NATRES CASE DIGEST If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of

the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-
Magallona v. Ermita (Case Digest) based rights.

In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the
Philippines was enacted – the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was
meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they
contend, among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the
Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments are
as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary
treaties – this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as
“archipelagic” waters which, in international law, opens our waters landward of the
baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts
(overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening
the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of
relevant constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough
Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a “regime of islands” pursuant to UNCLOS results in
the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence
fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is
not a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing
to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory.
What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international
law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the
execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting
statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental
shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it.
Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the
rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994
square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the
exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210 sq.
na. mi. (See image below for comparison) Anent their particular contentions:
a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of
Section 2 of RA 9522:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the
baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North
Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty.
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as “archipelagic waters” and that we may term it
as our “internal waters”, but the bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty
over these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due to our
observance of international law, we allow the exercise of others of their right of
innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely
forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international
law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratly’s), as well as the Scarborough Shoal,
as a regime of islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and
under the baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they generate their own
maritime zones – in short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines of the
main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is because if we do
that, then we will be enclosing a larger area which would already depart from the
provisions of UNCLOS – that the demarcation should follow the natural contour of
the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal
through effective occupation.
NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones
where we exercise treaty-based rights:
a. territorial waters – 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise
sovereignty
b. contiguous zone – 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can
enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone – 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have
the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic
zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf – this is covered by
Article 77 of the UNCLOS.
MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011
Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the
sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended
by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of
baselines around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III
of 1984. The requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize
the location of some basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime
of islands’.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;
2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence
undermining our sovereignty and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim
over those territories.
Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?
Ruling:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a
codified norm that regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a
baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting
points to measure. it merely notices the international community of the scope of our
maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation
designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes
passages. but in the absence of such, international law norms operate.
the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not
place them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a
customary international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid
such passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046
and in fact, it increased the Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover, the itself
commits the Phils.’ continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from
the general configuration of the archipelago’.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.
KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach the
rules: that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.
HILARION M. HENARES, JR., et al. vs. LAND TRANSPORTATION
FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD (LTFRB devotions) et al.
G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006
FACTS
Citing statistics from National and International agencies, petitioners prayed for a
writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use
compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Petitioners allege that the
particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid
droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various engine
combustions – have caused detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure
and the overall quality of life. In addition, they allege that with the continuing high
demand for motor vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are likely to remain the
major sources of harmful emissions. They cited studies showing that vehicular
emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive
pulmonary diseases (COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among jeepney
drivers; and that the children in Metro Manila showed more compromised
pulmonary function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are
mostly due to the emissions of PUVs.
Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition
for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an
alternative fuel, lie in Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution, in Oposa v.
Factoran, Jr. and Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the
“Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999.”
Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the government
agencies clothed with power to regulate and control motor vehicles, particularly
PUVs, and with the same agencies’ awareness and knowledge that the PUVs emit
dangerous levels of air pollutants, then, the responsibility to see that these are curbed
falls under respondents’ functions and a writ of mandamus should issue against
them.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General said that the respondent government
agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB, are not in a position to compel the PUVs to
use CNG as alternative fuel. He explained that the function of the DOTC is limited
to implementing the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said
law only goes as far as setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but it
does not recognize CNG as alternative engine fuel. He recommended that the
petition should be addressed to Congress for it to come up with a policy that would
compel the use of CNG as alternative fuel.
ISSUES
1. Whether the respondent is the agency responsible to implement the
suggested alternative of requiring public utility vehicles to use compressed
natural gas (cng)
2. Whether the respondent can be compelled to require public utility vehicles
to use compressed natural gas through a writ of mandamus
RULING
1. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically
enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the
respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to
use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5
(ii), Section 4 “to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public
Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the
results of the DOTC surveys.”
In addition, under the Clean Air Act, it is the DENR that is tasked to set the emission
standards for fuel use and the task of developing an action plan. As far as motor
vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the line agency whose
mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the
emission standards for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.
2. No. Petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable
legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus
compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. The legislature
should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex
environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial
recourse by mandamus is taken.
In addition, the petition had been mooted by the issuance of Executive Order No.
290, which implemented a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. The court
was assured that the implementation for a cleaner environment is being addressed.

Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents.
The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati,
Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against
defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a
distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber
License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the
relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by
the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and
asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of
contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by
law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental
legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in
Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to
refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the
judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O.
192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible
for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and
conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is
also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which
will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and
functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent)
to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and
advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with
grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology.
Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed
or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the
expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule
upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to
declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the
state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly
withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The
granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract
is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must
yield to the police power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC
decision is SET ASIDE.
