TOPIC: EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
[MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau
of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361,
368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923,
935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840,
1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213,
215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349,
357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615,
641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-
1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795,
1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866,
1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560,
563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the
instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not
being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be
done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they
need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of
mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be
subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he
has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal
Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor
General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent
said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right
is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always
dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the
rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different
from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of
the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right
sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally
empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for
their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect,
publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the
Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining
its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other
statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all
executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to
be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability
and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice
to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have
bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations
in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President.
Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien
los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon
respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given
substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have
been circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that
before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC
7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law
demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people
may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the
Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were
published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or
implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in
Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no
rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v.
Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most
difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his
favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences
which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette,
only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of
these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has
ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to
apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently
recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of
criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take
effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and
unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS

G.R. No. 187378 September 30, 2013

RAMONITO O. ACAAC, PETALFOUNDATION, INC., APOLINARIO M. ELORDE, HECTOR ACAAC, and ROMEO BULAWIN, Petitioners,
vs.
MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor, and MARIETES B. BONALOS, in her capacity as Municipal Engineer and Building Official-Designate,
both of Lopez Jaena Municipality, Misamis Occidental, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September 30, 2008 and Resolution3 dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN which reversed and set aside the Decision4 dated November 26, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 2 (RTC) in
Civil Case No. 4684 for injunction.

The Facts

Petitioner People’s Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation, Inc.(PETAL) is a non-governmental organization, founded by petitioner Ramonito O. Acaac, which is
engaged in the protection and conservation of ecology, tourism, and livelihood projects within Misamis Occidental.5 In line with its objectives, PETAL built some
cottages made of indigenous materials on Capayas Island (a 1,605 square meter islet) in 1995 as well as a seminar cottage in 20016 which it rented out to the public and
became the source of livelihood of its beneficiaries,7 among whom are petitioners Hector Acaac and Romeo Bulawin.

On April 11 and May 20, 2002, however, respondents Mayor Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr. (Azcuna) and Building Official Marietes B. Bonalos issued separate Notices of
Illegal Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply for a building permit prior to the construction of its buildings in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1096,8
otherwise known as the "National Building Code of the Philippines," ordering it to stop all illegal building activities on Capayas Island. When PETAL failed to comply
with the requirements for the issuance of a building permit, a Third and Final Notice of Illegal Construction was issued by respondents against it on July 8, 2002,9 but
still the same remained unheeded.

It was also on July 8, 2002 that the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena (SB) adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 02, Series of 200210 (subject ordinance) which
prohibited, among others: (a) the entry of any entity, association, corporation or organization inside the sanctuaries;11 and (b) the construction of any structures,
permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if authorized by the local government.12 On July 12, 2002, Azcuna approved the subject ordinance; hence, the same
was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP), which in turn, conducted a joint hearing on the matter. Thereafter, notices were posted at
the designated areas, including Capayas Island, declaring the premises as government property and prohibiting ingress and egress thereto.13

On August 23, 2002, a Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it to remove the structures it built on Capayas Island. Among the reasons
cited was its violation of the subject ordinance. A similar notice was also served against individual petitioners on October 25, 2002.

On October 29, 2002, petitioners filed an action praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, injunction and damages15 against respondents before the
RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 4684, alleging that they have prior vested rights to occupy and utilize Capayas Island. PETAL claimed that its predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession thereof since 1961, with whom it entered into a Memorandum of Agreement for the operation of the said island as a camping, tourism, and
recreational resort; thus, the issuance of the subject ordinance was prejudicial to their interest as they were deprived of their livelihood. Moreover, PETAL assailed the
validity of the subject ordinance on the following grounds: (a) it was adopted without public consultation; (b) it was not published in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province as required by Republic Act No.7160,16 otherwise known as "The Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC);and (c) it was not approved by the SP.
Therefore, its implementation should be enjoined.17

In their Answer,18 respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of action against them since they are not the lawful owners or lessees of Capayas Island, which
was classified as timberland and property belonging to the public domain. Further, they maintained that they have complied with all the publication and hearing
requirements for the passage of the subject ordinance, which was deemed approved by operation of law for failure of the SP to take any positive action thereon as
provided under the LGC. As such, it is valid and enforceable.

The RTC Ruling

On November 26, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision19 declaring the subject ordinance as invalid/void based on the following grounds: (a) PETAL’s protest has not
been resolved and that the subject ordinance was not duly approved by the SP; (b) the said ordinance was not published in a newspaper of general circulation nor was it
posted in public places; (c) Capayas Island is classified as timberland, hence, not suited to be a bird or fish sanctuary; and (d) the authority and control over timberlands
belong to the national government, through the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).20 Based on the foregoing, respondents were ordered,
among others, to desist from closing Capayas Island to the public.21 However, the petitioners were ordered to remove the structures they built thereon without valid
building permits22 since they were found to have no title over the disputed property.23

Aggrieved, respondents appealed the foregoing pronouncement before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN.

The Proceedings Before the CA

On September 30, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision24 granting respondents’ appeal.

Contrary to the RTC’s ruling, it held that the subject ordinance was deemed approved upon failure of the SP to declare the same invalid within30 days after its
submission in accordance with Section 56 of the LGC.25 It also gave credence to Azcuna’s testimony that the subject ordinance was posted and published in
conspicuous places in their municipality, and in the bulletin board.26 Moreover, public consultations were conducted with various groups before the subject ordinance
was passed.27 The CA further ruled that the Municipality of Lopez Jaena was vested with sufficient power and authority to pass and adopt the subject ordinance under
Section 447 in relation to Section 16 of the LGC.28 Therefore, it is not only the DENR that could create and administer sanctuaries.29 Having enacted the subject
ordinance within its powers as a municipality and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, the CA pronounced that the subject ordinance is valid.30

On the other hand, the CA upheld the RTC’s finding that petitioner shave no proprietary rights over the Capayas Island, thereby rendering their action for injunction
improper.31

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration32 therefrom was denied by the CA in a Resolution33 dated March 9, 2009. Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable against petitioners.34

The Court’s Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Section 56 of the LGC provides:

SEC. 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. – (a) Within three (3) days after approval, the
secretary to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan shall forward to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances and the
resolutions approving the local development plans and public investment programs formulated by the local development councils.

(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to
the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a period
of ten (10) days from receipt of the documents, inform the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in writing his comments or recommendations, which may be considered by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in making its decision.

(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan
concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and shall advise
the corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken.

(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed
consistent with law and therefore valid.

In this case, petitioners maintain that the subject ordinance cannot be deemed approved through the mere passage of time considering that the same is still pending with
the Committee on Fisheries and Aquatic Resources of the SP.35 It, however, bears to note that more than 30 days have already elapsed from the time the said ordinance
was submitted to the latter for review by the SB;36 hence, it should be deemed approved and valid pursuant to Section 56 (d) above. As properly observed by the CA:

Par. (d) should be read in conjunction with par. (c), in order to arrive at the meaning of the disputed word, "action." It is clear, based on the foregoing provision, that the
action that must be entered in the minutes of the sangguniang panlalawigan is the declaration of the sangguniang panlalawigan that the ordinance is invalid in whole or
in part. x x x.

This construction would be more in consonance with the rule of statutory construction that the parts of a statute must be read together in such a manner as to give effect
to all of them and that such parts shall not be construed as contradicting each other. x x x laws are given a reasonable construction such that apparently conflicting
provisions are allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them, reference being had to the moving spirit behind the enactment of the statute.37

Neither can the Court give credence to petitioners’ contentions that the subject ordinance was not published nor posted in accordance with the provisions of the LGC.38
It is noteworthy that petitioners’ own evidence reveals that a public hearing39 was conducted prior to the promulgation of the subject ordinance. Moreover, other than
their bare allegations, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that no publication or posting of the subject ordinance was made. In contrast, Azcuna had
testified that they have complied with the publication and posting requirements.40 While it is true that he likewise failed to submit any other evidence thereon, still, in
accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of any controverting evidence that
the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in its enactment. Likewise, petitioners had the burden of proving their own allegation, which they, however, failed to
do. In the similar case of Figuerres v. CA,41 citing United States v. Cristobal,42 the Court upheld the presumptive validity of the ordinance therein despite the lack of
controverting evidence on the part of the local government to show that public hearings were conducted in light of: (a) the oppositor’s equal lack of controverting
evidence to demonstrate the local government’s non-compliance with the said public hearing; and (b) the fact that the local government’s non-compliance was a
negative allegation essential to the oppositor’s cause of action:

However, it is noteworthy that apart from her bare assertions, petitioner Figuerres has not presented any evidence to show that no public hearings were conducted prior
to the enactment of the ordinances in question. On the other hand, the Municipality of Mandaluyong claims that public hearings were indeed conducted before the
subject ordinances were adopted, although it likewise failed to submit any evidence to establish this allegation. However, in accordance with the presumption of validity
in favor of an ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of evidence showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed
in their enactment. In an analogous case, United States v. Cristobal, it was alleged that the ordinance making it a crime for anyone to obstruct waterways had not been
submitted by the provincial board as required by §§2232-2233 of the Administrative Code. In rejecting this contention, the Court held:

From the judgment of the Court of First Instance the defendant appealed to this court upon the theory that the ordinance in question was adopted without authority on
the part of the municipality and was therefore unconstitutional. The appellant argues that there was no proof adduced during the trial of the cause showing that said
ordinance had been approved by the provincial board. Considering the provisions of law that it is the duty of the provincial board to approve or disapprove ordinances
adopted by the municipal councils of the different municipalities, we will assume, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the law has been complied with.

We have a right to assume that officials have done that which the law requires them to do, in the absence of positive proof to the contrary.

Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative allegation essential to petitioner's cause of action in the present case. Hence, as petitioner is the party asserting it,
she has the burden of proof. Since petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances and to discharge the burden of proving that no
public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we are constrained to uphold their constitutionality or legality.43 (Emphases supplied, citation omitted)

All told, the Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in upholding the validity of the subject ordinance.

In any event, petitioners have not shown any valid title44 to the property in dispute to be entitled to its possession. Besides, the RTC’s order directing the removal of the
structures built by petitioners on Capayas Island without building permits was not appealed. As such, the same should now be deemed as final and conclusive upon
them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30, 2008 and Resolution dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
00284-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: IGNORANCE OF THE LAW

EN BANC
G.R. No. 46623 December 7, 1939
MARCIAL KASILAG, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO ROQUE, SEVERO MAPILISAN and IGNACIO DEL ROSARIO, respondents.

Luis M. Kasilag for petitioner.

Fortunato de Leon for respondents.

IMPERIAL, J.:

This is an appeal taken by the defendant-petitioner from the decision of the Court of Appeals which modified that rendered by the court of First Instance of Bataan in
civil case No. 1504 of said court and held: that the contract Exhibit "1" is entirely null and void and without effect; that the plaintiffs-respondents, then appellants, are
the owners of the disputed land, with its improvements, in common ownership with their brother Gavino Rodriguez, hence, they are entitled to the possession thereof;
that the defendant-petitioner should yield possession of the land in their favor, with all the improvements thereon and free from any lien; that the plaintiffs-respondents
jointly and severally pay to the defendant-petitioner the sum of P1,000 with interest at 6 percent per annum from the date of the decision; and absolved the plaintiffs-
respondents from the cross-complaint relative to the value of the improvements claimed by the defendant-petitioner. The appealed decision also ordered the registrar of
deeds of Bataan to cancel certificate of title No. 325, in the name of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio and to issue in lieu thereof another certificate of title in favor of
the plaintiffs-respondents and their brother Gavino Rodriguez, as undivided owners in equal parts, free of all liens and incumbrances except those expressly provided by
law, without special pronouncement as to the costs.

The respondents, children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced the aforesaid civil case to the end that they recover from the petitioner the
possession of the land and its improvements granted by way of homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio under patent No. 16074 issued on January 11, 1931, with certificate of
title No. 325 issued by the registrar of deeds of Bataan on June 27, 1931 in her favor, under section 122 of Act No. 496, which land was surveyed and identified in the
cadastre of the municipality of Limay, Province of Bataan, as lot No. 285; that the petitioner pay to them the sum of P650 being the approximate value of the fruits
which he received from the land; that the petitioner sign all the necessary documents to transfer the land and its possession to the respondents; that he petitioner be
restrained, during the pendency of the case, from conveying or encumbering the land and its improvements; that the registrar of deeds of Bataan cancel certificate of
title No. 325 and issue in lieu thereof another in favor of the respondents, and that the petitioner pay the costs of suit.

The petitioner denied in his answer all the material allegations of the complaint and by way of special defense alleged that he was in possession of the land and that he
was receiving the fruits thereof by virtue of a mortgage contract, entered into between him and the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio on May 16, 1932, which was duly
ratified by a notary public; and in counterclaim asked that the respondents pay him the sum of P1,000 with 12 per cent interest per annum which the deceased owed him
and that, should the respondents be declared to have a better right to the possession of the land, that they be sentenced to pay him the sum of P5,000 as value of all the
improvements which he introduced upon the land.lawphil.net

On May 16, 1932 Emiliana Ambrosio, in life, and the petitioner executed the following public deed:

"This agreement, made and entered into this 16th day of May, 1932, by and between Emiliana Ambrosio, Filipino, of legal age, widow and resident of Limay, Bataan,
P.L., hereinafter called the party of the first part, and Marcial Kasilag, Filipino, of legal age, married to Asuncion Roces, and resident at 312 Perdigon Street, Manila,
P.L., hereinafter called party of the second part.

WITNESSETH: That the parties hereto hereby covenant and agree to and with each other as follows:

ARTICLE I. That the party of the first part is the absolute registered owner of a parcel of land in the barrio of Alngan, municipality of Limay, Province of Bataan, her
title thereto being evidenced by homestead certificate of title No. 325 issued by the Bureau of Lands on June 11, 1931, said land being lot No. 285 of the Limay
Cadastre, General Land Registration Office Cadastral Record No. 1054, bounded and described as follows:

Beginning at point marked 1 on plan E-57394, N. 84º 32' W. 614.82 m. from B.B.M. No. 3, thence N. 66º 35' E. 307.15 m. to point "2"; S. 5º 07' W. to point "5"; S.6º
10' E. 104.26 m. to point "4"; S. 82º 17' W. to point "5"; S. 28º 53' W. 72.26 m. to point "6"; N. 71º 09' W. to point "7"; N. 1º 42' E. 173.72 m. to point 1, point of
beginning, "Containing an area of 6.7540 hectares. "Points 1,2,6 and 7, B.L.; points 3,4 and 5, stakes; points 4, 5 and 6 on bank of Alangan River. "Bounded on the
North, by property claimed by Maria Ambrosio; on the East, by Road; on the South, by Alangan River and property claimed by Maxima de la Cruz; and on the West, by
property claimed by Jose del Rosario. "Bearing true. Declination 0º 51' E. "Surveyed under authority of sections 12-22, Act No. 2874 and in accordance with existing
regulations of the Bureau of Lands, by Mamerto Jacinto, public land surveyor, on July 8, 1927 and approved on February 25, 1931.

ARTICLE II. That the improvements on the above described land consist of the following:

Four (4) mango trees, fruit bearing: one hundred ten (110) hills of bamboo trees; one (1) tamarind and six (6) boñga trees.

ARTICLE III. That the assessed value of the land is P940 and the assessed value of the improvements is P860, as evidenced by tax declaration No. 3531 of the
municipality of Limay, Bataan.

ARTICLE IV. That for and in consideration of the sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) Philippine currency, paid by the party of second part to the party of the
first part, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the party of the first part hereby encumbers and hypothecates, by way of mortgage, only the improvements described
in Articles II and III hereof, of which improvements the party of the first part is the absolute owner.

ARTICLE V. That the condition of said mortgage is such that if the party of the first part shall well and truly pay, or cause to paid to the party of the second
part, his heirs, assigns, or executors, on or before the 16th day of November, 1936, or four and one-half (4½) years after date of the execution of this instrument, the
aforesaid sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) with interest at 12 per cent per annum, then said mortgage shall be and become null and void; otherwise the same shall be
and shall remain in full force and effect, and subject to foreclosure in the manner and form provided by law for the amount due thereunder, with costs and also
attorney's fees in the event of such foreclosure.lawphil.net

ARTICLE VI. That the party of the first part shall pay all taxes and assessments which are or may become due on the above described land and improvements
during the term of this agreement.
ARTICLE VII. That within thirty (30) days after date of execution of this agreement, the party of the first part shall file a motion before the Court of First
Instance at Balanga, Bataan, P. I., requesting cancellation of Homestead Certificate of Title No. 325 referred to in Article I hereof and the issuance, in lieu thereof, of a
certificate of title under the provisions of Land Registration Act No. 496, as amended by Act 3901.

ARTICLE III. It if further agreed that if upon the expiration of the period of time (4½) years stipulated in this mortgage, the mortgagor should fail to redeem this
mortgage, she would execute a deed of absolute sale of the property herein described for the same amount as this mortgage, including all unpaid interests at the rate of
12 per cent per annum, in favor of the mortgagee.

ARTICLE IX. That in the event the contemplated motion under Article VII hereof is not approved by the Court, the foregoing contract of sale shall
automatically become null and void, and the mortgage stipulated under Article IV and V shall remain in full force and effect.

In testimony whereof, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands the day and year first herein before written.

(Sgd.) MARCIAL KASILAG

(Sgd.) EMILIANA AMBROSIO

Signed in the presence of:

(Sgd.) ILLEGIBLE

(Sgd.) GAVINO RODRIGUEZ.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS } ss.

BALANGA, BATAAN } ss.

Before me this day personally appeared Emiliana Ambrosio without cedula by reason of her sex, to me known and known to me to be the person who signed the
foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that she executed the same as her free and voluntary act and deed.

I hereby certify that this instrument consists of three (3) pages including this page of the acknowledgment and that each page thereof is signed by the parties to the
instrument and the witnesses in their presence and in the presence of each other, and that the land treated in this instrument consists of only one parcel.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my notarial seal, this 16th day of May, 1932.

(Sgd.) NICOLAS NAVARRO

Notary Public

My commission expires December 31, 1933.

Doc. No. 178

Page 36 of my register
Book No. IV

One year after the execution of the aforequoted deed, that is, in 1933, it came to pass that Emiliana Ambrosio was unable to pay the stipulated interests as well as the tax
on the land and its improvements. For this reason, she and the petitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the
land on condition that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would
introduce improvements thereon. By virtue of this verbal contract, the petitioner entered upon the possession of the land, gathered the products thereof, did not collect
the interest on the loan, introduced improvements upon the land valued at P5,000, according to him and on May 22, 1934 the tax declaration was transferred in his name
and on March 6, 1936 the assessed value of the land was increased from P1,020 to P2,180.

After an analysis of the conditions of Exhibit "1" the Court of Appeals came to the conclusion and so held that the contract entered into by and between the parties, set
out in the said public deed, was one of absolute purchase and sale of the land and its improvements. And upon this ruling it held null and void and without legal effect
the entire Exhibit 1 as well as the subsequent verbal contract entered into between the parties, ordering, however, the respondents to pay to the petitioner, jointly and
severally, the loan of P1,000 with legal interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the decision. In this first assignment of error the petitioner contends that the
Court of Appeals violated the law in holding that Exhibit 1 is an absolute deed of sale of the land and its improvements and that it is void and without any legal effect.

The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is to the effect that the intention of the contracting parties should always prevail because their will has the force of
law between them. Article 1281 of the Civil Code consecrates this rule and provides, that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal sense of its stipulations shall be followed; and if the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties, the
intention shall prevail. The contract set out in Exhibit 1 should be interpreted in accordance with these rules. As the terms thereof are clear and leave no room for doubt,
it should be interpreted according to the literal meaning of its clauses. The words used by the contracting parties in Exhibit 1 clearly show that they intended to enter
into the principal contract of loan in the amount of P1,000, with interest at 12 per cent per annum, and into the accessory contract of mortgage of the improvements on
the land acquired as homestead, the parties having moreover, agreed upon the pacts and conditions stated in the deed. In other words, the parties entered into a contract
of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead, to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 and the stipulated interest thereon. In clause
V the parties stipulated that Emiliana Ambrosio was to pay, within four and a half years, or until November 16, 1936, the debt with interest thereon, in which event the
mortgage would not have any effect; in clause VI the parties agreed that the tax on the land and its improvements, during the existence of the mortgage, should be paid
by the owner of the land; in clause VII it was covenanted that within thirty days from the date of the contract, the owner of the land would file a motion in the Court of
First Instance of Bataan asking that certificate of title No. 325 be cancelled and that in lieu thereof another be issued under the provisions of the Land Registration Act
No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3901; in clause VIII the parties agreed that should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to redeem the mortgage within the stipulated period of four
years and a half, she would execute an absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of the mortgagee, the petitioner, for the same amount of the loan of P1,000 including
unpaid interest; and in clause IX it was stipulated that in case the motion to be presented under clause VII should be disapproved by the Court of First Instance of
Bataan, the contract of sale would automatically become void and the mortgage would subsist in all its force.

Another fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts, not less important than those indicated, is to the effect that the terms, clauses and conditions contrary to law,
morals and public order should be separated from the valid and legal contract and when such separation can be made because they are independent of the valid contract
which expresses the will of the contracting parties. Manresa, commenting on article 1255 of the Civil Code and stating the rule of separation just mentioned, gives his
views as follows:

On the supposition that the various pacts, clauses or conditions are valid, no difficulty is presented; but should they be void, the question is as to what extent they may
produce the nullity of the principal obligation. Under the view that such features of the obligation are added to it and do not go to its essence, a criterion based upon the
stability of juridical relations should tend to consider the nullity as confined to the clause or pact suffering therefrom, except in case where the latter, by an established
connection or by manifest intention of the parties, is inseparable from the principal obligation, and is a condition, juridically speaking, of that the nullity of which it
would also occasion. (Manresa, Commentaries on the Civil Code, Volume 8, p. 575.)

The same view prevails in the Anglo-American law, as condensed in the following words:

Where an agreement founded on a legal consideration contains several promises, or a promise to do several things, and a part only of the things to be done are illegal,
the promises which can be separated, or the promise, so far as it can be separated, from the illegality, may be valid. The rule is that a lawful promise made for a lawful
consideration is not invalid merely because an unlawful promise was made at the same time and for the same consideration, and this rule applies, although the invalidity
is due to violation of a statutory provision, unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication declares the entire contract void. . . . (13 C. J., par. 470, p. 512; New
York Cent. etc. R. Co. v. Gray, 239 U.S., 583; 60 Law ed., 451; U.S. v. Mora, 97 U.S., 413, 24 Law. ed., 1017; U.S. v. Hodson, 10 Wall, 395; 19 Law ed. 937; Gelpcke
v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 17 Law ed., 520; U.S. v. Bradly, 10 Pet. 343, 9 Law. ed., 448; Borland v. Prindle, 144 Fed 713; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas Pac. R.
Co., 4 Fed., 284; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. U.S., 15 Ct. Cl., 428.)

Addressing ourselves now to the contract entered into by the parties, set out in Exhibit 1, we stated that the principal contract is that of loan and the accessory that of
mortgage of the improvements upon the land acquired as a homestead. There is no question that the first of these contract is valid as it is not against the law. The
second, or the mortgage of the improvements, is expressly authorized by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended by section 23 of Act No. 3517, reading:

SEC. 116. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units or institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under the free
patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and
after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the
improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.

It will be recalled that by clause VIII of Exhibit 1 the parties agreed that should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to redeem the mortgage within the stipulated period of four and
a half years, by paying the loan together with interest, she would execute in favor of the petitioner an absolute deed of sale of the land for P1,000, including the interest
stipulated and owing. The stipulation was verbally modified by the same parties after the expiration of one year, in the sense that the petitioner would take possession of
the land and would benefit by the fruits thereof on condition that he would condone the payment of interest upon the loan and he would attend to the payment of the
land tax. These pacts made by the parties independently were calculated to alter the mortgage a contract clearly entered into, converting the latter into a contract of
antichresis. (Article 1881 of the Civil Code.) The contract of antichresis, being a real encumbrance burdening the land, is illegal and void because it is legal and valid.

The foregoing considerations bring us to the conclusion that the first assignment of error is well-founded and that error was committed in holding that the contract
entered into between the parties was one of absolute sale of the land and its improvements and that Exhibit 1 is null and void. In the second assignment of error the
petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that he is guilty of violating the Public Land Act because he entered into the contract, Exhibit 1. The
assigned error is vague and not specific. If it attempts to show that the said document is valid in its entirety, it is not well-founded because we have already said that
certain pacts thereof are illegal because they are prohibited by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended.

In the third assignment of error the petitioner insists that his testimony, as to the verbal agreement entered into between him and Emiliana Ambrosio, should have been
accepted by the Court of Appeals; and in the fourth and last assignment of error the same petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that he acted in
bad faith in taking possession of the land and in taking advantage of the fruits thereof, resulting in the denial of his right to be reimbursed for the value of the
improvements introduced by him.

We have seen that subsequent to the execution of the contract, Exhibit 1, the parties entered into another verbal contract whereby the petitioner was authorized to take
possession of the land, to receive the fruits thereof and to introduce improvements thereon, provided that he would renounce the payment of stipulated interest and he
would assume payment of the land tax. The possession by the petitioner and his receipt of the fruits of the land, considered as integral elements of the contract of
antichresis, are illegal and void agreements because, as already stated, the contract of antichresis is a lien and such is expressly prohibited by section 116 of Act No.
2874, as amended. The Court of Appeals held that the petitioner acted in bad faith in taking possession of the land because he knew that the contract he made with
Emiliana Ambrosio was an absolute deed of sale and, further, that the latter could not sell the land because it is prohibited by section 116. The Civil Code does not
expressly define what is meant by bad faith, but section 433 provides that "Every person who is unaware of any flaw in his title, or in the manner of its acquisition, by
which it is invalidated, shall be deemed a possessor in good faith"; and provides further, that "Possessors aware of such flaw are deemed possessors in bad faith".
Article 1950 of the same Code, covered by Chapter II relative to prescription of ownership and other real rights, provides, in turn, that "Good faith on the part of the
possessor consists in his belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner of the same, and could transmit the title thereto." We do not have before
us a case of prescription of ownership, hence, the last article is not squarely in point. In resume, it may be stated that a person is deemed a possessor in bad faith when
he knows that there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it is invalidated.

Borrowing the language of Article 433, the question to be answered is whether the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in good faith because he was unaware of
any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated. It will be noted that ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the rule. From the facts
found established by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside
from the prohibition contained in section 116. This being the case, the question is whether good faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws. Manresa,
commenting on article 434 in connection with the preceding article, sustains the affirmative. He says:

"We do not believe that in real life there are not many cases of good faith founded upon an error of law. When the acquisition appears in a public document, the
capacity of the parties has already been passed upon by competent authority, and even established by appeals taken from final judgments and administrative remedies
against the qualification of registrars, and the possibility of error is remote under such circumstances; but, unfortunately, private documents and even verbal agreements
far exceed public documents in number, and while no one should be ignorant of the law, the truth is that even we who are called upon to know and apply it fall into
error not infrequently. However, a clear, manifest, and truly unexcusable ignorance is one thing, to which undoubtedly refers article 2, and another and different thing is
possible and excusable error arising from complex legal principles and from the interpretation of conflicting doctrines.

But even ignorance of the law may be based upon an error of fact, or better still, ignorance of a fact is possible as to the capacity to transmit and as to the intervention of
certain persons, compliance with certain formalities and appreciation of certain acts, and an error of law is possible in the interpretation of doubtful doctrines. (Manresa,
Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code. Volume IV, pp. 100, 101 and 102.)

According to this author, gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that
the petitioner is not conversant with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that
he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly
as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section 116.
These considerations again bring us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the
basis of his good faith. We do not give much importance to the change of the tax declaration, which consisted in making the petitioner appear as the owner of the land,
because such an act may only be considered as a sequel to the change of possession and enjoyment of the fruits by the petitioner, to about which we have stated that the
petitioner's ignorance of the law is possible and excusable. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner acted in good faith in taking possession of the land and enjoying its
fruits.

The petitioner being a possessor in good faith within the meaning of article 433 of the Civil Code and having introduced the improvements upon the land as such, the
provisions of article 361 of the same Code are applicable; wherefore, the respondents are entitled to have the improvements and plants upon indemnifying the petitioner
the value thereof which we fix at P3,000, as appraised by the trial court; or the respondents may elect to compel the petitioner to have the land by paying its market
value to be fixed by the court of origin.

The respondents also prayed in their complaint that the petitioner be compelled to pay them the sum of P650, being the approximate value of the fruits obtained by the
petitioner from the land. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying the claim or indemnity for damages, being of the same opinion as the
trial court that the respondents may elect to compel the petitioner to have the land. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court that the respondents
have not established such damages. Under the verbal contract between the petitioner and the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, during the latter's lifetime, the former would
take possession of the land and would receive the fruits of the mortgaged improvements on condition that he would no longer collect the stipulated interest and that he
would attend to the payment of the land tax. This agreement, at bottom, is tantamount to the stipulation that the petitioner should apply the value of the fruits of the land
to the payment of stipulated interest on the loan of P1,000 which is, in turn, another of the elements characterizing the contract of antichresis under article 1881 of the
Civil Code. It was not possible for the parties to stipulate further that the value of the fruits be also applied to the payment of the capital, because the truth was that
nothing remained after paying the interest at 12% per annum. This interest, at the rate fixed, amounted to P120 per annum, whereas the market value of the fruits
obtainable from the land hardly reached said amount in view of the fact that the assessed value of said improvements was, according to the decision, P860. To this
should be added the fact that, under the verbal agreement, from the value of the fruits had to be taken a certain amount to pay the annual land tax. We mention these
data here to show that the petitioner is also not bound to render an accounting of the value of the fruits of the mortgaged improvements for the reason stated that said
value hardly covers the interest earned by the secured indebtednes.

For all the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision is reversed, and we hereby adjudge: (1) that the contract of mortgage of the improvements, set out in Exhibit
1, is valid and binding; (2) that the contract of antichresis agreed upon verbally by the parties is a real incumbrance which burdens the land and, as such, is a null and
without effect; (3) that the petitioner is a possessor in good faith; (4) that the respondents may elect to have the improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying the
latter the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and have the land where the improvements or plants are found, by paying them its market value to be
filed by the court of origin, upon hearing the parties; (5) that the respondents have a right to the possession of the land and to enjoy the mortgaged improvements; and
(6) that the respondents may redeem the mortgage of the improvements by paying to the petitioner within three months the amount of P1,000, without interest, as that
stipulated is set off by the value of the fruits of the mortgaged improvements which petitioner received, and in default thereof the petitioner may ask for the public sale
of said improvements for the purpose of applying the proceeds thereof to the payment of his said credit. Without special pronouncement as to the costs in all instances.
So ordered.
TOPIC: RETROACTIVITY OF LAWS

HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON, Petitioners,

-versus -
ELVIN* CHAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 157547 February 23, 2011

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the issuance of an unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 (BP 22).

Antecedents

On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) an information charging the late Eduardo Simon
(Simon) with a violation of BP 22, docketed as Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon. The accusatory portion reads:

That sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue
to Elvin Chan to apply on account or for value Landbank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 payable to cash in the amount of P336,000.00 said accused well
knowing that at the time of issue she/he/they did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Elvin Chan the amount of the check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same
within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [1]

More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the principal
amount of P336,000.00, coupled with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00).[2] He alleged in his complaint the
following:

xxx

2. Sometime in December 1996 defendant employing fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation encashed a check dated December 26, 1996 in the amount of P336,000.00 to
the plaintiff assuring the latter that the check is duly funded and that he had an existing account with the Land Bank of the Philippines, xerox copy of the said check is
hereto attached as Annex A;

3. However, when said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored on the ground that the account of the defendant with the Land Bank of the
Philippines has been closed contrary to his representation that he has an existing account with the said bank and that the said check was duly funded and will be honored
when presented for payment;

4. Demands had been made to the defendant for him to make good the payment of the value of the check, xerox copy of the letter of demand is hereto attached as Annex
B, but despite such demand defendant refused and continues to refuse to comply with plaintiffs valid demand;

5. Due to the unlawful failure of the defendant to comply with the plaintiffs valid demands, plaintiff has been compelled to retain the services of counsel for which he
agreed to pay as reasonable attorneys fees the amount of P50,000.00 plus additional amount of P2,000.00 per appearance.

ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER

FOR PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

6. The defendant as previously alleged has been guilty of fraud in contracting the obligation upon which this action is brought and that there is no sufficient security for
the claims sought in this action which fraud consist in the misrepresentation by the defendant that he has an existing account and sufficient funds to cover the check
when in fact his account was already closed at the time he issued a check;

7. That the plaintiff has a sufficient cause of action and this action is one which falls under Section 1, sub-paragraph (d), Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court of the
Philippines and the amount due the plaintiff is as much as the sum for which the plaintiff seeks the writ of preliminary attachment;

8. That the plaintiff is willing and able to post a bond conditioned upon the payment of damages should it be finally found out that the plaintiff is not entitled to the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.[3]

On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which was implemented on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff attaching a Nissan
vehicle of Simon.[4]

On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages,[5] pertinently averring:

xxx
On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a consequence of the pendency of another action between the instant parties for the same cause before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila, Branch X (10) entitled People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon, docketed thereat as Criminal Case No. 275381-CR, the instant action is
dismissable under Section 1, (e), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, xxx

xxx

While the instant case is civil in nature and character as contradistinguished from the said Criminal Case No. 915-00 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch
X (10), the basis of the instant civil action is the herein plaintiffs criminal complaint against defendant arising from a charge of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as a
consequence of the alleged dishonor in plaintiffs hands upon presentment for payment with drawee bank a Land Bank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 in
the amount of P336,000- drawn allegedly issued to plaintiff by defendant who is the accused in said case, a photocopy of the Criminal information filed by the Assistant
City Prosecutor of Manila on June 11, 1997 hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex 1.

It is our understanding of the law and the rules, that, when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately xxx.

On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simons urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages, stating:

1. The sole ground upon which defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiffs complaint is the alleged pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause,
contending among others that the pendency of Criminal Case No. 275381-CR entitled People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon renders this case dismissable;

2. The defendant further contends that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, the filing of the criminal action, the civil action for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action which the plaintiff does not contest; however, it is the submission of the
plaintiff that an implied reservation of the right to file a civil action has already been made, first, by the fact that the information for violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal
Case No. 2753841 does not at all make any allegation of damages suffered by the plaintiff nor is there any claim for recovery of damages; on top of this the plaintiff as
private complainant in the criminal case, during the presentation of the prosecution evidence was not represented at all by a private prosecutor such that no evidence has
been adduced by the prosecution on the criminal case to prove damages; all of these we respectfully submit demonstrate an effective implied reservation of the right of
the plaintiff to file a separate civil action for damages;

3. The defendant relies on Section 3 sub-paragraph (a) Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which mandates that after a criminal action has been commenced the
civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action; however, the defendant overlooks and conveniently failed to consider that
under Section 2, Rule 111 which provides as follows:

In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of criminal case provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

In as much as the case is one that falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines as it is based on fraud, this action therefore may be prosecuted independently
of the criminal action;

4. In fact we would even venture to state that even without any reservation at all of the right to file a separate civil action still the plaintiff is authorized to file this
instant case because the plaintiff seeks to enforce an obligation which the defendant owes to the plaintiff by virtue of the negotiable instruments law. The plaintiff in this
case sued the defendant to enforce his liability as drawer in favor of the plaintiff as payee of the check. Assuming the allegation of the defendant of the alleged
circumstances relative to the issuance of the check, still when he delivered the check payable to bearer to that certain Pedro Domingo, as it was payable to cash, the
same may be negotiated by delivery by who ever was the bearer of the check and such negotiation was valid and effective against the drawer;

5. Indeed, assuming as true the allegations of the defendant regarding the circumstances relative to the issuance of the check it would be entirely impossible for the
plaintiff to have been aware that such check was intended only for a definite person and was not negotiable considering that the said check was payable to bearer and
was not even crossed;

6. We contend that what cannot be prosecuted separate and apart from the criminal case without a reservation is a civil action arising from the criminal offense charged.
However, in this instant case since the liability of the defendant are imposed and the rights of the plaintiff are created by the negotiable instruments law, even without
any reservation at all this instant action may still be prosecuted;

7. Having this shown, the merits of plaintiffs complaint the application for damages against the bond is totally without any legal support and perforce should be
dismissed outright.[6]

On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simons urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages,[7]
dismissing the complaint of Chan because:

xxx

After study of the arguments of the parties, the court resolves to GRANT the Motion to Dismiss and the application to charge plaintiffs bond for damages.

For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties or at least such as to represent the same
interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two (2) cases should be
such that the judgment, which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. xxx

A close perusal of the herein complaint denominated as Sum of Money and the criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 would readily show that the parties are not only
identical but also the cause of action being asserted, which is the recovery of the value of Landbank Check No. 0007280 in the amount of P336,000.00. In both civil and
criminal cases, the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts, are identical.

Plaintiffs claim that there is an effective implied waiver of his right to pursue this civil case owing to the fact that there was no allegation of damages in BP Blg. 22 case
and that there was no private prosecutor during the presentation of prosecution evidence is unmeritorious. It is basic that when a complaint or criminal Information is
filed, even without any allegation of damages and the intention to prove and claim them, the offended party has the right to prove and claim for them, unless a waiver or
reservation is made or unless in the meantime, the offended party has instituted a separate civil action. xxx The over-all import of the said provision conveys that the
waiver which includes indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages arising under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code must be both clear and express.
And this must be logically so as the primordial objective of the Rule is to prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or omission of the
accused.
Indeed, the evidence discloses that the plaintiff did not waive or made a reservation as to his right to pursue the civil branch of the criminal case for violation of BP Blg.
22 against the defendant herein. To the considered view of this court, the filing of the instant complaint for sum of money is indeed legally barred. The right to institute
a separate civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity
to make such reservation. xxx

Even assuming the correctness of the plaintiffs submission that the herein case for sum of money is one based on fraud and hence falling under Article 33 of the Civil
Code, still prior reservation is required by the Rules, to wit:

In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of criminal case provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court resolves to:

1.Dismiss the instant complaint on the ground of litis pendentia;

2. Dissolve/Lift the Writ of Attachment issued by this court on August 14, 2000

3. Charge the plaintiffs bond the amount of P336,000.00 in favor of the defendant for the damages sustained by the latter by virtue of the implementation of the writ of
attachment;

4. Direct the Branch Sheriff of this Court to RESTORE with utmost dispatch to the defendants physical possession the vehicle seized from him on August 16, 2000; and

5. Direct the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P5,000.00 by way of attorneys fees.

SO ORDERED.

Chans motion for reconsideration was denied on December 20, 2000,[8] viz:

Considering that the plaintiffs arguments appear to be a mere repetition of his previous submissions, and which submissions this court have already passed upon; and
taking into account the inapplicability of the ratio decidendi in the Tactaquin vs. Palileo case which the plaintiff cited as clearly in that case, the plaintiff therein
expressly made a reservation to file a separate civil action, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld the dismissal of Chans complaint, disposing:[9]

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for review,[10] challenging the propriety of the dismissal of his complaint on the
ground of litis pendentia.

In his comment, [11] Simon countered that Chan was guilty of bad faith and malice in prosecuting his alleged civil claim twice in a manner that caused him (Simon)
utter embarrassment and emotional sufferings; and that the dismissal of the civil case because of the valid ground of litis pendentia based on Section 1 (e), Rule 16 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was warranted.

On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,[12] overturning the RTC, viz:

xxx

As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired through the
imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated through
indemnity which is also civil in nature. Thus, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the commission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either deemed
instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted.

Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on December 1, 2000, provides that:

(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Rule 111, Section 2 further states:

After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal
action.

However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule
has been changed.

In DMPI Employees Credit Association vs. Velez, the Supreme Court pronounced that only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with
the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Speaking through Justice Pardo, the Supreme Court held:
 There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not include recovery of
civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately without
a reservation.

Rule 111, Section 3 reads:

Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil
action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this
case.

Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure.
xxx

Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-124, an independent civil action for damages on account of the fraud committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil
Code, may proceed independently even if there was no reservation as to its filing.

It must be pointed that the abovecited case is similar with the instant suit. The complaint was also brought on allegation of fraud under Article 33 of the Civil Code and
committed by the respondent in the issuance of the check which later bounced. It was filed before the trial court, despite the pendency of the criminal case for violation
of BP 22 against the respondent. While it may be true that the changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil action became
effective on December 1, 2000, the same may be given retroactive application and may be made to apply to the case at bench, since procedural rules may be given
retroactive application. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure.

In view of the ruling on the first assigned error, it is therefore an error to adjudge damages in favor of the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 13, 2001 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108 affirming the
dismissal of the complaint filed by petitioner is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

On March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simons motion for reconsideration.[13]

Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioners submit that the CA erroneously premised its decision on the assessment that the civil case was an independent civil action
under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code; that the CAs reliance on the ruling in DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative Inc. v. Velez[14] stretched the
meaning and intent of the ruling, and was contrary to Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; that this case was a simple collection suit for a
sum of money, precluding the application of Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.[15]

In his comment,[16] Chan counters that the petition for review should be denied because the petitioners used the wrong mode of appeal; that his cause of action, being
based on fraud, was an independent civil action; and that the appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case did not preclude the filing of his separate civil
action.

Issue

The lone issue is whether or not Chans civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check (Civil Case No. 915-00) was an independent civil action.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on the Propriety of filing a separate civil action based on BP 22

The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation of BP 22 can give rise to civil liability in Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr.,[17] holding:

xxx

Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:

Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly
suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the
commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil 692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal
action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses (United
States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil 265).

xxx

Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was issued.
Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty-handed by excluding
the civil liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To do so may leave
the offended party unable to recover even the face value of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection
which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.

xxx

However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, effective December 1, 2000, which relevantly provides:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording
the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount
thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the
filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject
thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed.[18]

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall
be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages,
the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded
by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of the Rule governing consolidation of the
civil and criminal actions.

Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent
civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable.
It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally
objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws.[19] Any new rules may validly be made to
apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure,[20] except that in criminal
cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of the
offenses, because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution.[21]

Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the violation of any assumed vested right, because the new rule was adopted from Supreme Court
Circular 57-97 that took effect on November 1, 1997.

Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:

Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the following rules and guidelines shall henceforth be observed in the filing and prosecution of
all criminal cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which penalizes the making or drawing and issuance of a check without funds or credit:

1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil
action separately shall be allowed or recognized.[22]

2. Upon the filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based upon the amount of the check involved which
shall be considered as the actual damages claimed, in accordance with the schedule of fees in Section 7 (a) and Section 8 (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as last
amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94 effective August 1, 1994. Where the offended party further seeks to enforce against the accused civil liability by way of
liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, he shall pay the corresponding filing fees therefor based on the amounts thereof as alleged either in the
complaint or information. If not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the amount of such fees shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.

3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application
with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with the pertinent procedure outlined in Section 2
(a) of Rule 111 governing the proceedings in the actions as thus consolidated.

4. This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect on November 1, 1997.

The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were amply explained in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation,[23] thus:
xxx
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the recovery of the amount of the
checks was also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for
violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. The reservation to file a separate civil action is no longer needed. The Rules provide:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.

(a) xx

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be
considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the
offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently
awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court
trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil
and criminal actions.

The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It specifically states that the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include
the corresponding civil action. It also requires the complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved. Generally, no filing fees are
required for criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action in complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket fees upon the
filing of the complaint. This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because
ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and
sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to significantly lower the
number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting
two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to
discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a separate
civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal
case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of
recovering the amount of the dishonored checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would further delay the final
disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a
separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code cited
by the trial court will not apply to the case at bar.[24]

The CAs reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez[25] to give due course to the civil action of Chan independently and separately of Criminal Case
No. 275381 was unwarranted. DMPI Employees, which involved a prosecution for estafa, is not on all fours with this case, which is a prosecution for a violation of BP
22. Although the Court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing check may result in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22,[26] the
procedures for the recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different and non-interchangeable. In prosecutions of estafa, the offended
party may opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may institute an independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code,[27] as
DMPI Employees has allowed. In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate
civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance of the bouncing check upon the reasons delineated in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation, supra.

To repeat, Chans separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved in the prosecution for the violation of BP 22 could not be independently maintained
under both Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the aforequoted provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the allegations of fraud and deceit.

Aptness of the dismissal of the civil action on the ground of litis pendentia

Did the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila (as the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 275381) bar the filing of Civil Case No. 915-00 in the MeTC in
Pasay City on the ground of litis pendentia?

For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties
or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same
facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the existence of the third becomes nil.[28]

A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably shows that all the elements of litis pendentia are attendant. First of all, the parties in the
civil action involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and in Civil Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the information in Criminal Case No.
275381 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both alleged that Simon had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth P336,000.00 payable to cash, thereby
indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well as the facts upon which the reliefs sought were founded, were identical in all respects. And, thirdly,
any judgment rendered in one case would necessarily bar the other by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice upon the same claim.

It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case No. 915-00 on the ground of litis pendentia through its decision dated October 23,
2000; and that the RTC in Pasay City did not err in affirming the MeTC.

WHEREFORE, we grant the petition for review on certiorari, and, accordingly, we reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on June 25,
2002. We reinstate the decision rendered on October 23, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay City.

Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: RETROACTIVITY OF LAWS

[G.R. No. 102330. November 25, 1998]

TERESITA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS; and CONCHITA EVANGELISTA and Her Husband SIMEON EVANGELISTA;
ARACELI F. MARILLA and Her Husband FREDDY MARILLA; ANTONIO V. FRANCISCO; and EUSEBIO FRANCISCO, respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse respondent appellate courts decision[1] promulgated on October 7, 1991, affirming in toto the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court which ruled,[2] thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court renders judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, as follows:

1) Ordering the dismissal of the Complaint with costs against the plaintiff;

2) Declaring the defendant Eusebio Francisco the administrator of the properties described in paragraph eight (8) of the Complaint; and

3) Sentencing the plaintiff to pay the defendants the sum of P10,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco (Eusebio) by his second marriage. Private respondents Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and
Antonio Francisco are children of Eusebio by his first marriage.

Petitioner alleges that since their marriage on February 10, 1962, she and Eusebio have acquired the following: (1) a sari-sari store, a residential house and lot, and an
apartment house, all situated at Col. S. Cruz St., Barangay Balite, Rodriguez (formerly Montalban), Rizal, and; (2) a house and lot at Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez,
Rizal. Petitioner further avers that these properties were administered by Eusebio until he was invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer, thereby,
rendering him unfit to administer them. Petitioner also claims that private respondents succeeded in convincing their father to sign a general power of attorney which
authorized Conchita Evangelista to administer the house and lot together with the apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal.

On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit for damages and for annulment of said general power of attorney, and thereby enjoining its enforcement. Petitioner also
sought to be declared as the administratrix of the properties in dispute. In due course, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondents. It held that the
petitioner failed to adduce proof that said properties were acquired during the existence of the second conjugal partnership, or that they pertained exclusively to the
petitioner. Hence, the court ruled that those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and that he has the capacity to administer them.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner raised the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLES 160 AND 158, UNDER TITLE VI OF THE (NEW) CIVIL CODE BECAUSE SAID TITLE,
TOGETHER WITH THE OTHERS, HAVE (SIC) ALREADY BEEN REPEALED BY ARTICLE 253 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

RESPONDENT COURT FURTHER ERRED IN NOT APPLYING ARTICLE 124 OF THE FAMILY CODE.[3]

But in her reply, petitioner posed the sole issue whether or not Article 116 of the Family Code applies to this case because Article 253 of the same Code [which]
expressly repeals Arts. 158 and 160 of the Civil Code.[4]

To our mind, the crucial issue in this petition is whether or not the appellate court committed reversible error in affirming the trial courts ruling that the properties,
subject matter of controversy, are not conjugal but the capital properties of Eusebio exclusively.

Indeed, Articles 158[5] and 160[6] of the New Civil Code have been repealed by the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988. The
aforecited articles fall under Title VI, Book I of the New Civil Code which was expressly repealed by Article 254[7] (not Article 253 as alleged by petitioner in her
petition and reply) of the Family Code. Nonetheless, we cannot invoke the new law in this case without impairing prior vested rights pursuant to Article 256[8] in
relation to Article 105[9] (second paragraph) of the Family Code. Accordingly, the repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code does not operate to prejudice
or otherwise affect rights which have become vested or accrued while the said provisions were in force.[10] Hence, the rights accrued and vested while the cited articles
were in effect survive their repeal.[11] We shall therefore resolve the issue of the nature of the contested properties based on the provisions of the New Civil Code.

Petitioner contends that the subject properties are conjugal, thus, she should administer these on account of the incapacity of her husband. On the other hand, private
respondents maintain that the assets in controversy claimed by petitioner as conjugal are capital properties of Eusebio exclusively as these were acquired by the latter
either through inheritance or through his industry prior to his second marriage. Moreover, they stress that Eusebio is not incapacitated contrary to petitioners allegation.

We find petitioners contention lacks merit, as hereafter elucidated.

Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the
marriage.[12] Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.[13] The
party who asserts this presumption must first prove said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and
does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.[14] Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is
rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.[15]

In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the properties which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio.
With respect to the land at Col. Cruz St., Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal, petitioner failed to refute the testimony of Eusebio that he inherited the same from his parents.
Interestingly, petitioner even admitted that Eusebio brought into their marriage the said land, albeit in the concept of a possessor only as it was not yet registered in his
name.

Whether Eusebio succeeded to the property prior or subsequent to his second marriage is inconsequential. The property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a
matter of law, pursuant to Article 148[16] of the New Civil Code.

