CIVPRO – RULE 38 – TIME FOR FILING – STRICTLY FOLLOWED Respondent has no cause of action, because the subject contract
t has no cause of action, because the subject contract of sale has no more force and
G.R. No. 137162 January 24, 2007
CORAZON L. ESCUETA, assisted by her husband EDGAR ESCUETA, IGNACIO E. RUBIO, THE HEIRS
OF LUZ R. BALOLOY, namely, ALEJANDRINO R. BALOLOY and BAYANI R. BALOLOY, Petitioners,
vs.
RUFINA LIM, Respondent.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari1 to annul and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated October 26, 1998 and January 11, 1999, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 48282,
entitled "Rufina Lim v. Corazon L. Escueta, etc., et. al."
The facts2 appear as follows:
Respondent Rufina Lim filed an action to remove cloud on, or quiet title to, real property, with
preliminary injunction and issuance of [a hold-departure order] from the Philippines against Ignacio
E. Rubio. Respondent amended her complaint to include specific performance and damages.
In her amended complaint, respondent averred inter alia that she bought the hereditary shares
(consisting of 10 lots) of Ignacio Rubio [and] the heirs of Luz Baloloy, namely: Alejandrino, Bayani,
and other co-heirs; that said vendors executed a contract of sale dated April 10, 1990 in her favor;
that Ignacio Rubio and the heirs of Luz Baloloy received [a down payment] or earnest money in the
amount of P102,169.86 and P450,000, respectively; that it was agreed in the contract of sale that
the vendors would secure certificates of title covering their respective hereditary shares; that the
balance of the purchase price would be paid to each heir upon presentation of their individual
certificate[s] of [title]; that Ignacio Rubio refused to receive the other half of the down payment
which is P[100,000]; that Ignacio Rubio refused and still refuses to deliver to [respondent] the
certificates of title covering his share on the two lots; that with respect to the heirs of Luz Baloloy,
they also refused and still refuse to perform the delivery of the two certificates of title covering their
share in the disputed lots; that respondent was and is ready and willing to pay Ignacio Rubio and
the heirs of Luz Baloloy upon presentation of their individual certificates of title, free from whatever
lien and encumbrance;
As to petitioner Corazon Escueta, in spite of her knowledge that the disputed lots have already been
sold by Ignacio Rubio to respondent, it is alleged that a simulated deed of sale involving said lots
was effected by Ignacio Rubio in her favor; and that the simulated deed of sale by Rubio to Escueta
has raised doubts and clouds over respondent’s title.
In their separate amended answers, petitioners denied the material allegations of the complaint
and alleged inter alia the following:
For the heirs of Luz Baloloy (Baloloys for brevity):
effect as far as the Baloloys are concerned, since they have withdrawn their offer to sell for the
reason that respondent failed to pay the balance of the purchase price as orally promised on or
before May 1, 1990.
For petitioners Ignacio Rubio (Rubio for brevity) and Corazon Escueta (Escueta for brevity):
Respondent has no cause of action, because Rubio has not entered into a contract of sale with her;
that he has appointed his daughter Patricia Llamas to be his attorney-in-fact and not in favor of
Virginia Rubio Laygo Lim (Lim for brevity) who was the one who represented him in the sale of the
disputed lots in favor of respondent; that the P100,000 respondent claimed he received as down
payment for the lots is a simple transaction by way of a loan with Lim.
The Baloloys failed to appear at the pre-trial. Upon motion of respondent, the trial court declared
the Baloloys in default. They then filed a motion to lift the order declaring them in default, which
was denied by the trial court in an order dated November 27, 1991. Consequently, respondent was
allowed to adduce evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the trial court rendered a partial decision dated
July 23, 1993 against the Baloloys, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [respondent] and against
[petitioners, heirs] of Luz R. Balolo[y], namely: Alejandrino Baloloy and Bayani Baloloy. The
[petitioners] Alejandrino Baloloy and Bayani Baloloy are ordered to immediately execute an
[Absolute] Deed of Sale over their hereditary share in the properties covered by TCT No. 74392 and
TCT No. 74394, after payment to them by [respondent] the amount of P[1,050,000] or consignation
of said amount in Court. [For] failure of [petitioners] Alejandrino Baloloy and Bayani Baloloy to
execute the Absolute Deed of Sale over their hereditary share in the property covered by TCT No.
T-74392 and TCT No. T-74394 in favor of [respondent], the Clerk of Court is ordered to execute the
necessary Absolute Deed of Sale in behalf of the Baloloys in favor of [respondent,] with a
consideration of P[1,500,000]. Further[,] [petitioners] Alejandrino Baloloy and Bayani Baloloy are
ordered to jointly and severally pay [respondent] moral damages in the amount of P[50,000] and
P[20,000] for attorney’s fees. The adverse claim annotated at the back of TCT No. T-74392 and TCT
No. T-74394[,] insofar as the shares of Alejandrino Baloloy and Bayani Baloloy are concerned[,] [is]
ordered cancelled.