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, JR
G.R. NO. 101083. 224 SCRA 792 July 30, 1993
OPOSA et al, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondents.
Facts:
The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective
parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network,
Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the
purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The petitioners alleged the respondent,
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), continued approval of the Timber
License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous commercial logging companies to cut and
deforest the remaining forests of the country. Petitioners request the defendant, his
agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:
 Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
 Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued
and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may
be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This act of defendant constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust
for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. Plaintiff have
exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant’s office. On March 2,
1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits
in the country. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s to
the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
Issues:
 Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial
power of the Court.
 Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is
provided by law.
 Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing violates the
requirements of due process.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
 The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the
Court.
1. The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice
Davide, Jr. precisely identified in his opinion the requisites for a
case to be subjected for the judicial review by the Court.
According to him, the subject matter of the complaint is of
common interest, making this civil case a class suit and proving
the existence of an actual controversy. He strengthens this
conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the
1987 Constitution.
2. The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their personality
to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based
on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and
harmony of nature.” Nature means the created world in its
entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal
and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.
3. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of
their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time,
the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of
that right for the generations to come.
 The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the
plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right
 involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is
replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.
1. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right
— the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the
first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the
1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
1. This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the
preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.
1. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under
the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of
Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need
not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from
the inception of humankind.
 The Court are not persuaded by the trial court’s pronouncement.
1. The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his motion to
dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, Justice
Feliciano would have acted with utmost infidelity to the
Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and
advantages to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said
licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of
changes in policy and the demands of public interest and
welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of
the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides that
when the national interest so requires, the President may amend,
modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit,
licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein .
2. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive
action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested
by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of
respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 was set aside.
The petitioners amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or
grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
Felipe Ysmael, etc vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, etc
October 18, 1990
Petitioner sought the reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau
of Forest Development which cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as well
as the revocation of TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to private
respondents in 1984 by sending letters to the Office of the President and the MNR
[now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Petitioner’s
prayers were to no avail. Hence the petition in the Court, imputing grave abuse of
discretion to public respondents.
RULING:
The Court stressed the authority of administrative bodies to handle matters within
there scope without need of interference by the courts of law. These administrative
bodies are deemed to be in better positions to determine issues within their specialty
and resolve the same. The Court cited the doctrine of res judicata which avers that
the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force
and binding effect of a final judgment. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the
reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting within their
exclusive jurisdiction
The Court also held that the assailed orders by public respondent was in line with the
latter’s duty to develop and conserve the country’s natural resources in view of the
constitutional mandate of the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. It is their duty to regulate the
issuance of licenses (TLA) as they see fit, which the court cannot interfere with. The
Court further held that sans grave abuse of discretion which may be imputed to
public respondents, the court ruled that petitioner cannot seek affirmative relief.
(THIS IS 1906 CASE NOT 1909 IN THE SYLLABUS)
MATEO CARIÑO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT
G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906
FACTS: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cariňo went to the Court of Land Registration to
petition his inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare land he’s been possessing in the
then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information and no
other documentation. The State opposed the petition averring that the land is part of
the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed.
Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of
immemorial use and occupation as in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez & Tiglao
vs Government.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his
possession of it for some time.
HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The
government is still the absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further,
Mateo’s possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the
presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used
for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and
since the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by the petitioner
for any purpose.
While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he
proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he
must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from
them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute owner.
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian
Doctrine
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus
as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of
1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners
assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to
an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as
well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the
IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the
natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural
resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by
the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains
merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are
found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same
time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the
public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title,
which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant
from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of
their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right
to alienate the same.
Facts:
Petitioners view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants
ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples. They argue that IPRA and
its implementing rules will amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State's
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources, in violation of the regalian doctrine of the Constitution.
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
"ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands
found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these
provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral
but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination."
They contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over
executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting
remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Notes:
Puno: "When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it
introduced radical concepts into the Philippine legal system which appear to collide
with settled constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of land and other
natural resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated without
considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion
attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of our
history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfil the
constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural communities' right to
their ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice to
our indigenous people."
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or
indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants
these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral
lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership given is the
indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to
native title.
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people
or homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an organized community
on communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of people have actually
occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under claim of ownership since
time immemorial. They share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and
other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social and
cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became
historically differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include
descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or
colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and
political institutions but who may have been displaced from their traditional
territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.
To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier
proposed a bill based on two postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the
principle of parens patriae.
