest in the confidentiality of his
declined to find in the Constitution an absolute privilege of the
In theconsidered
a subpoena case at bar,essential
there is no claim
to the that militaryofor
enforcement
will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the
EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of
reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting
economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage,
evasion, dollar salting." 18 Consequently, while in cases which
secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the
that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the
Nor has matters
military our attention been
without called to production,
compelling any law or regulation
19 no similar
personnel
made for arecords ofresting
privilege the EIIBonasother
classified information. To the
considerations.
Circular No. 88-293, which petitioners invoke to support their
there is adequate safeguard against misuse of public funds,
"only item of expenditure which should be treated strictly
The
whichother statutes
refers to theand regulations
"purchase invoked byand
of information petitioners
paymentinof
contention that the documents sought in the subpoena duces
Ombudsman are classified merely indicate the confidential
functions, but they do not exempt the EIIB from the duty to
 funds to the proper authorities. Indeed by denying that there
made from certain items in the agency and alleging that the
to the EIIB only the allocations needed for the 947 personnel
reorganization, petitioners in effect invited inquiry into the
claim. If, as petitioners claim, the subpoenaed records have
the COA and found by it to be regular in all respects, there is
they cannot be shown to another agency of the government
constitutional
Above all, evenmandate is requireddocuments
if the subpoenaed to look intoareanytreated
complaint
as
office.
privileged, this decision would only justify ordering their
but not their nonproduction. However, as concession to the
functions of the EIIB and just to be sure no information of a
character is disclosed, the examination of records in this case
strict confidence by the Ombudsman himself. Reference may
documents in any decision or order which the Ombudsman
but
Îithonly to the
these extent that
safeguards it willitnot
outlined, reveal covert
is believed that aactivities of
Above all, thereclaims
the conflicting must ofbethe
a scrupulous protectionItof
parties is achieved, is the
not amiss
matters of national security have been inquired into in
proceedings by the courts. In Lansang v. Garcia this Court held
sessions, with only the immediate parties and their counsel
determine claims that because of subversion there was
public safety warranting the suspension of the writ of habeas
Again in Marcos v. Manglapus the Court met behind closed
military briefings on the threat posed to national security by
country of the former President and his family. In the United
inquiry into the danger to national security as a result of the
classified documents on the Vietnam war was upheld by the
Court. Îe see no reason why similar safeguards cannot be
agency of the Government, like the Office of the Ombudsman,
EN constitutional
BANC [G.R. No.duty to protect
169777. * April public interests
20, 2006.] while insuring

 
of classified

 
documents.


Facts:
The petitioners alleged that the President has abused its
Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005.
its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional. On
23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued
officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on
2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway
North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National
Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). On
President issued E.O. 464 which required all heads of
Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent
prior to appearing
„uthor͛s Note: I willbefore eithersome
reproduce House of of
theCongress. It also of
salient provisions
of
theseparation of powers
reader͛s guidance andand executive
reference onprivilege.
the principles lengthtily
SC͛s ruling.
E.O. 464, "ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
POÎERS, ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN
AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND FOR
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before
accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and
Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between
branches of the government, all heads of departments of the
of the government shall secure the consent of the President
beforethe
Îhen security
either Houseofofthe State or the public interest so
Congress.
President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be
executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive
(a) Nature and Scope. Ͷ The rule of confidentiality based
privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and
separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs.
95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or
information officially
Executive privilege known
covers all to them by reason
confidential of their office
or classified
available
Presidenttoandthethe
public to officers
public prejudice the public
covered interest.
by this executive
i. Conversations and correspondence between the
public official covered by this executive order (Almonte vs.
95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R.
2002);
ii. Military, diplomatic and other national security matters
interest of national security should not be divulged (Almonte
No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission
Government,
iii. G.R. No.
Information 130716,
between 9 December 1998).
inter-government agencies prior
of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential
Good
iv. Government, G.R. No. 130716,
Discussion in close-door 9 December
Cabinet 1998); v.
meetings (Chavez
Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9
v. Matters affecting national security and public order
Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002).
(b) Îho are covered. Ͷ The following are covered by this
i. Senior officials of executive departments who in the
department heads are covered by the executive privilege;
ii. Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the
such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff
executive
iii. privilege;
Philippine EaCSTc
National Police (PNP) officers with rank of
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the
Chief
iv. of the PNP
Senior are covered
national securityby the executive
officials privilege;
who in the judgment of
Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and
v. Such other officers as may be determined by the
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before
public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure
the President prior to appearing before either House of
observance of the principle of separation of powers,
executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials
inquiries in aid of legislation.
Issue:
Îhether the executive privilege is properly invoked in
Held:
No. Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there
recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which
rubric of "executive privilege." Since this term figures
challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its
and in its very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucial
Î)$'()-))$*)"
the constitutionality of E.O. 464. !)() !"$ !-."
/"0#"$), ! ,-!,)!* !* (!,)! 1, 
 !')!2)))/",
 )"#$0"#!)"!0
33))"$"'/-3 /,(0 ,)$ )!3 /") !#0
#)!*'() 33))"$
 !,,.'" ,)!"0""
)!,)""-(/-) !)!$)!")$0"*")!
 Îhen Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only
3"  3,)$ (

department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a
privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this
President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond
Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is
the highest official
Section of the
3 of E.O. executive
464 requiresbranch, and the
all the public due
officials
co-equal
Section 2(b)branch of government
to secure which
the consent is sanctioned
of the by a to
President prior long-
either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers
of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP,
national security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of
designated in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of
Chief of the PNP, and
The enumeration alsothe National
includes suchSecurity Adviser),
other officers as are
may be
executive privilege."
President. Given the title of Section 2 Ͷ "Nature, Scope and
Executive Privilege" Ͷ, it is evident that under the rule of
determination by the President under this provision is
En passant,
a similar the Court
finding notes that
of coverage Section
under 2(b) of
executive E.O. 464
privilege.
executive privilege actually covers persons. Such is a misuse of
Executive privilege, as discussed above, is properly invoked in
categories of information
In light, however, andofnot
of Sec 2(a) to464
E.O. categories of persons.
which deals with the
coverage of executive privilege, the reference to persons being
executive privilege" may be read as an abbreviated way of
person is in possession of information which is, in the
office concerned, privileged as defined in Section 2(a). The
proceed on the assumption that this is the intention of the
 The letter dated September 28, 2005 of respondent
Ermita to Senate President Drilon illustrates the implied nature
privilege authorized
In connection by inquiry
with the E.O. 464.
to Itbereads:
conducted by the
regarding the Northrail Project of the North Luzon Railways
September 2005 at 10:00 a.m., please be informed that
Department invited to appear at the meeting will not be able
same without the consent of the President, pursuant to
(s. 2005), entitled "Ensuring Observance Of The Principle Of
Powers, Adherence To The Rule On Executive Privilege And
Rights Of Public Officials Appearing In Legislative Inquiries In
Under Îhile there is no Philippine
The Constitution, case that
And For Other directlySaid
Purposes". addresses
officials
whetherthe
secured executive privilege
required consentmay
frombetheinvoked against Congress,
President.
from Chavez v. PEA that certain information in the possession
may validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by
holds:
privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. The
not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or
closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal-
Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of
Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of
pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank
exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of
by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence
makingÎhile the tasked
of those validitytoofexercise
claims ofPresidential,
privilege must be assessed
Legislative and
case basis, examining the ground invoked
This is not the situation in the instant case. therefor and the
circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an implied claim of
that renders it invalid per se. By its very nature, and as
letter of respondent Executive Secretary quoted above, the
authorized by Section 3 of E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any
of the basis thereof (e.g., whether the information demanded
or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.).
enumerates the types of information that are covered by the
challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to which
referred to by the executive. The enumeration is not even
comprehensive,
Certainly, Congressbuthas
a mere statement
the right to know of what
why theis included
executivein
"confidential
requested or classified
information information
privileged. between
It does the President
not suffice to merely
officers covered
President, by this executive
or an authorized head of order."
office, has determined that
the President has not overturned that determination. Such
Congress in the dark on how the requested information could
privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first
not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more
make Congress
„ claim ofdoubly blind
privilege, to the
being question
a claim of why the
of exemption from an
providinginformation,
disclose it with the information that it
must, therefore, behas requested.
clearly asserted. „s
teaches:
?he privilege belongs to the government and must be asserted
neither be claimed nor waived by a private party. It is not to be
?here must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head
which has control over the matter, after actual personal
officer. ?he court itself must determine whether the
appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without
Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim
of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
privilege, there is no way of determining whether it falls under
traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in
should be respected. These, in substance, were the same
the claim of privilege asserted against the Ombudsman in
94 and, more in point, against a committee of the Senate in
A.O. Smith v. Federal Trade Commission is enlightening:
Committee
[T]he lack ofon Presidential
specificity Campaign
renders Activitiesof
an assessment v. the
Nixon.
potential
from disclosure impossible, thereby preventing the Court from
harm against plaintiffs' needs to determine whether to
privilege.
And so is U.S. v. Article of Drug:
On the present state of the record, this Court is not called
balancing operation. In stating its objection to claimant's
government asserts, and nothing more, that the disclosures
would inhibit the free expression of opinion that non-
protect. The government has not shown Ͷ nor even alleged Ͷ
evaluated claimant's product were involved in internal
or in this particular instance. Privilege cannot be set up by an
claim. The facts upon which the privilege is based must be
these interrogatories objectionable, this Court would have to
evaluation and classification of claimant's products was a
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy 99 similarly
policy formulation, an assumption in which this Court is
agency must provide 'precise and certain' reasons for
sponte.
confidentiality
Black v. Sheratonof requested information."
Corp. of America 100 amplifies, thus:
A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a
and description of the documents within its scope as well as
reasons for preserving their confidentiality. Îithout this
impossible for a court to analyze the claim short of disclosure
sought to be protected. As the affidavit now stands, the Court
than its sua sponte speculation with which to weigh the
claim. An improperly asserted claim of privilege is no claim of
Therefore, despite the fact that a claim was made by the
Reynolds requires, the Court can not recognize the claim in the
because it is legally insufficient to allow the Court to make a
determination
Vue respect forasa to its applicability.
co-equal branch ofTo recognize such
government, a broad
moreover,
the
thanDefendant
a claim ofhas given no
privilege precise
clearly or compelling
stating reasons
the grounds to
therefor.
documents
following frominoutside
ruling McPhaul scrutiny,
v. in
U.S: would make a farce of the
Îe think the Court's decision United States v. Bryan, 339
724, is highly relevant to these questions. For it is as true here
that 'if (petitioner) had legitimate reasons for failing to
the association, a decent respect for the House of
authority the subpoenas issued, would have required that (he)
reasons for noncompliance upon the return of the writ. Such a
have given the Subcommittee an opportunity to avoid the
by taking other appropriate steps to obtain the records. 'To
the opportunity to consider the objection or remedy is in itself
authority and an obstruction of its processes. His failure to
statement
Upon was "a
the other patent
hand, evasionmust
Congress of the
notduty of one
require the executive
papers
reasonsbefore
for theaclaim
congressional
with suchcommittee[,
particularityand]
as tocannot
compelbe
information which the privilege is meant to protect. A useful
determining the requisite degree of particularity would be the
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in
self-incrimination.
2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely
providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely
coupled with an announcement that the President has not
is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the
information is justified under the circumstances of each case.
Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, in particular, cites
frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.
United States where, so it claims, only the President can assert
privilege to withhold
Section 2(b) information
in relation to Section from Congress.
3 virtually provides that,
office determines that a certain information is privileged, such
presumed to bear the President's authority and has the effect
official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the
pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the
official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize
Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the
privilege by mere silence.
of the privilege. Executive privilege, as already discussed, is
respect to information the confidential nature of which is
fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the
or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is
discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. 106
executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain
as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the
The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the
information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the
as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation
essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the
case.
course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the
in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the
of the President," which means that he personally consulted
privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded
official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the
authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is
uphold such authorization in the instant case where the
explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section
invalid on this score.
 It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned
matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by
must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or
Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is
order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with
to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of
after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President
Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to
failureIn
oflight of the above
the official discussion
to appear beforeof Section and
Congress 3, it may
is clear
then
essentially an authorization
necessary legal for implied
means to compel claims of executive
his appearance.
reason it must be invalidated. That such authorization is partly
need to ensure respect for such officials does not change the
the authorization itself.
EN BANC [G.R. No. 180643. March 25, 2008.]   
  
   
  
%    %   

Facts:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation
Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhing Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the
$329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project
by the People's Republic of China. Respondent Committees
investigation, in aid od legislation, by sending invitations to
and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner
invited. In particular, he refused to answer, invoking executive
questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up
6 (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c)
directed him to approve. In a letter sent to the Senate, Ermita
of executive privilege saying that the information sought to be
impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
of China. Given the confidential nature in which these
Issue:
conveyed to the President, he (Neri) cannot provide the
Îhether the Senate
details of these can compel
conversations, Neri todisclosing
without disclose the
the very
designed
Held: to protect.
No, because those informations are covered by
the same was properly invoked by Ermita. At this juncture, it
that the revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish
executive privilege. This is because this concept has
underpinnings. Unlike the United States which has further
with statutory status by enacting the Freedom of Information
Federal Advisory Committee Act, 24 the Philippines has
constitutional origination, occasionally interpreted only by this
cases. In In most
The re: Sealed
recentCase, 30 the
of these U.S.case
is the Courtofof Appeals
Senate delved
v. Ermita
ruled thatunconstitutional
declared there are two (2) kinds of executive
substantial portions privilege; one is
of E.O. 464.
 //(!)") !-))$* and, the other is the ,$)#")
The former pertains to "communications, documents or other
reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that
believes should remain confidential." The latter includes
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a
Accordingly,
governmentalthey are characterized
decisions and policiesbyaremarked distinctions.
formulated."
communications privilege applies to decision-making of the
deliberative process privilege, to decision-making of executive
is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power
President's unique constitutional role; the second on common
Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential
privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers
decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones 31 As a
congressional or judicial negation of the presidential
Turning
is alwayson who are
subject the officials
to greater covered
scrutiny thanby the presidential
denial of the
privilege,
privilege. In Re Sealed Case confines the privilege only to
has 4 -") !"$- ')/)04 to direct presidential decision-
privilege is meant to encompass only those functions that
presidential authority, involving what the court characterized
and non-delegable Presidential power", such as commander-
appointment and removal power, the power to grant pardons
the sole-authority
In Chavez v. PCGG,to38receive ambassadors
this Court and other
held that there is a public
to negotiate
against publictreaties etc. with respect to state secrets
disclosure
diplomatic and other security matters." In Chavez v. PEA, 39
recognition of the confidentiality of Presidential conversations,
correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet
Ermita, the concept of presidential communications privilege is
„s may be gleaned from the above discussion, the claim of
EHcaAI
highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates
textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such
military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the
repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning,
powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers,
The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and
relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than
somehow provide the elements of presidential
wit:
1) The protected communication must relate to a
delegable presidential power."
2) The communication must be authored or "solicited and
close advisor of the President or the President himself. The
an
3) advisor must be in "operational
The presidential proximity"
communications with
privilege the a
remains
that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such
information sought "likely contains important evidence" and
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his
authority.
privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by
questions "fall under conversation and correspondence
and public officials" necessary in "her executive and policy
process" and, that "the information sought to be disclosed
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People's
Simply put, the bases are presidential communications
Using theon
privilege above elements,
matters relatingwetoare convinced
diplomacy that, indeed,
or foreign the
relations.
elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the
communications privilege. First, the communications relate to
and non-delegable power" of the President, i.e. the power to
executive agreement with other countries. This authority of
enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
communications are "received" by a close advisor of the
"operational proximity" test, petitioner can be considered a
a member of President Arroyo's cabinet. And third, there is no
showing
The thirdof a compelling
element deservesneed that would
a lengthy justify the limitation
discussion.
and foregoing
The of the unavailability of the
is consistent withinformation elsewhere
the earlier case of Nixonby an
vs.
investigating authority.communications privilege are
held that presidential
and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere
need by the branch seeking access to conversations. The
resolve the competing interests of the political branches of the
the manner that preserves the essential functions of each
record is bereft of any categorical explanation from
show a compelling or critical need for the answers to the three
the enactment of a law. Instead, the questions veer more
of the legislative oversight function under Section 22 of Article
Section 21 of the same Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that the
function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process
extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation." It is
difficult to draw
In this regard, the line
Senate between
v. Ermita an inquiry
stressed that in
theaid of
validity of the
in the exercise of oversight function of Congress.
executive privilege depends not only on the ground invoked In this regard,
depend
proceduralon the content
setting or theofcontext
the questions
in which and
thethe manner
claim isintothe
made.
The respondent
conducted. Committees should cautiously tread the
matters which may present a conflict of interest that may
inhibit the Senators participating in the inquiry if later on an
proceeding is initiated on the same subject matter of the
inquiry. Pertinently, in Senate Select Committee on
Activities v. Nixon, it was held that since an impeachment
initiated by a House Committee, the Senate Select
oversight need for five presidential tapes, should give way to
It is true, Committee
Judiciary of course, that thehas
which Executive cannot, anyauthority
the constitutional more than to
branches of government, invoke a general confidentiality
presidential impeachment. The Court expounded on this issue
officials and employees from investigations by the proper
institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing. The Congress
its own privileges in Gravel v. United States, as did the judicial
 sense, in Clark v. United States, and the executive branch itself
But under Nixon v. Sirica, the showing required to overcome
favoring confidentiality turned, not on the nature of the
that the subpoenaed material might reveal, but, instead, on
appropriateness of the function in the performance of which
sought, and the degree to which the material was necessary to
Here also our task requires and our decision implies no
concerning possible presidential involvement in culpable
contrary, we think the sufficiency of the Committee's showing
Jurisprudence
solely on whetherteaches that for the claim
the subpoenaed to beis properly
evidence demonstrably
formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of
responsible fulfillment of the Committee's functions. the
control over the matter." „ formal and proper claim of
requires
The Lettera "precise and certain
dated November 17,reason"
2007 offor preserving
Executive their
Secretary
requirement. It serves as the formal claim of privilege. There
that "this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of
privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised
accordingly." Obviously, he is referring to the Office of the
more than enough compliance. In Senate v. Ermita, a less
Îith regard to the existence of "precise and certain reason",
even adjudged to be sufficient.
grounds relied upon by Executive Secretary Ermita specific
leave respondent Committees in the dark on how the
could be classified as privileged." The case of Senate v. Ermita
an allegation be made "whether the information demanded
diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc." The
must only beinspecified.
?he context The enumeration
which executive privilege isisbeing
not even intended
invoked is that
comprehensive." The following statement of grounds
sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well assatisfies
with the People's Republic of China. Given the confidential
these information were conveyed to the President, he cannot
Committee any further details of these conversations, without
At any
very rate,the
thing asprivilege
held further in Senate
is designed to v. Ermita, the Congress
protect.
the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such
compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is
This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal

