1.

)Dexter Job Uy

2.) ROQUE B. BENITEZ and SANTA FE LABOR UNION-FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS, Petitioners, vs. SANTA FE
MOVING AND RELOCATION SERVICESNEDIT KURANGIL, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 208163; April 20, 2015]

TOPIC: Termination by Employer

a. Substantive Due Process
1. Just Causes (Art. 282)
1.1 Serious Misconduct/Willful disobedience (Art. 282[a])

FACTS: (chronological order)

1. Petitioners Roque V. Benitez (Benitez) and Santa Fe Labor Union (union) filed a complaint for unfair
labor practice and illegal dismissal, with money claims,4 against respondents Santa Fe Moving and
Relocation Services (company) and its Managing Director, Vedit Kurangil (Kurangil), an Australian
citizen.

2. Benitez claimed that during the party, he noticed that the raffle committee members were putting
back the names of those who were already drawn, giving them more chances of winning. He
appealed to the committee to put a stop to what they were doing, but they replied they would not "in
the spirit of Christmas."

3. The company and Kurangil denied liability. They averred that during the Christmas Party, Benitez
berated and maligned Kurangil by throwing foul and offensive words at him, such as "putang ina mo
ka VK, gago ka! "Benitez’s tirade, they added, included the company and it officers. Moreover, the
incident happened in front of the company’s employees, their families, as well as company clients and
guests.

4. The company confirmed Benitez’s claim that the incident involved the conduct of the Christmas raffle.
However, they differed on what triggered his unruly behavior. It alleged that while the raffle was going
on, Benitez climbed up the stage and questioned the management’s decision to allow contractual
employees to join the raffle. This resulted in only 80% of the employees winning raffle prizes. Benitez
then started hurling invectives and foul language while still on stage, mostly directed at Kurangil.

5. The company further alleged that even when Benitez stormed out of the stage, he kept on berating
Kurangil, such that people he passed by overheard him cursing Kurangil and the company and that he
even attempted to a throw a beer bottle at Kurangil,but he was restrained by other employees.

6. The respondents presented in evidence the affidavits of Kurangil,8 Reynaldo Delavin (Delavin),9 a
company driver, and Diana Claros Urmeneta10 (Urmeneta),11 a guest at the party. Their statements
were corroborated by the depositions12 of company employees Jim Robert Afos (Afos) and Marciano
Atienza, Jr. (Atienza). The two disputed the statements13 of Bulan, Elib, Morata and Ramirez —
witnesses for Benitez — that they were seated together with Benitez at one table and that he caused
no disturbance during the Christmas Party. Afos and Atienza stated that they were the ones who were
seated with Benitez, not Bulan, Elib, Morata and Ramirez who were at a separate table with another
group of employees.

7. Afos and Atienza added that Benitez’s tirade started when the raffle for the grand prize was being
conducted. All of a sudden, Benitez, who had not yet won a prize at that time, stood up and
proceeded to the stage, fuming mad and complaining about the conduct of the raffle.14 The company
required Benitez to explain in writing why he should not be disciplined for serious misconduct and
willful disobedience of its lawful orders in connection with the incident. Benitez failed to comply and
neither did he show remorse for what he did.

8. In view of Benitez’s failure to explain his side, the company issued a memorandum15 to Benitez (signed by
Kurangil), terminating his employment effective on the same day, on grounds of serious misconduct or
willful disobedience in clear violation of "Santa Fe Policy and Procedure under Conduct and Behavior as
well as Labor Code of the Philippines under Art. 282 – Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
 employee of the lawful orders of his employer x x x." He bewailed that he was not given the opportunity
to defend himself.

9. Benitez denied having verbally abused Kurangil. He presented the affidavits of co-employees Jhun Bulan,
Romualdo Elib, Carlos Morata and Raul Ramirez,7 attesting that Benitez, who was with them at one table,
did not commit the offense which led to his dismissal.

10. Benitez argued that his dismissal constituted an unfair labor practice as he was a union officer and that it
was undertaken to derail the conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement with the company. He
further argued that the penalty of dismissal is disproportionate to his alleged offense, considering that it
was committed during a casual gathering and had no connection to his work.

11. The labor arbiter, the NLRC and the CA uniformly ruled that there is substantial evidence to warrant
Benitez’s dismissal for serious misconduct.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not Benitez is liable for serious misconduct which is a just cause for termination.

HELD: YES. However, the company failed to observe the two-notice requirement in employee dismissals

RATIO:

Serious misconduct is a just cause for termination of employment under the law. Article 282 of the Labor Code
provides: "An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct or
willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his
work, x x x."

Benitez's offense constituted a serious misconduct as defined by law.

There is substantial evidence that Benitez maligned the company’s managing director and the company itself
during their Christmas Party. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.30
Benitez presented the affidavits31 of four company employees — Bulan, Elib, Morata and Ramirez — who stated
under oath that Benitez was seated with them at one table and that he did not cause any disturbance during the
party. The testimony of these four employees were belied by their co-employees Afos and Atienza who executed a
joint affidavit,32 stating that Benitez was seated with them at a different table and that they witnessed him going
to the stage where he lost his temper and verbally abused Kurangil in connection with the conduct of the Christmas
raffle.