"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas
generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and
natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by
ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since
time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government
projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social
and cultural welfare.
b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed
and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs
since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest,
under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the
present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force,
deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary
dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, including,
but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, widen
farms and tree lots."
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be
acquired in two modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or
(2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with
respect to ancestral lands only.
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a
claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed
never to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held
that way since before the Spanish Conquest.
Article 12
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The
exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such
activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.
The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by
Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general
terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall
promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance
with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain
may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be
devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.
Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.
Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire
not more than twelve hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development,
and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by
law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held,
or leased and the conditions therefor.
Section 4. The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine, by law, the specific
limits of forest lands and national parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the
ground. Thereafter, such forest lands and national parks shall be conserved and may
not be increased nor diminished, except by law. The Congress shall provide for such
period as it may determine, measures to prohibit logging in endangered forests and
watershed areas.
Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural
well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing
property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral
domain.
Section 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall
contribute to the common good. Individuals and private groups, including
corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall have the right
to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises, subject to the duty of the State
to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands.
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Province of North Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga Del Norte, City of Iligan,
City of Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat,
City of Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon, Intervenors Franklin Drilon and
Adel Tamano and Sec. Mar Roxas
-vs-
Ermita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura Administrator
National Mapping & Resource Information Authority and Davide Jr. and
respondents in intervention Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and
Development and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc.,
Facts:
Subject of this case is the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD) which is scheduled to be signed by the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines and the MILF in August 05, 2008. Five cases bearing the same
subject matter were consolidated by this court namely:-
 GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato and Vice Governor Pinol on its
prayer to declare unconstitutional and to have the MOA-AD disclosed to
the public and be open for public consultation.
 GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et al on its prayer to declare null
and void said MOA-AD and to exclude the city to the BJE.
  GR 183893 by the City of Iligan enjoining the respondents from signing
the MOA-AD and additionally impleading Exec. Sec. Ermita.
 GR 183951 by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al, praying to
declare null and void the MOA-AD and without operative effect and those
respondents enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.
 GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and Pimentel III, praying for a judgment
prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing
and executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived
therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being
unconstitutional and illegal and impleading Iqbal.
The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements entered into by and between
the government and the MILF starting in 1996; then in 1997, they signed the
Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities; and the following year, they signed
the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. However, in
1999 and in the early of 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in
Central Mindanao. In March 2000, they took the hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte; hence, then Pres. Estrada declared an all-out war-which tolled the peace
negotiation. It was when then Pres. Arroyo assumed office, when the negotiation
regarding peace in Mindanao continued. MILF was hesitant; however, this
negotiation proceeded when the government of Malaysia interceded. Formal peace
talks resumed and MILF suspended all its military actions. The Tripoli Agreement in
2001 lead to the ceasefire between the parties. After the death of MILF Chairman
Hashim and Iqbal took over his position, the crafting of MOA-AD in its final form
was born.
 MOA-AD Overview
This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and the MILF. Used as reference in
the birth of this MOA-AD are the Tripoli Agreement, organic act of ARMM, IPRA
Law, international laws such as ILO Convention 169, the UN Charter etc., and the
principle of Islam i.e compact right entrenchment (law of compact, treaty and order).
The body is divided into concepts and principles, territory, resources, and
governance.
Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition of Bangsamoro as all
indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. These people have the
right to self- governance of their Bangsamoro homeland to which they have
exclusive ownership by virtue of their prior rights of occupation in the land. The
MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First Nation' with
defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of
amity and commerce with foreign nations." It then mentions for the first time the
"Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction
over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.
As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-
Sulu-Palawan geographic region, involving the present ARMM, parts of which are
those which voted in the inclusion to ARMM in a plebiscite. The territory is divided
into two categories, “A” which will be subject to plebiscite not later than 12 mos.
after the signing and “B” which will be subject to plebiscite 25 years from the
signing of another separate agreement. Embodied in the MOA-AD that the BJE shall
have jurisdiction over the internal waters-15kms from the coastline of the BJE
territory; they shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE
internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east
and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the
BJE and the government shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management
over all natural resources. There will also be sharing of minerals in the territorial
waters; but no provision on the internal waters.
Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to enter into any
economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the
option to establish trade missions in those countries, as well as environmental
cooperation agreements, but not to include aggression in the GRP. The external
defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the government. The BJE
shall have participation in international meetings and events" like those of the
ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled to
participate in Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of
border agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing
of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the
islands forming part of the ancestral domain. The BJE shall also have the right to
explore its resources and that the sharing between the Central Government and the
BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the
BJE. And they shall have the right to cancel or modify concessions and TLAs.