With costs against [petitioners] Alejandrino Baloloy and Bayani Baloloy.
SO ORDERED.3
The Baloloys filed a petition for relief from judgment and order dated July 4, 1994 and supplemental
petition dated July 7, 1994. This was denied by the trial court in an order dated September 16, 1994.
Hence, appeal to the Court of Appeals was taken challenging the order denying the petition for
relief.
Trial on the merits ensued between respondent and Rubio and Escueta. After trial, the trial court
rendered its assailed Decision, as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the complaint [and] amended complaint are dismissed against
[petitioners] Corazon L. Escueta, Ignacio E. Rubio[,] and the Register of Deeds. The counterclaim of
[petitioners] [is] also dismissed. However, [petitioner] Ignacio E. Rubio is ordered to return to the
[respondent], Rufina Lim[,] the amount of P102,169.80[,] with interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from April 10, [1990] until the same is fully paid. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s order and partial decision, but reversed the later
decision. The dispositive portion of its assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing premises considered, this Court rules:
1. the appeal of the Baloloys from the Order denying the Petition for Relief from
Judgment and Orders dated July 4, 1994 and Supplemental Petition dated July 7, 1994 is
DISMISSED. The Order appealed from is AFFIRMED.
2. the Decision dismissing [respondent’s] complaint is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a
new one is entered. Accordingly,
a. the validity of the subject contract of sale in favor of [respondent] is upheld.
b. Rubio is directed to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale conditioned upon the
payment of the balance of the purchase price by [respondent] within 30 days
from the receipt of the entry of judgment of this Decision.
c. the contracts of sale between Rubio and Escueta involving Rubio’s share in
the disputed properties is declared NULL and VOID.
d. Rubio and Escueta are ordered to pay jointly and severally the [respondent]
the amount of P[20,000] as moral damages and P[20,000] as attorney’s fees.
3. the appeal of Rubio and Escueta on the denial of their counterclaim is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied. Hence, this petition.
The issues are:
I Furthermore, petitioner Alejandrino was not clothed with a power of attorney to appear on behalf
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT FILED BY THE BALOLOYS.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REINSTATING THE COMPLAINT AND IN AWARDING
MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT RUFINA L. LIM
CONSIDERING THAT:
A. IGNACIO E. RUBIO IS NOT BOUND BY THE CONTRACT OF SALE BETWEEN VIRGINIA
LAYGO-LIM AND RUFINA LIM.
B. THE CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN RUFINA LIM AND VIRGINIA LAYGO-LIM IS A
CONTRACT TO SELL AND NOT A CONTRACT OF SALE.
C. RUFINA LIM FAILED TO FAITHFULLY COMPLY WITH HER OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE
CONTRACT TO SELL THEREBY WARRANTING THE CANCELLATION THEREOF.
D. CORAZON L. ESCUETA ACTED IN UTMOST GOOD FAITH IN ENTERING INTO THE
CONTRACT OF SALE WITH IGNACIO E. RUBIO.
III
THE CONTRACT OF SALE EXECUTED BETWEEN IGNACIO E. RUBIO AND CORAZON L.
ESCUETA IS VALID.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS’
COUNTERCLAIMS.
Briefly, the issue is whether the contract of sale between petitioners and respondent is valid.
Petitioners argue, as follows:
First, the CA did not consider the circumstances surrounding petitioners’ failure to appear at the
pre-trial and to file the petition for relief on time.
As to the failure to appear at the pre-trial, there was fraud, accident and/or excusable neglect,
because petitioner Bayani was in the United States. There was no service of the notice of pre-trial
or order. Neither did the former counsel of record inform him. Consequently, the order declaring
him in default is void, and all subsequent proceedings, orders, or decision are void.
of Bayani at the pre-trial conference.
Second, the sale by Virginia to respondent is not binding. Petitioner Rubio did not authorize Virginia
to transact business in his behalf pertaining to the property. The Special Power of Attorney was
constituted in favor of Llamas, and the latter was not empowered to designate a substitute
attorney-in-fact. Llamas even disowned her signature appearing on the "Joint Special Power of
Attorney," which constituted Virginia as her true and lawful attorney-in-fact in selling Rubio’s
properties.
Dealing with an assumed agent, respondent should ascertain not only the fact of agency, but also
the nature and extent of the former’s authority. Besides, Virginia exceeded the authority for failing
to comply with her obligations under the "Joint Special Power of Attorney."
The amount encashed by Rubio represented not the down payment, but the payment of
respondent’s debt. His acceptance and encashment of the check was not a ratification of the
contract of sale.
Third, the contract between respondent and Virginia is a contract to sell, not a contract of sale. The
real character of the contract is not the title given, but the intention of the parties. They intended
to reserve ownership of the property to petitioners pending full payment of the purchase price.
Together with taxes and other fees due on the properties, these are conditions precedent for the
perfection of the sale. Even assuming that the contract is ambiguous, the same must be resolved
against respondent, the party who caused the same.
