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IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRY APPLICATIONS
Substation Grounding Transfer of
Potential Case Studies
Duane Leschert, Senior Member, IEEE, George Iwasykiw, Member, IEEE, and Ron Derworiz, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Industrial substation grounding studies usually as-
sume a simple isolated substation, follow the routine IEEE 80
design and analysis procedures using the software tools bundled
with the power systems analysis suite of choice, and carry on
with the rest of the project. However, there can be complications
to substation grounding designs. This paper discusses two case
studies where a ground fault in one substation generates a voltage
that is transferred to other areas. The issues are assessed using
common software tools supplemented with simple spreadsheet
calculations. Some common limitations of the standard software
tools, when applied to these more complex problems, are discussed
in this paper, along with appropriate workarounds. Mitigation
methods are discussed.
Index Terms—Current split, ground potential rise (GPR),
grounding, split factor, step and touch potential, substation
grounding, transfer of potential.
I. I NTRODUCTION
T HE grounding system of industrial substations is typically
designed in accordance with IEEE 80, the IEEE Guide for
Safety in AC Substation Grounding [1], supplemented by IEEE
142 (“The Green Book”) [2].
IEEE 80 is focused on personnel and equipment safety when
electric currents are flowing into the earth. It considers power
system frequency (50–60 Hz) events. Although fault currents
do decay, conventional ground system analysis assumes that
the initial (subtransient) fault current is maintained at that same
high level for the duration of the fault under consideration.
A ground fault current is considered to flow through the
bonding and grounding conductors, through the grounding
electrodes, through the earth in the vicinity of the substation, to
“remote earth.” IEEE 80 provides a methodology to calculate
the effective resistance Rg of the grounding system to remote
earth. The fault current flowing through this system results in
a ground potential rise (GPR) of the substation with respect
to remote earth. Strictly speaking, the term GPR as used in
Manuscript received June 19, 2013; accepted October 1, 2013. Paper
2013-PCIC-488, presented at the 2013 IEEE Petroleum and Chemical Industry
Technical Conference, Chicago, IL, USA, September 23–25, and approved
for publication in the IEEE T RANSACTIONS ON I NDUSTRY A PPLICATIONS
by the Petroleum and Chemical Industry Committee of the IEEE Industry
Applications Society.
D. Leschertand G. Iwasykiw arewith WorleyParsons, Edmonton, AB T6E 5S2,
Canada (e-mail: Duane.Leschert@WorleyParsons.com; George.Iwasykiw@
WorleyParsons.com).
R. Derworiz is with Shell Canada Energy, Fort Saskatchewan, AB T8L 3T2,
Canada (e-mail: rderworiz@ieee.org).
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIA.2015.2463793
0093-9994 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
1
IEEE 80 refers to the highest calculated GPR for a given
case. When multiple potentials at different locations within the
calculation area are discussed, they should be referred to as
surface potentials, but often, the term GPR is used for these
surface potentials.
A person standing on the surface of the substation is exposed
to a voltage potential between his feet (step potential Es ) due to
the difference in surface potentials at each foot. The permissible
step potential is a function of body withstand capabilities, body
resistance, and the resistance of any special insulating material
on the surface of the substation. Similarly, the touch potential
Et is calculated for a person standing in the substation area
and touching a metallic object bonded to the ground system.
Ultimately, the tolerable step and touch potentials are deter-
mined by the tolerable resultant current through a person’s body
(10 mA). Hence, in dealing with unacceptable calculated volt-
ages, the most readily modified parameter is usually the resis-
tivity of the insulating layer on the surface of the substation.
(For details of these calculations, refer to [1].)
These parameters (GPR, Es , Et ) are calculated by readily
available software for a number of points (e.g., 1 m apart)
within the substation boundaries and assessed against the
tolerable limits for that system.
The main focus of IEEE 80 is the safety of a single substation
as an independent entity. There are references in IEEE 80 to
interconnection issues (e.g., see Fig. 1), which are sometimes
overlooked in the design of industrial substations. A standard
requirement in IEEE 80 is to address any instances of transfer
of potential outside of the substation. This paper discusses
this issue of transfer of potential from the perspective of the
petrochemical industry.