And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship between the
GRP and MILF is associative i.e. characterized by shared authority and
responsibility. This structure of governance shall be further discussed in the
Comprehensive Compact, a stipulation which was highly contested before the court.
The BJE shall also be given the right to build, develop and maintain its own
institutions, the details of which shall be discussed in the comprehensive compact as
well.
Issues:
1. WON the petitions have complied with the procedural requirements for the
exercise of judicial review
2. WON respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public
consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later initialed the
MOA-AD; and
3. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated the Constitution and the laws
Ruling:
The SC declared the MOA-AD contrary to law and the Constitution.
 On the Procedural Issue
1st issue: As regards the procedural issue, SC upheld that there is indeed a need for
the exercise of judicial review.
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversy, that is the
court will decline on issues that are hypothetical, feigned problems or mere
academic questions. Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is
the requirement of ripeness. The contention of the SolGen is that there is no issue
ripe for adjudication since the MOA-AD is only a proposal and does not
automatically create legally demandable rights and obligations. Such was denied.
The SC emphasized that the petitions are alleging acts made in violation of their
duty or in grave abuse of discretion. Well-settled jurisprudence states that acts made
by authority which exceed their authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3
and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie
case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or controversy
ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact
the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. This is aside from the fact that concrete
acts made under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy
ripe and that the law or act in question as not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
With regards to the locus standi, the court upheld the personalities of the Province of
Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga del norte, City of Iligan, City of Zamboanga,
petitioners in intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and
Municipality of Linnamon to have locus standi since it is their LGUs which will be
affected in whole or in part if include within the BJE. Intervenors Franklin Drilon
and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government
funds would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional
plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal
standing. Senator Mar Roxas is also given a standing as an intervenor. And lastly,
the Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and
Development, an advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace and
prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a
non-government organization of Muslim lawyers since they stand to be benefited or
prejudiced in the resolution of the petitions regarding the MOA-AD.
On the contention of mootness of the issue considering the signing of the MOA-AD
has already been suspended and that the President has already disbanded the GRP,
the SC disagrees. The court reiterates that the moot and academic principle is a
general rule only, the exceptions, provided in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, that it
will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and
paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
(d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review; and that where there is a
voluntary cessation of the activity complained of by the defendant or doer, it does
not divest the court the power to hear and try the case especially when the plaintiff is
seeking for damages or injunctive relief.
Clearly, the suspension of the signing of the MOA-AD and the disbandment of the
GRP did not render the petitions moot and academic. The MOA-AD is subject to
further legal enactments including possible Constitutional amendments more than
ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating
entity.
At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions.
There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners will again be subjected to the same
problem in the future as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in another or
any form. But with respect to the prayer of Mandamus to the signing of the MOA-
AD, such has become moot and academic considering that parties have already
complied thereat.
 On the Substantive Issue
2nd Issue: The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, involving
as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects
the lives of the public at large.
As enshrined in the Constitution, the right to information guarantees the right of the
people to demand information, and integrated therein is the recognition of the duty
of the officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The policy of public
disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in
a genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is
a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions
are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public
officials at all times accountable to the people.
Also, it was held that such stipulation in the Constitution is self-executory with
reasonable safeguards —the effectivity of which need not await the passing of a
statute. Hence, it is essential to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the
State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.
The idea of a feedback mechanism was also sought for since it is corollary to the
twin rights to information and disclosure. And feedback means not only the conduct
of the plebiscite as per the contention of the respondents. Clearly, what the law
states is the right of the petitioners to be consulted in the peace agenda as corollary
to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. As such, respondent
Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion for failing to carry out the furtive
process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in
excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
arbitrary and despotic exercise thereto. Moreover, he cannot invoke of executive
privilege because he already waived it when he complied with the Court’s order to
the unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD.
In addition, the LGU petitioners has the right to be involved in matters related to
such peace talks as enshrined in the State policy. The MOA-AD is one peculiar
program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the
Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora
or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
With respect to the ICC/IPPs they also have the right to participate fully at all levels
on decisions that would clearly affect their lives, rights and destinies. The MOA-
AD is an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, hence it should have observed
the free and prior informed consent to the ICC/IPPs; but it failed to do so. More
specially noted by the court is the excess in authority exercised by the respondent—
since they allowed delineation and recognition of ancestral domain claim by mere
agreement and compromise; such power cannot be found in IPRA or in any law to
the effect.
3rd issue: With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question
that they cannot be all accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Not
only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them:
 On matters of the Constitution.