Essentially, property already owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, and brought to the marriage, is considered his or her separate property.[17] Acquisitions by
lucrative title refers to properties acquired gratuitously and include those acquired by either spouse during the marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation.[18]
Hence, even if it be assumed that Eusebios acquisition by succession of the land took place during his second marriage, the land would still be his exclusive property
because it was acquired by him, during the marriage, by lucrative title.[19]

As regards the house, apartment and sari-sari store, private respondents aver that these properties were either constructed or established by their father during his first
marriage. On the other hand, petitioner insists that the said assets belong to conjugal partnership. In support of her claim, petitioner relied on the building permits for the
house and the apartment, with her as the applicant although in the name of Eusebio. She also invoked the business license for the sari-sari store issued in her name
alone.

It must be emphasized that the aforementioned documents in no way prove that the improvements were acquired during the second marriage. And the fact that one is
the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the property is conjugal or not. As the appellate court aptly noted:

x x x. And the mere fact that plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] is the licensee of the sari-sari store (Exhibit F-3; Exhibit G, pp. 44-47, Record) or is the supposed
applicant for a building permit does not establish that these improvements were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio Francisco, especially so when her exhibits
(D-1, E, E-1, T, T-1, T-2, U, U-1 and U-2; pp. 38-40; 285-290, Record; TSN, January 17, 1989, page 6-7) are diametrically opposed to her pretense as they all
described Eusebio Francisco as the owner of the structures (Article 1431, New Civil Code; Section 4, Rule 129, Revised Rules on Evidence).

Neither is it plausible to argue that the sari-sari store constructed on the land of Eusebio Francisco has thereby become conjugal for want of evidence to sustain the
proposition that it was constructed at the expense of their partnership (second paragraph, Article 158, New Civil Code). Normally, this absence of evidence on the
source of funding will call for the application of the presumption under Article 160 of the New Civil Code that the store is really conjugal but it cannot be so in this
particular case again, by reason of the dearth in proof that it was erected during the alleged second marriage (5 Sanchez Roman 840-841; 9 Manresa; cited in Civil Code
of the Philippines by Tolentino, Volume 1, 1983 Edition, page 421).[20]

Regarding the property at San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, private respondents assert that their father purchased it during the lifetime of their mother. In contrast, petitioner
claims ownership over said property inasmuch as the title thereto is registered in the name of Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco.

It must be stressed that the certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors her claim is inadequate. The fact that the land was registered in the name of Eusebio
Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco, is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two
different acts.[21] It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing.[22] The phrase married to preceding Teresita
Francisco is merely descriptive of the civil status of Eusebio Francisco.[23]

In the light of the foregoing circumstances, the appellate court cannot be said to have been without valid basis in affirming the lower courts ruling that the properties in
controversy belong exclusively to Eusebio.

Now, insofar as the administration of the subject properties is concerned, it follows that Eusebio shall retain control thereof considering that the assets are exclusively
his capital.[24] Even assuming for the sake of argument that the properties are conjugal, petitioner cannot administer them inasmuch as Eusebio is not incapacitated.
Contrary to the allegation of petitioner, Eusebio, as found by the lower court, is not suffering from serious illness so as to impair his fitness to administer his properties.
That he is handicapped due to a leg injury sustained in a bicycle accident, allegedly aggravated when petitioner pushed him to the ground in one of their occasional
quarrels, did not render him, in the Courts view, incapacitated to perform acts of administration over his own properties.

WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: RETROACTIVITY OF LAWS AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS

G.R. No. 136921. April 17, 2001]

LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner, vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, respondent.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No. 52374, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent.

Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind
courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the young couple did not live together as petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had
to leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six months later, the young couple established their residence in Quezon City
until they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City where they finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that
they could stay together when respondent was on vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old
Richie.

It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of psychological incapacity to perform his marital covenant. His "true
color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily
from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick
her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared from
physical violence.

Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his
violent ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to forgive respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so
turn out as expected. Indeed, matters became worse.

On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight oclock, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and
blue. She submitted herself to medical examination at the Quezon City General Hospital, which diagnosed her injuries as contusions and abrasions. Petitioner filed a
complaint with the barangay authorities, and a case was filed against respondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment.

This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her sister. Eventually, they decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner sued
respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the custody of
her minor children and prayed for support pendente lite.

Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on respondent on 25 April 1994 by personal service by the sheriff. As respondent failed to file an answer
or to enter his appearance within the reglementary period, the trial court ordered the city prosecutor to look into a possible collusion between the parties. Prosecutor
Rosa C. Reyes, on 03 August 1994, submitted her report to the effect that she found no evidence to establish that there was collusion between the parties.

On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an answer, and the same, although filed late, was admitted by the court. In his answer,
respondent admitted the fact of his marriage with petitioner and the birth of their children. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of the complaint which listed
the conjugal property. Respondent vehemently denied, however, the allegation that he was psychologically incapacitated.

On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and
void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court erred, particularly, in holding that there was legal basis to declare the
marriage null and void and in denying his motion to reopen the case.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting. The appellate court said:

"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the appellant showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to
meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and
has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.

The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity."[1]

Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of
Appeals,[2] promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina,[3] promulgated on 13 February 1997,
should have no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be
merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to
the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal.

Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there is absolutely no evidence that has been shown to prove
psychological incapacity on his part as the term has been so defined in Santos.

Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.

The term psychological incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, has been explained by the Court in
Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos, concluded:
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that
the use of the phrase `psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's `Void and Voidable
Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law, quoting form the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's `Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand
in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, `psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of `psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated."

The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law.[4] The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter
as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later
overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have
acted in good faith in accordance therewith[5] under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.

The phrase psychological incapacity, borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the
Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has
additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina
has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.

At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.

The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family[6] that the State cherishes and protects. While the
Court commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the
fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should we.

WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: MANDATORY OR PROHIBITORY LAWS

NERWIN INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, Petitioner,

- versus -

PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and ESTER R. GUERZON, Chairman, Bids and Awards Committee, Respondents.

G.R. No. 167057 April 11, 2012

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Republic Act No. 8975[1] expressly prohibits any court, except the Supreme Court, from issuing any temporary restraining order (TRO), preliminary injunction, or
preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain, prohibit or compel the Government, or any of its subdivisions or officials, or any person or entity, whether public or
private, acting under the Governments direction, from: (a) acquiring, clearing, and developing the right-of-way, site or location of any National Government project; (b)
bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the National Government; (c) commencing, prosecuting, executing, implementing, or operating any such contract or
project; (d) terminating or rescinding any such contract or project; and (e) undertaking or authorizing any other lawful activity necessary for such contract or project.

Accordingly, a Regional Trial Court (RTC) that ignores the statutory prohibition and issues a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory
injunction against a government contract or project acts contrary to law.

Antecedents

The following antecedents are culled from the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on October 22, 2004,[2] viz:

In 1999, the National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for a contract, otherwise known as IPB No. 80, for the
supply and delivery of about sixty thousand (60,000) pieces of woodpoles and twenty thousand (20,000) pieces of crossarms needed in the countrys Rural
Electrification Project. The said contract consisted of four (4) components, namely: PIA, PIB and PIC or woodpoles and P3 or crossarms, necessary for NEAs projected
allocation for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. In response to the said invitation, bidders, such as private respondent [Nerwin], were required to submit their application
for eligibility together with their technical proposals. At the same time, they were informed that only those who would pass the standard pre-qualification would be
invited to submit their financial bids.

Following a thorough review of the bidders qualifications and eligibility, only four (4) bidders, including private respondent [Nerwin], qualified to participate in the
bidding for the IPB-80 contract. Thereafter, the qualified bidders submitted their financial bids where private respondent [Nerwin] emerged as the lowest bidder for all
schedules/components of the contract. NEA then conducted a pre-award inspection of private respondents [Nerwins] manufacturing plants and facilities, including its
identified supplier in Malaysia, to determine its capability to supply and deliver NEAs requirements.

In the Recommendation of Award for Schedules PIA, PIB, PIC and P3 - IBP No. 80 [for the] Supply and Delivery of Woodpoles and Crossarms dated October 4, 2000,
NEA administrator Conrado M. Estrella III recommended to NEAs Board of Directors the approval of award to private respondent [Nerwin] of all schedules for IBP
No. 80 on account of the following:

a. Nerwin is the lowest complying and responsive bidder;

b. The price difference for the four (4) schedules between the bid of Nerwin Industries (lowest responsive and complying bidder) and the second lowest bidder in the
amount of $1.47 million for the poles and $0.475 million for the crossarms, is deemed substantial and extremely advantageous to the government. The price difference
is equivalent to 7,948 pcs. of poles and 20.967 pcs. of crossarms;

c. The price difference for the three (3) schedules between the bids of Nerwin and the Tri-State Pole and Piling, Inc. approximately in the amount of $2.36 million for
the poles and $0.475 million for the crossarms are equivalent to additional 12.872 pcs. of poles and 20.967 pcs. of crossarms; and

d. The bidder and manufacturer are capable of supplying the woodpoles and specified in the bid documents and as based on the pre-award inspection conducted.

However, on December 19, 2000, NEAs Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 32 reducing by 50% the material requirements for IBP No. 80 given the time
limitations for the delivery of the materials, xxx, and with the loan closing date of October 2001 fast approaching. In turn, it resolved to award the four (4) schedules of
IBP No. 80 at a reduced number to private respondent [Nerwin]. Private respondent [Nerwin] protested the said 50% reduction, alleging that the same was a ploy to
accommodate a losing bidder.

On the other hand, the losing bidders Tri State and Pacific Synnergy appeared to have filed a complaint, citing alleged false or falsified documents submitted during the
pre-qualification stage which led to the award of the IBP-80 project to private respondent [Nerwin].

Thus, finding a way to nullify the result of the previous bidding, NEA officials sought the opinion of the Government Corporate Counsel who, among others, upheld
the eligibility and qualification of private respondent [Nerwin]. Dissatisfied, the said officials attempted to seek a revision of the earlier opinion but the Government
Corporate Counsel declared anew that there was no legal impediment to prevent the award of IPB-80 contract to private respondent [Nerwin]. Notwithstanding, NEA
allegedly held negotiations with other bidders relative to the IPB-80 contract, prompting private respondent [Nerwin] to file a complaint for specific performance with
prayer for the issuance of an injunction, which injunctive application was granted by Branch 36 of RTC-Manila in Civil Case No. 01102000.

In the interim, PNOC-Energy Development Corporation purporting to be under the Department of Energy, issued Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 or an invitation to pre-
qualify and to bid for wooden poles needed for its Samar Rural Electrification Project (O-ILAW project).

Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 for the O-ILAW Project, Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC in Manila, docketed as Civil Case No.
03106921 entitled Nerwin Industries Corporation v. PNOC-Energy Development Corporation and Ester R. Guerzon, as Chairman, Bids and Awards Committee,
alleging that Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an attempt to subject a portion of the items covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding; and praying that a TRO issue to
enjoin respondents proposed bidding for the wooden poles.
Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 03106921, stating that the complaint averred no cause of action, violated the rule that government infrastructure
projects were not to be subjected to TROs, contravened the mandatory prohibition against non-forum shopping, and the corporate president had no authority to sign and
file the complaint.[3]

On June 27, 2003, after Nerwin had filed its rejoinder to respondents reply, the RTC granted a TRO in Civil Case No. 03106921.[4]

On July 30, 2003, the RTC issued an order,[5] as follows:

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing considerations, an order is hereby issued by this Court:

1. DENYING the motion to consolidate;

2. DENYING the urgent motion for reconsideration;

3. DISQUALIFYING Attys. Michael A. Medado, Datu Omar S. Sinsuat and Mariano H. Paps from appearing as counsel for the defendants;

4. DECLARING defendants in default;

5. GRANTING the motion for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction.

Accordingly, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue enjoining the defendant PNOC-EDC and its Chairman of Bids and Awards Committee Esther R. Guerzon from
continuing the holding of the subject bidding upon the plaintiffs filing of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00 to answer for any damage or damages which the
defendants may suffer should it be finally adjudged that petitioner is not entitled thereto, until final determination of the issue in this case by this Court.

This order shall become effective only upon the posting of a bond by the plaintiffs in the amount of P200,000.00.

Let a copy of this order be immediately served on the defendants and strict compliance herein is enjoined. Furnish the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
copy of this order.

SO ORDERED.

Respondents moved for the reconsideration of the order of July 30, 2003, and also to set aside the order of default and to admit their answer to the complaint.

On January 13, 2004, the RTC denied respondents motions for reconsideration, to set aside order of default, and to admit answer.[6]

Thence, respondents commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari (CA-GR SP No. 83144), alleging that the RTC had thereby
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that Nerwin had been entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction despite the express prohibition from the law and from the Supreme Court; in issuing the TRO in blatant violation of the Rules of Court and established
jurisprudence; in declaring respondents in default; and in disqualifying respondents counsel from representing them.[7]

On October 22, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision,[8] to wit:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated July 30 and December 29, 2003 are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil
Case No. 03106921, private respondents complaint for issuance of temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction before Branch 37 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Nerwin filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on February 9, 2005.[9]

Issues

Hence, Nerwin appeals, raising the following issues:

I. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 prohibiting the issuance of temporary restraining orders and preliminary
injunctions, except if issued by the Supreme Court, on government projects.
II. Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the entire case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 which prohibits the issuance only of a preliminary
injunction but not injunction as a final remedy.
III. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case considering that it is also one for damages.

Ruling

The petition fails.

In its decision of October 22, 2004, the CA explained why it annulled and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC issued on July 20, 2003 and December 29, 2003, and
why it altogether dismissed Civil Case No. 03106921, as follows:

It is beyond dispute that the crux of the instant case is the propriety of respondent Judges issuance of a preliminary injunction, or the earlier TRO, for that matter.

Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in entertaining an application for TRO/preliminary injunction, and worse, in issuing a preliminary injunction through
the assailed order enjoining petitioners sought bidding for its O-ILAW Project. The same is a palpable violation of RA 8975 which was approved on November 7, 2000,
thus, already existing at the time respondent Judge issued the assailed Orders dated July 20 and December 29, 2003.

Section 3 of RA 8975 states in no uncertain terms, thus:

Prohibition on the Issuance of temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. No court, except the Supreme Court, shall
issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials, or any
person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the governments direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under Section 2 hereof;

This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private party, including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to
have rights through such bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue,
such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. xxx

The said proscription is not entirely new. RA 8975 merely supersedes PD 1818 which earlier underscored the prohibition to courts from issuing restraining orders or
preliminary injunctions in cases involving infrastructure or National Resources Development projects of, and public utilities operated by, the government. This law was,
in fact, earlier upheld to have such a mandatory nature by the Supreme Court in an administrative case against a Judge.

Moreover, to bolster the significance of the said prohibition, the Supreme Court had the same embodied in its Administrative Circular No. 11-2000 which reiterates the
ban on issuance of TRO or writs of Preliminary Prohibitory or Mandatory Injunction in cases involving Government Infrastructure Projects. Pertinent is the ruling in
National Housing Authority vs. Allarde As regards the definition of infrastructure projects, the Court stressed in Republic of the Phil. vs. Salvador Silverio and Big
Bertha Construction: The term infrastructure projects means construction, improvement and rehabilitation of roads, and bridges, railways, airports, seaports,
communication facilities, irrigation, flood control and drainage, water supply and sewerage systems, shore protection, power facilities, national buildings, school
buildings, hospital buildings and other related construction projects that form part of the government capital investment.

Thus, there is nothing from the law or jurisprudence, or even from the facts of the case, that would justify respondent Judges blatant disregard of a simple,
comprehensible and unequivocal mandate (of PD 1818) prohibiting the issuance of injunctive writs relative to government infrastructure projects. Respondent Judge did
not even endeavor, although expectedly, to show that the instant case falls under the single exception where the said proscription may not apply, i.e., when the matter is
of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.

Respondent Judge could not have legally declared petitioner in default because, in the first place, he should not have given due course to private respondents complaint
for injunction. Indubitably, the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Perforce, this Court no longer sees the need to resolve the other grounds proffered by petitioners.[10]

The CAs decision was absolutely correct. The RTC gravely abused its discretion, firstly, when it entertained the complaint of Nerwin against respondents
notwithstanding that Nerwin was thereby contravening the express provisions of Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 for its seeking to enjoin the bidding
out by respondents of the O-ILAW Project; and, secondly, when it issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.

Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 provide:

Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. No court, except the Supreme
Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions,
officials or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the governments direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:

(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of any national government project;
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under Section 2 hereof;
(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any such contract or project;
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such contract/project.

This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private party, including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to
have rights through such bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue,
such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be fixed by the
court, which bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.
If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void, the court may, if appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to the
qualified and winning bidder or order a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur under existing laws.

Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. - Any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction issued in violation of Section 3
hereof is void and of no force and effect.

The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and unambiguous, nothing was left for the RTC to do except to enforce them and to exact upon Nerwin obedience to
them. The RTC could not have been unaware of the prohibition under Republic Act No. 8975 considering that the Court had itself instructed all judges and justices of
the lower courts, through Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, to comply with and respect the prohibition against the issuance of TROs or writs of preliminary
prohibitory or mandatory injunction involving contracts and projects of the Government.

It is of great relevance to mention at this juncture that Judge Vicente A. Hidalgo, the Presiding Judge of Branch 37 of the RTC, the branch to which Civil Case No.
03106921 had been raffled, was in fact already found administratively liable for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law as the result of his issuance of the
assailed TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. The Court could only fine him in the amount of P40,000.00 last August 6, 2008 in view of his intervening
retirement from the service. That sanction was meted on him in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2133 entitled Sinsuat v. Hidalgo,[11] where this Court stated:

The Court finds that, indeed, respondent is liable for gross misconduct. As the CA explained in its above-stated Decision in the petition for certiorari, respondent failed
to heed the mandatory ban imposed by P.D. No. 1818 and R.A. No. 8975 against a government infrastructure project, which the rural electrification project certainly
was. He thereby likewise obstinately disregarded this Courts various circulars enjoining courts from issuing TROs and injunctions against government infrastructure
projects in line with the proscription under R.A. No. 8975. Apropos are Gov. Garcia v. Hon. Burgos and National Housing Authority v. Hon. Allarde wherein this Court
stressed that P.D. No. 1818 expressly deprives courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against the implementation or execution of a government infrastructure
project.

Reiterating the prohibitory mandate of P.D. No. 1818, the Court in Atty. Caguioa v. Judge Lavia faulted a judge for grave misconduct for issuing a TRO against a
government infrastructure project thus:

xxx It appears that respondent is either feigning a misunderstanding of the law or openly manifesting a contumacious indifference thereto. In any case, his disregard of
the clear mandate of PD 1818, as well as of the Supreme Court Circulars enjoining strict compliance therewith, constitutes grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to
the proper administration of justice. His claim that the said statute is inapplicable to his January 21, 1997 Order extending the dubious TRO is but a contrived
subterfuge to evade administrative liability.
 In resolving matters in litigation, judges should endeavor assiduously to ascertain the facts and the applicable laws. Moreover, they should exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Also, they are expected to keep abreast of and be conversant with the rules and the circulars which the Supreme
Court has adopted and which affect the disposition of cases before them.

Although judges have in their favor the presumption of regularity and good faith in the performance of their judicial functions, a blatant disregard of the clear and
unmistakable terms of the law obviates this presumption and renders them susceptible to administrative sanctions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The pronouncements in Caguioa apply as well to respondent.

The questioned acts of respondent also constitute gross ignorance of the law for being patently in disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules which judges
are expected to know and apply properly.

IN FINE, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law, which are serious charges under Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. He
having retired from the service, a fine in the amount of P40,000 is imposed upon him, the maximum amount fixed under Section 11 of Rule 140 as an alternative
sanction to dismissal or suspension.[12]

Even as the foregoing outcome has rendered any further treatment and discussion of Nerwins other submissions superfluous and unnecessary, the Court notes that the
RTC did not properly appreciate the real nature and true purpose of the injunctive remedy. This failing of the RTC presses the Court to use this decision to reiterate the
norms and parameters long standing jurisprudence has set to control the issuance of TROs and writs of injunction, and to now insist on conformity to them by all
litigants and lower courts. Only thereby may the grave misconduct committed in Civil Case No. 03106921 be avoided.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or person, to
refrain from a particular act or acts.[13] It is an ancillary or preventive remedy resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests during the pendency
of the case. As such, it is issued only when it is established that:

(a) The applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; or

(b) The commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) A party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the
rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.[14]

The existence of a right to be protected by the injunctive relief is indispensable. In City Government of Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc.,[15]
the Court elaborated on this requirement, viz:

As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to
be protected. It is proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint, which must aver the existence of the right and the
violation of the right, or whose averments must in the minimum constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief sought. Accordingly, the conditions for the
issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is
an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely
contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a
right, to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.[16]

Conclusive proof of the existence of the right to be protected is not demanded, however, for, as the Court has held in Saulog v. Court of Appeals,[17] it is enough that:

xxx for the court to act, there must be an existing basis of facts affording a present right which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. And while a clear
showing of the right claimed is necessary, its existence need not be conclusively established. In fact, the evidence to be submitted to justify preliminary injunction at the
hearing thereon need not be conclusive or complete but need only be a sampling intended merely to give the court an idea of the justification for the preliminary
injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits. This should really be so since our concern here involves only the propriety of the preliminary injunction and
not the merits of the case still pending with the trial court.

Thus, to be entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction, the private respondent needs only to show that it has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in its
complaint xxx.[18]

In this regard, the Rules of Court grants a broad latitude to the trial courts considering that conflicting claims in an application for a provisional writ more often than
not involve and require a factual determination that is not the function of the appellate courts.[19] Nonetheless, the exercise of such discretion must be sound, that is, the
issuance of the writ, though discretionary, should be upon the grounds and in the manner provided by law.[20] When that is done, the exercise of sound discretion by
the issuing court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with except when there is manifest abuse.[21]

Moreover, judges dealing with applications for the injunctive relief ought to be wary of improvidently or unwarrantedly issuing TROs or writs of injunction that tend to
dispose of the merits without or before trial. Granting an application for the relief in disregard of that tendency is judicially impermissible,[22] for it is never the
function of a TRO or preliminary injunction to determine the merits of a case,[23] or to decide controverted facts.[24] It is but a preventive remedy whose only mission
is to prevent threatened wrong,[25] further injury,[26] and irreparable harm[27] or injustice[28] until the rights of the parties can be settled. Judges should thus look at
such relief only as a means to protect the ability of their courts to render a meaningful decision.[29] Foremost in their minds should be to guard against a change of
circumstances that will hamper or prevent the granting of proper reliefs after a trial on the merits.[30] It is well worth remembering that the writ of preliminary
injunction should issue only to prevent the threatened continuous and irremediable injury to the applicant before the claim can be justly and thoroughly studied and
adjudicated.[31]

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

The Court Administrator shall disseminate this decision to the lower courts for their guidance.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: WAIVER OF RIGHTS

G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001

D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.

PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a report dated November 25, 1990, stating that:

x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where he was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr.
Errol de Yzo[,] at around 2:15 p.m. of the same date.

Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A. Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as
carpenter[s] at the elevator core of the 14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board a [p]latform made of channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8
meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin
which was merely inserted to connect the chain block with the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing the whole [p]latform assembly and the victim to fall down to the
basement of the elevator core, Tower D of the building under construction thereby crushing the victim of death, save his two (2) companions who luckily jumped out
for safety.

It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was
due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform but without a safety lock.1

On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M.
Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, as follows:

1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.

2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.

3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juego’s earning capacity.

4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.

5. P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.2

On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds:

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE REPORT WAS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF
PETITIONER.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR [sic] IS APPLICABLE TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON
THE PART OF PETITIONER.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS PRESUMED NEGLIGENT UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL
CODE.3
Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible. The CA ruled otherwise. It held that said report, being an entry in
official records, is an exception to the hearsay rule.

The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception.4 A
witness, therefore, may not testify as what he merely learned from others either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay
and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.5 This is known as the hearsay rule.

Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements.6

The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error and untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested
assertion of a witness, may be best brought to light and exposed by the test of cross-examiantion.7 The hearsay rule, therefore, excludes evidence that cannot be tested
by cross-examination.8

The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule,9 among which are entries in official records. Section 44, Rule 130 provides:

Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,10 this Court, citing the work of Chief Justice Moran, enumerated the requisites for admissibility under the above rule:

(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and

(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.

The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites. Petitioner contends that the last requisite is not present.

The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in question, also testified before the trial court. In Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals,11 which involved a Fire
Investigation Report, the officer who signed the fire report also testified before the trial court. This Court held that the report was inadmissible for the purpose of
proving the truth of the statements contained in the report but admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of the officer who executed the report.

x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was available for cross-examination, the portions of the report which were of his personal knowledge or
which consisted of his perceptions and conclusions were not hearsay. The rest of the report, such as the summary of the statements of the parties based on their sworn
statements (which were annexed to the Report) as well as the latter, having been included in the first purpose of the offer [as part of the testimony of Major Enriquez],
may then be considered as independently relevant statements which were gathered in the course of the investigation and may thus be admitted as such, but not
necessarily to prove the truth thereof. It has been said that:

"Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply, but the statement may be shown.
Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the
existence of such a fact."

When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his Report and made himself available for cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report,
insofar as it proved that certain utterances were made (but not their truth), was effectively removed from the ambit of the aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130.
Properly understood, this section does away with the testimony in open court of the officer who made the official record, considers the matter as an exception to the
hearsay rule and makes the entries in said official record admissible in evidence as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The underlying reasons for this
exceptionary rule are necessity and trustworthiness, as explained in Antillon v. Barcelon.

The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the occasions in which the officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare
as a witness are numberless. The public officers are few in whose daily work something is not done in which testimony is not needed from official sources. Were there
no exception for official statements, hosts of officials would be found devoting the greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in court or delivering deposition
before an officer. The work of administration of government and the interest of the public having business with officials would alike suffer in consequence. For these
reasons, and for many others, a certain verity is accorded such documents, which is not extended to private documents. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1631).

The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever
acts they do in discharge of their duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as to the nature and circumstances of each
case may appear to require.

It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not presented to testify on his report. In that case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 143
would have been ripe for determination, and this Court would have agreed with the Court of Appeals that said report was inadmissible since the aforementioned third
requisite was not satisfied. The statements given by the sources of information of Major Enriquez failed to qualify as "official information," there being no showing
that, at the very least, they were under a duty to give the statements for record.

Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained therein but is admissible insofar as it constitutes
part of the testimony of PO3 Villanueva.

In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanueva’s testimony which were of his personal knowledge suffice to prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a result
of the elevator crash. PO3 Villanueva had seen Juego’s remains at the morgue,12 making the latter’s death beyond dispute. PO3 Villanueva also conducted an ocular
inspection of the premises of the building the day after the incident13 and saw the platform for himself.14 He observed that the platform was crushed15 and that it was
totally damaged.16 PO3 Villanueva also required Garcia and Fabro to bring the chain block to the police headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the chain was
detached from the lifting machine, without any pin or bolt.17

What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanueva’s testimony that the cause of the fall of the platform was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block.
It is claimed that such portion of the testimony is mere opinion. Subject to certain exceptions,18 the opinion of a witness is generally not admissible.19

Petitioner’s contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or
inference that the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific
proof of negligence.20

The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:

While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or
presumption that it was due to negligence on defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or
in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at
least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence.

x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the control or management of the defendant, and that the
occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care, there is
sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the
defendant’s want of care.21

One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or not available.22

The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the
accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and
to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief
evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or
should know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine,
another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in that it proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it is within the
power of the defendant to show that there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendant’s negligence is beyond plaintiff’s power. Accordingly, some
court add to the three prerequisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it must
appear that the injured party had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence has superior
knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident.23

The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar:

There is no dispute that appellee’s husband fell down from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while he was working with appellant’s construction project,
resulting to his death. The construction site is within the exclusive control and management of appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project superintendent, a carpenter
leadman and others who are in complete control of the situation therein. The circumstances of any accident that would occur therein are peculiarly within the knowledge
of the appellant or its employees. On the other hand, the appellee is not in a position to know what caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it
applies where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3)
the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. x x x.

No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a construction site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first
requisite for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely
caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence was attributed to
the appellee’s deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a
reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. x x x.24

Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur, but argues that the presumption or inference that it was negligent did
not arise since it "proved that it exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell respondent’s husband."

Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated earlier, the defendant’s negligence is presumed or inferred25 when the plaintiff
establishes the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant
to explain.26 The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances disputable presumption, such as that
of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference.27 It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference from arising.
Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been established.1âwphi1.nêt

In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed before the police investigator as evidence of its due care. According to
Fabro’s sworn statement, the company enacted rules and regulations for the safety and security of its workers. Moreover, the leadman and the bodegero inspect the
chain block before allowing its use.

It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabro’s sworn statement as proof of its due care but, in arguing that private respondent failed to prove negligence on the part of
petitioner’s employees, also assails the same statement for being hearsay.

Petitioner is correct. Fabro’s sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits are inadmissible as evidence under the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on
the witness stand to testify thereon.28 The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse party to cross-
examine the affiant, but also on the commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language
in writing the affiant’s statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.29 Petitioner, therefore, cannot use said statement as proof of
its due care any more than private respondent can use it to prove the cause of her husband’s death. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the
inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.

Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits provided under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming
from the deceased’s employer damages under the Civil Code.

Article 173 of the Labor Code states:

Article 173. Extent of liability. – Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liabilities of the employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The payment
of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered
Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred sixty-four as amended, and
other laws whose benefits are administered by the System or by other agencies of the government.

The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, provided that:

Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. – The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil
Code and other laws because of said injury x x x.

Whether Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act allowed recovery under said Act as well as under the Civil Code used to be the subject of conflicting decisions.
The Court finally settled the matter in Floresca vs.Philex Mining Corporation,30 which involved a cave-in resulting in the death of the employees of the Philex Mining
Corporation. Alleging that the mining corporation, in violation of government rules and regulations, failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the
employees, the heirs of the deceased employees filed a complaint against Philex Mining in the Court of First Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex Mining, the CFI
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs sought relief from this Court.

Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies, majority of the Court En Banc,31 following the rule in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, held in
the affirmative.

WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing
themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and
exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the
limited compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.

In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the
employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot
pursue both courses of action simultaneously. [Underscoring supplied.]

Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case to proceed with their suit under the Civil Code despite having availed of the benefits provided under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The Court reasoned:

With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased
employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino submitted notices and claims for compensation to the Regional Office
No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in
installments x x x. Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated may 27, 1968 x x x in the lower court, but they
set up the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen’s Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the committee created to investigate
the accident which established the criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to then Executive
Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only x x x.

WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, such my not preclude them from bringing an action
before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after
receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not
have sought redress under the Workmen’s Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on
ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be
deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor. [Underscoring supplied.]

The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was reiterated in Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs. Avelino,32 Vda. De Severo vs. Feliciano-Go,33
and Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Abeleda.34 In the last case, the Court again recognized that a claimant who had been paid under the Act could still sue under the Civil
Code. The Court said:

In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmen’s Compensation
Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In Floresca, this doctrine was abrogated in favor of the new rule that the claimants may invoke either the
Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the
acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has
already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring
after he opted for the first remedy. (Underscoring supplied.)

Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under the exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim
for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report
and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioner’s personnel. While stating that there was no negligence attributable to the
respondents in the complaint, the prosecutor nevertheless noted in the Memorandum that, "if at all," the "case is civil in nature." The CA thus applied the exception in
Floresca:

x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the alleged negligence of appellant as early as November 25, 1990, the date of the police investigator’s report.
The appellee merely executed her sworn statement before the police investigator concerning her personal circumstances, her relation to the victim, and her knowledge
of the accident. She did not file the complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against appellant’s employees. It was the investigator who recommended
the filing of said case and his supervisor referred the same to the prosecutor’s office. This is a standard operating procedure for police investigators which appellee may
not have even known. This may explain why no complainant is mentioned in the preliminary statement of the public prosecutor in her memorandum dated February 6,
1991, to wit: "Respondent Ferdinand Fabro x x x are being charged by complainant of "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide." It is also possible that the appellee
did not have a chance to appear before the public prosecutor as can be inferred from the following statement in said memorandum: "Respondents who were notified
pursuant to Law waived their rights to present controverting evidence," thus there was no reason for the public prosecutor to summon the appellee. Hence, notice of
appellant’s negligence cannot be imputed on appellee before she applied for death benefits under ECC or before she received the first payment therefrom. Her using the
police investigation report to support her complaint filed on May 9, 1991 may just be an afterthought after receiving a copy of the February 6, 1991 Memorandum of the
Prosecutor’s Office dismissing the criminal complaint for insufficiency of evidence, stating therein that: "The death of the victim is not attributable to any negligence on
the part of the respondents. If at all and as shown by the records this case is civil in nature." (Underscoring supplied.) Considering the foregoing, We are more inclined
to believe appellee’s allegation that she learned about appellant’s negligence only after she applied for and received the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact
that will make this case fall under the exception held in the Floresca ruling.35

The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as well:

x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only elementary school for her educational attainment; that she did not know what damages could be
recovered from the death of her husband; and that she did not know that she may also recover more from the Civil Code than from the ECC. x x x.36

Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private respondent "failed to allege in her complaint that her application and receipt of benefits from the ECC
were attended by ignorance or mistake of fact. Not being an issue submitted during the trial, the trial court had no authority to hear or adjudicate that issue."

Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been ignorant of the facts because as early as November 28, 1990, private respondent was the complainant
in a criminal complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against petitioner’s employees. On February 6, 1991, two months before the filing of the action
in the lower court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a resolution finding that, although there was insufficient evidence against petitioner’s employees, the case was "civil in
nature." These purportedly show that prior to her receipt of death benefits from the ECC on January 2, 1991 and every month thereafter, private respondent also knew of
the two choices of remedies available to her and yet she chose to claim and receive the benefits from the ECC.

When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent
with the elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election acts as a bar.37 Equitable in nature, the doctrine of election of remedies is
designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on the moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the
doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single wrong.38
The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Hence, the rule in Floresca that a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery
under the Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have waived the other.

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39

[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming
a waiver that the person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the party’s rights or of all material
facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver,
and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.

A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision.

Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and
intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence.40

That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis for the exception in Floresca.

It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioner’s contentions.

Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her complaint that she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus,
erroneous for petitioner to burden private respondent with raising waiver as an issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to plead waiver, as petitioner did in
pages 2-3 of its Answer;41 otherwise, the defense is waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for petitioner to now contend that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the
issue when petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial court.

Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that led to her husband’s death and the rights pertaining to a choice of remedies?

It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this case, the "fact" that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the
negligence of petitioner’s employees, of which private respondent purportedly learned only after the prosecutor issued a resolution stating that there may be civil
liability. In Floresca, it was the negligence of the mining corporation and its violation of government rules and regulations. Negligence, or violation of government rules
and regulations, for that matter, however, is not a fact, but a conclusion of law, over which only the courts have the final say. Such a conclusion binds no one until the
courts have decreed so. It appears, therefore, that the principle that ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a waiver has been misapplied in Floresca and in the case at bar.

In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application
for benefits from the ECC. The police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in
her behalf on November 27, 1990.

There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent
testified that she was not aware of her rights.

Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Court’s
ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.

The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws.42 This may be deduced from the language of the provision,
which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of
remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.

Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do not indicate the total amount private respondent ought to receive from the ECC,
although it appears from Exhibit "K"43 that she received P3,581.85 as initial payment representing the accrued pension from November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial
monthly pension, according to the same Exhibit "K," was P596.97 and present total monthly pension was P716.40. Whether the total amount she will eventually receive
from the ECC is less than the sum of P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by the trial court is subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court for
such determination. Should the trial court find that its award is greater than that of the ECC, payments already received by private respondent under the Labor Code
shall be deducted from the trial court'’ award of damages. Consistent with our ruling in Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent double compensation.

WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC.
Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be
deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: WAIVER OF RIGHTS

G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 154954

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE
MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO
MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN,
PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN DE
GUZMAN, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 155101

FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080

GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ:

We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case involving the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa due to fraternity hazing. While there is nothing new in the arguments
raised by the parties in their respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration, we find a few remaining matters needing to be clarified and resobed. Sorne oJ'
these matters include the effect of our Decision on the finality of the Court of Appeals judgments insofar as respondents Antonio Mariano A!meda (Almeda), June]
Anthony D. Arna (Arna), Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug), and Vincent Tecson (Tecson) are concerned; the question of who are eligible to seek probation; and the issue of
the validity of the probation proceedings and the concomitant orders of a court that allegedly had no jurisdiction over the case.

Before the Court are the respective Motions for Reconsideration or Clarification filed by petitioners People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), and Gerarda H. Villa (Villa); and by respondents Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson (collectively, Tecson et al.) concerning the Decision of this Court
dated 1 February 2012.1 The Court modified the assailed judgments2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 15520 and found respondents Fidelito Dizon
(Dizon), Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The modification had the effect
of lowering the criminal liability of Dizon from the crime of homicide, while aggravating the verdict against Tecson et al. from slight physical injuries. The CA
Decision itself had modified the Decision of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 finding all of the accused therein guilty of the crime of
homicide.3

Also, we upheld another CA Decision4 in a separate but related case docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 & 90153 and ruled that the CA did not commit grave abuse
of discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against Manuel Escalona II (Escalona), Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos), Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca), and Anselmo
Adriano (Adriano) on the ground that their right to speedy trial was violated. Reproduced below is the dispositive portion of our Decision:5

WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgmentin G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The
appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 – finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight
physical injuries – is also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and
Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of
Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of
12% from the date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction. Costs de oficio.

The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the
criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition
in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the
Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that
would increase the applicable penalties.

SO ORDERED.

To refresh our memories, we quote the factual antecedents surrounding the present case:6
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity
(Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy"
Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).

On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all
proceeded to Rufo’s Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect
during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to
last for three days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.

Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked
towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of
Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering
blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the
Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged
with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or withknee blows on their thighs by
two Aquilans; and the "Auxies’ Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the
neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation.

On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes were made to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to
memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the
Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing
that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended.

After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The
head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The
fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle
blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last
session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended,
and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and incoherent mumblings.1avvphi1 Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these
rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They
removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:

In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)

1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)

2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)

3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)

4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)

5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)

6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)

7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)

8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)

9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)

10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)

11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)

12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)

13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)

14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)

15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)

16. Antonio General (General)

17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)

18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)

19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)

20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)

21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)

22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)

23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)

24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)

25. Adel Abas (Abas)

26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)

In Criminal Case No. C-38340

1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)

2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)

3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)

4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)

5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)

6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)

7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)

8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)

9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)

Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried. On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal
Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.

On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November
1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced anew.

On 10 January 2002, the CAin (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal
liability of each of the accused according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the
remaining 25 accused, viz:

1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants– Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza,
Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) – were acquitted,as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Four of the accused-appellants– Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) – were found guilty of the
crime of slight physical injuriesand sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱30,000 as
indemnity.

3. Two of the accused-appellants– Fidelito Dizonand Artemio Villareal– were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17
years of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of ₱50,000 and to pay the additional amount
of ₱1,000,000 by way of moral damages.

On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.
Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano. On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153 reversed the trial court’s Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.

From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually brought before this Court. (Citations omitted)

Motion for Partial Reconsideration

filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa

Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial Reconsideration7 in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 (Villa v. Escalona) asserting that the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos,Saruca, and Adriano (collectively, Escalona et al.) in its assailed
Decision and Resolution.8 Villa reiterates her previous arguments that the right to speedy trial of the accused was not violated, since they had failed to assert that right
within a reasonable period of time. She stresses that, unlike their co-accused Reynaldo Concepcion, respondents Escalona et al.did not timely invoke their right to
speedy trial during the time that the original records and pieces of evidence were unavailable. She again emphasizes that the prosecution cannot be faulted entirely for
the lapse of 12 years from the arraignment until the initial trial, as there were a number of incidents attributable to the accused themselves that caused the delay of the
proceedings. She then insists that we apply the balancing test in determining whether the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated.

Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG

The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration9 of G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), agrees with the findings of this Court
that accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither the felonious intent to kill (animus interficendi) nor the felonious intent to injure (animus iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In
fact, it concedes that the mode in which the accused committed the crime was through fault (culpa). However, it contends that the penalty imposed should have been
equivalent to that for deceit (dolo) pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. It argues that the nature and gravity of the imprudence or negligence
attributable to the accused was so gross that it shattered the fine distinction between dolo and culpaby considering the act as one committed with malicious intent. It
maintains that the accused conducted the initiation rites in such a malevolent and merciless manner that it clearly endangered the lives of the initiates and was thus
equivalent to malice aforethought.

With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino et al., the OSG asserts that their acquittal may also be reversed despite the rule on double jeopardy, as the CA also
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed Decision (CA-G.R. No. 15520). The OSG insists that Victorino et al. should have been similarly convicted
like their other co-accused Dizon, Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson, since the former also participated in the hazing of Lenny Villa, and their actions contributed to
his death.

Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Tecson et al.

Respondents Tecson et al.,10 filed their respective motions pertaining to G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). They essentially seek a clarification as to the
effect of our Decision insofar as their criminal liability and service of sentence are concerned. According to respondents, they immediately applied for probation after
the CA rendered its Decision (CAG.R. No. 15520) lowering their criminal liability from the crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight
physical injuries, which carries a probationable sentence. Tecson et al.contend that, as a result, they have already been discharged from their criminal liability and the
cases against them closed and terminated. This outcome was supposedly by virtue of their Applications for Probation on various dates in January 200211 pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, otherwise known as the Probation Law. They argue that Branch 130 of Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) had
already granted their respective Applications for Probation on 11 October 200212 and, upon their completion of the terms and conditions thereof, discharged them from
probation and declared the criminal case against them terminated on various dates in April 2003.13

To support their claims, respondents attached14 certified true copies of their respective Applications for Probation and the RTC Orders granting these applications,
discharging them from probation, and declaring the criminal case against them terminated. Thus, they maintain that the Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 had already
lapsed into finality, insofar as they were concerned, whenthey waived their right to appeal and applied for probation.

ISSUES

I. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano for violation of their right to speedy trial

II. Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have corresponded to that for intentional felonies

III. Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of their probation discharged them from their criminal liability, and closed and terminated the
cases against them DISCUSSION

Findings on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of

Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa

As regards the first issue, we take note that the factual circumstances and legal assertions raised by petitioner Villa in her Motion for Partial Reconsideration concerning
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 have already been thoroughly considered and passed uponin our deliberations, which led to our Decision dated 1 February 2012. We
emphasize that in light of the finding of violation of the right of Escalona et al. to speedy trial, the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case against them amounted to an
acquittal,15 and that any appeal or reconsideration thereof would result in a violation of their right against double jeopardy.16 Though we have recognized that the
acquittal of the accused may be challenged where there has been a grave abuse of discretion,17 certiorari would lie if it is convincingly established that the CA’s
Decision dismissing the case was attended by a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be shown that the assailed
judgment constitutes "a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or toact
in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave
and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice."18 Thus, grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly
misappreciated the facts and the evidence.19

We have taken a second look at the court records, the CA Decision, and petitioner’s arguments and found no basis to rule that the CA gravely abused its discretion in
concluding that the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated. Its findings were sufficiently supported by the records of the case and grounded in law. Thus, we
deny the motion of petitioner Villa with finality.

Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG

We likewise deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG with respect to G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of
Appeals). Many of the arguments raised therein are essentially a mere rehash of the earlier grounds alleged in its original Petition for Certiorari.

Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSG’s theory that even if the act complained of was born of imprudence or negligence, malicious intent can still be appreciated
on account of the gravity of the actions of the accused. We emphasize that the finding of a felony committed by means of culpa is legally inconsistent with that
committed by means of dolo. Culpable felonies involve those wrongs done as a result of an act performed without malice or criminal design. The Revised Penal Code
expresses thusly:

ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its maximum period toprisión correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin
its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

xxxx

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform suchact, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly
manifest. (Emphases supplied)

On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those wrongs in which a deliberate malicious intent to do an unlawful act is present. Below is our exhaustive discussion
on the matter:20 Our Revised Penal Code belongs tothe classical school of thought. x x x The identity of mens rea– defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful
purpose or criminal intent – is the predominant consideration. Thus, it is not enough to do what the law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is
necessary that the act be committed by means of doloor "malice."

The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and intent. x x x x The element of intent – on which this Court shall
focus – is described as the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person
proceeds.It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intentconcerns the result of the act. While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to
action for a definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result. On the other hand, the term "felonious"means, inter alia, malicious,
villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious
intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus– that
the act or omission be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and "with malice aforethought." The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit
rea– a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent. As is required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of
malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

xxxx

The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala
in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill – or animus
interficendi– cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. Furthermore, the victim’s death must not have been the
product of accident, natural cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent – but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or
negligence – the act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.

xxxx

In order to be found guilty ofany of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with
dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu
facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, incase of physical injuries under the Revised Penal
Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or wellbeing of a person, so as to incapacitate and
deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per
semerely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his
intentions are.

Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of physical injuries, absentmalicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an
intentional felony.x x x.

xxxx

The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised
Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by
reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it. In this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the
actor. In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack
of foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible.

The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take
precaution against the mischievous resultsof the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.

As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the
danger involved. If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that particular
course of conduct is bound to be very careful, inorder to prevent or avoid damage or injury. In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required. It is thus
possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual, "from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort."
The duty of the person to employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)

We thus reiterate that the law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent or dolus malus before an accused can be adjudged liable for
committing an intentional felony.

Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by means of culpa, we cannot agree with the argument of the OSG. It contends that the imposable penalty for
intentional felony can also be applied to the present case on the ground that the nature of the imprudence or negligence of the accused was so gross that the felony
already amounted to malice. The Revised Penal Code has carefully delineated the imposable penalties as regards felonies committed by means of culpaon the one hand
and felonies committed by means of doloon the other in the context of the distinctions it has drawn between them. The penalties provided in Article 365 (Imprudence
and Negligence) are mandatorily applied if the death of a person occurs as a result of the imprudence or negligence of another. Alternatively, the penalties outlined in
Articles 246 to 261 (Destruction of Life) are automatically invoked if the death was a result of the commission of a forbidden act accompanied by a malicious intent.
These imposable penalties are statutory, mandatory, and not subjectto the discretion of the court. We have already resolved – and the OSG agrees – that the accused
Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither animus interficendi nor animus iniuriandi in inflicting physical pain on Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the imposable penalty is
what is applicable to the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide as defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling on the Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration

filed by Tecson et al.

We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in light of the motions of respondents Tecson et al. vis-à-vis G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals).

The finality of a CA decision will not

bar the state from seeking the
annulment of the judgment via a
Rule 65 petition.

In their separate motions,21 respondents insist that the previous verdict of the CA finding them guilty of slight physical injuries has already lapsed into finality as a
result of their respective availments of the probation program and their ultimate discharge therefrom. Hence, they argue that they can no longer be convicted of the
heavier offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.22 Respondents allude to our Decision in Tan v. People23 to support their contention that the CA
judgment can no longer be reversed or annulled even by this Court.

The OSG counters24 that the CA judgment could not have attained finality, as the former had timely filed with this Court a petition for certiorari. It argues that a Rule
65 petition is analogous to an appeal, or a motion for new trial or reconsideration, in that a petition for certiorarialso prevents the case from becoming final and
executory until after the matter is ultimately resolved.

Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment once the accused applies for probation, viz:

SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of convictionmay, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal
is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes finalafter the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or whenthe sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accusedhas waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) (Emphases supplied)

Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 11725 and Section 1 of Rule 122,26 it can be culled from the foregoing provisions that only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect
of a criminal case, especially if the relief being sought is the correction or review of the judgment therein. This rule was instituted in order to give life to the
constitutional edict27 against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. It is beyond contention that the accused would be exposed to
double jeopardy if the state appeals the criminal judgment in order to reverse an acquittal or even to increase criminal liability. Thus, the accused’s waiver of the right to
appeal – as when applying for probation – makes the criminal judgment immediately final and executory. Our explanation in People v. Nazareno is worth reiterating:28

Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the
criminal defendant’s culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on
multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The reason is not only the defendant’s already established innocence at the first trial where he had been placed in peril
of conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial initiated by a government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources
of the State.

Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendant’s guilt
while strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a process where the government’s power and resources are once again employed against the
defendant’s individual means. That the second opportunity comesvia an appeal does not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and
conscience. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)

It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. We have
already explained in our Decision that the rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the very
jurisdiction of the court that issued the criminal judgment.29 The reasoning behind the exception is articulated in Nazareno, from which we quote:30

In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done in an appeal, actually takes place; the focus of the review is on whether the
judgment is per sevoid on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or where the court has appropriate
jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, the review is on the question of whether there
has been a validly rendered decision, not on the question of the decision’s error or correctness. Under the exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden — a very
heavy one — is on the shoulders of the party asking for the review to show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in
contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted) While
this Court’s Decision in Tan may have created an impression of the unassailability of a criminal judgment as soon as the accused applies for probation, we point out that
what the state filed therein was a mere motion for the modification of the penalty, and not a Rule 65 petition. A petition for certiorari is a special civil action that is
distinct and separate from the main case. While in the main case, the core issue is whether the accused is innocent or guilty of the crime charged, the crux of a Rule 65
petition is whether the court acted (a) without or in excess of its jurisdiction; or (b) with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence,
strictly speaking, there is nomodification of judgment in a petition for certiorari, whose resolution does not call for a re-evaluation of the merits of the case in order to
determine the ultimate criminal responsibility of the accused. In a Rule 65 petition, any resulting annulment of a criminal judgment is but a consequence of the finding
of lack of jurisdiction.