A.Ê PROHIBITIONS (Sec 13)

EN BANC [G.R. No. 85468. September 7, 1989.] +  


 
%



Facts:
In October 1987, Special Prosecution Officer II, Dionisio
conducted a preliminary investigation of the charge against the
Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential
Good Government (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings
president and director of the Doromal International Trading
which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of electronic,
automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the
Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the National
Council (or NMYC), which act is absolutely prohibited by
of the Constitution.
Issue:
Îhether the said act violates the constitution.
Held:
Yes. Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
President, Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and
assistants shall not . . . during (their) tenure, . . . directly or
participate in any business." The constitutional ban is similar to
in the Civil Service Law (PD No. 807, Sec. 36, subpar. 24) that
business . . . without the permission required by Civil Service
Regulations" shall be a ground for disciplinary action against
employee in the?his
„uthor͛s Note: civilcase
service.
is more of a Criminal Procedure than a
case.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 83896. February 22, 1991.]
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:
The petitioners sought a declaration of the
Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino
The pertinent
"SECTION provisions
1. Even of the
if allowed assailed
by law or byExecutive Order are:
the ordinary
position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant
other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in
primary position, hold not more than two positions in the
government corporations and receive the corresponding
therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc
committees,
"SECTION 2. Iforato boards,ofcouncils
member or bodies
the cabinet, of which theor
undersecretary
Chairman.
secretary or other appointive official of the Executive
positions than what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic)
excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next
case shall any official hold more than two positions other than
"SECTION
position. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the
government-owned or controlled corporations, at least one-
members of the boards of such corporation should either be a
undersecretary, or assistant
Petitioners maintain that thissecretary."
Executive Order which, in effect,
of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries
government offices or positions in addition to their primary
subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to
of the 1987 Constitution.
In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is
petitioners on the principal submission that it adds exceptions
Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution.
petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided
Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other
employment in Government are those provided in the
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the
3, par. respondents,
Public (2), Article VIIon
thereof; andhand,
the other (2) themaintain
Secretary of the
that Justice is
member
otherwiseofprovided
the Judicial andConstitution"
in the Bar Council by in virtue
Sectionof13,
Section
Article8
reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B insofar as the
mentioned therein are concerned.
Issue:
Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are
the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general
par. (2), Article IX-B which, for easy reference is quoted anew,
otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
owned
Held: or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries."
No. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been
Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of
times, and the condition and circumstances under which the
framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
The blatant
accomplished betrayal
thereby, of public
in order trust evolved
to construe into as
the whole onetoof
causes
consonantof discontent with and
to that reason the Marcos
calculatedregime. It was
to effect therefore
that
and in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, convened as it was after the
successfully unseated former President Marcos, should draft
Constitution the provisions under consideration which are
remedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of
governmental offices and employment. In fact, as keenly
Justice Isagani A. Cruz during the deliberations in these cases,
strongest selling points of the 1987 Constitution during the
ratification was the assurance given by its proponents that the
practice
But whatofisCabinet members holding
indeed significant multiple
is the fact positionsSection
that although in the
collecting
already unconscionably
contains a blanketexcessive compensation
prohibition therefrom
against the holding of
discontinued.in the government subsuming both elective and
employment
officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to
provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
any other office or employment during their tenure, unless
in the Constitution itself.
Evidently, from this move as well as in the different
constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers
Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the
official family in so far as holding other offices or employment
Moreover,
governmentsuch intent is underscored
or elsewhere is concerned. by a comparison of
with other provisions of the Constitution on the
public officials or employees from holding other offices or
Section 13, Article VII, "(N)o Senator or Member of the House
Representatives may hold any other office or employment in
.". Under Section 5(4), Article XVI, "(N)o member of the armed
active service shall, at any time, be appointed in any capacity
position in the Government, including government-owned or
corporations or any of their subsidiaries." Even Section 7 (2),
upon by respondents provides "(U)nless otherwise allowed by
It is quite notable that in all these provisions on
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
office or employment, the prohibition pertains to an office or
office or employment in the Government."
the government and government-owned or controlled
subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the wording of Section 13,
states that "(T)he President, Vice-President, the Members of
their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
latter provision, the disqualification is absolute, not being
phrase "in the Government." The prohibition imposed on the
Going
officialfurther into
family is Section all-embracing
therefore 13, Article VII,and
the covers
secondboth
sentence
public
shall not, during said
office or employment. cdlltenure, directly or indirectly, practice any
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries." These sweeping,
prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family,
are not similarly imposed on other public officials or
Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general
the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil
President and his official family as a class by itself and to
to hold other office or employment in the government during
stricter prohibitions.
such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their
of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only
authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7,
meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective
public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is
exception
This being applicable
the case, theonly to the President,
qualifying the Vice-President,
phrase "unless otherwise
Cabinet, their in
Constitution" deputies
Sectionand
13, assistants.
Article VII cannot possibly refer to
exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987
construe said qualifying phrase as respondents would have us
nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of
the Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
holding other offices or employment in the government during
Respondents' interpretation that Section 13 of Article VII
exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B would
distinction so carefully set by the framers of the Constitution
high-ranking officials of the Executive Branch from the
Secretary, on the one hand, and the generality of civil servants
The prohibition
immediately againstSecretary
below Assistant holding dual or multiple
downwards, onoffices
the
under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must
other office or position in the government during their tenure. not,
construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive
therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio
law and as required 22 by the primary functions of said
reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office"
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are
of additional duties and functions on said officials. 23 To
posts otherwise would lead to absurd consequences, among
President of the Philippines cannot chair the National Security
reorganized under Executive Order No. 115 (December 24,
the Vice-President, the Executive Secretary, and the
Defense, Justice, Labor and Employment and Local
The Secretary
Council, whichof Laborthen
would and have
Employment
no reasoncannot chair
to exist forthe
lack of a
the National Manpower and Youth Council (NMYC)
members. The respective undersecretaries and assistant or the
Employment
be prohibited.Administration (POEA), both of which are
department for policy coordination and guidance. Neither can
The Secretaries ofand
Undersecretaries Finance and Budget
Assistant cannot
Secretaries sit these
chair in the
Neither can their respective undersecretaries and assistant
Central Bank Governor would then be assisted by lower
providing
Indeed, thepolicy direction
framers of ourinConstitution
the areas ofcould
money,notbanking
have and
consequences. A Constitution, viewed as a continuously
government, is not to be interpreted as demanding the
impracticable; and unreasonable or absurd consequences, if
To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII
avoided.
interpreted as covering positions held without additional
officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the
the concerned official's office. The term ex-officio means "from
of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official
expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather
official position." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done in an
character, or as a consequence of office, and without any
authority than that conferred by the office." 27 An ex-officio
is one Mandating additional
who is a member dutiesofand
by virtue his functions to the office,
title to a certain
President, Cabinet
further warrant Members, their deputies or assistants which
or appointment.
inconsistent with those already prescribed by their offices or
virtue of their special knowledge, expertise and skill in their
offices is a practice long-recognized in many jurisdictions. It is a
by the demands of efficiency, policy direction, continuity and
among the different offices in the Executive Branch in the
multifarious tasks of executing and implementing laws
interest and general welfare and delivering basic services to
consistent with the power vested on the President and his
Cabinet members, to have control of all the executive
and offices and to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
these additional duties and functions being assigned to the
official family to sit in the governing bodies or boards of
or instrumentalities
It bears repeating in anthough
ex-officio
thatcapacity
in orderasthat
provided
such by law
by their primary
functions may not functions,
transgress they
thewould be deprived
prohibition embodiedof the
in
supervision,
of thereby resulting
the 1987 Constitution, such in an unwieldy
additional andorconfused
duties functions
by the primary functions of the official concerned, who is to
in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving
The ex-officio position
compensation therefor.being actually and in legal
principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no
additional compensation for his services in the said position.
these services are already paid for and covered by the
to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the
attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio
actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary
principal office in defining policy in monetary and banking
under the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance,
not entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be
per diem
In the orofanthe
light honorarium
construction or an allowance,
given or some
to Section otherVII in
13, Article
whatever
Section 7, name it isArticle
par. (2), designated,
IX-B ofsuch additional
the 1987 compensation
Constitution,
the Constitution.
dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting
positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant
hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two
the government and government corporations, Executive
allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in
itself. with provisions against other officials:
Yompare
Constitution
Art VI, Sec. 13
Art. IX, A, Sec. 2
Art. IX, B, Sec. 7
Art. VIII, Sec. 12
Exceptions to the Rule:
Vice-President ʹ Art VII, Sec. 3, par 2
Secretary of Justice ʹ Art VIII, Sec 8 (1)
Ex officio positions
 B.Ê SUCCESSION
(A)Ê At the beginnin gof the term
Art VII, Sec. 7, 10
(B)Ê During the term
Art VII, Sec 8, 10
(C)Ê Temporary Disability
Art. VII, Sec 2-3

[G.R. No. 146738. April 3, 2001.]JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. GLORIA

ARROYO
Facts:
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President
adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers
presidency. His significant submittal is that "Congress has the
under the Constitution to determine whether the President is
performing his functions in the manner provided for in section
Issue:
Îhether Estrada was just temporarily incapable of
functions as President; hence did not resign.
Held:
No. An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order.
"SEC. 11. Îhenever the President transmits to the President of
the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and
them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and
dischargedabymajority
Îhenever of all the Members
the Vice-President as ActingofPresident.
the Cabinet
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
their written declaration that the President is unable to
and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately
Thereafter,
and duties of when the President
the office as Actingtransmits
President. to the President of
the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his
Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the
five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress
issue. For that purpose,
If the Congress, thedays
within ten Congress shall convene,
after receipt if itwritten
of the last is not
forty-eight
not hours,
in session, in accordance
within twelve dayswith itsitrules
after and without
is required to
a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising
duties of his office."
That is the law. Now, the operative facts:
1.Ê Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter
to the Senate President and Speaker of the House;
2.Ê Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath
President on January 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;
3.Ê Despite receipt of the letter, the House of
January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. 175; On the same date,
Representatives passed  ( $() !
56.expressing
assumption
=Ê of the office
On February of the
7, 2001, the president by Arroyo.
House of the Representatives
 $() !
567 which states: "RESOLUTION CONFIRMING
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SENATOR
GUINGONA,
4.Ê JR. AS VICE
Also, despite PRESIDENT
receipt OF THEletter
of petitioner's REPUBLIC OF THE
claiming
twelve (12) members of the Senate signed
=Ê On February 7, the !" also passed !"
states: "RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA
NOMINATION OF SEM. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE
REPUBLIC
=Ê OF THE
On the samePHILIPPINES
date, February 7, the !" likewise
 $() !
78 which states: "RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING
IMPEACHMENT
5.Ê COURT
On February IS Senate
8, the FUNC?US alsoOFFICIO
passed  $() !
79
the existence of vacancy in the Senate and calling on the
such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with
election on May 14, 2001 and the Senatorial candidate
(13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the
6.Ê
Senator% Teofisto
 ( 3 !*Jr.started sending #)$$ #
T. Guingona,
respondent
 0 " ),!.
7.Ê Despite the lapse of time and still without any
without any recognition from any sector of government, and
support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to
momentary.
Î"$"- 03 /)3("#$3")"
 !*" *!):,- !,!
 0 "
" *!)) !)-/)")!"#)$)0 3-)) !
$=()
!*/-!)2)
"0
 !*"$"$0;,-)) !<
(";(),)) ! )2
/- "0)!"#)$)0 3-)) !"," and thereafter )
#  ( 3 !*recognizing respondent Arroyo as
Philippines. Following ">","
(! , we hold that this
its judicial power or this is an issue "in regard to which full
authority has been delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of
Or to use the language in %"1
",103 there is a "textually
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of
the power and duties of the presidency. =() !)
",,, $$0  !*#0
!3)!.!)3-)) !"!-!)() !"$3)". It is)*!.
",),! a
cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing
(3($$0$")/")" ),! !$" !the
separation
(!"#$ *of!/-
powers. ")$0
"$")/"#!$"), 
,)) !"- !,!
 0 ),;(.-),!
=("$#"! 3* !/!"!! #)2,#0)
 

c
 Î
      
A.Ê EXECUTIVE POÎER (Art VII, Secs. 1 and 17)
EN BANC [G.R. No. 88211. September 15, 1989.] FERDINAND E.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS
Facts:
Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to
Philippines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire
nation of his return at a time when the stability of government
from various directions and the economy is just beginning to
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of
his family.
Issue:
Îhether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from
Philippines.
Held:
Yes. As the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15
pointed out "a grant of the legislative power means a grant of
power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all
which may be exercised under the government." [At 631-632.]
of the legislative power which is exercised by two chambers
membership of more than two hundred members and of the
which Consideration
is vested in a hierarchy of courts,
of tradition and theitdevelopment
can equally be
ofsaid
power which
under the is vested
different in one official
constitutions are Ͷ the President.
essential for a complete
the extent of and limitations to the President's powers under
Constitution. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes
exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact
traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive
the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only
powersTheenumerated in theisConstitution.
power involved the President'sIn other words,
residual power to
more
generalthan the sum
welfare of specific
of the people. powers so enumerated.
It is founded on the duty of the
steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is
power of the President but also his duty to do anything not
Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand.
not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of
order and ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no
on the horizon. Îide discretion, within the bounds of law, in
The request
presidential duties or demand
in times of the is
of peace Marcoses to way
not in any be allowed
Philippines cannot be considered
want of an emergency specified ininthe
thecommander-in-chief
light solely of the
provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to
certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
 even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of
which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty
office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion
President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

EN BANC [G.R. No. L-21897. October 22, 1963.]

 



c


Facts:
On September 22, 1963, respondent Executive Secretary
importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased
and created a rice procurement committee composed of the
herein for the implementation of said proposed importation.
September 25, 1963, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales Ͷ
president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association,
likewise, engaged in the production of rice and corn Ͷ filed
averring that, in making or attempting to make said
the aforementioned respondents "are acting without
jurisdiction", because Republic Act No. 3452 Ͷ which allegedly
amends Republic Act No. 2207 Ͷ explicitly prohibits the
corn by "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
the other hand, Respondents question the sufficiency of
action upon the theory that the proposed importation in
governed by Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452, but was
President as commander-in-chief "for military stock pile
exercise of his alleged authority under Section 2 of
that in cases of necessity, the President "or his subordinates
preventive
Issue: measure for the restoration of good order and
peace"; and that,
Îhether theaspresident can enter into
Commander-in-Chief of executive
our armed forces,
of
. isaduty-bound
legislative enactment.
to prepare for the challenge of threats of war
without
Held: waiting for any special authority."
No. Respondents' trend of thought, that, if an executive officer
compliance with a certain statute will not benefit the people
disregard it, must
Although thebePresident
rejected Ͷ weunder
may, still live
theunder a rule of
American
enter into executive agreements without previous legislative
not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is
statutes enacted
Under prior thereto.the main function of the
the Constitution,
laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the
the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of
may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the
indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement
[G.R. No. 149724.ofAugust
performance 19,
the very act2003.] 
 
prohibited by said laws. 5&
 
Facts:
Pursuant to DENR Adm. Order No. 99-14, a
directing the immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional
City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The respondents
the DENR Secretary to reorganize the DENR because they
power to reorganize is ͞executive͟ in nature.
Issue:
Îhether the DENR Secretary has the authority to
Held:
It is apropos to reiterate the elementary , )! 3
"*!0, thus:
Under this doctrine, which  *!):"#$)/! 3"
all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
Department, the heads of the various executive departments
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed
the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,
This doctrineor
disapproved is reprobated
corollary to by
thethe
control
Chief power of the President
Executive,
under Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution.
Chief Executive.
Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the
President to reorganize the National Government may validly
his cabinet members exercising control over a particular
Thus, in DOTC Secretary v. Mabalot, 21 we held that the
his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC
legally and validly decree the reorganization of the
establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB Regional Office at the
Administrative
Similarly, in theRegion,
case at with the DENR
bar, the concomitant transfer
Secretary and
can validly
functions
by orderingandtheresponsibilities
transfer of theappurtenant to a regional
DENR XII Regional Officesoffice
from
Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by
Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the
latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
B.Ê POÎER OF CONTROL (Sec. 17)
[G.R. No. L-7708. May 30, 1955.]†  


 
Facts:
The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of
municipality of Mainit, province of Surigao. On 27 February
Vda. de Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the Presidential
Action Committee accusing him of (1) rape committed on her
Mosende; and (2) concubinage for cohabiting with her
than the conjugal dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant Executive
indorsed the complaint to the respondent provincial governor
investigation, appropriate action and report. On 10 April the
appeared before the provincial governor in obedience to his
served with a copy of the complaint filed by the provincial
provincial board. On the same day, the provincial governor
Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the petitioner from
the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the charges preferred
petitioner over his objection.
Issue:
Îhether the Assistant Executive Secretary, as agent of
Executive, can exercise control over local governments, most
mayor in this case.
Held:
No. The department head as agent of the President has
and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his
for in section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he
the same control of local governments as that exercised by him
and offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to
investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the person
any bureau of office under his department is confined to
jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over the
exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law
paragraph 1, Article VII of the Constitution). If the provisions of
the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as
corresponding department head direct control, direction, and
all local governments and that for that reason he may order
In administrative
an official law supervision
of a local government means overseeing
for malfeasance or
in office, such
authority
would be of an officer
contrary to see
to the that subordinate
provisions officers
of paragraph perform
1, section 10,
the latter fail
Constitution. or neglect to fulfill them the former may take
as prescribed by law to make them perform these duties.
hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor
to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath
officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other
maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment
involving moral turpitude." 2 And if the charges are serious,
written charges touching the matter to the provincial board,
such charges to the accused either personally or by registered
in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal
action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one
integrity of the officer in question." 3 Section 86 of the Revised
Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised
Department Head over the administration of . . . municipalities
construed that it does and such additional power is the same
vested in the Department Head by section 79 (c) of the Revised
Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have
section 10(1), Article VII, of the Constitution.
EN BANC [G.R. No. 46570. April 21, 1939.]† 
c 