Association as the type of relationship governing between the parties. The
parties manifested that in crafting the MOA-AD, the term association was
adapted from the international law. In international law, association happens
when two states of equal power voluntarily establish durable links i.e. the one
state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, principal,
while maintaining its international status as state; free association is a middle
ground between integration and independence. The MOA-AD contains many
provisions that are consistent with the international definition of association
which fairly would deduced that the agreement vest into the BJE a status of an
associated state, or at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The court
vehemently objects because the principle of association is not recognized under
the present Constitution.
 On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state. The concept implies power
beyond what the Constitution can grant to a local government; even the
ARMM do not have such recognition; and the fact is such concept implies
recognition of the associated entity as a state. There is nothing in the law
that contemplate any state within the jurisdiction other than the Philippine
State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare
any part of Philippine territory for independence. The court disagrees with
the respondent that the MOA-AD merely expands the ARMM. BJE is a
state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the
Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other
states. As such the MOA-AD clearly runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
  On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The territory included in the
BJE includes those areas who voted in the plebiscite for them to become
part of the ARMM. The stipulation of the respondents in the MOA-AD
that these areas need not participate in the plebiscite is in contrary to the
express provision of the Constitution. The law states that that "[t]he
creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for
the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region." Clearly, assuming that the BJE is just an expansion of the
ARMM, it would still run afoul the wordings of the law since those
included in its territory are areas which voted in its inclusion to the
ARMM and not to the BJE.
 On the powers vested in the BJE as an entity. The respondents contend
that the powers vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD shall be within sub-
paragraph 9 of sec 20, art. 10 of the constitution and that a mere passage of
a law is necessary in order to vest in the BJE powers included in the
agreement. The Court was not persuaded. SC ruled that such conferment
calls for amendment of the Constitution; otherwise new legislation will not
concur with the Constitution. Take for instance the treaty making power
vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD. The Constitution is clear that only the
President has the sole organ and is the country’s sole representative with
foreign nation. Should the BJE be granted with the authority to negotiate
with other states, the former provision must be amended
consequently. Section 22 must also be amended—the provision of the law
that promotes national unity and development. Because clearly,
associative arrangement of the MOA-AD does not epitomize national
unity but rather, of semblance of unity. The associative ties between the
BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine
territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a
preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.
 On matters of domestic statutes.
o Provisions contrary to the organic act of ARMM. RA 9054 is a bar to the
adoption of the definition of Bangsamoro people used in the MOA-AD. Said law
specifically distinguishes between the Bangsamoro people and the Tribal peoples
that is contrary with the definition of the MOA-AD which includes all indigenous
people of Mindanao.
o Provisions contrary to the IPRA law. Also, the delineation and recognition of the
ancestral domain is a clear departure from the procedure embodied in the IPRA law
which ironically is the term of reference of the MOA-AD.
 On matters of international law.
The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principle of international law as part
of the law of the land. In international law, the right to self-determination has long
been recognized which states that people can freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. There are the
internal and external self-determination—internal, meaning the self-pursuit of man
and the external which takes the form of the assertion of the right to unilateral
secession. This principle of self-determination is viewed with respect accorded to
the territorial integrity of existing states. External self-determination is only afforded
in exceptional cases when there is an actual block in the meaningful exercise of the
right to internal self-determination. International law, as a general rule, subject only
to limited and exceptional cases, recognizes that the right of disposing national
territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every state.
On matters relative to indigenous people, international law states that indigenous
peoples situated within states do not have a general right to independence or
secession from those states under international law, but they do have rights
amounting to what was discussed above as the right to internal self-determination;
have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal
and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous
functions; have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
Clearly, there is nothing in the law that required the State to guarantee the
indigenous people their own police and security force; but rather, it shall be the
State, through police officers, that will provide for the protection of the people. With
regards to the autonomy of the indigenous people, the law does not obligate States to
grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of a state; since it would
impair the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states.
  On the basis of the suspensive clause.
o It was contented by the respondents that grave abuse of discretion cannot be had,
since the provisions assailed as unconstitutional shall not take effect until the
necessary changes to the legal framework are effected.
The Court is not persuaded. This suspensive clause runs contrary to Memorandum of
Instructions from the President stating that negotiations shall be conducted in
accordance to the territorial integrity of the country—such was negated by the
provision on association incorporated in the MOA-AD. Apart from this, the
suspensive clause was also held invalid because of the delegated power to the GRP
Peace panel to advance peace talks even if it will require new legislation or even
constitutional amendments. The legality of the suspensive clause hence hinges on
the query whether the President can exercise such power as delegated by EO No.3 to
the GRP Peace Panel. Well settled is the rule that the President cannot delegate a
power that she herself does not possess. The power of the President to conduct peace
negotiations is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but is rather implied
from her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-chief. As Chief Executive,
the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as
Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress
rebellion and lawless violence.