The petitioners assert that even if Benitez committed the offense for which he was charged, it was not a serious
misconduct that would warrant his dismissal under the law. They cite Samson v. NLRC39 as authority for their
submission that "misconduct, however serious, must nevertheless be in connection with the employee’s work to
constitute just cause for his separation."40

Samson v. NLRC is not applicable in the case at bar. Samson’s outburst occurred during an informal Christmas
gathering of company sales officials and staff and his maligned superior was not present during the gathering. On
the other hand, Benitez went up the stage and confronted his superior with a verbal abuse.1âwphi1

Under the circumstances, we believe that Benitez’s tirade against Kurangil, the company and other company
officers indeed happened. Significantly, the Christmas Party was attended not only by company officers and
employees and their families, but also by company clients and guests. With such a big audience in front of him, we
cannot imagine how Benitez could get away with his claim that he did not malign and disrespect Kurangil and the
others.

In contrast, the company acted swiftly, and decisively in Benitez's case, obviously and understandably, because of
the gravity and high visibility of his offense, which not only constituted a frontal verbal, and nearly physical (the
attempted beer bottle throwing), assault against Kurangil. Needless to say, Benitez's outburst also caused grave
embarrassment for the audience who witnessed the incident, including company officials whom he likewise
maligned, as well as company clients and guests.
Under the foregoing circumstances, we are convinced - as the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA had been - that
Benitez's offense constituted a serious misconduct as defined by law. His display of insolent and disrespectful
behavior, in utter disregard of the time and place of its occurrence, had very much to do with his work. He set a bad
example as a union officer and as a crew leader of a vital division of the company. His actuations during the
company's Christmas Party could have had negative repercussions for his employer had he been allowed to stay on
the job. His standing before those clients who witnessed the incident and those who would hear of it would surely
be diminished, to the detriment of the company.

However, we agree with the NLRC ruling that the company failed to observe the two-notice requirement in
employee dismissals as Benitez was dismissed on the same day that the memorandum was served on him. The
verbal directive for him to explain why he should not be dismissed, assuming that there was indeed such a
directive, clearly was not in compliance with the law. Nonetheless, considering the gravity of Benitez's offense, we
deem it reasonable to award him P30,000.00 in nominal damages for violation of his right to procedural due
process.

3.) ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER VS. MARIA SANCHEZ

Maria Theresa Sanchez (respondent), employed by the St. Luke’s Medical Center as a Staff Nurse, passed thru the
SMLC Centralization Entrance/Exit, manned by the security guard on duty, SG Jaime Manzanade at the end of her
shift. As part of standard operating procedure, she was subjected to inspection, where it was found out that her
bag contained a pouch that held an assortment of medical stocks. Maria Theresa asked SG Manzanade if she could
just return the items, however, she was not allowed to do so; instead, she was brought to the In-House Security
Department where she was directed to write an incident report to explain her possession of the medical stocks.
She complied, at the same time submitting her handwritten apology. The matter was brought to the attention of
SMLC, and its Division of Nursing then required Maria Theresa to explain. In her explanation, Maria Theresa
pointed out that the items were left behind in the drawers of patients who were already discharged. As similarly
practiced by other staff, she saved these items in her pouch, which she then uses for use in immediate procedures
when stocks run out. She however failed to return the pouch inside the medication drawer; instead she placed it in
her bag and forgot about it, until she was inspected by the guard on duty. She was placed on preventive
suspension, and eventually terminated by management for violation of SLMC’s Code of Discipline, particularly
Section 1, Rule 1 on Acts of Dishonesty, i.e.,Robbery, Theft, Pilferage, and Misappropriation of Funds. Maria Theresa
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC, averring that her bringing out of the medical stocks was due to
inadvertence and not out of intent to gain, hence she was innocent of the charges that brought about her
termination, as shown by the fact that SMLC did not file a criminal case against her. She was unassisted by counsel
when she executed the handwritten admission, thus it was inadmissible for being unconstitutional. On the other
hand, the company argued she was validly dismissed for theft of company property in violation of the SMLC Code
of Discipline.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that Sanchez was validly dismissed, but the NLRC ruled otherwise. The NLRC noted the
usual practice of “hoarding” among nurses in the Pediatric Unit which was tolerated by SMLC for a long time.
While Sanchez admitted her remorse for hoarding, she was not motivated by ill-will when she hoarded the items,
as she intented to use it for replenishment of stocks in case their supplies are depleted. At any rate, the penalty of
dismissal was too harsh, and a one-month suspension should have sufficed. Thus, it ordered SMLC to reinstate
Sanchez. The CA affirmed the NLRC’s decision. It ruled that Sanchez’s offence cannot be classified as a serious
misconduct since: (a) the questioned items found in her possession were not SLMC property since said items were
paid for by discharged patients, thus discounting any material or economic damage on SLMC’s part; (b) the
retention of excess medical supplies was an admitted practice amongst nurses in the Pediatric Unit which was
tolerated by SLMC; (c) it was illogical for Sanchez to leave the pouch in her bag since she would be subjected to a
routine inspection; (d) Sanchez’s lack of intention to bring out the pouch was manifested by her composed
demeanor upon apprehension and offer to return the pouch to the treatment room; and (e) had SLMC honestly
believed that Sanchez committed theft or pilferage, it should have filed the appropriate criminal case, but failed to
do so. It held that dismissal was not commensurate to Sanchez’s offence, given that she was not motivated by self-
interest or an unlawful objective when she did it. SLMC appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sanchez was validly dismissed.