In view thereof, we find that the proper interpretation of Section 7 of Rule 120 must be that it is inapplicable and irrelevant where the court’s jurisdiction is being
assailed through a Rule 65 petition. Section 7 of Rule 120 bars the modification of a criminal judgment only if the appeal brought before the court is in the nature of a
regular appeal under Rule 41, or an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, and if that appeal would put the accused in double jeopardy. As it is, we find no irregularity in
the partial annulment of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 in spite of its finality, as the judgment therein was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The orders of Caloocan City RTC

Branch 130 have no legal effect, as
they were issued without jurisdiction.

First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong court. Part and parcel of our criminal justice system is the authority or jurisdiction of the court
to adjudicate and decide the case before it. Jurisdiction refers to the power and capacity of the tribunal to hear, try, and decide a particular case or matter before it.31
That power and capacity includes the competence to pronounce a judgment, impose a punishment,32 and enforce or suspend33 the execution of a sentencein
accordance with law.

The OSG questions34 the entire proceedings involving the probation applications of Tecson et al. before Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. Allegedly, the trial court did
not have competence to take cognizance of the applications, considering that it was not the court of origin of the criminal case. The OSG points out that the trial court
that originally rendered the Decision in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) was Branch 121 of the Caloocan City RTC.

The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby quoted for reference:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application
by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction. x x x x (Emphases supplied)

It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires that an application for probation be filed withthe trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant,
meaning the court of origin. Here, the trial court that originally convicted and sentenced Tecson et al.of the crime of homicide was Branch 121 – not Branch 130 – of
the Caloocan City RTC.35 Neither the judge of Branch 130 in his Orders nor Tecson et al.in their pleadings have presented any explanation or shown any special
authority that would clarify why the Applications for Probation had not been filed with or taken cognizance of by Caloocan City RTC Branch 121. While we take note
that in a previous case, the CA issued a Decision ordering the inhibition of Branch 121 Judge Adoracion G. Angeles from hearing and deciding Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91), the ruling was made specifically applicable to the trial of petitioners therein, i.e. accused Concepcion, Ampil, Adriano, and S. Fernandez.36

Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they filed their probation applications with Caloocan City RTC Branch 130, and not with Branch 121. We stress that
applicants are not at liberty to choose the forum in which they may seek probation, as the requirement under Section 4 of the Probation law is substantive and not
merely procedural. Considering, therefore, that the probation proceedings were premised on an unwarranted exercise of authority, we find that Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130 never acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Second, the records of the casewere still with the CA when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 granted the probation applications. Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with
the court in which the criminal action has been properly instituted.37 If a party appeals the trial court’s judgment or final order,38 jurisdiction is transferred to the
appellate court. The execution of the decision is thus stayed insofar as the appealing party is concerned.39 The court of origin then loses jurisdiction over the entire case
the moment the other party’s time to appeal has expired.40 Any residual jurisdiction of the court of origin shall cease – including the authority to order execution
pending appeal – the moment the complete records of the case are transmitted to the appellate court.41 Consequently, it is the appellate court that shall have the
authority to wield the power to hear, try, and decide the case before it, as well as to enforce its decisions and resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power and authority
shall remain with the appellate court until it finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction cannot be ousted by any subsequent event, even if the nature of the incident would
have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first place.

According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, "[n]o penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment." A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting
the accused of the offense charged becomes final under any of the following conditions among others:42 after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal; when the
accused waives the right to appeal; upon the grant of a withdrawal ofan appeal; when the sentence has already been partially or totally satisfied or served; or when the
accused applies for probation. When the decision attains finality, the judgment or final order is entered in the book of entries of judgments.43 If the case was previously
appealed to the CA, a certified true copy of the judgment or final order must be attached to the original record, which shall then be remanded to the clerk of the court
from which the appeal was taken.44 The court of origin then reacquires jurisdiction over the case for appropriate action. It is during this time that the court of origin
may settle the matter of the execution of penalty or the suspension of the execution thereof,45 including the convicts’ applications for probation.46

A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not yet relinquished its jurisdiction over the case when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of the
Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. It shows that the accused filed their respective applications47 while a motion for reconsideration was still pending before the
CA48 and the records were still with that court.49 The CA settled the motion only upon issuing the Resolution dated 30 August 2002 denying it, or about seven months
after Tecson et al. had filed their applications with the trial court.50 In September 2002, or almost a month before the promulgation of the RTC Order dated 11 October
2002 granting the probation applications,51 the OSG had filed Manifestations of Intent to File Petition for Certiorari with the CA52 and this Court.53 Ultimately, the
OSG assailed the CA judgments by filing before this Court a Petition for Certiorari on 25 November 2002.54 We noted the petition and then required respondents to file
a comment thereon.55 After their submission of further pleadings and motions, we eventually required all parties to file their consolidated memoranda.56 The records
of the case remained with the CA until they were elevated to this Court in 2008.57

For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on the probation applications of Tecson et al. It had neither the power nor the
authority to suspend their sentence, place them on probation, order their final discharge, and eventually declare the case against them terminated. This glaring
jurisdictional faux pasis a clear evidence of either gross ignorance of the law oran underhanded one-upmanship on the part of RTC Branch 130 or Tecson et al., or both
– to which this Court cannot give a judicial imprimatur.

In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied for it. Probation58 is a special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified
offenders who immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right to appeal. In view of their acceptance of their fate and willingness to be reformed, the state
affords them a chance to avoid the stigma of an incarceration recordby making them undergo rehabilitation outside of prison. Some of the major purposes of the law are
to help offenders to eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and self respecting individuals, as well as to assist them in their reintegration with the community.

It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is an act of grace orclemency conferred by the state. In Francisco v. Court of
Appeals,59 this Court explained thus:

It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the
discretion of the court which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. The Probation Law
should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government of any of the latter’s prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this
end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within them. (Emphases supplied)

The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the probation applications of Tecson et al.60 It points out that when they appealed to the CA their homicide conviction
by the RTC, they thereby made themselves ineligible to seek probation pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (the Probation Law).

We refer again to the full text ofSection 4 of the Probation Law as follows:

SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application
by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing
of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphases supplied)

Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the offender must not have appealed the conviction.61 In the 2003 case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals,62 this
Court was faced with the issue of whether a convict may still apply for probation even after the trial court has imposed a non probationable verdict, provided that the
CA later on lowers the original penalty to a sentence within the probationable limit. In that case, the trial court sentenced the accused to a maximum term of eight years
of prisión mayor, which was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only became eligible for probation after the CA reduced the maximum term of the
penalty imposed to 1 year, 8 months and 21 days of prisión correccional.

In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco and ruled that the accused was ineligiblefor probation, since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In
Francisco, we emphasized that Section 4 of the Probation Law offers no ambiguity and does not provide for any distinction, qualification, or exception. What is clearis
that all offenders who previously appealed their cases, regardless of their reason for appealing, are disqualified by the law from seeking probation. Accordingly, this
Court enunciated in Lagrosathat the accused are disallowed from availing themselves of the benefits of probation if they obtain a genuine opportunity to apply for
probation only on appeal as a result of the downgrading of their sentence from non-probationable to probationable.

While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 issued its various Orders discharging Tecson et al. from probation, the ruling in
Lagrosa, however, was a mere reiteration of the reasoning of this Court since the 1989 case Llamado v. Court of Appeals63 and Francisco. The Applications for
Probation of Tecson et al., therefore, should not have been granted by RTC Branch 130, as they had appealed their conviction to the CA. We recall that respondents
were originally found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accordingly, even if the CA later
downgraded their conviction to slight physical injuries and sentenced them to 20 days of arresto menor, which made the sentence fall within probationable limits for the
first time, the RTC should have nonetheless found them ineligible for probation at the time.

The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as an arbitrary and despotic use of authority, so gross that it divested the court of its very power to dispense justice.
As a consequence, the RTC Orders granting the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. and thereafter discharging them from their criminal liability must be deemed
to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Whether for lack of jurisdiction orfor grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, we declare all orders, resolutions, and judgments of
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation applications of Tecson et al. null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction. We find our
pronouncement in Galman v. Sandiganbayan64 applicable, viz:

A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon
it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. (Emphasis supplied)

The ultimate discharge of Tecson et

al. from probation did not totally
extinguish their criminal liability.

Accused Bantug asserts65 that, in any event, their criminal liability has already been extinguished as a result of their discharge from probation and the eventual
termination of the criminal case against them by Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. To support his argument, he cites the following provision of the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment.

2. By service of the sentence.

3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.

4. By absolute pardon.

5. By prescription of the crime.

6. By prescription of the penalty.

7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article 344 of this Code. (Emphasis supplied)

As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be the source of legal rights; legally speaking, it is as if no judgment had been rendered at all. Considering our
annulment of the Orders of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation proceedings, respondents cannot claim benefits that technically do not exist.

In any event, Tecson et al.cannot invoke Article89 of the Revised Penal Code, as we find it inapplicable to this case. One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is
precisely to "suspend the execution of the sentence,"66 and not to replace the original sentence with another, as we pointed out in our discussion in Baclayon v.
Mutia:67

An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather in effect a suspension of the imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an
"interlocutory judgment"in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a
final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. (Emphases supplied)

Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et al.remains.

In light of our recent Decision in
Colinares v. People, Tecson et al.
may now reapply for probation.

Very recently, in Colinares v. People,68 we revisited our ruling in Franciscoand modified our pronouncements insofar as the eligibility for probation of those who
appeal their conviction is concerned. Through a majority vote of 9-6, the Court En Bancin effect abandoned Lagrosaand settled the following once and for all:69

Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the judgment of conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of
probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court,now set
aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the probation law on Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled judgment against him.
He will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court’s judgment of conviction for a lesser
offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial court’s judgment — even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to
pay for the trial court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw(the horse errs,
the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?

The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appealsthat
the probation law requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But there is a huge difference between
Franciscoand this case.

xxxx

Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation.
Hewas not in a position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice.
Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that
those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.

xxxx

In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time
imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right
penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.

The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards
the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in
Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would
be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent
purpose.

xxxx

At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would havehad
the right to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC doneright by him. The idea may not even
have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not probationable.

The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness.1âwphi1 Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to apply for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on
him is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation? (Emphases supplied)

In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA judgments and found Tecson et al.ultimately liable for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period (from 4 months and 1 day to 6 months) to prisión
correccional in its medium period (from 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Considering that the new ruling in Colinares is more favorable to
Tecson et al., we rule that they are now eligible to apply for probation. Since Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) was convicted of the same crime, we hereby clarify that Dizon is
also eligible for probation.

While we cannot recognize the validityof the Orders of RTC Branch 130, which granted the Applications for Probation, we cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et al.
have fulfilled the terms and conditions of their previous probation program and have eventually been discharged therefrom. Thus, should they reapply for probation, the
trial court may, at its discretion, consider their antecedent probation service in resolving whether to place them under probation at this time and in determining the
terms, conditions, and period thereof.

Final clarificatory matters

We now take this opportunity to correct an unintentional typographical error in the minimum term of the penalty imposed on the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. While
this issue was not raised by any of the parties before us, this Court deems it proper to discuss the matter ex proprio motuin the interest of justice. In the first paragraph of
the dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February 2012, the fourth sentence reads as follows:

They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prisión correccional, as maximum.

As we had intended to impose on the accused the maximum term of the "penalty next lower" than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL),70 the phrase "and one (1) day," which had been inadvertently added, must
be removed. Consequently, in the first paragraph of the dispositive portion, the fourth sentence should now read as follows:

They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión
correccional, as maximum. In this instance, we further find it important to clarify the accessory penalties inherent to the principal penalty imposed on Dizon and Tecson
et al.

By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised Penal Code, a corresponding accessory penalty automatically attaches every time a court lays down a principal
penalty outlined in Articles 25 and 27 thereof.71 The applicable accessory penalty is determined by using as reference the principal penaltyimposed by the court before
the prison sentence is computed in accordance with the ISL.72 This determination is made in spite of the two classes ofpenalties mentioned in an indeterminate
sentence. It must be emphasized that the provisions on the inclusion of accessory penalties specifically allude to the actual "penalty"73 imposed, not to the "prison
sentence"74 set by a court. We believe that the ISL did not intend to have the effect of imposing on the convict two distinct sets of accessory penalties for the same
offense.75 The two penalties are only relevant insofar as setting the minimum imprisonment period is concerned, after which the convict may apply for parole and
eventually seek the shortening of the prison term.76

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prisión correccionalin its medium period. As this provision grants courts the discretion tolay down a penalty without regard to the presence of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, the imposable penaltymust also be within the aforementioned range.77 Hence, before applying the ISL, we ultimately imposed on Dizon
and Tecson et al. the actual (straight) penalty78 of four years and two months of prisión correccional.79 Pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of
prisión correccional automatically carries with it80 the following accessory penalties: ARTICLE 43. Prisión Correccional— Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of
prisión correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right tofollow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification
from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article
although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

The duration of their suspension shall be the same as that of their principal penalty sans the ISL; that is, for four years and two months81 or until they have served their
sentence in accordance with law. Their suspension takes effect immediately, once the judgment of conviction becomes final.82

We further point out that if the length of their imprisonment exceeds 18 months, they shall furthermore suffer a perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage. Under Article 32 of the RevisedPenal Code, if this accessory penalty attaches, it shall forever deprive them of the exercise of their right (a) to vote in any
popular election for any public office; (b) to be elected to that office; and (c) to hold any public office.83 Any public office that they may be holding becomes vacant
upon finality of the judgment.84 The aforementioned accessory penalties can only be wiped out if expressly remitted in a pardon.85

Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are without prejudice to a grant of probation, shouldthe trial court find them eligible therefor. As we explained in
Baclayon,86 the grant of probation suspends the execution of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as that of the accessory penalties. We have reiterated this
point in Moreno v. Commission on Elections:87

In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of
sentence. We held that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus
deleted from the order granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from continuing with her teaching profession.

Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period
imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.

It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension
from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation. x x x x. During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him
by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of petitioner Gerarda H. Villa in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 is hereby
DENIED. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General concerning G.R. Nos. 155101 and 154954 is also DENIED.

The respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are likewise
DENIED. In light of the finding that Caloocan City Regional Trial Court Branch 130 acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the
aforementioned Applications for Probation, we hereby ANNUL the entire probation proceedings and SET ASIDE all orders, resolutions, or judgments issued in
connection thereto. We, however, CLARIFY that Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., Vincent Tecson, and Fidelito Dizon are
eligible to apply or reapply for probation in view of our recent ruling in Colinares v. People of the Philippines,88 without prejudice to their remaining civil liability, if
any.

Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February 2012 and hereby delete the phrase "and one (1) day" located in the
fourth sentence of the first paragraph thereof. The sentence shall now read as follows: "They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisi6n correccional, as maximum."

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: REPEAL OF LAWS

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION G.R. No. 154598 August 16, 2004

FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS Present:

RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for PANGANIBAN,J., Chairman,

and in behalf of the minor SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,*

child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER CORONA and

DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON CARPIO MORALES, JJ. Petitioner,

- versus –

ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5, 2002 resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in CA G.R. SP No. 70501
dismissing the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of substance. The dispositive portion[2] read:

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds that: a) this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition; and b)
the petition is not sufficient in substance.

Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28, 1998 in the Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year
later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.

However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a guest relations officer in a nightclub, with
the freedom to go out with her friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving her daughter in the
care of the househelp.

Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her
daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but this was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the child
was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find them there and the barangay
office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification[3] that respondent was no longer residing there.

Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondents cellular phone bills showing calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and
other provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the
entire country.

However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts
Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):

Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction finds its
procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.

In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter.

The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA 7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of habeas corpus in custody of minor
cases is concerned? The simple answer is, yes, it did, because there is no other meaning of the word exclusive than to constitute the Family Court as the sole court
which can issue said writ. If a court other than the Family Court also possesses the same competence, then the jurisdiction of the former is not exclusive but concurrent
and such an interpretation is contrary to the simple and clear wording of RA 8369.

Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a petition for habeas corpus involving custody of minors, a respondent can easily evade the service of
a writ of habeas corpus on him or her by just moving out of the region over which the Regional Trial Court issuing the writ has territorial jurisdiction. That may be so
but then jurisdiction is conferred by law. In the absence of a law conferring such jurisdiction in this Court, it cannot exercise it even if it is demanded by expediency or
necessity.
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority of this Court or any court for that matter to determine. The enactment of a law on jurisdiction is
within the exclusive domain of the legislature. When there is a perceived defect in the law, the remedy is not to be sought form the courts but only from the legislature.

The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of
the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions.

In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M.
No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003) has rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the Supreme
Court,[4] Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.[5]

The petition is granted.

The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the
custody of minors.

The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the
lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word exclusive apparently cannot be construed any other way.

We disagree with the CAs reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of
their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose
writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the
petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed the
Family Courts Act of 1997. As observed by the Solicitor General:

Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the State is to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children. The creation of the Family Court is
geared towards addressing three major issues regarding childrens welfare cases, as expressed by the legislators during the deliberations for the law. The legislative
intent behind giving Family Courts exclusive and original jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid further clogging of regular court dockets, ensure greater sensitivity
and specialization in view of the nature of the case and the parties, as well as to guarantee that the privacy of the children party to the case remains protected.

The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. Again, to quote the Solicitor General:

To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus involving a minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain and transient will
not result in one of the situations that the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte nature of habeas corpus
proceedings will not result in disruption of the childs privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil
sought to be avoided by the legislature: the childs welfare and well being will be prejudiced.

This is not the first time that this Court construed the word exclusive as not foreclosing resort to another jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the Solicitor General, in
Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation,[6] the heirs of miners killed in a work-related accident were allowed to file suit in the regular courts even if, under the
Workmens Compensation Act, the Workmens Compensation Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.

We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:

While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case at bar. it supports petitioners submission that the word exclusive in the Family Courts Act of 1997
may not connote automatic foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other courts over habeas corpus cases involving minors. In the same manner that the remedies in the
Floresca case were selective, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Family Court in the case at bar is concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs of habeas
corpus enforceable only within its territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, in cases where the territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot be
determined with certainty, the Court of Appeals can issue the same writ enforceable throughout the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of
Court, thus:

The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member
thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any
member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a
judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district. (Emphasis supplied)

In ruling that the Commissioners exclusive jurisdiction did not foreclose resort to the regular courts for damages, this Court, in the same Floresca case, said that it was
merely applying and giving effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and implemented by the Civil Code. It also
applied the well-established rule that what is controlling is the spirit and intent, not the letter, of the law:

Idolatrous reverence for the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures mans survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, the letter of the
law killeth; its spirit giveth life.

xxx xxx xxx

It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of
the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation aforementioned.

Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense. Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in mind is not
accurately reflected in the language of a statute, and its literal interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or contradiction.[7] In the case at bar,
a literal interpretation of the word exclusive will result in grave injustice and negate the policy to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children[8] under the
Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in
construing the provisions of RA 8369.

Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored:

The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in
the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not have enacted
conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on
the subject.[9]

The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to
the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in
harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus
where the custody of minors is at issue.

In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ
shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.

xxx xxx xxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in
the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be
found for hearing and decision on the merits. (Emphasis Ours)

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the
custody of minors is involved.

One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the country is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of Appeals cited
as a ground for dismissing the petition. As explained by the Solicitor General:[10]

That the serving officer will have to search for the child all over the country does not represent an insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such a task is no
more different from or difficult than the duty of the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the latter is likewise enforceable anywhere within the
Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court
of Appeals, Sixteenth Division.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: JUDICIAL DECISIONS

G.R. No. 191002 April 20, 2010

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 191032

JAIME N. SORIANO, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 191057

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC

IN RE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION TO APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIARY, ESTELITO P. MENDOZA,
Petitioner,

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 191149

JOHN G. PERALTA, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC). Respondent.
PETER IRVING CORVERA; CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM; ALFONSO V. TAN, JR.; NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE’S LAWYERS; MARLOU B. UBANO;
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES-DAVAO DEL SUR CHAPTER, represented by its Immediate Past President, ATTY. ISRAELITO P. TORREON, and
the latter in his own personal capacity as a MEMBER of the PHILIPPINE BAR; MITCHELL JOHN L. BOISER; BAGONG ALYANSANG BAYAN (BAYAN)
CHAIRMAN DR. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO; BAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR.; CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION
AND ADVANCE-MENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE) CHAIRMAN FERDINAND GAITE; KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP
(KADAMAY) SECRETARY GENERAL GLORIA ARELLANO; ALYANSA NG NAGKAKAISANG KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA SA
KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN) CHAIRMAN KEN LEONARD RAMOS; TAYO ANG PAG-ASA CONVENOR ALVIN PETERS; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS (LFS) CHAIRMAN JAMES MARK TERRY LACUANAN RIDON; NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUSP)
CHAIRMAN EINSTEIN RECEDES; COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES (CEGP) CHAIRMAN VIJAE ALQUISOLA; and STUDENT
CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (SCMP) CHAIRMAN MA. CRISTINA ANGELA GUEVARRA; WALDEN F. BELLO and LORETTA ANN P.
ROSALES; WOMEN TRIAL LAWYERS ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by YOLANDA QUISUMBING-JAVELLANA; BELLEZA
ALOJADO DEMAISIP; TERESITA GANDIONCO-OLEDAN; MA. VERENA KASILAG-VILLANUEVA; MARILYN STA. ROMANA; LEONILA DE JESUS;
and GUINEVERE DE LEON; AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.; Intervenors.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 191342

ATTY. AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO, JR., (IBP Governor-Southern Luzon), and ATTY. ROLAND B. INTING (IBP Governor-Eastern Visayas), Petitioners,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 191420

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and HER EXCELLENCY GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its decision, holding:

WHEREFORE, the Court:

1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149, and the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being
premature;
2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of merit; and

3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs the Judicial and Bar Council:

(a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May
17, 2010;

(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice;

(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or before May 17, 2010; and

(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees
corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision.

SO ORDERED.

Motions for Reconsideration

Petitioners Jaime N. Soriano (G.R. No. 191032), Amador Z. Tolentino and Roland B. Inting (G.R. No. 191342), and Philippine Bar Association (G.R. No. 191420), as
well as intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Davao del Sur (IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.); Christian Robert S. Lim; Peter Irving Corvera; Bagong Alyansang
Bayan and others (BAYAN, et al.); Alfonso V. Tan, Jr.; the Women Trial Lawyers Organization of the Philippines (WTLOP); Marlou B. Ubano; Mitchell John L.
Boiser; and Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales (Bello, et al.), filed their respective motions for reconsideration. Also filing a motion for reconsideration was
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., whose belated intervention was allowed.

We summarize the arguments and submissions of the various motions for reconsideration, in the aforegiven order:

Soriano

1. The Court has not squarely ruled upon or addressed the issue of whether or not the power to designate the Chief Justice belonged to the Supreme Court en banc.

2. The Mendoza petition should have been dismissed, because it sought a mere declaratory judgment and did not involve a justiciable controversy.

3. All Justices of the Court should participate in the next deliberations. The mere fact that the Chief Justice sits as ex officio head of the JBC should not prevail over the
more compelling state interest for him to participate as a Member of the Court.

Tolentino and Inting

1. A plain reading of Section 15, Article VII does not lead to an interpretation that exempts judicial appointments from the express ban on midnight appointments.

2. In excluding the Judiciary from the ban, the Court has made distinctions and has created exemptions when none exists.

3. The ban on midnight appointments is placed in Article VII, not in Article VIII, because it limits an executive, not a judicial, power.

4. Resort to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is superfluous, and is powerless to vary the terms of the clear prohibition.

5. The Court has given too much credit to the position taken by Justice Regalado. Thereby, the Court has raised the Constitution to the level of a venerated text whose
intent can only be divined by its framers as to be outside the realm of understanding by the sovereign people that ratified it.

6. Valenzuela should not be reversed.

7. The petitioners, as taxpayers and lawyers, have the clear legal standing to question the illegal composition of the JBC.

Philippine Bar Association

1. The Court’s strained interpretation of the Constitution violates the basic principle that the Court should not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than what is
required by the precise facts of the case.

2. Considering that Section 15, Article VII is clear and straightforward, the only duty of the Court is to apply it. The provision expressly and clearly provides a general
limitation on the appointing power of the President in prohibiting the appointment of any person to any position in the Government without any qualification and
distinction.

3. The Court gravely erred in unilaterally ignoring the constitutional safeguard against midnight appointments.

4. The Constitution has installed two constitutional safeguards:- the prohibition against midnight appointments, and the creation of the JBC. It is not within the authority
of the Court to prefer one over the other, for the Court’s duty is to apply the safeguards as they are, not as the Court likes them to be.

5. The Court has erred in failing to apply the basic principles of statutory construction in interpreting the Constitution.

6. The Court has erred in relying heavily on the title, chapter or section headings, despite precedents on statutory construction holding that such headings carried very
little weight.

7. The Constitution has provided a general rule on midnight appointments, and the only exception is that on temporary appointments to executive positions.

8. The Court has erred in directing the JBC to resume the proceedings for the nomination of the candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Puno with a view to submitting the list of nominees for Chief Justice to President Arroyo on or before May 17, 2010. The Constitution grants
the Court only the power of supervision over the JBC; hence, the Court cannot tell the JBC what to do, how to do it, or when to do it, especially in the absence of a real
and justiciable case assailing any specific action or inaction of the JBC.
9. The Court has engaged in rendering an advisory opinion and has indulged in speculations.

10. The constitutional ban on appointments being already in effect, the Court’s directing the JBC to comply with the decision constitutes a culpable violation of the
Constitution and the commission of an election offense.

11. The Court cannot reverse on the basis of a secondary authority a doctrine unanimously formulated by the Court en banc.

12. The practice has been for the most senior Justice to act as Chief Justice whenever the incumbent is indisposed. Thus, the appointment of the successor Chief Justice
is not urgently necessary.

13. The principal purpose for the ban on midnight appointments is to arrest any attempt to prolong the outgoing President’s powers by means of proxies. The attempt of
the incumbent President to appoint the next Chief Justice is undeniably intended to perpetuate her power beyond her term of office.

IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.

1. Its language being unambiguous, Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution applies to appointments to the Judiciary. Hence, no cogent reason exists to warrant the
reversal of the Valenzuela pronouncement.

2. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides for presidential appointments to the Constitutional Commissions and the JBC with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments. Its phrase "other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution" is enough proof that the limitation on the appointing power of
the President extends to appointments to the Judiciary. Thus, Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 of Article VII apply to all presidential appointments in the
Executive and Judicial Branches of the Government.

3. There is no evidence that the framers of the Constitution abhorred the idea of an Acting Chief Justice in all cases.

Lim

1. There is no justiciable controversy that warrants the Court’s exercise of judicial review.

2. The election ban under Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Court and to other appointments to the Judiciary.

3. The creation of the JBC does not justify the removal of the safeguard under Section 15 of Article VII against midnight appointments in the Judiciary.

Corvera

1. The Court’s exclusion of appointments to the Judiciary from the Constitutional ban on midnight appointments is based on an interpretation beyond the plain and
unequivocal language of the Constitution.

2. The intent of the ban on midnight appointments is to cover appointments in both the Executive and Judicial Departments. The application of the principle of verba
legis (ordinary meaning) would have obviated dwelling on the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution. If there is any ambiguity in Section
15, Article VII, the intent behind the provision, which is to prevent political partisanship in all branches of the Government, should have controlled.

3. A plain reading is preferred to a contorted and strained interpretation based on compartmentalization and physical arrangement, especially considering that the
Constitution must be interpreted as a whole.

4. Resort to the deliberations or to the personal interpretation of the framers of the Constitution should yield to the plain and unequivocal language of the Constitution.

5. There is no sufficient reason for reversing Valenzuela, a ruling that is reasonable and in accord with the Constitution.

BAYAN, et al.

1. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did not present a justiciable controversy. The issues it raised were not yet ripe
for adjudication, considering that the office of the Chief Justice was not yet vacant and that the JBC itself has yet to decide whether or not to submit a list of nominees
to the President.

2. The collective wisdom of Valenzuela Court is more important and compelling than the opinion of Justice Regalado.

3. In ruling that Section 15, Article VII is in conflict with Section 4(1), Article VIII, the Court has violated the principle of ut magis valeat quam pereat (which
mandates that the Constitution should be interpreted as a whole, such that any conflicting provisions are to be harmonized as to fully give effect to all). There is no
conflict between the provisions; they complement each other.

4. The form and structure of the Constitution’s titles, chapters, sections, and draftsmanship carry little weight in statutory construction. The clear and plain language of
Section 15, Article VII precludes interpretation.

Tan, Jr.

1. The factual antecedents do not present an actual case or controversy. The clash of legal rights and interests in the present case are merely anticipated. Even if it is
anticipated with certainty, no actual vacancy in the position of the Chief Justice has yet occurred.

2. The ruling that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to a vacancy in the Court and the Judiciary runs in conflict with long standing principles and doctrines of
statutory construction. The provision admits only one exception, temporary appointments in the Executive Department. Thus, the Court should not distinguish, because
the law itself makes no distinction.

3. Valenzuela was erroneously reversed. The framers of the Constitution clearly intended the ban on midnight appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary.
Hence, giving more weight to the opinion of Justice Regalado to reverse the en banc decision in Valenzuela was unwarranted.
4. Section 15, Article VII is not incompatible with Section 4(1), Article VIII. The 90-day mandate to fill any vacancy lasts until August 15, 2010, or a month and a half
after the end of the ban. The next President has roughly the same time of 45 days as the incumbent President (i.e., 44 days) within which to scrutinize and study the
qualifications of the next Chief Justice. Thus, the JBC has more than enough opportunity to examine the nominees without haste and political uncertainty.1avvphi1

5. When the constitutional ban is in place, the 90-day period under Section 4(1), Article VIII is suspended.

6. There is no basis to direct the JBC to submit the list of nominees on or before May 17, 2010. The directive to the JBC sanctions a culpable violation of the
Constitution and constitutes an election offense.

7. There is no pressing necessity for the appointment of a Chief Justice, because the Court sits en banc, even when it acts as the sole judge of all contests relative to the
election, returns and qualifications of the President and Vice-President. Fourteen other Members of the Court can validly comprise the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

WTLOP

1. The Court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the JBC to submit the list of nominees for Chief Justice to the President on or before May 17, 2010, and to continue its
proceedings for the nomination of the candidates, because it granted a relief not prayed for; imposed on the JBC a deadline not provided by law or the Constitution;
exercised control instead of mere supervision over the JBC; and lacked sufficient votes to reverse Valenzuela.

2. In interpreting Section 15, Article VII, the Court has ignored the basic principle of statutory construction to the effect that the literal meaning of the law must be
applied when it is clear and unambiguous; and that we should not distinguish where the law does not distinguish.

3. There is no urgency to appoint the next Chief Justice, considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948 already provides that the power and duties of the office devolve on
the most senior Associate Justice in case of a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice.

Ubano

1. The language of Section 15, Article VII, being clear and unequivocal, needs no interpretation

2. The Constitution must be construed in its entirety, not by resort to the organization and arrangement of its provisions.

3. The opinion of Justice Regalado is irrelevant, because Section 15, Article VII and the pertinent records of the Constitutional Commission are clear and unambiguous.

4. The Court has erred in ordering the JBC to submit the list of nominees to the President by May 17, 2010 at the latest, because no specific law requires the JBC to
submit the list of nominees even before the vacancy has occurred.

Boiser

1. Under Section 15, Article VII, the only exemption from the ban on midnight appointments is the temporary appointment to an executive position. The limitation is in
keeping with the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution to place a restriction on the power of the outgoing Chief Executive to make appointments.

2. To exempt the appointment of the next Chief Justice from the ban on midnight appointments makes the appointee beholden to the outgoing Chief Executive, and
compromises the independence of the Chief Justice by having the outgoing President be continually influential.

3. The Court’s reversal of Valenzuela without stating the sufficient reason violates the principle of stare decisis.

Bello, et al.

1. Section 15, Article VII does not distinguish as to the type of appointments an outgoing President is prohibited from making within the prescribed period. Plain textual
reading and the records of the Constitutional Commission support the view that the ban on midnight appointments extends to judicial appointments.

2. Supervision of the JBC by the Court involves oversight. The subordinate subject to oversight must first act not in accord with prescribed rules before the act can be
redone to conform to the prescribed rules.

3. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did not present a justiciable controversy.

Pimentel

1. Any constitutional interpretative changes must be reasonable, rational, and conformable to the general intent of the Constitution as a limitation to the powers of
Government and as a bastion for the protection of the rights of the people. Thus, in harmonizing seemingly conflicting provisions of the Constitution, the interpretation
should always be one that protects the citizenry from an ever expanding grant of authority to its representatives.

2. The decision expands the constitutional powers of the President in a manner totally repugnant to republican constitutional democracy, and is tantamount to a judicial
amendment of the Constitution without proper authority.

Comments

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the JBC separately represent in their respective comments, thus:

OSG

1. The JBC may be compelled to submit to the President a short list of its nominees for the position of Chief Justice.

2. The incumbent President has the power to appoint the next Chief Justice.

3. Section 15, Article VII does not apply to the Judiciary.

4. The principles of constitutional construction favor the exemption of the Judiciary from the ban on midnight appointments.1awph!1
5. The Court has the duty to consider and resolve all issues raised by the parties as well as other related matters.

JBC

1. The consolidated petitions should have been dismissed for prematurity, because the JBC has not yet decided at the time the petitions were filed whether the
incumbent President has the power to appoint the new Chief Justice, and because the JBC, having yet to interview the candidates, has not submitted a short list to the
President.

2. The statement in the decision that there is a doubt on whether a JBC short list is necessary for the President to appoint a Chief Justice should be struck down as bereft
of constitutional and legal basis. The statement undermines the independence of the JBC.

3. The JBC will abide by the final decision of the Court, but in accord with its constitutional mandate and its implementing rules and regulations.

For his part, petitioner Estelito P. Mendoza (A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC) submits his comment even if the OSG and the JBC were the only ones the Court has required to do
so. He states that the motions for reconsideration were directed at the administrative matter he initiated and which the Court resolved. His comment asserts:

1. The grounds of the motions for reconsideration were already resolved by the decision and the separate opinion.

2. The administrative matter he brought invoked the Court’s power of supervision over the JBC as provided by Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, as
distinguished from the Court’s adjudicatory power under Section 1, Article VIII. In the former, the requisites for judicial review are not required, which was why
Valenzuela was docketed as an administrative matter. Considering that the JBC itself has yet to take a position on when to submit the short list to the proper appointing
authority, it has effectively solicited the exercise by the Court of its power of supervision over the JBC.

3. To apply Section 15, Article VII to Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII is to amend the Constitution.

4. The portions of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission quoted in the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales, as well as in some of the motions for
reconsideration do not refer to either Section 15, Article VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but to Section 13, Article VII (on nepotism).

Ruling

We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being thereby raised and argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the decision of
March 17, 2010.

Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on some matters only for the purpose of clarification and emphasis.

First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and accordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning
Valenzuela.1

The contention has no basis.

Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It simply
means that a principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority, controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts
within the same jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority. The decisions relied upon as precedents
are commonly those of appellate courts, because the decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts and for that reason are probably not the best evidence
of the rules of law laid down. 2

Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the
criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.3 In a hierarchical
judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other. The one highest court
does not bind itself, being invested with the innate authority to rule according to its best lights.4

The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to
follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification.5 The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law
setting like the United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament.6 But ours is not a common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not
always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and
justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is for the
sake of convenience and stability.

For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned, or reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this case
is, therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to
modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division.7

Second: Some intervenors are grossly misleading the public by their insistence that the Constitutional Commission extended to the Judiciary the ban on presidential
appointments during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII.

The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the Constitutional Commission did not concern either Section 15, Article VII or
Section 4(1), Article VIII, but only Section 13, Article VII, a provision on nepotism. The records of the Constitutional Commission show that Commissioner Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. had proposed to include judges and justices related to the President within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity among the persons whom the
President might not appoint during his or her tenure. In the end, however, Commissioner Davide, Jr. withdrew the proposal to include the Judiciary in Section 13,
Article VII "(t)o avoid any further complication,"8 such that the final version of the second paragraph of Section 13, Article VII even completely omits any reference to
the Judiciary, to wit:

Section 13. xxx

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
Last: The movants take the majority to task for holding that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments in the Judiciary. They aver that the Court either
ignored or refused to apply many principles of statutory construction.

The movants gravely err in their posture, and are themselves apparently contravening their avowed reliance on the principles of statutory construction.

For one, the movants, disregarding the absence from Section 15, Article VII of the express extension of the ban on appointments to the Judiciary, insist that the ban
applied to the Judiciary under the principle of verba legis. That is self-contradiction at its worst.

Another instance is the movants’ unhesitating willingness to read into Section 4(1) and Section 9, both of Article VIII, the express applicability of the ban under Section
15, Article VII during the period provided therein, despite the silence of said provisions thereon. Yet, construction cannot supply the omission, for doing so would
generally constitute an encroachment upon the field of the Constitutional Commission. Rather, Section 4(1) and Section 9 should be left as they are, given that their
meaning is clear and explicit, and no words can be interpolated in them.9 Interpolation of words is unnecessary, because the law is more than likely to fail to express the
legislative intent with the interpolation. In other words, the addition of new words may alter the thought intended to be conveyed. And, even where the meaning of the
law is clear and sensible, either with or without the omitted word or words, interpolation is improper, because the primary source of the legislative intent is in the
language of the law itself.10

Thus, the decision of March 17, 2010 has fittingly observed:

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point in order to suit the purposes of any quarter.

Final Word

It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the controversy we are resolving that because all the Members of the present Court were appointed by the
incumbent President, a majority of them are now granting to her the authority to appoint the successor of the retiring Chief Justice.

The insinuation is misguided and utterly unfair.

The Members of the Court vote on the sole basis of their conscience and the merits of the issues. Any claim to the contrary proceeds from malice and condescension.
Neither the outgoing President nor the present Members of the Court had arranged the current situation to happen and to evolve as it has. None of the Members of the
Court could have prevented the Members composing the Court when she assumed the Presidency about a decade ago from retiring during her prolonged term and
tenure, for their retirements were mandatory. Yet, she is now left with an imperative duty under the Constitution to fill up the vacancies created by such inexorable
retirements within 90 days from their occurrence. Her official duty she must comply with. So must we ours who are tasked by the Constitution to settle the controversy.

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: JUDICIAL DECISIONS

G.R. No. 199310 February 19, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by RONNIE P. INOCENCIO, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision2 dated November 10, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90503. The CA affirmed the Decision3 dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 69,
in Land Registration Case No. N-11465.

The Facts

On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. (respondent), filed an application4 with the RTC for judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of land situated in
Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastre, with an area of 29,945 square meters and 20,357 sq
m, respectively.

On December 13, 2001, the RTC issued the Order5 finding the respondent’s application for registration sufficient in form and substance and setting it for initial hearing
on February 21, 2002. The scheduled initial hearing was later reset to May 30, 2002.6 The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette, April 1, 2002
issue, Volume 98, No. 13, pages 1631-16337 and in the March 21, 2002 issue of People’s Balita,8 a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of
Initial Hearing was likewise posted in a conspicuous place on Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, as well as in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the City hall of Taguig,
Metro Manila.9

On May 30, 2002, when the RTC called the case for initial hearing, only the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC
issued an order of general default except LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to the respondent’s application for registration.10

On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition11 to the respondent’s application for registration, asserting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are not part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), on July 16, 2002, likewise filed its Opposition,12 alleging
that the respondent failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of
land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Trial on the merits of the respondent’s application ensued thereafter.

The respondent presented four witnesses: Teresita Villaroya, the respondent’s corporate secretary; Ronnie Inocencio, an employee of the respondent and the one
authorized by it to file the application for registration with the RTC; Cenon Cerquena (Cerquena), the caretaker of the subject properties since 1957; and Engineer
Mariano Flotildes (Engr. Flotildes), a geodetic engineer hired by the respondent to conduct a topographic survey of the subject properties.

For its part, the LLDA presented the testimonies of Engineers Ramon Magalonga (Engr. Magalonga) and Christopher A. Pedrezuela (Engr. Pedrezuela), who are both
geodetic engineers employed by the LLDA.

Essentially, the testimonies of the respondent’s witnesses showed that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the said parcels of land long before June 12, 1945. The respondent purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador (Salvador) and
Bella Mijares (Mijares), respectively, in 1989. The subject properties were originally owned and possessed by Veronica Jaime (Jaime), who cultivated and planted
different kinds of crops in the said lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said parcels of land to Salvador and
Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until the same were purchased by the respondent in 1989.

The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, as evidenced by the certifications issued
by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia, presented the following documents: (1) Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 28, 1989 executed by Salvador and
Mijares in favor of the respondent;13 (2) survey plans of the subject properties;14 (3) technical descriptions of the subject properties;15 (4) Geodetic Engineer’s
Certificate;16 (5) tax declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for 2002;17 and (6) certifications dated December 17, 2002, issued by Corazon D. Calamno (Calamno),
Senior Forest Management Specialist of the DENR, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.18

On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondent’s application for registration should be denied since the subject parcels of land are not part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain; it pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of Republic Act No. 485019 (R.A. No. 4850), lands, surrounding the Laguna de
Bay, located at and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the
oppositor LLDA, claimed that, upon preliminary evaluation of the subject properties, based on the topographic map of Taguig, which was prepared using an aerial
survey conducted by the then Department of National Defense-Bureau of Coast in April 1966, he found out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below
12.50 m. That upon actual area verification of the subject properties on September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of the subject properties
range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.

On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed that, based on the actual topographic survey of the subject properties he conducted upon the request
of the respondent, the elevations of the subject properties, contrary to LLDA’s claim, are above 12.50 m. Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed that Lot No. 3068 has an
elevation ranging from 12.60 m to 15 m while the elevation of Lot No. 3077 ranges from 12.60 m to 14.80 m.

The RTC Ruling

On May 16, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision,20 which granted the respondent’s application for registration of title to the subject properties, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered confirming the title of the applicant Remman Enterprises Incorporated over a parcels of land [sic] consisting
of 29,945 square meters (Lot 3068) and 20,357 (Lot 3077) both situated in Brgy. Napindan, Taguig, Taguig,
Metro Manila more particularly described in the Technical Descriptions Ap-04-003103 and Swo-00-001769 respectively and ordering their registration under the
Property Registration Decree in the name of Remman Enterprises Incorporated.

SO ORDERED.21

The RTC found that the respondent was able to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The RTC opined
that the elevations of the subject properties are very much higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.50 m and, thus, not part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC
pointed out that LLDA’s claim that the elevation of the subject properties is below 12.50 m is hearsay since the same was merely based on the topographic map that was
prepared using an aerial survey on March 2, 1966; that nobody was presented to prove that an aerial survey was indeed conducted on March 2, 1966 for purposes of
gathering data for the preparation of the topographic map.

Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a parcel of land does not always remain the same; that the elevations of the subject properties may have already changed
since 1966 when the supposed aerial survey, from which the topographic map used by LLDA was based, was conducted. The RTC likewise faulted the method used by
Engr. Magalonga in measuring the elevations of the subject properties, pointing out that:

Further, in finding that the elevation of the subject lots are below 12.5 meters, oppositor’s witness merely compared their elevation to the elevation of the particular
portion of the lake dike which he used as his [benchmark] or reference point in determining the elevation of the subject lots. Also, the elevation of the said portion of the
lake dike that was then under the construction by FF Cruz was allegedly 12.79 meters and after finding that the elevation of the subject lots are lower than the said
[benchmark] or reference point, said witness suddenly jumped to a conclusion that the elevation was below 12.5 meters. x x x.

Moreover, the finding of LLDA’s witness was based on hearsay as said witness admitted that it was DPWH or the FF Cruz who determined the elevation of the portion
of the lake dike which he used as the [benchmark] or reference point in determining the elevation of the subject lots and that he has no personal knowledge as to how
the DPWH and FF Cruz determined the elevation of the said [benchmark] or reference point and he only learn[ed] that its elevation is 12.79 meters from the
information he got from FF Cruz.22

Even supposing that the elevations of the subject properties are indeed below 12.50 m, the RTC opined that the same could not be considered part of the bed of Laguna
Lake. The RTC held that, under Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake extends only to those areas that can be covered by the lake water when it is at the
average annual maximum lake level of 12.50 m. Hence, the RTC averred, only those parcels of land that are adjacent to and near the shoreline of Laguna Lake form
part of its bed and not those that are already far from it, which could not be reached by the lake water. The RTC pointed out that the subject properties are more than a
kilometer away from the shoreline of Laguna Lake; that they are dry and waterless even when the waters of Laguna Lake is at its maximum level. The RTC likewise
found that the respondent was able to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject
properties as early as 1943.

The petitioner appealed the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

On November 10, 2011, the CA, by way of the assailed Decision,23 affirmed the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007. The CA found that the respondent was able to
establish that the subject properties are part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; that the same are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, as claimed
by the petitioner. Thus:

The evidence submitted by the appellee is sufficient to warrant registration of the subject lands in its name. Appellee’s witness Engr. Mariano Flotildes, who conducted
an actual area verification of the subject lots, ably proved that the elevation of the lowest portion of Lot No. 3068 is 12.6 meters and the elevation of its highest portion
is 15 meters. As to the other lot, it was found [out] that the elevation of the lowest portion of Lot No. 3077 is also 12.6 meters and the elevation of its highest portion is
15 meters. Said elevations are higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.5 meters as provided for under paragraph 11, Section 41 of R.A. No. 4850, as amended.

In opposing the instant application for registration, appellant relies merely on the Topographic Map dated March 2, 1966, prepared by Commodore Pathfinder, which
allegedly shows that the subject parcels of land are so situated in the submerge[d] [lake water] of Laguna Lake. The said data was gathered through aerial photography
over the area of Taguig conducted on March 2, 1966. However, nobody testified on the due execution and authenticity of the said document. As regards the testimony
of the witness for LLDA, Engr. Ramon Magalonga, that the subject parcels of land are below the 12.5 meter elevation, the same can be considered inaccurate aside
from being hearsay considering his admission that his findings were based merely on the evaluation conducted by DPWH and FF Cruz. x x x.24 (Citations omitted)

The CA likewise pointed out that the respondent was able to present certifications issued by the DENR, attesting that the subject properties form part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, which was not disputed by the petitioner. The CA further ruled that the respondent was able to prove, through the
testimonies of its witnesses, that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties prior to
June 12, 1945.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue

The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007, which granted the application for registration
filed by the respondent.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The petitioner maintains that the lower courts erred in granting the respondent’s application for registration since the subject properties do not form part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. The petitioner insists that the elevations of the subject properties are below the reglementary level of 12.50 m and, pursuant
to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, are considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake.

That the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m is a finding of fact by the lower courts, which this Court, generally may not
disregard. It is a long-standing policy of this Court that the findings of facts of the RTC which were adopted and affirmed by the CA are generally deemed conclusive
and binding. This Court is not a trier of facts and will not disturb the factual findings of the lower courts unless there are substantial reasons for doing so.25

That the subject properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, however, does not necessarily mean that they already form part of the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain. It is still incumbent upon the respondent to prove, with well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, that the subject properties are indeed part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. While deference is due to the lower courts’ finding that the elevations of the subject properties are above the
reglementary level of 12.50 m and, hence, no longer part of the bed of Laguna Lake pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, the Court nevertheless finds that the
respondent failed to substantiate its entitlement to registration of title to the subject properties.

"Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable."26

The respondent filed its application for registration of title to the subject properties under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 152927, which provides that:

Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

xxxx

Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to public land acquired under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act
(C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073.28 Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently
establish: first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.29

The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the
respondent presented two certifications30 issued by Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain "under Project No. 27-B of Taguig, Metro Manila as per LC Map 2623, approved on January 3, 1968."

However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are insufficient to prove that the subject properties are alienable and disposable. In Republic of the
Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,31 the Court clarified that, in addition to the certification issued by the proper government agency that a parcel of land is alienable
and disposable, applicants for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of public domain as
alienable and disposable. They must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of
the records. Thus:

Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established
to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the
land is alienable and disposable.32 (Emphasis ours)

In Republic v. Roche,33 the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the ruling in T.A.N. Properties, viz:

Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate
of land classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and
that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that
the land is alienable and disposable.

Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified as alienable or disposable land of the public domain. She submitted only the
survey map and technical description of the land which bears no information regarding the land’s classification. She did not bother to establish the status of the land by
any certification from the appropriate government agency. Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all requisites for registration of title under Section 14(1) of
P.D. 1529.34 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

The DENR certifications that were presented by the respondent in support of its application for registration are thus not sufficient to prove that the subject properties are
indeed classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable. It is still imperative for the respondent to present a copy of the original classification approved by
the DENR Secretary, which must be certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy. Accordingly, the lower courts erred in granting the application for
registration in spite of the failure of the respondent to prove by well-nigh incontrovertible evidence that the subject properties are alienable and disposable.

Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which was promulgated on June 26, 2008, must be applied prospectively, asserting that
decisions of this Court form part of the law of the land and, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect. The respondent points out that
its application for registration of title to the subject properties was filed and was granted by the RTC prior to the Court’s promulgation of its ruling in T.A.N. Properties.
Accordingly, that it failed to present a copy of the original classification covering the subject properties approved by the DENR Secretary and certified by the legal
custodian thereof as a true copy, the respondent claims, would not warrant the denial of its application for registration.

The Court does not agree.

Notwithstanding that the respondent’s application for registration was filed and granted by RTC prior to the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the pronouncements in
that case may be applied to the present case; it is not antithetical to the rule of non-retroactivity of laws pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code. It is elementary that the
interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes part of that law from the date it was originally passed, since this Court’s construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect.35 "Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law, but consists
merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one."36
Verily, the ruling in T.A.N. Properties was applied by the Court in subsequent cases notwithstanding that the applications for registration were filed and granted by the
lower courts prior to the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties.