  
Facts:
It appears that the Division of Investigation of the
Justice, upon the request of the Secretary of the Interior,
into the conduct of the petitioner, mayor of Makati, Rizal, as a
the latter was found to have committed bribery, extortion,
authority and unauthorized practice of the law profession. The
therefore, on February 8, 1939, recommended to the
Philippines the suspension of the petitioner to prevent
witnesses, which recommendation was granted, according to
Solicitor-General of March 20, 1939, verbally by the President
The Secretary of the Interior suspended the petitioner from
Villena contended that the Secretary of the Interior has
9, 1939, and then and thereafter wired the Provincial Governor
or authority to suspend and much less to prefer by himself
instruction that the petitioner be advised accordingly.
charges against the petitioner and decide also by himself the
charges as the power to suspend municipal elective officials
punish them for misconduct in office or dereliction of duty is
other agencies of the government. As to him, the Secretary of
suspending him, has exercised control over local governments
has been taken away from the President of the Philippines by
Issue:
Îhether the Secretary of Interior has authority to
suspend Villena, pending the investigation of the charges
Held:
Yes. Section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code provides
"The Department Head shall have direct control, direction, and
all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and may, any
law to the contrary notwithstanding, repeal or modify the
of
"Thesaid bureaus orHead
Department offices
maywhen advisable
order in the public
the investigation of interest.
any act
person in the service of any bureau or office under his
connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate
person who shall conduct such investigations, and such
person may summon, witness by subpoena and subpoena
administer cath and take testimony relevant to the
The above section speaks, it is true, of direct control, direction,
over bureaus and offices under the jurisdiction of the Secretary
but this section should be interpreted in relation to section 86
which grants to the Department of the Interior "executive
administration of provinces, municipalities, chartered cities
political subdivisions." In the case of Planas vs. Gil (37 Off. Gaz.,
observed that "Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an
certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority
facts and conditions in order to render the power real and
supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not
must be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and
after careful study and investigation." The principle there
applicable with equal force to the present case.
Îe hold, therefore, that the Secretary of the Interior is
to order the investigation of the charges against the petitioner
special investigator for that purpose. As regards the
Secretary of the Interior to decree the suspension of the herein
pending an administrative investigation of the charges against
question, it may be admitted, is not free from difficulties.
express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of
who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power
provincial governor by section 2188 of the Administrative Code
that "The provincial governor shall receive and investigate
under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty,
or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by
any crime involving moral turpitude. For minor delinquency he
the offender; and if a more severe punishment seems to be
submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial
copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by
he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the
pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be
official integrity of the officer in question. Îhere suspension is
the written charges against the officer shall be filed with the
days." The fact, however, that the power of suspension is
section 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial
mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the
Interior from exercising a similar power. For instance, counsel
admitted in the oral argument that the President of the
suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater
(sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised
law. Indeed, if the President could, in the manner prescribed
municipal official, it would be a legal incongruity if he were to
lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity would be
possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a
2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be without
suspend a municipal
In the deliberationofficial. Here
of this caseis, parenthetically,
it has also been an
counsel
admitting forthat
petitioner admitted,
the President thePhilippines
of the power to suspend
is investeda with
exclusive.
suspend the Upon the other
petitioner, and hand, it may bethat
it appearing argued
he hadwith some
verbally
plausibility that, ifinthe
least acquiesced theSecretary
action taken of theby Interior is, as we
the Secretary have
of the
concluded,
suspension empowered
of the petitionerto investigate
should bethe chargeson
sustained against
the the
appoint a special
ratification of theinvestigator for that purpose,
act of the Secretary preventive
of the Interior by the
means by which to carry into effect a fair and impartial
Philippines. There is, to be sure, more weight in this argument
point, however,
suggested which, forofthe
generalization reason
section 37hereinafter indicated,
of Act No. 4007. Îithal,
decide.
argument of ratification may seem plausible under the
be observed that there are certain prerogative acts which, by
cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by
of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no
approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of
other person. Such, for instance, i9 his power to suspend the
corpus and proclaim martial law (par. 3, sec. 11, Art. VII) and
of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem).
doubt is entertained be some members of the court whether
made by the Secretary to the President in the latter's behalf
that the President had no objection to the suspension of the
accepted as an affirmative exercise of the power of suspension
that the verbal approval by the President of the suspension
After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the
presented in this case by the Solicitor-General could be
government in this case on the broad proposition, albeit not
sufficient ratification in law.
under the presidential type of government which we have
considering the departmental organization established and
by paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Yonstitution, all
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
heads of the various executive departments are assistants
Yhief Executive, and, except in cases where the Yhief
the Yonstitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive
functions of the Yhief Executive are performed by and
departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such
reference to in
Îithpromulgated
and thethe
Executive
regular Department of the are, unless
course of business,
purpose which
reprobated is crystal-clear
by the and ispresumptively
Yhief Executive, readily visible the
without
acts the
of
judicial
Executive.searchlight, and that is, the establishment of a single,
Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution,
Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the
executive power shall be vested in a President of the
that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the
Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive
political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and,
Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom
Ford ed., 498), and, in the language of Attorney-General
Attorney-General, 453), "are subject to the direction of the
minimizing the importance of the heads of the various
personality is in reality but the projection of that of the
otherwise,
Secretaries and as forcibly characterized
of departments, by Chiefcertain
of course, exercise Justicepowers
Taft of
Court
but theoflaw
thecannot
Unitedimpair
States,or
"each head
in any wayofaffect
a department
the is, and
President's
control and alter ego in
direction ofthe
thematters of that
President. As a department where
matter of executive
required
be granted bydepartmental
law to exercise authority"
autonomy as to certain matters but
concession of the executive, in the absence of valid legislation
field. If the President, then, is the authority in the Executive
assumes the corresponding responsibility. The head of a
his confidence; he controls and directs his acts; he appoints
him at pleasure; he is the executive, not any of his secretaries.
 administration of the entire executive Department before his
no less than before that undefined power of public opinion
language of Danie, Îebster, is the last repository of popular
are the necessary corollaries of the American presidential type
and if there is any defect, it is attributable to the system itself.
modify the system unless we modify the Constitution, and we
the Constitution by any subtle process of judicial interpretation

EN BANC [G.R. No. L-58184. October 30, 1981.]  


 
%  
% 

Facts:
Petitioner filed with the Ministry of Labor a notice of
labor practices allegedly committed by private respondent
of their existing collective bargaining agreement, particularly
arbitrary implementation of a Code of Conduct to the
its members. Several conciliation meetings called by the
Thereafter, the Ministry of Labor pursuant to law, certified the
the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and the holding of any
respondent establishment was enjoined. Hearing was
whereas private respondent agreed to the indefinite
the provisions of the Code of Conduct, the principal cause of
a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, petitioner
Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 insofar as it amends Article 264 of
delegating to the Minister of Labor the power and discretion to
jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration to
effect make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining, is
delegation of legislative powers and is contrary to the
Issue: Îhether
the workers' there
right is invalid
to self delegation
organization and in this case.
collective
„uthor͛s Note: ?he crux of this case is the validity of
according to petitioner union, is within the competence of the
powers. ?he president͛s power of control over the members of
can best determine national interests when a strike is in
discussed only to support the claim that the Philippines still
presidential, not parliamentary, form of government during the
1973 Constitution under Marcos.
Held:
Yes. (?he author omitted the discussion on delegation of
reason of its irrelevance.)
As the only one whose constituency is national it is the
of his election by the entire electorate, has an indisputable
the country as a whole. Moreover, it is he who explicitly
power of control of such ministries. He continues to be the
amplitude and scope of the functions entrusted to him in the
policy and its execution leading to the apt observation by Laski
one aspect of which that does not affect the lives of all. The
be of valuable assistance indeed to the President in the
awesome responsibility, but it is the latter who is vested with
characterized by Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62
 steady hand without vexation or embarrassing interference
and much less dictation from any source.
Under the presidential system, all executive and
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
various executive departments are assistants and agents of the
and. except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by
the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
Executive are performed by and through the executive
acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
C.Ê POÎER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LGUs
Art. X, Sec 4, 16

EN BANC    

 
 
%  
C.Ê Î  
 c   c 



.
9
 ),!"$$')*!"$
* !/!

Ganzon vs CA
The grant of mere supervisory power over local
autonomous regions is in line with the policy of the State
the autonomy of local governments and autonomous
can be no real local autonomy while the National
Ganzon
the localvsgovernments.
CA 200 SCRA 271
The petitioners question the power of the
through the Secretary of Local Government, to suspend
local officials.
It is the considered opinion of the Court that
the change in the constitution, the charter did not
legislature of its right -- or the President of her
by existing legislation to provide administrative
officials. The omission of "as may be provided by law"
signifies nothing more than to underscore local
from Congress and to break Congress' "control" over
The Constitution did not, however, intend for the sake of
Petitioners
autonomy, are under
to deprive the impression
the legislature that the over
of all authority
left the President
corporations, mere supervisory
in particular, powers,
concerning which
discipline.
the power of investigation, and denied her control,
embraces disciplinary authority. This is a mistaken
legally "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary
"Control" has been defined as the power of an officer to
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
for that of the latter. "Supervision" on the other hand
 overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
subordinate officers perform their duties.
D.Ê Î 
 
SARMIENTO V MISON
Petitioners brought this suit for prohibition in their
taxpayers, members of the Bar and law professors, to
Commissioner of Customs from performing his functions
that his appointment, w/o confirmation by the CA, is
HELD: Art. VII, Sec. 16, as orginally proposed by the
Executive Power of the 1986 Con Com read:
Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with
a Commission on Appointment, shall appoint the heads
departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
captain and all other officers of the Government whose
are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may by law
appointment of inferior officers in the President alone,
However,
in the heads on motion of Comm. Foz, 2 changes
of departments.
the text of the provision. The first was to delete the
bureaus," and the second was to place a period (.) after
"captain" and substitute the phrase "and all" w/ the
ALSO APPOINT ANY." The first amendment was
appointment of bureau directors from the requirement
on the ground that this position is low and to require
would subject bureau directors to political influence. On
The 2nd
hand, the heads of the exec.
amendment wasdepts, ambassadors,
intended to subjectother
to
ministers and consuls,
those mentioned in theofficers of the armed
frist sentence, forces from
namely:
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
vested(1)
in him in the
Regular Consti, i.e.,
members of the Judicial and Bar
Sec. 8(2)]
(2) Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil
Commission [Art. IX-B, Sec. 1 (2)];
(3) Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC
Sec. 1 (2)];
(4) Chairman and Commissioners of the COA [Art.
(2)];
(5) Members of the regional consultative
Sec. 18.)
The rest of the appointments mentioned in sec. 16
subject to confirmation. These are: (1) all other officers
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
whom the Pres. may be authorized by law to appoint;
lower in rank whose appointments Congress may by law
â
 









Pres. alone.
 F: Petitioner and 3 others were appointed Sectoral
tatives by the President pursuant to Article VII, Section
Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. However,
3 other sectoral representatives- appointees were not
oaths and discharge their duties as members of
opposition of some congressmen-members of the
Appointments (CA), who insisted that sectoral
be confirmed by the CA before they can take their oaths
ISSUE:
office asÎhether
members the
ofConstitution
the House ofrequires confirmation
Representatives.
appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives.
HELD: YES. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
"The president shall nominate and, with the consent of
on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
In SARMIENTO VS. MISON (1987), the SC
x".
Art. VII of the Constitution to mean that only
mentioned in the first sentence of the said Section 16,
confirmation
Since theby seats
the CA.
reserved for sectoral
Sec. 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the
provision of Sec. 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is
sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives
"other officers whose appointments are vested in the
Constitution", referred to in the first sentence of Sec. 16,
appointments are subject to confirmation by the
MISON) Implicit in the invocation of par. 2, Section 16, Art.
authority for the appointment of petitioner is, the
President as appointing authority that petitioner's
confirmation by the CA. Under Par. 2, Sec. 16, Art VII,
made by the President pursuant thereto "shall be
disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment of
indeed appointments of sectoral representatives need
the President need not make any reference to the
provisions above-quoted in appointing the petitioner.
fact, the President had expressly submitted petitioner's
confirmation by the CA. Considering that Congress had
without resp. CA having acted on petitioner's
appointment/nomination had become moot and
Sec. 23 of the Rules of resp. CA and "unless resubmitted
 

 

 


be considered by the Commission."

,"-,

F: In March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law),
Labor Code, was approved. It provides in Sec. 13 thereof
 "xxx
The Chairman, the Division Presiding
Commissioners shall be appointed by the President,
confirmation byto
Pursuant the CA.law,
said xxx"
President Aquino appointed
(B. CARALE) and Commissioners of the NLRC. The
that the appointees may qualify and enter upon the
the duties
The of the office.
present petition for prohibition questions the
tionality and legality of the permanent appointments
President to the respondents Chairman and Members of
without submitting the same to the Commission on
confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as
6715. Petitioners insists on a mandatory compliance w/
which has in its favor the presumption of validity. RA
according to the petitioner, an encroachment on the
of the The
executive contained
Solicitor Generalin Sec. 16 ofonArt.
contends, theVII of the
other hand,
transgresses Sec. 16, Art. VII by expanding the
the Commission on Appointments without constitutional
ISSUES: (1) Î/N Congress may, by law, require
Commission on Appointments of appointments
dent to government officers additional to those
the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution.
HELD: The controversy in the case is focused on Sec. 16,
1987 Constitution w/c provides:
"Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with
the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
and other officers whose appointments are vested in
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
There are four groups of officers whom the
commissions, or boards." xxx
appoint. These four groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments,
other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government
ments are not otherwise provided for law;
Third, those whom the President may be
appoint;
 Fourth, officers lower in rank whose
may by law vest in the President alone.
The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to
officers of the government whose appointments are not
provided for by law and those whom the President may
by Indubitably,
law to appoint.
the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners
second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII, more specifically
whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to
Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are
officers mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 whose
requires confirmation by the CA.
To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation
the appointments of respondents Chairman and
it is unconstitutional because:
1. it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec.
Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring
the2.CA; and
it amends by legislation, the second sentence of
by imposing the confirmation of the CA on
otherwise entrusted only with the President.
Deciding on what laws to pass is a legislative
Determining their constitutionality is a judicial function.
Supreme Court decisions applying or interpreting
tution shall form part of the legal system of the
or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision
banc or in division may be modified or reversed except
sitting en banc.
,"-,

÷


!

"




###

$
%

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&%

 


 


!
'


 '
( 

1. Confirmation by the CA is required only for

appointees as mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16,
including, those officers whose appointments are
the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral
Congress and members of the constitutional
Service and Election).
2. Confirmation is not required when the
other government officers whose appointments are not
provided for by law or those officers whom he may be
law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the
Rights). Also, as observed in Sarmiento v. Mison, when
inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment
provides in an unconstitutional manner for such
officers are considered as among those whose
otherwise provided for by law.
 (2) Î/N legislation can expand a constitutional
the Supreme Court has interpreted it.
In Endencia and Jugo v. David, 93 Phil. 699, the
"Îe have already said that the Legislature under
government is assigned the task and the power to make
but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard
interpretation of the Constitution, which is not within
Legislative Department. If the Legislature may declare
means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution
after the courts have in actual case ascertained its
interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would
confusion and instability in judicial processes and court
such a system, a final court determination of a case
interpretation of the law or of the Constitution may be
even annulled by a subsequent and different
or of the Constitution by the Legislative Department.
be wiseThenorfunction
desirable, besides
of the Courtbeing clearlyupon
in passing violative of of
an act
principles
to " lay theofarticle
our constitutional systemwhich
of the Constitution of government,
is invoked
governing the separation of powers."
statute which is challenged and to decide whether the
with the former" and to announce its considered
question."
It cannot be overlooked that Sec. 16, Art. VII of
Constitution was deliberately intended by the framers to
from the system embodied in the 1935 Constitution
exercised the power of confirmation over almost all
appointments, leading to many cases of abuse of such
confirmation.
,"-,