HELD: YES.

The right of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment, aptly called “management prerogative,” gives
employers the freedom to regulate, according to their discretion and best judgment, all aspects of employment,
including work assignment, working methods, processes to be followed, working regulations, transfer of
employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. In this light,
courts often decline to interfere in legitimate business decisions of employers. In fact, labor laws discourage
interference in employers’ judgment concerning the conduct of their business.

Among the employer’s management prerogatives is the right to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations
necessary or proper for the conduct of its business or concern, to provide certain disciplinary measures to
implement said rules and to assure that the same would be complied with. At the same time, the employee has the
corollary duty to obey all reasonable rules, orders, and instructions of the employer; and willful or intentional
disobedience thereto, as a general rule, justifies termination of the contract of service and the dismissal of the
employee. Article 296 (formerly Article 282) of the Labor Code provides:

Article 296. Termination by Employer. – An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following
causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or his
representative in connection with his work;
xxxx

Note that for an employee to be validly dismissed on this ground, the employer’s orders, regulations, or
instructions must be: (1) reasonable and lawful, (2) sufficiently known to the employee, and (3) in connection with
the duties which the employee has been engaged to discharge.”

The Court finds that Sanchez was validly dismissed by SLMC for her willful disregard and disobedience of Section 1,
Rule I of the SLMC Code of Discipline, which reasonably punishes acts of dishonesty, i.e., “theft, pilferage of hospital
or co-employee property, x x x or its attempt in any form or manner from the hospital, co-employees, doctors,
visitors, [and] customers (external and internal)” with termination from employment. Such act is obviously
connected with Sanchez’s work, who, as a staff nurse, is tasked with the proper stewardship of medical supplies.
Significantly, records show that Sanchez made a categorical admission in her handwritten letter– i.e., “[k]ahit alam
kong bawal ay nagawa kong [makapag-uwi] ng gamit”– that despite her knowledge of its express prohibition
under the SLMC Code of Discipline, she still knowingly brought out the subject medical items with her. It is apt to
clarify that SLMC cannot be faulted in construing the taking of the questioned items as an act of dishonesty
(particularly, as theft, pilferage, or its attempt in any form or manner) considering that the intent to gain may be
reasonably presumed from the furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another. Note that Section 1, Rule 1
of the SLMC Code of Discipline is further supplemented by the company policy requiring the turn-over of excess
medical supplies/items for proper handling and providing a restriction on taking and bringing such items out of the
SLMC premises without the proper authorization or “pass” from the official concerned, which Sanchez was equally
aware thereof. Nevertheless, Sanchez failed to turn-over the questioned items and, instead, “hoarded” them, as
purportedly practiced by the other staff members in the Pediatric Unit. As it is clear that the company policies
subject of this case are reasonable and lawful, sufficiently known to the employee, and evidently connected with
the latter’s work, the Court concludes that SLMC dismissed Sanchez for a just cause.

On a related point, the Court observes that there lies no competent basis to support the common observation of
the NLRC and the CA that the retention of excess medical supplies was a tolerated practice among the nurses at the
Pediatric Unit. While there were previous incidents of “hoarding,” it appears that such acts were – in similar fashion
– furtively made and the items secretly kept, as any excess items found in the concerned nurse’s possession would
have to be confiscated. Hence, the fact that no one was caught and/or sanctioned for transgressing the prohibition
therefor does not mean that the so-called “hoarding” practice was tolerated by SLMC. Besides, whatever maybe
the justification behind the violation of the company rules regarding excess medical supplies is immaterial since it
has been established that an infraction was deliberately committed. Doubtless, the deliberate disregard or
disobedience of rules by the employee cannot be countenanced as it may encourage him or her to do even worse
and will render a mockery of the rules of discipline that employees are required to observe.

Finally, the Court finds it inconsequential that SLMC has not suffered any actual damage. While damage aggravates
the charge, its absence does not mitigate nor negate the employee’s liability. Neither is SLMC’s non-filing of the
appropriate criminal charges relevant to this analysis. An employee’s guilt or innocence in a criminal case is not
determinative of the existence of a just or authorized cause for his or her dismissal. It is well-settled that conviction
in a criminal case is not necessary to find just cause for termination of employment, as in this case. Criminal and
labor cases involving an employee arising from the same infraction are separate and distinct proceedings which
should not arrest any judgment from one to the other.
As it stands, the Court thus holds that the dismissal of Sanchez was for a just cause, supported by substantial
evidence, and is therefore in order. By declaring otherwise, bereft of any substantial bases, the NLRC issued a
patently and grossly erroneous ruling tantamount to grave abuse of discretion, which, in turn, means that the CA
erred when it affirmed the same. In consequence, the grant of the present petition is warranted.

4.)The Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf Philippines, Inc. and Walden Chu vs. Rolly P. Arenas
G.R. No. 208908, March 11, 2015

Respondent Rolly P. Arenas was hired by petitioner Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf Philippines, Inc. (CBTL) as a
barista at its Paseo Center Branch. His principal functions included taking orders from customers and preparing
their ordered food and beverages. To ensure the quality of its crew’s services, CBTL regularly employs a “mystery
guest shopper” who poses as a customer, for the purpose of covertly inspecting the baristas’ job performance.