In Republic v. Medida,37 the application for registration of the subject properties therein was filed on October 22, 2004 and was granted by the trial court on June 21,
2006. Similarly, in Republic v. Jaralve,38 the application for registration of the subject property therein was filed on October 22, 1996 and was granted by the trial court
on November 15, 2002. In the foregoing cases, notwithstanding that the applications for registration were filed and granted by the trial courts prior to the promulgation
of T.A.N. Properties, this Court applied the pronouncements in T.A.N. Properties and denied the applications for registration on the ground, inter alia, that the
applicants therein failed to present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy.

Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject properties since 1943, the respondent presented the testimony of
Cerquena. Cerquena testified that the subject properties were originally owned by Jaime who supposedly possessed and cultivated the same since 1943; that sometime
in 1975, Jaime sold the subject properties to Salvador and Mijares who, in turn, sold the same to the respondent in 1989.

The foregoing are but unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of the possession and occupation of the subject properties by the respondent and its predecessors-in-
interest; they do not constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of the subject properties required by Section 14(1) of P.D. No.
1529. Indeed, other than the testimony of Cerquena, the respondent failed to present any other evidence to prove the character of the possession and occupation by it
and its predecessors-in-interest of the subject properties.

For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land subject of the application. Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general
statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of
such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property.39

Although Cerquena testified that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest cultivated the subject properties, by planting different crops thereon, his testimony is
bereft of any specificity as to the nature of such cultivation as to warrant the conclusion that they have been indeed in possession and occupation of the subject
properties in the manner required by law. There was no showing as to the number of crops that are planted in the subject properties or to the volume of the produce
harvested from the crops supposedly planted thereon.

Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have indeed planted crops on the subject properties, it does not necessarily
follow that the subject properties have been possessed and occupied by them in the manner contemplated by law. The supposed planting of crops in the subject
properties may only have amounted to mere casual cultivation, which is not the possession and occupation required by law.

"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive and
notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the state. The possession of public land, however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title
thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the state, unless the occupant can prove possession and
occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years."40

Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties presented by the respondent were only for 2002. The respondent failed to explain why,
despite its claim that it acquired the subject properties as early as 1989, and that its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property since 1943,
it was only in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. "While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of
claim of ownership."41 That the subject properties were declared for taxation purposes only in 2002 gives rise to the presumption that the respondent claimed
ownership or possession of the subject properties starting that year. Likewise, no improvement or plantings were declared or noted in the said tax declarations. This fact
belies the claim that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest, contrary to Cerquena's testimony, have been in possession and occupation of the subject properties
in the manner required by law.

Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and that it and its predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same since June 12, 1945, or earlier, the respondent's application for registration
should be denied.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 90503, which affirmed the Decision dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69, in Land Registration Case No. N-
11465 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Application for Registration of Remman Enterprises, Inc. in Land Registration Case No. N-11465 is DENIED for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: DUTY TO RENDER JUDGMENT

CH S. RITTER, accused-appellant,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Esteban B. Bautista for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The appellant challenges his conviction of the crime involving a young girl of about 12 years old who had been allegedly raped and who later died because of a foreign
object left inside her vaginal canal.

Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with homicide under an information which reads:

That on or about the tenth (10th day of October, 1986 in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with lewd design and with intent to kill one Rosario Baluyot, a woman under twelve (12) years of age, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of said Rosario Baluyot and inserted a foreign object into the vaginal canal of said Rosario Baluyot which caused her death shortly thereafter, to
the damage and prejudice of her relatives. (66)

When arraigned, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty". Thereafter, the case was set for trial on the merits.

To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecutor presented the following witnesses, namely: (1) Jessie Ramirez, (2) Maria Burgos y Turla, (3) P/Cpl. Mariano Victoria,
(4) Policarpio Baluyot, (5) Dr. Reino Rosete, (6) Sumulong Daniel, (7) Jessica Herrera, (8) Sister Eva Palencia, (9) Conrado Salonga, (10) Dr. Devonne Loop, (11) Dr.
Leo Cruz, (12) Paul Maclor, (13) Aida Sarmiento, (14) Patricia Prollamanta (15) Mel Santos, (16) Lorna Limos, (17) Eduard Lee Bungarner, (18) Ronaldo Marquez,
(19) Tom Bonte, (20) 2nd Asst. City Fiscal Nini Alcala, (21) lst Asst. City Fiscal Dorentino Z. Floresta, (22) Corazon Caber, (23) Rodolfo Mercurio and (24) Fe Israel.

On the other hand, the defense offered in evidence Exhibits "1" to "24" and the testimonies of (1) Heinrich S. Ritter, (2) Father Roque Villanueva, (3) Angelita
Amulong (4) Gaspar Alcantara, (5) Dr. Val Barcinal and (6) Dr. Pedro C. Solis.

The facts of the case upon which the lower court based its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt are summarized in its decision, as follows:

The people's evidence show that on October 10, 1986 about midnight, accused Heinrich Stefan Ritter brought a boy and girl namely: Jessie Ramirez and Rosario
Baluyot inside his hotel room at MGM Hotel along Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City. These two (2) children were chosen from among a bunch of street children. Once
inside the hotel room accused told them to take a bath. Jessie Ramirez, alias "Egan", was the first to take a bath and when he came out Rosario Baluyot went to the
bathroom to do the same. While Rosario Baluyot was inside the bathroom, accused Ritter took out some pictures depicting dressed up young boys, and put them on top
of the table. Other things which were taken out and placed on top of a table were three (3) other objects which he described as like that of a vicks inhaler. One of these
objects the accused played with his hands and placed it on his palms. The color of which is grayish blue which turned out later to be the foreign object which was
inserted inside the vagina of Rosario Baluyot. The other objects were later established to be anti-nasal inhalers against pollution purchased by the accused in Bangkok
when he went there as a tourist. While Rosario was in the bathroom, accused told Ramirez to lay down on bed, and so did the accused. He then started masturbating the
young boy and also guided the boy's hand for him to be masturbated, so that they masturbated each other, while they were both naked, and he gave Jessie Ramirez an
erection. When Rosario Baluyot came out of the bathroom, she was told to remove her clothes by accused and to join him in bed. The accused then placed himself
between the two (2) children and accused started fingering Rosario.

At this time, Ramirez was already sleepy, but Rosario touched him to call his attention. He looked, and he saw accused placing his penis against the vagina of Rosario
and that he was trying to penetrate the vagina but it would not fit. After what he saw, Ramirez did not anymore bother to look because he was sleepy and fell asleep.

The following morning, the accused, whom the juveniles described as an "American, paid Ramirez alias "Egan" P200.00 and Rosario P300.00. He then left them in the
hotel. After the American left, they went downstairs, and Rosario told Egan that the American inserted something in her vagina. But they could not do anything
anymore, because the American had already left, and neither did they report the matter to the police. Sometime the following day, Jessie saw Rosario and he asked her
whether the object was already removed from her body and Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie Ramirez claimed that on the evening of that same date, he saw Rosario
and she was complaining of pain in her vagina and when Egan asked her, she said that the foreign object was not yet removed. Then there was another occasion wherein
Jessie was summoned and when he came he saw Rosario writhing in pain and when he tried to talk to Rosario she scolded him with defamatory remarks. Thereafter, he
did not see Rosario anymore because he already went home to his aunt's house who resided at Barrio Barretto and resumed his studies in the primary grades.

On May 14, 1987, Gaspar Alcantara, a defense witness, while garbage scavenging at Lot 21, near the gate of the U.S. Naval Base saw Rosario at Magsaysay Drive near
the Happy Bake Shop near Lot 21, being ogled by people because Rosario's skirt was bloodied and she was unconscious and foul smelling. Since nobody helped
Rosario, he took pity on her condition and brought her to the Olongapo City General Hospital in an unconscious condition, via jeepney. He went to the Information desk
and he was the one who gave the personal circumstances of Rosario as to her name, age, her residence as Nagbakulaw, Lower Kalaklan, and Gaspar Alcantara signed as
"guardian" of Rosario, while Rosario was already in the emergency room. Although Gaspar Alcantara denied that he did not know the name of Rosario Baluyot when
he brought her to the hospital, this is belied by the testimony of the Information clerk Lorna Limos, who was then on duty. Limos testified that it was Alcantara who
supplied the personal circumstances of Rosario. The Court gives more credence to the testimony of Miss Limos as against Gaspar Alcantara who became a defense
witness, for the reason that through his own testimony, Gaspar Alcantara claimed that even prior to May 14, 1987, he had already known Rosario Baluyot for more than
one (1) year, because he has seen the said girl go to the house of his twin brother, Melchor Alcantara, who is his immediate neighbor. Rosario used to visit a girl by the
name of "Nora" who was then in the custody of his brother. His brother Melchor was also living with their mother, brother and sister-in-law and their two (2) children in
his house. Rosario as per Gaspar's testimony even stays for one week or a few days at his brother's house when she visits Nora. So the Court can safely assume that of
all the more than one (1) year that he had regularly seen Rosario at his brother's house, he must have already did come to know the name of Rosario Baluyot including
her age. In his testimony in Court he stated that he even asked Rosario for movie and softdrinks money which can safely be concluded that he knows her very well. It is
against normal behavior especially to a Filipino who have a characteristic of curiosity not to have found out the real name of the girl he claims to know only as
"Tomboy".

While Rosario Baluyot was confined at the Olongapo City General Hospital, nobody was attending to her since she is a street child, having stowed away from the
custody of her grandmother. Three (3) good samaritans who belong to religious and civic organizations, in the persons of Jessica Herrera, Fe Israel and Sr. Eva
Palencia, in one of their missions in the hospital chanced upon Rosario Baluyot who was all alone with no relatives attending to her and after finding out that she was
only 12 years old decided to help her. After a short interview with Rosario, regarding her name and age only because she clamped up about her residence and her
relatives, they decided to help her by providing her the medicine she needed during her confinement in readiness for an operation. It was Fe Israel who was able to get
the name and age of Rosario Baluyot from Rosario Baluyot herself when she saw her for the first time. For Fe Israel, the age of Rosario Baluyot was an important factor
because their program assisted only indigent patients from infants up to 13 years old.
Rosario's first ailment at the Olongapo City General Hospital was loose bowel movement and vomiting, which was first suspected as gastro-enteritis, but which came
out later as symptoms of peritonitis due to a massive infection in the abdominal cavity. Subsequently, on May 17, 1987, after she was examined by the physicians at the
hospital, it was found out that there was a foreign object lodged in her vaginal canal and she had vaginal discharge tinged with blood and foul smelling odor emanating
from her body. One of the doctors who attended to her was Dr. Barcinal, an OB-GYNE. Dr. Barcinal tried to extract the foreign object by means of a forceps, but
several attempts proved futile because said object was deeply embedded in the vaginal canal and was covered by tissues. Her abdomen was enlarged, tender and
distended, symptoms of peritonitis. The patient was feverish and incoherent when she was scheduled for operation on May 19, 1987, after the first attempt for an
operation on May 17 was aborted allegedly because the consent of Dr. Reino Rosete, the hospital director was not obtained. The surgeon who operated on her was Dr.
Rosete himself. He testified that Rosario had to be operated even in that condition in order to save her life. Her condition was guarded. This was corroborated by Dr.
Leo Cruz, the anesthesiologist during Rosario's operation. It was in the evening of May 19 at about 7:00 p.m. when Dr. Rosete opened her abdomen by making a 5 inch
incision on her stomach. He found out that the fallopian tubes were congested with pus and so with the peritonieum, and the pelvic cavity, and patches of pus in the
liver, although the gallbladder and kidney appeared to have septicemia, poisoning of the blood. The peritonitis and septicemia were traced to have been caused through
infection by the foreign object which has been lodged in the intra-vaginal canal of Rosario. The foreign object which was already agreed upon by both parties that it is a
portion of a sexual vibrator was extracted from the vagina of Rosario while under anesthesia. Said object was coated with tissues, pus and blood. Dr. Rosete gave it to
the assisting surgical nurse for safekeeping and gave instructions to release it to the authorized person. This object was shown by the nurse to Dr. Leo Cruz. Dr. Rosete
considered the operation successful and the patient was alive when he left her under Dr. Cruz. Dr. Cruz stayed with said patient in the ward for about 30 minutes and
thereafter he left. The following day, Rosario got serious and it was Dr. Leo Cruz who pronounced her death at 2:00 to 2:15 in the afternoon of May 20, 1987.

Thereafter, a death certificate was prepared under the direction of Dr. Cruz which was indicated therein that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest, secondary
to septicemia caused by the foreign object lodged in the intra uteral vaginal canal of Rosario Baluyot.

The foreign object was washed by nurse Obedina, then placed it in a transparent small jar and labelled "Rosario Baluyot". Jessica Herrera asked the nurse for the foreign
object, and it was given to her under proper receipt. Herrera then showed the same to the persons who helped financially Rosario's case, and afterwards she gave it to
Sister Eva Palencia. Sis. Palencia was in custody of the said object until Mr. Salonga came and asked her for the object.

After Rosario Baluyot died, Sis. Palencia and a companion went to Gaspar Alcantara to ask him in locating the relatives of Rosario. They were able to trace Rosario's
grandmother, Mrs. Maria Burgos Turla, and informed her that her granddaughter was already dead and lying in state at St. Martin Funeral Parlor. Mrs. Turla went there
with her son, who shouldered all the burial expenses for Rosario.

Subsequently, Sis. Palencia, Fr. Cullens and Mr. Salonga came to her residence at Sta. Rita and asked her if she was interested in filing a case against the person who
caused the death of her granddaughter. Of course she agreed. Hence, she was brought to the Fiscal's (City) Office to file the same.

After the case was filed against the herein accused, Atty. Edmundo Legaspi with his messenger came to her house and told her that the accused was willing to settle the
case, but that accused Ritter had only P15,000.00. The old woman did not accept it because she knows that the accused is liable to pay damages anyway. After that, she
received a letter from Atty. Legaspi telling her to get a lawyer for her case. By this time, Mrs. Turla, who wanted to have the case settled once and for all giving the
reason that she can no longer bear the situation, sent her nephew, Conrado Marcelo to Atty. Legaspi. Her nephew obliged and told her that she will be paid at the office
of Atty. Legaspi. On a date not clear in the records, she went with her nephew Conrado Marcelo, and Roberto Sundiam, an assistant barangay tanod of Sta. Rita, and
while they were there, she saw Ritter arrive at the law office. Ritter and Atty. Legaspi talked at the office near the bathroom, and thereafter Ritter left. After he left,
Atty. Legaspi told Rosario's grandmother that they are willing to settle for P20,000.00, but that Ritter left only P15,000.00, so she received the money with the
understanding that there was a balance of P5,000.00 yet. She was made to sign a statement, and she was asked to change the age of her granddaughter Rosario. With the
document prepared, she and the lawyer's messenger went to the Fiscal's office to have it subscribed, and was subscribed before an assistant city fiscal. But the balance
of P5,000.00 was not paid, because later on Atty. Legaspi became the OIC of Olongapo City and he could no longer attend to it. Atty. Legaspi, during one of the
hearings before the Court even apologized to her.

As to the case, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria, as criminal investigator of Station "A", was directed by Col. Daos, Station Commander of the Olongapo Police Department to
make a follow up of the case of Rosario Baluyot. On the other hand, since the suspect who inserted the foreign object inside Rosario's vagina was said to be an
American, the NISRA Subic Naval Base also conducted its investigation headed by criminal investigator Agent Conrado Salonga. Coordinating with the local police
and with Sister Eva Palencia, since Rosario was a street child at Magsaysay Drive, they rounded up about 43 street children and from some of them they learned that
Rosario Baluyot was with Jessie Ramirez with an American at the MGM Hotel when the foreign object was inserted in her vagina. After finding Jessie Ramirez, they
asked him about Rosario Baluyot. They found out that indeed he was with Rosario Baluyot sometime before Christmas of 1986 with an American, who brought them to
the said hotel. Jessie Ramirez was taken inside the U.S. Naval Base, Olongapo City and took his statement. Then he was brought to Mr. Edward Lee Bungarner, a
cartographer, and out of the description supplied by Ramirez, a composite drawing was photocopied and copies thereof were distributed to the local police and to the
sentries at the gate of the U.S. Naval Base. Some American servicemen who had resemblance to the composite drawing were photographed and these were shown to
Jessie Ramirez, but the result was negative. Aside from the physical description by Ramirez about the appearance of the suspect, he also described him as having the
mannerisms of a homo-sexual.

After obtaining information that foreign homo-sexuals frequented Ermita, Manila, and thinking that the so-called American may be European or Australian national, the
team composed of Agent Salonga, Mr. Heinsell, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria and P/Cpl. Andres Montaon, Jessie Ramirez and Michael Johnson, another juvenile, proceeded
to Manila. They first went to the Manila NISRA Office, and thereafter checked in a hotel. That was on September 23, 1987. On the first night, they went to Luneta Park
where foreign homo-sexuals were said to be frequenting, but the result was negative. Then on September 25, at about 11:00 p.m., while they were standing at the corner
of A. Mabini and M.H. del Pilar Street, a male caucasian who looked like a homo-sexual stopped by admiringly infront of the two (2) juveniles, Ramirez and Johnson.
Jessie Ramirez then reported to Mr. Salonga that this foreigner had a similarity with the American suspect, so the two minors were instructed to follow the foreigner and
to strike a conversation. They did, and when they returned, Jessie Ramirez told them that indeed the said foreigner was the one who brought him and Rosario Baluyot to
the MGM Hotel. Bobby Salonga told Ramirez that this foreigner had no beard while the one previously described by Ramirez had a beard. Jessie Ramirez told them
that maybe he have just shaved it off. The said caucasian then entered a bar, and after several minutes he came out, and Jessie Ramirez upon his signal with his thumbs
up, as a signal to confirm that the said foreigner is the suspect, arrested Ritter and brought him to the Manila Western Police District. It could be mentioned at this stage
that in this operation they were accompanied by two (2) policemen from the Western Police District. The foreigner was hand cuffed and was told that he was a suspect
for Rape with Homicide. After the arrest, they first went to the pension house of the suspect in Ermita, Manila to get his shoulder bag which contained his personal
belongings, and from there they brought him to the Western Police Department. At the said police headquarters, they were allowed a permissive search by the foreigner
of his clutch bag and his small shoulder bag and confiscated his passport, I.D., 3 inhalers, money in the form of dollars and travellers checks amounting about $1,500.00
and about P100.00, all duly receipted for. From the passport they learned that the suspect's name was Heinrich Stefan Ritter, an Austrian national. During the
questioning of Hitter, Salonga and his team already left the headquarters and went to their hotel, because at this time Jessie Ramirez was already shaking with fear after
he identified the accused.

The following day, they brought the accused to Olongapo and was detained at the Olongapo City Jail. The case for Rape with Homicide was filed against him at the
City Fiscal of Olongapo. At the preliminary investigation, accused was assisted by his own counsel. The private complainant was Maria Burgos Turla because it was
she who had custody of Rosario Baluyot after her mother Anita Burgos died on January 12, 1982, and their father Policarpio Baluyot had left them under her custody.
When this case was filed, the father's whereabouts was unknown, and he only appeared when the trial of this case before the Court was already in progress. And upon
his (Policarpio Baluyot) own admission, he only learned about the death of his daughter Rosario Baluyot from the newspaper, long after Rosario was already gone.
The defense tried to dislodge the case by claiming that there could be no crime of Rape with Homicide because the suspect was described as an American while Ritter is
an Austrian. Also advanced by the defense is that, it is a case of mistaken identity. That Rosario Baluyot was at the time of the commission of the offense, already more
than 13 years old, she having been born on December 26, 1973 as per baptismal certificate, wherein it appears that Rosario Baluyot was baptized on December 25, 1974
and was born on December 26, 1973 as testified to by Fr. Roque Villanueva of St. James Parish Church who issued the Baptismal Certificate, having custody and
possession of the book of baptism for the year 1975, but admitted that he had no personal knowledge about the matters or entries entered therein. Likewise, the defense's
stand is that the accused cannot be liable for Homicide because a vibrator is not a weapon of death but it is a thing for the purpose of giving sexual pleasure, and that the
death of Rosario Baluyot was due to the incompetence of Dr. Rosete, the surgeon and Director of the Olongapo City General Hospital, who operated on her. (Rollo, pp.
109-116)

On March 29, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court holds, that the prosecution has established the GUILT of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime of Rape with Homicide as defined and penalized in Art. 335 No. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER to a
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00) Philippine Currency, and TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000.00) by way of attorney's fees to the private prosecutors and to pay the costs. (Rollo, p. 126)

The accused now comes to this Court on the following assigned errors allegedly committed by the court:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED ON
OCTOBER 10, 1986 AND THAT IT WAS ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHO COMMITTED IT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT ROSARIO BALUYOT WAS LESS THAN TWELVE (12)
YEARS OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED AND IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE WITH HOMICIDE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING CREDENCE TO AND NOT REJECTING THE PROSECUTION'S
EVIDENCE AND IN NOT UPHOLDING THAT OF THE DEFENSE AND ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED.

Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgment of conviction only if the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, it
behooves us to exert the most painstaking effort to examine the records in the light of the arguments of both parties if only to satisfy judicial conscience that the
appellant indeed committed the criminal act (See People v. Villapaña, 161 SCRA 73 [1988]).

The appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape with homicide of a young girl who died after the rape because of a foreign object, believed to be a
sexual vibrator, left inside her vagina.

As stated by the trial court one crucial issue in this case is the age of the victim—whether or not Rosario Baluyot was less than twelve (12) years old at the time the
alleged incident happened on October 10, 1986. The age is important in determining whether or not there was statutory rape, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
defines the third type of rape as having carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age, in which case force, intimidation, deprivation of reason or unconscious
state do not have to be present.

The trial court found that Rosario was below 12 years old when she was sexually abused by the accused and, therefore, rape was committed inspite of the absence of
force or intimidation.

In resolving the issue, the trial court put great weight on the testimonies of the victim's grandmother and father who testified that she was born on December 22, 1975.
These oral declarations were admitted pursuant to then Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of Court where, in the absence of a birth certificate, the act or declaration
about pedigree may be received in evidence on any notable fact in the life of a member of the family. Since birth is a matter of pedigree within the rule which permits
the admission of hearsay evidence, oral declarations are therefore admissible as proof of birth (Decision, p. 54).

The grandmother, Maria Burgos Turla, testified that she remembered Rosario's birth date because her brother died in Pampanga and her daughter, Anita (Rosario's
mother) was the only one who failed to attend the funeral because the latter has just given birth allegedly to Rosario (T.S.N. p. 8, Jan. 13, 1988).

The father likewise testified that as far as he could remember, Rosario was born on December 22, 1975 (T.S.N., p. 4, Jan. 27, 1988) and he was certain that Rosario was
more than one (1) year old when she was baptized (T.S.N., p. 45, Jan. 27, 1988).

The trial court further added that their testimony is supported by the clinical record and the death certificate indicating that she was 12 years old when she was admitted
at the Olongapo City General Hospital for treatment. The age was supplied by Rosario's alleged guardian, Gaspar Alcantara to the hospital's clinical record clerk, Lorna
Limos. Fe Israel, a social worker who interviewed Rosario Baluyot also testified that she was told by Rosario that she was 12 years old. The trial court accepted this as
adequate evidence of the truth. Moreover, Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness in this case declared that he was born on September 5, 1973 and that he was older than
Rosario Baluyot. Therefore, since he was 13 years old in 1986, Rosario must have been less than 12 yeas old in 1986. (Decision, p. 55)

The trial court concluded that the oral declarations of the grandmother and father supported by other independent evidence such as the clinical record, death certificate
and the testimonies of Fe Israel and Jessie Ramirez, rendered the baptismal certificate presented by the defense without any probative or evidentiary value. (Decision, p.
55)

The findings of the trial court with respect to Rosario Baluyot's age cannot stand the application of evidentiary rules.

The trial court relied on Section 33, Rule 130 (now Section 40 of Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules of Court).

For oral evidence to be admissible under this Rule, the requisites are:

(1) That the declarant must be dead or outside of the Philippines or unable to testify;
(2) That pedigree is in issue;

(3) That the person whose pedigree is in question must be related to the declarant by birth or marriage;

(4) That the declaration must be made before the controversy occurred or ante litem motam; and

(5) That the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must as a general rule be shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.

These requirements were not satisfied by the evidence for the prosecution nor do the declarations fall within the purview of the rule.

The victim's grandmother and father whose declarations regarding Rosario's age were admitted by the trial court are both alive, in the Philippines and able to testify as
they both did testify in court. Their declarations were made at the trial which is certainly not before the controversy arose. The other witnesses who testified on
Rosario's age are not members of the victim's family. The testimonies of Rosario's relatives must be weighed according to their own personal knowledge of what
happened and not as hearsay evidence on matters of family history.

At this point, we find the evidence regarding Rosario's age of doubtful value.

The trial court justified the admissibility of the grandmother's testimony pursuant to the ruling laid down in U.S. v. Bergantino, (3 Phil., 118 [1903]) where the Court
accepted the testimony of the mother that her daughter was 14 years old and 4 months old. The mother stated that she knew the age because the child was born about the
time of the cholera epidemic of 1889. This was not hearsay, but came from one who had direct knowledge of the child's birth.

It is however, equally true that human memory on dates or days is frail and unless the day is an extraordinary or unusual one for the witness, there is no reasonable
assurance of its correctness. (People v. Dasig 93 Phil. 618, 632 [1953])

With respect to the grandmother's testimony, the date of the brother's death or funeral was never established, which indicates that the day was rather insignificant to be
remembered. The father's declaration is likewise not entirely reliable. His testimony in court does not at all show that he had direct knowledge of his daughter's birth.
He was certain though that she was more than one (1) year old at the time she was baptized.

The other witnesses are not at all competent to testify on the victim's age, nor was there any basis shown to establish their competence for the purpose. The clinical
records were based on Gaspar Alcantara's incompetent information given when he brought the victim to the hospital. Alcantara came to know her only about a year
before her death. He had absolutely no knowledge about the circumstances of Rosario's birth. The death certificate relied upon by the trial court was merely based on
the clinical records. It is even less reliable as a record of birth.

All the evidence presented by the prosecution showing that Rosario Baluyot was less than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident are not adequate to establish
the exact date of birth, much less offset a documentary record showing a different date.

The defense presented Rosario Baluyot's baptismal certificate which the trial court rejected as being hearsay and of no value. As against the oral declarations made by
interested witnesses establishing Rosario's age to be less than 12 years old, the evidence on record is more convincing and worthy of belief. (See Filinvest Land, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 664, 673 [1990]).

By virtue of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum, issued by the lower court to the St. James Parish Church, Subic, Zambales, Fr. Roque Villanueva a Roman
Catholic priest testified and stated that he is the head of said parish. He brought with him Baptismal Register No. 9 entitled "Liber Baptisnorum", a latin term for
baptismal book or record. On page 151, No. 3 of the said Registry Book, there appears the name of Rosario Baluyot who was baptized on December 25, 1974, and born
on December 26, 1973. Parents are Policarpio Baluyot and Anita Burgos, residents of Subic, Zambales. Edita R. Milan appears as the only sponsor with Olongapo City
as her address.

In the case of Macadangdang v. Court of appeals (100 SCRA 73 [1980]), we held that:

xxx xxx xxx

In our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the value of baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage
certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified—but not the
veracity of the status or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship (Paa v. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case of Fortus v.
Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court held that a baptismal certificate is conclusive proof only of the baptism administered, in conformity with the rites
of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate that concern
the relationship of the person baptized. Such declarations and statements, in order that their truth may be admitted, must indispensably be shown by proof recognized by
law. (At pp. 84-85)

In the same light, the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in the course of business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an
exception to the hearsay rule. The baptisms administered by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and recorded in a book of the
church during the course of its business. (U.S. v. de Vera, 28 Phil. 105 [1914] Hence, the certificate (Exhibit "22") presented by the defense that Rosario Baluyot was
baptized on December 25, 1974 may be admitted in evidence as proof of baptism. Policarpio Baluyot, the victim's father testified that he had in his possession a
baptismal certificate different from the one presented in court. However, no other baptismal record was ever presented to prove a date different from that brought by the
official custodian. Since the baptismal certificate states that Rosario was baptized on December 25, 1974, it is therefore highly improbable that Rosario could have been
born on December 22, 1975. She could not have been baptized before she was born. Exhibit "22" may be proof only of baptism but it puts a lie to the declaration that
Rosario was born in 1975. With the father's assertion that Rosario was more than one (1) year old when she was baptized, we are then more inclined to agree that
Rosario was born in 1973 as stated in the Baptismal Registry.

In the case of People v. Rebancos (172 SCRA 425 [1989]), the Court stated:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Although no birth certificate was presented because her birth had allegedly not been registered, her baptismal certificate, coupled by her mother's testimony, was
sufficient to establish that Mary Rose was below twelve years old when she was violated by Rebancos. (At. p. 426)

Unfortunately, in the instant case, nobody could corroborate the date on a more reliable document as to Rosario's birth which could serve as sufficient proof that she
was born on December 26, 1973. Therefore, she was more than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident on October 10, 1986.
Moreover, it is not incumbent upon the defense to prove Rosario's age. The burden of proof lies on the prosecution to prove that Rosario was less than 12 years old at
the time of the alleged incident in a charge of statutory rape. The prosecution failed in this respect.

Since Rosario was not established to have been under 12 years of age at the time of the alleged sexual violation, it was necessary to prove that the usual elements of
rape were present; i.e. that there was force of intimidation or that she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious in accordance with Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code.

We agree with the defense that there was no proof of such facts. On the contrary, the evidence shows that Rosario submitted herself to the sexual advances of the
appellant. In fact, she appears to have consented to the act as she was paid P300.00 the next morning while her companion, Jessie Ramirez was paid P200.00 (T.S.N. p.
50, January 6, 1988). The environmental circumstances coupled with the testimonies and evidence presented in court clearly give the impression that Rosario Baluyot, a
poor street child, was a prostitute inspite of her tender age. Circumstances in life may have forced her to submit to sex at such a young age but the circumstances do not
come under the purview of force or intimidation needed to convict for rape.

In view of these clear facts which the prosecution failed to refute, no rape was committed. But was Ritter guilty of homicide?

The trial court justified its ruling by saying that the death of the victim was a consequence of the insertion of the foreign object into the victim's vagina by the appellant.

We now ask "Was the appellant responsible for the sexual vibrator left inside Rosario's vagina which led to her death?

The trial court convicted the accused based on circumstantial evidence. Unfortunately, the circumstances are capable of varying interpretations and are not enough to
justify conviction.

Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness did not actually see the object inserted in Rosario's vagina. Neither could he identify the object (Exhibit "C-2") taken from Rosario
as the same object which the appellant was holding at that time of the alleged incident.

In his sworn statement given to the police investigator on September 4, 1987, he answered that:

xxx xxx xxx

T Habang kayo ay nasa loob ng kuwarto ng otel, mayroon ka bang napansin na inilabas ng kano sa kanyang daladalahan kung mayroon man?

S Ang Amerikano ay may dala-dalang shoulder bag na kulay itim, at napansin ko na may inilabas siya sa kanyang bag na parang vicks inhaler, na kanyang
inamoy-amoy habang nasa otel kami at pagkatapos niya ay inilapag niya sa lamiseta.

T Ilarawan mo nga sa akin ang bagay na nakita mong inilabas ng Amerikano?

S Ito ay may habang tatlong pulgada at ang takip nito ay may habang dalawang pulgada. Iyong takip ay bilog na patulis at may tabang mga kalahating pulgada.
Hindi ko napansin ang hugis ng dulo ng bagay na may takip dahil natatakpan ng kamay at ilong ng Amerikano.

T Ipinakikita ko sa iyo ang isang larawan. Tignan mong mabuti ang larawang ito at sabihin mo nga sa akin kung makikilala mo ang mga bagay na nasa
larawang ito, na may kinalaman sa nakita mong kinuha ng Amerikano sa kanyang bag?

S Napansin ko na ang kulay asul na bagay sa larawan ay katulad na katulad noong takip ng bagay na inilabas ng Amerikano sa kanyang bag. Kaya lang ay
bakit naging kulay asul gayong ng makita ko ito ay kulay puti? (Exhibit "A", p. 2; Emphasis Supplied)

Presumably, what Jessie Ramirez saw was merely the Vicks inhaler which the appellant does not deny having possessed at that time. He was certain that the object was
white. (T.S.N. p. 91, January 6, 1988)

Later, Ramirez retracted and corrected himself. He said that it was grayish in color with color blue (Medyo kulay abo na may kulay na parang blue). (T.S.N. p. 92,
January 6, 1988) The inconsistency of the witness' testimony casts doubt as to the veracity of the statements made especially when he answered on additional cross-
examination that the reason why he concluded that Exhibit "C-2" was the same object being held by Ritter was because it was the only one shown to him by the
prosecution (T.S.N. pp. 109-110, January 6, 1988). Jessie Ramirez was not all certain about the sexual vibrator because he did not actually see it in the possession of the
appellant.

What he merely remembers is the revelation made by Rosario the next morning that the foreigner inserted something inside her vagina. The trial court admitted such
statement as part of the res gestae. In a strained effort to accept such statement as part of res gestae, the trial court focused the test of admissibility on the lapse of time
between the event and the utterance. For the average 13 years old, the insertion of a mechanical device or anything for that matter into the vagina of a young girl is
undoubtedly startling. For Rosario and Jessie, however, there must be more evidence to show that the statement, given after a night's sleep had intervened, was given
instinctively because the event was so startling Res gestae does not apply. (Section 42, Rule 130, Rules of Court)

Even if it were established that the appellant did insert something inside Rosario's vagina, the evidence is still not adequate to impute the death of Rosario to the
appellant's alleged act.

Jessie Ramirez testified that Rosario was able to remove the object inserted in her vagina. We quote:

Q Now, you also stated on direct examination that later on Rosario even categorically admitted to you that she was already able to remove the object allegedly
inserted inside her vagina, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. CARAAN:

Q Will you kindly tell to this Honorable Court the exact words used by Rosario Baluyot later on when you met her when you asked her and when she told you
that she was already able to remove that object from her vagina?
A "Oy, Jessie, natanggal na, "she told me that. I asked her, "Was it already removed?" And she answered, "Yes, it was removed." But the same night, she again
complained of pain of her stomach. She sent one of her friends to call for me. And as a matter of fact, Tomboy was uttering defamatory words against me as she was
groaning in pain. (TSN, Jan. 6,1988, pp. 72-73)

This encounter happened on the night of the day following the day after both children were invited by the foreigner to the hotel. (T.S.N. p. 73, January 6, 1988). Rosario
was said to be groaning in pain so we can just imagine the distress she was undergoing at this point in time. If the device inserted by the appellant caused the pain, it is
highly inconceivable how she was able to endure the pain and discomfort until May, 1987, seven (7) months after the alleged incident. Evidence must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. (People vs. Patog, 144 SCRA 429 [1986]).

At this juncture, we find Dr. Pedro Solis' testimony rather significant. Dr. Pedro Solis, a witness for the defense is considered an expert witness. (A Doctor of Medicine
and a graduate of the State University in 1940, a degree of Bachelor of Laws and member of the Bar 1949, and a graduate of the Institute of Criminology University. He
was awarded Post Graduate Diploma in Criminology in 1963, and also a graduate of United Nations Asia and Far East Asia Institute on the Prevention of Crimes in
Tokyo Japan 1965. He was appointed Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation in 1940 until 1944. He became Chief Medico Legal Officer in 1970
and became the Deputy Director of the NBI up to 1984. He is at present a Professorial Lecturer on Legal Medicine at the UP, FEU, UE, and Fatima College of
Medicine; a Medico Legal Consultant of the PGH Medical Center, Makati Medical Center, UERM Medical Center, MCU Medical Center. He has been with the NBI
for 43 years. He has attended no less than 13 conferences abroad. He is the author of the textbooks entitled "Legal Medicine" and "Medical Jurisprudence".) With his
impressive legal and medical background, his testimony is too authoritative to ignore. We quote the pertinent portions of his testimony:

Q Now Dr. Solis, would you kindly go over this object marked as Exh. "C-2" which object was described as a part of a sexual vibrator battery operated. Now,
given this kind of object, would you kindly tell us what would be the probable effect upon a 12 years old girl when it is inserted into her vagina?

A Well, this vibrator must be considered a foreign body placed into a human being and as such be considered a foreign object. As a foreign object, the
tendency of the body may be: No. 1—expel the foreign body—No. 2.—The tendency of the body is to react to that foreign body. One of the reactions that maybe
manifested by the person wherein such foreign body is concerned is to cover the foreign body with human tissue, in a way to avoid its further injury to the body.

Now, the second reaction is irritation thereby producing certain manifest symptoms and changes in the area where the foreign body is located.

In severe cases, the symptoms manifestation might not only be localized but may be felt all over the body, we call it systemic reaction. Now, considering the fact that
this foreign body as shown to me is already not complete, this shows exposure of its different parts for the body to react. If there is mechanism to cause the foreign body
to vibrate, there must be some sort of power from within and that power must be a dry cell battery. [The] composition of the battery are, manganese dioxide ammonium,
salts, water and any substance that will cause current flow. All of these substances are irritants including areas of the container and as such, the primary reaction of the
body is to cause irritation on the tissues, thereby inflammatory changes develop and in all likelihood, aside from those inflammatory changes would be a supervening
infection in a way that the whole generative organ of the woman will suffer from diseased process causing her the systemic reaction like fever, swelling of the area, and
other systemic symptoms. . . . . (TSN., pp. 13-15, October 19,1988)

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, given this object, how long would it take, Doctor before any reaction such as an infection would set in, how many days after the insertion of this object
in the vagina of a 12 year old girl?

A In the example given to me, considering that one of the ends is exposed, in a way that vaginal secretion has more chance to get in, well, liberation of this
irritant chemicals would be enhanced and therefore in a shorter period of time, there being this vaginal reaction.

Q How many days or weeks would you say would that follow after the insertion?

A As I said, with my experience at the NBI, insertion of any foreign body in the vaginal canal usually developed within, a period of two (2) weeks . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Q . . . [T]he subject in this case was allegedly raped, and a sexual vibrator was inserted in her vagina on October 10, 1986 and she was operated on, on May 19,
1987 the following year, so it took more than 7 months before this was extracted, would you say that it will take that long before any adverse infection could set in
inside the vagina?

A Infection and inflamatory changes will develop in a shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19,1988, p. 18)

xxx xxx xxx

Q When you said shorter, how long would that be, Doctor?

A As I said, in my personal experience, hair pins, cottonballs and even this lipstick of women usually, there are only about two (2) weeks time that the patient
suffer some abnormal symptoms.

Q Now, considering that this is a bigger object to the object that you mentioned, this object has a shorter time?

A Yes, Sir shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19. 1988, p. 20)

The trial court, however, ruled that "there is no hard and fast rule as to the time frame wherein infection sets in upon insertion of a foreign body in the vagina canal. For
Dr. Solis, the time frame is not more than 10 months, and this case is still within the said time frame."

A more generous time interval may be allowed in non-criminal cases. But where an accused is facing a penalty of reclusion perpetua, the evidence against him cannot
be based on probabilities which are less likely than those probabilities which favor him.

It should be clarified that the time frame depends upon the kind of foreign body lodged inside the body. An examination of the object gave the following results:

(1) Color: Blue

Size: (a) Circumference—3.031
inches (b) Length—approximately
2.179 inches.
Composition: Showed the general
characteristics of a styrene-butadiene plastic.

(2) The specimen can be electrically operated by means of a battery as per certification dated 01 June 1988, signed by Mr. Rodolfo D. Mercuric, Shipboard
Electrical Systems Mechanics, Foreman II, SRF Shop 51, Subic (see attached certification).

(3) No comparative examination was made on specimen #1 and vibrator depicted in the catalog because no actual physical dimensions and/or mechanical
characteristics were shown in the catalog. (Exhibit "LL")

The vibrator end was further subjected to a macro-photographic examination on the open end portion which revealed the following:

Result of Examination

Macro-photographic examination on the open end portion of specimen #1 shows the following inscription:

MABUCHI MOTOR JAPAN RE 14 PAT (Exhibit "MM")

From the above results, the subject object is certainly not considered as inert and based on Dr. Solis' testimony, it is more likely that infection should set in much earlier.
Considering also that the object was inserted inside the vagina which is part of the generative organ of a woman, an organ which is lined with a very thin layer of
membrane with plenty of blood supply, this part of the body is more susceptible to infection. (T.S.N. p. 34, October 19, 1988)

The truth of Dr. Solis' testimony is more probable under the circumstances of the case. We see no reason why his opinions qualified by training and experience should
not be controlling and binding upon the Court in the determination of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Tolentino, 166 SCRA 469 [1988]).

Dr. Barcinal, another witness for the defense also testified that he examined Rosario Baluyot on May 17, 1986 as a referral patient from the Department of Surgery to
give an OB-GYN clearance to the patient prior to operation. (T.S.N. p. 6, September 28, 1988)

Q And how many times did you examine this patient Rosario Baluyot on that day?

A I examined her twice on that day.

Q The first time that you examined her, what is the result of your findings, if any?

A My first examination, I examined the patient inside the delivery room. The patient was brought to the delivery room wheel-chaired then from the wheel
chair, the patient was ambigatory (sic). She was able to walk from the door to the examining table. On examination, the patient is conscious, she was fairly nourished,
fairly developed, she had fever, she was uncooperative at that time and examination deals more on the abdomen which shows slightly distended abdomen with muscle
guarding with tenderness all over, with maximum tenderness over the hypogastric area. (T.S.N. p. 5, September 28, 1988)

xxx xxx xxx

Q What about your second examination to the patient, what was your findings, if any?

A In my second examination, I repeated the internal examination wherein I placed my index finger and middle finger inside the vagina of the patient and was
able to palpate a hard object. After which, I made a speculum examination wherein I was able to visualize the inner portion of the vaginal canal, there I saw purulent
foul smelling, blood tints, discharge in the vaginal canal and a foreign body invaded on the posterior part of the vaginal canal.

xxx xxx xxx

A I referred back to Dr. Fernandez about my findings and he asked me to try to remove the said foreign object by the use of forceps which I tried to do so also
but I failed to extract the same.

Q All this time that you were examining the patient Rosario Baluyot both in the first and second instance, Rosario Baluyot was conscious and were you able to
talk to her when you were examining her?

A Yes, sir.

Q And did you ask her why there is a foreign object lodge inside her vagina?

A Yes, Sir I asked her.

Q And what did she tell you, if any?

A She said in her own words that "GINAMIT AKO NG NEGRO AT SIYA ANG NAGLAGAY NITO."

Q Did she also tell you when, this Negro who used her and who inserted and placed the foreign object on her vagina?

A Yes, Sir I asked her and she said he used me three (3) months ago from the time I examined her.

Q Now, you said that you referred the patient to the ward, what happened next with your patient?

A To my knowledge, the patient is already scheduled on operation on that date.

Q Meaning, May 17, 1987?

A Yes, Sir I was presuming that the patient would undergo surgery after that?

(TSN, Sept. 28,1988, pp. 8-9; Emphasis supplied)

The trial court debunked Dr. Barcinals testimony considering Rosario's condition at that time. It ruled that it is inconceivable that she would be striking a normal
conversation with the doctors and would be sitting on the examination table since Gaspar Alcantara stated that when he brought Rosario Baluyot to the hospital, she was
unconscious and writhing in pain.

It was not improbable for Rosario Baluyot to still be conscious and ambulant at that time because there were several instances testified to by different witnesses that she
was still able to talk prior to her operation:

(1) Fe Israel, a witness for the prosecution and a member of the Olongapo Catholic Charismatic Renewal Movement testified that as a member of this group she
visits indigent children in the hospital every Saturday and after office hours on working days.

On the Saturday prior to Rosario's death which was May 17, she was still able to talk to Rosario Baluyot. In fact, one of her groupmates helped Rosario go to the
comfort room to urinate. (T.S.N., pp. 16-19, May 25, 1988)

(2) Angelita Amulong, a witness for the defense is another para social worker who worked at Pope John 23rd Community Center under Sister Eva Palencia. In
one of her hospital visits, she encountered Rosario Baluyot in the month of May, 1987. She actually saw a child who happened to be Rosario Baluyot seated on the
cement floor and when she asked why she was seated there, she was told that it was too hot in the bed. She saw Rosario Baluyot for about 2 or 3 days successively.
(T.S.N. pp. 10-13, September 7, 1988)

(3) Gaspar Alcantara, the person who brought Rosario to the hospital actually testified that she was conscious (T.S.N. p. 36, September 14, 1988) but writhing in
pain. He took pity on her so he brought her to the hospital (T.S.N. p. 12, September 14, 1988)

From the above testimonies, it is clear that Rosario was still conscious and could still answer questions asked of her although she was complaining of stomach pains.
Unfortunately, the medical attention given to her failed to halt the aggravation of her condition. The operation on May 19 was too late.

Rosario died because of septicemia, which in layman's language is blood poisoning, and peritonitis, which is massive infection, in the abdominal cavity caused by the
foreign object or the cut sexual vibrator lodged in the vagina of the victim. This led to the infection from the uterus to the fallopian tubes and into the peritoneum and
the abdominal cavity.

The trial court convicted the accused citing the rationale of Article 4 of the RPC

He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.

But before the conviction is affirmed, we must first follow the rule as stated in the case of Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit:

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing
with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. (Emphasis supplied)

In People v. Tempongko, Jr., (144 SCRA 583, 592 [1986]), we explained that:

xxx xxx xxx

The basic principle in every criminal prosecution is that accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by the
prosecution. If the prosecution fails, it fails utterly, even if the defense is weak or, indeed, even if there is no defense at all. The defendant faces the full panoply of state
authority with all "The People of the Philippines" arrayed against him. In a manner of speaking, he goes to bat with all the bases loaded. The odds are heavily against
him. It is important, therefore, to equalize the positions of the prosecution and the defense by presuming the innocence of the accused until the state is able to refute the
presumption by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (At. p. 592)

The evidence for the accused maybe numerically less as against the number of witnesses and preponderance of evidence presented by the prosecution but there is no
direct and convincing proof that the accused was responsible for the vibrator left inside the victim's vagina which caused her death seven (7) months after its insertion.
What the prosecution managed to establish were mere circumstances which were not sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. While
circumstantial evidence may suffice to support a conviction it is imperative, though, that the following requisites should concur:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (Rule 133, Sec. 4 Revised Rules of Court)

For the well-entrenched rule in evidence is that "before conviction can be had upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken
chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime (People v. Subano, 73 Phil.
692 [1942]; Emphasis supplied). It must fairly exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence (Dorado v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 420, 433 [1987]). In this case
the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution does not conclusively point to the liability of the appellant for the crime charged. (People v. Tolentino, supra)

We are aware of the wide publicity given to the plight of Rosario Baluyot and how her death exemplified starkly the daily terrors that most street children encounter as
they sell their bodies in order to survive. At an age when innocence and youthful joys should preponderate in their lives, they experience life in its most heartless and
inhuman form. Instead of nothing more than gentle disappointments occupying their young minds, they daily cope with tragedies that even adults should never be made
to carry.

It is with distressing reluctance that we have to seemingly set back the efforts of Government to dramatize the death of Rosario Baluyot as a means of galvanizing the
nation to care for its street children. It would have meant a lot to social workers and prosecutors alike if one pedophile-killer could be brought to justice so that his
example would arouse public concern, sufficient for the formulation and implementation of meaningful remedies. However, we cannot convict on anything less than
proof beyond reasonable doubt. The protections of the Bill of Rights and our criminal justice system are as much, if not more so, for the perverts and outcasts of society
as they are for normal, decent, and law-abiding people.

The requirement of proof which produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty or conviction that the accused did commit the offense has not been satisfied.

By way of emphasis, we reiterate some of the factors arousing reasonable doubt:

1. The evidence on Rosario Baluyot's baptism creates reasonable doubt about her being less than 12 years old when the carnal knowledge took place. If the
evidence for the prosecution is to be believed, she was not yet born on the date she was baptized.

2. Since the proof of Rosario's being under 12 years of age is not satisfactory, the prosecution has to prove force, intimidation, or deprivation of reason in order
to convict for rape. There is no such proof. In fact, the evidence shows a willingness to submit to the sexual act for monetary considerations.

3. The only witness to the fact of Ritter's placing a vibrator inside the vagina of Rosario was Jessie Ramirez. This witness did not see Ritter insert the vibrator.
The morning after the insertion, he was only told by Rosario about it. Two days later, he allegedly met Rosario who informed him that she was able to remove the
object. And yet, Ramirez testified that on the night of that second encounter, he saw Rosario groaning because of pain in her stomach. She was even hurling invectives.
Ramirez' testimony is not only hearsay, it is also contradictory.

4. It was improbable, according to expert medical testimony, for a foreign object with active properties to cause pain, discomfort, and serious infection only
after seven months inside a young girl's vaginal canal. Infection would have set in much earlier. Jessie Ramirez recalled that the incident happened in December of
1986. (TSN., January 6, 1988, pp. 15-17) The evidence, however shows that the appellant was not here in the Philippines that December. As per the Commission on
Immigration Arrival and Departure Report, Heinrich Ritter arrived in the Philippines on October 7, 1986 and left on October 12, 1986. He never returned until
September 23, 1987 (Exhibits "DD" and "EE") The incident could have happened only in October, but then it would have been highly improbable for the sexual
vibrator to stay inside the vagina for seven (7) months with the kind of serious complications it creates.

5. The gynecologist who attended to Rosario during her hospital confinement testified that she told him "Ginamit ako ng Negro at siya ang naglagay nito." The
accused is not a black.