In an IEEE 80 grounding analysis, there are a number of
assumptions that are appropriate for a single isolated sub-
station, but are not always appropriate when assessing mul-
tiple interconnected grounding systems. For example, in an
isolated substation, the dimensions are small enough that the
error in ignoring the resistance of the horizontal conductors
is insignificant. However, this is often incorrect when con-
sidering interconnected substations at large complexes, which
may involve distances on the order of a few kilometers. In
an isolated substation, typically, there is only one uniform
surface treatment (e.g., a layer of washed crushed rock 150 mm
deep). This surface treatment may extend some small distance
outside the substation limits, but rarely extends over the entire
surface of the larger facility. These assumptions are generally
incorporated into software tools often used for industrial sub-
station design. While there are specialized software packages
2 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRY APPLICATIONS
Fig. 1. IEEE 80-2000 figure 13.
available, which eliminate these and many other limitations, it
is not necessary to resort to these specialized tools for many
industrial applications, as long as some simple adjustments
are used. For some more complex grounding situations, the
specialized (and substantially more expensive) software tools
are needed.
II. C ASE S TUDY 1: I NTERCONNECTED S UBSTATIONS
A. Description of the Facility
This application is at a large oil refining complex. Power is
supplied to the refinery from a utility owned 138-/25-kV sub-
station. This utility substation contains two 138-/25-kV trans-
formers, some 138-kV breakers, and associated equipment.
There are two incoming 138-kV circuits and two outgoing
138-kV circuits. The outgoing circuits are interconnected to
other portions of the refinery complex.
Adjacent to the utility substation is the refinery 25-kV power
distribution switchgear, complete with its own grounding sys-
tem, which is effectively interconnected with the utility ground-
ing system, since the two systems are adjacent to each other.
A new 25-kV distribution substation is subfed from the main
distribution substation by armored cable over 1 km in length.
The two grounding systems are effectively interconnected both
by grounding conductors internal to the power cables and
by external insulated interconnecting grounding conductors. A
simplified power single line diagram is shown in Fig. 2.
The 138-/25-kV transformers are delta/wye connected with
neutral grounding resistors of 400 A each. The 138-kV system
is solidly grounded at its source, which is another utility substa-
tion a few kilometers away, and is interconnected by overhead
lines. The entire 25-kV distribution system is arranged as a
secondary selective system with all tie breakers normally open.
The existing facility utilizes traditional ground rods and
a buried horizontal grid of interconnected bare conductors
Fig. 2. Simplified one-line diagram.
(ground mesh). The new substation equipment is in a shop-
fabricated steel building installed on driven steel piles; addi-
tional ground rods and conductors are installed as necessary.
Each substation has a surface treatment adequate for the needs
of that substation; there are multiple surfaces encountered
between the existing substations and the new substation.
B. Challenges in Analysis
The available fault current at the new (remote) substation
is 400 A; this would result from a single-line-to-ground fault
in the new substation. As the two supply transformers can
only be paralleled for a fraction of a second due to automatic
tripping of one of the main breakers in this situation, an 800-A
single-line-to-ground fault could only exist for the short time
it takes to automatically trip one breaker. Even this rare 800-A
fault is not difficult to manage with a very simple grounding
design. However, a ground fault on the 138-kV portion of
the utility substation can result in a GPR of 2532 V at the
utility substation. This voltage will be transferred to the new
remote substation by the interconnecting bonding conductors
described earlier and is limited only by the impedances of
these interconnecting conductors and the associated grounding
systems.
LESCHERT et al.: SUBSTATION GROUNDING TRANSFER OF POTENTIAL CASE STUDIES
Fig. 3. Ground fault current sharing.
The utility substation has an effective resistance to remote
earth (Rg ) of 0.09 Ω and a potential ground fault current of
25 000 A (IF and Rg1 in Fig. 3). The bonding conductors
in each of the two cables feeding the new substation have a
resistance of 1.213 Ω. The interconnecting ground conductors
have a resistance of 0.381 Ω; thus, the effective resistance of
these three parallel paths to the new substation is 0.234 Ω (R12
in Fig. 3).