E.Ê PARDONING POÎER
F.Ê MILITARY POÎERS
Îrit of habeas Data
THE RULE ON THE ÎRIT OF HABEAS DATA
SECTION 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is a
to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
SEC. 2. Îho May File. - Any aggrieved party may file a
writ of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal
enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the
namely: the spouse, children and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of
party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph;
SEC. 3. Îhere to File. - The petition may be filed with
Court where the petitioner or respondent resides, or
jurisdiction over the place where the data or information
collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner.
The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or
Appeals or the Sandiganbayan when the action concerns
files of government offices.
SEC. 4. Îhere Returnable; Enforceable. - Îhen the writ
Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, it shall be
such court or judge.
Îhen issued by the Court of Appeals or the
justices, it may be returnable before such court or any
or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the
respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over
the data or information is gathered, collected or stored.
Îhen issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices,
returnable before such Court or any justice thereof, or
of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, or
Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or
resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place
information is gathered, collected or stored.
The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere
Philippines.
Sec. 5. Docket Fees. - No docket and other lawful fees
from an indigent petitioner. The petition of the indigent
and acted upon immediately, without prejudice to
submission of proof of indigency not later than fifteen
the filing of the petition.
SEC. 6. Petition. - A verified written petition for a writ of
should contain:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or
affects the right to life, liberty or security of the
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to
or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the
office, and the person in charge, in possession or in
or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the
suppression or destruction of the database or
by the respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for
enjoining the act complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.
SEC. 7. Issuance of the Îrit. - Upon the filing of the
justice or judge shall immediately order the issuance of
face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the
seal of the court and cause it to be served within three
issuance; or, in case of urgent necessity, the justice or
the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize
person
The writserve
shallit.
also set the date and time for summary
petition which shall not be later than ten (10) work days
of its issuance.
SEC. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Îrit. -
who refuses to issue the writ after its allowance, or a
who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the
judge for contempt without prejudice to other
SEC. 9. How the Îrit is Served. - The writ shall be served
respondent by a judicial officer or by a person deputized
justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to
service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on
the rules on substituted service shall apply.
SEC. 10. Return; Contents. - The respondent shall file a
return together with supporting affidavits within five (5)
from service of the writ, which period may be
the Court for justifiable reasons. The return shall, among
contain the following:
(a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state
privileged communications, confidentiality of the source
of media and others;
(b) In case of respondent in charge, in possession or in
data or information subject of the petition;
(i) a disclosure of the data or information about the
nature of such data or information, and the purpose for
(ii) the steps or actions taken by the respondent to
and confidentiality of the data or information; and,
(iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information
(c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of the
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall
SEC. 11. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may
imprisonment or fine a respondent who commits
false return, or refusing to make a return; or any person
disobeys or resist a lawful process or order of the court.
SEC. 12. Îhen Defenses May be Heard in Chambers. - A
chambers may be conducted where the respondent
that the release of the data or information in question
national security or state secrets, or when the data or
cannot be divulged to the public due to its nature or
character.
Sec. 13. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The
motions are prohibited:
(a) Motion to dismiss;
(b) Motion for extension of time to file return,
position paper and other pleadings;
(c) Dilatory motion for postponement;
(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;
(f) Third-party complaint;
(g) Reply;
(h) Motion to declare respondent in default;
(i) Intervention;
(j) Memorandum;
(k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or
orders; and
(l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition
interlocutory order.
SEC. 14. Return; Filing. - In case the respondent fails to
court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition
granting the petitioner such relief as the petition may
the court in its discretion requires the petitioner to
SEC. 15. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the petition
summary. However, the court, justice or judge may call
conference to simplify the issues and determine the
obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.
SEC. 16. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment
days from the time the petition is submitted for
allegations in the petition are proven by substantial
shall enjoin the act complained of, or order the deletion,
rectification of the erroneous data or information and
relevant reliefs as may be just and equitable; otherwise,
the
Uponwrit
its shall be denied.
finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the
lawful officers as may be designated by the court, justice
five (5) working days.
SEC. 17. Return of Service. - The officer who executed
judgment shall, within three (3) days from its
verified return to the court. The return shall contain a
the proceedings under the writ and a complete
database or information, or documents and articles
rectified, or deleted, with copies served on the
respondent.
The officer shall state in the return how the judgment
complied with by the respondent, as well as all
regarding the manner and regularity of the service of the
SEC. 18. Hearing on Officer͛s Return. - The court shall set
hearing with due notice to the parties and act
SEC. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final
order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal
questions of fact or law or both.
The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from
notice of the judgment or final order.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas
amparo cases.
SEC. 20. Institution of Separate Actions. - The filing of a
writ of habeas data shall not preclude the filing of
civil or administrative actions.
SEC. 21. Consolidation. - Îhen a criminal action is filed
the filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be
the criminal action.
Îhen a criminal action and a separate civil action are
to a petition for a writ of habeas data, the petition shall
with the criminal action.
After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall
govern the disposition of the reliefs in the petition.
SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. - Îhen a
been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall
 relief under the writ shall be available to an aggrieved
in the criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the
available under the writ of habeas data.
SEC. 23. Substantive Rights. - This Rule shall not
modify substantive rights.
SEC. 24. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. -
Court shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not
Rule.
SEC. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on
following its publication in three (3) newspapers of
[PUBLISHED IN THE MANILA BULLETIN, THE PHILIPPINE
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER ON 25 JANUARY 2008]
Îrit of Amparo
Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
public official or employee, or of a private individual or

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced

threats thereof.

1. Any
Sec. 2. member
Îho MayofFile.
the -immediate family,
The petition may benamely: thethe
filed by
and
or byparents of the aggrieved
any qualified party; in the following
person or entity

2. Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of

party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph;

3. Any concerned citizen, organization, association or

is no known member of the immediate family or relative
aggrieved party.

The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends

other authorized parties to file similar petitions.
Sec. 3. Îhere
the petition bytoanFile. - The petition
authorized may
party on be filed
behalf on any
of the
time with the
suspends the right
Regional
of allTrial Court
others, of the place
observing where the
the order
omission was committed or any of its elements
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, the Supreme
of such courts. The writ shall be enforceable anywhere
Philippines.

Îhen issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge

Îhen issued by the Sandiganbayan or the Court of
their justices, it may be returnable before such court or
thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place
or omission was committed or any of its elements

Îhen issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices,

returnable before such Court or any justice thereof, or
Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their
Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or
committed or any of its elements occurred.

Sec. 4. No Docket Fees. - The petitioner shall be

payment of the docket and other lawful fees when filing
The court, justice or judge shall docket the petition and
1. The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
immediately.

2. The
Sec. 5. name andof
Contents personal
Petition.circumstances
- The petitionofshall
the be signed
for
andthe threat,
shall allegeact
theorfollowing:
omission, or, if the name is
the respondent may be described by an assumed

3. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved

threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission
respondent, and how such threat or violation is
attendant circumstances detailed in supporting

4. The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the

circumstances, and addresses of the investigating
individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the
together with any report;

5. The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to

fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the
The petition may include a general prayer for other just
person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
reliefs.
6. The relief prayed for.
Sec. 6. Issuance of the Îrit. - Upon the filing of the
justice or judge shall immediately order the issuance of
face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the
seal of the court; or in case of urgent necessity, the
may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may
officer or person to serve it.

The writ shall also set the date and time for summary
petition which shall not be later than seven (7) days
Sec. 7. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Îrit. -
who refuses to issue the writ after its allowance, or a
who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the
judge for contempt without prejudice to other

Sec. 8. How the Îrit is Served. - The writ shall be served

respondent by a judicial officer or by a person deputized
justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to
service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on
the rules on substituted service shall apply.

Sec. 9. Return; Contents. - Îithin seventy-two (72)

1.
of The lawfulthe
the writ, defenses to show
respondent shallthat
file the respondent
a verified did
written
threaten with violation
with supporting thewhich
affidavits right shall,
to life,among
libertyother
and
aggrieved
following: party, through any act or omission;

2. The steps or actions taken by the respondent to

whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or
responsible for the threat, act or omission;

3. All relevant information in the possession of the

pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the
and

1.
4. to verify
If the the identity
respondent is aof the aggrieved
public official or party;
employee, the
further state the actions that have been or will still be
2. to recover and preserve evidence related to the death
disappearance of the person identified in the petition
the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;

3. to identify witnesses and obtain statements from

the death or disappearance;

4. to determine the cause, manner, location and time of

disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that
about the death or disappearance;

5. to identify and apprehend the person or persons

death or disappearance; and
The return shall also state other matters relevant to the
its resolution and the prosecution of the case.
6. to bring the suspected offenders before a competent
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall

Sec. 10. Defenses not Pleaded Deemed Îaived. - All

raised in the return, otherwise, they shall be deemed
Sec. 11. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The
motions
1. Motionare
to prohibited:
dismiss;

2. Motion for extension of time to file return,

position paper and other pleadings;

3. Dilatory motion for postponement;

4. Motion for a bill of particulars;

5. Counterclaim or cross-claim;

6. Third-party complaint;

7. Reply;

8. Motion to declare respondent in default;

9. Intervention;

10. Memorandum;

11. Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or

Sec. 12. Effect of Failure to File Return. - In case the
orders; and
file a return, the court, justice or judge shall proceed to
petition ex parte.
12. Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition
interlocutory order.
Sec. 13. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the petition
summary. However, the court, justice or judge may call
conference to simplify the issues and determine the
obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.

The hearing shall be from day to day until completed

same priority as petitions for habeas corpus.
(a)
Sec.Temporary
14. InterimProtection Order.filing
Reliefs. - Upon - Theofcourt, justice or
the petition or at
motion or motuthe
final judgment, proprio,
court,may order
justice that the
or judge maypetitioner
grant any
party and any member
following reliefs: of the immediate family be
government agency or by an accredited person or
capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the
organization, association or institution referred to in
Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers

The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and

aggrieved party and any member of the immediate
accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.

The accredited persons and private institutions shall

rules and conditions that may be imposed by the court,

(b) Inspection Order. - The court, justice or judge, upon

and after due hearing, may order any person in
a designated land or other property, to permit entry for
inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the
relevant object or operation thereon.

The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be

shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of
personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance or
the aggrieved party.

If the motion is opposed on the ground of national

privileged nature of the information, the court, justice or
conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of
opposition.

The movant must show that the inspection order is

establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be
violated.

The inspection order shall specify the person or persons

make the inspection and the date, time, place and
the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to
constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall expire
after the date of its issuance, unless extended for

(c) Production Order. - The court, justice or judge, upon

and after due hearing, may order any person in
control of any designated documents, papers, books,
photographs, objects or tangible things, or objects in
electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence
petition or the return, to produce and permit their
or photographing by or on behalf of the movant.

The motion may be opposed on the ground of national

privileged nature of the information, in which case the
judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine
opposition.
capable of keeping and securing their safety.

Sec. 15. Availability of Interim Reliefs to Respondent. -

motion of the respondent and after due hearing, the
judge may issue an inspection order or production order
paragraphs (b) and (c) of the preceding section.

A motion for inspection order under this section shall be

affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal
defenses of the respondent.

Sec. 16. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may

respondent who refuses to make a return, or who makes
or any person who otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful
order of the court to be punished for contempt. The
imprisoned or imposed a fine.

Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence

parties shall establish their claims by substantial

The respondent who is a private individual or entity

ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules
was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent who is a public official or employee

extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws,
regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent public official or employee cannot

presumption that official duty has been regularly
responsibility or liability.

Sec. 18. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment

days from the time the petition is submitted for
allegations in the petition are proven by substantial
shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as
and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be

Sec. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final
order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal
questions of fact or law or both.

The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from

notice of the adverse judgment.
 dismissed with prejudice upon failure to prosecute the
lapse of two (2) years from notice to the petitioner of
archiving the case.

The clerks of court shall submit to the Office of the Court

a consolidated list of archived cases under this Rule not
first week of January of every year.

Sec. 21. Institution of Separate Actions. - This Rule shall

filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions.

Sec. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. - Îhen a

been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall
reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the

The procedure under this Rule shall govern the

available under the writ of amparo.

Sec. 23. Consolidation. - Îhen a criminal action is filed

the filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be
the criminal action.

Îhen a criminal action and a separate civil action are

to a petition for a writ of amparo, the latter shall be
the criminal action.

After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall

apply to the disposition of the reliefs in the petition.

Sec. 24. Substantive Rights. - This Rule shall not diminish,

modify substantive rights recognized and protected by

Sec. 25. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. -

Court shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not
G.Ê EMERGENCY
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Sec. 26. Applicability to)!*-""$0."$$"
Pending Cases. - This Rule shall
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Sec. 27. Effectivity.
,$",!") - This Rule shall
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OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS
I.Ê POÎER
J.Ê POÎER OVER LEGISLATION
Facts:
The petitioners take common issue on the power of the
(acting through the Secretary of Local Government), to
local officials. The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a
administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him by
officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them,
oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral
culpable
Issue: violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.
Îhether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as
alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials under the
supervision of the President.
Held:
Yes. The 1987 Constitution provides in Art. X, Sec. 4 that
President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
governments." It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in
Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 10(1), stating that "[T]he President
general supervision over all local governments as may be
the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the
constitutional language, the Charter did not intend to divest
right Ͷ or the President of her prerogative as conferred by
Ͷ to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It
that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies
to underscore local governments' autonomy from Congress
Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The
however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive
authority over
Since municipal
local corporations,
governments in particular,to the
remain accountable
change in may,
the latter constitutional language
by law, and did not exempt
in the manner set forthlocal
therein,
legislative regulation provided regulation is consistent with the
action against local officials. In the case at bar, the Secretary of
premise of autonomy.
Government, the President's alter ego, in consonance with the
provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the existing Local Government
petitioner Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and
The petitioners are under the impression that the
member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod.
the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly
of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly
authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally,
"Supervision" is notdisciplinary
incompatible with incompatible with disciplinary
authority authority.
as this Court has held.
„s
in Ganzon vs. Cayanan, 104 Phil. 484, "in administration law
overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to
their duties."
Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President
suspend remove) it was not because we did not think that the
exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the
power elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him
Court, Now, autonomy
as in Ganzon is either decentralization
v. Kayanan, of in
found little difficulty
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
central government delegates administrative powers to
order to broaden the base of government power and in the
local governments "more responsive and accountable," and
development as self-reliant communities and make them more
partners in the pursuit of national development and social
same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. ?he
exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure
are administered according to law." He has no control over
[G.R. No.
sense that125350. Decembertheir
he can substitute 3, 2002.]
judgments with his own.

†

 
   
Facts:
In 1986, petitioners as RTC and MTC judges stationed in
received a monthly allowance of P1,260 each pursuant to the
appropriation ordinance. Eventually, in 1991, it was increased
each judge. However, on March 15, 1994, the Department of
Management (DBM) issued Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC
that the additional monthly allowances to be given by a local
should not exceed P1,000 in provinces and cities and P700 in
Acting on the said DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor
disallowance to herein petitioners in excess of the amount
55. Thus, petitioners filed with the Office of the City Auditor a
it was treated as a motion for reconsideration and was
Commission on Audit (COA) Regional Office No. 7. In turn, the
Office referred the said motion to their Head Office with
the same should be denied. Accordingly, it was denied by the
petitioners filed the
Petitioner instant
judges arguepetition.
that LBCThey argued,
55 is among
void for infringing
void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue
autonomy of Mandaue City by dictating a uniform amount City by
that
amount that a local government unit can disburse
government unit can disburse as additional allowances to as additional
judges stationed
therein. therein.
They maintain that said circular is not supported by
therefore goes beyond the supervisory powers of the
Issue:
Îhether LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the
powers of the President
Held:
No. Îe recognize that, although our Constitution 6
autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local
subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of
President. Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine
that:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
local governments. . . .
In Pimentel vs. Aguirre, 7 we defined the supervisory power of
and distinguished it from the power of control exercised by
This provision (Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine
been interpreted to exclude the power of control. In Mondano
the Court contrasted the President's power of supervision over
government officials with that of his power of control over
the national government. It was emphasized that the two
and control Ͷ differed in meaning and extent. The Court
". . . In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or
follows:
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform
the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take
as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of
substitute
In Taule v. the judgment
Santos, of thestated
we further formerthat
for the
thatChief
of the latter." Ii
Executive
authority than that of checking whether local governments or
were performing their duties as provided by the fundamental
statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments, so long
the scope of their authority. "Supervisory power, when
is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does
In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim, the difference
restraining authority over such body," iv[8] we said.
supervision was further delineated. Officers in control lay
performance or accomplishment of act. If these rules are not
may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by
or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand,
cover such authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that
followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not
order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such
Under
prescribe our
their present
own system
manner of government,
of execution executive
of the act. They have
the President. The members of the Cabinet and other
this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.
merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power of
President, at whose will and behest they can be removed from
actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In
political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign
emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly
constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President's
control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of
powers. Clearly
By thethen,
samethe President
token, can only may
the President interfere in the or
not withhold
of a local government
authority or power givenunitthem
if hebyor the
she Constitution
finds that theand
latter
thehas
law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers
government units. Hence, the President or any of his or her
interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local
within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any
by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter
law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local
nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and
powers of the executive and legislative departments in
Does LBC 55 go beyond the law it seeks to implement?
corporations.
LBC 55 provides that the additional monthly allowances to be
government unit should not exceed P1,000 in provinces and
municipalities. Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160, the law
serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of
"when the finances of the city government allow." The said
authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the additional
to judges. Thus, we need not belabor the point that the
government may allow the grant of additional allowances
the revenues of the said city government exceed its annual
to illustrate, a city government with locally generated annual
million
Setting and expenditures
a uniform amountofforP35
themillion canadditional
grant of afford to grant
than P1,000 each
inappropriate wayto,
of say, ten judges
enforcing inasmuch
the criterion as the
found in finances
Section
afford it.
of RA 7160. The DBM over-stepped its power of supervision
government units by imposing a prohibition that did not
law it sought to implement. In other words, the prohibitory
circular had no legal basis.
1.Ê POÎER OF APPOINTMENT
d.1. Basis