Noteworthy is the fact that nothing was mentioned about Rosario's activities after the hotel incident. Considering Dr. Barcinal's testimony indicating that she was "used"
by a "Negro" three (3) months prior to admission in the hospital and Rosario's unfortunate profession, there is always the possibility that she could have allowed herself
to be violated by this perverse kind of sexual behavior where a vibrator or vibrators were inserted into her vagina between October, 1986 and May, 1987.

Moreover, the long delay of seven (7) months after the incident in reporting the alleged crime renders the evidence for the prosecution insufficient to establish
appellant's guilty connection with the requisite moral certainty. (See People v. Mula Cruz, 129 SCRA 156 [1984]).

The established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that the appellant could have inserted a foreign object inside Rosario's vagina. This object may have caused
her death. It is possible that the appellant could be the guilty person. However, the Court cannot base an affirmance of conviction upon mere possibilities. Suspicions
and possibilities are not evidence and therefore should not be taken against the accused. (People v. Tolentino, supra)

Well-established is the rule that every circumstance favorable to the accused should be duly taken into account. This rule applies even to hardened criminals or those
whose bizarre behaviour violates the mores of civilized society. The evidence against the accused must survive the test of reason. The strongest suspicion must not be
allowed to sway judgment. (See Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]). As stated in the case of People v. Ng (142 SCRA 615 [1986]):

. . . [F]rom the earliest years of this Court, it has emphasized the rule that reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the accused. The requirement
of proof beyond reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty of guilt. It has been defined as meaning such proof "to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the
presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to support. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability,
even though strong, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty—a
certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and the conscience of those who are to act upon it. (Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Edition, p. 379, citing
U.S. v. Reyes, 3 Phil. 3). . . .

In the instant case, since there are circumstances which prevent our being morally certain of the guilt of the appellant, he is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal.

This notwithstanding, the Court can not ignore the acts of the appellant on the children, Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in October, 1986 at the MGM Hotel.
Inspite of his flat denials, we are convinced that he comes to this country not to look at historical sights, enrich his intellect or indulge in legitimate pleasures but in
order to satisfy the urgings of a sick mind.

With the positive Identification and testimony by Jessie Ramirez that it was the appellant who picked him and Rosario from among the children and invited them to the
hotel; and that in the hotel he was shown pictures of young boys like him and the two masturbated each other, such actuations clearly show that the appellant is a
pedophile. When apprehended in Ermita, he was sizing up young children. Dr. Solis defined pedophilia in his book entitled Legal Medicine, 1987 edition, as follows:

Pedophilia—A form of sexual perversion wherein a person has the compulsive desire to have sexual intercourse with a child of either sex. Children of various ages
participate in sexual activities, like fellatio, cunnilingus, fondling with sex organs, or anal sexual intercourse. Usually committed by a homosexual between a man and a
boy the latter being a passive partner.

Ritter was prosecuted for rape with homicide and not pedophilia, assuming this is a crime by itself. Pedophilia is clearly a behavior offensive to public morals and
violative of the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well-being of our youth. (Article II, Section 13, 1987
Constitution) (Harvey v. Defensor Santiago, 162 SCRA 840, 848 [1989]). Pedophiles, especially thrill seeking aliens have no place in our country.

In this case, there is reasonable ground to believe that the appellant committed acts injurious not only to Rosario Baluyot but also to the public good and domestic
tranquility of the people. The state has expressly committed itself to defend the right of children to assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. (Art. XV, Section 3 [2] . . . (Harvey v. Santiago, supra). The appellant has abused Filipino
children, enticing them with money. The appellant should be expelled from the country.

Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Rule III, Section 1)
The well-settled doctrine is that a person while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. We reiterate what has been stated in Urbano v. IAC, supra.

. . . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action
for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).

The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has
given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The
reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.

This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between
criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects
the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for the reparation of damages suffered by the
aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise
upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for
the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the
complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?

For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible
source of injustice—a cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged.

Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her grandmother's house.1âwphi1 Circumstances forced her to succumb and enter this unfortunate profession.
Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs who have certainly suffered mental anguish, anxiety and moral shock by her sudden and incredulous death as reflected in the
records of the case. Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It
is only the constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of
unlawful conduct do not exist. As earlier stated, there is the likelihood that he did insert the vibrator whose end was left inside Rosario's vaginal canal and that the
vibrator may have caused her death. True, we cannot convict on probabilities or possibilities but civil liability does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
Court can order the payment of indemnity on the facts found in the records of this case.

The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public policy (see Article 21 Civil Code). As earlier mentioned, the appellant
has abused Filipino children, enticing them with money. We can not overstress the responsibility for proper behavior of all adults in the Philippines, including the
appellant towards young children. The sexual exploitation committed by the appellant should not and can not be condoned. Thus, considering the circumstances of the
case, we are awarding damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot in the amount of P30,000.00.

And finally, the Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which will adequately protect street children from exploitation by pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps, their own
parents or guardians who profit from the sale of young bodies. The provisions on statutory rape and other related offenses were never intended for the relatively recent
influx of pedophiles taking advantage of rampant poverty among the forgotten segments of our society. Newspaper and magazine articles, media exposes, college
dissertations, and other studies deal at length with this serious social problem but pedophiles like the appellant will continue to enter the Philippines and foreign
publications catering to them will continue to advertise the availability of Filipino street children unless the Government acts and acts soon. We have to acquit the
appellant because the Bill of Rights commands us to do so. We, however, express the Court's concern about the problem of street children and the evils committed
against them. Something must be done about it.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.
The appellant is ordered to pay the amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot. The Commissioner of Immigration
and Deportation is hereby directed to institute proper deportation proceedings against the appellant and to immediately expel him thereafter with prejudice to re-entry
into the country.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: DUTY TO RENDER JUDGMENT

G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987

CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.

Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.

Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious conjecture, whether we are a court of law or a court of justice. Do we apply the law even if it is unjust
or do we administer justice even against the law? Thus queried, we do not equivocate. The answer is that we do neither because we are a court both of law and of
justice. We apply the law with justice for that is our mission and purpose in the scheme of our Republic. This case is an illustration.

Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in 'the name of their deceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of
Deeds of Tarlac. 1

On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share of the herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale. 2 One year
later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in an instrument denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of P
440.00. 3

By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them.
The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of
the enclosed area.4

On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to redeem the area sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared
that he was an American citizen .5 On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption claimed by
her brother. 6

The trial court * also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963
and 1964. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. 7

In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be plausibly denied. The other co-heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived on the same lot, which consisted of
only 604 square meters, including the portions sold to the petitioners . 8 Eustaquia herself, who had sold her portion, was staying in the same house with her sister
Tecla, who later claimed redemption petition. 9 Moreover, the petitioners and the private respondents were close friends and neighbors whose children went to school
together. 10

It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of the sales and that they thought, as they alleged, that the area occupied by the petitioners had merely been
mortgaged by Celestino and Eustaquia. In the circumstances just narrated, it was impossible for Tecla not to know that the area occupied by the petitioners had been
purchased by them from the other. co-heirs. Especially significant was the erection thereon of the permanent semi-concrete structure by the petitioners' son, which was
done without objection on her part or of any of the other co-heirs.

The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct interpretation and application of the pertinent law as invoked, interestingly enough, by both the petitioners
and the private respondents. This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code, providing as follows:

Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser
by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.

In reversing the trial court, the respondent court ** declared that the notice required by the said article was written notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a
substitute. Citing the same case of De Conejero v. Court of Appeals 11 applied by the trial court, the respondent court held that that decision, interpreting a like rule in
Article 1623, stressed the need for written notice although no particular form was required.

Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of the Court, furnishing the co-heirs with a copy of the deed of sale of the property subject to redemption
would satisfy the requirement for written notice. "So long, therefore, as the latter (i.e., the redemptioner) is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof,"
he declared, "the thirty days for redemption start running. "

In the earlier decision of Butte v. UY, 12 " the Court, speaking through the same learned jurist, emphasized that the written notice should be given by the vendor and
not the vendees, conformably to a similar requirement under Article 1623, reading as follows:

Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the
vendors, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given
written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the adjoining owners.

As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice, and that notice must be deemed
exclusive," the Court held that notice given by the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the running of the 30-day period.

The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum that "hard cases make bad laws" as the petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that
there was really no written notice given by the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one conclusion, to wit, that in
view of such deficiency, the 30 day period for redemption had not begun to run, much less expired in 1977.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law,
the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the in tent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there
are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the
word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its
cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a
policy that goes beyond them." 13 While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the
legislature. While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we
defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the law maker's will.

The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is
within the letter but although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently, a
thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the
statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. 14

In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time
of the 30-day period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin,
to obviate any problem of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two.

The instant case presents no such problem because the right of redemption was invoked not days but years after the sales were made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint
was filed by Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years after the second sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners extends to more than a
decade, assuming of course that there was a valid notice that tolled the running of the period of redemption.

Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be written, would such notice be necessary in this case? Assuming there was a valid notice
although it was not in writing. would there be any question that the 30-day period for redemption had expired long before the complaint was filed in 1977?

In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and
1964. By requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the
letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers
and sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.

Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?

While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime between those years and 1976, when the
first complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period started running and ultimately
expired. This could have happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in
other words, when Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already been extinguished because the period for its exercise had already expired.

The following doctrine is also worth noting:

While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of an alleged right it is essential that he should have knowledge of the facts upon which he
bases his claim, yet if the circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon inquiry, but the
party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with laches, the same as if he had known the facts. 15

It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo, who were not among them, should enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build
thereon a house of strong materials. This definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet,
given this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It took all of thirteen years
before one of them chose to claim the right of redemption, but then it was already too late.

We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict letter of the law, which the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to
existing jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases. In fact, and this
should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general
rule, in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case.

The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began
and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of
redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." 16 That wish continues to motivate this Court
when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we
interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. So we have
done in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and that of the trial court is reinstated, without any pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered.
TOPIC: PRESUMPTION AND APPLICABILITY OF CUSTOM

G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910

S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant.

Lionel D. Hargis for appellant.

Sanz and Oppisso for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

The facts found by the trial court are undisputed by either party in this case. They are —

That on the 11th day of September, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of Manila, P.I., along
the left-hand side of the street as she was going, when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant used for the purpose of transportation of fodder by the defendant,
and to which was attached a pair of horses, came along the street in the opposite direction to that the in which said plaintiff was proceeding, and that thereupon the
driver of the said plaintiff's carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at great speed, crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand
side of the street and stopped, in order to give defendant's delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by, but that instead of passing by the defendant's wagon and horses ran
into the carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring
the carromata itself and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it.

xxx xxx xxx

These facts are not dispute, but the defendant presented evidence to the effect that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred,
was a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero; that the delivery wagon had sent to deliver some forage at Paco Livery Stable on Calle Herran, and
that for the purpose of delivery thereof the cochero driving the team as defendant's employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon
and then went back inside of the wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered; that while unloading the forage and in the act of carrying some of it out,
another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran
away, and the driver was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground and was unable to stop the horses; that the horses then ran up and on
which street they came into collision with the carromata in which the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding.

The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on the day in question.

Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of negligence and gave judgment against him for P442.50, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per
annum from the 17th day of October, 1908, and for the costs of the action. The case is before us on an appeal from that judgment.

There is no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands except that embodied in the Civil Code. The provisions of that code pertinent to this case are —

Art. 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.

Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should
be responsible.

The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with them.

Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live with them.

Owners of directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by the employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may
be employed or on account of their duties.

The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damages should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to
do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.

Finally, masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.

The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the
damage.

Passing the question whether or not an employer who has furnished a gentle and tractable team and a trusty and capable driver is, under the last paragraph of the above
provisions, liable for the negligence of such driver in handling the team, we are of the opinion that the judgment must be reversed upon the ground that the evidence
does not disclose that the cochero was negligent.

While the law relating to negligence in this jurisdiction may possibly be some what different from that in Anglo-Saxon countries, a question we do not now discuss, the
rules under which the fact of negligence is determined are, nevertheless, generally the same. That is to say, while the law designating the person responsible for a
negligent act may not be the same here as in many jurisdictions, the law determining what is a negligent act is the same here, generally speaking, as elsewhere.
(Supreme court of Spain, 4 December, 1903; 16 May, 1893; 27 June, 1894; 9 April, 1896; 14 March, 1901; 2 March, 1904; 7 February, 1905; 16 June, 1905; 23 June,
1905; 13 April, 1903; 7 March, 1902; 12 June, 1900; 2 March, 1907; 18 March, 1898; 3 June, 1901.)

It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and tractable; that the cochero was experienced and capable; that he had
driven one of the horses several years and the other five or six months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in which they
were left on the day of the accident; that they had never run away up to that time and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the horses
and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of
that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers.
In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this case, either under Spanish or
American jurisprudence. (Lynch vs. Nurdin, 1 Q. B., 422; Rumsey vs. Nelson, 58 Vt., 590; Drake vs. Mount, 33 N. J. L., 442; Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. vs.
Lally, 48 N. J. L., 604; Wasmer vs. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 80 N. Y., 212.) lawphi1.net

In the case of Hayman vs. Hewitt (Peake N. P. Cas., pt. 2, p. 170), Lord Kenyon said:

He was performing his duty while removing the goods into the house, and, if every person who suffered a cart to remain in the street while he took goods out of it was
obliged to employ another to look after the horses, it would be impossible for the business of the metropolis to go on.

In the case of Griggs vs. Fleckenstein (14 Minn., 81), the court said:

The degree of care required of the plaintiff, or those in charged of his horse, at the time of the injury, is that which would be exercised by a person of ordinary care and
prudence under like circumstances. It can not be said that the fact of leaving the horse unhitched is in itself negligence. Whether it is negligence to leave a horse
unhitched must be depend upon the disposition of the horse; whether he was under the observation and control of some person all the time, and many other
circumstances; and is a question to be determined by the jury from the facts of each case.

In the case of Belles vs. Kellner (67 N. J. L., 255), it was held that it was error on the part of the trial court to refuse to charge that "it is not negligence for the driver of a
quite, gentle horse to leave him unhitched and otherwise unattended on the side of a public highways while the driver is upon the sidewalk loading goods on the
wagon." The said court closed its opinion with these words:

There was evidence which could have fully justified the jury in finding that the horse was quite and gentle, and that the driver was upon the sidewalk loading goods on
the wagon, at time of the alleged injury, and that the horse had been used for years in that way without accident. The refusal of the trial court to charge as requested left
the jury free to find was verdict against the defendant, although the jury was convinced that these facts were proven.lawphil.net

In the case of Southworth vs. Ry. Co. (105 Mass., 342), it was held:

That evidence that a servant, whom traders employed to deliver goods, upon stopping with his horse and wagon to deliver a parcel at a house from fifty to a hundred
rods from a railroad crossing, left the horse unfastened for four or five minutes while he was in the house, knowing that it was not afraid of cars, and having used it for
three or four months without ever hitching it or knowing it to start, is not conclusive, as a matter of law, of a want of due care on his part.

The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the respect in question, is to exercise reasonable care and prudence. Where reasonable care is employed in
doing an act not itself illegal or inherently likely to produce damage to others, there will be no liability, although damage in fact ensues. (Milwaukee Ry. Co. vs. Arms,
91 U. S., 489; Parrott vs. Wells, 15 Wall., 524; Brown vs. Kendall, 6 Cushing, 292; Jackson Architectural Iron Works vs. Hurlbut, 158 N. Y., 34 Westerfield vs. Levis,
43 La. An., 63; Niosi vs. Empire Steam Laundry, 117 Cal., 257.)

The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable or imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive
or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, can not be held to be themselves
unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have been permitted by society is that they beneficial rather than prejudicial.itc-alf Accidents sometimes
happen and injuries result from the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their natural or customary results. To hold that, because such an act once resulted in
accident or injury, the actor is necessarily negligent, is to go far. The fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is sometimes successfully invoked in such a case, does not
in any sense militate against the reasoning presented. That maxim at most only creates a prima facie case, and that only in the absence of proof of the circumstances
under which the act complained of was performed. It is something invoked in favor of the plaintiff before defendant's case showing the conditions and circumstances
under which the injury occurred, the creative reason for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur disappears. This is demonstrated by the case of Inland and Seaboard Costing
Co. vs. Tolson (139 U.S., 551), where the court said (p. 554):

. . . The whole effect of the instruction in question, as applied to the case before the jury, was that if the steamboat, on a calm day and in smooth water, was thrown with
such force against a wharf properly built, as to tear up some of the planks of the flooring, this would be prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant's
agent in making the landing, unless upon the whole evidence in the case this prima facie evidence was rebutted. As such damage to a wharf is not ordinarily done by a
steamboat under control of her officers and carefully managed by them, evidence that such damage was done in this case was prima facie, and, if unexplained, sufficient
evidence of negligence on their part, and the jury might properly be so instructed.

There was presented in this case, and by the plaintiffs themselves, not only the fact of the runway and the accident resulting therefrom, but also the conditions under
which the runaway occurred. Those conditions showing of themselves that the defendant's cochero was not negligent in the management of the horse, the prima facie
case in plaintiffs' favor, if any, was destroyed as soon as made.

It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to deliver merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time
of the injury, in the manner in which that was then being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at the
time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has
acquiesced for years without objection. Ought the public now, through the courts, without prior objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of decades
and thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every reason and assurance to believe that he was acting under the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the
custom of a people? We think not.

The judgement is reversed, without special finding as to costs. So ordered.

TOPIC: LEGAL PERIODS

G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO in his official capacity as Revenue District Officer of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati),
Petitioners,
vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the August 1, 2003 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64782 and its February 9, 2004
resolution denying reconsideration.3

On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. In
Yap's letter to petitioner revenue district officer Arturo V. Parcero of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),4 he explained that
the increase in the cost of labor and materials and difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and collecting receivables caused the real estate industry to slowdown.5
As a consequence, while business was good during the first quarter of 1997, respondent suffered losses amounting to ₱71,879,228 that year.6

According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for income taxes.7 Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted
creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR in the total amount of ₱26,318,398.32.8 Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax refund or tax credit.9

On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent to submit additional documents to support its claim.10 Respondent complied but its claim
was not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review11 in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).

On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit.12 It
invoked Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC):

Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. -- No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal
revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any
sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit
or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.

In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening
cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without a claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the
return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (emphasis supplied)

The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date.13

The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:

Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days,
of twenty-four hours, and nights from sunset to sunrise.

If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last included. (emphasis supplied)

Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the
year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days14 after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period.15

Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied.16 Hence, it filed an appeal in the CA.17

On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA.18 It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a
leap year. According to the CA:

The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular year is a leap year.19

In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be
counted as 365 days each or a total of 730 days. A statute which is clear and explicit shall be neither interpreted nor construed.20

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.21 Thus, this appeal.

Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an exemption, should be strictly construed against claimants.22 Section 229 of the NIRC should be strictly
applied against respondent inasmuch as it has been consistently held that the prescriptive period (for the filing of tax refunds and tax credits) begins to run on the day
claimants file their final adjusted returns.23 Hence, the claim should have been filed on or before April 13, 2000 or within 730 days, reckoned from the time respondent
filed its final adjusted return.

The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for review in the CTA within the two-year prescriptive period provided in Section 229 of the NIRC is
correct. Its basis, however, is not.

The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted return.24 But how should the two-year prescriptive period be
computed?

As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing
Corporation v. Tecson,25 we ruled that a year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.26
However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:

Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it
shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis
supplied)

A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain."28 It is the "period of time running from the beginning of
a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient number of days in the next month,
then up to and including the last day of that month."29 To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008;
one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008.30

A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the law is revoked and abrogated by another) or impliedly (when the provisions of a more recent law
cannot be reasonably reconciled with the previous one).31 Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 states:

Sec. 27. Repealing clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the laws to be abolished.32 Thus, the provision above
only impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the Administrative Code of 1987.1avvphi1

Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must have been clearly and unmistakably intended by the legislature. The test is whether the subsequent
law encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former law and they cannot be logically or reasonably reconciled.33

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter — the computation of
legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year
is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.

There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason,
we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori
derogat priori.

Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the two-year prescriptive period (reckoned from the time respondent filed
its final adjusted return34 on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:

Year 1

1st

calendar month

April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998

2nd

calendar month

May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998

3rd

calendar month

June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998

4th

calendar month

July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998

5th

calendar month

August 15, 1998 to September 14, 1998

6th

calendar month

September 15, 1998 to October 14, 1998

7th

calendar month

October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998

8th

calendar month

November 15, 1998 to December 14, 1998

9th

calendar month

December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999

10th

calendar month

January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999

11th

calendar month

February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999

12th

calendar month

March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999

Year 2
13th

calendar month

April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999

14th

calendar month

May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999

15th

calendar month

June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999

16th

calendar month

July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999

17th

calendar month

August 15, 1999 to September 14, 1999

18th

calendar month

September 15, 1999 to October 14, 1999

19th

calendar month

October 15, 1999 to November 14, 1999

20th

calendar month

November 15, 1999 to December 14, 1999

21st

calendar month

December 15, 1999 to January 14, 2000

22nd

calendar month

January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000

23rd

calendar month

February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000

24th

calendar month

March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000

We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final
adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period.

Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals which is ordered to expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No.
6113 entitled Primetown Property Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Arturo V. Parcero.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: BINDING EFFECT

G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.

Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-
appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto
and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño," respectively.2

The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:

Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce,
Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage
vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic
chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with
the local civil register.

Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and
go-between, they had planned out their marital future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A few
weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor
beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some
of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.

Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however, materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after the
marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had
already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great scandal
that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a
recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish
priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid,
whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor
Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of
Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while
still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame.

Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by
her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"), but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already
estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer
filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without
prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").

On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was
domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a
verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of
"extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.

In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954,
Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).

On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She
acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.

But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against
Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating
her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation
and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her
parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.

The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed
the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00,
and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.

The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:

1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for damages and in dismissing the complaint;.

2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doña Mena Escaño liable for damages;.

3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant parents on their counterclaims; and.

4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to each other, from the
standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented
to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not
duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.

The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only
because of the separation of Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly
provided that —

SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)

The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is
emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the following:

SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this
Act if, when it was performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to do so, and
that the marriage was perfectly legal.

The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45
Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after
the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for
annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.

Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in
conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and
undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court.
This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.

It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law,
notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State
of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly
provided:

Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.

The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further
emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of
the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it
expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).

For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the
declared public policy of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of
wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the
Philippines.

From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law
cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot confer
jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).

From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not
entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to
perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is
entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the
husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person
not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of
adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).

The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the
subject, particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of
legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in
disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889,
prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that
case:

As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize
their relations; and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal significance. The claims of
the very children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged
natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to
include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at
bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation on the part of
the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.

True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question
arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:

The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of
divorce as written by Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)

The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.

However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their daughter
and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity toward him
strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. on
App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders"
and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he
would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine
marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the
canons of their religion upon advice that the previous one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due to defendants
Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escaño did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the
recelebration but respected her decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's
parents sent her money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that they should not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her
decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).

There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to
have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly
cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the
contrary is proved.

SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law distinguishes between the right of a parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the
absence of rights in a stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of strangers is only in regard to what
will justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to
leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his
child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty to
interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of the
spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate,
although it has been held that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his home and afford him or her
protection and support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse.
This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice given to a son.

Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment
and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the
charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.

In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicente Escaño, it is proper to take into account, against his patently
unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation
on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although
such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of
the indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of
the opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.

With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño, by the court below, we opine that the same are excessive.
While the filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their
reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the
decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages
awarded to P5,000 only.

Summing up, the Court rules:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce,
entitled to validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation
conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of
damages and attorneys' fees.

Neither party to recover costs.

TOPIC: BINDING EFFECT

G.R. No. 178551 October 11, 2010

ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAIT Petitioners,
vs.
MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the
Ministry), for the position of medical technologist under a two-year contract, denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), with a monthly salary of
US$1,200.00.

Under the MOA,1 all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one (1) year and are covered by Kuwait’s Civil Service Board Employment Contract No.
2.

Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on February 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the probationary period.

As the Ministry denied respondent’s request for reconsideration, she returned to the Philippines on March 17, 2001, shouldering her own air fare.

On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint2 for illegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the local
recruitment agency, represented by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.

By Decision3 of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding that petitioners neither showed that there was just cause to warrant respondent’s dismissal nor that she
failed to qualify as a regular employee, held that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly ordered petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00, representing her salary
for the three months unexpired portion of her contract.

On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision by Resolution4 of January 26, 2004. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
having been denied by Resolution5 of April 22, 2004, they appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a foreign government
agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the immunity extended to them; and that respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the performance rating
within the one-year period as required under Kuwait’s Civil Service Laws. Petitioners further contended that Ikdal should not be liable as an officer of petitioner ATCI.

By Decision6 of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC Resolution.

In brushing aside petitioners’ contention that they only acted as agent of the Ministry and that they cannot be held jointly and solidarily liable with it, the appellate court
noted that under the law, a private employment agency shall assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas worker,
hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign principal for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment.

As to Ikdal’s liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the "Migrant and Overseas Filipinos’ Act of 1995," corporate officers,
directors and partners of a recruitment agency may themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the recruitment agency for money claims and damages awarded to
overseas workers.

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution7 of June 27, 2007, the present petition for review on certiorari was
filed.

Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because respondent’s employment contract specifically stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the
Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait. They thus conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals and the appellate court to apply the Labor Code
provisions governing probationary employment in deciding the present case.

Further, petitioners argue that even the Philippine Overseas Employment Act (POEA) Rules relative to master employment contracts (Part III, Sec. 2 of the POEA
Rules and Regulations) accord respect to the "customs, practices, company policies and labor laws and legislation of the host country."

Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws are applicable, given that the foreign principal is a government agency which is immune
from suit, as in fact it did not sign any document agreeing to be held jointly and solidarily liable, petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be held liable, more so since the
Ministry’s liability had not been judicially determined as jurisdiction was not acquired over it.

The petition fails.

Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the money claims of Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) which it deploys abroad by
the mere expediency of claiming that its foreign principal is a government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that such foreign principal’s liability must first be
established before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily liable.

In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment agencies with their foreign principals, Republic Act No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs with a
recourse and assures them of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them. Skippers United Pacific v. Maguad8 explains:

. . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminous with the term of
such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under the
agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the
said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very purpose for which the law governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was
enacted. (emphasis supplied)

The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to protect and alleviate the plight of the working class.9 Verily, to allow petitioners to
simply invoke the immunity from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign principal’s liability before petitioner can be held
liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile.
As to petitioners’ contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not applicable since it was expressly provided in respondent’s employment
contract, which she voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact
POEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs and practices of the host country, the same was not substantiated.

Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who can establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, including the laws which they wish to govern their respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy.

It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual
presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to discharge. The Court’s ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Int’l., v. NLRC10 illuminates:

In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific
causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should
govern all matters relating to the termination of the employment of Gran.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a
question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or
forum law.

Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual
presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we
apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it
must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in
the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)

SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: MOA between respondent and the Ministry, as represented by ATCI, which provides that the employee
is subject to a probationary period of one (1) year and that the host country’s Civil Service Laws and Regulations apply; a translated copy11 (Arabic to English) of the
termination letter to respondent stating that she did not pass the probation terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the certificate of
termination,12 both of which documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic
Certification and Translation Unit; and respondent’s letter13 of reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted that in her first eight (8) months of employment, she
was given a rating of "Excellent" albeit it changed due to changes in her shift of work schedule.

These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove that respondent was validly terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil
service laws. Instead of submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required under the
Rules, what petitioners submitted were mere certifications attesting only to the correctness of the translations of the MOA and the termination letter which does not
prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly terminated. Thus the subject
certifications read:

xxxx

This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to English/Tagalog and or vice versa was/were presented to this Office for review and certification
and the same was/were found to be in order. This Office, however, assumes no responsibility as to the contents of the document/s.

This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for whatever legal purpose it may serve. (emphasis supplied)1avvphi1

Respecting Ikdal’s joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the same is in order too following the express provision of R.A. 8042 on money claims, viz:

SEC. 10. Money Claims.—Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have
the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-
employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual moral, exemplary and other
forms of damages.

The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be
incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the
recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable
with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: BINDING EFFECT

G.R. No. 185582 February 29, 2012

TUNA PROCESSING, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Can a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, but which collects royalties from entities in the Philippines, sue here to enforce a foreign
arbitral award?

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,1 petitioner Tuna Processing, Inc. (TPI), a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines,
prays that the Resolution2 dated 21 November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City be declared void and the case be remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings. In the assailed Resolution, the RTC dismissed petitioner’s Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award3 against
respondent Philippine Kingford, Inc. (Kingford), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines,4 on the ground that petitioner lacked legal
capacity to sue.5

The Antecedents

On 14 January 2003, Kanemitsu Yamaoka (hereinafter referred to as the "licensor"), co-patentee of U.S. Patent No. 5,484,619, Philippine Letters Patent No. 31138, and
Indonesian Patent No. ID0003911 (collectively referred to as the "Yamaoka Patent"),6 and five (5) Philippine tuna processors, namely, Angel Seafood Corporation,
East Asia Fish Co., Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc., and respondent Kingford (collectively referred to as the "sponsors"/"licensees")7
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),8 pertinent provisions of which read:

1. Background and objectives. The Licensor, co-owner of U.S.Patent No. 5,484,619, Philippine Patent No. 31138, and Indonesian Patent No. ID0003911 xxx wishes to
form an alliance with Sponsors for purposes of enforcing his three aforementioned patents, granting licenses under those patents, and collecting royalties.

The Sponsors wish to be licensed under the aforementioned patents in order to practice the processes claimed in those patents in the United States, the Philippines, and
Indonesia, enforce those patents and collect royalties in conjunction with Licensor.

xxx

4. Establishment of Tuna Processors, Inc. The parties hereto agree to the establishment of Tuna Processors, Inc. ("TPI"), a corporation established in the State of
California, in order to implement the objectives of this Agreement.

5. Bank account. TPI shall open and maintain bank accounts in the United States, which will be used exclusively to deposit funds that it will collect and to disburse cash
it will be obligated to spend in connection with the implementation of this Agreement.

6. Ownership of TPI. TPI shall be owned by the Sponsors and Licensor. Licensor shall be assigned one share of TPI for the purpose of being elected as member of the
board of directors. The remaining shares of TPI shall be held by the Sponsors according to their respective equity shares. 9

xxx

The parties likewise executed a Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement10 dated 15 January 2003 and an Agreement to Amend Memorandum of Agreement11 dated
14 July 2003.

Due to a series of events not mentioned in the petition, the licensees, including respondent Kingford, withdrew from petitioner TPI and correspondingly reneged on
their obligations.12 Petitioner submitted the dispute for arbitration before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution in the State of California, United States and
won the case against respondent.13 Pertinent portions of the award read:

13.1 Within thirty (30) days from the date of transmittal of this Award to the Parties, pursuant to the terms of this award, the total sum to be paid by RESPONDENT
KINGFORD to CLAIMANT TPI, is the sum of ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SIX DOLLARS AND TEN
CENTS ($1,750,846.10).

(A) For breach of the MOA by not paying past due assessments, RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall pay CLAIMANT the total sum of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY
NINE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTY FIVE DOLLARS AND NINETY CENTS ($229,355.90) which is 20% of MOA assessments since September
1, 2005[;]

(B) For breach of the MOA in failing to cooperate with CLAIMANT TPI in fulfilling the objectives of the MOA, RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall pay CLAIMANT
the total sum of TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY DOLLARS AND TWENTY CENTS ($271,490.20)[;]14 and

(C) For violation of THE LANHAM ACT and infringement of the YAMAOKA 619 PATENT, RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall pay CLAIMANT the total sum of
ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO CENTS ($1,250,000.00). xxx

xxx15

To enforce the award, petitioner TPI filed on 10 October 2007 a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC of
Makati City. The petition was raffled to Branch 150 presided by Judge Elmo M. Alameda.

At Branch 150, respondent Kingford filed a Motion to Dismiss.16 After the court denied the motion for lack of merit,17 respondent sought for the inhibition of Judge
Alameda and moved for the reconsideration of the order denying the motion.18 Judge Alameda inhibited himself notwithstanding "[t]he unfounded allegations and
unsubstantiated assertions in the motion."19 Judge Cedrick O. Ruiz of Branch 61, to which the case was re-raffled, in turn, granted respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration and dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue in the Philippines.20
Petitioner TPI now seeks to nullify, in this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, the order of the trial court dismissing its Petition for Confirmation,
Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award.

Issue

The core issue in this case is whether or not the court a quo was correct in so dismissing the petition on the ground of petitioner’s lack of legal capacity to sue.

Our Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

The Corporation Code of the Philippines expressly provides:

Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. - No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be
permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or
proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.

It is pursuant to the aforequoted provision that the court a quo dismissed the petition. Thus:

Herein plaintiff TPI’s "Petition, etc." acknowledges that it "is a foreign corporation established in the State of California" and "was given the exclusive right to license
or sublicense the Yamaoka Patent" and "was assigned the exclusive right to enforce the said patent and collect corresponding royalties" in the Philippines. TPI likewise
admits that it does not have a license to do business in the Philippines.

There is no doubt, therefore, in the mind of this Court that TPI has been doing business in the Philippines, but sans a license to do so issued by the concerned
government agency of the Republic of the Philippines, when it collected royalties from "five (5) Philippine tuna processors[,] namely[,] Angel Seafood Corporation,
East Asia Fish Co., Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc. and respondent Philippine Kingford, Inc." This being the real situation, TPI cannot
be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceedings in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines." A priori, the "Petition, etc." extant of
the plaintiff TPI should be dismissed for it does not have the legal personality to sue in the Philippines.21

The petitioner counters, however, that it is entitled to seek for the recognition and enforcement of the subject foreign arbitral award in accordance with Republic Act
No. 9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004),22 the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards drafted during the United
Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration in 1958 (New York Convention), and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration (Model Law),23 as none of these specifically requires that the party seeking for the enforcement should have legal capacity to sue. It anchors its argument
on the following:

In the present case, enforcement has been effectively refused on a ground not found in the [Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004], New York Convention, or
Model Law. It is for this reason that TPI has brought this matter before this most Honorable Court, as it [i]s imperative to clarify whether the Philippines’ international
obligations and State policy to strengthen arbitration as a means of dispute resolution may be defeated by misplaced technical considerations not found in the relevant
laws.24

Simply put, how do we reconcile the provisions of the Corporation Code of the Philippines on one hand, and the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, the New
York Convention and the Model Law on the other?

In several cases, this Court had the occasion to discuss the nature and applicability of the Corporation Code of the Philippines, a general law, viz-a-viz other special
laws. Thus, in Koruga v. Arcenas, Jr.,25 this Court rejected the application of the Corporation Code and applied the New Central Bank Act. It ratiocinated:

Koruga’s invocation of the provisions of the Corporation Code is misplaced. In an earlier case with similar antecedents, we ruled that:

"The Corporation Code, however, is a general law applying to all types of corporations, while the New Central Bank Act regulates specifically banks and other financial
institutions, including the dissolution and liquidation thereof. As between a general and special law, the latter shall prevail – generalia specialibus non derogant."
(Emphasis supplied)26

Further, in the recent case of Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council,27 this Court held:

Without doubt, the Corporation Code is the general law providing for the formation, organization and regulation of private corporations. On the other hand, RA 6657 is
the special law on agrarian reform. As between a general and special law, the latter shall prevail—generalia specialibus non derogant.28

Following the same principle, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 shall apply in this case as the Act, as its title - An Act to Institutionalize the Use of an
Alternative Dispute Resolution System in the Philippines and to Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for Other Purposes - would suggest, is a
law especially enacted "to actively promote party autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make their own arrangements to resolve their
disputes."29 It specifically provides exclusive grounds available to the party opposing an application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award.30

Inasmuch as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, a municipal law, applies in the instant petition, we do not see the need to discuss compliance with
international obligations under the New York Convention and the Model Law. After all, both already form part of the law.

In particular, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 incorporated the New York Convention in the Act by specifically providing:

SEC. 42. Application of the New York Convention. - The New York Convention shall govern the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards covered by the said
Convention.

xxx

SEC. 45. Rejection of a Foreign Arbitral Award. - A party to a foreign arbitration proceeding may oppose an application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral
award in accordance with the procedural rules to be promulgated by the Supreme Court only on those grounds enumerated under Article V of the New York
Convention. Any other ground raised shall be disregarded by the regional trial court.

It also expressly adopted the Model Law, to wit:

Sec. 19. Adoption of the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. International commercial arbitration shall be governed by the Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration (the "Model Law") adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on June 21, 1985 xxx."

Now, does a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines have legal capacity to sue under the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
of 2004? We answer in the affirmative.

Sec. 45 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 provides that the opposing party in an application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award may
raise only those grounds that were enumerated under Article V of the New York Convention, to wit:

Article V

1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent
authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:

(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law
to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or

(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise
unable to present his case; or

(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the
scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the
award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or

(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or

(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of
which, that award was made.

2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds
that:

(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or

(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.

Clearly, not one of these exclusive grounds touched on the capacity to sue of the party seeking the recognition and enforcement of the award.

Pertinent provisions of the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution,31 which was promulgated by the Supreme Court, likewise support this position.

Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules provides that "[a]ny party to a foreign arbitration may petition the court to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award." The contents
of such petition are enumerated in Rule 13.5.32 Capacity to sue is not included. Oppositely, in the Rule on local arbitral awards or arbitrations in instances where "the
place of arbitration is in the Philippines,"33 it is specifically required that a petition "to determine any question concerning the existence, validity and enforceability of
such arbitration agreement"34 available to the parties before the commencement of arbitration and/or a petition for "judicial relief from the ruling of the arbitral tribunal
on a preliminary question upholding or declining its jurisdiction"35 after arbitration has already commenced should state "[t]he facts showing that the persons named as
petitioner or respondent have legal capacity to sue or be sued."36

Indeed, it is in the best interest of justice that in the enforecement of a foreign arbitral award, we deny availment by the losing party of the rule that bars foreign
corporations not licensed to do business in the Philippines from maintaining a suit in our courts. When a party enters into a contract containing a foreign arbitration
clause and, as in this case, in fact submits itself to arbitration, it becomes bound by the contract, by the arbitration and by the result of arbitration, conceding thereby the
capacity of the other party to enter into the contract, participate in the arbitration and cause the implementation of the result. Although not on all fours with the instant
case, also worthy to consider is the

wisdom of then Associate Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her Dissenting Opinion in Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals,37 to wit:

xxx Arbitration, as an alternative mode of settlement, is gaining adherents in legal and judicial circles here and abroad. If its tested mechanism can simply be ignored by
an aggrieved party, one who, it must be stressed, voluntarily and actively participated in the arbitration proceedings from the very beginning, it will destroy the very
essence of mutuality inherent in consensual contracts.38

Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign arbitral award should be respected not because it is favored over domestic laws and procedures, but because Republic
Act No. 9285 has certainly erased any conflict of law question.

Finally, even assuming, only for the sake of argument, that the court a quo correctly observed that the Model Law, not the New York Convention, governs the subject
arbitral award,39 petitioner may still seek recognition and enforcement of the award in Philippine court, since the Model Law prescribes substantially identical
exclusive grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement.40

Premises considered, petitioner TPI, although not licensed to do business in the Philippines, may seek recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral award in
accordance with the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004.

II

The remaining arguments of respondent Kingford are likewise unmeritorious.

First. There is no need to consider respondent’s contention that petitioner TPI improperly raised a question of fact when it posited that its act of entering into a MOA
should not be considered "doing business" in the Philippines for the purpose of determining capacity to sue. We reiterate that the foreign corporation’s capacity to sue in
the Philippines is not material insofar as the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is concerned.
Second. Respondent cannot fault petitioner for not filing a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Resolution dated 21 November 2008 dismissing the case. We have,
time and again, ruled that the prior filing of a motion for reconsideration is not required in certiorari under Rule 45.41

Third. While we agree that petitioner failed to observe the principle of hierarchy of courts, which, under ordinary circumstances, warrants the outright dismissal of the
case,42 we opt to relax the rules following the pronouncement in Chua v. Ang,43 to wit:

[I]t must be remembered that [the principle of hierarchy of courts] generally applies to cases involving conflicting factual allegations. Cases which depend on disputed
facts for decision cannot be brought immediately before us as we are not triers of facts.44 A strict application of this rule may be excused when the reason behind the
rule is not present in a case, as in the present case, where the issues are not factual but purely legal.1âwphi1 In these types of questions, this Court has the ultimate say
so that we merely abbreviate the review process if we, because of the unique circumstances of a case, choose to hear and decide the legal issues outright.45

Moreover, the novelty and the paramount importance of the issue herein raised should be seriously considered.46 Surely, there is a need to take cognizance of the case
not only to guide the bench and the bar, but if only to strengthen arbitration as a means of dispute resolution, and uphold the policy of the State embodied in the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, to wit:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to actively promote party autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party
to make their own arrangements to resolve their disputes. Towards this end, the State shall encourage and actively promote the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) as an important means to achieve speedy and impartial justice and declog court dockets. xxx

Fourth. As regards the issue on the validity and enforceability of the foreign arbitral award, we leave its determination to the court a quo where its recognition and
enforcement is being sought.

Fifth. Respondent claims that petitioner failed to furnish the court of origin a copy of the motion for time to file petition for review on certiorari before the petition was
filed with this Court.47 We, however, find petitioner’s reply in order. Thus:

26. Admittedly, reference to "Branch 67" in petitioner TPI’s "Motion for Time to File a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45" is a typographical error. As
correctly pointed out by respondent Kingford, the order sought to be assailed originated from Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 61.

27. xxx Upon confirmation with the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 61, a copy of petitioner TPI’s motion was received by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Makati City, Branch 67. On 8 January 2009, the motion was forwarded to the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 61.48

All considered, petitioner TPI, although a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, is not, for that reason alone, precluded from filing the
Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before a Philippine court.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated 21 November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati City in Special Proceedings No. M-6533 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to Branch 61 for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: ARTICLE 16

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of
partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five
legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second
wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate
children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for,
his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on September 15, 1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary
E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in
satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various
motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of
Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the
legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the
executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the
testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived
of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the
executor.1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and
approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of
which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31,
1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the
decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated,
renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not
be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items:
(a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide
that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of
this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change
the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision
in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039,
which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he
intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the
law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance
with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16
— of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.
TOPIC: ARTICLE 17

G.R. No. 162894 February 26, 2008

RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner,

vs.
STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR., respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks the reversal of the Decision1 and Resolution2 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 and the dismissal of the civil case filed by respondent against petitioner with the trial court.

As culled from the records of the case, the following antecedents appear:

Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of
America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale
of services in several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On 11 March 1992, respondent secured a service
contract with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.3

On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc.
(RUST), Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment contract.4 On 28
September 1995, Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to pay respondent’s money claims.5 Upon appeal by BMSI, the
NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed respondent’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.6 Respondent elevated the case to this
Court but was dismissed in a Resolution dated 26 November 1997. The Resolution became final and executory on 09 November 1998.

On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union. The
Complaint,7 docketed as Civil Case No. 1192-BG, named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations
impleaded in the earlier labor case. The complaint essentially reiterated the allegations in the labor case that BMSI verbally employed respondent to negotiate the sale of
services in government projects and that respondent was not paid the commissions due him from the Pinatubo dredging project which he secured on behalf of BMSI.
The complaint also averred that BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner itself had combined and functioned as one company.

In its Answer,8 petitioner alleged that contrary to respondent’s claim, it was a foreign corporation duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and denied entering
into any arrangement with respondent or paying the latter any sum of money. Petitioner also denied combining with BMSI and RUST for the purpose of assuming the
alleged obligation of the said companies.9 Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written agreement between respondent and BMSI
and RUST, denominated as "Special Sales Representative Agreement," the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut.10 Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by
way of compulsory counterclaim.11

On 18 May 1999, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Hearing Based on Affirmative Defenses and for Summary Judgment12 seeking the dismissal of
the complaint on grounds of forum non conveniens and failure to state a cause of action. Respondent opposed the same. Pending the resolution of the omnibus motion,
the deposition of Walter Browning was taken before the Philippine Consulate General in Chicago.13

In an Order14 dated 13 September 2000, the RTC denied petitioner’s omnibus motion. The trial court held that the factual allegations in the complaint, assuming the
same to be admitted, were sufficient for the trial court to render a valid judgment thereon. It also ruled that the principle of forum non conveniens was inapplicable
because the trial court could enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines.15

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration16 of the order, which motion was opposed by respondent.17 In an Order dated 31 July 2001,18 the trial court denied
petitioner’s motion. Thus, it filed a Rule 65 Petition19 with the Court of Appeals praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and a writ of injunction to set aside the
twin orders of the trial court dated 13 September 2000 and 31 July 2001 and to enjoin the trial court from conducting further proceedings.20

On 28 August 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision21 denying the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. It also denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration in the assailed Resolution issued on 10 March 2004.22

The appellate court held that although the trial court should not have confined itself to the allegations in the complaint and should have also considered evidence aliunde
in resolving petitioner’s omnibus motion, it found the evidence presented by petitioner, that is, the deposition of Walter Browning, insufficient for purposes of
determining whether the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The appellate court also stated that it could not rule one way or the other on the issue of whether the
corporations, including petitioner, named as defendants in the case had indeed merged together based solely on the evidence presented by respondent. Thus, it held that
the issue should be threshed out during trial.23 Moreover, the appellate court deferred to the discretion of the trial court when the latter decided not to desist from
assuming jurisdiction on the ground of the inapplicability of the principle of forum non conveniens.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF FORUM NON
CONVENIENS.24

Incidentally, respondent failed to file a comment despite repeated notices. The Ceferino Padua Law Office, counsel on record for respondent, manifested that the lawyer
handling the case, Atty. Rogelio Karagdag, had severed relations with the law firm even before the filing of the instant petition and that it could no longer find the
whereabouts of Atty. Karagdag or of respondent despite diligent efforts. In a Resolution25 dated 20 November 2006, the Court resolved to dispense with the filing of a
comment.

The instant petition lacks merit.

Petitioner mainly asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the
laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute – namely, the parties and witnesses involved are American
corporations and citizens and the evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines – that renders our local courts inconvenient forums. Petitioner theorizes that
the foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the immediate application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura,26 the Court outlined three consecutive phases involved in judicial resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely: jurisdiction,
choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Thus, in the instances27 where the Court held that the local judicial machinery was adequate to resolve
controversies with a foreign element, the following requisites had to be proved: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort; (2) that
the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power to
enforce its decision.28

On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an
exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.29

Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law30 and by the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective
of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein.31 Civil Case No. 1192-BG is an action for damages arising from
an alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of damages prayed are within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other
hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.32

That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any
other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether
it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits
of the case is fair to both parties.33 The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing
on the merits proceeds before the trial court.

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or
available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.34 Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not
sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.

Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a
matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are
established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance.35

Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the trial court, the Court of Appeals respected its conclusion that it can assume jurisdiction over the dispute notwithstanding its
foreign elements. In the same manner, the Court defers to the sound discretion of the lower courts because their findings are binding on this Court.

Petitioner also contends that the complaint in Civil Case No. 1192-BG failed to state a cause of action against petitioner. Failure to state a cause of action refers to the
insufficiency of allegation in the pleading.36 As a general rule, the elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if
true would justify the relief demanded.37

The complaint alleged that petitioner had combined with BMSI and RUST to function as one company. Petitioner contends that the deposition of Walter Browning
rebutted this allegation. On this score, the resolution of the Court of Appeals is instructive, thus:

x x x Our examination of the deposition of Mr. Walter Browning as well as other documents produced in the hearing shows that these evidence aliunde are not quite
sufficient for us to mete a ruling that the complaint fails to state a cause of action.

Annexes "A" to "E" by themselves are not substantial, convincing and conclusive proofs that Raytheon Engineers and Constructors, Inc. (REC) assumed the warranty
obligations of defendant Rust International in the Makar Port Project in General Santos City, after Rust International ceased to exist after being absorbed by REC. Other
documents already submitted in evidence are likewise meager to preponderantly conclude that Raytheon International, Inc., Rust International[,] Inc. and Brand Marine
Service, Inc. have combined into one company, so much so that Raytheon International, Inc., the surviving company (if at all) may be held liable for the obligation of
BMSI to respondent Rouzie for unpaid commissions. Neither these documents clearly speak otherwise.38

As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the question of whether petitioner, BMSI and RUST merged together requires the presentation of further evidence,
which only a full-blown trial on the merits can afford.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: ARTICLE 18

G.R. No. 126603 June 29, 1998

ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO, ADIB A. TAMANO and the HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals of 30 September 1996 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 39656 which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Estrellita J. Tamano.

On 31 May 1958 Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married private respondent Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) in civil rites. Their marriage
supposedly remained valid and subsisting until his death on 18 May 1994. Prior to his death, particularly on 2 June 1993, Tamano also married petitioner Estrellita J.
Tamano (Estrellita) in civil rites in Malabang, Lanao del Sur.

On 23 November 1994 private respondent Zorayda joined by her son Adib A. Tamano (Adib) filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullify of Marriage of Tamano and
Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous. They contended that Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented themselves as divorced and single, respectively, thus making
the entries in the marriage contract false and fraudulent.

Private respondents alleged that Tamano never divorced Zorayda and that Estrellita was not single when she married Tamano as the decision annulling her previous
marriage with Romeo C. Llave never became final and executory for non-compliance with publication requirements.

Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action. She alleged
that "only a party to the marriage" could file an action for annulment of marriage against the other spouse, 1 hence, it was only Tamano who could file an action for
annulment of their marriage. Petitioner likewise contended that since Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and
try the instant case was vested in the shari'a courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.