Fourth, Respondent failed to faithfully fulfill her part of the obligation. Thus, Rubio had the right to
sell his properties to Escueta who exercised due diligence in ascertaining ownership of the
properties sold to her. Besides, a purchaser need not inquire beyond what appears in a Torrens title.
The petition lacks merit. The contract of sale between petitioners and respondent is
valid.lawphil.net
Bayani Baloloy was represented by his attorney-in-fact, Alejandrino Baloloy. In the Baloloys’ answer
to the original complaint and amended complaint, the allegations relating to the personal
circumstances of the Baloloys are clearly admitted.
"An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case,
does not require proof."6 The "factual admission in the pleadings on record [dispenses] with the
need x x x to present evidence to prove the admitted fact."7 It cannot, therefore, "be controverted
by the party making such admission, and [is] conclusive"8 as to them. All proofs submitted by them
"contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored whether objection is interposed by a
party or not."9 Besides, there is no showing that a palpable mistake has been committed in their
admission or that no admission has been made by them.
Pre-trial is mandatory.10 The notices of pre-trial had been sent to both the Baloloys and their former
counsel of record. Being served with notice, he is "charged with the duty of notifying the party
represented by him."11 He must "see to it that his client receives such notice and attends the pre-
trial."12 What the Baloloys and their former counsel have alleged instead in their Motion to Lift
Order of As In Default dated December 11, 1991 is the belated receipt of Bayani Baloloy’s special
power of attorney in favor of their former counsel, not that they have not received the notice or
been informed of the scheduled pre-trial. Not having raised the ground of lack of a special power of
attorney in their motion, they are now deemed to have waived it. Certainly, they cannot raise it at
this late stage of the proceedings. For lack of representation, Bayani Baloloy was properly declared
in default.
Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. – A petition provided for in either of the
preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns
of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months
after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be
accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied
upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as
the case may be.
There is no reason for the Baloloys to ignore the effects of the above-cited rule. "The 60-day period
is reckoned from the time the party acquired knowledge of the order, judgment or proceedings and
not from the date he actually read the same."13 As aptly put by the appellate court:
The evidence on record as far as this issue is concerned shows that Atty. Arsenio Villalon, Jr., the
former counsel of record of the Baloloys received a copy of the partial decision dated June 23, 1993
on April 5, 1994. At that time, said former counsel is still their counsel of record. The reckoning of
the 60 day period therefore is the date when the said counsel of record received a copy of the partial
decision which was on April 5, 1994. The petition for relief was filed by the new counsel on July 4,
1994 which means that 90 days have already lapsed or 30 days beyond the 60 day period. Moreover,
the records further show that the Baloloys received the partial decision on September 13, 1993 as
evidenced by Registry return cards which bear the numbers 02597 and 02598 signed by Mr.
Alejandrino Baloloy.
The Baloloys[,] apparently in an attempt to cure the lapse of the aforesaid reglementary period to
file a petition for relief from judgment[,] included in its petition the two Orders dated May 6, 1994
and June 29, 1994. The first Order denied Baloloys’ motion to fix the period within which plaintiffs-
appellants pay the balance of the purchase price. The second Order refers to the grant of partial
execution, i.e. on the aspect of damages. These Orders are only consequences of the partial decision
subject of the petition for relief, and thus, cannot be considered in the determination of the
reglementary period within which to file the said petition for relief.
Furthermore, no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence exists in order that the petition
for relief may be granted.14 There is no proof of extrinsic fraud that "prevents a party from having a
trial x x x or from presenting all of his case to the court"15 or an "accident x x x which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against, and by reason of which the party applying has probably
been impaired in his rights."16 There is also no proof of either a "mistake x x x of law"17 or an
excusable negligence "caused by failure to receive notice of x x x the trial x x x that it would not be
necessary for him to take an active part in the case x x x by relying on another person to attend to
the case for him, when such other person x x x was chargeable with that duty x x x, or by other
circumstances not involving fault of the moving party."18
Article 1892 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1892. The agent may appoint a substitute if the principal has not prohibited him from doing so;
but he shall be responsible for the acts of the substitute:
(1) When he was not given the power to appoint one x x x.
Applying the above-quoted provision to the special power of attorney executed by Ignacio Rubio in
favor of his daughter Patricia Llamas, it is clear that she is not prohibited from appointing a
substitute. By authorizing Virginia Lim to sell the subject properties, Patricia merely acted within the
limits of the authority given by her father, but she will have to be "responsible for the acts of the
sub-agent,"19 among which is precisely the sale of the subject properties in favor of respondent.
Even assuming that Virginia Lim has no authority to sell the subject properties, the contract she
executed in favor of respondent is not void, but simply unenforceable, under the second paragraph
of Article 1317 of the Civil Code which reads:
"[A]ll the elements of a valid contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code are present, such
as: (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain in
money or its equivalent."26 Ignacio Rubio, the Baloloys, and their co-heirs sold their hereditary
shares for a price certain to which respondent agreed to buy and pay for the subject properties.