In April 2009, a mystery guest shopper at the Paseo Center Branch submitted a report stating that on
March 30, 2009, Arenas was seen eating non-CBTL products at CBTL’s al fresco dining area while on duty. As a
result, the counter was left empty without anyone to take and prepare the customers’ orders. On another occasion,
or on April 28, 2009, the duty manager of CBTL, while conducting a routine inspection, noticed an iced tea bottle
being chilled inside the bin where the ice for customers’ drinks is stored. Investigation showed the respondent was
responsible for it, in violation of company policy. Based on the foregoing infractions coupled with a record of
reporting late for work on several occasions, Arenas was dismissed from the service. Arenas prevailed in his case
before the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Court of Appeals (CA) sustained
their findings ruling that Arenas’ offenses fell short of the required legal standard to justify his dismissal; and that
these do not constitute serious misconduct or willful disobedience, and gross negligence, to merit his termination
from service.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arenas termination from service on the ground of serious misconduct or wilful disobedience
valid?

HELD: No. For wilful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, these two elements must concur:
(1) the employee’s assailed conduct must have been wilful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse
attitude; and
(2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the
duties which he had been engaged to discharge.

Tested against these standards, it is clear that Arenas’ alleged infractions do not amount to such a
wrongful and perverse attitude. Though Arenas may have admitted these wrongdoings, these do not amount to a
wanton disregard of CBTL’s company policies. As Arenas mentioned in his written explanation, he was on a
scheduled break when he was caught eating at CBTL’s al fresco dining area. During that time, the other service
crews were the one in charge of manning the counter.

Notably, CBTL’s employee handbook imposes only the penalty of a written warning for the offense of
eating non-CBTL products inside the store’s premises. CBTL also imputes gross and habitual neglect of duty to
Arenas for coming in late in three separate instances. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of, or failure to
exercise even a slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. There is habitual neglect if based on the circumstances;
there is a repeated failure to perform one’s duties for a period of time.

In light of the foregoing criteria, we rule that Arenas’ three counts of tardiness cannot be considered as
gross and habitual neglect of duty. The infrequency of his tardiness already removes the character of habitualness.
These late attendances were also broadly spaced out, negating the complete absence of care on Arenas’ part in the
performance of his duties. Even CBTL admitted in its notice to explain that this violation does not merit yet a
disciplinary action and is only an aggravating circumstance to Arenas’ other violations.

CBTL argues that he committed serious misconduct when he lied about using the ice bin as cooler for his
bottled iced tea. Under CBTL's employee handbook, dishonesty, even at the first instance, warrants the penalty of
termination from service.

For misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal:

(a) it must be serious;
(b) it must relate to the performance of the employee's duties; and
(c) it must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer.
 However, the facts on record reveal that there was no active dishonesty on the part of Arenas. When
questioned about who placed the bottled iced tea inside the ice bin, his immediate reaction was not to deny his
mistake, but to remove the bottle inside the bin and throw it outside. More importantly, when he was asked to
make a written explanation of his action, he admitted that the bottled iced tea was his.

Thus, even if there was an initial reticence on Arenas' part, his subsequent act of owing to his mistake only
shows the absence of a deliberate intent to lie or deceive his CBTL superiors. On this score, we conclude that
Arenas' action did not amount to serious misconduct.

Moreover, the imputed violations of Arenas, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not necessitate the
imposition of the strict and harsh penalty of dismissal from service. The LA, NLRC and the CA all consistently
ruled that these offenses are not grave enough to qualify as just causes for dismissal. Factual findings of the labor
tribunals especially if affirmed by the CA must be given great weight, and merit the Court's respect.

5.) GR No. 208890, Dec 08, 2014 JOEL N. MONTALLANA v. LA CONSOLACION COLLEGE MANILA

Montallana was a faculty member of La Consolacion’s College of Arts and Sciences. On January 16, 2009, Mrs.
Nerissa D. Del Fierro-Juan (Juan), the Assistant Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and the immediate
superior of Montallana, filed a formal administrative complaint with La Consolacion against Montallana, charging
him of: (a) oral defamation (or slander); (b) disorderly conduct in the school premises; and (c)
discourteous/indecent behavior or using profane or obscene language in addressing co-employees, superiors, or
anybody within the school premises. Aside from this, Mrs. Juan also filed grave oral defamation against him before
the City Prosecutor’s Office.

Montallana meted the penalty of suspension without pay for a period of two (2) months and directed him to
submit a written public apology to Juan.

In a letter dated April 22, 2009, Montallana sought reconsideration of his suspension and explained that a written
public apology was inappropriate at that time in view of the pendency of a criminal complaint for grave oral
defamation filed by Juan against him before the City Prosecutor’s Office. He mentioned that his issuance of a
written public apology while the criminal case was being heard might incriminate himself, adding too that it was his
lawyer who advised him to invoke his right against self-incrimination.

The request having been denied by La Consolacion’s President, respondent Sr. Imelda A. Mora (Mora), in her letter
dated May 12, 2009, Montallana filed a complaint for illegal suspension and unfair labor practice, with prayer for
payment of salaries during the period of suspension, andmoral and exemplary damages against respondents La
Consolacion and Mora before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 05-07667-09 (illegal suspension case).