d.2. with concurrence of COA

Art VII, Sec. 16

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 139554. July 21, 2006.]
ARMITA B. RUFINO vs. BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA
Facts:
Presidential Decree No. 15 (PD 15) created the Cultural
Philippines (CCP) for the primary purpose of propagating arts
Philippines. PD 15 created a Board of Trustees ("Board") to
controversy revolves on who between the contending groups,
Endriga groups, both claiming as the rightful trustees of the
legal right to hold office. The resolution of the issue boils down
constitutionality of the provision of PD 15 on the manner of
the Board. During the term of President Fidel V. Ramos, the
Endriga, Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez, Lenora A.
and Manuel T. Mañosa ("Mañosa"). On 22 December 1998,
Joseph E. Estrada appointed seven new trustees to the CCP
four years to replace the Endriga group (by the Rufino Group)
 Endriga questioned President Estrada's appointment of
members to the CCP Board. The Endriga group alleged that
of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board "shall be filled by election
majority of the trustees held at the next regular meeting . . . ."
trustee survive[s], the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving
consultation with the ranking officers of the [CCP]." The
that it is only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant may the
Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with the
the CCP. The Endriga group asserted that when former
appointed the Rufino group, only one seat was vacant due to
Mañosa's term.
On the It maintained
other thatgroup
hand, Rufino underasserted
the CCPthat
Charter, the
the law
four-year
delegate to term
thecould only be
CCP Board theterminated "by reason
power to appoint of lower
officers
death,
trusteesorofother cause."The law may not validly confer on the
the Board.
authority to appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the latter
officers of equal rank and not of lower rank. Section 6(b) of PD
the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be
unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of
Constitution allowing the appointment only of "officers lower
Issue:
appointing power.
Îhether Section 6(b) of PD 15 is constitutional.
Held:
No. The source of the President's power to appoint, as
Legislature's authority to delegate the power to appoint, is
ArticleThe
VII of the 1987
power Constitution.
to appoint is the prerogative of the
those instances when the Constitution provides otherwise.
fundamentally Executive power by the Legislative and Judicial
the system of separation of powers that inheres in our
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the
government.
three groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
whose appointments are vested in the President by the
second group refers to those whom the President may be
appoint.
Under theThe third
same group 16,
Section refers to all
there is aother
fourthofficers
group of
of the
lower-
appointments are not otherwise provided by law.
whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of
agencies, commissions, or boards. The present case involves
of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution with respect
The Presidentof
appointment appoints the group
this fourth first group of officers with the
of officers.
Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the
groups of officers without the consent of the Commission on
President appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent
appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a
commission, or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional.
6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the President
trustees of the CCP Board because the trustees fall under the
officers.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly intended
could by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The
1986framers
The Constitutional Commission
of the 1987 explain
Constitution this intent
changed beyond any
the qualifying
the less disparaging phrase "lower in rank" purely for style.
intent remained that these inferior or lower in rank officers are
subordinates of the heads of departments, agencies,
who are vested by law with the power to appoint. The express
Constitution and the clear intent of its framers point to only
the officers whom the heads of departments, agencies,
may appoint
Further,must be of16,
Section lower rank
Article VIIthan those
of the 1987vested by law
Constitution
appoint.
Congress to vest "in the heads of departments, agencies,
boards" the power
?he Congress to appoint
may, by law, vestlower-ranked officers.
the appointment Section
of other
in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
commissions, or boards.
In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the
not authorize the Undersecretary, acting as such
lower-ranked officers in the Executive department. In an
vested in the head of the agency for it would be preposterous
agency itself. In a commission, the head is the chairperson of
a board, the head is also the chairperson of the board. In the
situations,
The grant ofthe
thelaw may to
power notappoint
also authorize officers
to the heads other than
of agencies,
agency,
boards iscommission,
a matter of or board tograce.
legislative appoint lower-ranked
Congress has the
withhold from, the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards
appoint lower-ranked officers. If it so grants, Congress may
conditions for the exercise of such legislative delegation, like
recommendation of subordinate officers or the concurrence of
This is in contrast to the President's power to appoint which is
members of the commission or board.
power vested by the Constitution itself and thus not subject to
limitations or conditions. The power to appoint conferred
Constitution on the Supreme Court en banc and on the
Commissions 30 is also self-executing and not subject to
The 1987 Constitution speaks of vesting the power to appoint
conditions.
in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
consistent with Section 5(6), Article VIII of the 1987
that the "Supreme Court shall . . . [a]ppoint all officials and
Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law," making the
en banc the appointing power. In sharp contrast, when the
speaks of the power to appoint lower-ranked officers in the
vestsCCP,
The the being
powergoverned
"in the heads of departments,
by a board, agencies,
is not an agency but a
boards."
of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 6(b)
thus irreconcilably inconsistent with Section 16, Article VII of
Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers the
the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them
fellow trustees. On the other hand, Section 16, Article VII of
Constitution allows heads of departments, agencies,
appoint only "officers lower in rank" than such "heads of
agencies, commissions, or boards." This excludes a situation
appointing officer appoints an officer equal in rank as him.
authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to elect their co-
and
It (c) not
does of PD 15 is unconstitutional
matter that Section 6(b) because
of PD 15itempowers
violates Section
the
the 1987 Constitution.
to "elect" and not "appoint" their fellow trustees for the effect
which is to fill vacancies in the CCP Board. A statute cannot
constitutional limitations on the power to appoint by filling
office through election by the co-workers in that office. Such
Further,
vacanciesSection 6(b) office
in a public and (c)has
of no
PD constitutional
15 makes the CCP trustees
basis.
appointing power of their fellow trustees. The creation of an
appointing power inherently conflicts with the President's
This inherent conflict has spawned recurring controversies in
of CCP trustees every time a new President assumes office.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 79974. December 17, 1987.]



    
†
 

 



Facts:
The petitioners questioned the appointment of Mison as
of the Bureau of customs as it was done without the
Commission on Appointments.
Issue:
Îhether the appointment is valid.
Held:
Yes. It is readily apparent that under the provisions of
Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers
President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will
from
=Ê timeFirst,tothe
time, are:of the executive departments,
heads
public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
him in Second,
=Ê this Constitution;
all other officers of the Government whose
not otherwise provided for by law;
=Ê Third, those whom the President may be authorized by
=Ê Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the
by law vest in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent
Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers
nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Appointments, the President appoints. The second, third and
in the 1935
officers are Constitution, almost
the present bone all presidential appointments
of contention.
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. It
of our political history that the power of confirmation by the
Appointments, under the 1935 Constitution, transformed that
many
On thetimes,
otherinto a venue
hand, of "horse-trading"
the 1973 and similar
Constitution, consistent with the
pattern in which it was molded and remolded by successive
placed the absolute power of appointment in the President
check
Given onthethe parttwo
above of the legislature.
in extremes, one, in the 1935
in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state
of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a
by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
the first group of appointments and leaving to the President,
confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in
As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII
third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers
Constitution, there are officers whose appointments require
the Commission on Appointments, even if such officers may be
compared to some officers whose appointments have to be
Commission on Appointments under the first sentence of the
But
VII. these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely
intention and deliberate judgment of the framers of the 1987
except as to those officers whose appointments require the
Commission on Appointments by express mandate of the first
16, Art. VII, appointments of other officers are left to the
need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
inevitable, if we are to presume, as we must, that the framers
Constitution were knowledgeable
Besides, the power of what they were
to appoint is fundamentally doingorand
executive
foreseable effects thereof.
character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power
construed against them. Such limitations or qualifications must
in order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence of
where it is clearly stated that appointments by the President to
It is evident
therein that the require
enumerated positionthe
of consent of the of
Yommissioner the Bureauon
Commission
bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of
the consent of the Yommission on Appointments is required.
fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution
bureaus" among those officers whose appointments need the
Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution, on the
deliberately
Moreover, the excluded
Presidenttheisposition of authorized
expressly "heads of bureaus"
by law tofrom
that need the consent
Commissioner (confirmation)
of the Bureau of the
of Customs. TheCommission
original texton
of
Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff and
Philippines, which was enacted by the Congress of the
After
1967.the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep.
PD No. 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII,
while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of
that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is
make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the
Commission on Appointments.
[G.R. No. 86439. April 13, 1989.]

   %
 


 † c  

Facts:
On 27 August 1987, the President of the Philippines
petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as "Acting Chairman,
Human Rights." Realizing perhaps the need for a permanent
members of the Commission on Human Rights, befitting an
as mandated by the Constitution, the President of the
December 1988 extended to petitioner Bautista a permanent
Chairman of the Commission. On 22 December 1988, before
this Court,
On 9Hon. Marcelo
January 1989,B.petitioner
Fernan, petitioner Bautistaatook
Bautista received letter
virtue of her appointment as Chairman of the Commission
Secretary of the Commission on Appointments requesting her on
Commission certain information and documents as required by
connection with the confirmation of her appointment as
Commission on Human Rights. On 26 January 1989, the
Appointments disapproved petitioner Bautista's "ad interim
Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights in view of her
submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments.
had designated PCHR Commissioner Hesiquio R. Mallillin as
Issue:
the Commission" pending the resolution of Bautista's case.
Îhether or not the appointment by the President of the
the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), an "independent
1987 Constitution, is to be made with or without the
Commission on Appointments.
Held:
Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on
not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of
the 1987 Constitution, appointments to which are to be made
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, it follows
appointment by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is to
To
thebe moreor
review precise, the appointment
participation of the Chairman
of the Commission on and
Commission on Human Rights is not specifically provided for in
itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose
are expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with
The Presidentonappoints
Commission the Chairman and Members of the
Appointment.
Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16,
without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
among the officers of government "whom he (the President)
by law to appoint." And Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163,
authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and
As disclosed by the records, and as previously adverted to, it is
Commission on Human Rights.
petitioner Bautista was extended by Her Excellency, the
appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights
1988. Before this date, she was merely the "Acting Chairman"
Commission. Bautista's appointment on 17 December 1988 is
that was for the President solely to make, i.e., not an
submitted for review and confirmation (or rejection) by the
Appointments. This is in accordance with Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
The thresholdand
Constitution question that has
the doctrine in really
Misoncome
whichtoisthe fore is
here
President, subsequent to her act of 17 December 1988, and
Bautista had qualified for the office to which she had been
the oath of office and actually assuming and discharging the
duties thereof, could extend another appointment to the
January 1989, an "ad interim appointment" as termed by the
Commission on Appointments or any other kind of
office of Chairman
The Court, of the
with all due Commission
respect to bothontheHuman Rights
Executive andthat
confirmation
Departments by the Commission
of government, andon Appointments.
after careful deliberation, is
hold and rule in the negative. Îhen Her Excellency, the
petitioner Bautista's designation as Acting Chairman to a
appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights
1988, significantly she advised Bautista (in the same
by virtue of such appointment, she could qualify and enter
performance of the duties of the office (of Chairman of the
Human Rights). All that remained for Bautista to do was to
appointment. Obviously, she accepted the appointment by
office before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Hon.
and assuming immediately thereafter the functions and duties
Respondent Commission
of the Commission vigorously
on Human Rights.contends that,
Bautista's granting
appointment
appointment
December 1988 as Chairman
as Chairman of the Commission
of the Commission on on
Human
HumanRights
under Sec. 16,
completed act Art. VII part
on the of the
ofConstitution,
the President.as interpreted in the
solely for the President to make, yet, it is within the president's
voluntarily submit such appointment to the Commission on
confirmation. The mischief in this contention, as the Court
the suggestion that the President (with Congress agreeing)
timecan
Nor move
thepower boundaries,
Commission in the Constitution
on Appointments, by thedifferently
actual
are placed by thedelimited
constitutionally Constitution.
power to review presidential
power to confirm appointments that the Constitution has
President alone. Stated differently, when the appointment is
Constitution mandates is for the President to make without
the Commission on Appointments, the executive's voluntary
such appointment
Nor can respondents to the Commission
impressively on Appointments
contend that the newand
confirming
appointment or on
rejecting the same,
14 January are done
1989 was an adwithout
interim or in
under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do
appointments solely for the President to make, i.e., without
the Commission on Appointments. Ad interim appointments,
nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to
review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is
appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but
that are for the President solely to make, that is, without the
Commission on Appointments, can not be ad interim

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 83216. September 4, 1989.]
 
+  ?    
Facts:
On April 6, 1988, petitioner and three others were
Representatives by the President pursuant to Article VII,
and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. However,
three other sectoral representatives-appointees were not able
oaths and discharge their duties as members of Congress due
of some congressmen-members of the Commission on
insisted that sectoral representatives must first be confirmed
Commission before they could take their oaths and/or assume
Issue:
members of the House of Representatives.
Îhether the Constitution requires the appointment of
representatives to the House of Representatives to be
Commission on Appointments.
Held:
In Sarmiento vs. Mison, et al. (156 SCRA 549 [1987]), we
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution to mean that only
offices mentioned in the first sentence of the said Section 16,
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The ruling
reiterated in the recent case of Mary Concepcion Bautista vs.
Salonga, et al. (G.R. No. 86439, promulgated on April 13,
reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5,
filled by appointment by the President by express provision of
XVIII of the Constitution, it is indubitable that sectoral
House of Representatives are among the "other officers whose
are vested
Thereinare
theappointments
President in this Constitution,"
vested referred
in the President to in
in the
of Section
which, 16, Art. mandate
by express VII whoseofappointments are subject
the Constitution, requireto
no
Commission on Appointments.
appointments of members of the Supreme Court and judges of
(Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and the Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. 9,
exemption from confirmation had been extended to
Petitioner's
representatives in appointment was furthermore made
the Constitution.
Section 16, paragraph 2 which provides:
"SEC 16. ...
The President shall have the power to make appointments
the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
next adjournment of the Congress."
The reference to paragraph 2, Section 16 of Article VII as
the appointment of petitioner is of vital significance to the
records show that petitioner's appointment was made on April
Congress was in recess (March 26, 1988 to April 17, 1988);
to the said paragraph 2 of Section 16, Art. VII in the
Implicit
her. in the invocation of paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII as
appointment of petitioner is, the recognition by the President
authority that petitioner's appointment requires confirmation
Commission on Appointments. Under paragraph 2, Section 16,
appointments made by the President pursuant thereto "shall
until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
adjournment of the Congress." If indeed appointments of
representatives need no confirmation, the President need not
reference to the constitutional provisions above-quoted in
petitioner. As a matter of fact, the President in a letter dated
The provisions of Executive Order No. 198 do not deal with the
expressly submitted petitioner's appointment for confirmation
appointment of sectoral representatives. Executive Order No.
Commission on Appointments.
to specifying the sectors to be represented, their number, and
of such sectoral representatives. The power of the President to
representatives remains directly derived from Section 7, Article
Constitution which is quoted in the second "Îhereas" clause
No. 198. Petitioner Deles' appointment was issued not by
Order No. 198 but pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph 2
Section 7 of the Constitution which require submission to the
process.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 91636. April 23, 1992.]
†  

 
%
  



Facts:
Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso
Labor Code (PD 442) was approved. It provides in Section 13
"xxx xxx xxx
?he Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other
shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation
Commission on „ppointments. „ppointments to any vacancy
the nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor.
Labor „rbiters and Labor „rbiters shall also be appointed by
recommendation of the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
Pursuant to said law (RA 6715), President Aquino appointed
subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations."
Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public, workers
sectors.
This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and
permanent appointments extended by the President of the
respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor
Commission (NLRC), without submitting the same to the
Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the
amended by said RA 6715.
Issue:
Îhether RA 6715 is constitutional insofar as it requires
the Commission on Appointments the appointment of the
Commissioners of the NLRC by the president . whether or not
law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
extended by the President to government officers additional to
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
appointments
Held: require confirmation by the Commission on
No. From the cases of Sarmiento III vs. Mison (156 SCRA 549);
Bautista v. Salonga (172 SCRA 160), and Teresita Quintos
Commission on Constitutional Commissions, et al (177 SCRA
doctrines are deducible: 1. Confirmation by the Commission on
required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the
Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose
expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like
representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional
Audit, Civil Service and Election). 2. Confirmation is not
President appoints other government officers whose
otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may
law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the
Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates
Theprovide
omits to secondfor
sentence of Sec.thereto,
appointment 16, Art. or
VIIprovides
refers toinallan
government whose
manner for such appointmentthe
appointments, areofficers
not otherwise provided
are considered as
those whom the President may be authorized by law
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. to
the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically
groups" of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom
be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman
NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first
Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the
Appointments.  '!"
65@=()
 //)) ! !
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!(, !$02) ),!
Deciding on what law to
prerogative. Determining their constitutionality is a judicial
respects the laudable intention of the legislature. Regretfully,
constitutional infirmity of Sec. 13 of RA 6715 amending Art.

Code, insofar as it requires confirmation of the Commission on
over appointments of the Chairman and Members of the
Relations Commission (NLRC) is, as we see it, beyond
(a)Ê Heads of departments
(b)Ê Ambassadors, public ministers and consuls
(c)Ê Officers of AFP from colonel and naval captain
(d)Ê Chairman and members of the constitutional
(e)Ê Regular members of JBC (Art VIII, Sec. 8 [2])
(f)Ê Sectoral (Art XVIII, Sec. 7)
d.3 Upon Recommendation of JBC
(a) members of SC and all other courts (Art VIII, Sec 9)
(b) ombudsman and deputies
d.4 Appointment of VP as cabinet member (Sec 3)
d.5 Appointments solely by president (Sec 16)
(a) those whose appointments are not otherwise
(b) those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint
d.6 Limitations to appointing power
d.6.1. Art VII, Secs 13 and 15

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-19313. January 19, 1962.]
 
 




c

  
 
Facts:
On December 29, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia
Dominador R. Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central
day, the latter 30,
On December took1961,
the corresponding oath.
at noon, President-elect Diosdado
office; and on December 31, 1961, he issued Administrative
recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim
President Garcia after December 13, 1961 (date when he,
proclaimed elected by the Congress). On January 1, 1962,
appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the
latter
Issue: qualified immediately.
Îhether the new President had power to issue the
of the ad interim appointments made by the past President,
appointees had already qualified.
Held:
As a rule, once an appointment is issued, it cannot be
specially where the appointee has qualified. On the other
admit of exceptional circumstances justifying revocation such
interim appointments (350) issued in the last hours of an
Executive are to be considered by the Commission on
different from that be submitted by an incoming Chief
whollyAfter
approve of the selections
the proclamation especially
of the electionif of
it isandoubtful
incomingthat
President exercised
the outgoing double care
Chief Executive inmore
is no extending
than such
a "care- taker"
is duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority
President and he should not do acts which, he ought to know,
or obstruct the policies, of his successor. It is not for him to use
incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had
himselfThe
of presidential prerogatives
filling up of vacancies to serve partisan
in important purposes.
positions, if few,
as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful
the need for the appointment and the appointee's
undoubtedly permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments
the planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before
of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by
Îhen the President makes ad-interim appointments, he
abuse of presidential prerogatives.
special prerogative and is bound to be prudent to insure
selection either by previous consultation with the members of
or by thereafter explaining to them the reason for such
Commission on Appointments that will consider the
that existing at the time of the appointment and where the
submitted by his successor who may not wholly approved of
President should be doubly careful in extending such
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-21776. February 28, 1964.]