"The offer and the acceptance are concurrent, since the minds of the contracting parties meet in
the terms of the agreement."27

Art. 1317. x x x
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation,
or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or
impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other
contracting party.
Ignacio Rubio merely denies the contract of sale. He claims, without substantiation, that what he
received was a loan, not the down payment for the sale of the subject properties. His acceptance
and encashment of the check, however, constitute ratification of the contract of sale and "produce
the effects of an express power of agency."20 "[H]is action necessarily implies that he waived his
right of action to avoid the contract, and, consequently, it also implies the tacit, if not express,
confirmation of the said sale effected" by Virginia Lim in favor of respondent.
Similarly, the Baloloys have ratified the contract of sale when they accepted and enjoyed its
benefits. "The doctrine of estoppel applicable to petitioners here is not only that which prohibits a
party from assuming inconsistent positions, based on the principle of election, but that which
precludes him from repudiating an obligation voluntarily assumed after having accepted benefits
therefrom. To countenance such repudiation would be contrary to equity, and would put a premium
on fraud or misrepresentation."21
In fact, earnest money has been given by respondent. "[I]t shall be considered as part of the price
and as proof of the perfection of the contract.28 It constitutes an advance payment to "be deducted
from the total price."29
Article 1477 of the same Code also states that "[t]he ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred
to the vendee upon actual or constructive delivery thereof." 30 In the present case, there is actual
delivery as manifested by acts simultaneous with and subsequent to the contract of sale when
respondent not only took possession of the subject properties but also allowed their use as parking
terminal for jeepneys and buses. Moreover, the execution itself of the contract of sale is
constructive delivery.
Consequently, Ignacio Rubio could no longer sell the subject properties to Corazon Escueta, after
having sold them to respondent. "[I]n a contract of sale, the vendor loses ownership over the
property and cannot recover it until and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded x x x."31 The
records do not show that Ignacio Rubio asked for a rescission of the contract. What he adduced was
a belated revocation of the special power of attorney he executed in favor of Patricia Llamas. "In
the sale of immovable property, even though it may have been stipulated that upon failure to pay
the price at the time agreed upon the rescission of the contract shall of right take place, the vendee
may pay, even after the expiration of the period, as long as no demand for rescission of the contract
has been made upon him either judicially or by a notarial act."32

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
Indeed, Virginia Lim and respondent have entered into a contract of sale. Not only has the title to
G.R. CV No. 48282, dated
the subject properties passed to the latter upon delivery of the thing sold, but there is also no
stipulation in the contract that states the ownership is to be reserved in or "retained by the vendor
until full payment of the price."22 October 26, 1998 and January 11, 1999, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
Applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code, a second buyer of the property who may have had actual or
constructive knowledge of such defect in the seller’s title, or at least was charged with the obligation SO ORDERED.
to discover such defect, cannot be a registrant in good faith. Such second buyer cannot defeat the
first buyer’s title. In case a title is issued to the second buyer, the first buyer may seek reconveyance
of the property subject of the sale.23 Even the argument that a purchaser need not inquire beyond
what appears in a Torrens title does not hold water. A perusal of the certificates of title alone will
reveal that the subject properties are registered in common, not in the individual names of the
heirs.

Nothing in the contract "prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming
effective"24 or gives "the vendor the right to unilaterally resolve the contract the moment the buyer
fails to pay within a fixed period."25 Petitioners themselves have failed to deliver their individual
certificates of title, for which reason it is obvious that respondent cannot be expected to pay the
stipulated taxes, fees, and expenses.
CIVPRO – RULE 38 – REOPENING NOT ALLOWED
G.R. No. L-72138 January 22, 1990
SPS. FELICIDAD M. ALVENDIA and JESUS F. ALVENDIA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Third Judicial Region, Branch VIII, the PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF OF BULACAN, and BONIFACIO BONAMY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-72373 January 22, 1990
BONIFACIO BONAMY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS, in his capacity as Associate Appellate Justice and Chairman, HON.
VICENTE V. MENDOZA, in his capacity as Associate Appellate Justice and Member, and HON.
LUIS A. JAVELLANA, in his capacity as Associate Appellate Justice and Member of the Fourth
Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court; FELICIDAD M. ALVENDIA and JESUS
F. ALVENDIA, respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
In G.R. No. 72138, the spouses Felicidad M. Alvendia and Jesus F. Alvendia filed an urgent motion
for extension of time to file an appeal by certiorari from the denial of their motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) dismissing their
petition docketed therein as AC-G.R. No. SP-04423, entitled "Alvendia et al. v. Telan etc., et al."