In a Decision dated April 15, 2010, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of Montallana, holding that his actions did
not constitute serious misconduct. Hence, Montallana’s suspension from employment was declared illegal and
respondents La Consolacion and Mora were ordered to pay Montallana the amount of 48,000.00 as his salary
during the period of suspension.

On appeal, however, the NLRC disagreed with the findings of the LA and found Montallana’s acts to be constitutive
of serious misconduct and against the rule of honor and decency expected of any teacher. While it found sufficient
basis to impose the penalty of termination, the NLRC nonetheless sustained the two (2)-month suspension in
deference to the school’s prerogative to discipline its employees. Montallana moved for reconsideration but was
denied by the NLRC in a Decision dated February 7, 2011. Montallana no longer elevated the matter to the CA and
the NLRC’s decision became final and executory on February 28, 2011.

Thereafter, on June 1, 2011, La Consolacion, through its HRD Director, respondent Albert D. Manalili (Manalili),
directed Montallana to explain in writing why he should not be dismissed for failure to submit his written public
apology which formed part of the disciplinary sanction that was sustained with finality by the NLRC.

In a letter dated June 9, 2011, Montallana begged for La Consolacion’s indulgence, explaining that he had no
intention of defying the directive to submit a written public a pology and that his inability to comply therewith was,
to reiterate, only in view of the pendency of the criminal case against him. He, nonetheless, expressed his
willingness to comply with the directive once the said case was resolved with finality. Finding Montallana’s written
explanation unsatisfactory, Manalili terminated him from work on June 13, 2011.
Asserting that his dismissal for failure to submit a written public apology was unjustified, Montallana filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against respondents La Consolacion, Mora, and Manalili
(respondents).

In a Decision dated November 14, 2011, the LA dismissed Montallana’s complaint, holding that his refusal to
apologize was tantamount to serious misconduct and, hence, warranted his termination.

The NLRC reversed and set aside the LA’s verdict, and thus, ordered respondents to reinstate Montallana and to pay
him backwages from the time he was illegally dismissed up to his reinstatement.

However, the CA gave due course to respondents’ petition and eventually reversed and set aside the NLRC’s
Decision .It found that Montallana deliberately refused to obey the directive of the respondents to apologize and
that the pendency of the criminal case against him was not sufficient justification to excuse him from compliance.

Issue: Whether or not Montallana’s termination from work was lawful and justified.

Ruling:

“Willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his
work” is one of the just causes to terminate an employee under Article 296 (a) (formerly Article 282[a]) of the
Labor Code. In order for this ground to be properly invoked as a just cause for dismissal, the conduct must be willful
or intentional, willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude.

In the case at bar, respondents failed to prove, by substantial evidence, that Montallana’s non-compliance with
respondents’ directive to apologize was “willful or intentional.” The Court finds itself in complete agreement with
the NLRC that the disobedience attributed to Montallana could not be justly characterized as “willful” within the
contemplation of Article 296 of the Labor Code, in the sense above-described.

In fine, since respondents failed to prove, by substantial evidence, that Montallana's dismissal was based on a just
or authorized cause under the Labor Code or was clearly warranted under La Consolacion's Administrative Affairs
Manual, the Court rules that the dismissal was illegal.

The Decision dated May 31, 2013 and the Resolution dated August 30, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 127988 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated July 31, 2012 and the Resolution
dated October 16, 2012 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC LAC No. 02-000556-12, declaring
petitioner Joel N. Montallana (Montallana) to have been illegally dismissed, are REINSTATED with the
MODIFICATION deleting the order for respondents Sr. Imelda A. Mora and Albert D. Manalili to pay Montallana his
backwages.

6.) DR. PHYLIS C. RIO vs. COLEGIO DE STA. ROSA-MAKATI GR No. 189629 Aug 6, 2014

Petitioner was hired by respondent Colegio De Sta. Rosa-Makati as a school physician.

In a letter dated 30 July 2002, respondent Gustilo charged petitioner and Mrs. Neneth Alonzo (Alonzo), the school
nurse, of "grave misconduct, dishonesty and/or gross neglect of duty detrimental not only to the school but,
principally, to the health and well-being of the pupils based on the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and
Section 94 (a) and (b) and Article 282 (a), (b) and (c) of the Labor Code." In the same letter, petitioner and Alonzo
were preventively suspended for a period of thirty (30) days, effective 30 July 2002.

Petitioner was made to answer for the following: (1) nine (9) students have medical records for school years during
which they were not in the school yet, thus could not have been the subject of medical examination/evaluation; (2)
seventy-nine (79) students of several classes/sections during certain school years were not given any
medical/health evaluation/examination; and (3) failure to conduct medical/health examination on all students of
several classes of different grade levels for the school year 2001-2002.

Issue:

Whether or not the dismissal is proper.

Held:
Yes. Based on Article 282 of the Labor Code, in relation to Section 94 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools, petitioner was legally dismissed on the ground of gross inefficiency and incompetence, and negligence in
the keeping of school or student records, or tampering with or falsification of records.

