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RISK ANALYSIS
Outline
Risk Analysis
▫ Event tree analysis
▫ Fault tree analysis
▫ Risk matrix analysis
▫ Indicator based approach etc
Learning outcome (Objective)
Students should be:
• Understand the difference between qualitative and quantitative
methods
• Be familiar with risk analysis methods such as FTA & ETA
• Understand the difference between deterministic and stochastic
methods
Risk Analysis
• Use of available information to determine how often specified
events may occur and the magnitude of their consequences
• Can be performed:
▫ Qualitatively – by instinct or gut feel (“that seems too risky”)
▫ Quantitatively – assign numeric values to risks
Risk Analysis
Qualitative assessment
Defines consequence, probability and level of risk by significance levels such as
“high”, “medium” and “low”, may combine consequence and probability.
Semi-quantitative
Methods use numerical rating scales for consequence and probability and combine
them to produce a level of risk using a formula. Formulae used can vary.
Quantitative analysis
Estimates practical values for consequences and their probabilities, and produces
values of the level of risk in specific units defined when developing the context. Full
quantitative analysis may not always be possible or desirable.
Event-Tree Analysis (ETA)
1. Event-Tree Analysis (ETA)
• A number of hazard may occur in chains: one hazard causes the next
• Most problematic types to analyze
• Best approach for hazard chains is to use so-called event-trees
1. Event-Tree Analysis (ETA)
• Event trees begin with an initiating event & work towards the
final result (inductive approach).
• This method provides information on how a failure can occur &
the probability of occurrence.
1. Event-Tree Analysis (ETA)
Steps
1. Identify an initiating event of interest (usually falls in one of 4 categories).
2. Identify the safety functions (barriers) designed to deal with the initiating
event.
3. Describe the resulting accident event sequences
4. Construct the event tree.
1. Event-Tree Analysis (ETA)
Steps
5. Determine the frequency of the accidental event and the (conditional)
probabilities of the branches in the event tree
6. Calculate the probabilities/frequencies for the identified consequences
(outcomes)
7. Compile and present the results from the analysis
1. Event-Tree Analysis (ETA)
• All the analyzed events are linked by nodes
• All possible states of the system are
considered at each node
• Each state (branch of the event tree) is
characterized by a defined value of
probability of occurrence
1. Event-Tree Analysis (ETA)
Possible to have three or more alternatives other than just true or false
1. Event-Tree Analysis (ETA)
4. Construct the event tree…..
1. Event-Tree Analysis (ETA)
5. Frequency & probabilities
• λ - frequency of the accidental (initiating) event
• Pr(Bi ) - denote the probability of event B(i).
• Probability of “Outcome 1” is:
Block diagram
2. FTA Illustration
Here F(x1) , F(x2) , F(x3), F(x4)
are events fail
• F (A) = SUB – SYSTEM (A) FAILS
• F(B) = SUB – SYSTEM (B) FAILS
THEN
• F(A) = F(X1) AND F(X2)
• F(B) = F(X3) AND F(X4)
El Fault tree describe una serie de eventos que pueden causar un peligro y el Event tree muestra cómo se
mitiga si ocurre
Hazard & Top event
Threats
Consequences
Control and Recovery Barriers
Escalation factors & Escalation factor barriers
Example
Almost certain
E H H M M
(A)
Likely
H H M M L
(B)
Possible
H M M L L
(C)
Unlikely
M M L L T
(D)
Rare
M L L T T
(E)
3. Risk matrix approach (RMA)
a.k.a consequences-frequency matrices (CFM)
For risks
▫ Not fully quantifiable
▫ Have a very large degree of uncertainty
▫ Difficult to define hazard scenarios, and map
▫ Difficult to characterize the elements-at-risk, or
▫ Difficult to define the vulnerability using vulnerability curves
3. Risk matrix approach (RMA)
• Classify risks based on expert knowledge with limited quantitative data
• Depends on the quality of the group of experts
3. RMA Example - CASE STUDY OF A COAL MINE
Mining is done by an opencast method. The mine has 8 coal horizons out of
which 4 horizons are now workable. Coal production is 12000 TPD and OB
removed is 25000m3 per day. The OMS of mine is 95 and striping ratio of mine
is 1: 2.60. There are 3 coal seams in the mines. The overburden removal is being
done with shovel-truck combination, with drilling and blasting. Coal
production is done by pay loaders and tippers, with drilling and blasting. 35
trucks are assigned for overburden removal and 20 trucks for production.
Drilling is being carried out by 160mm dia. drill machine contractually.
3. RMA Example - CASE STUDY OF A COAL MINE
Haul road is 300m in length and 20m in width having a slope of 1 in 16. Tipping
truck road is 30m wide and its length is 2.5kms having flat slope and ramps of 1
in 12. In dump yard area height is kept at 30m, sufficient space is provided
avoid overcrowdings, for slope natural angle should not be more than 37°. For
the use of explosives a magazine with license, having a capacity of explosives
14000kg, fuse 10000kg and detonators 20000. One explosive van and 5 blasting
shelters are present and blasting density per million tonnes is 279.32
3. Risk Analysis and Risk Management
• Hazards identification
4. Determine how serious (S) each effect is. rated on a scale from 1
to 10
FMEA Procedure
5. For each failure mode, determine all the potential root causes. List all
possible causes for each failure mode
6. For each cause, determine the occurrence rating, or O (between 0 and 1).
7. For each cause, identify current process controls
8. For each control, determine the detection rating, or D. (between 0 and 1).
9. Is this failure mode associated with a critical characteristic (compliance
with government regulations)?
FMEA Procedure
10. Calculate the risk priority number, or RPN, which equals S × O × D. Also
calculate Criticality by multiplying severity by occurrence, S × O
11. Identify recommended actions.
12. As actions are completed, note results and the date on the FMEA form.
Also, note new S, O or D ratings and new RPNs.
4. Indicator-based approach (IBA)
• Used where (semi)-quantitative methods for risk mapping are not appropriate.
• Lack of data to quantify the components, such as hazard frequency, intensity, and
physical vulnerability
• Desire to take into account a number of different components of vulnerability
such as social vulnerability,