In G.R. No. 72373, a petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed by Bonifacio Bonamy, seeking
to annul and set aside: [a] Resolution II dated September 11, 1985 granting the motion filed by the
spouses Alvendia to pay Bonifacio Bonamy the amount of the judgment in cash, and [b] Resolution
I dated October 8, 1985 denying Bonamy's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution
both issued by the Fourth Special Cases Division in said AC-G.R. No. SP-04423.
Although no appeal was ever filed in G.R. No. 72138, the same was ordered consolidated with G.R.
No. 72373 in the resolution of February 3, 1986 of the First Division of this Court.
The instant petitions trace their genesis to a simple collection suit, Civil Case No. 5182-M 1 filed on
September 12, 1977, by Bonifacio Bonamy against the spouses Jesus F. Alvendia and Felicidad M.
Alvendia before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bulacan, 5th Judicial District, Branch VI, for
the sum of P107,481.50 representing construction materials which the Alvendias had purchased on
credit from Bonamy.
After the Alvendias had filed a "Motion to Dismiss" dated October 31, 1977 which was opposed by
Bonamy on November 16, 1977 and an "Answer with Affirmative and Negative Defenses and
Counterclaim" dated December 1, 1977, both parties submitted to the trial court on January 6, 1978
a "Compromise Agreement" providing, among other things:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) That defendants do hereby acknowledge the in debtedness of their family corporation, Dona
Felisa Village and Housing Corporation, in the amount of P107,481.50, representing the cost of
construction materials bought on credit from plaintiff from June 20 to August 12, 1975 and jointly
with said family corporation, do hereby bind themselves to pay said obligation out of the first
release or releases of funds from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for housing
units and lots sold by the said corporation to members of the GSIS provided, however, that the
P47,000.00 previously assigned to Wells and Pu shall be first satisfied before applying such GSIS
release to satisfaction of said indebtedness to the herein plaintiff;
(2) That the plaintiff and defendants shall thereby join hands in asking the GSIS to expedite the
releases of the funds due to said corporation; and
(3) That for and in consideration of this agreement the plaintiff and defendants hereby waive any
and all further claims monetary or otherwise against each other regarding the subject matter of
this case.
xxx xxx xxx
On the same date, the trial court, finding the aforesaid compromise agreement not to be contrary
to laws, morals, good customs public policy and public order, approved and adopted the same as
the decision in the case. 3
Subsequently, Bonamy moved for execution of judgment, alleging that the Alvendias "have not
submitted any finished project with the GSIS, thereby preventing the full realization of the aforesaid
decision." 4
On December 6, 1979, over the objection of the Alvendias, the court ordered the issuance of the
writ prayed for. The Alvendias did not move for reconsideration nor did they elevate the matter to
the higher courts. 5
In a motion dated April 23,1980, Bonamy sought the issuance of an alias writ of execution, the first
writ having been returned unsatisfied. He admitted though in the same motion that he received
P20,000.00 in cash from the Alvendias sometime in January 1980 and an additional amount of
P4,000.00 by way of proceeds of the sale of the Alvendias vehicle. 6
Pursuant to the alias writ issued by the Court on May 2,1980, the Bulacan provincial sheriff levied
on the Alvendias "leasehold rights" over a fishpond (lease application no. V-1284 (EV-87) Lot I PSU-
141243), located at Baluarte, Bulacan, Bulacan.
On January 15, 1981, a certificate of sale over said leasehold right was executed by the Sheriff in
favor of Bonamy.
More than a year later, or on February 2, 1982, the spouses moved for the quashal and annulment
of the writ of execution, levy and sale.
A final deed of sale was executed on January 25, 1983 and registered with the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan on April 27, 1983.
In an order dated September 10, 1984, the trial court (now RTC of Bulacan, 3rd Judicial Region, Br.
VIII) denied the spouses' motion to quash and ordered instead the issuance of a writ of possession
in Bonamy's favor, thus:
Premises considered, the pending incidents are hereby resolved, as follows:
(1) The motion to quash or annul the writ of execution is hereby denied;
(2) The sale of the Toyota Land Cruiser is hereby declared null and void, consequently, let the
defendants be restored in the ownership and possession thereof;
(3) The levy and sale of the defendants' rights over Foreshore Lease Application No. V-1284 (EV-
87) Lot 1 PSU-141243 is hereby confirmed and declared valid, for which reason, let a writ of
possession of the said premises be issued forthwith.7
The records show that as per sheriffs return, possession of the fishpond was delivered to Bonamy
on October 8, 1984. 8
In a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court, (docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-04423)
the spouses Alvendias sought the annulment of the writ of execution, the levy made upon the
leasehold rights and the writ of possession.