As we already held, gross inefficiency is closely related to gross neglect because both involve specific acts of
omission resulting in damage to another. Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act,
not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other
persons may be affected. As borne by the records, petitioner’s actions fall within the purview of the above-
definitions. Petitioner failed to diligently perform her duties. It was un-refuted that: (1) there were dates when a
medical examination was supposed to have been conducted and yet the dates fell on weekends; (2) failure to
conduct medical examination on all students for two (2) to five (5) consecutive years; (3) lack of medical records on
all students; and (4) students having medical records prior to their enrollment.

7.) Dexter Job Uy

8.) G.R. No. 206942 February 25, 2015 VICENTE C. TATEL vs. JLFP INVESTIGATION SECURITY AGENCY, INC., JOSE
LUIS F. PAMINTUAN, and/or PAOLO C. TURNO

(JLFP), a business engaged as a security agency, hired Tatel as one of its security guards. Tatel alleged that he was
last posted at BaggerWerken located at the Port Area in Manila. He was required to work twelve (12) hours every
day from Mondays to Sundays and received only P12,400.00 as monthly salary.

Tatel filed a complaint before the NLRC against JLFP and its officer, (Pamintuan), as well as SKI Group of Companies
(SKI) and its officer, Joselito Dueñas, for underpayment of salaries and wages, non-payment of other benefits, 13th
month pay, and attorney's fees (underpayment case).

Tatel was placed on "floating status"; thus, after the lapse of six (6) months therefrom, without having been given
any assignments, he filed another complaint against JLFP and its officers, respondent Paolo C. Turno (Turno) and
Jose Luis Fabella, for illegal dismissal, reinstatement, backwages, refund of cash bond deposit amounting to
₱25,400.00, attorney's fees, and other money claims (illegal dismissal case).

In their defense, respondents denied that Tatel was dismissed and averred that they removed the latter from his
post at BaggerWerken because of several infractions he committed while on duty. Thereafter, he was reassigned at
SKI and last posted at IPVG.

Notwithstanding the pendency of the underpayment case, respondents sent a Memorandum directing Tatel to
report back to work. However, despite receipt of the said memorandum, respondents averred that Tatel ignored
the same and failed to appear; hence, he was deemed to have abandoned his work.

In his reply, Tatel admitted having received a Memorandum directing him to report back to work for reassignment.
However, when he went to the JLFP office, he was merely advised to "wait for possible posting." He repeatedly
went back to the office for reassignment, but to no avail. He likewise refuted respondents' claim that he abandoned
his work, insisting that after working for JLFP for more than eleven (11) years, it was illogical for him to refuse any
assignments, more so, to abandon his work and security of tenure without justifiable reasons.

ISSUE: WON Tatel abandoned his work. NO

HELD: NO

At the core of this petition is Tatel' s insistence that he was illegally dismissed when, after he was put on "floating
status" on October 24, 2009, respondents no longer gave him assignments or postings, and the period therefor had
lasted for more than six ( 6) months. On the other hand, respondents maintained that Tatel abandoned his work,
and that his inconsistent statements before the labor tribunals regarding his work details rendered his claim of
illegal dismissal suspect.

After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court is convinced that Tatel was constructively, not actually, dismissed
after having been placed on "floating status" for more than six ( 6) months

IN SUPERSTAR SECURITY AGENCY, INC. AND/OR COL. ANDRADA V. NLRC, the Court ruled that placing an employee
on temporary "off-detail" is not equivalent to dismissal provided that such temporary inactivity should continue
only for a period of six (6) months. In security agency parlance, being placed "off-detail" or on "floating status"
means "waiting to be posted."

IN SALVALOZA V. NLRC, the Court further explained the nature of the "floating status," to wit: Temporary "off-
detail" or "floating status" is the period of time when security guards are in between assignments or when they are
made to wait after being relieved from a previous post until they are transferred to a new one. It takes place when
the security agency's clients decide not to renew their contracts with the agency, resulting in a situation where the
available posts under its existing contracts are less than the number of guards in its roster. It also happens in
instances where contracts for security services stipulate that the client may request the agency for the replacement
of the guards assigned to it even for want of cause, such that the replaced security guard may be placed on
temporary "off-detail" if there are no available posts under the agency's existing contracts. During such time, the
security guard does not receive any salary or any financial assistance provided by law. It does not constitute a
dismissal, as the assignments primarily depend on the contracts entered into by the security agencies with third
parties, so long as such status does not continue beyond a reasonable time. When such a "floating status" lasts for
more than six (6) months, the employee may be considered to have been constructively dismissed.

Relative thereto, constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain, on the
part of the employer has become so unbearable as to leave an employee with no choice but to forego continued
employment, or when there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable, or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay.

In this case, respondents themselves claimed that after having removed Tatel from his post at BaggerWerken, they
subsequently reassigned him to SKI and then to IPVG. Thereafter, and until Tatel filed the instant complaint for
illegal dismissal six (6) months later, he was not given any other postings or assignments. While it may be true that
respondents summoned him back to work through the Memorandum, which Tatel acknowledged to have received,
records are bereft of evidence to show that he was given another detail or assignment. As the "off-detail" period
had already lasted for more than six ( 6) months, Tatel is therefore deemed to have been constructively dismissed.