In general, mutual coupling through the earth between sub-
stations should be considered. For case study 1, where the sub-
stations are separated by over a kilometer, mutual coupling is
clearly not significant. However, for smaller separations, it may
become an issue. A quick assessment of the need to consider
mutual coupling can be made by examining the earth potential
plots of each substation. The distance from the substation at
which the earth potential is reduced to a nominal low value
is taken to define the region within which any object may be
affected by the earth potential due to a fault at that substation.
Where fault currents can be connected to earth at each substa-
tion, a reasonable assessment can be made by superimposing
the earth potential plots of the two substations, assuming each is
an isolated substation. Areas where the resultant earth potential
is higher than the criteria voltage will need further investigation.
The limiting voltage from mining code CSA M421-2011 [6] is
100 V and is a reasonable criteria voltage in the absence of other
guidance.
The new substation building is constructed on driven bare
steel piles with a minimum length of 15 m. Interconnections
between these piles are by the large structural steel building
members. Relevant steel connections are welded. There is a
minimal bare copper grid in the substation yard, interconnect-
ing the building with a loop around an outdoor transformer
and the fence. There is a loop of bare copper 1 m (measured
horizontally) outside the fence. The fence and transformer
loops have conventional ground rods at key locations.
The geotechnical report for the new substation area indicates
that the soil is Unified Soil Classification System (USCS) types
SM and SC. Type SM is a silty sand, and type SC is a clayey
sand. IEEE 142-2007 lists typical soil resistivities for some
USCS soil types in Table 4.2. Typical soil resistivities for type
SM range from 100 to 500 Ω · m, and for type SC, they range
from 50 to 200 Ω · m.
Initially, the ground fault protection on the 138-kV utility
feeders was unknown; thus, it was assumed that a ground fault
at the utility substation would be interrupted by a distance relay
3
at a remote substation in its zone 2 or 3 region; hence, a 1-s
fault duration was assumed.
A two-layer soil model is used. This area is subject to frost
depths of up to 3 m in winter. The resistivity of frozen soil
is taken as ten times that of unfrozen soil. Both summer and
winter soil conditions are modeled, but the winter condition
with a top layer of frozen soil yields the worst case grounding
analysis results.
The initial analysis found this substation design to be unac-
ceptable. To manage the high GPR calculated for any significant
amount of current shared with the existing substation, with
high touch and step voltages, an extensive copper mesh with
many additional ground rods plus a surface layer of nominal
50-mm washed crushed granite would be required. Based on
this information, an in situ earth resistivity test was performed.
This resulted in a much more manageable soil resistivity of
28 Ω · m for unfrozen soil, which emphasizes the importance
of accurate soil resistivity data for any grounding system study,
as clearly stated in IEEE 80.
It was also determined that the utility protection scheme
included differential protection on all 138-kV feeders, with in-
stantaneous tripping. Thus, the fault duration could be reduced
to a minimal relay operating time plus the breaker operating
time.
When the new substation grounding grid was analyzed with
these more realistic values, its equivalent resistance to remote
earth was calculated to be 0.35 Ω in the winter and 0.23 Ω in
the summer.
The interconnected ground system is represented in simpli-
fied form in Fig. 3.
The resistance to remote earth of each substation (Rg1 , Rg2 )
is considered to be independent. If the substations were close to
each other, there would be a mutual coupling effect to consider.
With two substations separated by over a kilometer, mutual
coupling for the case studied is negligible. The fault current
IF at the utility substation (Substation A in Fig. 3) is shared by
the two ground systems in proportion to the ratio of resistances,
as shown in the network in Fig. 3. The ratio of fault current
through each grounding system is called the split factor.
The calculated ground network currents, for the ultimate
138-kV fault of 25 kA in winter conditions, are 21.7 kA in
the 138-kV network and 3.34 kA in the new 25-kV substation
network. This is substantially above the 400- or 800-A ground
fault current available due to a local 25-kV fault in the new
substation and must be accommodated by the design of the new
grounding network.
Ground surface potentials are plotted in Fig. 4 for the worst
case condition. The resulting worst case GPR at the new substa-
tion due to this fault current is 1178 V. The nominal resistivity
of the surface material is 200 Ω · m. This results in no step
potential issues. However, in some areas, there could be a touch
potential issue, if there were anything installed in that portion
of the yard. (Worst case touch potentials are plotted in Fig. 5.)