As such, the President is given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace
negotiations, solutions that may require changes to the Constitution for their
implementation. At all event, the president may not, of course, unilaterally
implement the solutions that she considers viable; but she may not be prevented
from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is
minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional
amendment and revision.
While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be
exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through
initiative and referendum - she may submit proposals for constitutional change to
Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers.
Clearly, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of conducting
peace negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those policies that
require changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them
without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body
were assumed as a certainty. The President’s power is limited only to the
preservation and defense of the Constitution but not changing the same but simply
recommending proposed amendments or revisions.
o The Court ruled that the suspensive clause is not a suspensive condition but is a
term because it is not a question of whether the necessary changes to the legal
framework will take effect; but, when. Hence, the stipulation is mandatory for the
GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework –which changes would include
constitutional amendments. Simply put, the suspensive clause is inconsistent with
the limits of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, it being
a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points" found
in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down as unconstitutional.
 On the concept underlying the MOA-AD.
While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral
declaration binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of
guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders
the MOA-AD fatally defective. The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind
the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost
consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself,
sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact
that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within
a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign
Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution.Upholding such an act
would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process
of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the
amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.
SJS V Atienza G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007
J. Corona
Facts:
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance
No. 8027 and Atienza passed it the following day. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified
the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and
operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from
operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the
ordinance. These were the Pandacan oil depots of Shell and Caltex.
But the city of Manila and the DOE entered into an MOU which only scaled down
the property covered by the depots and did not stop their operations. In the same
resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of
six months starting July 25, 2002. It was extended to 2003.
Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC urging the city to implement Ordinance 8027.
Respondent’s defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU
and the resolutions and that the MOU was more of a guideline to 8027.
Issues:
1. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or
repeal Ordinance No. 8027
Held: Yes to both, Petition granted
Ratio:
1. Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court- mandamus may be filed when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust
or station. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to
the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent
to do the act required to be done.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty,
which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. Unless the right to
the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue. When a mandamus
proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the
people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real
parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest. Petitioners are
citizens of manila and thus have a direct interest in the ordinances.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty,
as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the
city. "One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has
the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the
Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial
duty to do so.
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged
invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might
seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be
permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances
imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are
creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
2. Need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were
inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it
binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April
30, 2003.
Chavez v. Pea and Amari
Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim
areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the
Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084,
tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to
the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation
Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects
under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to
PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the
Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known
as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a
Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250
hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to
AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement,
claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the
“mother of all scams”).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of
preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to
AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President
Estrada’s admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves
claim that the contract is null and void.
Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the
stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art.
XII of the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint
venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these
lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open
to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can
make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the
public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In
their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and
outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify
the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer
needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the
1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
Facts: On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land,
including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, lease
and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same date, then President Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the
foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road
and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent
No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under
the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a
total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four
(1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds
of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309,
7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as
the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road, Parañaque City.
PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public
bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No.
1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through
then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate
Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of
their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the
JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as
alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of
title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential
Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the
legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The members of
the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel, and the Government Corporate Counsel. The Legal Task Force upheld the
legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a
taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner
contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the
reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of
any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article
III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President,
petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated
contract be declared null and void."
Issue: The issues raised by petitioner, PEA and AMARI are as follows:
1. Whether the reliefs prayed for are moot and academic because of subsequent
events;
 2. Whether the petition should be dismissed for failing to observe the principle of
governing the heirarchy of courts;
3. Whether the petition should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies;
4. Whether petitioner has locus standi;
5. Whether the constitutional right to information includes information on on-
going neogtiations BEFORE a final agreement;
6. Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the
transfer to AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed violate the
1987 Constitution; and
7. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the issue whether the amended JVA is
grossly disadvantageous to the government
Held: 1. We rule that the signing and of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI
and its approval by the President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the
Court of its jurisdiction.
PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to
enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily
includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have
signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in assailing
the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of the Section 3, Article XII of the
Constitution, which prohibits the government from alienating lands of the public
domain to private corporations. The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial
contract but one which seeks to transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of
reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single private corporation.
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression being a wholly government
owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary functions. All previous
decisions of the Court involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or
its counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution, covered agricultural lands sold to
private corporations which acquired the lands from private parties.
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in
this petition because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title
and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA is
obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy percent proportionate share in the
reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses, The Amended JVA even allows
AMARI to mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the
reclamation project.
2. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental
importance to the public. The Court can resolve this case without determining any
factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus
which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII
of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
3. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and
conditions for the sale of its lands. The law obligated PEA make this public
disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed to make
this public disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the
result of a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an
affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and was even in breach of
this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the
issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional question. The principal issue in the
instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of the
constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to private
corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
does not apply in the instant case.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks
to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional
issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information on matters of public
concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure
the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino
Citizens.