In a nutshell, the spouses argued as follows:[1] that the writ and the alias writ of execution levied
upon properties not referred to in the judgment by compromise; [2] the writs made only the
Alvendias liable, when under the "agreement" their family corporation was also supposed to be
liable; [3] the writ was premature because the Compromise Agreement contained a condition which
had not yet been fulfilled, namely, the release of a loan from the GSIS; [4] the fishpond, owned by
the government though leased to the Alvendias, cannot be a proper subject of a levy on execution;
and [5] the leasehold rights possessed by the Alvendias had already expired before the issuance of
the order. 9
In its Decision dated February 27, 1985, the IAC dismissed the aforesaid petition. The pertinent
portion is hereunder quoted, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Firstly, we note that after the questioned writ of possession had been issued, no motion for
reconsideration was filed to give the respondent judge an opportunity to correct any error that
may have been committed.
Secondly, the orders complained of and which are attached to the petition are not certified true
copies, in violation of the requirements under the rules of court
Thirdly, the writ of execution could properly levy on the properties of the Alvendias because their
debt had already matured and remained unpaid despite demands. The judgment does not have
to indicate what specific properties should be levied upon.
Fourthly, there could be no execution against the family corporation because it was not a party
to the case, was not a party or signatory to the compromise agreement. Neither was it
represented by the Alvendias.
Fifthly, the issuance of the writs was not premature. There is nothing in the compromise
agreement which says that the release of the GSIS loan was a condition precedent to the payment
of the debt. True, there was an indication by the Alvendias as to where they would obtain the
needed financing, but this did not make the obtaining of the same a suspensive condition which
would give rise to the creation of their obligation. The obligation to pay was admittedly there —
even before any reference to the GSIS. Had they desired to make the fund release a condition
sine qua non words should have been used to that effect. Indeed, it is absurd to say that if the
GSIS would not release the money the Alvendias would be excused from the payment of their
acknowledged indebtedness.
Sixthly, it is not the fishpond that was levied upon but the leasehold rights of the Alvendias.
Seventhly, if it is really true that the lease had already expired before the writs were issued, this
is a matter that can be raised by the government, not the Alvendias who have already ceased to
become real parties in interest regarding the property.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is denied due course, and is hereby DISMISSED. The restraining
order previously issued is hereby lifted. 10
The Alvendias filed an urgent motion for reconsideration. Pending action thereon, the spouses
manifested to the court, thru motion, their willingness to immediately pay to Bonamy the remaining
balance of the judgment sought to be enforced, which they place at P 37,481.50, plus interests due
and/or any amount as the court may determine to be due (the said amount was reached by
deducting from the total sum of P107,481.50: P20,000.00, P4,000.00 representing the value of the
Toyota Land Cruiser and the further amount of P46,000.00 representing the actual value of the
Toyota Land Cruiser minus the amount of P4,000.00 allegedly realized from the execution sale
thereof). 11
On September 11, 1985, the IAC issued two resolutions, denominated as Resolutions I and II.
Resolution I denied the Alvendias' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, without prejudice
to what was stated in Resolution II hereunder.
Resolution II granted their motion to satisfy the judgment sought to be enforced in cash thereby
directing the parties to submit to the court an agreement duly signed by both parties regarding full
satisfaction of the judgment but only after the total amount involved in said judgment had been
tendered and delivered to Bonamy. 12
The Alvendias then tendered payment to Bonamy in the form of a cashier's check in the amount of
P100,000.00. 13 Bonamy refused said tender of payment, and instead moved for a reconsideration
of Resolution II.
In the meantime, the spouses moved for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to prevent
or stop the allegedly unjust enforcement of the questioned writ of execution/possession and to
prevent the sheriff and Bonamy and all persons acting under them from entering and encroaching
on the fishpond area.
On October 2, 1985, the IAC restrained Bonamy and his corespondents therein from enforcing the
questioned Writ of Execution/Possession issued in Civil Case No. 5182-M, as well as from entering
and encroaching further into the subject fishpond. 14
Bonamy moved for the lifting of that order on the averment, among others, that the acts sought to
be restrained had already been executed, Bonamy having been placed in possession on October 8,
1984 by Deputy Sheriff Rufino I. Santiago of Bulacan by virtue of the Writ of Possession issued in
Civil Case No. 5182-M. 15
In an urgent motion for extension of time to file appeal by certiorari (from respondent court's order
denying their motion for reconsideration) spouses Alvendias elevated their case to this Tribunal,
docketed as G.R. No. 72138. Such motion was granted by the Court. A second motion was, however,
denied. Hence, no petition was filed in G.R. No. 72138.
On October 8,1985, the IAC issued three resolutions embodied in a single document: Resolution I—
denying Bonamy's motion for reconsideration; II—ordering him to comment on the motion for
Deposit filed by the Alvendias; III—ordering the spouses to comment on the Manifestation and
Motion to lift restraining order filed by Bonamy.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying for the annulment of respondent court's
Resolution II of September 11, 1985 and its Resolution I of October 8, 1985, filed with this Court on
October 21, 1985 by Bonamy and docketed as G.R. No. 72373.
As earlier stated, on February 3, 1986, notwithstanding the Alvendias failure to file a petition in G.R.