There are locations of high touch potential located more than a
meter outside the fence, which are acceptable as this is greater
than a person’s unaided touch distance. There are also some
locations of high touch potential in some open areas of the yard,
where there is nothing installed. If desired, these touch potential
4 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRY APPLICATIONS

Fig. 4. Case study 1, worst case earth potential plot.

Fig. 5. Case study 1, worst case touch potential plot.

issues can be resolved with a better surface material (nominal
resistivity of at least 1000 Ω · m).
Worst case calculation results are summarized in Table I.
These worst case results required the worst case future 138-kV
ground fault. Present fault levels did not result in unacceptable
touch or step voltages anywhere inside the new substation.
III. C ASE S TUDY 2: I NTERCONNECTED P ROCESS P LANT
A. Description of the Facility
This application involves new pipeline pumping stations
installed as part of a pipeline extension project. Each pumping
station includes a utility substation with a delta/wye connected
LESCHERT et al.: SUBSTATION GROUNDING TRANSFER OF POTENTIAL CASE STUDIES
TABLE I
C ASE S TUDY 1 C ALCULATION R ESULTS
TABLE II
K EY M ODELING D ATA : C ASE S TUDY 2
transformer, typically 115 kV, solidly grounded to 6.9-kV re-
sistance grounded, a small number of 6.9-kV pipeline pumps,
and associated equipment and support buildings. The entire
facility is installed on bare driven steel piles 55 ft long and
interconnected with insulated 4/0 copper conductors. The utility
substation has a traditional buried bare copper grounding mesh.
The utility substation surface material is 6 in of crushed rock.
The pumping station is covered with 6 in of gravel, of a lesser
specification.
There are ground interconnections between the utility substa-
tion and the pumping facility, both intentional (ground conduc-
tors) and less obvious (metal cable tray carrying 6.9-kV cables
from the substation to the electrical buildings). Thus, a fault in
the utility substation will result in a transfer of potential to the
process facility and needs to be investigated to ensure worker
safety.
Several typical pumping stations were modeled. The station
with the highest GPR is presented in this paper.
The utility substation and process plant grounding systems
are adjacent to each other and were modeled as one integrated
grounding system. Key modeling data are shown in Table II.
B. Challenges in Analysis
With the utility and process plant grounding grids adjacent
to each other, there is a mutual coupling effect. Modeling the
grids as a single entity is an attempt to include these mutual
effects. The software used performs a finite-element analysis of
the grounding system modeled and does appear to include these
mutual coupling effects for the model we created. One caution
is that this software (and apparently other similar software from
many sources) assumes that the entire fault current can be
injected into the grounding grid at any given location. This is a
valid assumption for a substation design, but is excessive for the
model we created where the process facility and the substation
are modeled together. There are provisions in the software to
model unconnected elements, such as a fence or a buried pipe,
which are not bonded to the ground grid, but interconnections
between two grids, such as to only inject the maximum fault
current into one grid, are not easily modeled. We were able
to work around this limitation, but there are some applications
where this could become a serious limitation, forcing the use of
specialized (and significantly more expensive) software.
5
TABLE III
C ASE S TUDY 2 C ALCULATION R ESULTS
Another software limitation, which is not a problem for the
case analyzed, is that the software is only able to accommodate
one surface treatment (resistivity, depth). As there is gravel over
the entire surface of the process plant, this is not a problem.
However, in many process facilities, the surface treatment can-
not be treated as uniform. In such a situation (which is encoun-
tered when assessing the step and touch potentials outside the
fenced graveled area of the pipeline pumping station studied),
the software used will correctly calculate GPR and surface
potentials. One approach is to perform multiple iterations of the
calculation, using each of the surface materials involved in one
of the iterations, and then manually combine the resulting step
and touch potential results. Another approach is to manually
calculate step and touch potentials based on the calculated sur-
face potentials, although this can involve a significant effort for
many applications. If neither of these approaches is acceptable,
then the specialized software will be required.
C. Calculation Results
The calculation results are summarized in Table III.
GPR and touch potentials are shown graphically in
Figs. 6 and 7, respectively.