† 
† c  +

 
Facts:
Petitioner, Nicanor G. Jorge, is a career official in the
He started working there as a Junior Computer in the course of
from February 1, 1922 to October 31, 1960, and attained the
Director, through regular and successive promotions, in
service rules. On June 17, 1961, he was designated Acting
Bureau, and on December 13, 1961 was appointed by
interim Director. He qualified by taking the oath of office on
of 1961. This appointment was on December 26, 1961,
Petitioner
Commission discharged the dutiesand
on Appointments, as Director until1962,
on May 14, on November
received a letter
appointment from Benjamin
as Director of LandsGozon, then Secretary
was confirmed by theof
Natural Resources of the Macapagal Administration, informing
pursuant to a letter from the Assistant Executive Secretary
petitioner on November 13, his appointment was among those
Administrative Order No. 2 of President Diosdado Macapagal;
of Director of Lands was considered vacant.
Issue:
Îhether the Jorge appointment is similarly situated as those
and therefore invalid.
Held:
Petitioner Jorge's ad interim appointment is dated
but there is no evidence on record that it was made and
session of Congress that ended on the same day. It is a matter
history, of which this Court may take judicial cognizance, that
late in the night of December 13, 1961, and, therefore, after
hours. In the absence of competent evidence to the contrary,
presumed that the appointment of Jorge was made before the
hours, that being the regular course of business. The
was not included in, nor intended to be covered by,
and the same stands unrevoked. Consequently, it was validly
It is an error on
Commission to consider petitioner's
Appointments, case as within
and thereafter, the purview
the office never
the Aytona vs. Castillo case (L-19313, Jan. 20, 1962). If in that
refused to interfere with the application of the Chief
Order No. 2, it was because the circumstances of the
involved rendered it doubtful whether the appointees'
invoked,"considering the rush conditional appointments,
and
There other happenings
is certainly detracting
no parity from
between thethat degree of good
appointment of
propriety which form the basic foundation of claims
13, 1961 and the confused scramble for appointments in and to
immediately preceding the inauguration of the present
aught that appears on the record before us, the appointment
was the only one made in that day, and there is nothing to
"so
Ͷ spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action
consideration of the need for the appointment and the
qualifications."That could be validly made even by an outgoing
the Aytona ruling.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-19981. February 29, 1964.]
   +  

 
†

 
 
Facts:
On May 20, 1960, Godofredo Quimsing was designated
Police of Iloilo City. On December 20, 1961, and while such
office, he was extended by then President Garcia an ad-interim
the same position. Quimsing took his oath of office before the
Iloilo on December 28, 1961, and continued discharging the
At the of
Police session of the Commission on Appointments on May 16,
said City.
appointment of Quimsing, among others was confirmed. On
however, at the session of said body, Senator Puyat moved for
reconsideration of all the appointments previously confirmed,
On
the June
same11, 1962,
time thatPresident Macapagal
said "motion designated Eduardo
for reconsideration be laid on
acting Chief of Police of Iloilo City and the latter took his oath
discharge the functions of the office on June 13, 1962.
in his answer, claimed among others, that petitioner's ad-
was a nullity in view of the President's Administrative Order
cancelling, or recalling ad-interim appointments extended
1961; and that the alleged confirmation of petitioner's ad-
by the Commission on Appointments did not also produce any
the same had been the subject of a motion for reconsideration
Issue:
action has been taken on said appointment until the present
 Îhether the Quimsing appointment is similarly situated
rejected in the Aytona case, hence illegal.
Held:
No. In the various cases decided by this Court after the
Castillo case, 1 the matter of the validity of appointments
13, 1961 by former President Garcia was considered not in the
Administrative Order No. 2 (which was never upheld by this
basis of the nature, character and merit of the individual
particular circumstances surrounding the same. In other
not declare that all the ad-interim appointments made by the
President after December 13, 1961 are invalid by the mere fact
were extended after said date, nor they automatically come
of the,In"midnight"
the present case, petitioner
appointments, theQuimsing
validity ofadmittedly
which werehad
the
gaveposition in controversy,
rise to the ruling in thein an acting
Aytona casecapacity
cited bysince May
respondent.
discharging the functions thereof. Clearly, it cannot be said
appointment extended to him on December 20, 1961, by
took his oath of office on December 28, 1961 was one of those
designations that brought about the "scramble" on the 29th
December, 1961, where the outgoing Chief Executive perhaps
opportunity to consider the merits and qualifications of the
nominees to the positions to which they were respectively
ad-interim appointment of petitioner, whose qualification is
the regularity of which is not questioned except for the fact
only on December 20, 1961, can not be considered as among
appointments the validity of which this Court declared to be,
d.6.2.
to entitle theInterim or recess
appointees to appointments
the equitable relief of quo
Art VI, Sec 19
Art VII, Sec 16, par 2

[G.R. No. L-25577. March 15, 1966.]


c




  

Facts:
Petitioner was extended an ad interim appointment as
of Labor by the former Executive on November 18, 1965,
of office on November 25 of the same year, and considering
appointment for the same position extended to respondent by
Executive on January 23, 1966 is invalid in spite of
issued by the latter on the same date declaring all ad interim
made by the former
Petitioner Executive
argued that hisasposition
having lapsed with the
is subsisting because
special
͞session͟ in Article VII, section 10, subsection 4 of the 22,
session of Congress at about midnight of January
regular session and not a special session; and because the
appointment has not yet been constituted.
Issue:
 Îhether the ad interim appointment of the petitioner
expired.
Held:
Yes. After due deliberation, the Court resolved that the
appointment extended to petitioner on November 18, 1965 by
Executive lapsed when the special session of Congress
about midnight of January 22, 1966, as embodied in our
Petitioner's
February 16,theory 1966. that the first mode of termination
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments should be
with the clause "until the next adjournment of Congress" in
Commission has to be first organized in order that the last
untenable considering that the latter is not dependent upon,
any manner by, the operation of the former. As already stated,
of termination are completely separate from and independent
the framers of the Constitution had intended to make the
second clause dependent upon the prior constitution of the
Appointments they should have so stated in clear terms
first clause implies a positive act of the Commission while the
separate and independent act of Congress. Indeed, the theory
carried to its logical conclusion, may result into the anomaly
Congress be controlled by a party not inclined to organize said
should there arise a group which for reasons of its own
obstructionism, the Commission on Appointments
Constitution is never organized as a consequence of the action
appointment
It is truemade
that during the recess
the phrases "untilof Congress
the would never
next adjournment of
legislative scrutiny and would thereby then be
does not make any reference to any specific session of thealways
even
regularif itorisspecial
extended ad interim,
Ͷ but a result
such silence is ofwhich, to be sure,
no moment, for itwas
is
by the framers of our Constitution. It thus becomes
maxim in statutory construction that when the law does not imperative
such
courtsabsurd
shouldresult.
not distinguish. Consequently, it is safe to
framers of the Constitution in employing merely the word
mode of
Theterminating an appointment
power to appoint made
is inherently an during the function
executive recess
mind
powereither the regular
to confirm or special
or reject session,belongs
appointments and nottosimply
the the
the latter power having been conferred as a check on the
check may be exercised through the members of both Houses
Commission on Appointments. But although the Commission
is provided for in the Constitution, its organization requires
action, and once organized, by express provision of the
meet only while Congress is in session." Consequently, if for
Congress adjourns a regular or special session without
Commission on Appointments, Congress should be deemed to
exercised said power to check by allowing the ad interim
as provided for in the Constitution.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 131136. February 28, 2001.]
 
 



  


Facts:
Upon assumption as Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon,
wrote a letter to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking
appointments of fourteen municipal employees on the ground
"midnight" appointments of the former mayor in violation of
15 of the Constitution. Îhile the matter was pending before
Marino, Morell Ayala and Flordeliza Oriazel filed with the CSC a
payment of their salaries which were withheld pursuant to
01, issued by de Rama wherein their appointments as
Issue:
were recalled.
Îhether the ͞midnight appointment͟ ban against the
to local chiefs.
Held:
No. The only reason advanced by the petitioner to justify
that these were "midnight appointments." The CSC correctly
that the constitutional prohibition on so-called "midnight
specifically those made within two (2) months immediately
It has been held
presidential that upon
elections, theonly
applies issuance
to theofPresident
an appointment and
or Acting
assumption of the position in the civil service, "he acquires a
cannot be taken away either by revocation of the appointment
except for cause and with previous notice and hearing."
settled that the person assuming a position in the civil service
completed appointment acquires a legal, not just an equitable,
position. This right is protected not only by statute, but by the
well, which right cannot be taken away by either revocation of
A thorough
or by removal, perusal
unless thereofisthe records
valid causereveal thatprovided
to do so, the CSC's
supported by the
previous notice evidence
and hearing.and the law. The fourteen (14)
appointed following two meetings of the Personnel Selection
May 31 and June 26, 1995. There is no showing that any of the
respondents were not qualified for the positions they were
Moreover, their appointments were duly attested to by the
field office at Lucena City. By virtue thereof, they had already
appointive positions even before petitioner himself assumed
position as town mayor. Consequently, their appointments
immediately and cannot be unilaterally revoked or recalled by
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 149036. April 2, 2002.]


†




 %


 
%
 

Facts:
Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the
right to hold office of respondents Alfredo L. Benipayo, as
Commission on Elections, and Resurreccion Z. Borra and
Jr., as COMELEC Commissioners. The first ad interim
respondents were by-passed by Commission on Appointment
such appointment was later on renewed by the president.
that the ad interim appointments and reappointments of the
violated the constitutional provisions on the independence of
well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and
its Chairman and members under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of
Issues:
1.Ê Îhat is the nature of ad interim appointment,
temporary?
2.Ê Does the renewal of the ad interim appointment when
by-passed by the CA constitute reappointment, hence violative
constitution?
Held:
First Issue: It is permanent.
Second Issue: It does not constitute renewal.
Discussion:

!",)!)/"-- )!/!)"-/"!!"-- )!/!

)//,)"$0"!,"!! $ !*#2),"2!#0
"-- )!"=("$)3),)!  33)
3""))(#;
 //)) ! !
-- )!/!, ! "$)
 !)() !)$3/"1"!",)!)/"-- )!/!
/"1)!*)33)(!)$,)"-- ,#0 //)) ! !
(!)$!'",; (!/! 3 !*
The second
Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows: "The
power to make appointments during the recess of the
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
of the Congress." Thus, the ad interim appointment remains
disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no
The Constitution
or revoked imposes
by the President. Theno condition
fear that theon the effectivity
President can
interim appointment, and thus an ad interim appointment
at any time and for any reason an ad interim appointment is
immediately.
basis. The appointee can at once assume office and
officer, all the powers pertaining to the office. In Pacete vs.
Commission on Appointments, this Court elaborated on the
interim appointment as follows: "A distinction is thus made
exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring
Commission on Appointments when Congress is in session and
recess. In the former, the President nominates, and only upon
the Commission on Appointments may the person thus named
is not so with reference to ad interim appointments. It takes
individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his function
Petitioner
time. His cites office
title to such Black'sisLaw Dictionary
complete. which
In the defines
language of the
the
interim" to mean "in the meantime" or "for the time
appointment is effective 'until disapproval by the Commission being."
argues
or untilthat an adadjournment
the next interim appointment is undoubtedly
of the Congress."
This argument is not new and was answered by this Court in
Lungsod ng Maynila vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, where
". . . From the arguments, it is easy to see why the petitioner
difficulty in understanding the situation. Private respondent
several 'ad interim' appointments which petitioner mistakenly
appointments temporary in nature. Perhaps, it is the literal
word 'ad interim' which creates such belief. The term is
mean "in the meantime" or "for the time being." Thus, an
one appointed to fill a vacancy, or to discharge the duties of
the absence or temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent
Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, 1978). But such is not the
use intended in the context of Philippine law. In referring to
appointments, the term is not descriptive of the nature of the
given to him. Rather, ))(, ,! /"!!)!2)
"-- )!/!2/",.")., !#0 ),! 3
/"!)/.2)$% ", 3*!.2)) )*)!"$$0
!))0"2)- 2 3"-- )!/!.)(!"#$
/4",)!)/"-- )!/!.4"(,)!$ 3
 ),!./"!"-/"!!"-- )!/!/",#0
/"!)/" !*))!
 , ! /"!"
""!#2),"2!  1,""!0)/
/.
' 3 !)() !.""=(),",3)!)$*"$
)$)--)!;()-(,!
The Court had again occasion to
An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two
an ad interim appointment in the more recent case of
in the Constitution. The first cause is the disapproval of his ad
of Appeals, where the Court stated: "Î""$",0
appointment by the Commission on Appointments. The second
)!)/"-- )!/!)! ,)-) 3!"( 3
adjournment of Congress without the Commission on
))! )!,)") 32"-- )!/!)/- "0
his appointment. These two causes are resolutory conditions
"-")0."),! /"!!)!2)
by the Constitution on all ad interim appointments. These
constitute, in effect, a Sword of Damocles over the heads of ad
appointees.
Îhile No one,
an ad however,
interim can complain
appointment because itand
is permanent is the
that
as places the
provided Sword
by law, anof Damocles over
appointment the heads of
or designation inthe
a ad
capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the
A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of
matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the
prohibits the President from making to the three independent
commissions, including the COMELEC. Thus, in Brillantes vs.
struck down as unconstitutional the designation by then
Aquino of Associate Commissioner Haydee Yorac as Acting
COMELEC. This Court ruled that: "A designation as Acting
terms essentially temporary and therefore revocable at will.
established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity, the
respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections
withdrawn by the President of the Philippines at any time and
reason she sees fit. It is doubtful if the respondent, having
designation, will not be estopped from challenging its
Constitution provides for many safeguards to the
of the Commission on Elections by designation of the President
Philippines."
Earlier, in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista, a case decided
Constitution, which did not have a provision prohibiting
appointments to the COMELEC, this Court nevertheless
unconstitutional the designation of the Solicitor General as
the COMELEC. This Court ruled that the designation of an
would undermine the independence of the COMELEC and
Constitution. Îe declared then: "It would be more in keeping
purpose and aim of the framers of the Constitution to appoint
Commissioner than to designate one to act temporarily." In
President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill
the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission
Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended
appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not
designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike
Yorac in Brillantes
Îhile vs. Yorac and
the Constitution Solicitorthat
mandates General Felix Bautista
the COMELEC
Party vs. Bautista.
independent," thisThe ad interim
provision shouldappointments
be harmonizedof Benipayo,
with the
are expressly allowed by the Constitution which
to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the authorizes the
the recess requires
COMELEC of Congress, to make appointments
the Commission that take
on Appointments to effect
first
appointees before the appointees can assume office will
power to make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to
statutory
Theconstruction
reinstatement to in
give
themeaning
presentand effect to every
Constitution of the ad
It
appointing power of the President was for the purpose ofof the
will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers
in vital government services that otherwise would result from
vacancies in government offices, including the three
In his concurring opinion in Guevara vs. Inocentes, decided
Constitution, Justice Roberto Concepcion, Jr. explained the
interim appointments in this manner: "Now, why is the lifetime
appointments so limited? Because, if they expired before the
Congress, the evil sought to be avoided Ͷ interruption in the
essential functions Ͷ may take place. Because the same evil
appointments ceased to be effective during the session of
its adjournment. Upon the other hand, once Congress has
aforementioned may easily be conjured by the issuance of
appointments or reappointments." Indeed, the timely
sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution barely
interruption of essential government services in the May 2001
elections. Following the decision of this Court in Gaminde vs.
Appointments, promulgated on December 13, 2000, the terms
constitutional officers
Evidently, first appointed
the exercise under the
by the President inConstitution
the instant
counted starting
constitutional February
power to make2, 1987, the date
ad interim of ratification of
appointments
regardless
occurrenceofofthe
thedate
veryof their
evil actual
sought to appointment.
be avoided byBy thethis
second
of office16,
Section of three
ArticleCommissioners of the COMELEC,
VII of the Constitution. This powerincluding
to make
would end on February 2, 2001.
appointments is lodged in the President to be exercised by her
judgment. pnder the second paragraph of Section 16, Article
Yonstitution, the President can choose either of two modes in
officials who are subject to confirmation by the Yommission
First, while Yongress is in session, the President may
appointee, and pending consent of the Yommission on
nominee cannot qualify and assume office. Second, during
Yongress,
There theis President
no disputemay thatextend an ad interim
an ad interim appointee
the appointee
Yommission ontoAppointments
immediately qualify and assume
can no longer office. a
be extended
The disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on
exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of
disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the
Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the
appointee. Since the Constitution does not provide for any
decision, the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee
appointing power. In this instance, the President can no
appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on
An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because
but because of a final decision by the Yommission on
failure of the Yommission on Appointments to organize is
its consent to the appointment.
passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted
by the Yommission on Appointments at the close of the
There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments
withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the
such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim
by-passed appointee. This is recognized in Section 17 of the
Commission on Appointments, which provides as follows:
Nominations or Appointments Returned to the President.
appointments submitted by the President of the Philippines
finally acted upon at the close of the session of Congress shall
the President and, unless new nominations or appointments
again beIt isconsidered
well settled byinthe
this jurisdiction that
Commission." theunder
Hence, President
the
interim appointments of by-passed appointees.
Commission on Appointments, a by-passed appointment can Justice
lucidly
again ifexplained
the Presidentin hisrenews
concurring opinion in Guevara vs.
the appointment.
passed ad interim appointees could be extended new
short, an ad interim appointment ceases to be effective upon
Commission, because the incumbent can not continue holding
positive objection of the Commission. It ceases, also, upon "the
adjournment of the Congress," simply because the President
new appointments Ͷ not because of implied disapproval of
deduced from its inaction during the session of Congress, for,
Constitution, the Commission may affect adversely the interim
only by action, never by omission. If the adjournment of
implied disapproval of ad interim appointments made prior
President could no longer appoint those so by-passed by the
the fact is that the President may reappoint them, thus clearly
the reason for said termination of the ad interim appointments
Congress, the President is free to make ad interim
appointments or reappointments."
The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2),
Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad
appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot
another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is
16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a
prohibited under Section 1(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim
there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the
phrase "without
?heappointment
such new reappointment"
will not applies only
result in the appointee to
serving
appointed by the
term of seven President and confirmed by the Yommission
years.
Appointments, whether or not such person completes his
must be a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can
otherwise will lead to absurdities and negate the President's
interim appointments. In the great majority of cases, the
Appointments usually fails to act, for lack of time, on the ad
appointments first issued to appointees. If such ad interim
longer be renewed, the President will certainly hesitate to
appointments because most of her appointees will effectively
by mere inaction of the Commission on Appointments. This will
constitutional power of the President to make ad interim
powerThe ad interim
intended appointments
to avoid disruptionsand subsequent
in vital renewals
government
appointments
cannot subscribeof Benipayo, Borra and
to a proposition thatTuason do not
will wreak violate
havoc on
reappointments
services. because there were no previous
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. A
a previous confirmed appointment. The same ad interim
renewals of appointments will also not breach the seven-year
because all the appointments and renewals of appointments of
and Tuason are for a fixed term expiring on February 2, 2008.
confirmation will not extend the expiry date of their terms of
Consequently, there is no danger whatsoever that the renewal
appointments of these three respondents will result in any of
to be exorcised by the twin prohibitions in the Constitution.
renewal of the ad interim appointment of these three
as their terms of office expire on February 2, 2008, does not
prohibition
d.6.3. on reappointments
Temporary Designations in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of
Adm. Code of 1987, Book III, Sec 17
d.6.4. Limitations on Appointing Power of Acting President
2.Ê PARDONING POÎER (Sec 19)
Art IX, C, Sec. 5
e.1. pardon distinguished from probation

[G.R. No. 45685. December 22, 1937.]