No. 72138, the Court resolved to consolidate the two cases, namely, G.R. Nos. 72138 and 72373, in
the resolution of February 3, 1986, of the First Division of this Court. 16
On February 24, 1986, Bonamy, as private respondent in G.R. No. 72138, filed a manifestation that
since the Alvendias did not file their petition in said case, the proceeding should be ordered
dismissed and that entry of the IAC judgment be ordered.
Upon the Alvendias' failure to comply with the court's order to comment on the aforementioned
manifestation, this Court issued a "show cause" resolution to the spouses.
Pleading absolute good faith and honesty and attributing failure to file the required comment to
the confusing circumstances engendered by the issued resolutions (denying respondents' motion
for reconsideration but granting their motion to satisfy judgment in cash) the Alvendias prayed the
Court to consider instead their urgent petition (to extend time to file appeal) as their sufficient
appeal, anchoring their entreaty on Bonamy's petition which is also pending in this Court and which
has, anyway, opened the entire case for review. This explanation and manifestation of counsel for
private respondents was noted in the resolution of October 15, 1986 of the Second Division of this
Court where this case was eventually referred.*
The petition in G.R. No. 72373 is impressed with merit. The pivotal issue in this case is whether or
not the judgment debtors may successfully ask that they be allowed to pay the judgment debt in
cash long after they have failed to pay or redeem their properties which have been sold in execution.
Bonamy puts forward the averment that respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion in
granting the Alvendias' motion that they be allowed to pay the judgment debt in cash.
He anchors his contention on the fact that there having been a valid levy and sale on execution of
the Alvendias' leasehold rights over the fishpond in question, there is no longer any money
judgment to be satisfied.
He maintains the position that all the questioned writs herein as well as the questioned orders have
already been found by respondent IAC to be proper and legal and had in fact dismissed the petition
of the Alvendias in its decision of February 27, 1985. Since then, he has been in ownership and
possession of the disputed fishpond in Baluarte, Bulacan, and has been exercising all the acts of
possession with respect to the same. 17
Hence, petitioner claims that the assailed resolutions are in effect [a] an annulment of the assailed
Orders and Writs of the Bulacan Regional Trial Court, the Certificate of Sale and the Final Deed of
Sale of the Leasehold Rights over the Foreshore Lands; [b] an extension of the Alvendias' period to
redeem the leasehold rights over said land; and [c] orders directing Bonamy and the Alvendias to
enter into a contract of sale over said leasehold rights for the price of the judgment debt embodied
in the Compromise Agreement. 18
Verily, it is unrefuted that the writs and orders of the lower court sought to be annulled or at least
reopened are already final and executory and in fact already executed.
The judgment which was executed was a compromise judgment, duly approved by the court and
therefore, final and immediately executory. 19 Bonamy was clearly entitled to execution since the
Alvendias failed to pay on time the judgment. Hence, the Bulacan Court ordered the execution
thereof on December 9, 1979. 20
The compromise judgment against the Alvendias had been duly and legally executed and fully
satisfied as of January 15,1981 in accordance with Section 15 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court when
the Bulacan Sheriff levied on the Alvendias foreshore leasehold rights by selling the same and paying
the judgment creditor Bonamy. The Alvendias had one year within which to redeem said property
rights but they failed to do so. Hence, the Sheriff issued the Final Deed of Sale on January 25, 1983.
As above stated, on certiorari and prohibition in CA-G.R. No. SP-04423, all these orders and writs,
taken up one by one by the Intermediate Appellate Court were found to be legal and proper for
which reason, the petition was dismissed in the decision of February 27, 1985.
In this Court, private respondents moved for extension of time to file a petition for review in G.R.
No. 72138 but failed to file the same, thereby foreclosing their right to appeal.
In any event, it is axiomatic that there is no justification in law and in fact for the reopening of a case
which has long become final and which has in fact been executed. 21 Time and again this Court has
said that the doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental consideration of public
policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error the judgments of courts must become
final at some definite date fixed by law. 22
On the other hand, the Alvendias invoke equity and aver that the IAC acted correctly in granting
their motion to pay the balance of the judgment indebtedness in view of highly exceptional
circumstances such as the supposedly grossly fraudulent irregularities committed by Bonamy and
the Special Sheriff of Bulacan.
It is a settled rule, however, that said Special Sheriff is under the control and supervision of the trial
court which issued the assailed writ of execution to the exclusion of other courts. Accordingly, the
court which rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control over its process of execution
and this power carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and law which may be
involved in the execution. 23 But as earlier stated, private respondents neither moved for
reconsideration of the December 6, 1979 order of the trial court directing the issuance of the writ
of execution, nor appealed the same to the higher courts.