The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the instant case was properly cognizable by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City since Estrellita and
Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively in accordance with PD No. 1083 2 or the Code of Muslim Personal laws. The motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied; hence, petitioner filed the instant petition with this Court seeking to set aside the 18 July 1995 order of respondent presiding judge
of the RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and the 22 August 1995 order denying reconsideration thereof.

In a Resolution dated 13 December 1995 we referred the case to the Court of Appeals for consolidation with G.R. No. 118371. Zorayda and Adib A. Tamano however
filed a motion, which the Court of Appeals granted, to resolve the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage ahead of the other consolidated cases.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the instant case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of shari'a courts only when filed in places where there are shari'a court. But
in places where there are no shari'a courts, like Quezon City, the instant case could properly be filed before the Regional Trial Court.

Petitioner is now before us reiterating her earlier argument that it is the shari'a court and not the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the subject and nature
of the action.

Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, 3 Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. 4
Personal actions, such as the instant complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. 5 There should be no question by now that what determines the
nature of an action and correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations made by the plaintiff in this case. 6 In the complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage filed by private respondents herein, it was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code.
Never was it mentioned that Estrellita and Tamano were married under Muslim laws or PD No. 1083. Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion to Dismiss that
she and Tamano were married under Muslim laws. That she was in fact married to Tamano under Muslim laws was first mentioned only in her Motion for
Reconsideration.

Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration that
Estrellita and Tamano were likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because a court's jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a
motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the complaint. 7 Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from
the allegations of the complaint as the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. 8

Petitioner argues that the shari'a courts have jurisdiction over the instant suit pursuant to Art. 13, Title II, PD No. 1083, 9 which provides —

Art. 13. Application. — (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a
Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.

(2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines
shall apply.

(3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the essential requisites and legal impediments to marriage, divorce, paternity and filiation, guardianship and
custody of minors, support and maintenance, claims for customary dower (mahr), betrothal, breach of contract to marry, solemnization and registration of marriage and
divorce, rights and obligations between husband and wife, parental authority, and the property relations between husband and wife shall be governed by this Code and
other applicable Muslim laws.

As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code. Hence, contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is
applicable in the instant case. Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws, the same would still fall under the general
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the shari'a courts are not vested
with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts are not
divested of their general original jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129 which provides —

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: . . . (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of
any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions . . .

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the 18 July 1995 and 22 August 1995 orders of the Regional Trial
Court — Br. 89, Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss and reconsideration thereof, is AFFIRMED. Let the records of this case be immediately remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings until terminated.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: ARTICLE 18

G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011

ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of subsequent marriage laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of
the legitimate union of a married couple.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent
Resolution2 dated September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita
Juliano-Llave’s (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.

Factual Antecedents

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City3 and,
subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993.4 In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil status
was indicated as ‘divorced.’
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of
the rest of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda,5 filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita
and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint6 alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage
remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. The complaint likewise averred that:

11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been celebrated under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law. Based on Article 35
(4) of the Family Code, the subsequent marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal with Defendant Llave is void ab initio because he contracted the same while his
prior marriage to Complainant Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status being declared as "divorced" has no factual or legal basis, because the deceased never
divorced Complainant Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not have validly done so because divorce is not allowed under the New Civil Code;

11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced Complainant Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that the marriage of the deceased with Complainant Zorayda was never deemed, legally and factually, to have been one
contracted under Muslim law as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased and Complainant Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire to be thus
covered by this law;7

Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked from the court for an extension of 30 days to file her answer to be counted from January
4, 1995,8 and again, another 15 days9 or until February 18, 1995, both of which the court granted.10

Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss11 on February 20, 1995 where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both
Muslims who were married under the Muslim rites, as had been averred in the latter’s disbarment complaint against Sen. Tamano.12 Estrellita argued that the RTC has
no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim
Code), questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of shari’a courts.

The trial court denied Estrellita’s motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity.13 Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995 a certiorari
petition with this Court questioning the denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the CA14 which was docketed thereat as
CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.

During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the case since there can be no default in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the
respondent failed to file an answer. Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing parties presented their evidence. When it was Estrellita’s turn to
adduce evidence, the hearings set for such purpose15 were postponed mostly at her instance until the trial court, on March 22, 1996, suspended the proceedings16 in
view of the CA’s temporary restraining order issued on February 29, 1996, enjoining it from hearing the case.17

Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its Decision dated September 30, 1996.18 Estrellita then elevated the appellate court’s
judgment to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603.19

Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to present her evidence on June 26, 1997.20 As Estrellita was indisposed on that day,
the hearing was reset to July 9, 1997.21 The day before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked for a postponement.22

Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the case for decision,23 reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the
case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she has not yet filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R. No. 126603.24

On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City,25 stating as one of the reasons that as shari’a courts are not vested with original and exclusive
jurisdiction in cases of marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming
jurisdiction over such cases. In our Resolution dated August 24, 1998,26 we denied Estrellita’s motion for reconsideration27 with finality.

A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered the aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellita’s marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab
initio.28

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never severed, declared Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for
being bigamous under Article 35 of the Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.29 The court said:

A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the second marriage of the late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into during the
subsistence of his first marriage with [Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage void from the very beginning. The fact that the late Senator declared his civil
status as "divorced" will not in any way affect the void character of the second marriage because, in this jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an
acceptable method of terminating the effects of a previous marriage, especially, where the subsequent marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code.30

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard as

the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the RTC should have
required her to file her answer after the denial of her motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano is capacitated to marry her as his marriage and subsequent
divorce with Zorayda is governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly, she highlighted Zorayda’s lack of legal standing to question the validity of her marriage to the deceased.

In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004,32 the CA held that Estrellita can no longer be allowed to file her answer as she was given ample
opportunity to be heard but simply ignored it by asking for numerous postponements. She never filed her answer despite the lapse of around 60 days, a period longer
than what was prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that Estrellita cannot rely on her pending petition for certiorari with the higher courts since, as an independent and
original action, it does not interrupt the proceedings in the trial court.

As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano is void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of
Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for an absolute divorce. It noted that their first nuptial celebration was under civil
rites, while the subsequent Muslim celebration was only ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the CA, had the legal standing to file the action as she is Sen. Tamano’s
wife and, hence, the injured party in the senator’s subsequent bigamous marriage with Estrellita.

In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,33 the CA denied Estrellita’s Motion for Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked the
additional errors she raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the public prosecutor’s report on the existence of collusion in violation of both Rule 9, Section
3(e) of the Rules of Court34 and Article 48 of the Family Code35 will not invalidate the trial court’s judgment as the proceedings between the parties had been
adversarial, negating the existence of collusion. Assuming that the issues have not been joined before the RTC, the same is attributable to Estrellita’s refusal to file an
answer. Lastly, the CA disregarded Estrellita’s allegation that the trial court erroneously rendered its judgment way prior to our remand to the RTC of the records of the
case ratiocinating that G.R. No. 126603 pertains to the issue on the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue of the validity of Estrellita’s marriage to Sen.
Tamano.

The Parties’ Respective Arguments

Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues that the CA erred in upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely issued, depriving
her of the opportunity to file an answer and to present her evidence to dispute the allegations against the validity of her marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v.
Macias36 laid down the rule that the filing of a motion to dismiss instead of an answer suspends the period to file an answer and, consequently, the trial court is obliged
to suspend proceedings while her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with finality. She maintains that she merely
participated in the RTC hearings because of the trial court’s assurance that the proceedings will be without prejudice to whatever action the High Court will take on her
petition questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction and yet, the RTC violated this commitment as it rendered an adverse judgment on August 18, 1998, months before the
records of G.R. No. 126603 were remanded to the CA on November 11, 1998.37 She also questions the lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent a finding of
whether there was collusion, this being a prerequisite before further proceeding could be held when a party has failed to file an answer in a suit for declaration of nullity
of marriage.

Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator is valid as the latter was already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married
her. She asserts that such law automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need of registering their consent to be covered by it, as both
parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized under Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano married all his wives under Muslim rites, as attested to by
the affidavits of the siblings of the deceased.38

Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file suit because only the husband or the wife can file a complaint for the declaration of nullity
of marriage under Supreme Court Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.39

Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CA’s reasoning and stresses that Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that
filing an original action for certiorari does not stay the proceedings of the main action before the RTC.

As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is collusion, the Sol Gen says that this is no longer essential considering the vigorous opposition of
Estrellita in the suit that obviously shows the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private respondents’ legal standing to challenge the validity of Estrellita’s
purported marriage with Sen. Tamano, reasoning that any proper interested party may attack directly or collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have such
right to file the action as they are the ones prejudiced by the marital union.

Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.

Issues

The issues that must be resolved are the following:

1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment, even though the latter was rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment was rendered without waiting
for the Supreme Court’s final resolution of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) she has not yet filed her answer and thus was denied due process; and c) the
public prosecutor did not even conduct an investigation whether there was collusion;

2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous; and

3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellita’s marriage declared void ab initio.

Our Ruling

Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer; and her pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of
the motion to dismiss before the higher courts does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before the RTC of Quezon City.

Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due process. She was never declared in default, and she even actively participated in the trial to
defend her interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40 to justify the suspension of the period to file an answer and of the proceedings in the trial court until her petition for
certiorari questioning the validity of the denial of her Motion to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said case, we affirmed the following reasoning of the CA
which, apparently, is Estrellita’s basis for her argument, to wit:

However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a ‘Motion to Dismiss,’ instead of filing an Answer to the complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the period for
her to file her Answer to the complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the Respondent Court to suspend the hearings
of the case on the merits. The Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its Order denying the ‘Motion to Dismiss’ of the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance of the period provided for in Rule 11 of the said Rules but in no case less than five (5)
days computed from service on her of the aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within which to file her Answer to the complaint: x x x41 (Emphasis supplied.)

Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is that the trial court is mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to dismiss
that is filed before it. Nothing in the above excerpt states that the trial court should suspend its proceedings should the issue of the propriety or impropriety of the
motion to dismiss be raised before the appellate courts. In Macias, the trial court failed to observe due process in the course of the proceeding of the case because after it
denied the wife’s motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow the husband to present evidence ex parte and resolved the case with undue haste even when,
under the rules of procedure, the wife still had time to file an answer. In the instant case, Estrellita had no time left for filing an answer, as she filed the motion to
dismiss beyond the extended period earlier granted by the trial court after she filed motions for extension of time to file an answer.

Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have waited first for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and,
subsequently, before this Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for certiorari does not suspend the proceedings
before the trial court. "An application for certiorari is an independent action which is not part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the
judgment complained of."42 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case."43 In fact, the trial court
respected the CA’s temporary restraining order and only after the CA rendered judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to present her evidence.

Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we never issued any order precluding the trial court from proceeding with the principal action.
With her numerous requests for postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to present her evidence when it was her turn to do so,
insisting that the trial court should wait first for our decision in G.R. No. 126603. Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to present her evidence were attributable
only to herself and she should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly
proceeded with the trial and rendered its Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have waived her right to present her side of the story. Neither should the lower court wait
for the decision in G.R. No. 126603 to become final and executory, nor should it wait for its records to be remanded back to it because G.R. No. 126603 involves
strictly the propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and not the issue of validity of marriage.

The Public Prosecutor issued a report as

to the non-existence of collusion.

Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)44 also requries the participation of the public prosecutor in cases involving void marriages. It specifically
mandates the prosecutor to submit his investigation report to determine whether there is collusion between the parties:

Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.–(1) Within one month after receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public
prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.

(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of
collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss
the petition.

(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at
the pre-trial.

Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to submit the required report,45 which we find to have been sufficiently complied with by
Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March 30, 1995,46 wherein he attested that there could be no collusion between the parties and
no fabrication of evidence because Estrellita is not the spouse of any of the private respondents.

Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming that there is a lack of report of collusion or a lack of participation by the public
prosecutor, just as we held in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,47 the lack of participation of a fiscal does not invalidate the proceedings in the trial court:

The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and
to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion
existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are
convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in
the trial court.48

The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to
Estrellita is void ab initio.

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.49 The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time.50
Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 39451 which was not availed of during its
effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083,52 the law that codified Muslim personal
laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims,
or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we already
ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites."53
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on
the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the prospective application of its provisions unless otherwise provided:

Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. —Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and
nothing herein except as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby.

It has been held that:

The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably
expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186 aforecited enunciates the
general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the
Civil Code – in respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Code’s enactment.54

An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states:

A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in accordance with non-Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim
law provided the spouses register their mutual desire to this effect.

Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent
between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have
already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamano’s prior
marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.

Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the
husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous
subsequent marriage.

Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines,55 Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under
Section 2(a)56 thereof, only the husband or the wife, to the exclusion of others, may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity, therefore only she and Sen.
Tamano may directly attack the validity of their own marriage.

Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply
if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.

In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the petition to the exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders
explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:

(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions
cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be
filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or
intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of
a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve
marriage and not to seek its dissolution.57

Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the "aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellita’s interpretation is employed,
the prior spouse is unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated.

The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially
if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an
action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage.
The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of
all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior
marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.

Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from impugning the subsequent marriage.1âwphi1 But in the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have
legal personalities to file an action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under the Family Code, such is prospective in
application and does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003.58

Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellita’s marriage in November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party
who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken
place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the
lifetime of the parties to the marriage.59 Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is
likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit.60

Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be interpreted in a way that would preserve their respective rights which include striking
down bigamous marriages. We thus find the CA Decision correctly rendered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent
Resolution issued on September 13, 2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: ARTICLE 18

G.R. No. 193902 June 1, 2011

ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 193908
ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner,
vs.
SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 194075
SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

These are three (3) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 dated July 30, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN, dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Atty. Marietta D. Zamoranos (Zamoranos) in G.R. No. 193902,
thus, affirming the Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Lanao del Norte, in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy filed by petitioner Samson R.
Pacasum, Sr. in G.R. No. 194075.

Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.

On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam on
April 28, 1982. Subsequently, on July 30, 1982, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.

A little after a year, on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their marriage was confirmed by the Shari’a
Circuit District Court, 1st Circuit, 3rd District, Isabela, Basilan, which issued a Decree of Divorce on June 18, 1992, as follows:

DECREE OF DIVORCE

This is a case for divorce filed by the herein complainant Marietta (Mariam) D. Zamoranos de Guzman against her husband, the herein respondent, on the ground that
the wife, herein complainant, was previously given by her husband the authority to exercise Talaq, as provided for and, in accordance with Presidential Decree No.
1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.

When this case was called for hearing[,] both parties appeared and herein respondent, Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman[,] interposes no objection to confirm their divorce,
which they have freely entered into on December 18, 1983.

This Court, after evaluating the testimonies of the herein parties is fully convinced that both the complainant and the respondent have been duly converted to the faith of
Islam prior to their Muslim wedding and finding that there is no more possibility of reconciliation by and between them, hereby issues this decree of divorce.

WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to the provisions of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, this petition is hereby granted.
Consequently, the marriage between Marietta (Mariam) D. Zamoranos de Guzman and Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman is hereby confirmed dissolved.

Issued this 18th day of June, 1992, at Isabela, Basilan Province, Philippines.

(signed)

HON. KAUDRI L. JAINUL

Presiding Judge3

Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew on December 20, 1989. As she had previously done in her first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson
Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, on December 28,
1992, in order to strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the
RTC, Iligan City. However, unlike in Zamoranos’ first marriage to De Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was blessed with progeny, namely: Samson, Sr.,
Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.

Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and, in 1998, the two were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of
Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually, on October 18, 1999, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a
compromise agreement which vested primary custody of the children in the former, with the latter retaining visitorial rights thereto.

As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases against Zamoranos, to wit:

1. Petition for Annulment of Marriage filed on March 31, 2003 before the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6249. Subsequently, on May 31,
2004, Pacasum amended the petition into one for Declaration of a Void Marriage, alleging, among other things, that: (a) Zamoranos, at the time of her marriage to
Pacasum, was already previously married to De Guzman on July 30, 1982; (b) Zamoranos’ first marriage, solemnized before the RTC, Quezon City, presided over by
Judge Laguio, subsisted at the time of the celebration of Zamoranos and Pacasum’s marriage; (c) Zamoranos and Pacasum’s marriage was bigamous and void ab initio;
and (d) thus, Zamoranos, as the guilty spouse, should forfeit: (i) custody of her minor children to their father, who should have sole and exclusive custody; (ii) her share
in the community property in favor of the children; and (iii) her inheritance from Pacasum by testate or intestate succession.

2. Criminal complaint for Bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), filed on October 25, 2004.
3. Separate administrative cases for Zamoranos’ dismissal from service and disbarment before the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Bureau of Finance Revenue Integrity Protection Service, respectively. Parenthetically, the administrative cases were dismissed in due course.
However, as of the date of the assailed CA Decision, Pacasum’s appeal from the CSC’s dismissal of the administrative case was still pending resolution.

Quite ironically, soon after amending his petition in Civil Case No. 6249, Pacasum contracted a second marriage with Catherine Ang Dignos on July 18, 2004.4

Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City Prosecutor, through Prosecutor Leonor Quiñones, issued a resolution dated February 2, 2005, finding
prima facie evidence to hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy.5 Consequently, on February 22, 2006, an Information for Bigamy was filed against Zamoranos before the
RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-12305.6

Zamoranos filed a motion for reconsideration of the City Prosecutor’s February 2, 2005 resolution. As a result, the proceedings before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City,
were temporarily suspended. On April 29, 2005, the City Prosecutor of Ozamis City, the acting City Prosecutor of Iligan City at the time, issued a resolution granting
Zamoranos’ motion for reconsideration and dismissing the charge of Bigamy against Zamoranos.7

Not unexpectedly, Pacasum moved for reconsideration of the April 29, 2005 resolution of the City Prosecutor, which was denied in a resolution dated August 15,
2005.8 Posthaste, Pacasum filed a Petition for Review before the Office of the Secretary of Justice, assailing the dismissal of his criminal complaint for Bigamy against
Zamoranos.9

In yet another turn of events, the Secretary of Justice, on February 7, 2006, issued a resolution granting Pacasum’s Petition for Review and reversed the February 2,
2005 and April 29, 2005 resolutions of the City Prosecutor.10 Zamoranos immediately filed an Omnibus Motion and Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1)
for Reconsideration; (2) to Hold in Abeyance Filing of the Instant Case; and (3) to Hold in Abeyance or Quash Warrant of Arrest, respectively dated February 20, 2006
and February 24, 2006, before the Secretary of Justice.11 Unfortunately for Zamoranos, her twin motions were denied by the Secretary of Justice in a resolution dated
May 17, 2006.12

Zamoranos’ second motion for reconsideration, as with her previous motions, was likewise denied.

On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 6249, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, rendered a decision in favor
of Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and
were such at the time of their marriage, whose marital relationship was governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines:

From the foregoing uncontroverted facts, the Court finds that the allegation of [Pacasum] to the effect that his marriage with [Zamoranos] on December 28, 1992 is a
bigamous marriage due to the alleged subsisting previous marriage between [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman is misplaced. The previous marriage between Jesus de
Guzman and [Zamoranos] has long been terminated [and] has gone with the wind. The fact that divorce by Talaq was entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first husband
in accordance with PD 1083, x x x their marriage is dissolved and consequently thereof, [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman can re-marry. Moreover, the second
marriage entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first husband Jesus de Guzman under the Family Code on July 30, 1982 is merely ceremonial, being unnecessary, it does
not modify/alter or change the validity of the first marriage entered into by them under PD 1083.

Likewise, in the case of [Pacasum] and [Zamoranos], their second marriage on December 28, 1992 under the Family Code does not in any way modify, alter or change
the validity of the first marriage on December 20, 1989 entered into by [Pacasum] and [Zamoranos] under PD 1083, as amended. In fact, according to Ghazali, one of
the renowned Muslim author and jurist in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence and concurred in by retired Justice Ra[s]ul of the Court of Appeals and also a Professor on
Islamic Law and Jurisprudence, in the case of combined marriage[s], the first marriage is to be considered valid and effective as between the parties while the second
marriage is merely ceremonial, being a surplusage and unnecessary. Therefore, the divorce by Talaq dissolved the marriage between [Zamoranos] and her first
husband[,de Guzman,] being governed by PD 1083, x x x.

Article 13, Chapter I, Title II of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, provides x x x:

"Application

The provisions of this title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims[,] or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines."

Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos] and her first husband, Jesus de Guzman[,] shall be governed by the Muslim Code and
divorce proceedings shall be properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Shari’a Circuit Court.

Art. 155, Chapter 2, Title II, Book 4 of the Muslim code, provides x x x:

"Jurisdiction – The Shari’a Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:

xxxx

2. All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or have been married in accordance with Article 13 involving disputes relating to:

a) Marriage;

b) Divorce recognized under this Code;

x x x x"

The above provision of law clearly shows no concurrent jurisdiction with any civil courts or other courts of law. And any divorce proceeding undertaken before the
Shari’[a] Court is valid, recognized, binding and sufficient divorce proceedings.

Moreover, the instant case is one of the several cases filed by [Pacasum] against [Zamoranos] such as complaints for disbarment, for immorality, for bigamy and
misconduct before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and in the Civil Service Commission which were all similar or [based on] the same set of facts. A pure
and simple harassment.

In the light of the foregoing findings, the Court is of the considered view and so hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the above-entitled case for
annulment of marriage entered into under PD 1083, x x x. It is the Shari’a Circuit Court that has the exclusive original jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the affirmative defenses which are in the nature of motion to dismiss is hereby granted.

The above-entitled case is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.13

On separate appeals, the CA and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 6249 by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City. On April 3, 2009, the denial by
the Supreme Court of Pacasum’s appeal became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.14

In the meantime, on August 7, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, upon motion of Pacasum, issued an Order reinstating Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy
against Zamoranos.15

Not surprisingly, Zamoranos filed a Motion to Quash the Information, arguing that the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, had no jurisdiction over her person and over the
offense charged. Zamoranos asseverated, in the main, that the decision of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, in Civil Case No. 6249 categorically declared her and
Pacasum as Muslims, resulting in the mootness of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 and the inapplicability of the RPC provision on Bigamy to her marriage to Pacasum. In
all, Zamoranos claimed that Criminal Case No. 06-12305 ought to be dismissed.16

On December 21, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, denied Zamoranos’ Motion to Quash the Information. Zamoranos’ motion for reconsideration thereof was
likewise denied.17

Undaunted, Zamoranos filed a petition for certiorari for the nullification and reversal of the December 21, 2009 Order of the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City. As previously
adverted to, the CA dismissed Zamoranos’ petition. The CA dwelt on the propriety of a petition for certiorari to assail the denial of a Motion to Quash the Information:

A petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an extraordinary remedy. As such, it is confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior
court is wholly void. The aim of certiorari is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to a
court on the basis alone of an alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. To prosper, a petition for certiorari must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly
abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.

Simply put, in a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the appellate court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at
will and resolve questions or issues beyond its competence, such as an error of judgment which is defined as one in which the court or quasi-judicial body may commit
in the exercise of its jurisdiction; as opposed to an error of jurisdiction where the acts complained of were issued without or in excess of jurisdiction.

xxxx

In the present case, [w]e have circumspectly examined [Zamoranos’] Motion to Quash Information and the action taken by the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City] in respect
thereto, and [w]e found nothing that may constitute as grave abuse of discretion on the part of the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City]. The Order dated December 21, 2009,
which first denied [Zamoranos’] [M]otion to [Q]uash Information meticulously explained the factual and legal basis for the denial of the issues raised by [Zamoranos]
in said motion. We find the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City’s] stance in upholding the sufficiency of the Information for bigamy and taking cognizance of Criminal Case
No. 06-12305 to be well within the bounds of its jurisdiction. Even assuming arguendo that the denial of petitioner’s motion to quash is erroneous, such error was, at
worst, an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction.18

Interestingly, even Pacasum was not satisfied with the CA’s dismissal of Zamoranos’ petition for certiorari. Hence, these separate appeals by Zamoranos and Pacasum.

We note that Zamoranos is petitioner in two separate cases, filed by her two counsels, docketed as G.R. Nos. 193902 and 193908, respectively, which assail the same
CA Decision. However, upon motion of counsel for Zamoranos, to obviate confusion and superfluity, we have allowed Zamoranos to withdraw her petition in G.R. No.
193908 and for her earlier petition in G.R. No. 193902 to remain.

Zamoranos posits that it was grievous error for the CA to ignore the conclusions made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, and affirmed by the CA and this Court, to wit:

1. Zamoranos is a Muslim and was validly married to another Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites;

2. Zamoranos and De Guzman’s marriage ceremony under civil rites before Judge Laguio did not remove their marriage from the ambit of P.D. No. 1083;

3. Corollary to paragraph 1, Zamoranos’ divorce by talaq to De Guzman severed their marriage ties;

4. "Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos] and her first husband, Jesus de Guzman[, are] governed by the Muslim Code and [the]
divorce proceedings properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Shari’a Circuit Court."

5. Zamoranos remarried Pacasum, another Muslim, under Islamic rites; and

6. On the whole, regular courts, in particular, RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, have no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case for declaration of nullity of marriage entered
into under P.D. No. 1083 because it is the Shari’a Circuit Court that has original jurisdiction over the subject matter.

For his part, Pacasum, although he agrees with the dismissal of Zamoranos’ petition, raises a quarrel with the aforementioned conclusions of the CA. Pacasum
vehemently denies that Zamoranos is a Muslim, who was previously married and divorced under Islamic rites, and who entered into a second marriage with him,
likewise under Islamic rites.

We impale the foregoing issues into the following:

1. Whether the CA correctly dismissed Zamoranos’ petition for certiorari; and

2. Whether the RTC’s, Branch 2, Iligan City and the CA’s separate factual findings that Zamoranos is a Muslim are correct.

As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.19
The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts—acts which courts have no power or authority in law to perform.20

The denial of a motion to quash, as in the case at bar, is not appealable. It is an interlocutory order which cannot be the subject of an appeal.21

Moreover, it is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The
established rule is that, when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the
case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.22

However, on a number of occasions, we have recognized that in certain situations, certiorari is considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order,
specifically the denial of a motion to quash. We have recognized the propriety of the following exceptions: (a) when the court issued the order without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief; (c) in the interest of a "more enlightened and substantial justice";23 (d) to promote public welfare and public policy;24 and (e) when the cases "have
attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof."25 The first four of the foregoing exceptions occur in this
instance.

Contrary to the asseverations of the CA, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, committed an error of jurisdiction, not simply an error of judgment, in denying Zamoranos’
motion to quash.

First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of judgment made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Pacasum on the ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a bigamous marriage. In that case, the decision of which is
already final and executory, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
by the regular civil courts. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, declared that it was the Shari’a Circuit Court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof.

Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the principle of res judicata. The provision reads:

SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or final order, may be as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in
respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title
to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall
only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate.

The requisites for res judicata or bar by prior judgment are:

(1) The former judgment or order must be final;

(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;

(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and

(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.26

The second and fourth elements of res judicata are not present in this case. Suffice it to state that the judgment rendered by RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, was not a
judgment on the merits. The lower court simply dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage since it found that the Shari’a Circuit Court had jurisdiction
to hear the dissolution of the marriage of Muslims who wed under Islamic rites.

Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy, should have taken cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2,
Iligan City, that Zamoranos is a Muslim, whose first marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and recognized under Islamic law. In fact, the same court
further declared that Zamoranos’ divorce from De Guzman validly severed their marriage ties. Apart from that, Zamoranos presented the following evidence:

1. Affidavit of Confirmation27 executed by the Ustadz, Abdullah Ha-Ja-Utto, who solemnized the marriage of Zamoranos and De Guzman under Islamic rites,
declaring under oath that:

1. I am an Ustadz, in accordance with the Muslim laws and as such, authorized to solemnize the marriages among Muslims;

2. On May 3, 1982, after I was shown the documents attesting that both parties are believers of Islam, I solemnized the marriage of Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman and
Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos in accordance with Muslim Personal Laws in Isabela, Basilan;

3. Sometime in 1992[,] Mr. Mohamad de Guzman and his former wife, Mariam Zamoranos came to see me and asked my assistance to have their marriage and the
subsequent Talaq by the wife, which divorce became irrevocable pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1083; registered [by] the Shari’a Circuit Court in
the province of Basilan; and, after I was convinced that their divorce was in order, I accompanied them to the [C]lerk of [C]ourt of the Shari’a Circuit Court;

4. Satisfied that their marriage and the subsequent divorce were in accordance with Muslim personal laws, the Clerk of Court registered their documents;

5. In June of 1993, the old Capitol building, where the Shari’a Circuit Court was housed, was razed to the ground; and, I found out later that all the records, effects and
office equipments of the Shari’a Circuit Court were totally lost [in] the fire;

6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above statements of fact; and

7. This is issued upon the request of Mr. De Guzman for whatever legal purposes it may serve.

2. Certification28 issued by Judge Kaudri L. Jainul (Judge Jainul), which confirmed the divorce agreement between Zamoranos and De Guzman.

3. Affidavit29 executed by Judge Uyag P. Usman (Judge Usman), former Clerk of Court of Judge Jainul at the time of the confirmation of Zamoranos and De
Guzman’s divorce agreement by the latter. Judge Usman’s affidavit reads, in pertinent part:
1. I am the presiding Judge of the Sharia’s Circuit Court in the City of Pagadian;

2. The first time that a Sharia’s Circuit court was established in the Island Province of Basilan was in 1985, with the Honorable Kaudri L. Jainul, as the Presiding Judge,
while I was then the First Clerk of Court of the Basilan Sharia’s Circuit Court;

3. The Sharia’s Circuit Council in the Island Province of Basilan was housed at the old Capitol Building, in the City of Isabela, Basilan, Philippines;

4. As the Clerk of Court of the Sharia’s Circuit Court since 1985, I can recall that in 1992, Mr. Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman, who is a province mate of mine in
Basilan, and his former wife, Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos, jointly asked for the confirmation of their Talaq, by the wife; which divorce became irrevocable pursuant
to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1083;

5. In June of 1993, all the records of the Sharia’s Circuit Court were lost by reason of the fire that gutted down the old Capitol Building in the City of Isabela;

6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above statements of fact.

From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are officers of the court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another
Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and incidents of such marriage are governed by P.D. No. 1083.

True, the Shari’a Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction over offenses penalized under the RPC. Certainly, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is correct when it
declared that:

The Regional Trial Courts are vested the exclusive and original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or
body. [Sec. 20 (b), BP Blg. 129] The Code of Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083) created the Sharia District Courts and Sharia Circuit Courts with limited jurisdiction.
Neither court was vested jurisdiction over criminal prosecution of violations of the Revised Penal Code. There is nothing in PD 1083 that divested the Regional Trial
Courts of its jurisdiction to try and decide cases of bigamy. Hence, this Court has jurisdiction over this case.30

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of
Bigamy hinges on Pacasum’s claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was governed by civil law. This is obviously far from the truth,
and the fact of Zamoranos’ Muslim status should have been apparent to both lower courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.

The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the
very least, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should have suspended the proceedings until Pacasum had litigated the validity of

Zamoranos and De Guzman’s marriage before the Shari’a Circuit Court and had successfully shown that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered
into by Zamoranos and De Guzman.

Zamoranos was correct in filing the petition for certiorari before the CA when her liberty was already in jeopardy with the continuation of the criminal proceedings
against her.

In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to "promote the advancement and
effective participation of the National Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall consider their customs, traditions, beliefs and interests in the formulation and
implementation of its policies."

Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have jurisdiction over the offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws and the equal recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos.

Article 3, Title II, Book One of P.D. No. 1083 provides:

TITLE II.
CONSTRUCTION OF CODE AND DEFINITION OF TERMS

Article 3. Conflict of provisions.

(1) In case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of general application, the former shall prevail.

(2) Should the conflict be between any provision of this Code and special laws or laws of local application, the latter shall be liberally construed in order to carry out the
former.

(3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims and nothing herein shall be construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim.

In Justice Jainal Rasul and Dr. Ibrahim Ghazali’s Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of the Philippines, the two experts on the subject matter of
Muslim personal laws expound thereon:

The first provision refers to a situation where in case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of general application, this Code shall prevail. For
example, there is conflict between the provision on bigamy under the Revised Penal Code which is a law of general application and Article 27 of this Code, on
subsequent marriage, the latter shall prevail, in the sense that as long as the subsequent marriage is solemnized "in accordance with" the Muslim Code, the provision of
the Revised Penal Code on bigamy will not apply. The second provision refers to a conflict between the provision of this Code which is a special law and another
special law or laws of local application. The latter should be liberally construed to carry out the provision of the Muslim Code.31

On Marriage, Divorce, and Subsequent Marriages, P.D. No. 1083 provides:

TITLE II. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

Chapter One
APPLICABILITY CLAUSE

Article 13. Application. –

(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.

(2) In case of marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.

xxxx

Chapter Two
MARRIAGE (NIKAH)

Section 1. Requisites of Marriage.

xxxx

Section 3. Subsequent Marriages

xxxx

Article 29. By divorcee.

(1) No woman shall contract a subsequent marriage unless she has observed an ‘idda of three monthly courses counted from the date of divorce. However, if she is
pregnant at the time of the divorce, she may remarry only after delivery.

xxxx

Chapter Three
DIVORCE (TALAQ)

Section 1. Nature and Form

Article 45. Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in accordance with this Code to be granted only after the exhaustion of all
possible means of reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by:

(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);

xxxx

Article 46. Divorce by talaq.

(1) A divorce by talaq may be effected by the husband in a single repudiation of his wife during her non-menstrual period (tuhr) within which he has totally abstained
from carnal relation with her. Any number of repudiations made during one tular shall constitute only one repudiation and shall become irrevocable after the expiration
of the prescribed ‘idda.

(2) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for the first or second time, shall have the right to take her back (ruju) within the prescribed ‘idda by resumption of
cohabitation without need of a new contract of marriage. Should he fail to do so, the repudiation shall become irrevocable (talaq bain sugra).

xxxx

Article 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq; or faskh. A talaq or faskh, as soon as it becomes irrevocable, shall have the following effects:

(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another marriage in accordance with this Code;
(b) The spouses shall lose their mutual rights of inheritance;
(c) The custody of children shall be determined in accordance with Article 78 of this Code;
(d) The wife shall be entitled to recover from the husband her whole dower in case the talaq has been effected after the consummation of the marriage, or one-half
thereof if effected before its consummation;
(e) The husband shall not be discharged from his obligation to give support in accordance with Article 67; and
(f) The conjugal partnership if stipulated in the marriage settlements, shall be dissolved and liquidated.

For our edification, we refer once again to Justice Rasul and Dr. Ghazali’s Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of the Philippines:

If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim law is complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is likewise
solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil marriage rites whichever comes first is the validating rite and
the second rite is merely ceremonial one. But, in this case, as long as both parties are Muslims, this Muslim Code will apply. In effect, two situations will arise, in the
application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is, when both parties are Muslims and when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occur[s] when the Civil Code of the Philippines will govern the marriage and divorce of the parties, if
the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code.32

Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the effects of irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of
matrimonial bond, entitling one to remarry.331avvphi1

It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos’ divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Shari’a Circuit Court, and attested to by
Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for
the crime of Bigamy.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 193902 is GRANTED. The petition in G.R. No. 194075 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
03525-MIN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: ARTICLE 18

G.R. No. 188832 April 23, 2014

VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA, Petitioner,

vs.
FIFTH (5th) SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT and ROLDAN E. MALA, represented by his father Hadji Kalam T. Mala, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Shari' a District Courts have no jurisdiction over real actions where one of the parties is not a Muslim.

This is a petition for certiorari with application for issuance of temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to set aside the Fifth (5th) Shari'a District
Court's decision1 dated June 11, 2008 and order2 dated May 29, 2009 in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200.

The facts as established from the pleadings of the parties are as follows:

On February 15, 1996, Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-square-meter parcel of land located in Poblacion, Parang, Maguindanao, now Shariff Kabunsuan, from one
Ceres Cañete. On March 3, 1996, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15633 covering the parcel of land was issued in Roldan’s name.3 At the time of the purchase,
Vivencio B. Villagracia occupied the parcel of land.4

By 2002, Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-60192 issued by the Land Registration Authority allegedly covering the same parcel of land.5

On October 30, 2006, Roldan had the parcel of land surveyed. In a report, Geodetic Engineer Dennis P. Dacup found that Vivencio occupied the parcel of land covered
by Roldan’s certificate of title.6

To settle his conflicting claim with Vivencio, Roldan initiated barangay conciliation proceedings before the Office of the Barangay Chairman of Poblacion II, Parang,
Shariff Kabunsuan. Failing to settle with Vivencio at the barangay level, Roldan filed an action to recover the possession of the parcel of land with respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court.7

In his petition, Roldan alleged that he is a Filipino Muslim; that he is the registered owner of the lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15633; and that
Vivencio occupied his property, depriving him of the right to use, possess, and enjoy it. He prayed that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court order Vivencio to vacate
his property.8

Respondent court took cognizance of the case and caused service of summons on Vivencio. However, despite service of summons, Vivencio failed to file his answer.
Thus, Roldan moved that he be allowed to present evidence ex parte, which motion respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court granted in its order9 dated January 30,
2008.10

In its decision11 dated June 11, 2008, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled that Roldan, as registered owner, had the better right to possess the parcel of land. It
ordered Vivencio to vacate the property, turn it over to Roldan, and pay ₱10,000.00 as moderate damages and ₱5,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

On December 15, 2008, respondent Fifth Shari’a Distict Court issued the notice of writ of execution12 to Vivencio, giving him 30 days from receipt of the notice to
comply with the decision. He received a copy of the notice on December 16, 2008.13

On January 13, 2009, Vivencio filed a petition for relief from judgment with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction.14 In his petition for relief from
judgment, Vivencio cited Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines15 and argued that Shari’a District Courts may only hear
civil actions and proceedings if both parties are Muslims. Considering that he is a Christian, Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land. He prayed that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court set aside the
decision dated June 11, 2008 on the ground of mistake.16

Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled that Vivencio "intentionally [waived] his right to defend himself."17 It noted that he was duly served with summons and
had notice of the following: Roldan’s motion to present evidence ex parte, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s decision dated June 11, 2008, and the writ of
execution. However, Vivencio only went to court "when he lost his right to assail the decision via certiorari."18

According to respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court, Vivencio cited the wrong provision of law. Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines refers to the jurisdiction of Shari’a Circuit Courts, not of Shari’a District Courts.19 It ruled that it had jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for recovery of
possession. Regardless of Vivencio being a non-Muslim, his rights were not prejudiced since respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court decided the case applying the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.20

Thus, in its order21 dated May 29, 2009, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court denied Vivencio’s petition for relief from judgment for lack of merit. It reiterated its
order directing the issuance of a writ of execution of the decision dated June 11, 2008.

Vivencio received a copy of the order denying his petition for relief from judgment on June 17, 2009.22

On August 6, 2009, Vivencio filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order with this court.23

In his petition for certiorari, Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court acted without jurisdiction in rendering the decision dated June 11, 2008. Under
Article 143, paragraph (2)(b) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines,24 Shari’a District Courts may only take cognizance of real actions where the
parties involved are Muslims. Reiterating that he is not a Muslim, Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of Roldan’s action. Thus, all the proceedings before respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court, including the decision dated June 11, 2008, are void.25

In the resolution26 dated August 19, 2009, this court ordered Roldan to comment on Vivencio’s petition for certiorari. This court subsequently issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the implementation of the writ of execution against Vivencio.27

On September 21, 2011, Roldan filed his comment28 on the petition for certiorari. He allegedly filed the action for recovery of possession with the Shari’a District
Court where "a more speedy disposition of the case would be obtained":29
1. That SDC Spl. Case No. 07-200 (Quieting of Title…) was duly filed with the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court, Cotabato City at the option of herein private
respondent (petitioner below) who believed that a more speedy disposition of the case would be obtained when the action is filed with the Shariah District Court than in
the Regional Trial Courts considering the voluminous pending cases at the Regional Trial Courts[.]30

On Vivencio’s claim that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to decide the action for recovery of possession because he is a non-Muslim, Roldan
argued that no provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines prohibited non-Muslims from participating in Shari’a court proceedings, especially in
actions where the Shari’a court applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Thus, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court validly took cognizance of his
action:

2. That the Shariah District Court is not a court exclusively for muslim litigants. No provision in the Code on Muslim Personal Laws which expressly prohibits non-
muslim to participate in the proceedings in the Shariah Courts, especially in actions which applies the civil code and not the Code on Muslim Personal Laws;

3. The Shariah District Courts has jurisdiction over action for quieting of title filed by a muslim litigant since the nature of the action involved mere removal of cloud of
doubt upon one’s Certificate of Title. The laws applied in this case is the Civil Code and other related laws, and not the Code on Muslim Personal Laws[.]31

Since respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had jurisdiction to decide the action for recovery of possession, Roldan argued that the proceedings before it were valid.
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Vivencio upon service on him of summons. When Vivencio failed to file his answer, he
"effectively waived his right to participate in the proceedings [before the Fifth Shari’a District Court]"32 and he cannot argue that his rights were prejudiced:

4. That it is not disputed that herein petitioner (respondent below) was properly served with summons, notices and other court processes when the SDC Spl. Case No.
07-200 was filed and heard in the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court, Cotabato City, but petitioner (respondent below) intentionally or without known reason, ignore the
proceedings;

5. That the main issue in the instant action for certiorari is whether or not herein petitioner (respondent below) has effectively waived his right to participate in the
proceedings below and had lost his right to appeal via Certiorari; and the issue on whether or not the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court has jurisdiction over an action
where one of the parties is a non-muslim;

6. That the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court, Cotabato City acquired jurisdiction over the case and that the same Court had correctly ruled that herein petitioner
(respondent) intentionally waived his right to defend himself including his right to appeal via certiorari;

7. That it is humbly submitted that when the Shariah District Court took cognizance of an action under its concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Court, the law
rules applied is not the Code on Muslim Personal Laws but the Civil Code of the Philippines and the Revised Rules of Procedure, hence the same would not prejudice
the right of herein petitioner (respondent below)[.]33

In the resolution dated November 21, 2011, this court ordered Vivencio to reply to Roldan’s comment. On February 3, 2012, Vivencio filed his manifestation,34 stating
that he would no longer file a reply to the comment as he had "exhaustively discussed the issue presented for resolution in [his petition for certiorari]."35

The principal issue for our resolution is whether a Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over a real action where one of the parties is not a Muslim.

We also resolve the following issues:

1. Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and decide a real action where one of the parties is a non-Muslim if the District Court decides the action
applying the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines; and

2. Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and decide a real action filed by a Muslim against a non-Muslim if the non-Muslim defendant was served with
summons.

We rule for petitioner Vivencio.

Respondent Fifth Shari’a District

Court had no jurisdiction to hear, try,
and decide Roldan’s action for
recovery of possession

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong."36 This power is
conferred by law,37 which may either be the Constitution or a statute. Since subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law, parties cannot choose, consent to, or agree as
to what court or tribunal should decide their disputes.38 If a court hears, tries, and decides an action in which it has no jurisdiction, all its proceedings, including the
judgment rendered, are void.39

To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, the material allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are
examined.40

The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts is the Code of the Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code,
Shari’a District Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction with "existing civil courts" over real actions not arising from customary contracts41 wherein the parties
involved are Muslims:

ART 143. Original jurisdiction. – x x x x

(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari’a District Court shall have original jurisdiction over:

xxxx

(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1(d)42 wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court; and
xxxx

When ownership is acquired over a particular property, the owner has the right to possess and enjoy it.43 If the owner is dispossessed of his or her property, he or she
has a right of action to recover its possession from the dispossessor.44 When the property involved is real,45 such as land, the action to recover it is a real action;46
otherwise, the action is a personal action.47 In such actions, the parties involved must be Muslims for Shari’a District Courts to validly take cognizance of them.

In this case, the allegations in Roldan’s petition for recovery of possession did not state that Vivencio is a Muslim. When Vivencio stated in his petition for relief from
judgment that he is not a Muslim, Roldan did not dispute this claim.

When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court should have motu proprio dismissed the case. Under Rule 9, Section 1
of the Rules of Court, if it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action based on the pleadings or the evidence on record, the court shall
dismiss the claim:

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However,
when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.

Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no authority under the law to decide Roldan’s action because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims. Thus,
it had no jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession. All its proceedings in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200 are void.

Roldan chose to file his action with the Shari’a District Court, instead of filing the action with the regular courts, to obtain "a more speedy disposition of the case."48
This would have been a valid argument had all the parties involved in this case been Muslims. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, the jurisdiction of Shari’a District
Courts over real actions not arising from customary contracts is concurrent with that of existing civil courts. However, this concurrent jurisdiction over real actions "is
applicable solely when both parties are Muslims"49 as this court ruled in Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong.50 When one of the parties is not a Muslim, the action must be
filed before the regular courts.

The application of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines by respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court does not validate the proceedings before the court.
Under Article 175 of the Muslim Code, customary contracts are construed in accordance with Muslim law.51 Hence, Shari’a District Courts apply Muslim law when
resolving real actions arising from customary contracts.

In real actions not arising from contracts customary to Muslims, there is no reason for Shari’a District Courts to apply Muslim law. In such real actions, Shari’a District
Courts will necessarily apply the laws of general application, which in this case is the Civil Code of the Philippines, regardless of the court taking cognizance of the
action. This is the reason why the original jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts over real actions not arising from customary contracts is concurrent with that of regular
courts.

However, as discussed, this concurrent jurisdiction arises only if the parties involved are Muslims. Considering that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court had no jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of real property. The proceedings before it are void, regardless of the fact that it
applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines in resolving the action.

True, no provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines expressly prohibits non-Muslims from participating in Shari’a court proceedings. In fact,
there are instances when provisions in the Muslim Code apply to non-Muslims. Under Article 13 of the Muslim Code,52 provisions of the Code on marriage and
divorce apply to the female party in a marriage solemnized according to Muslim law, even if the female is non-Muslim.53 Under Article 93, paragraph (c) of the
Muslim Code,54 a person of a different religion is disqualified from inheriting from a Muslim decedent.55 However, by operation of law and regardless of Muslim law
to the contrary, the decedent’s parent or spouse who is a non-Muslim "shall be entitled to one-third of what he or she would have received without such
disqualification."56 In these instances, non-Muslims may participate in Shari’a court proceedings.57

Nonetheless, this case does not involve any of the previously cited instances. This case involves an action for recovery of possession of real property. As a matter of
law, Shari’a District Courts may only take cognizance of a real action "wherein the parties involved are Muslims."58 Considering that one of the parties involved in this
case is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the action for recovery of possession of real property. The
judgment against Vivencio is void for respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.

That Vivencio raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter only after respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had rendered judgment is immaterial. A
party may assail the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over a subject matter at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.59 The reason is that "jurisdiction is
conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action."60

In Figueroa v. People of the Philippines,61 Venancio Figueroa was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan.
The trial court convicted Figueroa as charged. On appeal with the Court of Appeals, Figueroa raised for the first time the issue of jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court to decide the case. Ruling that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the crime charged, this court dismissed the criminal case despite the fact that
Figueroa objected to the trial court’s jurisdiction only on appeal.

In Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin,62 Johnny Pastorin filed a complaint for constructive dismissal against Metromedia Times Corporation. Metromedia
Times Corporation actively participated in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. When the Labor Arbiter ruled against Metromedia Times, it appealed to the
National Labor Relations Commission, arguing for the first time that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the complaint. According to Metromedia Times, the
case involved a grievance issue "properly cognizable by the voluntary arbitrator."63 This court set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter despite the fact that the issue of jurisdiction was raised only on appeal.

There are exceptional circumstances when a party may be barred from assailing the jurisdiction of the court to decide a case. In the 1968 case of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy,64 the Spouses Tijam sued the Spouses Sibonghanoy on July 19, 1948 before the Court of First Instance of Cebu to recover ₱1,908.00. At that time, the
court with exclusive original jurisdiction to hear civil actions in which the amount demanded does not exceed ₱2,000.00 was the court of justices of the peace and
municipal courts in chartered cities under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

As prayed for by the Spouses Tijam in their complaint, the Court of First Instance issued a writ of attachment against the Spouses Sibonghanoy. However, the latter
filed a counter-bond issued by Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. Thus, the Court of First Instance dissolved the writ of attachment.

After trial, the Court of First Instance decided in favor of the Spouses Tijam. When the writ of execution returned unsatisfied, the Spouses Tijam moved for the issuance
of a writ of execution against Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.’s bond. The Court of First Instance granted the motion. Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. moved to
quash the writ of execution, which motion the Court of First Instance denied. Thus, the surety company appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals sustained the Court of First Instance’s decision. Five days after receiving the Court of Appeals’ decision, Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
filed a motion to dismiss, arguing for the first time that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals
forwarded the case to this court for resolution.

This court ruled that the surety company could no longer assail the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance on the ground of estoppel by laches. Parties may be barred
from assailing the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action if it took them an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to object to the court’s
jurisdiction.65 This is to discourage the deliberate practice of parties in invoking the jurisdiction of a court to seek affirmative relief, only to repudiate the court’s
jurisdiction after failing to obtain the relief sought.66 In such cases, the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is overlooked in favor of the public policy of
discouraging such inequitable and unfair conduct.67

In Tijam, it took Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. 15 years before assailing the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. As early as 1948, the surety company
became a party to the case when it issued the counter-bond to the writ of attachment. During trial, it invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance by seeking
several affirmative reliefs, including a motion to quash the writ of execution. The surety company only assailed the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance in 1963
when the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision. This court said:

x x x x Were we to sanction such conduct on [Manila Surety and Fidelity, Co. Inc.’s] part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the
present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel [the spouses Tijam] to go up their Calvary once more.

The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.68

After this court had rendered the decision in Tijam, this court observed that the "non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction"69 has been ignored, and the Tijam doctrine
has become more the general rule than the exception.

