MISAEL P.

VERA – Commission of Internal Revenue and Fair Trade Board (Petitioner)

HON. SERAFIN R. CUEVAS – Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila
INSTITUTE OF EVAPORATED FILLED MILK MANUFACTURERS OF THE PHILIPPINES
CONSOLIDATED MILK COMPANY PHIL. INC.
MILK INDUSTRIES INC. (Respondents)

FACTS

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to review the decision rendered by respondent judge, in
Civil Case No. 52276 and in Special Civil Action No. 52383 both of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Plaintiffs, in Civil Case No. 52276 private respondents herein, are engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution
of filled milk products throughout the Philippines. The controversy arose from the order of defendant, Commissioner
of Internal Revenue now petitioner herein, requiring plaintiffs- private respondents to withdraw from the market all
of their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the order with the explicit warning that failure of plaintiffs' private respondents to comply
with said order will result in the institution of the necessary action against any violation of the aforesaid order. Section
169 of the Tax Code reads as follows:

Section 169. Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk. — All condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever
form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the Philippines shall be
clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers, and in all the language in which such containers are marked,
with the words, "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with other
equivalent words.

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Fair Trade Board joined together to file the present petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction, assigning the following errors:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SECTION 169 OF THE TAX CODE HAS BEEN REPEALED BY
IMPLICATION.

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SECTION 169 OF THE TAX CODE HAS LOST ITS TAX PURPOSE, AND
THAT COMMISSIONER NECESSARILY LOST HIS AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE THE SAME AND THAT THE PROPER AUTHORITY
TO PROMOTE THE HEALTH OF INFANTS IS THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AS PROVIDED FOR IN RA 3720, NOT THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE POWER TO INVESTIGATE AND TO PROSECUTE VIOLATIONS
OF FOOD LAWS IS ENTRUSTED TO THE FOOD AND DRUG INSPECTION, THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, THE
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AND THAT THE FAIR TRADE BOARD IS WITHOUT
JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE ALLEGED MISBRANDING, MISLABELLING AND/OR MISLEADING
ADVERTISEMENT OF FILLED MILK PRODUCTS. (pp, 4-5, Rollo).

ISSUE

WoN the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Fair Trade Board has jurisdiction to investigate and to prosecute
alleged misbranding, mislabeling and/or misleading advertisements of filled milk.
HELD

The lower court did not err in ruling that Section 169 of the Tax Code has been repealed by implication. Section 169
was enacted in 1939, together with Section 141 and Section 177. However, Section 141 was expressly repealed by
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 344, and Section 177, by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 463. By the express repeal of
Sections 141 and 177, Section 169 became a merely declaratory provision, without a tax purpose, or a penal sanction.

Moreover, it seems apparent that Section 169 of the Tax Code does not apply to filled milk. The use of the specific and
qualifying terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section,
would restrict the scope of the general clause "all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been removed
totally or in part." In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk" under the
familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms
they follow in the statute.

Skimmed milk is different from filled milk. According to the "Definitions, Standards of Purity, Rules and Regulations of
the Board of Food Inspection," skimmed milk is milk in whatever form from which the fatty part has been removed.
Filled milk, on the other hand, is any milk, whether or not condensed, evaporated concentrated, powdered, dried,
dessicated, to which has been added or which has been blended or compounded with any fat or oil other than milk
fat so that the resulting product is an imitation or semblance of milk cream or skim milk." The difference, therefore,
between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the former, the fatty part has been removed while in the latter, the
fatty part is likewise removed but is substituted with refined coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily
or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and filled milk.

The Board of Food Inspection way back in 1961 rendered an opinion that filled milk does not come within the purview
of Section 169, it being a product distinct from those specified in the said Section since the removed fat portion of the
milk has been replaced with coconut oil and Vitamins A and D as fortifying substances.

As stated in the early part of this decision, with the repeal of Sections 141 and 177 of the Tax Code, Section 169 has
lost its tax purpose. Since Section 169 is devoid of any tax purpose, petitioner Commissioner necessarily lost his
authority to enforce the same.

The aforequoted provisions of law clearly show that petitioners, Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Fair Trade
Board, are without jurisdiction to investigate and to prosecute alleged misbranding, mislabeling and/or misleading
advertisements of filled milk. The jurisdiction on the matters cited in Republic Act No. 3720 is vested upon the Board
of Food and Drug inspection and the Food and Drug Administrator, with the Secretary of Health and the Secretary of
Justice, also intervening in case criminal prosecution has to be instituted. To hold that the petitioners have also
jurisdiction as would be the result were their instant petition granted, would only cause overlapping of powers and
functions likely to produce confusion and conflict of official action which is neither practical nor desirable.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed en toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Cecilio S. De Villa – Petitioner
Court of Appeals, People of the Philippines, Honarable Job Madayag and Roberto Lorayes – Respondents

FACTS:
 Petitioner Cecilio de Villa was charged before the RTC of Makati with violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 aka “Bouncing Checks Law”.
 That on or about the 3rd day of April 1987, the above-named accused, unlawfully and feloniously
make or draw and issue to ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ a check antedated March 31, 1987, payable to
herein complainant in the total amount of U.S. $2,500.00 equivalent to P50,000.00 and said accused
well knowing that at the time of issue he had no sufficient funds.
 Despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the said accused then failed to pay ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ
the amount of P50,000.00 of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within
five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
 Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the Information on the following grounds: (a) Respondent court
has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (b) That no offense was committed since the check
involved was payable in dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and void pursuant to Republic
Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency). RTC denied the
motion. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration; RTC subsequently denied the petition. A
petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the RTC ruling was filed by the petitioner in the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition with costs against the petitioner. A
motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed by the petitioner but the same was denied
by the Court of Appeals, thus elevated to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
Whether or not:
(1) The Regional Trial Court of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case; and,
(2) The check in question, drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, is covered by
the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22).

HELD:
YES on both cases. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

RATIO:
For the first issue: The trial court’s jurisdiction over the case, subject of this review, cannot be questioned,
Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court specifically provide that:

 Sec. 10. Place of the commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be
understood therefrom that the offense was committed or some of the essential ingredients thereof
occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place wherein it was
committed constitutes an essential element of the offense or is necessary for identifying the offense
charged.
 Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions
the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense
was committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
 The information under consideration specifically alleged that the offense was committed in Makati,
Metro Manila and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. By jurisdiction in general sense means that courts have the power
 over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendant, or over the
issues framed in the pleadings. Thus, the Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case and over the
person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal
action.

For the second issue: Petitioner argues that the check in question was drawn against the dollar account of
petitioner with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22). But
it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. As the trial court correctly
ruled in its order dated July 5, 1988:

Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided
they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside
thereof . . . are within the coverage of said law. The law likewise applied to checks drawn against current
accounts in foreign currency.

Exception in the Statute. It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not
distinguish courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make any
exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it. More importantly,
it is well established that courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body to
assist in determining the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning (Palanca vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil.
125 [1920]). Thus, where there is doubts as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the
provision during the legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be adopted (Arenas vs. City of San
Carlos, 82 SCRA 318 [1978]). The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention of the
lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof. The discussion on the floor
of the then Batasang Pambansa fully sustains this view, as follows:

xxxxxxxxx
THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman from Basilan is recognized.
MR. TUPAY. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman may proceed.
MR. TUPAY. Mr. Speaker, it has been mentioned by one of the Gentlemen
who interpellated that any check may be involved, like U.S. dollar checks,
etc. We are talking about checks in our country. There are U.S. dollar
checks, checks, in our currency, and many others.
THE SPEAKER. The Sponsor may answer that inquiry.
MR. MENDOZA. The bill refers to any check, Mr. Speaker, and this check
may be a check in whatever currency. This would not even be limited to U.S.
dollar checks. The check may be in French francs or Japanese yen or
deutschunorhs. (sic.) If drawn, then this bill will apply.
MR TUPAY. So it include U.S. dollar checks.
MR. MENDOZA. Yes, Mr. Speaker.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of m

Aris vs NLRC
G.R. 90501 (August 5, 1991)

Facts:
 Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715 took effect on March 21, 1989, which amended Art. 223 Sec. 12
of the Labor Code.
 A new paragraph was added in the Labor Code by the virtue of Sections 2 and 17 of the "NLRC Interim
Rules on Appeals Under R.A. No. 6715, Amending the Labor Code", which was promulgated on
August 8, 1989.
 The new provision states that the Labor Arbiter can reinstate dismissed or separated employee, and
the decision will be final and executory.
 The transitory provision states that appeals filed on or after March 21, 1989, but prior to the
effectivity of these Interim Rules must conform to the requirements as herein set forth or as may be
directed by the Commission.
 The private respondents, who were employees of the petitioner, failed to address their grievances,
and resulted to protest.
 The management issued a memorandum to dismiss the ones who were involved in the protest.
 When the respondents took the matter to the Labor Arbiter, who ruled in their favor.
 The petitioners contend that the laws involved above are unconstitutional, and they should not have
retroactive effects.

Issues:
 Whether or not the said laws were unconstitutional.
 Whether or not the said laws can have retroactive effects.

Held:
 No. There are two principles involved in this matter: the presumption of constitutionality and the
laws should be in favor of the laborers. The laws are presumed to be constitutional because
separation of powers is involved. It is presumed that the legislative and executive branch has
carefully studied the laws, in regards to their constitutionality, before they were enacted. Hence,
there should be a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution in order for it to be entertained.
As for the favor of the laborers, it is stated in the constitution that the rights of the laborers should
be protected. It is so because they are the life, blood and stability of the nation. The workingman
should be protected because of their vulnerability and importance to society. Without them, there
would be no one to improve our country.
 Yes. The said laws, especially the transitory provisions may have retroactive effect. This is because
the laws mentioned above are procedural in nature. Procedural laws are kinds of laws that have
retroactive, hence one of the exemptions to non-retroactivity. The laws above state the procedure
of how the court decides cases. In this case, the procedure is the execution of the reinstatement of
the dismissed or separated workers.
Principles: Equal protection of rights in the Constitution, Presumption of Constitutionality, Retroactivity of
Procedural Laws
G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987

CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.

FACTS:
 The Paduas- five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso a parcel of land of 604 square meters
registered under their deceased parents’ names under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac.
 On March 15 1963, Celestino Padua transferred his share for P550 to the petitioners through absolute sale.
A year later, Eustaquia Padua also sold her own share to the same vendees for P440, as denominated by
“Con Pacto de Retro Sale” (sale with power of redemption).
 Petitioners enclosed the bought portions in a fence, which is 2/5 of the said lot. On 1975, the son- Eduardo
Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house.
 On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five co-heirs, sought to redeem the area sold to the
Alonzo’s but complaint was dismissed since he is already an American citizen.
 On May 27, 1977, Tecla Padua also filed a complaint invoking the same right to redemption claimed by her
brother but was dismissed on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within 30
days from notice of sale in 1963 and 1964, as invoked by Article 1088 of the Civil Code.
 There was no written notice of sale by the co-heirs as required by the law but it was held that the actual
knowledge of the sale of the co-heirs already satisfied the requirement of the law.
 Private respondents alleged that they were unaware of the sale as they thought that the occupied area was
merely mortgaged by Celestino and Eustaquia. This is highly improbable since the petitioners and the private
respondents were close friends and neighbours whose children went to school together. Tecla did not even
object to the permanent erection of semi-concrete structure by petitioners’ son. More so, Eustaquia- one of
the vendors, was staying in the same house as Tecla.
 In reversing the trial court, the respondent court asserted Article 1088 and Article 1623 of the Civil Code as
basis in relation to previous cases decided in the past-(De Conejero c Vourt of Appeals; and Butte v Uy).

ISSUE:
1. What is the correct interpretation and application of the Article 1088 of the Civil Code as invoked in this
case.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Article 1088 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the
co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale
by the vendor.
A similar rule in Article 1623 was stressed, reading as follows:
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within 30 days from
the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall
not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has
given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the adjoining owners.
This makes the case an illustration of Holmes dictum that “hard cases make bad laws” as the petitioners cannot
argue against the fact that there were no written notice of sale given by vendors to their co-heirs. If Article 1088 is
strictly followed, to wit, that in view of such deficiency, the 30-day period for redemption had not begun to run,
much less expired in 1977.

But, law should be tested by its results and purpose. It is cardinal rule that in seeking the meaning of the law, the
first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Indispensably, we
presume that the good motive of the legislature is to render justice. More so, law is interpreted in consonance with
justice. Hence, the court deferred not to “the letter that killeth” but to “the spirit that vivifieth” to give effect to the
lawmakers’ will.
The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute must be read
according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the letter but although it is not within
the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute.
Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if
within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within
the intent of the lawmakers.

In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the redemption is properly notified of the
sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. Yet,
Tecla Padua filed the complaint 14 years after the first sale and 13 years after the second sale.

Was there a valid notice?

Based on the established facts, yes there was. Private respondents’ pretense about being unaware
about the sale made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964 is unacceptable. Since the purpose of
Article 1088 is clearly to make sure the redemptioners are notified, in this case, the redemptioners are
actually informed although not in writing, and that is sufficient enough.

When did the 30-day period of redemption begin?

When the first complaint for redemption was filed; the co-heirs were actually informed of the sale
and thereafter the 30-day period started running and ultimately expired.

The following doctrine is worth noting:

While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of an alleged right it is
essential that he should have knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if the
circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truth
were readily available upon inquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with
laches, the same as if he had known the facts.

As for conclusion, this is not a deviation of the strict letter of the law (Art. 1088 and Art. 1623), but simply
adopting an exception to the rule, in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case. When facts warrant,
law should be interpreted in a way that it will render justice, as presumably intended by the law maker.

RULING:
Wherefore, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and that of
the trial court is reinstated, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Berces v Guingona
GR No. 112099
February 21, 1995

Principle:
Presumption against implied repeals

Facts:
Petitioner filed two administrative cases against respondent Naomi C. Corral, the incumbent mayor of Tiwi,
Albay with the Sangguniang Panlalawiga of Albay to wit:
1. Admin Case No. 02-92 for abuses of authority and oppression for non-payment of accrued leave
benefits due the petitioner amounting to P36,779.02.
2. Admin Case No. 05-92 for dishonesty and abuse of authority for installing a water pipeline which is
being operated, maintained and paid for by the municipality to service respondent’s private residence
and medical clinic.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disposed the 2 Admin cases in the ff manner:

1. Admin Case No. 02-92
Respondent is ordered to pay the petitioner P36,779.02 plus legal interest. In addition respondent mayor
is ordered suspended from office for a period of 2 months.
2. Admin Case No. 05-92
Respondent is hereby sentenced to suffer penalty of suspension for a period of 3 months beginning after
her service of the first penalty of suspension ordered in the preceding case. He is likewise ordered to
reimburse the municipality of one half the amount the latter have paid for electricity and water bills from
July-December 1992.

Respondent appealed to the Office of the President questioning the decision and at the same time prayed
for the stay of execution thereof in accordance with Section 67(b) of the LGC.

Acting on the prayer to stay execution during the pendency of the appeal, the Office of the President issued
an Order. The pertinent portions of which read as follows:
The stay of the execution is governed by Sec 68 of RA No 7160 and Sec 6 of Admin Order No. 18.

After due consideration, and in light of the Petition for Review filed before this Office, we find that a
stay for execution pending appeal would be just and reasonable to prevent undue prejudice to public
interest.

Whereby, the Office hereby orders the suspension/stay of the execution of the decision for Admin
Case No 02-92 and Admin Case No 05-92.

Petitioner the filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the Order of the Office of the President.
Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Issue:
Whether repealing clause of RA No 7160 repealed Sec 6 Amin Case No. 18.

Ruling:
Petitioner invoked repealing clause of Section 530 (f) of RA No. 7160 which provides:
All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, administrative regulations,
part or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with any of the provision of this Code, are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.
The clause is not an express repeal of Sec. 6 of Admin Code No 18 because it failed to identify or designate
the laws or executive orders that are intended to be repealed.

If there is any repeal of Admin Order No 18 by RA No 7160, it is through implication though such kind of
repeal is not favored. There is even a presumption against implied repeal.

An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found
between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed
as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new
and old laws. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible. There must be such a repugnancy between the
laws that they cannot be made to stand together.

We find the provisions of Sec 68 of RA No 7160 and Sec 6 of Admin Order No 18 are not irreconcilably
inconsistent and repugnant and the two laws must in fact be read together.

The first sentence of Sec 68 merely provides that and “appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming
final and executory.” As worded, there is room to construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing
officials to say the execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing to infer that the reviewing officials
are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal
Sec 6 of Admin Order No 18, it could have used more direct language expressive of such intention.

The term “shall” may be read either as mandatory or directory depending upon a consideration of the entire
provisions in which it is found, its object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way
or the other. In the case, there is no basis to justify the construction of the word as mandatory.

The Office of the President, made a finding that the execution of the decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan suspending respondent Mayor from office might be prejudicial to the public interest. Thus, in
order not to disrupt the rendition of service to the public, a stay of the execution of the decision is in order.

Petition dismissed.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992
ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

Antonio A. Mecano, through a petition for certiorari, seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA,
for brevity) embodied in its 7th Indorsement, dated January 16, 1992, denying his claim for reimbursement under Section
699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), as amended, in the total amount of P40,831.00.

FACTS:
Antonio Mecano is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation. He was hospitalized for cholecystitis from March
26, 1990 to April 7, 1990, on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of
which he is claiming from the COA.

Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits: under [1]
Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, in his 7th
Indorsement, denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that {1} Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292), solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor
re-enacted in the latter.

Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of duty. — When a
person in the service of the national government of a province, city, municipality or municipal district is so injured
in the performance of duty as thereby to receive some actual physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of
Department may direct that absence during any period of disability thereby occasioned shall be on full pay,
though not more than six months, and in such case he may in his discretion also authorize the payment of the
medical attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital fees of the injured person. Absence in
the case contemplated shall be charged first against vacation leave, if any there be.

xxx xxx xxx

In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some act in the line of duty, the
Department head may in his discretion authorize the payment of the necessary hospital fees.

Petitioner also anchored his claim on [2] Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary Drilon stating
that “the issuance of the Administrative Code did NOT operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised
Administrative Code. The COA, on the other hand, {2} strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code
of 1987 operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC.

Lastly, the COA contends that {3} employment-related sickness, injury or death is adequately covered by the
Employees' Compensation Program under P.D. 626, such that to allow simultaneous recovery of benefits under both
laws on account of the same contingency would be unfair and unjust to the Government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code
of 1917.

1987 Administration Code provides that: “All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof,
inconsistent with this code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

HELD:
NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioner’s claim for benefits.

RULING: Court ruled that the new Code did not repeal Sec 699:
 Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when two statutes cover the same subject matter,
they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized,
and both cannot be given effect, that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other.
  The new Code does not cover not attempt to the cover the entire subject matter of the old Code.
 There are several matters treated in the old Code that are not found in the new Code. (provisions on notary
public; leave law, public bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness benefits under section 699 and
others)
 CoA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the matter of the subject claim are in an
irreconcilable conflict.
 There can no conflict because the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has
not been restated in old Code.
 The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself
sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act new statute may merely be cumulative or a continuation of
the old one.
 Second Category: possible only if the revised statute or code was intended to cover the whole subject to be a
complete and perfect system in itself.
o Rule: a subsequent is deemed to repeal a prior law if the former revises the whole subject matter of the
former statute.
 When both intent and scope clearly evince the idea of a repeal, then all parts and provisions of the prior act that
are omitted from the revised act are deemed repealed.
 Before there can be an implied repeal under this category, it must be the clear intent of the legislature that later
act be the substitute of the prior act.
 Opinion 73 s.1991 of the Secretary of Justice: what appears clear is the intent to cover only those aspects of
government that pertain to administration, organization and procedure, understandably because of the many
changes that transpired in the government structure since the enactment of RAC.
 Repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. Presumption is against the inconsistency and repugnancy
for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes.

EXPLANATION:
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part
of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be
a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to
abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later
act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts
are the same from the time of the first enactment.

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption
is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and
not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in pari materia.