      
† 
c

Facts:

e.2. pardon distibguished from parole

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 76872. July 23, 1987.]
Î    

  
 



Facts:
Petitioner was convicted by the Court of First Instance of
crime of estafa. On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was
petitioner by the President of the Philippines on condition that
"not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines.
be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner
Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was
On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole (the
confinement.
resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of
pardon granted to the petitioner. In making its
President, the Board relied upon the decisions of this Court in
Director of Prisons (68 Phil. 154 [1939]) and Espuelas vs.
Bohol (108 Phil. 356 [1960]). The evidence before the Board
March 1982 and 24 June 1982, petitioner had been charged
of estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-19672 and Q-20756, which
(on 21 May 1986) pending trial before the Regional Trial Court
City). The record before the Board also showed that on 26 June
had been convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Rizal
crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926: this conviction
pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court. The
before it a letter report dated 14 January 1986 from the
Investigation ("NBI"), addressed to the Board, on the
the records of the NBI showed that a long list of charges had
against the petitioner during the last twenty years for a wide
crimes including estafa, other forms of swindling, grave
illegal On
possession of firearms,
10 October 1986, theammunition
respondentand explosives,
Minister of Justice
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and violation
authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and of
772 (interfering
petitioner. with policewas
The petitioner functions).
accordinglySome of these
arrested andcharges
the
to NBI report
serve
Petitionerthe
now as havingportion
unexpired
impugns been
the dismissed. theThe
of hisofsentence.
validity NBIof
Order report
Arrestdid
and
status report on each of the charges there listed and identified.
He claims that he did not violate his conditional pardon since
convicted by final judgment of the twenty (20) counts of estafa
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-19672 and Q-20756 nor of the crime of
Criminal Case No. Q-22926 3 Petitioner also contends that he
opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and
accordingly claims he has been deprived of his rights under the
clause of the Constitution.
Issue:
Îhether the pending charges suffice to constitute
conditional pardon.
Held:
No. It may be emphasized that what is involved in the
the prosecution of the parolee for a subsequent offense in the
administration of the criminal law. Îhat is involved is rather
of whether the convict has breached his undertaking that he
violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines" for purposes
upon him of the remitted portion of his original sentence. The
that we here deal with are the consequences of an ascertained
conditions of a pardon. A convict granted conditional pardon,
herein, who is recommitted must of course be convicted by
court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was
criminal penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be
Again, since Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code defines a
Succinctly
substantive,put, in proceeding
felony, against
the parolee a convict
or convict whowho has beenas
is regarded
pardoned and who
the provisions is alleged
thereof must betocharged,
have breached the conditions
prosecuted and
Executive
judgment Department
before he canhas betwo options:
made (i) to
to suffer theproceed
penaltyagainst
64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed
Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the
correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who "having
conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of
such pardon." Here, the President has chosen to proceed
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That
exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not
scrutiny.
e.3. pardon distinguished from amnesty

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-1278. January 21, 1949.]
  %
 +  "!, % †  


Facts:
Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto
with the crime of murder. As the latter had not yet been
proceeded against the former, and after trial the Court of First
Zamboanga sentenced Jimenez to life imprisonment. Before
perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez
Proclamation No. 8, dated September 7, 1946, which grants
all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under
Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against
the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the
8, 1941, to the date when each particular area of the
offense was actually committed was liberated from enemy
occupation, and said Jimenez decided to submit his case to the
Amnesty Commission presided by the respondents herein, and
petitioner
The Loreto
AmnestyBarrioquinto,
Commissionwho hadto
denied then beenthe
extend already
benefits
the same.
on the ground that Jimenez and Barrioquinto did not admit
the crime charged.
Issue:
Îhether the petitioners can invoke the benefits of the
regardless of whether there is prior admission of the offense
Held:
Yes. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as
act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation
Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public
courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one
while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities
guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the
criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon
relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of
convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and
does "nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms
and it "in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the
imposed upon him by the sentence" (article 36, Revised Penal
amnesty looksofbackward
In view and abolishes
the foregoing, and
we are of theputs into oblivion
opinion and so
it so
to overlooks
entitle and to
a person obliterates the of
the benefits offense with which he is
the Amnesty
person
1946, itreleased by amnesty
is not necessary thatstands before
he should, as athe law precisely as
condition
committed no offense.
non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with
charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient
either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the
comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence,
say that "invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature
confession and avoidance." Although the accused does not
imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or
Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For,
admits or confesses having committed the offense with which
Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the
summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants
on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of
the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the
decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to
Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty
created thereby should take notice of the terms of said
the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their
jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person
offenses or not, if the evidence presented shows that the
said benefits.
e.4. effect of pardon

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 78239. February 9, 1989.]

c
 

 
 
  

 
.†


Facts:
Petitioner (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City)had
of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public
sentenced to imprisonment of four years, two months and one
correccional as minimum, to ten years and one day of prision
maximum. The penalty of prision mayor carries the accessory
temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
the right of suffrage, enforceable during the term of the
was granted pardon. By reason of said pardon, petitioner
Petitioner's
City treasurer letter-request
requesting that shewas referred to the
be restored her Ministry
former
resolution in view
city treasurer sinceofthe
thesame
provision of the
was still Local Government
vacant.
the power of appointment of treasurers from the city
Ministry. In its 4th Indorsement dated March 1, 1985, the
that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the
appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the
also directed the city treasurer to see to it that the amount of
the Sandiganbayan
Seeking had required
reconsideration to be indemnified
of the foregoing in favor of
ruling, petitioner
as well
on Aprilas17,
the costs
1985 of the litigation,
stressing be satisfied.
that the full pardon bestowed on
the crime which implies that her service in the government has
interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement
the date of her preventive suspension which is August 1, 1982;
entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension;
not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount
Issue:
Îhether or not a public officer, who has been granted
pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to
position without need of a new appointment.

Held:
No. Temporary absolute disqualification bars the convict
office or employment, such disqualification to last during the
sentence. !)3 33!,#-", !,." 
" 0-!"$)/")!(!$"/"#!
-", !
-!"$0 3-)) ! ) !"$")."
-!"$).(-!) !3 /-(#$) 33)

Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from
entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the
whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for
committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive
delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and
communicated officially to the Court . . . A pardon is a deed, to
The modern trend of authorities now rejects the unduly
which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete
of the Garland case [4 Îall, 333 18 L.ED. 366] (reputed to be
extreme statement which has been made on the effects of a
mind, this is the more realistic approach. Îhile a pardon has
regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the
offender is as innocent as though he never Committed the
operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is
remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the
commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does
moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness. The
cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the
relieving the party from all the punitive consequences of his
including the disqualifications or disabilities based on the
relieves him from nothing more. "To say, however, that the
man', and 'as innocent as if he had never committed the
the difference between the crime and the criminal. A person
an offense is a convicted criminal, though pardoned; he may
punishment, though left unpunished; and the law may regard
dangerous to society than one never found guilty of crime,
restraints upon him following his conviction." A pardon looks
not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords
has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon
obligation to ponencia,
In this make reparation
the Court forwishes
what has been suffered.
to stress one vital
has been established
prepared by judicial
to concede that pardonproceedings,
may remit all that
thewhich
penalhas
suffered indictment
criminal while they were
if onlyintoforce
give ismeaning
presumed to have
to the beena
fiat that
justly suffered,
presidential and no satisfaction
prerogative, should notfor beitcircumscribed
can be required."by This
whynot
do petitioner,
subscribethough
to the pardoned, cannot
fictitious belief thatbepardon
entitled to out
blots
earnings
individualandandbenefits.
that once he is absolved, he should be treated
innocent. For whatever may have been the judicial dicta in the
perceive how pardon can produce such "moral changes" as to
pardoned convict in character and conduct with one who has
maintained the mark of a good, law-abiding citizen. Pardon
acts constituting the crime. These are "historical" facts which,
manifestation of mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon,
men will take into account in their subsequent dealings with
granted after conviction frees the individual from all the
disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless
on the person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back
 Notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of
case, we are in full agreement with the commonly-held
does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office
relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although
undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that
is plainly evident. Public offices are intended primarily for the
protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They
compromised to favor private interests. To insist on automatic
because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually
offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit
cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing
deemed
Îhat to be
it the of bad
effect character,
of accepted a poortomoral
pardon risk,appeal?
pending or who is
reason of the pardoned conviction.
It is our view that in the present case, it is not material
was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the
the same. ")!*"-,-", !.-)) !),/,
"--"$"!,(!, !)) !#0
"" 33)!"$)0

e.5. Îho may avail amnesty

3.Ê MILITARY POÎERS (Sec 18)

Art II, Sec 13
Art VIII, Sec 1, par 2

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 159085. February 3, 2004.]


B
 c

 
Facts
Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of
and General Order No. 4 issued by the President on July 27,
state of rebellion" and calling upon the Armed Forces to
in the wake of the so-called "Oakwood Incident". The
lifted by the President five (5) days later, on August 1, 2003,
Proclamation No. 435. Party-list organizations, Sanlakas and
Manggagawa (PM), contend that Section 18, Article VII of the
not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out
They further submit that, because of the cessation of the
there exists no sufficient factual basis for the proclamation by
Issue:
state of rebellion
Îhether forproclamation
the an indefiniteof
period.
the state of rebellion
constitutional requirements for the proclamation of a state of
emergency. Îhether such proclamation is equivalent to
result to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
warrantless arrests.
Held:
No. It is true that for the purpose of exercising the
Constitution does not require the President to make a
rebellion.
Sec. 18. Section 18, Articleshall
The President VII provides:
be the Commander-in-Chief of
the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Îithin
from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
The Congress,or
proclamation if not in session,
suspension forshall, within
a period twenty-four
to be determinedhours
by
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its
the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires
of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
filing.
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative
authorize the conferment of the jurisdiction on military courts
over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
The suspension
the privilege of the
of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to
writ.
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person
detained shall be judicially charged within three days,
released.
The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-
of "graduated power[s]." From the most to the least benign,
calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the
corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise
powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two
an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires
such power. However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the
Zamora, "[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of
power. ?he only criterion is that 'whenever it becomes
may callNevertheless, it is equally
the armed forces true that
'to prevent Section 18,
or suppress Article VII
lawless
expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of
rebellion.'"
the Constitution vests the President not only with
but, first and foremost, with Executive powers.
The President's authority to declare a state of rebellion
main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same
from her Commander-in-Chief
Should powers. generated by the
there be any "confusion"
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, we clarify that,
in Lacson correctly pointed out, the mere declaration of a state
cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights.
martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then it is
that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring
conditions. At same
For the any rate, the presidential
reasons, issuances
apprehensions that thethemselves
military
suppressionmay
authorities of the rebellion
resort "with duearrests
to warrantless regardare
to constitutional
likewise
vs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court held that "[i]n quelling
rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless
suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113
Court, 63 if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless
petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a 'state of
other words, a person may be subjected to a warrantless
It is not disputed
rebellion whetherthat thethe
or not President hashas
President fulldeclared
discretionary
a state of
armed forces andfor
as the requisites to adetermine the necessity
valid warrantless arrestfor
arethe exercise
present.
Îhile the Court may examine whether the power was
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of
of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their
Theacted
President argument
without thatfactual
the declaration
basis. of a state of rebellion
declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of
requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no indication that
replaced civil courts in the "theater of war" or that military
taken over the functions of civil government. There is no
curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no indication
has exercised judicial and legislative powers. In short, there is
that by
Nor theany
President
stretch has attempted
of the to exercise
imagination can theor has exercised
declaration
powers. of emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a
exercise
Congress
Sec. 23. pursuant
(1) . . . to
. Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to
may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the
to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief
Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of
calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding
Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely
vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as
opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by
Section 23 (2), Article VI.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000.]

%
    


 %


Facts:
The President of the Philippines, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in a
ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility
purpose of crime prevention and suppression. In compliance
presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief
B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (the "LOI")
the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task
would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed under
the Police Chief of Metro Manila. Invoking his powers as
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in
suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President also
services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely
nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when
have improved. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the
petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment
Marines null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that the
marines
Issue: in Metro Manila is violative of the Constitution
situation obtainsthe
Îhether in said
Metro Manila as would
deployment violatesjustify, even only
the constitution.
deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work; hence, said
Held:
derogation of Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution.
No. Îhen the President calls the armed forces to
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises
power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent
and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus,
upon to overrule the President's wisdom or substitute its own.
does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in
constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the
give the President full discretionary power to determine the
out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to
President's decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The
discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to
that there exist no justification for calling out the armed
likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave
committed because the power to call was exercised in such a
violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
judgment. To doubt is to sustain.
Under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an
rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These
required in the case of the power to call out the Armed Forces.
criterion is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the
armed forces "to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
The implication is that
The President asthe President is given full
Commander-in-Chief has discretion
a vast and
the exercise
gather of the power
information, some to call as may
of which compared to the two
be classified other
as highly
affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power
spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency
great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property.
to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence
swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. Such a
farfetched when we consider the present situation in
insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the
determination of the necessity for the calling out power if
unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription
power may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a
order every time it is exercised. Thus, it is the unclouded intent
Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-
Forces, 3($$,)) ! to call forth the military when in his
necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless
rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of
was gravely abused, the President's exercise of judgment
EN BANC
accorded
[G.R. respect from
No. 147780. May this
10, Court.
2001.]

  
 


  
Facts:
Faced by an "angry and violent mob armed with
bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons"
attempting to break into Malacañang. President Macapagal-
Proclamation No. 38 on May 1, 2001. In the said proclamation,
declared that the National Capital Region was in a state of
likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces
Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the
Îarrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters
were thereafter effected. Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests,
declaration of a "state of rebellion", which allegedly gave a
to the arrests, four related petitions were filed before the
assailed the declaration of a state of rebellion by President
Arroyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue
having no basis both in fact and in law. Significantly, on May 6,
Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a
Issue:
Îhether the declaration of a state of rebellion was
basis, hence issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Held:
No. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution expressly
"[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
we held in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora,
August 15, 2000): . . . The factual necessity of calling out the
easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since
considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several
not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of
that the court may use to judge necessity, information
such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts.
information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable
many instances, the evidence upon which the President might
is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not
technical proof. On the other hand, the President as
vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which
classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the
exerciseIn of the power
quelling to call, on-the-spot
or suppressing decisions
the rebellion, may be
the authorities
necessary in emergency
to warrantless arrests of situations to avert great
persons suspected loss of human
of rebellion, as
destruction of property. . . . The Court, in a proper case,
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances may
sufficiency
warrantlessofarrest
the factual
fearedbasis of the exercise
by petitioners of not
is, thus, thisbased
power.on
longer
a "statefeasible
Moreover, at this time,
petitioners'
of rebellion." Proclamation
contention in G.R. No.
No. 38 having
147780 been
(Lacson
(Defensor-Santiago Petition), and 147799 (Lumbao Petition)
imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not
the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition,
subjected to warrantless arrest is not without adequate
ordinary course of law.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 171396. May 3, 2006.]
 

 

c 
 




?
  
Facts:
Petitioners allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No.
and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria
committed grave abuse of discretion. On February 24, 2006, as
celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency.
that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was
among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New
and some members of the political opposition in a plot to
President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or
and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present
demonstrations conducted during the commemoration of
by the anti-riot police. During the dispersal of the rallyists
arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a
University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also
companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it
emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid
requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it
Issue:
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech
Îhether President Arroyo abused her power in
rebellion.
Held:
No. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, 111 this Court,
Justice Dante O. Tinga, held that Section 18, Article VII of the
the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of
the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
Martial Law. Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,
ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out
"whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion."
conditions present in the instant cases? As stated earlier,
circumstances
Under thethen prevailing,
calling-out President
power, Arroyo found
the President may it
1017.
forcesOwing to her
to aid him Office's vast lawless
in suppressing intelligence network,
violence, she is
invasion in
and
to determine
involves the actual
ordinary condition
police action. Butofevery
the country.
act that goes beyond
calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this
must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke
when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the
It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction
Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the
President's authority to declare a "state of rebellion" (in
authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. Îhile
authority to declare a "state of rebellion" emanates from her
Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was Section
SEC.
Book4.II of theProclamations. Ͷ „cts ofCode
Revised Administrative the President fixing a
of 1987, which
status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the
the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend,
promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an

9
Ê EMERGENCYPOÎERS (Art VI, Sec 23 [2])

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 171396. May 3, 2006.]
 

 

c 
 




?
  