In this regard, the Court concurs with the finding of the NLRC that respondents failed to establish that Tatel
abandoned his work. To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (a) the failure to report for work or
absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (b) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship,
with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Mere absence
is not sufficient. The employer has the burden of proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee
to resume his employment without any intention of returning. Abandonment is incompatible with constructive
dismissal.

The charge of abandonment in this case is belied by the high improbability of Tatel intentionally abandoning his
work, taking into consideration his length of service and, concomitantly, his security of tenure with JLFP. As the
NLRC had opined, no rational explanation exists as to why an employee who had worked for his employer for more
than ten (10) years would just abandon his work and forego whatever benefits he may be entitled to as a
consequence thereof.68 As such, respondents failed to sufficiently establish a deliberate and unjustified refusal on
the part of Tatel to resume his employment, which therefore leads to the logical conclusion that the latter had no
such intention to abandon his work.

Moreover, Tatel refuted respondents' allegation that he did not heed their directive to return to work following his
receipt of the November 26, 2009 Memorandum. The Court finds no compelling reason not to give credence to
such rebuff, especially in light of the filing of the instant complaint for illegal dismissal. An employee who forthwith
takes steps to protest his layoff cannot, as a general rule, be said to have abandoned his work, and the filing of the
complaint is proof enough of his desire to return to work, thus negating any suggestion of abandonment. As the
Court sees it, it is simply incongruent for Tatel to refuse any offer of an assignment and thereafter, seek redress by
filing a case for illegal dismissal.

9.) G.R. No. 153983 May 26, 2009 SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION AND WILLIAM L. FRIEND, JR., Respondents.

Respondent William L. Friend, Jr. was a route salesman of petitioner San Miguel Corporation Bacoor Sales Office for
ten (10) years with a monthly salary of ₱30,000.00.

On April 3, 1995, Rene de Jesus, respondent’s supervisor, conducted an audit of his route on account of complaints
of some customers.
These customers complained to the supervisor that respondent padded their accounts in the total amount of
₱20,540.00.

After the audit, the supervisor found reasonable ground to hold respondent liable for misappropriation of company
funds through falsification of private documents. Respondent was summoned to petitioner’s Canlubang Bottling
Plant for investigation.

Hence, respondent filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT FRIEND WAS TERMINATED LAWFULLY.

HELD: NO

In termination cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the dismissal of the employee is for a just or
an authorized cause. Failure to dispose of the burden would imply that the dismissal is not lawful, and that the
employee is entitled to reinstatement, back wages and accruing benefits. Moreover, dismissed employees are not
required to prove their innocence of the employer’s accusations against them.

Petitioner cites Article 282 of the Labor Code, specifically loss of trust and confidence as the ground for validly
dismissing respondent. Under the law, loss of confidence must be based on "fraud or willful breach by the
employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative." In this regard, the Court
has ruled that ordinary breach does not suffice. A breach of trust is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and
purposely, without any justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or
inadvertently.20

Here, respondent was investigated on and dismissed for misappropriation of company funds through falsification of
company documents, as shown in the termination letter.

Company Rule No. 16 of petitioner’s Disciplinary Actions for Violations of Company Rules specifically provides that
"Misappropriation of Company Funds/Withholding Funds Due to the Company" is punishable with discharge even
for the first offense.

Records, nevertheless, neither showed nor convinced us that there was misappropriation of funds that benefited
anybody which warranted the dismissal of respondent for the first offense. Respondent admittedly committed
padding of accounts and/or paper renewal, which respondent claims to be a practice among salesmen and such
claim was not disputed by petitioner.

The paper renewal committed by respondent may be considered as falsification, but we agree with the Labor
Arbiter and the CA that such paper renewal did not amount to misappropriation that could justify outright
dismissal for the first offense, as what petitioner did to respondent. Otherwise, the company rules would not have
separated these two offenses under Rule Nos. 15 and 16. Besides, we agree with the CA that although petitioner
did in fact violate company Rule No. 15 by falsifying company records and documents through paper renewal, such
falsification has to be qualified, thus:

It is therefore clear that petitioner did in fact violate company Rule No. 15 by falsifying company records and
documents. However, there is a qualification. Such falsification must benefit the offender (herein petitioner) or
somebody else.

(JUST IN CASE IPADEFINE: Paper renewal is falsification of private document because the author makes it appear
that the accounts of his customers were moving otherwise the customers’ credit line would be severed. When the
time frame within which the customers should settle their obligations is extended through "paper renewal" the rule
of respondent collection of credit within one (1) week is circumvented to the prejudice of the company.

A high degree of confidence is reposed in salesman as they are entrusted with funds or properties of their employer
(CCBPI vs. NLRC, 172 SCRA 751). By his own wrongdoing, it would be an act of oppression to compel his employer to
welcome him anew to its fold.

The paper renewal is also beneficial to the salesman because the good credit standing of his customers is a boost to
his performance level and continuous employment. This is the moving force for the salesman to resort to paper
renewal. And we cannot countenance the salesman’s self-interest to the prejudice of the company. )
According to the NLRC, the benefit to petitioner was "a boost to his performance level and continuing
employment"’ while according to the Labor Arbiter, the benefit to the customers was "it prolonged the time for
them to pay their account to SMC." Such are hardly the benefits obtained that would warrant the supreme penalty
of dismissal for the first offense.