The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of
hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution,
compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.
4. Ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning
the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the
issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the
social, economic and moral well being of the people.'
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the
enforcement of constitutional rights — to information and to the equitable diffusion
of natural resources — matters of transcendental public importance, the petitioner
has the requisite locus standi.
5. The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public
interest reinforces the people's right to information on matters of public concern.
This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:
“Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest."
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission understood that the right to information "contemplates inclusion of
negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a
consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to
information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is
consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose
its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the
contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal,
becomes a fait accompli.
However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. 34 The
right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means the
opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the
records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also
subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to
minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and how
to conduct the inspection and copying.
6. Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as
follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is —
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar
character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general
public use, is employed in some public service, or in the development of the national
wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and
mines, until granted to private individuals.
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In
contrast, property devoted to public service referred to property used for some
specific public service and open only to those authorized to use the
property.Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public
use, but also to property not so used but employed to develop the national wealth.
This class of property constituted property of public dominion although employed
for some economic or commercial activity to increase the national wealth.
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use
or to the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the private property of the
State." This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the
executive department pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer needed
for public use or territorial defense before the government could lease or alienate the
property to private parties.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor
mineral land, shall be classified as suitable for residential purposes or for
commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural
purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under
the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent
potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the government prohibited the
sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties. The State always
reserved these lands for some future public service.
However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to
classification as disposable public agricultural lands, could only be leased and not
sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874.
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution
banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private
corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. As in
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private
corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public
domain is still CA No. 141.
Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum
area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to
acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations
as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a
corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The
corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on
acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent
covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying
the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Being
neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands
necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain.
Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain are the only
natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All other
natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters . . . owned by the State"
forming part of the public domain, and are inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution.
 In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas
under water, while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical
reclamation of areas under water whether directly or through private contractors.
DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or
disposable lands subject to the approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is
tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged
areas does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the
National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of
PEA.
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA
to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and
administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525
declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." PEA's
charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer,
deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands . . . owned,
managed, controlled and/or operated by the government." 87 (Emphasis supplied)
There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether
patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties
its patrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA charter free from
constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's
patrimonial lands.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the
Government Auditing Code, the government is required to sell valuable government
property through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that:... "In the
event that the public auction fails, the property may be sold at a private sale at such
price as may be fixed by the same committee or body concerned and approved by
the Commission."
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom
Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option
to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated contract,
enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares. The failure of public bidding on
December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares, is not a valid justification for a
negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned.
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the
certificate of title the alienable land of the public domain automatically becomes
private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section
60 of CA No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable lands of the public
domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public domain
must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked
to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial
lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become illusory if Congress can declare
lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of a
government agency tasked to dispose of public lands.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to
PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
This scheme can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public domain
since PEA can "acquire . . . any and all kinds of lands."
The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations.
7. Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no
necessity to rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not the trier of facts, and this
last issue involves a determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority
and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY
ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which
is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
Valmonte vs Belmonte
FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary
injunction invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be directed: (a)
to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the
then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true
copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow
petitioners access to the public records for the subject information On June 20, 1986,
apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and
Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote
respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now
considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to
pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest."
ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire
upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to
Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political
parties.
HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of
confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is
apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle
policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law
should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of
the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the
repository of all State power. The concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed
if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they
were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be
denied that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public
figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a
more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions
being subject to closer public scrutiny The "transactions" used here I suppose is
generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a
consummated contract, Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution
which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and
considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether
performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the
Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-
controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the
people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in
government dealings. Although citizens are afforded the right to information and,
pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not
accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of
public concern.
Tano vs Socrates 278 SCRA 154
Facts
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princessa enacted ordinance no. 15-92
banning the shipment of live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princessa City for a
period of 5 years. In the same light, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan also
enacted a resolution that prohibits the catching, gathering, buying, selling and
possessing and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a
period of 5 years within the Palawan waters. The petitiones Airline Shippers
Association of Palawan together with marine merchants were charged for violating
the above ordinance and resolution by the city and provincial governments. The
petitioners now allege that they have the preferential rights as marginal fishermen
granted with privileges provided in Section 149 of the Local Government Code,
invoking the invalidity of the above-stated enactments as violative of their
preferential rights.
Issue
Whether or not the enacted resolutions and ordinances by the local government units
violative of the preferential rights of the marginal fishermen ?