It is noteworthy that the calculated touch potentials at places
approached, but did not exceed, the allowable potential. This
is attributed to the insulating qualities of the surface material.
Thus, it is concluded that transfer of potential from the sub-
station, while real, does not pose a problem for this facility.
Had these calculated touch potentials not been acceptable, our
options to improve our calculations and minimize the effect
of overly conservative assumptions would have been to calcu-
late each grounding grid (utility and process plant) separately,
attempt an assessment of mutual coupling, and combine the
results as for the new substation in case study 1 earlier, or to
resort to specialized modeling software.
IV. C ONCLUSION
It is important to clearly understand the assumptions and
limitations of each of the software tools employed in perform-
ing a grounding analysis. It is equally important to ensure that
the system analyzed be modeled in such a manner that the
desired analysis can be completed adequately. Some software
tool limitations can be resolved using supplementary tools.
Transfer of potential out of a substation grounding system
can be a significant safety risk, even when the secondaries
of all transformers in that substation are resistance grounded.
There are practical analytical tools available to assess the risk
involved, and there are limitations to the common software
tools usually used for grounding system analysis, which must
be considered.
6 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRY APPLICATIONS

Fig. 6. Case study 2, earth potential plot.

Fig. 7. Case study 2, touch potential plot.

When the supply substation is sufficiently remote from the to remote earth, may be sufficient. This is illustrated in case
affected facility such that mutual earth coupling between the study 1. Each grounding grid can be studied as an independent
grounding systems is negligible, a simple network of resistive grid using available software, and the results combined as
elements, considering each grounding grid as a single resistance illustrated.
LESCHERT et al.: SUBSTATION GROUNDING TRANSFER OF POTENTIAL CASE STUDIES 7

When mutual coupling effects are not negligible, it may
be possible to model the two ground grids as a single entity.
However, the inherent assumptions of the utilized software
must be dealt with. In our software, these limitations included
a single surface treatment capability and the assumption that
one fault current is injected anywhere in the grid. These are
discussed in case study 2.
The software limitation of capability to allow only one
surface treatment, where multiple surfaces must be analyzed
in different portions of the grid, can be managed by multiple
analysis runs and manual combination of the results. Where the
injection of excessive fault current into the process plant grid is
causing analysis difficulties, it may become necessary to model
the grids separately and independently assess mutual coupling
effects. In some situations, it will become necessary to resort to
specialized software tools.
Duane Leschert (S’72–A’78–M’05–SM’09) re-
ceived the Bachelor of Applied Science degree in
electrical engineering from The University of British
Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada, in 1975.
He is currently the Chief Electrical Engineer
for power systems with WorleyParsons, Edmonton,
AB, Canada.
George Iwasykiw (M’12) received the B.Eng.
degree from Lakehead University, Thunder Bay,
ON, Canada, in 1991.
He is currently a Senior Electrical Engineer with
WorleyParsons, Edmonton, AB, Canada.

R EFERENCES
[1] IEEE Guide for Safety in AC Substation Grounding, IEEE 80-2000,
2000.
[2] IEEE Recommended Practice for Grounding of industrial and Commercial
Power Systems (IEEE Green Book), IEEE 142-2007, 2007.
[3] IEEE Recommended Practice for Determining the Electric Power
Station Ground Potential Rise and Induced Voltage from a Power Fault, Ron Derworiz (S’92–M’93–SM’12) received the
IEEE 367-1996, 1996. B.Sc. degree in electrical engineering from the Uni-
[4] J. E. T. Villas, D. Mudhedhar, V. R. Fernandes, and A. C. Magalhaes, versity of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada, in 1992.
“Ground grid design of a transition station system—A typical example He is currently the upgrader facility Electrical
of fault transfer,” IEEE Trans. Power Del., vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 124–129, Engineering Manager with Shell Canada Energy,
Fort Saskatchewan, AB. He has authored three IEEE
Jan. 1990.
[5] N. Nichols and D. D. Shipp, “Designing to avoid hazardous transferred papers.
Earth potentials,” IEEE Trans. Ind. Appl., vol IA-18, no 4, pp. 340–347,
Jul./Aug. 1982.
[6] Use of Electricity in Mines, CSA M421-2011, 2011.