Petitioner utterly failed to establish that respondent or somebody pecuniarily or materially benefited from the
falsification through paper renewal committed by respondent that could have warranted his dismissal for the first
offense. Neither was there clear and convincing evidence that petitioner suffered any material loss by the
respondent’s act of paper renewal. Regarding petitioner’s sweeping charge of misappropriation of company funds
against respondent, we quote with approval the disquisition of the Labor Arbiter as cited by the CA:

Respondent failed to prove that complainant misappropriated company funds though. The padding was merely for
the purpose of maintaining the line account of complainant’s clients.

We find the penalty of dismissal too severe a penalty for the offense committed. Firstly, there is no showing that
complainant’s service record was replete with offenses. It appears that this is the first time he was charged of
violation of company rule. Secondly, there is no convincing evidence that he materially benefited from the acts
committed. Thirdly, SMC did not suffer from any damage or losses by reason thereof.

We find no reversible error committed by the CA in reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter which held that
respondent should have been suspended rather than dismissed outright.

To recapitulate, the right of an employer to dismiss an employee on account of loss of trust and confidence must
not be exercised whimsically. To countenance an arbitrary exercise of that prerogative is to negate the
employee’s constitutional right to security of tenure. In other words, the employer must clearly and convincingly
prove by substantial evidence the facts and incidents upon which loss of confidence in the employee may be fairly
made to rest; otherwise, the latter’s dismissal will be rendered illegal.

10.) ABELARDO P. ABEL vs. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION

GR No. 178976 July 31, 2009

Petitioner was implicated in an irregularity occurring in the subsidence area of respondent's mine site at Pacdal,
Tuba, Benguet. Petitioner's co-worker Danilo R. Lupega (Lupega), a Subsidence Checker at the mine site who was
himself under administrative investigation for what came to be known as the "subsidence area anomaly," executed
an affidavit.

13. That sometime in 2001, I was then on 2nd shift duty eating my dinner at a little past 7:00 PM when the
telephone rang. I lifted the phone receiver and the caller was asking for Didith, whom I knew was the
ANSECA Accountant. I told the caller to re-dial the phone number and after he had done it, I was tempted
to lift the phone receiver and I heard the caller telling Didith, "Si Abel ito, paano na yung usapan natin?"
(This is Abel. What happened to our deal?), and Didith answered that, "O sige, huwag kang mag-alala,
ipapaalam ko sa Cebu" (Alright, do not worry. I will take it up with our Cebu office.), then I put back the
phone receiver on its place;

14. That again sometime in 2001, I was then on 1st shift duty when the telephone rang. I lifted the receiver
and the caller said, "Open pit watcher, sa ANSECA nga" (To ANSECA please.), and I answered "I-dial mo
ulit" (Please dial again.), and I immediately put the receiver down on its place. When he re-dialed and was
answered by ANSECA, I was again tempted to lift the phone receiver and I heard the caller saying, "Si Abel
ito, paano na yung usapan natin[?]" (This is Abel. What happened to our deal?), and the ANSECA
accountant replied, "O sige, hintayin mo ako sa bangko at magwiwithdraw ako." (Alright, wait for me at the
bank. I will come to make the withdrawal.). That this was only the conversation I heard between the two
because I already put down the phone receiver. (Italics and translations supplied)

Issue: WON the dismissal is valid.

Held: No.

ART. 282. Termination by employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
 x x x

c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or his duly
authorized representative.

The first requisite for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence is that the employee concerned must
be holding a position of trust and confidence. Verily, the Court must first determine if petitioner holds such a
position.

There are two classes of positions of trust. The first class consists of managerial employees. They are defined as
those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-
off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions. The second
class consists of cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc.. They are defined as those who, in the normal and
routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.

Respondent relies on petitioner's reports regarding his inspection of the work accomplishment of such contractors.
As a result of his monitoring the enforcement of respondent's contracts which involve large sums of money,
petitioner may well be considered an employee with a position of trust analogous to those falling under the second
class. A position where a person is entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the custody, handling or
care and protection of the employer's property is one of trust and confidence.

The second requisite is that there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence. Loss of trust
and confidence, to be a valid cause for dismissal, must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly
established facts. The basis for the dismissal must be clearly and convincingly established but proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not necessary, Respondent's evidence against petitioner fails to meet this standard. Its lone
witness, Lupega, did not support his affidavit and testimony during the company investigation with any piece of
evidence at all. No other employee working at respondent's mine site attested to the truth of any of his
statements. Standing alone, Lupega's account of the subsidence area anomaly could hardly be considered
substantial evidence. And while there is no concrete showing of any ill motive on the part of Lupega to falsely
accuse petitioner, that Lupega himself was under investigation when he implicated petitioner in the subsidence
area anomaly makes his uncorroborated version suspect.

Even assuming that the foregoing conversations attributed to petitioner and Didith Caballero of ANSECA took place,
they do not amply establish petitioner's involvement in a scheme to defraud respondent. Lupega's account is only
one piece of a huge puzzle. There are yet too many missing pieces. The purported telephone conversations fail to
convince the Court that they constitute such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support the conclusion that petitioner attempted to extort money from ANSECA in connection with its backfilling
operations to the prejudice of respondent. To doubt is to rule in favor of labor.