In any event, the Alvendias cannot invoke equity as a ground for reopening the case and making the
payment of the judgment in cash possible. The records show that they had all the opportunity to
make such payments on four occasions but failed. These are: [1] from the time they got the building
and construction materials worth P107,461.50 from the petitioner (from June 26 to August 12,
1975) up to the time they agreed to a compromise agreement on January 6, 1978; [2] from the
compromise judgment to the time execution was ordered by the respondent court (Order dated
December 6, 1979); [3] from the Execution Order to the Execution Sale (on January 15, 1981); and
[4] from the Execution Sale up to the end of the redemption period, finally ending in the Final Deed
of Sale. 24
There is no question therefore, that the Alvendias failed to pay on time the judgment of which the
execution sale was a necessary consequence. They also failed to redeem the property within the
required period despite the fact that the Final Deed of Sale was issued only on January 25, 1983,
long past the aforesaid period; undeniably showing a lack of intention or capability to pay the same.
Instead the offer to pay the judgment in cash was first made by private respondents Alvendias on
April 23, 1985 or two months after the decision of respondent Appellate Court on February 27, 1985
and more than two years after the redemption period had elapsed. More importantly, the offer was
made after Bonamy had introduced improvements on the property worth one million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) as evidenced by irrefutable proof. Of course, the Alvendias claim the same amount
as the value of the fishpond presumably before execution but such claim besides having been raised
only on appeal, specifically after the promulgation of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court on February 27, 1985, is unsupported by evidence on record. On the contrary, petitioner
Bonamy's pictures of the leased premises before and after he took possession of the same belie
said claim of private respondents. 25
As insisted upon by petitioner, the money judgment against the Alvendias has already been satisfied
and there is no more need to pay, in cash or otherwise. Hence, as ruled by this Court, when
judgment has been satisfied, the same passes beyond review, for satisfaction thereof is the last act
and end of the proceedings. Payment produces permanent and irrevocable discharge. 26
On the other hand, equity has been aptly described as "a justice outside legality"; winch is applied
only in the absence of and never against statutory law or as in this case, judicial rules of procedure.
27 The rule is "equity follows the law" but where a particular remedy is given by the law and that
remedy is bounded and circumscribed by particular rules, it would be very improper, for the court
to take it up where the law leaves it and to extend it further than the law allows. 28 There may be a
moral obligation but if there is no enforceable legal duty, the action for reconveyance must fail. 29
Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to
disregard them. Equitable reasons will not control against any well-settled rule of law or public
policy. 30
Moreover, it is oft repeated that "He who comes into Equity must come with clean hands." 31 At this
stage, to allow private respondents to pay in cash the balance of the judgment account for which
they offered P100,000.00 to redeem the property on which petitioner has spent one million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) in terms of improvements introduced would be less than fair. If equity is to be
applied at all, it should be applied for the benefit of the petitioner. Thus, this Court in applying equity
jurisprudence in a partition case, ruled that improvements introduced on the property by one who
necessarily and in good faith improved the same and enhanced its value at his own cost, should be
taken into account under the familiar principle that "one who seeks equity must do equity." 32
In resume, the Alvendias, after having allowed the period of redemption to lapse without availing
themselves of the same, and after petitioner had introduced improvements on the property at the
latter's expense, cannot now be allowed to redeem the property sold to the latter thru the
expediency of a motion or manifestation.
As to other matters, there appears to be no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions
of the Intermediate Appellate Court in its decision of February 27, 1985 which has become final and
executory when the Alvendias failed to file their contemplated petition for review on certiorari in
G.R. No. 72138. It has been held that failure to perfect an appeal renders the lower court's judgment
final and executory and a modification of such judgment by the appellate court cannot be allowed.
Furthermore, an appellee who is not also an appellant may also assign errors in his brief where his
purpose is to maintain the judgment on other grounds, but he may not do so if his purpose is to
have the judgment modified or reversed, for, in such case, he must appeal. 33
However, where there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion
of the decision, in this case in the questioned "Writ of Possession" issued by the trial court, where
the twenty-three (23) hectare foreshore land (23.467 hec.), described in the Sheriffs Certificate of
Sale and Final Deed of Sale 34 became a forty-hectare foreshore land (40.63 hec.), 35 it has been held
that this Court may clarify such ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment had become
final. 36
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolutions are hereby SET ASIDE and the decision dismissing the
Alvendias' petition is AFFIRMED save that portion upholding the validity of the writ of possession
which contained an error in property description. Hence, the writ of possession is hereby AMENDED
to conform to the description appearing in the Certificate of Sale and the Final Deed of Sale. Let the
restraining order issued by the Intermediate Appellate Court on October 2, 1985 relative to the
enforcement of said writ be lifted accordingly.
Petitioner is hereby ordered to return to private respondents, the amount of P12,518.50 pesos,
which amount represents the difference between the execution price of P100,000.00 and P
87,481.50, the latter amount having been arrived at by deducting P20,000.00 from the total amount
of indebtedness which is P107,481.50. 37
In G.R. No. 72138, the petition for review on certiorari of Resolution I of the Intermediate Appellate
Court denying private respondents' motion for reconsideration of its decision of February 27, 1985,
not having been filed, entry of judgment of aforesaid decision may now be made by said Appellate
Court.
SO ORDERED.