In Calimlim v. Ramirez,70 this court said:

A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the
action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of [Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy]. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. x x x.71

Thus, the court reiterated the "unquestionably accepted"72 rule that objections to a court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. This is because jurisdiction over the subject matter is a "matter of law"73 and "may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the
parties."74

In Figueroa,75 this court ruled that the Tijam doctrine "must be applied with great care;"76 otherwise, the doctrine "may be a most effective weapon for the
accomplishment of injustice":77

x x x estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely — only from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The
doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity must be strong in its favor. When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the
accomplishment of injustice. x x x a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. x x x. No laches will even attach when the judgment is null
and void for want of jurisdiction x x x.78

In this case, the exceptional circumstances similar to Tijam do not exist. Vivencio never invoked respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s jurisdiction to seek
affirmative relief. He filed the petition for relief from judgment precisely to assail the jurisdiction of respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court over Roldan’s petition for
recovery of possession.

Thus, the general rule holds. Vivencio validly assailed the jurisdiction of respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court over the action for recovery of possession for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of Roldan’s action.

II

That respondent Fifth Shari’a

District Court served summons on
petitioner Vivencio did not vest it
with jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner Vivencio

Roldan argued that the proceedings before respondent Shari’a District Court were valid since the latter acquired jurisdiction over the person of Vivencio. When
Vivencio was served with summons, he failed to file his answer and waived his right to participate in the proceedings before respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court.
Since Vivencio waived his right to participate in the proceedings, he cannot argue that his rights were prejudiced.

Jurisdiction over the person is "the power of [a] court to render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings
rendered in the action."79 A court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff once he or she files the initiatory pleading.80 As for the defendant, the court
acquires jurisdiction over his or her person either by his or her voluntary appearance in court81 or a valid service on him or her of summons.82

Jurisdiction over the person is required in actions in personam83 or actions based on a party’s personal liability.84 Since actions in personam "are directed against
specific persons and seek personal judgments,"85 it is necessary that the parties to the action "are properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be
heard."86 With respect to the defendant, he or she must have been duly served with summons to be considered properly impleaded; otherwise, the proceedings in
personam, including the judgment rendered, are void.87

On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person is not necessary for a court to validly try and decide actions in rem.88 Actions in rem are "directed against the thing or
property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world."89 In actions in rem, the court trying the case must have jurisdiction
over the res, or the thing under litigation, to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either "by the seizure of the property under legal
process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and
made effective."90 In actions in rem, summons must still be served on the defendant but only to satisfy due process requirements.91
Unlike objections to jurisdiction over the subject matter which may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, objections to jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; otherwise, the objection to the court’s jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is deemed waived. Under Rule 9,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, "defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived."

In this case, Roldan sought to enforce a personal obligation on Vivencio to vacate his property, restore to him the possession of his property, and pay damages for the
unauthorized use of his property.92 Thus, Roldan’s action for recovery of possession is an action in personam. As this court explained in Ang Lam v. Rosillosa and
Santiago,93 an action to recover the title to or possession of a parcel of land "is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the
right to a tangible thing."94 Also, in Muñoz v. Yabut, Jr.,95 this court said that "a judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in
personam. It is binding only against the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action."96

This action being in personam, service of summons on Vivencio was necessary for respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court to acquire jurisdiction over Vivencio’s
person.

However, as discussed, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, with Vivencio not being a Muslim. Therefore,
all the proceedings before respondent Shari’a District Court, including the service of summons on Vivencio, are void.

III

The Shari’a Appellate Court and the

Office of the Jurisconsult in Islamic
law must now be organized to
effectively enforce the Muslim legal
system in the Philippines

We note that Vivencio filed directly with this court his petition for certiorari of respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s decision. Under the judicial system in Republic
Act No. 9054,97 the Shari’a Appellate Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari of decisions of the Shari’a District Courts. He should have
filed his petition for certiorari before the Shari’a Appellate Court.

However, the Shari’a Appellate Court is yet to be organized.1âwphi1 Thus, we call for the organization of the court system created under Republic Act No. 9054 to
effectively enforce the Muslim legal system in our country. After all, the Muslim legal system – a legal system complete with its own civil, criminal, commercial,
political, international, and religious laws98 – is part of the law of the land,99 and Shari’a courts are part of the Philippine judicial system.100

Shari’a Circuit Courts and Shari’a District Courts created under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines shall continue to discharge their duties.101 All
cases tried in Shari’a Circuit Courts shall be appealable to Shari’a District Courts.[[102]

The Shari’a Appellate Court created under Republic Act No. 9054 shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases tried in the Shari’a District Courts.103 It shall also
exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, and other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.104 The decisions of the Shari’a Appellate Court shall be final and executory, without prejudice to the original and appellate jurisdiction of this court.105

This court held in Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong106 that "until such time that the Shari’a Appellate Court shall have been organized,"107 decisions of the Shari’a District
Court shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals and "shall be referred to a Special Division to be organized in any of the [Court of Appeals] stations preferably
composed of Muslim [Court of Appeals] Justices."108 However, considering that To m a w i s was not yet promulgated when Vivencio filed his petition for certiorari
on August 6, 2009, we take cognizance of Vivencio’s petition for certiorari in the exercise of our original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari.109

Moreover, priority should be given in organizing the Office of the Jurisconsult in Islamic law. A Jurisconsult in Islamic law or "Mufti" is an officer with authority to
render legal opinions or "fatawa"110 on any questions relating to Muslim law.111 These legal opinions should be based on recognized authorities112 and "must be
rendered in precise accordance with precedent."113 In the Philippines where only Muslim personal laws are codified, a legal officer learned in the Qur’an and Hadiths
is necessary to assist this court as well as Shari’a court judges in resolving disputes not involving Muslim personal laws.

All told, Shari’a District Courts have jurisdiction over a real action only when the parties involved are Muslims. Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court acted without
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of Roldan E. Mala’s action for recovery of possession considering that Vivencio B. Villagracia is not a Muslim. Accordingly, the
proceedings in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200, including the judgment rendered, are void.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s decision dated June 11, 2008 and order dated May 29, 2009 in SDC
Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200 are SET ASIDE without prejudice to the filing of respondent Roldan E. Mala of an action with the proper court.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: COMMENCEMENT AND TERMINATION OF PERSONALITY

G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.

Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.

A.P. Salvador for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from
physician who caused the same.

The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician.
Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz, ordering the
latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the award by a
majority vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting opinion.

The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:

Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present
husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the
defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be
inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955,
accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where
the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff
was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.

It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.

The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case
of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en
consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and
obligations.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages
could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact,
even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from
on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child
(conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that
the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that
the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.

The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery can not had for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway
Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the
injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help, support or services from an
unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account
of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the
circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral
damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not
contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of
the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning
of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have
been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that,
under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.

The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:

It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the abortion which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician
would be highminded rather than mercenary; and that his primary concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged of an unworthy member rather
than turn his wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of
abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages of which not only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.

It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally
reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of
the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical Examiners for their information and such investigation and action against
the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant.
TOPIC: COMMENCEMENT AND TERMINATION OF PERSONALITY

G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970

CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.

Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.

Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590,
dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and another order denying amendment of the same pleading.

The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:

Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan
City, and had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and
intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence,
she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.

Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing
arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.

Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining
defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this
Court.

We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all
purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors,
particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa
mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his
testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the testator
Article 854, Civil Code).

ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons who would legally represent them if they were already born.

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after
the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of 'representation.

It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not
contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that
Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a
condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa, in his
Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points this out:

Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido tecnico que la moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que constituyen un
caso de los propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en estado de pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no determina el nacimiento de
aquellos derechos (que ya existian de antemano), sino que se trata de un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit., page 271)

A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint
in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines:

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.

The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:

ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....

Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the
order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision.
Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
TOPIC: COMMENCEMENT AND TERMINATION OF PERSONALITY

G.R. No. L-39110 November 28, 1933

ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.

Jose Sotelo for plaintiffs-appellants.

Vicente J. Francisco for defendant-appellant.

STREET, J.:

This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Antonia Loanco de Jesus in her own right and by her mother, Pilar Marquez, as next friend and
representative of Ismael and Pacita Loanco, infants, children of the first-named plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering from the defendant, Cesar Syquia, the sum of
thirty thousand pesos as damages resulting to the first-named plaintiff from breach of a marriage promise, to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael and Pacita as
natural children begotten by him with Antonia, and to pay for the maintenance of the three the amount of five hundred pesos per month, together with costs. Upon
hearing the cause, after answer of the defendant, the trial court erred a decree requiring the defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child and to pay
maintenance for him at the rate of fifty pesos per month, with costs, dismissing the action in other respects. From this judgment both parties appealed, the plaintiffs
from so much of the decision as denied part of the relief sought by them, and the defendant from that feature of the decision which required him to recognize Ismael
Loanco and to pay for his maintenance.

At the time with which we are here concerned, the defendant, Cesar Syquia was of the age of twenty-three years, and an unmarried scion of the prominent family in
Manila, being possessed of a considerable property in his own right. His brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of a barber shop in Tondo, where the defendant
was accustomed to go for tonsorial attention. In the month of June Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl of the age of twenty years, was taken on as cashier in this
barber shop. Syquia was not long in making her acquaintance and amorous relations resulted, as a consequence of which Antonia was gotten with child and a baby boy
was born on June 17, 1931. The defendant was a constant visitor at the home of Antonia in the early months of her pregnancy, and in February, 1931, he wrote and
placed in her hands a note directed to the padre who has expected to christen the baby. This note was as follows:

Saturday, 1:30 p. m.
February 14, 1931

Rev. FATHER,

The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.

CESAR SYQUIA

The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the eve of his departure on a trip to China and Japan; and while he was abroad on this visit he wrote
several letters to Antonia showing a paternal interest in the situation that had developed with her, and cautioning her to keep in good condition in order that "junior"
(meaning the baby to be, "Syquia, Jr.") might be strong, and promising to return to them soon. The baby arrived at the time expected, and all necessary anticipatory
preparations were made by the defendant. To this he employed his friend Dr. Crescenciano Talavera to attend at the birth, and made arrangements for the hospitalization
of the mother in Saint Joseph's Hospital of the City of Manila, where she was cared for during confinement.

When Antonio was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, with her mother and the baby, to a house at No. 551 Camarines Street, Manila, where they lived together
for about a year in regular family style, all household expenses, including gas and electric light, being defrayed by Syquia. In course of time, however, the defendant's
ardor abated and, when Antonia began to show signs of a second pregnancy the defendant decamped, and he is now married to another woman. A point that should here
be noted is that when the time came for christening the child, the defendant, who had charge of the arrangement for this ceremony, caused the name Ismael Loanco to
be given to him, instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., as was at first planned.

The first question that is presented in the case is whether the note to the padre, quoted above, in connection with the letters written by the defendant to the mother during
pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of paternity, within the meaning of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code. Upon this point we have no hesitancy in
holding that the acknowledgment thus shown is sufficient. It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights and
capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the recognition
of unborn child is really not different from that presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a child already born and bearing a specific name. Only the means
and resources of identification are different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral evidence to connect the particular individual intended with the name used.

It is contended however, in the present case that the words of description used in the writings before us are not legally sufficient to indemnify the child now suing as
Ismael Loanco. This contention is not, in our opinion, well founded. The words of recognition contained in the note to the padre are not capable of two constructions.
They refer to a baby then conceived which was expected to be born in June and which would thereafter be presented for christening. The baby came, and though it was
in the end given the name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., its identity as the child which the defendant intended to acknowledge is clear. Any doubt that
might arise on this point is removed by the letters Exhibit F, G, H, and J. In these letters the defendant makes repeated reference to junior as the baby which Antonia, to
whom the letters were addressed, was then carrying in her womb, and the writer urged Antonia to eat with good appetite in order that junior might be vigorous. In the
last letter (Exhibit J) written only a few days before the birth of the child, the defendant urged her to take good care of herself and of junior also.

It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the sufficiency of acknowledgment is whether the acknowledgment contemplated in subsection 1 of
article 135 of the Civil Code must be made in a single document or may be made in more than one document, of indubitable authenticity, written by the recognizing
father. Upon this point we are of the opinion that the recognition can be made out by putting together the admissions of more than one document, supplementing the
admission made in one letter by an admission or admissions made in another. In the case before us the admission of paternity is contained in the note to the padre and
the other letters suffice to connect that admission with the child then being carried by Antonia L. de Jesus. There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be
addressed to one, or any particular individual. It is merely required that the writing shall be indubitable.

The second question that presents itself in this case is whether the trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status
of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said
Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code. The facts already stated are sufficient, in our opinion, to justify the conclusion of the trial court on this
point, and we may add here that our conclusion upon the first branch of the case that the defendant had acknowledged this child in writings above referred to must be
taken in connection with the facts found by the court upon the second point. It is undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant supplied a home for it and the
mother, in which they lived together with the defendant. This situation continued for about a year, and until Antonia became enciente a second time, when the idea
entered the defendant's head of abandoning her. The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and
the period in this case was long enough to evince the father's resolution to concede the status. The circumstance that he abandoned the mother and child shortly before
this action was started is unimportant. The word "continuous" in subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean that the concession of status shall continue
forever, but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues.

What has been said disposes of the principal feature of the defendant's appeal. With respect to the appeal of the plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that the trial court was
right in refusing to give damages to the plaintiff, Antonia Loanco, for supposed breach of promise to marry. Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add
that the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith
of such promise. This case exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain such an action. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based
requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.

Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to the amount of the maintenance which the trial court allowed to Ismael Loanco. And in this
connection we merely point out that, as conditions change, the Court of First Instance will have jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of the pension as
circumstances will require.

The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
TOPIC: COMMENCEMENT AND TERMINATION OF PERSONALITY

G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-
SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution2 dated 9 May
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution3 dated 20 November 2007 of respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty.
Allan S. Montaño (Montaño) granting bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng
Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave,
Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the
Union, which reads:

ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE

xxxx

Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE—The Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave with pay to any employee in case of death of the employee’s legitimate
dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and sisters) based on the following:

2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days

2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days

xxxx

ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS

xxxx

Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE—The Company shall grant death and accidental insurance to the employee or his family in the following manner:

xxxx

4.3 DEPENDENTS—Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and
children). In case the employee is single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death
certificate).4

The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in
the 38th week of pregnancy.5 According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to
uteroplacental insufficiency.6

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the
death and accident insurance.7

Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillano’s claims for bereavement and other death benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery
provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute,8 prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR).9 In a Submission
Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement
leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2

and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.10 The parties mutually chose Atty. Montaño, an Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.11

When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the parties proceeded to submit their respective Position Papers, 12 Replies,13
and Rejoinders14 to Atty. Montaño.

The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and
Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that
his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer
Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar
provisions of their CBAs.

The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already
died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA between his union and Mayer
Steel.15 Dugan’s child was only 24 weeks in the womb and died before labor, as opposed to Hortillano’s child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only
died during labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the same compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel
and Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with their respective employees’ unions were the same as the representatives of Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA
with the Union.

Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the
safety of and decent living for the laborer.

On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It
claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s
case. Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 4216 of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never
died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of
delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus that was delivered dead
could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported.

Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally
accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by both parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child included in the definition of dependent,
as used in the CBA – the death of whom would have qualified the parent-employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits – bound the Union to the legally
accepted definition of the latter term.

Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were
irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its claim that the grant of
bereavement leave and other death benefits to the parent-employee for the loss of an unborn child constituted "company practice."

On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution17 ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave
with pay and death benefits.

Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:

This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the covered employees as provided under Article X, Section 2 of the
parties’ CBA, three (3) indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is "death"; (2) such death must be of employee’s "dependent"; and (3) such dependent must be
"legitimate".

On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as provided under Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties’ CBA, four
(4) indispensable elements must be present: (a) there is "death"; (b) such death must be of employee’s "dependent"; (c) such dependent must be "legitimate"; and (d)
proper legal document to be presented.18

Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an employee’s legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents
from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power
or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died during the labor or delivery. There was also no
question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child, legitimate.

In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four
Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00), representing his bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos
(₱11,550.00) representing death benefits, or a total amount of ₱16,489.00

The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.

Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari,19 under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 101697.

Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in granting Hortillano’s claims for bereavement leave with pay and other death benefits because no death of an
employee’s dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since what was contemplated by
the CBA was the death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed out that its contention was
bolstered by the fact that the term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon said
child’s birth, otherwise, no such appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillano’s entitlement to bereavement leave and other death benefits
under the CBA were lacking.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaño’s Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court interpreted death to
mean as follows:

[Herein petitioner Continental Steel’s] exposition on the legal sense in which the term "death" is used in the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant
for ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave and death benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel]
that the acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such event of premature delivery of a
fetus could never be contemplated as a "death" as to be covered by the CBA provision, undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with
whom the dead fetus stands in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical significance to the term "death of a legitimate dependent"
as condition for granting bereavement leave and death benefits under the CBA. Following [Continental Steel’s] theory, there can be no experience of "death" to speak
of. The Court, however, does not share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less than "loss of human life", especially for the expectant
parents. In this light, bereavement leave and death benefits are meant to assuage the employee and the latter’s immediate family, extend to them solace and support,
rather than an act conferring legal status or personality upon the unborn child. [Continental Steel’s] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical purposes
only sadly misses this crucial point.20

Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].21

In a Resolution22 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration23 of Continental Steel.

Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be
applied. Only one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality.

We are not persuaded.

As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent,
spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the employee. The requisites for death and accident insurance under
Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a parent,
brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.

It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the provisions of the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for
denying Hortillano’s claim for bereavement leave and other death benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms "death" and "dependent" as used in
the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or construction of the same. Moreover,
Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor the Union sought to define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the
negotiation of the CBA.

The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child
acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.

First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the
same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality, which reads:

Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act,
which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.

We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question
before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the child’s parents. The
rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s death.

Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality
may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die.

And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.24 Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she
could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,25 that the State must protect
equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is "one who relies on another for support;
one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else." Under said general definition,26 even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents.
Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is
explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single
employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality, as
Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.

The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,27 we have expounded on who is a legitimate
child, viz:

A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation
between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate." (Emphasis ours.)

Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,28 we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:

The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate
(and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are
illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)

It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the
present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child
legitimate upon her conception.1avvphi1

Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element entitling him to death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation
of the death certificate of his unborn child.

Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA, Hortillano’s claims for the same should have been granted by
Continental Steel.

We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his
family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had
a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions
thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be
interpreted in favor of labor.29 In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor
Relations Commission,30 we pronounced:

Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are
equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved
in favor of labor, it insists that what is involved-here is the amended CBA which is essentially a contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the
avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.

In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically stated that:

When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by
sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker.

Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we declared:

Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano
bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred
Fifty Pesos (₱11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: DEATH

G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948

ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,

vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.

Angel Limjoco, Jr. and Delfin L. Gonzales for petitioner.

Bienvenido A. Tan for respondent.

HILADO, J.:

Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibañez, rendered its decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O. Fragante,
as applicant for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said commission held that the evidence
therein showed that the public interest and convenience will be promoted in a proper and suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and maintenance of another ice
plant of two and one-half (2-½) tons in the municipality of San Juan; that the original applicant Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death; and
that his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service". The commission, therefore, overruled the opposition filed in the case and ordered
"that under the provisions of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended a certificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased
Pedro Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and
operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant in the
said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City", subject to the conditions therein set forth in detail (petitioner's brief,
pp. 33-34).

Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:

1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in accordance with law.

2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not reasonably supported by evidence.

3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner and the Ice and Cold Storage Industries of the Philippines, Inc., as existing operators, a reasonable
opportunity to meet the increased demand.

4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an unwarranted departure from its announced policy with respect to the establishment and operation of ice plant.
(Pp. 1-2, petitioner's brief.)

In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante
for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be
in contravention of law.

If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to prosecute his application before the commission to its final conclusion.
No one would have denied him that right. As declared by the commission in its decision, he had invested in the ice plant in question P 35,000, and from what the
commission said regarding his other properties and business, he would certainly have been financially able to maintain and operate said plant had he not died. His
transportation business alone was netting him about P1,440 a month. He was a Filipino citizen and continued to be such till his demise. The commission declared in its
decision, in view of the evidence before it, that his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant. The aforesaid right of Pedro O. Fragante to
prosecute said application to its conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for which a
right was property despite the possibility that in the end the commission might have denied application, although under the facts of the case, the commission granted the
application in view of the financial ability of the estate to maintain and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his memorandum of March 19, 1947, admits (page 3) that the
certificate of public convenience once granted "as a rule, should descend to his estate as an asset". Such certificate would certainly be property, and the right to acquire
such a certificate, by complying with the requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent in his lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial administrator after his
death.

If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land and during the life of the option he died, if the option had been given him in the
ordinary course of business and not out of special consideration for his person, there would be no doubt that said option and the right to exercise it would have survived
to his estate and legal representatives. In such a case there would also be the possibility of failure to acquire the property should he or his estate or legal representative
fail to comply with the conditions of the option. In the case at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's undoubted right to apply for and acquire the desired certificate of public
convenience — the evidence established that the public needed the ice plant — was under the law conditioned only upon the requisite citizenship and economic ability
to maintain and operate the service. Of course, such right to acquire or obtain such certificate of public convenience was subject to failure to secure its objective through
nonfulfillment of the legal conditions, but the situation here is no different from the legal standpoint from that of the option in the illustration just given.

Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend actions, among other cases, for the protection of the property or rights of the
deceased which survive, and it says that such actions may be brought or defended "in the right of the deceased".

Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the executor or administrator, the making of an inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and
estate of the deceased which shall come to his possession or knowledge, or to the possession of any other person for him.

In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages 366, 367) the present chief Justice of this Court draws the following conclusion from the
decisions cited by him:

Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action affecting the property or rights (emphasis supplied) of a deceased person which may be brought by or
against him if he were alive, may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or against the administrator, unless the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest
thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive, because death extinguishes the right . . . .

It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience before the Public Service Commission is not an "action". But the foregoing
provisions and citations go to prove that the decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his
estate which, being placed under the control and management of the executor or administrator, can not be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the
benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the right involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished
proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public convenience of the deceased before the Public Service Commission, it is but logical that the legal
representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right effective in that proceeding.

Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and article 336 of the Civil Code, respectively, consider as immovable and movable things rights which
are not material. The same eminent commentator says in the cited volume (p. 45) that article 336 of the Civil Code has been deficiently drafted in that it is not
sufficiently expressive of all incorporeal rights which are also property for juridical purposes.

Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the term, property includes, among other things, "an option", and "the certificate of the railroad
commission permitting the operation of a bus line", and on page 748 of the same volume we read:

However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have also been declared to include every species of title, inchoate or complete, and embrace rights which lie in
contract, whether executory or executed. (Emphasis supplied.)

Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a "person" within the meaning of the Public Service Act.

Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the following doctrine in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana:

As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person, a forgery committed after the death of the man whose name purports to be signed to the instrument may be
prosecuted as with the intent to defraud the estate. Billings vs. State, 107 Ind., 54, 55, 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E. 763, 57 Am. Rep. 77.

The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before it a case of forgery committed after the death of one Morgan for the purpose of defrauding his
estate. The objection was urged that the information did not aver that the forgery was committed with the intent to defraud any person. The Court, per Elliott, J.,
disposed of this objection as follows:

. . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the law does not regard the estate of a decedent as a person. This intention (contention) cannot prevail.
The estate of the decedent is a person in legal contemplation. "The word "person" says Mr. Abbot, "in its legal signification, is a generic term, and includes artificial as
well as natural persons," 2 Abb. Dict. 271; Douglas vs. Pacific, etc. Co., 4 Cal. 304; Planters', etc., Bank vs. Andrews, 8 Port. (Ala.) 404. It said in another work that
'persons are of two kinds: natural and artificial. A natural person is a human being. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons forming a
corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class of artificial persons is recognized only to a
limited extent in our law. "Examples are the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person." 2 Rapalje & L. Law Dict. 954. Our own cases inferentially recognize the
correctness of the definition given by the authors from whom we have quoted, for they declare that it is sufficient, in pleading a claim against a decedent's estate, to
designate the defendant as the estate of the deceased person, naming him. Ginn vs. Collins, 43 Ind. 271. Unless we accept this definition as correct, there would be a
failure of justice in cases where, as here, the forgery is committed after the death of a person whose name is forged; and this is a result to be avoided if it can be done
consistent with principle. We perceive no difficulty in avoiding such a result; for, to our minds, it seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as
an artificial person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made, and, although natural persons as heirs, devises, or
creditors, have an interest in the property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal entity. The interest which natural persons have in it is not complete until there has been
a due administration; and one who forges the name of the decedent to an instrument purporting to be a promissory note must be regarded as having intended to defraud
the estate of the decedent, and not the natural persons having diverse interests in it, since ha cannot be presumed to have known who those persons were, or what was
the nature of their respective interest. The fraudulent intent is against the artificial person, — the estate — and not the natural persons who have direct or contingent
interest in it. (107 Ind. 54, 55, 6 N.E. 914-915.)

In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is considered a "person", for quashing of the proceedings for no other
reason than his death would entail prejudicial results to his investment amounting to P35,000.00 as found by the commission, not counting the expenses and
disbursements which the proceeding can be presumed to have occasioned him during his lifetime, let alone those defrayed by the estate thereafter. In this jurisdiction
there are ample precedents to show that the estate of a deceased person is also considered as having legal personality independent of their heirs. Among the most recent
cases may be mentioned that of "Estate of Mota vs. Concepcion, 56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein the principal plaintiff was the estate of the deceased Lazaro Mota, and this
Court gave judgment in favor of said estate along with the other plaintiffs in these words:

. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it holds that defendants Concepcion and Whitaker are indebted to he plaintiffs in the amount of P245,804.69
....

Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the heirs of a deceased person were considered in contemplation of law as
the continuation of his personality by virtue of the provision of article 661 of the first Code that the heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the decedent by the
mere fact of his death. It was so held by this Court in Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil., 44, 46. However, after the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, article 661 of the
Civil Code was abrogated, as held in Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil., 13, 22. In that case, as well as in many others decided by this Court after the innovations
introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of estates of deceased persons, it has been the constant doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property,
rights and assets left by the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his demise.

The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality simply by legal fiction, for they might not have been flesh and blood — the reason
was one in the nature of a legal exigency derived from the principle that the heirs succeeded to the rights and obligations of the decedent. Under the present legal
system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were not
indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate, represented by the executor or administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the
deceased. The reason and purpose for indulging the fiction is identical and the same in both cases. This is why according to the Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs.
State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje & L. Dictionary, 954, among the artificial persons recognized by law figures "a collection of property to which the law attributes the
capacity of having rights and duties", as for instance, the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.

Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be considered a "citizen of the Philippines" within the meaning of section
16 of the Public Service Act, as amended, particularly the proviso thereof expressly and categorically limiting the power of the commission to issue certificates of
public convenience or certificates of public convenience and necessity "only to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States or to corporations, copartnerships,
associations, or joint-stock companies constituted and organized under the laws of the Philippines", and the further proviso that sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up
capital of such entities must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.

Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the legal fiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate of the deceased person is
considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the
decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged. Substantially the same reason is assigned to support the same rule in the jurisdiction of the State of
Indiana, as announced in Billings vs. State, supra, when the Supreme Court of said State said:
. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. it is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the
assets to be properly made . . . .

Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one example, under the bill of rights it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed
therein in the majority of cases relate to natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for
otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional guarantee against being deprived of property without due process of law, or the immunity from unreasonable
searches and seizures. We take it that it was the intendment of the framers to include artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons in these constitutional
immunities and in others of similar nature. Among these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence, we hold that within the framework of
the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate
which, of course, include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his
death. One of those rights was the one involved in his pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of
said application to its final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue from the opposite course.

How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality is considered extended so that any debts or obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid,
and any surviving rights may be exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs, respectively, we find no sound and cogent reason for denying the application of the
same fiction to his citizenship, and for not considering it as likewise extended for the purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before the Public Service
Commission. The outcome of said proceeding, if successful, would in the end inure to the benefit of the same creditors and the heirs. Even in that event petitioner could
not allege any prejudice in the legal sense, any more than he could have done if Fragrante had lived longer and obtained the desired certificate. The fiction of such
extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of the extension of personality. The fiction is made
necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death to the loss of the investment amounting to P35,000, which he
has already made in the ice plant, not counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the Public Service Commission of this Court.

We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the constitution (Article IV), its provisions on Philippine citizenship exclude the legal principle of
extension above adverted to. If for reasons already stated our law indulges the fiction of extension of personality, if for such reasons the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante
should be considered an artificial or juridical person herein, we can find no justification for refusing to declare a like fiction as to the extension of his citizenship for the
purposes of this proceeding.

Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the evidence of record, he would have obtained from the commission the certificate for
which he was applying. The situation has suffered but one change, and that is, his death. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to
appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary
showing, which does not exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is the simple expedient of revoking the certificate or
enjoining them from inheriting it.

Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the
personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the
constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.

Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

TOPIC: DEATH

G.R. No. 182894 April 22, 2014

FE FLORO VALINO, Petitioner,

vs.
ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, FLORANTE D. ADRIANO, RUBEN D. ADRIANO, MARIA TERESA ADRIANO ONGOCO, VICTORIA ADRIANO BAYONA, and
LEAH ANTONETTE D. ADRIANO, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Challenged in this petition is the October 2, 2006 Decision1 and the May 9, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61613, which reversed
the October 1, 1998 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City (RTC) which ruled that petitioner Fe Floro Valino (Valino) was entitled to the
remains of the decedent.

The Facts:

Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano), a partner in the Pelaez Adriano and Gregorio Law Office, married respondent Rosario Adriano (Rosario) on November 15,
1955. The couple had two (2) sons, Florante and Ruben Adriano; three (3) daughters, Rosario, Victoria and Maria Teresa; and one (1) adopted daughter, Leah
Antonette.

The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were eventually separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his
clients, until they decided to live together as husband and wife. Despite such arrangement, he continued to provide financial support to Rosario and their children
(respondents).

In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the United States spending Christmas with her children. As none of the family members
was around, Valino took it upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she
immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the interment for a few days but her request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at
the mausoleum of the family of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attend the interment.

Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he was buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary
to his wishes, respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and that the
remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.

In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been separated for more than twenty (20) years before he courted her. Valino claimed that
throughout the time they were together, he had introduced her to his friends and associates as his wife. Although they were living together, Valino admitted that he
never forgot his obligation to support the respondents. She contended that, unlike Rosario, she took good care of Atty. Adriano and paid for all his medical expenses
when he got seriously ill. She also claimed that despite knowing that Atty. Adriano was in a coma and dying, Rosario still left for the United States. According to
Valino, it was Atty. Adriano’s last wish that his remains be interred in the Valino family mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park.

Valino further claimed that she had suffered damages as result of the suit brought by respondents. Thus, she prayed that she be awarded moral and exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees.

Decision of the RTC

The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit as well as the counterclaim of Valino after it found them to have not been sufficiently proven.

The RTC opined that because Valino lived with Atty. Adriano for a very long time, she knew very well that it was his wish to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park.
Taking into consideration the fact that Rosario left for the United States at the time that he was fighting his illness, the trial court concluded that Rosario did not show
love and care for him. Considering also that it was Valino who performed all the duties and responsibilities of a wife, the RTC wrote that it could be reasonably
presumed that he wished to be buried in the Valino family mausoleum.4

In disposing of the case, the RTC noted that the exhumation and the transfer of the body of Atty. Adriano to the Adriano family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial
Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City, would not serve any useful purpose and so he should be spared and respected.5 Decision of the CA

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to have the remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the expense of respondents. It likewise
directed respondents, at their expense, to transfer, transport and inter the remains of the decedent in the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Park in Novaliches,
Quezon City.

In reaching said determination, the CA explained that Rosario, being the legal wife, was entitled to the custody of the remains of her deceased husband. Citing Article
305 of the New Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, it was the considered view of the appellate court that the law gave the surviving spouse not
only the duty but also the right to make arrangements for the funeral of her husband. For the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right on the ground of her subsisting
marriage with Atty. Adriano at the time of the latter’s death, notwithstanding their 30-year separation in fact.

Like the RTC, however, the CA did not award damages in favor of respondents due to the good intentions shown by Valino in giving the deceased a decent burial when
the wife and the family were in the United States. All other claims for damages were similarly dismissed.

The Sole Issue

The lone legal issue in this petition is who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano.

The Court’s Ruling

Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 1996 of the Family Code, specifies the persons who have the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements for the deceased. Thus:
Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the order established for support, under Article 294. In
case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right. [Emphases
supplied]

Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:

(1) The spouse;

(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;

(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and

(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)

[Emphasis supplied]

Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and 305. [Emphases
supplied]

In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. – The immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the
expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons herein below specified:

(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the surviving spouse if he or she possesses sufficient means to pay the
necessary expenses;

x x x x. [Emphases supplied]

From the aforecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the
exclusion of one’s common law partner. In Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez,7 a petition for habeas corpus was filed by the brothers and sisters of the late Vitaliana Vargas
against her lover, Tomas Eugenio, Sr., alleging that the latter forcibly took her and confined her in his residence. It appearing that she already died of heart failure due to
toxemia of pregnancy, Tomas Eugenio, Sr. sought the dismissal of the petition for lack of jurisdiction and claimed the right to bury the deceased, as the common-law
husband.

In its decision, the Court resolved that the trial court continued to have jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding the death of Vitaliana Vargas. As to the claim of
Tomas Eugenio, Sr. that he should be considered a "spouse" having the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for his common-law wife, the Court ruled:

x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who
represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally
married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and
interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in
any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him
from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving
Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted, however, that with respect to 'spouse,' the same must be the legitimate 'spouse'
(not common-law spouses)."

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in
cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple
whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at
bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully
wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.8 [Emphases
supplied]

As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The
fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect,
waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make
funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of
a free and voluntary intent to that end.9 While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was still alive, the Court also
recognizes that human compassion, more often than not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator. Notably, it is an undisputed
fact that the respondents wasted no time in making frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days so they could attend the service and view the
remains of the deceased. As soon as they came to know about Atty. Adriano’s death in the morning of December 19, 1992 (December 20, 1992 in the Philippines), the
respondents immediately contacted Valino and the Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their request, but to no avail.

Valino insists that the expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless prevail pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil Code. Valino’s own testimony that it was Atty.
Adriano’s wish to be buried in their family plot is being relied upon heavily. It should be noted, however, that other than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be
buried at the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence was presented to corroborate such claim. Considering that Rosario equally claims that Atty. Adriano wished to
be buried in the Adriano family plot in Novaliches, it becomes apparent that the supposed burial wish of Atty. Adriano was unclear and undefinite. Considering this
ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it is the law that supplies the presumption as to his intent. No presumption can be said to have been created in Valino’s
favor, solely on account of a long-time relationship with Atty. Adriano.

Moreover, it cannot be surmised that just because Rosario was unavailable to bury her husband when she died, she had already renounced her right to do so. Verily, in
the same vein that the right and duty to make funeral arrangements will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, the right to deprive a legitimate spouse
of her legal right to bury the remains of her deceased husband should not be readily presumed to have been exercised, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of
conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent of the deceased to that end. Should there be any doubt as to the true intent of the deceased, the law favors the legitimate
family. Here, Rosario’s keenness to exercise the rights and obligations accorded to the legal wife was even bolstered by the fact that she was joined by the children in
this case.

Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty. Adriano truly wished to be buried in the Valino family plot at the Manila Memorial Park, the result remains the same.
Article 307 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall
determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to make arrangements for the same, after consulting the
other members of the family.

From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the "form of the funeral rites" that should govern in the burial of the deceased. As thoroughly
explained earlier, the right and duty to make funeral arrangements reside in the persons specified in Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code. Even if
Article 307 were to be interpreted to include the place of burial among those on which the wishes of the deceased shall be followed, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino (Dr.
Tolentino), an eminent authority on civil law, commented that it is generally recognized that any inferences as to the wishes of the deceased should be established by
some form of testamentary disposition.10 As Article 307 itself provides, the wishes of the deceased must be expressly provided. It cannot be inferred lightly, such as
from the circumstance that Atty. Adriano spent his last remaining days with Valino. It bears stressing once more that other than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano
wished to be buried at the Valino family plot, no other evidence was presented to corroborate it.

At any rate, it should be remembered that the wishes of the decedent with respect to his funeral are not absolute. As Dr. Tolentino further wrote:

The dispositions or wishes of the deceased in relation to his funeral, must not be contrary to law. They must not violate the legal and reglamentary provisions
concerning funerals and the disposition of the remains, whether as regards the time and manner of disposition, or the place of burial, or the ceremony to be observed.11
[Emphases supplied]

In this case, the wishes of the deceased with respect to his funeral are limited by Article 305 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, and subject
the same to those charged with the right and duty to make the proper arrangements to bury the remains of their loved-one. As aptly explained by the appellate court in
its disquisition:

The testimony of defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino that it was the oral wish of Atty. Adriano Adriano that he be interred at the Floro family’s mausoleum at the
Manila Memorial Park, must bend to the provisions of the law. Even assuming arguendo that it was the express wish of the deceased to be interred at the Manila
Memorial Park, still, the law grants the duty and the right to decide what to do with the remains to the wife, in this case, plaintiff-appellant Rosario D. Adriano, as the
surviving spouse, and not to defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino, who is not even in the list of those legally preferred, despite the fact that her intentions may have been
very commendable. The law does not even consider the emotional fact that husband and wife had, in this case at bench, been separated-in-fact and had been living apart
for more than 30 years.12

As for Valino’s contention that there is no point in exhuming and transferring the remains of Atty. Adriano, it should be said that the burial of his remains in a place
other than the Adriano family plot in Novaliches runs counter to the wishes of his family. It does not only violate their right provided by law, but it also disrespects the
family because the remains of the patriarch are buried in the family plot of his live-in partner.

It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce of man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right of possession over the corpse
exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising
out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final
resting place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt
that persons having this right may recover the corpse from third persons.13

All this notwithstanding, the Court finds laudable the acts of Valino in taking care of Atty. Adriano during his final moments and giving him a proper burial. For her
sacrifices, it would indeed be unkind to assess actual or moral damages against her. As aptly explained by the CA:

The trial court found that there was good faith on the part of defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino, who, having lived with Atty. Adriano after he was separated in fact
from his wife, lovingly and caringly took care of the well-being of Atty. Adriano Adriano while he was alive and even took care of his remains when he had died.

On the issue of damages, plaintiffs-appellants are not entitled to actual damages. Defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino had all the good intentions in giving the remains
of Atty. Adriano a decent burial when the wife and family were all in the United States and could not attend to his burial. Actual damages are those awarded in
satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. To be recoverable, they must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable
degree of certainty. In this case at bench, there was no iota of evidence presented to justify award of actual damages.

Plaintiffs-appellants are not also entitled to moral and exemplary damages.1âwphi1 Moral damages may be recovered only if the plaintiff is able to satisfactorily prove
the existence of the factual basis for the damages and its causal connection with the acts complained of because moral damages although incapable of pecuniary
estimation are designed not to impose a penalty but to compensate for injury sustained and actual damages suffered. No injury was caused to plaintiffs-appellants, nor
was any intended by anyone in this case. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, may only be awarded if claimant is able to establish his right to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. Unfortunately, neither of the requirements to sustain an award for either of these damages would appear to have been adequately
established by plaintiffs-appellants.

As regards the award of attorney's fees, it is an accepted doctrine that the award thereof as an item of damages is the exception rather than the rule, and counsel's fees
are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the New Civil Code demands factual, legal
and equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In this case, we
have searched but found nothing in plaintiffs-appellants' suit that justifies the award of attorney's fees.14

Finally, it should be said that controversies as to who should make arrangements for the funeral of a deceased have often aggravated the bereavement of the family and
disturbed the proper solemnity which should prevail at every funeral. It is for the purpose of preventing such controversies that the Code Commission saw it best to
include the provisions on "Funerals."15

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: PRESUMPTION OF CAPACITY

G.R. No. 159567 July 31, 2007

CORAZON CATALAN, LIBRADA CATALAN-LIM, EULOGIO CATALAN, MILA CATALAN-MILAN, ZENAIDA CATALAN, ALEX CATALAN, DAISY
CATALAN, FLORIDA CATALAN and GEMMA CATALAN, Heirs of the late FELICIANO CATALAN, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE BASA, MANUEL BASA, LAURETA BASA, DELIA BASA, JESUS BASA and ROSALINDA BASA, Heirs of the late MERCEDES CATALAN,
Respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073, which affirmed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Lingayen, Pangasinan, in Civil Case No. 17666, dismissing the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents,
Recovery of Possession and Ownership, and damages.

The facts, which are undisputed by the parties, follow:

On October 20, 1948, FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano) was discharged from active military service. The Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran
Affairs found that he was unfit to render military service due to his "schizophrenic reaction, catatonic type, which incapacitates him because of flattening of mood and
affect, preoccupation with worries, withdrawal, and sparce (sic) and pointless speech."1

On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo.2

On June 16, 1951, a document was executed, titled "Absolute Deed of Donation,"3 wherein Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister MERCEDES
CATALAN(Mercedes) one-half of the real property described, viz:

A parcel of land located at Barangay Basing, Binmaley, Pangasinan. Bounded on the North by heirs of Felipe Basa; on the South by Barrio Road; On the East by heirs
of Segundo Catalan; and on the West by Roman Basa. Containing an area of Eight Hundred One (801) square meters, more or less.

The donation was registered with the Register of Deeds. The Bureau of Internal Revenue then cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2876, and, in lieu thereof, issued Tax
Declaration No. 180804 to Mercedes for the 400.50 square meters donated to her. The remaining half of the property remained in Feliciano’s name under Tax
Declaration No. 18081.5

On December 11, 1953, People’s Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings No. 45636 before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan to declare Feliciano
incompetent. On December 22, 1953, the trial court issued its Order for Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance7
of Feliciano. The following day, the trial court appointed People’s Bank and Trust Company as Feliciano’s guardian.8 People’s Bank and Trust Company has been
subsequently renamed, and is presently known as the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI).

On November 22, 1978, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lots 1 and 3 of their property, registered under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 18920, to their
son Eulogio Catalan.9

On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property in issue in favor of her children Delia and Jesus Basa.10 The Deed of Absolute Sale was registered with the Register of
Deeds of Pangasinan on February 20, 1992, and Tax Declaration No. 12911 was issued in the name of respondents.11

On June 24, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 2 of the aforementioned property registered under OCT No. 18920 to their children Alex Catalan, Librada
Catalan and Zenaida Catalan. On February 14, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 4 (Plan Psu-215956) of the same OCT No. 18920 to Eulogio and
Florida Catalan.12

On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian, filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership,13 as well as
damages against the herein respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation to Mercedes was void ab initio, as Feliciano never donated the property to
Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even if Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to her, the donation would still be void, as he was not of sound mind
and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. Thus, it claimed that if the Deed of Absolute Donation was void ab initio, the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale to
Delia and Jesus Basa should likewise be nullified, for Mercedes Catalan had no right to sell the property to anyone. BPI raised doubts about the authenticity of the deed
of sale, saying that its registration long after the death of Mercedes Catalan indicated fraud. Thus, BPI sought remuneration for incurred damages and litigation
expenses.

On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. The original complaint was amended to substitute his heirs in lieu of BPI as complainants in Civil Case No. 17666.

On December 7, 1999, the trial court found that the evidence presented by the complainants was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was sane and
competent at the time he executed the deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan. Thus, the court declared, the presumption of sanity or competency not having
been duly impugned, the presumption of due execution of the donation in question must be upheld.14 It rendered judgment, viz:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Dismissing plaintiff’s complaint;

2. Declaring the defendants Jesus Basa and Delia Basa the lawful owners of the land in question which is now declared in their names under Tax Declaration No. 12911
(Exhibit 4);

3. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants Attorney’s fees of ₱10,000.00, and to pay the Costs.(sic)

SO ORDERED.15

Petitioners challenged the trial court’s decision before the Court of Appeals via a Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.16 The appellate
court affirmed the decision of the trial court and held, viz:
In sum, the Regional Trial Court did not commit a reversible error in disposing that plaintiff-appellants failed to prove the insanity or mental incapacity of late (sic)
Feliciano Catalan at the precise moment when the property in dispute was donated.

Thus, all the elements for validity of contracts having been present in the 1951 donation coupled with compliance with certain solemnities required by the Civil Code in
donation inter vivos of real property under Article 749, which provides:

xxx

Mercedes Catalan acquired valid title of ownership over the property in dispute. By virtue of her ownership, the property is completely subjected to her will in
everything not prohibited by law of the concurrence with the rights of others (Art. 428, NCC).

The validity of the subsequent sale dated 26 March 1979 (Exhibit 3, appellees’ Folder of Exhibits) of the property by Mercedes Catalan to defendant-appellees Jesus
Basa and Delia Basa must be upheld. Nothing of the infirmities which allegedly flawed its authenticity is evident much less apparent in the deed itself or from the
evidence adduced. As correctly stated by the RTC, the fact that the Deed of Absolute Sale was registered only in 1992, after the death of Mercedes Catalan does not
make the sale void ab initio. Moreover, as a notarized document, the deed of absolute sale carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document with
respect to its due execution (Garrido vs. CA 236 SCRA 450). In a similar vein, jurisprudence has it that documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their
favor the presumption of regularity, and to contradict the same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than preponderant (Salame vs. CA, 239 SCRA
256).

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated December 7, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, is hereby affirmed.

SO ORDERED.17

Thus, petitioners filed the present appeal and raised the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED CA-G.R. CV NO. 66073 IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN HOLDING THAT "THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT
A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISPOSING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS (PETITIONERS) FAILED TO PROVE THE INSANITY OR MENTAL
INCAPACITY OF THE LATE FELICIANO CATALAN AT THE PRECISE MOMENT WHEN THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE WAS DONATED";

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATE OF DISABILITY FOR DISCHARGE (EXHIBIT "S") AND THE REPORT OF A BOARD OF OFFICERS
CONVENED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ARMY REGULATIONS (EXHIBITS "S-1" AND "S-2") ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE;

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED CA-G.R. CV NO. 66073 IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN UPHOLDING THE SUBSEQUENT SALE OF THE PROPERTY IN
DISPUTE BY THE DONEE MERCEDES CATALAN TO HER CHILDREN RESPONDENTS JESUS AND DELIA BASA; AND-

4. WHETHER OR NOT CIVIL CASE NO. 17666 IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.18

Petitioners aver that the presumption of Feliciano’s competence to donate property to Mercedes had been rebutted because they presented more than the requisite
preponderance of evidence. First, they presented the Certificate of Disability for the Discharge of Feliciano Catalan issued on October 20, 1948 by the Board of Medical
Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs. Second, they proved that on December 22, 1953, Feliciano was judged an incompetent by the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, and put under the guardianship of BPI. Based on these two pieces of evidence, petitioners conclude that Feliciano had been suffering from a mental
condition since 1948 which incapacitated him from entering into any contract thereafter, until his death on August 14, 1997. Petitioners contend that Feliciano’s
marriage to Corazon Cerezo on September 28, 1948 does not prove that he was not insane at the time he made the questioned donation. They further argue that the
donations Feliciano executed in favor of his successors (Decision, CA-G.R. CV No. 66073) also cannot prove his competency because these donations were approved
and confirmed in the guardianship proceedings.19 In addition, petitioners claim that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed on March 26, 1979 by Mercedes Catalan and
her children Jesus and Delia Basa is simulated and fictitious. This is allegedly borne out by the fact that the document was registered only on February 20, 1992, more
that 10 years after Mercedes Catalan had already died. Since Delia Basa and Jesus Basa both knew that Feliciano was incompetent to enter into any contract, they
cannot claim to be innocent purchasers of the property in question.20 Lastly, petitioners assert that their case is not barred by prescription or laches under Article 1391
of the New Civil Code because they had filed their case on April 1, 1997, even before the four year period after Feliciano’s death on August 14, 1997 had begun.21

The petition is bereft of merit, and we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court.

A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it.22 Like any other contract, an agreement of
the parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2)
it should be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous.23 The parties' intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract, renders the donation
voidable.24

In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donor’s capacity to give consent at the time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact
that insanity impinges on consent freely given.25 However, the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this
effect is presented, capacity will be presumed.26

A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that the evidence presented by the petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption that
Feliciano was competent when he donated the property in question to Mercedes. Petitioners make much ado of the fact that, as early as 1948, Feliciano had been found
to be suffering from schizophrenia by the Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs. By itself, however, the allegation cannot prove the
incompetence of Feliciano.

A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be presumed capable of attending to his property rights. Schizophrenia was brought to the
attention of the public when, in the late 1800s, Emil Kraepelin, a German psychiatrist, combined "hebrephrenia" and "catatonia" with certain paranoid states and called
the condition "dementia praecox." Eugene Bleuler, a Swiss psychiatrist, modified Kraepelin’s conception in the early 1900s to include cases with a better outlook and in
1911 renamed the condition "schizophrenia." According to medical references, in persons with schizophrenia, there is a gradual onset of symptoms, with symptoms
becoming increasingly bizarre as the disease progresses.1avvphi1 The condition improves (remission or residual stage) and worsens (relapses) in cycles. Sometimes,
sufferers may appear relatively normal, while other patients in remission may appear strange because they speak in a monotone, have odd speech habits, appear to have
no emotional feelings and are prone to have "ideas of reference." The latter refers to the idea that random social behaviors are directed against the sufferers.27 It has
been proven that the administration of the correct medicine helps the patient. Antipsychotic medications help bring biochemical imbalances closer to normal in a
schizophrenic. Medications reduce delusions, hallucinations and incoherent thoughts and reduce or eliminate chances of relapse.28 Schizophrenia can result in a
dementing illness similar in many aspects to Alzheimer’s disease. However, the illness will wax and wane over many years, with only very slow deterioration of
intellect.29

From these scientific studies it can be deduced that a person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property.
By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost
total control of his mental faculties. Thus, the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and that this condition continued to exist until
proof to the contrary was adduced.30 Sufficient proof of his infirmity to give consent to contracts was only established when the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
declared him an incompetent on December 22, 1953.31

It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned Feliciano’s capacity at the time he donated the property, yet did not see fit to question his mental competence
when he entered into a contract of marriage with Corazon Cerezo or when he executed deeds of donation of his other properties in their favor. The presumption that
Feliciano remained competent to execute contracts, despite his illness, is bolstered by the existence of these other contracts. Competency and freedom from undue
influence, shown to have existed in the other acts done or contracts executed, are presumed to continue until the contrary is shown.32

Needless to state, since the donation was valid, Mercedes had the right to sell the property to whomever she chose.33 Not a shred of evidence has been presented to
prove the claim that Mercedes’ sale of the property to her children was tainted with fraud or falsehood. It is of little bearing that the Deed of Sale was registered only
after the death of Mercedes. What is material is that the sale of the property to Delia and Jesus Basa was legal and binding at the time of its execution. Thus, the
property in question belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa.