Facts:
The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:
. . . and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Yonstitution do
of
Thenational emergency.
import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during
emergency under PP 1017, can call the military not only to
"to all the laws and to all decrees . . ." but also to act pursuant
of Section
Sec. 17. 17,InArticle XIInational
times of which reads:
emergency, when the public
the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable
it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
utility
 or business affected with public interest.
Issue:
Did the president properly invoked Sec 17 of Art XII of
incident to her declaration of a state of national emergency.
power to declare state of national emergency carries with it
emergency power͟ e.g. the take over of private establishment?
Held:
No. During the existence of the state of national
purports to grant the President, without any authority or
Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any privately-
utility or business affected
A distinction must bewith
drawnpublic interest.
between the President's
declare "a state of national emergency" and to exercise
the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18, Article VII
such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can
Section
the second, 23, Article
manifold VI of the Constitution
constitutional issues arise.reads:
SEY. 23. (1) ?he Yongress, by a vote of two-thirds of both
assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to
of
(2)a state of war.
In times of war or other national emergency, the
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to
may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to
national policy. pnless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above
not only to war but also to "other national emergency." If the
Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the
declare a "state of national emergency" pursuant to Section
(calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the
of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so.
intend that Congress should first authorize the President
a "state of national emergency." The logical conclusion then is

 0  ($,"$),$0,$"')! 3"" 3
%(') 3/*!0- 2.(""1)!*
2!,-(#$)()$)0 #()!"33,2)-(#$))!.
/"
)=()",$*")
Considering that Section 17!3 / !*

of Article XII and Section 23
previously quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must
to determine theCongress
Generally, limitationisofthe
therepository
exercise of
of emergency
emergency
evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it
powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a
upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it
possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its
Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
emergency powers to must
(2) The delegation the President, subjectperiod
be for a limited to certain
only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as
prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a
declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the
powers clause. The taking over of private business affected
is just another facet of the emergency powers generally
Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may, during
under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over
operation of any privately owned public utility or business
interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now,
President
The order may exercise
cannot such
properly bepower is dependent
sustained on whether
as an exercise of the
delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing
power as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The the reasonable
to do so by citing a number of cases upholding broad powers in
commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of
need not concern us here. Even though "theater of war" be an
concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate
take possession of private property in order to keep labor
Following our interpretation
stopping production. This is aofjob
Section
for the17, Articlelawmakers,
nation's XII, invoked
Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such
authorities.
authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over
operation of any privately owned public utility or business
Let it be without
interest emphasized that while
authority from the President alone can
Congress.
national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances
the take over of privately-owned public utility or business
interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no
the types of businesses affected with public interest that
In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all
the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an
5.Ê CONTRACTING AND GUARANTEEING FOREIGN LOANS
6.Ê POÎER OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sec 21)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000.]
%


 c

 
 


Facts:
The instant petitions for certiorari and prohibition
agreement forged between the RP and the USA Ͷ THE
AGREEMENT, which formalized, among others, the use of
Philippine territory by the US military personnel to strengthen
security relationship. On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E.
the VFA, and then transmitted to the Senate his letter of
VFA
Fromfor concurrence
these pursuant
consolidated to Section
petitions, 21, Art.
petitioners Ͷ VII of the
as legislators,
The Senate subsequently
governmental approved
organizations, citizensthe VFA
and by a 2/3Ͷvote
taxpayers of its
assailed
constitutionality of the VFA and imputed to respondents grave
discretion in ratifying the agreement. Petitioners argue that
XVIII is applicable considering that the VFA has for its subject
foreign military troops in the Philippines. Respondents, on the
maintain that Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch as
basing arrangement but an agreement which involves merely
Issue:
visits of United States personnel engaged in joint military
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII
Article XVIII of the Constitution?
Held:
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions
concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international
Article VII, which
"No treaty herein respondents
or international invoke,
agreement reads:
shall be validAcICTS
and
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the
Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:
"After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the
Philippines and the pnited States of America concerning
military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the
under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the
requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people
referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty
contracting
SectionState."
21, Article VII deals with treaties or international
general, in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds
Members of the Senate is required to make the subject treaty,
agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines.
down the general rule on treaties or international agreements
any form of treaty with a wide variety of subject matter, such
to, extradition or tax treaties or those economic in nature. All
international agreements entered into by the Philippines,
matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation,
concurrence of the Senate
In contrast, Section to be
25, Article valid
XVIII is aand effective.
special provision that
which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or
Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the
the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional
consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Section 25,
further requires that "foreign military bases, troops, or
allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly
Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
It is ourifconsidered
that purpose so requiredview that bothand
by Congress, constitutional
recognized as
contradicting each
contracting state. other, actually share some common
constitutional provisions both embody phrases in the negative
deemed prohibitory in mandate and character. In particular,
with the clause "No treaty . . .," and Section 25 contains the
allowed." Additionally, in both instances, the concurrence of
indispensable to render
To our mind, the that
the fact treaty
theorPresident
international agreement
referred the VFA
effective.
under Section 21, Article VII, and that the Senate extended its
under the same provision, is immaterial. For in either case,
Section 21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the
crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to
On theconstitutional
strict whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the
requirements.
States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides
guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and
rights of the United States and the Philippine government in
criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft,
!, (#,$0.)
exportation !&@.
)$c
of equipment, .2)-)3)"$$0
materials and supplies.
)! $)!*3 )*!/)$)"0#". -. 3")$)).should
case
To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the
Section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the
sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to
Moreover,
concurrence it of
is specious to argue
the Senate, as willthat Sectiondiscussed
be further 25, Article XVIII is
mere transient agreements for the reason that there is no
structure for the establishment of a military base. On this
Constitution makes no distinction between "transient" and
Certainly, we find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that
In
or like manner,
facilities to bewe do not subscribe
stationed or placedtopermanently
the argument that
in the
XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but
and facilities, are involved in the VFA. Notably, a perusal of
provision reveals that the proscription covers "foreign military
facilities." Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to
and facilities without any foreign bases being established. The
refer to "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities" collectively
as separate and independent subjects. The use of comma and
word "or" clearly signifies disassociation and independence of
the others included in the enumeration, 28 such that, the
contemplates three different situations Ͷ a military treaty the
could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c)
any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of
ArticleAt this juncture, we shall then resolve the issue of
XVIII.
requirements of Section 25 were complied with when the
concurrence to theXVIII
Section 25, Article VFA.disallows foreign military bases,
the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently
be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by
when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of the
people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty
There is no dispute
contracting state. as to the presence of the first two
the VFA.
As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII
that a treaty or international agreement, to be valid and
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the
other hand, Section 25, Article XVIII simply provides that the
Applying
concurredthe in foregoing constitutional provisions, a two-thirds
by the Senate."
members of the Senate is clearly required so that the
contemplated by law may be validly obtained and deemed
true that Section 25, Article XVIII requires, among other things,
Ͷ the VFA, in the instant case Ͷ be a "duly concurred in by
very true however that said provision must be related and
clear mandate embodied in Section 21, Article VII, which in
requires that the concurrence of a treaty, or international
This Courtvote
by a two-thirds is ofofthe
allfirm view that of
the members thethe
phrase
Senate. Indeed,
means that the other contracting party accepts
Article XVIII must not be treated in isolation to Section or 21,
as a treaty. 32 To require the other contracting state, the
America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States
concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, 33 is to accord strict
phrase.It is inconsequential whether the United States treats
executive agreement because, under international law, an
is as binding as a treaty. 35 To be sure, as long as the VFA
elements of an agreement under international law, the said
In international
taken equally law, there is no difference between
as a treaty.
executive agreements in their binding effect upon states
the negotiating functionaries have remained within their
International law continues to make no distinction between
By constitutional
executive agreements: they fiat and
are by the intrinsic
equally bindingnature of his
obligations
President, as head of State, is the sole organ and authority in
of the country. In many ways, the President is the chief
foreign policy; his "dominance in the field of foreign relations
conceded." 51 Îielding vast powers and influence, his conduct
affairs As
of regards the as
the nation, power to enter
Jefferson into treaties
describes, or
is "executive
the Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only
concurrence of at least two-thirds vote of all the members of
light, the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent
agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the
exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted
by the fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation
intrude, and Yongress itself is powerless to invade it.
judgment calls of the President involving the VFA Ͷ
ratification and entering into a treaty and those necessary or
exercise of such principal acts Ͷ squarely fall within the
constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly struck
It is the Court's considered view that the President, in
calibrated by this Yourt, in the absence of clear showing of
and in submitting the same to the Senate for concurrence,
power or discretion.
confines and limits of the powers vested in him by the
moment that the President, in the exercise of his wide latitude
in the honest belief that the VFA falls within the ambit of
of the Constitution, referred the VFA to the Senate for
aforementioned provision. Certainly, no abuse of discretion,
patent and whimsical abuse of judgment, may be imputed to
his act of ratifying the VFA and referring the same to the
of complying with the concurrence requirement embodied in
law. In doing so, the President merely performed a
exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to the functions of
he erred in submitting the VFA to the Senate for concurrence
provisions of Section 21 of Article VII, instead of Section 25 of
Constitution, still, the President may not be faulted or scarred,
EN BANC guilty of committing an abuse of discretion in some
adjudged
[G.R. No. 158088.
capricious manner.July 6, 2005.]

 
+    
    c
Facts:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to
of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign
signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. It is the theory of the
ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and
function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive
transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to
exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties.
petitioners submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to
Statute under treaty law and customary international law.
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining the
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a
have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless they have
clear not to become parties to the treaty. On the other hand,
Issue:
that the executive department has no duty to transmit the
Senate for concurrence.
 Îhether the Executive Secretary and the Department of
have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of
signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United
without the signature of the President. Does the power to
the Senate?
Held:
No. In our system of government, the President, being
state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external
country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief
foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the
with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold
diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise
foreignNonetheless,
relations. In while
the realm of treaty-making, the President
the ),!"sole"( )0
authority to
!)! negotiate
"), thewith other states.
Constitution provides a limitation to his
requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the
validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII
Constitution provides that "no treaty or international
and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all
The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-
the Senate."
was deemed essential to provide a check on the executive in
relations. 14 By requiring the concurrence of the legislature in
entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures a
checks and balance necessary in the nation's pursuit of political
growth. Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law,
treaty-making process in this wise:
The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation,
ratification, and exchange of the instruments of ratification.
then be submitted for registration and publication under the
although this step is not essential to the validity of the
* )") ! may be undertaken directly by the head of state
the parties.
assigns this task to his authorized representatives. These
provided with credentials known as full powers, which they
negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It is standard
of the parties to submit a draft of the proposed treaty which,
counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent
negotiations may be brief or protracted, depending on the
may
If andeven
when "collapse" in case the
the negotiators parties
finally decide areon
unable to come
the terms to
of the
the points for
is opened under consideration.
)*!"(. This step is primarily intended as a
authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of
of the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate the final
state in cases where ratification of the treaty is required. The
ordinarily signed in accordance with the alternat, that is, each
negotiators
")3)") !,iswhich
allowed to sign
is the nextfirst
step,onisthe
thecopy which
formal hewhich
act by will
own state. the provisions of a treaty concluded by its
and accepts
purpose of ratification is to enable the contracting states to
more closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be
they find it inimical to their interests. It is for this reason that
made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of
The
otherlast step
than in the
that whichtreaty-making process is the '"!*of
negotiated them.
ratification, which usually also signifies the effectivity of the
different date has been agreed upon by the parties. Îhere
dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the
instrument isPetitioners' arguments
deemed effective uponequate the signing of the
its signature.
Philippine representative with ratification. It should be
signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and
the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature
intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a
good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the state's
representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the
formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the
Petitioners'
concluded submission that
by its representative. the
It is Philippines
generally heldisto
bound
be an
and international
undertaken by thelaw
headto of
ratify
thethe treaty
state or ofwhich it has signed is
the government.
The signature does not signify the final consent of the state to
the ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof.
Statute itself requires that the signature of the representatives
subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory
Ratification is the act by which the provisions of a treaty are
and approved by a State. By ratifying a treaty signed in its
expresses its willingness to be bound by the provisions of such
treaty is signed by the state's representative, the President,
to the people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty
the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical
of the state and its people. ?hus, the President has the
signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether
the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does
to defeat or even restrain this power of the head of states. If
requirement of ratification of treaties would be pointless and
held thatbe
It should a state has no legal
emphasized or even
that under ourmoral duty to ratify
Yonstitution, the a
been
vestedsigned
in theby subject to theThere
its plenipotentiaries.
President, is no legal
concurrence of the
treaty, but it goes without saying that the refusal
the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding must be
grounds and not
concurrence, on superficial
to the ratification.or Hence,
whimsicalit isreasons.
within the
would be justified in taking offense.
President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having
consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the
ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious
not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of
alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of
Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the
performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot
mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its
the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed
Statute to the Senate.

i.1. Deportation of undesirable aliens

[G.R. No. L-23846. September 9, 1977.]

 B
 
 %


Facts:
On March 3, 1964 the chief prosecutor of the
complaint against Go Tek, a Chinaman residing at Ilagan,
Misericordia Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. It was alleged in the
December, 1963 certain agents of the National Bureau of
searched an office located at 1439 O'Donnel Street, Sta. Cruz,
to be the headquarters of a guerilla unit of the "Emergency
Army of the United States", and that among those arrested
an alleged sector commander and intelligence and record
unit. It was further alleged that fake dollar checks were found
The prosecutor
possession prayed that
and that, therefore, he after trial the article
had violated Board 168
should
of
the President of the Philippines the immediate
Code and rendered himself an undesirable alien. deportation of
undesirable alien. Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss on the
complaint was premature because there was a pending case
city fiscal's office of Manila for violation of article 168 (I.S. 64-
contended that the Board had no jurisdiction to try the case in
obiter dictum in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, 118 Phil.
the President may deport aliens only on the grounds specified
other hand, The Board reasoned out that a criminal conviction
prerequisite before the State may exercise its right to deport
alien and that the Board is only a fact-finding body whose
report and recommendation to the President in whom is
Issues:
1.Ê to deportthe
powerÎhether an president can deport
alien or dismiss undesirable
a deportation alien only
proceeding.
specified by law.
2.Ê Is conviction of a crime necessary to warrant
Held:
First Issue:
No. The President's power to deport aliens and the
subject to deportation are provided for in the following
Revised
SEC. 69. Administrative
DeportationCode:
of subject of foreign power. Ͷ „
residing in the Philippine Islands shall not be deported,
from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the
except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or
agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated.
person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges
shall be allowed not less than three days for the preparation of
shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to
in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing
On the other hand, section 37 of the Immigration Law provides
aliens may be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner
of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and
Commissioner's warrant "after a determination by the Board
of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged
Thirteen classes of aliens who may be deported by the
specified
So, underin sectionlaw,
existing 37 (See PO Siok Pin vs.
the deportation Vivo,
of an L-24792, alien
undesirable
SCRA
(1) by 363,
order368).
of the President, after due investigation, pursuant
the Revised Administrative Code and (2) by the Commissioner
upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under
"")!!-
Immigration Law (Qua Chee Gan 2 ,- (!,)"#$
vs. Deportation Board, supra).
Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). "
'),#0)3'()42!,/(") !
-""!,, /)"!=()$)0 3!") !4†()
2!)3'()3)!,"""$)!2 
)! (!0))!;() ( -(#$))!.4/"0.
express law.,-
4)* /4

3" (!0 '-$#
(  )" "!,
,- "$)!#"()
@7.@CA !($$ )1.87 )$
95

-!),)/!"$ -(#$)2$3")"# $("!,
Hai and Go Tam vs. Commissioner of Immigration and the
Phil. 949, 956).

Section 69 and Executive Order No. 398, reorganizing the

not specify the grounds for deportation. Paragraph 1(a) of
398 merely provides that "the Deportation Board, motu
complaint of any person, is authorized to conduct
prescribed in section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code to
whether a subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines
undesirable
As observed alien or not,
by Justice and thereafter
Labrador, there istonorecommend
legal nor to the
Philippines
defining thethe deportation
power to deportofaliens
such alien."
because the intention of
the Chief Executive "full discretion to determine whether an
the country is so undesirable as to affect or injure the security,
interest of the state. The adjudication of facts upon which
predicated also devolves on the Chief Executive whose
executory." (Tanthat
It has been held Tongthe
vs.Chief
Deportation Board,
Executive is the96 Phil.
sole and934, 936;
Deportation Board,
existence of facts 104 Phil.
which 868,the
warrant 872).
deportation of aliens, as
investigation conducted in accordance with section 69. No
liberty to reexamine or to controvert the sufficiency of the
he acted. (Martin vs. Mott, 12 Îheat., 19, 31, cited in re
In the41,
Phil. Dick
62).case it was noted "that every alien forfeits his right
country in which he resides, in the absence of treaty provisions
when his conduct or his mode of life renders his presence
public interests". "The reasons may be summed up and
word: the public interest of the State." (38 Phil. 41, 47, 100).
Second Issue:
No. "It is fundamental that an executive order for deportation
on a prior judicial conviction in a criminal case" (Ang Beng vs.
Immigration, 100 Phil. 801, 803). Thus, it was held that the fact
been acquitted in a criminal proceeding of the particular
prevent the deportation of such alien based on the same
does not constitute res judicata in the deportation
)/)! !"0 2""!,- ") !
(3 C.J.S. 743,
vs. Frick,
And in the233
TanU.S.
Tong291, 58 L.
case, Ed. 967
supra, andruled
it was U.S. ex.
thatrel.
theMastoras
61 F. cognizance
take 2nd 366; Tama Miyake
of the chargevs.ofU.S. 257importation
illegal F. 732). against an
for deportation, even if he has not been convicted of that

7.Ê POÎER OVER LEGISLATION

j.1. to address congress (Sec 23)
j.2. Preparation and submission of budget

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 132988. July 19, 2000.]

+  +
  .†

 !




 

Facts:
On December 27, 1997, the then President of the
Ramos, issued Administrative Order (AO) 372. Subsequently,
1998, President Joseph E. Estrada issued AO 43, amending
by reducing to five percent (5%) the amount of internal
to be withheld from local government units (LGUs.) In this
certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court, petitioner
Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it requires LGUs to reduce their
25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-
enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order,
Issue:
a portion of their internal revenue allotments.
Does AO 43 violate the local fiscal autonomy?
Held:
Yes. Under existing law, local government units, in
administrative autonomy in the exercise of their functions,
autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local
power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to
share in the national taxes released by the national
power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own
extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials
work within the constraints thereof. They are not formulated
level and imposed on local governments, whether they are
needs and resources or not. Hence, the necessity of a
and the harmonization of proposals from both local and
in any Local
case are partners
fiscal in the
autonomy attainment
does of national
not however goals.
rule out any
national government intervention by way of supervision, in
local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with
)*!)3)"!$0. ),!.#0 !)() !"$3)".)",
"!,-$"!!)!*"*!0 3* !/!.-)/")$0
"!,)/-$/!)!* !)!()!*. ,)!","!,)!*",
- $)).-$"!"!,- *"/&3 !) (!0

 !)() !.3 /($") !"!,)/-$/!") ! 3
- *"/"(#; 4 !($") !2)"-- -)"
Consequently, the
") (-)" Local "$*
."!,$ Government Code provides:
!/!(!)
4 The 27
". . . [I]n the event the national government incurs an
unilaterally.
deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized,
recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the
Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management,
consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of
presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in
revenue allotment of local government units but in no case
be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national
There
taxes of arethe
therefore several
third fiscal year requisites
preceding before the President
the current fiscal year . .
local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of
government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of
House of Representatives and the presidents of the various
(3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of
Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and
Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case
percent (30%)
Petitioner pointsof the
out collection of national
that respondents internal
failed revenue
to comply with
fiscal
beforeyear thepreceding
issuance and the the
current one.
implementation of AO 372. At the
did not even try to show that the national government was
unmanageable public sector deficit. Neither did they claim
consultations with the different leagues of local governments.
requisites, the President has no authority to adjust, much less
The solicitor general insists, however, that AO 372 is merely
unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment.
been issued by the President consistent with his power of
governments. It is intended only to advise all government
instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that
economic stability in the country, which is facing economic
it does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.
advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the
President. Since
Section it is
4 of AOnot
372a mandatory imposition,
cannot, however, the directive
be upheld. A basic
characterized
fiscal autonomy as isanthe
exercise of the
automatic powerofofthe
release control.
shares of LGUs
internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the
Local Government Code 29 specifies further that the release
directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every
and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be
national government for whatever purpose." 30 As a rule, the
word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning.
is, therefore,
Section imperative.
4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding,
of 10 percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and
Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging
in the country. Such withholding clearly contravenes the
law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback which
"something held back or withheld, often temporarily." Hence,
nature
In sum,of the retention
while byAO
Section 1 of the372
national government
may be upheld as does
an not
retention is prohibited.
times of national crisis, Section 4 thereof has no color of
provision effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of
Concededly, the President was well-intentioned in issuing his
the LGUs' IRA, but the rule of law requires that even the best
carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the
laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods.