BADUA VS.

CORDILLERA BODONG ADMNISTRATION

194 SCRA 101 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Judicial Power – Tribal Court Has No
Judicial Power
Spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua were occupying a parcel of land in Abra. The said land is
being claimed by David Quema. Quema said he sold the land to a certain Dra. Erotida Valera
but then he was able to repurchase the land later from the same doctor. The Baduas however
contend that they were the ones who bought the land from Valera but that they cannot
produce the deed of sale because it was with the vice governor. Quema sued the Baduas not
before the regular courts but rather before the Maeng Tribal Court. The said tribal court is
composed of elders respected in the community and that it is alleged that their decision is
likewise respected. The tribal court is also a branch of the Cordillera Bodong Administration.
Non-compliance to the tribal court’s decision would result to community ostracism. The tribal
court resolved the issue by granting the land to Quema. The Baduas were then ordered to
vacate the land. The Baduas refused. Thereafter the Baduas received a warning order from
the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) – the military branch of the Cordillera Bodong
Administration. This brought fear to the couple which led to Leonor’s running away and Rosa’s
arrest. They were threatened by the CPLA hence they appeal before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Maeng Tribal Court is a competent court.
HELD: No, the Maeng Tribal Court is not a competent court. The Cordillera AUTONOMOUS
Region never came into existence. Hence, the Cordillera Bodong Council – which would have
received judicial power, granted CAR’s autonomy – never possessed judicial power. What
we currently have is the Cordillera ADMINISTRATIVE Region. Hence, the Maeng Tribal
Council, its supposed branch, likewise never received judicial power. Therefore, it cannot
validly decide on cases, neither can it enforce its decision.

JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

50 SCRA 30 – Political law – Constitutional Law – Political Question – Validity of the 1973
Constitution – Restriction to Judicial Power
In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution.
Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet
secretaries from implementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the said
constitution is void because the same was initiated by the president. He argued that the
President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed
constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free election there
being intimidation and fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.
HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices
expressed the view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president of
the Philippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent
evidence to show such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed that the
people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question of the validity of
the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was left to the people in their sovereign
capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such acquiescence.
FACTS:

On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed a prohibition case to restrain respondents from
implementing any of the provisions of the proposed constitution not found in the present
constitution. Javellana maintained that the respondents are acting without or in excess of
jurisdiction in implementing proposed constitution and that the president is without power to
proclaim the ratification of the constitution. Similar actions were filed by Vidal Tan, Gerardo
Roxas, among others. Petitioners pray for the nullification of Proclamation 1102 (Citizens
Assemblies) and any order, decree, and proclamation which are similar in objective.

ISSUES:

1. Is the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 justiciable?

2. Was the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention ratified validly in
compliance to applicable laws?

3. Was the proposed Constitution acquiesced by the people?

4. Are the petitioners entitled relief?

5. Is the proposed Constitution in force?

HELD:

Whether a constitutional amendment has been properly adopted according to an existing

constitution is a judicial question as it is the absolute duty of the judiciary to determine whether
the Constitution has been amended in the manner required by the constitution. The
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with
Article XV section 1 of the 1935 Constitution which provides only one way for ratification
(election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and only with qualified voters). Due to the
environmental and social conditions in the Philippines (i.e. martial law) the Court cannot
honestly say that the people acquiesced to the proposed Constitution. The majority ruled to
dismiss the cases as the effectivity of the proposed Constitution is the basic issue posed by
the cases which considerations other than judicial are relevant and unavoidable. The new
constitution is in force as there are not enough votes to say otherwise.

LLANA VS. ALBA

In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating
Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes”, was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in
Olongapo, was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that
would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would
contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the
courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the
legislature by such statute (BP 129).
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to
discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their
dismissal.” Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it
was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be
distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no
tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case
of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It
is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment
of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts
abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between
removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to
be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it
would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as
incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be
accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord
respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question
of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to
the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way
of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into
who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains
in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore
from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this
liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the
conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present
incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus
be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those
predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance
with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and
another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.”

ALMARIO VS. ALBA

Amendment to the Constitution

As provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, the Filipino electorate will go to the polls on
January 27, 1984 to either approve or reject amendments to the Constitution proposed by
Resolution Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111, 112, and 113 of the Batasang Pambansa. The
proposed amendments are embodied in four (4) separate questions to be answered by
simple YES or NO answers. Petitioners herein seek to enjoin the submission on January
27, 1984 of Question Nos. 3 (“grant” as an additional mode of acquiring lands belonging to
the public domain) and 4 (the undertaking by the government of a land reform program and
a social reform program), which cover Resolution Nos. 105 and 113, to the people for
ratification or rejection on the ground that there has been no fair and proper submission
following the doctrine laid down in Tolentino v. COMELEC. The petitioners do not seek to
prohibit the holding of the plebiscite but only ask for more time for the people to study the
meaning and implications of Resolution Nos. 105 and 113 until the nature and effect of the
proposals are fairly and properly submitted to the electorate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can be presented to the people on a later date.

HELD: The necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the proposed amendments are beyond
the power of the courts to adjudicate. Precisely, whether or not "grant" of public land and
"urban land reform" are unwise or improvident or whether or not the proposed amendments
are unnecessary is a matter which only the people can decide. The questions are presented
for their determination. Assuming that a member or some members of this Court may find
undesirable any additional mode of disposing of public land or an urban land reform
program, the remedy is to vote "NO" in the plebiscite but not to substitute his or their
aversion to the proposed amendments by denying to the millions of voters an opportunity to
express their own likes or dislikes. The issue before us has nothing to do with the wisdom of
the proposed amendments, their desirability, or the danger of the power being abused. The
issue is whether or not the voters are aware of the wisdom, the desirability, or the dangers
of abuse. The petitioners have failed to make out a case that the average voter does not
know the meaning of "grant" of public land or of "urban land reform."

SANIDAD VS. COMLEC

73 SCRA 333 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Amendment to the Constitution

On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976
for the Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial
law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its
existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present
powers. Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031,
amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for
the manner of voting and canvass of votes in “barangays” applicable to the national
referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec
4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating
the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976.
The Decree recites in its “whereas” clauses that the people’s continued opposition to the
convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished
and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body,
which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to
enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite
on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033,
insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No.
1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and
conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to
exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.
The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take
cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial
question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the
amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the
legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to
propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the
period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National
Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the
prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973
Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim
National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President
undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru
Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the
very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing
Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force
and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees
is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2)
Article X of the new Constitution provides: “All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and
no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the
concurrence of at least ten Members. . . ..” The Supreme Court has the last word in the
construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The
amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and
hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine
whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the
Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time. The
President at that time also sits as the legislature

TANADA VS. CUENCO

103 Phil. 1051 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Political Question Defined – Members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly
occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who
belonged to the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial
candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET).
But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET
should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme
Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since
there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the
minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So
did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then
he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest.
Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot
take cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power
to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for
Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it
before the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable
question. The term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely,
a question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked
by Tañada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was
whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial
question. Note that the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does
not perform legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority
members) must not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET,
apparently already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even though those
will come from the majority party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET
(referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its
own rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.

GONZALES VS. COMELEC

21 SCRA 774 – Political Law – Amendment to the Constitution – Political Question vs

Justiciable Question
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law
that the plebiscite shall be held on the same day that the general national elections shall be
held (November 14, 1967). This was questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned
groups as they argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the
proposals to the people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the general
election rather than in the issues involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when they came
up with their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC
and other respondents interposed the defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed
by the courts because it is a political question.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political question.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.
HELD:
I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend as well as
the power to propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in the general grant of
legislative powers to Congress. Such powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress.
On the contrary, such powers are inherent to the people as repository of sovereignty in a
republican state. That being, when Congress makes amendments or proposes amendments,
it is not actually doing so as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as a constituent assembly. Such
act is not a legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such act of the constituent
assembly is within constitutional limitations.
II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a special
election. SC held that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935] Constitution to indicate
that the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that
the previous amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification
in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the
circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed
amendments for ratification in general elections.
Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. “Plebiscite should be scheduled
on a special date so as to facilitate “Fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection”.
They should be able to compare the original proposition with the amended proposition.

LOPEZ VS. ROXAS

17 SCRA 756 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Judicial Power Defined

Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the candidates for Vice President in the 1965
elections. Lopez won the election. Roxas appealed his loss before the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET). The PET was created by RA 1793. It is provided in the law that:
“There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect
and the Vice-president elect of the Philippines.”
In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal his loss. Lopez assailed the law
and he sought to enjoin Roxas and the PET from proceeding with the case. Lopez averred
that the PET is unconstitutional for it was not provided for in the constitution. Also, since the
PET is composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten members of the SC any decision of
the PET cannot be validly appealed before the SC or that there may be conflict that may arise
once a PET decision is appealed before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body.
HELD: Yes. In coming up with the PET, the Congress merely conferred a new function to the
Supreme Court. Such is within its power, the Constitution allowed Congress to determine
which body should decide controversies relating to the election of the President or the Vice
President. RA 1793 did not create another court within the SC for pursuant to the Constitution,
“the Judicial power shall be vested in one SC and in such inferior courts as may be
established by law”
The Supreme Court went on to emphasize that the fundamental law vests in the judicial
branch of the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but “the”
judicial power under our political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or “all” of said power,
except, only, so much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the
power to “judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of members of
the Senate and those of the House of Representatives, which is vested by the fundamental
law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively.
Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights
that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for
violations of such rights. The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1)
defining such enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for violations
thereof; and (2) determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies
or disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the Constitution ordains
that “Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts”, subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law.
The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA 1793 merely added the
court’s jurisdiction and such can be validly legislated by Congress. It merely conferred upon
the SC additional functions i.e., the functions of the PET. This is valid because the
determining of election contests is essentially judicial.

SANTIAGO VS. BAUTISTA

7 SCRA 21 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Judicial Power – Justiciable Controversy

– Citizenship

Ricardo Santiago was considered an alien as evidenced by his alien certificate of registration.
He averred that this is erroneous. He was born of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father here
in the Philippines. He was sent to China when he was 4 years old by his dad. He returned in
1925 and in his Landing Certificate he was already labeled as a Filipino. Hence, he would like
to cancel the alien certificate that was issued by the Bureau of Immigrations. In his original
petition however in the lower court he was praying for a declaratory relief for him to be
declared as a Filipino. He was favored by the court. The fiscal appealed averring that a
declaratory relief is not the proper remedy. The lower court amended the decision not stating
the “declaratory statement” but rather focusing on the cancellation of the alien certificate. The
fiscal appealed before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not declaratory relief is a proper remedy to have a judicial declaration of
citizenship.
HELD: No. The SC ruled against Santiago. Although amended, the proceeding initiated and
originally prayed for is a declaratory relief to have him be declared as a Filipino. Under our
laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an
individual. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justiciable controversies, which
imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative
of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As
an accident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may
pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their status. Otherwise, such a
pronouncement is beyond judicial power.
Thus, for instance, no action or proceeding may be instituted for a declaration to the effect
that a plaintiff or a petitioner is married, or single, or a legitimate child, although a finding
thereon may be made as a necessary premise to justify a given relief available only to one
enjoying said status. At times, the law permits the acquisition of a given status, such as
naturalization, by judicial decree. But, there is no similar legislation authorizing the institution
of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry.

RADIOWEALTH VS. AGRACADA (READ FULL CASE)

NOBLEJAS VS, TEEHANKEE (READ FULL CASE)

NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE

• Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA 1151, he is entitled to the
same compensation, emoluments, and privileges as those of a Judge of CFI. He approved a
subdivision plan covering certain areas that are in excess of those covered by the title

• The Secretary of Justice, Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas, requiring him to explain.

• Noblejas answered, arguing that since he has a rank equivalent to that of a Judge, he could
only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as an ordinary Judge, under the
Judiciary Act. He claims that he may be investigated only by the Supreme Court

• Nevertheless, he was suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES)

• Noblejas filed this case claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the ES and his abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the
Supreme Court (in view of his having a rank equivalent to a judge)?

SC: NO. If the law had really intended to include the general grant of “rank and privileges
equivalent to Judges”, the right to be investigated and be suspended or removed only by the
Supreme Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate
the doctrine of separation of powers because it would charge the Supreme Court with an
administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, simultaneously
reducing pro tanto, the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.

There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislative to charge the Judiciary with
administrative functions except when reasonable incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties.

The judiciary cannot give decisions which are merely advisory, nor can it exercise or
participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative. The
Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or
to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the
administration of judicial functions

As such, RA 1151 while conferring the same privileges as those of a judge, did not include
and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and
to be suspended or removed only upon the Court’s recommendation. Said rights would be
violative of the Constitution. The suspension of Noblejas by the ES valid. Also, the resolution
of the consult a by a Register of Deeds is NOT a judicial function, but an administrative
process. It is conclusive and binding only upon the Register of Deeds, NOT the parties
themselves. Even if the resolution is appealable, it does not automatically mean that they are
judicial in character. Still, the resolution of the consult as are but a minimal portion of the
administrative or executive functions.
The suspension of Noblejas by the ES valid. Also, the resolution of the consult a by a Register
of Deeds is NOT a judicial function, but an administrative process. It is conclusive and binding
only upon the Register of Deeds, NOT the parties themselves. Even if the resolution is
appealable, it does not automatically mean that they are judicial in character. Still, the
resolution of the consult as are but a minimal portion of the administrative or executive
functions.

LINA VS. PURISIMA (READ FULL CASE)

GARCIA VS. MACARAIG JR.

9 SCRA 106 – Political Law – Separation of Powers

Judge Catalino Macaraig, Jr. took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City
on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to be
organized from scratch. From July 1, 1970 to February 28, 1971, Macaraig was not able to
assume the duties and functions of a judge due to the fact that his Court Room can not be
properly established due to problems as to location and as to appropriations to make his
Court up and running. When Macaraig realized that it would be some time before he could
actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had
worked in the Department of Justice, he had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on
extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the
maximum ten months allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, convinced
Macaraig to forego his leave and instead to assist the Secretary, without being extended a
formal detail, whenever he was not busy attending to the needs of his court.
Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that Macaraig is incompetent,
dishonest and has acted in violation of his oath as a judge. Garcia said that Macaraig has
not submitted the progress of his Courts as required by law. And that Macaraig has received
salaries as a judge while he is fully aware that he has not been performing the duties of a
judge. Also questioned was the fact that a member of the judiciary is helping the the DOJ, a
department of the executive oi charge of prosecution of cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence and dishonesty as Judge.
HELD: No. Macaraig’s inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances
mentioned above does not constitute incompetence. Macaraig was, like every lawyer who
gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of
the stigma of being ‘a judge without a sala’, but forces and circumstances beyond his control
prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.
On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court looks with favor at
the practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the DOJ to assist the
Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority
over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in
collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the
government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of separation
of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be
gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the
public service.
The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three
departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check
and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount
than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is
thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of
government that no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a
position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be
subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal
effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case
may be. Needless to say, the Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is
discontinued.