Finally, we note that the petitioners raised the issue of prescription and laches for the first time on appeal before this Court. It is sufficient for this Court to note that
even if the present appeal had prospered, the Deed of Donation was still a voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it remained binding as it was not annulled in a proper
action in court within four years.34

IN VIEW WHEREOF, there being no merit in the arguments of the petitioners, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
66073 is affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: CONTRACTS:

G.R. No. L-11872 December 1, 1917

DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
JOSE ESPIRITU, administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu, defendant-appellee.
Perfecto Salas Rodriguez for appellants.
Vicente Foz for appellee.

TORRES, J.:

This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, filed by the counsel for the plaintiffs from the judgment of September 22, 1914, in which the judge of the Seventh Judicial
District dismissed the complaint filed by the plaintiffs and ordered them to keep perpetual silence in regard to the litigated land, and to pay the costs of the suit.
By a complaint dated April 9, 1913, counsel for Domingo and Josefa Mercado brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, against Luis Espiritu, but, as the
latter died soon thereafter, the complaint was amended by being directed against Jose Espiritu in his capacity of his administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis
Espiritu. The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, all surnamed Mercado, were the children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu, a sister of
the deceased Luis Espiritu; that Margarita Espiritu died in 1897, leaving as her paraphernal property a tract of land of 48 hectares in area situated in the barrio of
Panducot, municipality of Calumpit, Bulacan, and bounded as described in paragraph 4 of the amended complaint, which hereditary portion had since then been held by
the plaintiffs and their sisters, through their father Wenceslao Mercado, husband of Margarita Espiritu; that, about the year 1910, said Luis Espiritu, by means of
cajolery, induced, and fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado to sign a deed of sale of the land left by their mother, for the sum of
P400, which amount was divided among the two plaintiffs and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, notwithstanding the fact that said land, according to its assessment, was
valued at P3,795; that one-half of the land in question belonged to Margarita Espiritu, and one-half of this share, that is, one-fourth of said land , to the plaintiffs, and
the other one-fourth, to their two sisters Concepcion and Paz; that the part of the land belonging to the two plaintiffs could produce 180 cavanes of rice per annum, at
P2.50 per cavan, was equivalent to P450 per annum; and that Luis Espiritu had received said products from 1901 until the time of his death. Said counsel therefore
asked that judgment be rendered in plaintiffs' favor by holding to be null and void the sale they made of their respective shares of their land, to Luis Espiritu, and that
the defendant be ordered to deliver and restore to the plaintiffs the shares of the land that fell to the latter in the partition of the estate of their deceased mother Margarita
Espiritu, together with the products thereof, uncollected since 1901, or their equivalent, to wit, P450 per annum, and to pay the costs of the suit.

In due season the defendant administrator answered the aforementioned complaint, denying each and all of the allegations therein contained, and in special defense
alleged that the land, the subject-matter of the complaint, had an area of only 21 cavanes of seed rice; that, on May 25, 1894, its owner, the deceased Margarita Espiritu
y Yutoc, the plaintiffs' mother, with the due authorization of her husband Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz sold to Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,000 a portion of
said land, to wit, an area such as is usually required for fifteen cavanes of seed; that subsequently, on May 14, 1901, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the plaintiffs'
father, in his capacity as administrator of the property of his children sold under pacto de retro to the same Luis Espiritu at the price of P375 the remainder of the said
land, to wit, an area covered by six cavanes of seed to meet the expenses of the maintenance of his (Wenceslao's) children, and this amount being still insufficient the
successively borrowed from said Luis Espiritu other sums of money aggregating a total of P600; but that later, on May 17,1910, the plaintiffs, alleging themselves to be
of legal age, executed, with their sisters Maria del Consejo and Maria dela Paz, the notarial instrument inserted integrally in the 5th paragraph of the answer, by which
instrument, ratifying said sale under pacto de retro of the land that had belonged to their mother Margarita Espiritu, effected by their father Wenceslao Mercado in favor
of Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,600, they sold absolutely and perpetually to said Luis Espiritu, in consideration of P400, the property that had belonged to their
deceased mother and which they acknowledged having received from the aforementioned purchaser. In this cross-complaint the defendant alleged that the complaint
filed by the plaintiffs was unfounded and malicious, and that thereby losses and damages in the sum of P1,000 had been caused to the intestate estate of the said Luis
Espiritu. He therefore asked that judgment be rendered by ordering the plaintiffs to keep perpetual silence with respect to the land in litigation and, besides, to pay said
intestate estate P1,000 for losses and damages, and that the costs of the trial be charged against them.

In reply to the cross-complaint, the plaintiffs denied each and all of the facts therein set forth, and in special defense alleged that at the time of the execution of the deed
of sale inserted in the cross-complaint the plaintiffs were still minors, and that since they reached their majority the four years fixed by law for the annulment of said
contract had not yet elapsed. They therefore asked that they be absolved from the defendant's cross-complaint.
After trial and the introduction of evidence by both parties, the court rendered the judgment aforementioned, to which the plaintiffs excepted and in writing moved for a
reopening of the case and a new trial. This motion was overruled, exception was taken by the petitioners, and the proper bill of exceptions having been presented, the
same was approved and transmitted to the clerk of this court.
As the plaintiffs assailed the validity of the deed of sale, Exhibit 3, executed by them on May 17, 1910, on the ground that they were minors when they executed it, the
questions submitted to the decision of this court consist in determining whether it is true that the plaintiffs were then minors and therefore incapable of selling their
property on the date borne by the instrument Exhibit 3; and in case they then were such, whether a person who is really and truly a minor and, notwithstanding, attests
that he is of legal age, can, after the execution of the deed and within legal period, ask for the annulment of the instrument executed by him, because of some defect that
invalidates the contract, in accordance with the law (Civ. Code, arts. 1263 and 1300), so that he may obtain the restitution of the land sold.

The records shows it to have been fully proven that in 1891 Lucas Espiritu obtained title by composition with the State, to three parcels of land, adjoining each other, in
the sitio of Panducot of the pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, containing altogether an area of 75 hectares, 25 ares, and 59 centares, which facts appear in the title Exhibit D;
that, upon Luis Espiritu's death, his said lands passed by inheritance to his four children named Victoria, Ines, Margarita, and Luis; and that, in the partition of said
decedent's estate, the parcel of land described in the complaint as containing forty-seven and odd hectares was allotted to the brother and sister Luis and Margarita, in
equal shares. Margarita Espiritu, married to Wenceslao Mercado y Ardeno Cruz, had by this husband five children, Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa,
and Amalia, all surnamed Mercado y Espiritu, who, at the death of their mother in 1896 inherited, by operation of law, one-half of the land described in the complaint.

The plaintiffs' petition for annulment of the sale and the consequent restitution to them of two-fourths of the land left by their mother, that is, of one-fourth of all the
land described in the complaint, and which, they stated, amounts to 11 hectares, 86 ares and 37 centares. To this claim the defendant excepted, alleging that the land in
question comprised only an area such as is customarily covered by 21 cavanes of seed.

It was also duly proven that, by a notarial instrument of May 25, 1894, the plaintiffs' mother conveyed by actual and absolute sale for the sum of P2,000, to her brother
Luis Espiritu a portion of the land now on litigation, or an area such as is usually covered by about 15 cavanes of seed; and that, on account of the loss of the original of
said instrument, which was on the possession of the purchaser Luis Espiritu, and furthermore because, during the revolution, the protocols or registers of public
documents of the Province of Bulacan were burned, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the widower of the vendor and father of the plaintiffs, executed, at the instance
of the interested party Luis Espiritu, the notarial instrument Exhibit 1, of the date of May 20, 1901, in his own name and those of his minor children Maria Consejo,
Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa, and Amalia, and therein set forth that it was true that the sale of said portion of land had been made by his aforementioned wife, then
deceased, to Luis Espiritu in 1894.

However, even prior to said date, to wit, on May 14th of the same year, 1901, the widower Wenceslao Mercado, according to the private document Exhibit 2, pledged
or mortgaged to the same man, Luis Espiritu, for P375, a part, or an area covered by six cavanes of seed, of the land that had belonged to this vendor's deceased wife, to
the said Luis Espiritu and which now forms a part of the land in question — a transaction which Mercado was obliged to make in order to obtain funds with which "to
cover his children's needs." Wenceslao Mercado, the plaintiffs' father, having died, about the year 1904, the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado, together with their
sisters Consejo and Paz, declaring themselves to be of legal age and in possession of the required legal status to contract, executed and subscribed before a notary the
document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, in which referring to the previous sale of the land, effected by their deceased mother for the sum of P2,600 and with her
husband's permission and authorization, they sold absolutely and in perpetuity to Luis Espiritu, for the sum of P400 "as an increase" of the previous purchase price, the
land described in said instrument and situated in Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, of an area equal to that usually sown with 21 cavanes of seed bounded on the
north by the lands of Flaviano Abreu and the heirs of Pedro Espiritu, on the east by those of Victoria Espiritu and Ines Espiritu, on the south by those of Luis Espiritu,
and on the west by those of Hermogenes Tan-Toco and by the Sapang-Maitu stream.

In this status of the case the plaintiffs seek the annulment of the deed Exhibit 3, on the ground that on the date of its execution they were minors without legal capacity
to contract, and for the further reason that the deceased purchaser Luis Espiritu availed himself of deceit and fraud in obtaining their consent for the execution of said
deed.

As it was proven by the testimony of the clerk of the parochial church of Apalit (plaintiffs were born in Apalit) that the baptismal register books of that parish pertaining
to the years 1890-1891, were lost or burned, the witness Maria Consejo Mercado recognized and identified the book Exhibit A, which she testified had been kept and
taken care of by her deceased father Wenceslao Mercado, pages 396 and 397 of which bear the attestation that the plaintiff Domingo Mercado was born on August 4,
1890, and Josefa Mercado, on July 14, 1891. Furthermore, this witness corroborated the averment of the plaintiffs' minority, by the personal registration certificate of
said Domingo Mercado, of the year 1914, Exhibit C, by which it appears that in 1910 he was only 23 years old, whereby it would also be appear that Josefa Mercado
was 22 years of age in 1910, and therefore, on May 17,1910, when the instrument of purchase and sale, Exhibit 3, was executed, the plaintiffs must have been,
respectively, 19 and 18 years of age.

The witness Maria Consejo Mercado also testified that after her father's death her brother and sisters removed to Manila to live there, although her brother Domingo
used to reside with his uncle Luis Espiritu, who took charge of the administration of the property left by his predecessors in interest; that it was her uncle Luis who got
for her brother Domingo the other cedula, Exhibit B, pertaining to the year 1910, where in it appears that the latter was then already 23 years of age; that she did not
know why her uncle did so; that she and her brother and sisters merely signed the deed of May 17, 1910; and that her father Wenceslao Mercado, prior to his death had
pledged the land to her uncle Luis Espiritu.

The witness Ines Espiritu testified that after the death of the plaintiffs' father, it was Luis Espiritu who directed the cultivation of the land in litigation. This testimony
was corroborated by her sister Victoria Espiritu, who added that her nephew, the plaintiff Domingo, had lived for some time, she did not know just how long, under the
control of Luis Espiritu.

Roque Galang, married to a sister of Luis Espiritu, stated that the land that fell to his wife and to his sister-in-law Victoria, and which had an area of about 8 hectares
less than that of the land allotted to the aforementioned Luis and Margarita produced for his wife and his sister-in-law Victoria a net and minimum yield of 507 cavanes
in 1907, in spite of its being high land and of inferior quality, as compared with the land in dispute, and that its yield was still larger in 1914, when the said two sisters'
share was 764 cavanes.

Patricio Tanjucto, the notary before whom the deed Exhibit 3 was ratified, was a witness for the defendant. He testified that this deed was drawn up by him at the
request of the plaintiff Josefa Mercado; that the grantors of the instrument assured him that they were all of legal age; that said document was signed by the plaintiffs
and the other contracting parties, after it had been read to them and had been translated into the Pampangan dialect for those of them who did not understand Spanish.
On cross-examination, witness added that ever since he was 18 years of age and began to court, he had known the plaintiff Josefa Mercado, who was then a young
maiden, although she had not yet commenced to attend social gatherings, and that all this took place about the year 1898, for witness said that he was then [at the time
of his testimony, 1914,] 34 years of age.

Antonio Espiritu, 60 years of age, who knew Lucas Espiritu and the properties owned by the latter, testified that Espiritu's land contained an area of 84 cavanes, and
after its owner's death, was under witness' administration during to harvest two harvest seasons; that the products yielded by a portion of this land, to wit, an area such
as is sown by about 15 cavanes of seed, had been, since 1894, utilized by Luis Espiritu, by reason of his having acquired the land; and that, after Margarita Espiritu's
death, her husband Wenceslao Mercado took possession of another portion of the land, containing an area of six cavanes of seed and which had been left by this
deceased, and that he held same until 1901, when he conveyed it to Luis Espiritu. lawphi1.net

The defendant-administrator, Jose Espiritu, son of the deceased Luis Espiritu, testified that the plaintiff Domingo Mercado used to live off and on in the house of his
deceased father, about the year 1909 or 1910, and used to go back and forth between his father's house and those of his other relatives. He denied that his father had at
any time administered the property belonging to the Mercado brother and sisters.

In rebuttal, Antonio Mercado, a cousin of Wenceslao, father of the plaintiffs, testified that he mediate in several transactions in connection with a piece of land
belonging to Margarita Espiritu. When shown the deed of purchase and sale Exhibit 1, he stated that he was not acquainted with its contents. This same witness also
testified that he mediated in a transaction had between Wenceslao Mercado and Luis Espiritu (he did not remember the year), in which the former sold to the latter a
parcel of land situated in Panducot. He stated that as he was a witness of the deed of sale he could identify this instrument were it exhibited to him; but he did not do so,
for no instrument whatever was presented to him for identification. The transaction mentioned must have concerned either the ratification of the sale of the land of 15
cavanes, in 1901, attested in Exhibit 1, or the mortgage or pledge of the other parcel of 6 cavanes, given on May 14, 1901, by Wenceslao Mercado to Luis Espiritu, as
may be seen by the private document Exhibit 2. In rebuttal, the plaintiff Josefa Mercado denied having gone to the house of the notary Tanjutco for the purpose of
requesting him to draw up any document whatever. She stated that she saw the document Exhibit 3 for the first time in the house of her uncle Luis Espiritu on the day
she signed it, on which occasion and while said document was being signed said notary was not present, nor were the witnesses thereto whose names appear therein;
and that she went to her said uncle's house, because he had sent for her, as well as her brother and sisters, sending a carromata to fetch them. Victoria Espiritu denied
ever having been in the house of her brother. Luis Espiritu in company with the plaintiffs, for the purpose of giving her consent to the execution of any deed in behalf of
her brother.

The evidence adduced at the trial does not show, even circumstantially, that the purchaser Luis Espiritu employed fraud, deceit, violence, or intimidation, in order to
effect the sale mentioned in the document Exhibit 3, executed on May 17, 1910. In this document the vendors, the brother and the sisters Domingo, Maria del Consejo,
Paz and, Josefa surnamed Mercado y Espiritu, attested the certainty of the previous sale which their mother, during her lifetime, had made in behalf of said purchaser
Luis Espiritu, her brother with the consent of her husband Wenceslao Mercado, father of the vendors of the portion of land situated in the barrio of Panducot, pueblo of
Calumpit, Bulacan; and in consideration of the fact that the said vendor Luis Espiritu paid them, as an increase, the sum of P400, by virtue of the contract made with
him, they declare having sold to him absolutely and in perpetuity said parcel of the land, waive and thenceforth any and all rights they may have, inasmuch as said sum
constitutes the just price of the property.

So that said document Exhibit 3 is virtually an acknowledgment of the contract of sale of the parcel or portion of land that would contain 15 cavanes of seed rice made
by the vendors' mother in favor of the purchaser Luis Espiritu, their uncle, and likewise an acknowledgment of the contract of pledge or mortgage of the remainder of
said land, an area of six cavanes, made with the same purchaser, at an increase of P400 over the price of P2,600, making an aggregate sum of P3,000, decomposed as
follows: P2,000, collected during her lifetime, by the vendors' father; and the said increase of P400, collected by the plaintiffs.
In the aforementioned sale, according to the deed of May 25, 1894, Margarita Espiritu conveyed to her brother Luis the parcel of 15 cavanes of seed, Exhibit 1, and
after her death the plaintiffs' widowed father mortgaged or pledged the remaining parcel or portion of 6 cavanes of seed to her brother-in-law, Luis Espiritu, in May,
1901 (Exhibit 2). So it is that the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, which was assailed by the plaintiffs, recognized the validity of the previous contracts, and the totality of
the land, consisting of an area containing 21 cavanes of seed rice, was sold absolutely and in perpetuity, the vendors receiving in exchange P400 more; and there is no
conclusive proof in the record that this last document was false and simulated on account of the employment of any violence, intimidation, fraud, or deceit, in the
procuring of the consent of the vendors who executed it.

Considering the relation that exists between the document Exhibit 3 and those of previous dates, Exhibits 1 and 2, and taking into the account the relationship between
the contracting parties, and also the general custom that prevails in many provinces of these Islands for the vendor or debtor to obtain an increase in the price of the sale
or of the pledge, or an increase in the amount loaned, without proof to the contrary, it would be improper and illegal to hold, in view of the facts hereinabove set forth,
that the purchaser Luis Espiritu, now deceased, had any need to forge or simulate the document Exhibit 3 inasmuch as, since May, 1894, he has held in the capacity of
owner by virtue of a prior acquisition, the parcel of land of 15 cavanes of seed, and likewise, since May, 1901, according to the contract of mortgage or pledge, the
parcel of 6 cavanes, or the remainder of the total area of 21 cavanes.

So that Luis Espiritu was, during his lifetime, and now, after his death, his testate or intestate estate is in lawful possession of the parcel of land situated in Panducot that
contains 21 cavanes of seed, by virtue of the title of conveyance of ownership of the land measuring 15 cavanes, and, in consequence of the contract of pledge or
mortgage in security for the sum of P600, is likewise in lawful possession of the remainder of the land, or an area containing 6 cavanes of seed.

The plaintiffs have absolutely no right whatever to recover said first parcel of land, as its ownership was conveyed to the purchaser by means of a singular title of
purchase and sale; and as to the other portion of 6 cavanes of seed, they could have redeemed it before May 17, 1910, upon the payment or the return of the sum which
their deceased father Wenceslao Mercado had, during his lifetime, received as a loan under security of the pledged property; but, after the execution of the document
Exhibit 3, the creditor Luis Espiritu definitely acquired the ownership of said parcel of 6 cavanes. It is therefore a rash venture to attempt to recover this latter parcel by
means of the contract of final and absolute sale, set forth in the deed Exhibit 3.

Moreover, the notarial document Exhibit 1, are regards the statements made therein, is of the nature of a public document and is evidence of the fact which gave rise to
its execution and of the date of the latter, even against a third person and his predecessors in interest such as are the plaintiffs. (Civ. Code, art. 1218.)

The plaintiffs' father, Wenceslao Mercado, recognizing it to be perfectly true that his wife Margarita Espiritu sold said parcel of land which she inherited from her
father, of an area of about "15 cavanes of seed," to her brother Luis Espiritu, by means of an instrument executed by her on May 25,1894 — an instrument that
disappeared or was burned — and likewise recognizing that the protocols and register books belonging to the Province of Bulacan were destroyed as a result of the past
revolution, at the request of his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu he had no objection to give the testimony recorded in said notarial instrument, as it was the truth regarding
what had occurred, and in so doing he acted as the plaintiffs' legitimate father in the exercise of his parental authority, inasmuch as he had personal knowledge of said
sale, he himself being the husband who authorized said conveyance, notwithstanding that his testimony affected his children's interest and prejudiced his own, as the
owner of any fruits that might be produced by said real property.

The signature and handwriting of the document Exhibit 2 were identified as authentic by one of the plaintiffs, Consejo Mercado, and as the record shows no evidence
whatever that this document is false, and it does not appear to have been assailed as such, and as it was signed by the plaintiffs' father, there is no legal ground or well-
founded reason why it should be rejected. It was therefore properly admitted as evidence of the certainty of the facts therein set forth.

The principal defect attributed by the plaintiffs to the document Exhibit 3 consists in that, on the date of May 17, 1910, when it was executed that they signed it, they
were minors, that is, they had not yet attained the age of 21 years fixed by Act No. 1891, though no evidence appears in the record that the plaintiffs Josefa and
Domingo Mercado were in fact minors, for no certified copies were presented of their baptismal certificates, nor did the plaintiffs adduce any supplemental evidence
whatever to prove that Domingo was actually 19 and Josefa 18 years of age when they signed the document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, inasmuch as the copybook,
Exhibit A, notwithstanding the testimony of the plaintiff Consejo Mercado, does not constitute sufficient proof of the dates of births of the said Domingo and Josefa.

However, even in the doubt whether they certainly were of legal age on the date referred to, it cannot be gainsaid that in the document Exhibit 3 they stated that they
were of legal age at the time they executed and signed it, and on that account the sale mentioned in said notarial deed Exhibit 3 is perfectly valid — a sale that is
considered as limited solely to the parcel of land of 6 cavanes of seed, pledged by the deceased father of the plaintiffs in security for P600 received by him as a loan
from his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu, for the reason that the parcel of 15 cavanes had been lawfully sold by its original owner, the plaintiffs' mother.

The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they are
not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled in pursuance of
the provisions of Law 6, title 19, of the 6th Partida; and the judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed against him
does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors' property, nor the juridical rules established in consonance therewith. (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain, of
April 27, 1860, July 11, 1868, and March 1, 1875.) itc@alf

With respect to the true age of the plaintiffs, no proof was adduced of the fact that it was Luis Espiritu who took out Domingo Mercado's personal registration certificate
on April 13, 1910, causing the age of 23 years to be entered therein in order to corroborate the date of the notarial instrument of May 17th of the same year; and the
supposition that he did, would also allow it to be supposed, in order to show the propriety of the claim, that the cedula Exhibit C was taken out on February 14, 1914,
where in it is recorded that Domingo Mercado was on that date 23 years of age, for both these facts are not proved; neither was any proof adduced against the statement
made by the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa in the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, that, on the date when they executed it, they were already of legal age, and, besides the
annotation contained in the copybook Exhibit A, no supplemental proof of their true ages was introduced.

Aside from the foregoing, from a careful examination of the record in this case, it cannot be concluded that the plaintiffs, who claim to have minors when they executed
the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, have suffered positive and actual losses and damages in their rights and interests as a result of the execution of said document,
inasmuch as the sale effected by the plaintiffs' mother, Margarita Espiritu, in May, 1894, of the greater part of the land of 21 cavanes of seed, did not occasion any
damage or prejudice to the plaintiffs, inasmuch as their father stated in the document Exhibit 2 that he was obliged to mortgage or pledge said remaining portion of the
land in order to secure the loan of the P375 furnished by Luis Espiritu and which was subsequently increased to P600 so as to provide for certain engagements or
perhaps to meet the needs of his children, the plaintiff; and therefore, to judge from the statements made by their father himself, they received through him, in exchange
for the land of 6 cavanes of seed, which passed into the possession of the creditor Luis Espiritu, the benefit which must have accrued to them from the sums of money
received as loans; and, finally, on the execution of the impugned document Exhibit 3, the plaintiffs received and divided between themselves the sum of P400, which
sum, added to that P2,000 received by Margarita Espiritu, and to that of the P600 collected by Wenceslao Mercado, widower of the latter and father of the plaintiffs,
makes all together the sum of P3,000, the amount paid by the purchaser as the price of all the land containing 21 cavanes of seed, and is the just price of the property,
was not impugned, and, consequently, should be considered as equivalent to, and compensatory for, the true value of said land.

For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment appealed from have been refuted, and deeming said judgment to be in accordance with law and
the evidence of record, we should, and do hereby, affirm the same, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
TOPIC: CONTRACTS

G.R. No. L-27710 January 30, 1928

ISIDRO BAMBALAN Y PRADO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
GERMAN MARAMBA and GENOVEVA MUERONG, defendants-appellants.

Pedro C. Quinto for plaintiff-appellant.

Turner, Rheberg and Sanchez for defendants-appellants.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The defendants admit in their amended answer those paragraphs of the complaint wherein it is alleged that Isidro
Bambalan y Colcotura was the owner, with Torrens title, of the land here in question and that the plaintiff is the sole and
universal heir of the said deceased Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura, as regards the said land. This being so, the fundamental
question to be resolved in this case is whether or not the plaintiff sold the land in question to the defendants.

The defendants affirm they did and as proof of such transfer present document Exhibit 1, dated July 17, 1922. The
plaintiff asserts that while it is true that he signed said document, yet he did so by intimidation made upon his mother
Paula Prado by the defendant Genoveva Muerong, who threatened the former with imprisonment. While the evidence on
this particular point does not decisively support the plaintiff's allegation, this document, however, is vitiated to the extent
of being void as regards the said plaintiff, for the reason that the latter, at the time he signed it, was a minor, which is
clearly shown by the record and it does not appear that it was his real intention to sell the land in question.

What is deduced from the record is, that his mother Paula Prado and the latter's second husband Vicente Lagera, having
received a certain sum of money by way of a loan from Genoveva Muerong in 1915 which, according to Exhibit 3, was
P200 and according to the testimony of Paula Prado, was P150, and Genoveva Muerong having learned later that the land
within which was included that described in said Exhibit 3, had a Torrens title issued in favor of the plaintiff's father, of
which the latter is the only heir and caused the plaintiff to sign a conveyance of the land.

At any rate, even supposing that the document in question, Exhibit 1, embodies all of the requisites prescribed by law for
its efficacy, yet it does not, according to the provisions of section 50 of Act No. 496, bind the land and would only be a
valid contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the register of deeds to make the proper registration,
inasmuch as it is the registration that gives validity to the transfer. Therefore, the defendants, by virtue of the document
Exhibit 1 alone, did not acquire any right to the property sold as much less, if it is taken into consideration, the vendor
Isidro Bambalan y Prado, the herein plaintiff, was a minor.

As regards this minority, the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), wherein
the minor was held to be estopped from contesting the contract executed by him pretending to be age, is not applicable
herein. In the case now before us the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age; his minority was well known to the purchaser,
the defendant, who was the one who purchased the plaintiff's first cedula used in the acknowledgment of the document.

In regard to the amount of money that the defendants allege to have given the plaintiff and her son in 1992 as the price of
the land, the preponderance of evidence shows that no amount was given by the defendants to the alleged vendors in said
year, but that the sum of P663.40, which appears in the document Exhibit 1, is arrived at, approximately, by taking the
P150 received by Paula Prado and her husband in 1915 and adding thereto interest at the rate of 50 per cent annum, then
agreed upon, or P75 a year for seven years up to July 31, 1922, the sate of Exhibit 1.

The damages claimed by the plaintiff have not been sufficiently proven, because the witness Paula Prado was the only one
who testified thereto, whose testimony was contradicted by that of the defendant Genoveva Muerong who, moreover,
asserts that she possesses about half of the land in question. There are, therefore, not sufficient data in the record to award
the damages claimed by the plaintiff.

In view of the foregoing, the dispositive part of the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without any express
findings as to the costs in this instance. So ordered.
TOPIC: CONTRACTS

G.R. No. L-1720 March 4, 1950

SIA SUAN and GAW CHIAO, petitioners,

vs.
RAMON ALCANTARA, respondent.
Antonio Barredo for petitioners.
Zosimo D. Tanalega for respondents.

PARAS, J.:

On August 3, 1931, a deed of sale was executed by Rufino Alcantara and his sons Damaso Alcantara and Ramon Alcantara conveying to Sia Suan five parcels of land.
Ramon Alcantara was then 17 years, 10 months and 22 days old. On August 27, 1931, Gaw Chiao (husband of Sia Suan) received a letter from Francisco Alfonso,
attorney of Ramon Alcantara, informing Gaw Chiao that Ramon Alcantara was a minor and accordingly disavowing the contract. After being contacted by Gaw Chiao,
however, Ramon Alcantara executed an affidavit in the office of Jose Gomez, attorney of Gaw Chiao, wherein Ramon Alcantara ratified the deed of sale. On said
occasion Ramon Alcantara received from Gaw Chiao the sum of P500. In the meantime, Sia Suan sold one of the lots to Nicolas Azores from whom Antonio Azores
inherited the same.
On August 8, 1940, an action was instituted by Ramon Alcantara in the Court of First Instance of Laguna for the annulment of the deed of sale as regards his undivided
share in the two parcels of land covered by certificates of title Nos. 751 and 752 of Laguna. Said action was against Sia Suan and her husband Gaw Chiao, Antonio,
Azores, Damaso Alcantara and Rufino Alcantara (the latter two being, respectively, the brother and father of Ramon Alcantara appealed to the Court of Appealed which
reversed the decision of the trial court, on the ground that the deed of sale is not binding against Ramon Alcantara in view of his minority on the date of its execution,
and accordingly sentenced Sia Suan to pay to Ramon Alcantara the sum of P1,750, with legal interest from December 17, 1931, in lieu of his share in the lot sold to
Antonio Azores (who was absolved from the complaint), and to reconvey to Ramon Alcantara an undivided one-fourth interest in the lot originally covered by
certificate of title NO. 752 of Laguna plus the cost of the suit. From this judgment Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao have come to us on appeal by certiorari.

It is undeniable that the deed of sale signed by the appellee, Ramon Alcantara, On August 3, 1931, showed that he, like his co-signers (father and brother), was then of
legal age. It is not pretend and there is nothing to indicate that the appellants did not believe and rely on such recital of fact. This conclusion is decisive and very
obvious in the decision of the Court of Appeals It is true that in the resolution on the for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals remarked that "The fact that when
informed of appellant's minority, the appellees too no steps for nine years to protect their interest beyond requiring the appellant to execute a ratification of the sale
while still a minor, strongly indicates that the appellees knew of his minority when the deed of sale was executed." But the feeble insinuation is sufficiently negative by
the following positive pronouncements of the Court of Appeals as well in said resolution as in the decision.

As to the complaint that the defendant is guilty of laches, suffice it to say that the appellees were informed of his minority within one (1) month after the transaction was
completed. (Resolution.)
Finally, the appellees were equally negligent in not taking any action to protect their interest form and after August 27, 1931, when they were notified in writing of
appellant's minority. (Resolution.)

. . . The fact remains that the appellees were advised within the month that appellant was a minor, through the letter of Attorney Alfonso (Exhibit 1) informing appellees
of his client's desire to disaffirm the contract . . . (Decision.)

The purchaser having been apprised of incapacity of his vendor shortly after the contract was made, the delay in bringing the action of annulment will not serve to bar it
unless the period fixed by the statute of limitations expired before the filing of the complaint. . . . (Decision.)

In support of the contend that the deed of sale is binding on the appellee, counsel for the appellants invokes the decision in Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu (37 Phil.,
215), wherein this court held:

The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when it fact they are
not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled in pursuance of
the provisions of Law 6 title 19, of the 6th Partida; and the judgment that holds such a sale to valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed against him does
not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors' property, nor the juridical rules established in consonance therewith. (Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, of
April 27, 1840, July 11, 1868, and March 1, 1875.)

The Court of Appeals has refused to apply this doctrine on the ground that the appellants did not actually pay any amount in cash to the appellee and therefore did not
suffer any detriment by reason of the deed of sale, it being stipulated that the consideration therefore was a pre-existing indebtedness of appellee's father, Rufino
Alcantara. We are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals erred. In the first place, in the case cited, the consideration for sale consisted in greater part of pre-existing
obligation. In the second place, under the doctrine, to bind a minor who represents himself to be of legal age, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually part with cash,
as long as the contract is supported by a valid consideration. Since appellee's conveyance to the appellants was admittedly for and in virtue of a pre-existing
indebtedness (unquestionably a valid consideration), it should produce its full force and effect in the absence of any other vice that may legally invalidate the same. It is
not here claimed that the deed of sale is null and void on any ground other than the appellee's minority. Appellee's contract has become fully efficacious as a contract
executed by parties with full legal capacity.

The circumstance that, about one month after the date of the conveyance, the appellee informed the appellants of his minority, is of no moment, because appellee's
previous misrepresentation had already estopped him from disavowing the contract. Said belated information merely leads to the inference that the appellants in fact did
not know that the appellee was a minor on the date of the contract, and somewhat emphasizes appellee's had faith, when it is borne in mind that no sooner had he given
said information than he ratified his deed of sale upon receiving from the appellants the sum of P500.

Counsel for the appellees argues that the appellants could not have been misled as to the real age of the appellee because they were free to make the necessary
investigation. The suggestion, while perhaps practicable, is conspicuously unbusinesslike and beside the point, because the findings of the Court of Appeals do not
show that the appellants knew or could suspected appellee's minority.

The Court of Appeals seems to be of the opinion that the letter written by the appellee informing the appellants of his minority constituted an effective disaffirmance of
the sale, and that although the choice to disaffirm will not by itself avoid the contract until the courts adjudge the agreement to be invalid, said notice shielded the
appellee from laches and consequent estoppel. This position is untenable since the effect of estoppel in proper cases is unaffected by the promptness with which a notice
to disaffirm is made.

The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the appellants absolved from the complaint, with costs against the appellee, Ramon Alcantara. So
ordered.
TOPIC: CRIMINAL LIABILITY

G.R. No. 173822 October 13, 2010

SALVADOR ATIZADO and SALVADOR MONREAL, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

On May 4, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Sorsogon, convicted the petitioners of murder.1 On December 13, 2005, the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed their conviction in C.A.-G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, but modified the awarded damages.2

The petitioners contest the CA’s affirmance of their conviction in this appeal via petition for review on certiorari.

We affirm their conviction, but we reduce the penalty imposed on Salvador Monreal because the RTC and the CA did not duly appreciate his minority at the time of the
commission of the crime. We order his immediate release from prison because he already served his sentence, as hereby modified. Also, we add to the damages to
which the heirs of the victim were entitled in order to accord with the prevailing law and jurisprudence.

Antecedents

On June 20, 1994, the Office of the Sorsogon Provincial Prosecutor formally charged the petitioners and a certain Danilo Atizado (Danilo) with murder through the
following information, to wit:

That on or about the 18th day of April 1994, at Barangay Bogña, Municipality of Castilla, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
treachery and evident premeditation, and without any justifiable cause or motive, with intent to kill, armed with handguns, attack, assault and shot one Rogelio Llona y
Llave, a Sangguniang Bayan member of Castilla, Sorsogon, thereby inflicting upon him mortal and serious wounds which directly caused his instantaneous death, to the
damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

After the petitioners and Danilo pleaded not guilty to the information on November 7, 1994,4 the trial ensued.

The witnesses for the State were Simeona Mirandilla (Mirandilla), Major Saadra Gani (Major Gani), Dr. Wilhelmo Abrantes (Dr. Abrantes), Lawrence Llona
(Lawrence), and Herminia Llona (Herminia).

Mirandilla narrated that on April 18, 1994 she and the late Rogelio Llona (Llona), her common-law husband, had attended the fiesta of Barangay Bonga in Castilla,
Sorsogon; that at about 8 pm of that date, they had gone to the house of Manuel Desder (Desder) in the same barangay; that as they and Jose Jesalva (Jesalva), a
barangay kagawad of the place, were seated in the sala of Desder’s house, she heard "thundering steps" as if people were running and then two successive gunshots; that
she then saw Atizado pointing a gun at the prostrate body of Llona; that seeing Atizado about to shoot Llona again, she shouted: Stop, that’s enough!; that while aiding
Llona, she heard three clicking sounds, and, turning towards the direction of the clicking sounds, saw Monreal point his gun at her while he was moving backwards and
simultaneously adjusting the cylinder of his gun; that the petitioners then fled the scene of the shooting; that she rushed to the house of barangay captain Juanito
Lagonsing (Lagonsing) to report the shooting; and that she and Lagonsing brought Llona to a hospital where Llona was pronounced dead.5

Major Gani testified that the petitioners and Danilo were arrested on May 18, 1994,6 based on the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Teodisio R. Dino, Jr. of the
Municipal Trial Court in Castilla, Sorsogon.

Dr. Abrantes confirmed that Llona died due to two gunshot wounds in the back that penetrated his spinal column, liver, and abdomen.7

Lawrence and Herminia stated that the Llona family spent ₱30,000.00 for the funeral expenses of Llona.8

Denying the accusation, the petitioners interposed alibi. The witnesses for the Defense were Monreal, Roger Villafe (Villafe), Merlinda Lolos, Joseph Lorenzana
(Lorenzana), Jesalva, and Lagonsing.

The Defense showed that at the time of the commission of the crime, Atizado had been in his family residence in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla,

Sorsogon, because he had been sick of influenza, while Monreal and Danilo had been in the house of a certain Ariel also in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla, Sorsogon
drinking gin; that the petitioners and Danilo had not been recognized to be at the crime scene during the shooting of Llona; and that the petitioners had been implicated
only because of their being employed by their uncle Lorenzana, the alleged mastermind in the killing of Llona.

As stated, on May 4, 2000, the RTC convicted the petitioners but acquitted Danilo, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the Court hereby sentences each of the accused to an
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of Rogelio Llona the sum of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos, Philippines currency, in solidum, as civil
indemnity, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to reimburse the heirs of the victim the amount of ₱30,000.00 as actual expenses and to pay the cost.

Accused Danilo Atizado on reasonable doubt is hereby acquitted of the crime charged and he being a detention prisoner, his immediate release from the provincial jail
is hereby ordered, unless he is charged of other lawful cause or causes.

Accused Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal being detained, shall be credited in full in the service of their sentence.

SO ORDERED.9

The Court referred the petitioners’ direct appeal to the CA pursuant to People v. Mateo.10
On December 13, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction, disposing:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellants Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal are hereby ordered to suffer the imprisonment
of Reclusion Perpetua. Likewise, they are ordered to pay the heirs of Rogelio Llona the amount of: (a) ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱30,000.00 as actual damages;
and (c) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.11

After the CA denied their motion for reconsideration,12 the petitioners now appeal.

Issue

The petitioners submit that the RTC and the CA erred in finding them guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt based on the eyewitness testimony of Mirandilla
despite her not being a credible witness; that some circumstances rendered Mirandilla’s testimony unreliable, namely: (a) she had failed to identify them as the
assailants of Llona, because she had not actually witnessed them shooting at Llona; (b) she had merely assumed that they had been the assailants from the fact that they
had worked for Lorenzana, the supposed mastermind; (c) the autopsy report stated that Llona had been shot from a distance, not at close range, contrary to Mirandilla’s
claim; (d) Mirandilla’s testimony was contrary to human experience; and (e) Mirandilla’s account was inconsistent with that of Jesalva’s.

Ruling

The conviction of the petitioners is affirmed, subject to modifications in the penalty imposed on Monreal and in the amounts and kinds of damages as civil liability.

I.
Factual findings of the RTC and CAare accorded respect

The RTC and CA’s conclusions were based on Mirandilla’s positive identification of the petitioners as the malefactors and on her description of the acts of each of them
made during her court testimony on March 6, 1995,13 viz:

q Who were you saying ‘we sat together’?

a Kdg. Llona, Mr. Jose Jesalva and I was letting my 5 years old child to sleep.

q Can you demonstrate or described before this Honorable Court the size of the sala and the house you wherein (sic)?

a The size of the sale (sic) is about 3 x 3 meters.

q Now, please show to this Honorable Court the relative position, the sitting arrangement of yours, Kgd. Llona and Kgd. Jesalva.

a I was sitting on a long bench then my child was on my lap, then Kdg. Llona was infront of me, I was at the right side of Kdg. Llona

q How about Kdg. Jesalva?

a This Kgd. Jesalva was facing Kgd. Llona and Kgd. Llona was facing the door in otherwords, the door was at his back.

q Was the door open?

a Yes, sir.

q Was the door immediately found… Rather was this the main door of the house?

a That was the main door leading to the porch of the house.

q And from the porch is the main stairs already?

a Yes, sir.

q Now, what were you doing there after dinner as you said you have finished assisting the persons in Bongga about the program, ... after that, what were you doing
then?

a I was letting my child to sleep and Kgd. Llona was fanning my child.

q How about Kgd. Jesalva?

a His head was stopping (sic) because of his drunkenness.

q Can you tell this Honorable Court, while you were on that situation, if there was any incident that happened?

a There was a sudden thundering steps as if they were running and there were successive shots.

q Simultaneously with these two (2) successive shots can you see the origin or who was responsible for the shots?

a Upon hearing the shots, I turned my head and saw Salvador Atizado.

q Who is this Salvador Atizado?

a He was the one who shot Kgd. Llona.

q Can you be able to identify him?

a (Witness identifying the person, and when asked of his name answered Salvador Atizado.)

q So when you heard the shots, who was actually shot?

a Kgd. Llona, because after looking at the (3) persons I saw Kgd. Llona sliding downward.

q Then after that what happened?

a Then I stood immediately and I told the persons responsible ‘stop that’s enough’, and I gave assistance to Kgd. Llona.

q Then after that what happened?

a My intention was to let Kgd. Llona push-up but I heard three (3) clicks of the trigger of the gun.

q Then what did you do when you heard that?

a After which I turned my head suddenly then I saw this Salvador Monreal but at that time I do not know his name.

q Then what did you see of him?

a I saw this Salvador Monreal stepping backward and he was adjusting the cylinder of the gun.

q Now, when you saw and heard Atizado three (3) clicks of the gun, can you see where the gun was pointed at?

a It was pointed towards me.

q So, there were three (3) shots that did not actually fired towards you?

a Yes, sir.

q So when you said that you saw this man Monreal, can you still recognize this man?

a Yes, sir.

q Could you be able to point at him, if he is in Court?

a Yes, sir.

q Kindly please go down and tap his shoulder?

a (witness going down and proceeded to the first bench and tap the shoulder of the person, the person tapped by the witness answered to the name Salvador Monreal.)

q You said, when you stood up and face with him while he was adjusting his revolver and he was moving backward, did you see other persons as his companion, if any?

a At the first time when I turned my head back, I saw this Atizado he was already on the process of leaving the place.

q Who is the first name of this Atizado?

a Danilo Atizado

q And did they actually leave the place at that moment?

a Salvador Monreal was the one left.

Our own review persuades us to concur with the RTC and the CA. Indeed, Mirandilla’s positive identification of the petitioners as the killers, and her declarations on
what each of the petitioners did when they mounted their sudden deadly assault against Llona left no doubt whatsoever that they had conspired to kill and had done so
with treachery.

It is a basic rule of appellate adjudication in this jurisdiction that the trial judge’s evaluation of the credibility of a witness and of the witness’ testimony is accorded the
highest respect because the trial judge’s unique opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of the witness enables him to determine whether the witness is telling the
truth or not.14 Such evaluation, when affirmed by the CA, is binding on the Court unless facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended, or
misinterpreted that, if considered, would materially affect the disposition of the case.15 We thus apply the rule, considering that the petitioners have not called attention
to and proved any overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted circumstance. Fortifying the application of the rule is that Mirandilla’s positive declarations on the
identities of the assailants prevailed over the petitioners’ denials and alibi.16

Under the law, a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.17 Yet, the State
did not have to prove the petitioners’ previous agreement to commit the murder,18 because their conspiracy was deduced from the mode and manner in which they had
perpetrated their criminal act.19 They had acted in concert in assaulting Llona, with their individual acts manifesting a community of purpose and design to achieve
their evil end. As it is, all the conspirators in a crime are liable as co-principals.20 Thus, they cannot now successfully assail their conviction as co-principals in murder.

Murder is defined and punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which provides:

Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or
afford impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor
vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public
calamity.

5. With evident premeditation.

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which offended party might make.21 For treachery to be attendant, the means,
method, or form of execution must be deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offenders.22 Moreover, treachery must be present and seen by the witness right at
the inception of the attack.23

The CA held that Mirandilla’s testimonial narrative "sufficiently established that treachery attended the attack o[n] the victim" because Atizado’s shooting the victim at
the latter’s back had been intended to ensure the execution of the crime; and that Atizado and Monreal’s conspiracy to kill the victim was proved by their presence at
the scene of the crime each armed with a handgun that they had fired except that Monreal’s handgun did not fire.24

We concur with the CA on the attendance of treachery. The petitioners mounted their deadly assault with suddenness and without the victim being aware of its
imminence. Neither an altercation between the victim and the assailants had preceded the assault, nor had the victim provoked the assault in the slightest. The assailants
had designed their assault to be swift and unexpected, in order to deprive their victim of the opportunity to defend himself.25 Such manner constituted a deliberate
adoption of a method of attack that ensured their unhampered execution of the crime.

II.
Modification of the Penalty on Monreal and of the Civil Damages

Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no modifying circumstances,
the CA correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on Atizado, which was conformable with Article 63 (2) of the RPC.26 But reclusion perpetua was not
the correct penalty for Monreal due to his being a minor over 15 but under 18 years of age. The RTC and the CA did not appreciate Monreal’s minority at the time of
the commission of the murder probably because his birth certificate was not presented at the trial.

Yet, it cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below 18 years of age when the crime was committed on April 18, 1994. Firstly, his counter-affidavit executed on
June 30 1994 stated that he was 17 years of age.27 Secondly, the police blotter recording his arrest mentioned that he was 17 years old at the time of his arrest on May
18, 1994.28 Thirdly, Villafe’s affidavit dated June 29, 1994 averred that Monreal was a minor on the date of the incident.29 Fourthly, as RTC’s minutes of hearing
dated March 9, 1999 showed,30 Monreal was 22 years old when he testified on direct examination on March 9, 1999,31 which meant that he was not over 18 years of
age when he committed the crime. And, fifthly, Mirandilla described Monreal as a teenager and young looking at the time of the incident.32

The foregoing showing of Monreal’s minority was legally sufficient, for it conformed with the norms subsequently set under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344, also
known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,33 viz:

Section 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with
the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child may be determined from the child’s birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any
other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the
physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.

Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to the filing of the information in any appropriate court may file a case in a summary
proceeding for the determination of age before the Family Court which shall decide the case within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of
all interested parties.

If a case has been filed against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in the appropriate court, the person shall file a motion to determine the age of the child
in the same court where the case is pending. Pending hearing on the said motion, proceedings on the main case shall be suspended.

In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other government officials concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the child in
conflict with the law.

Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC,34 when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law is imposed. Based
on Article 61 (2) of the RPC, reclusion temporal is the penalty next lower than reclusion perpetua to death. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and Article 64 of
the RPC, therefore, the range of the penalty of imprisonment imposable on Monreal was prision mayor in any of its periods, as the minimum period, to reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as the maximum period. Accordingly, his proper indeterminate penalty is from six years and one day of prision mayor, as the minimum
period, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period.

Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is, from the time of his arrest on May 18, 1994 until the present. Given that the entire period of Monreal’s detention
should be credited in the service of his sentence, pursuant to Section 41 of Republic Act No. 9344,35 the revision of the penalty now warrants his immediate release
from the penitentiary.

In this regard, the benefits in favor of children in conflict with the law as granted under Republic Act No. 9344, which aims to promote the welfare of minor offenders
through programs and services, such as delinquency prevention, intervention, diversion, rehabilitation and re-integration, geared towards their development, are
retroactively applied to Monreal as a convict serving his sentence. Its Section 68 expressly so provides:

Section 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. – Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity
of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence,
shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be
adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable laws.

Both petitioners were adjudged solidarily liable to pay damages to the surviving heirs of Llona.1avvp++il Their solidary civil liability arising from the commission of
the crime stands,36 despite the reduction of Monreal’s penalty. But we must reform the awards of damages in order to conform to prevailing jurisprudence. The CA
granted only ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱30,000.00 as actual damages, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. We hold that the amounts for death indemnity and moral
damages should each be raised to ₱75,000.00 to accord with prevailing case law;37 and that exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00 due to the attendance of treachery
should be further awarded,38 to accord with the pronouncement in People v. Catubig,39 to wit:

The commission of an offense has two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings,
each of which, is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase
of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying,
in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended
party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is
ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of
consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.

The award of actual damages of ₱30,000.00 is upheld for being supported by the record.

WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the decision dated December 13, 2005 promulgated in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, subject to the following modifications:

(a) Salvador Monreal is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty from six years and one day of prision mayor, as the minimum period, to 14 years, eight months,
and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period;

(b) The Court orders the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City to immediately release Salvador Monreal due to his having fully served the penalty imposed on him,
unless he is being held for other lawful causes; and

(c) The Court directs the petitioners to pay jointly and solidarily to the heirs of Roger L. Llona ₱75,000.00 as death indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages,
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱30,000.00 as actual damages.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City by personal service. The
Director of Bureau of Corrections shall report to this Court the action he has taken on this decision within five days from service.

SO ORDERED.