Held
No, the enacted resolution and ordinance of the LGU were not violative of their
preferential rights. The enactment of these laws was a valid exercise of the police
power of the LGU to protect public interests and the public right to a balanced and
healthier ecology. The rights and privileges invoked by the petitioners are not
absolute. The general welfare clause of the local government code mandates for the
liberal interpretation in giving the LGUs more power to accelerate economic
development and to upgrade the life of the people in the community. The LGUs are
endowed with the power to enact fishery laws in its municipal waters which
necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances in order to effectively carry out the
enforcement of fishery laws in their local community.
FACTS:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an
ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa
City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting
the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several
species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming
from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the
court declare the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground
that the said ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their livelihood,
and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2,
Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the
challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution
and applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners
qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII
aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on
the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called
“preferential right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine
resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and
pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their
“exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.
In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the
enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of
mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively
carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles of
decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted
therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the
validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.
Chiongbian vs. orbos
Facts:
-Pursuant to article X sec 18 of the 1987 constitution, Congress passed Ra No. 6734
“the organic act for the Autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao” calling for
plebiscite to be held in 23 provinces
-4 provinces voted in favor of creating the Autonomous region and these are Lanao
Del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Twi-tawi. Hence, in accordance to RA NO ^&#$
THESE 4 PROVINCES BECAME THE ARMM.
-On the other hand, With respect to the remaining provinces who did not vote in
favor of creating ARMM. Article XIX Sec RA 6724 provides; “That only THE
PROVINCES and CITIES VOTING FAVORABLY IN SUCH PLEBISCITE
SHALL BE INCLUDED IN ARMM and the provinces WHO DID NOT VOTE
FOR THE INCLUSION IN ARMM SHALL REMAIN IN THE EXISTING
ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS; PROVIDED, However, THE PRESIDENT MAY
BY ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION, MERGE the EXISTING
REGIONS”
-Pursuant to the authority granted by the above provision, then President Aquino
issued EO NO 429 “PROVIDING FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF THE
ARMM” Where in those who are not in favor in creating the ARMM where
transferred (provinces of a certain region to another) some of which are; a. misamis
occidental, at present part of Region X will become part of REGION XI,………”
-PETITIONERS, PROTESTED and Challenges the VALIDITY of EO
429 CONTENDING that THERE is NOT LAW WHICH AUTHORIZES
THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE ALTERATIONS ON THE EXISTING
STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENTAL UNITS in other words
REORGANiZATION. And that the AUTHORITY MERGE granted in RA
6724 DOES NOT INCLUDE the AUTHORITY to REORGANIZE even if
it does not affect the apportionment of the congressional representatives.
In addition, they contend that Article XIX SEC 13 of RA 6724 is
UNCONSITTUIONAL for 1) it is invalid delegation of power by the
Legislative to the President 2) the power granted is not expressed in the
title of the law.
Issues:
1. WON Article XIX sec 13 of RA 6724 is invalid because it contains no
express standard to guide the President’s Discretion and whether the
power given fairly expressed in the title of the statue.
2. WON the power granted authorizes not just to merge but even the
reorganization of those who did not vote or not in favor to it.
3. WON the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer the
regional center of Region IX from ZAmoanga to PAgadian since it should
be the acts of Congress.
Ruling
While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the
constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to
facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments
(Article X sec 4 of the Constitution). The regions themselves are not territorial and
political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are “mere
groupings of contagious provinces for administrative purposes. The power conferred
on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries”.
1. No, A legislative STANdARD NEED NOT BE EXPRESSED. May
simply be GATHERED OR IMPLIED. Nor need it be found in the law
challenge because it may be embodied in other statues on the same subject
as that of the challenge legislation. And with respect to the power to merge
existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same
policy underlying the grant to the President in RA NO. 5435 of the power
 to reorganize the Exec Department to “Promote simplicity, economy, and
efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent
with national goals for accelerated social and economic development and
to improve the services in the transition of public business.
2. No, while ARTICLE XIX sec 13 provides that “the provinces and cities
which do not vote for inclusion in the autonomous region shall remain in
the existing administrative regions” this provisions Is subject to the
qualification that the PRSIDENT MAY BY ADMINISTRATIVE
DETERMINATION MERGE THE EXISTING REGIONS. This means
that while non-assenting provinces are to remain in the regions as
designated upon the creation of the Autonomous region, they may
nevertheless be regrouped with continuous provinces forming other
regions as the exigency of administration may require.
3. Yes, for administrative regions are mere “groupings of contiguous
provinces for administrative purpose hence are not territorial and political
subdivision like provinces, cities municipalities and brgys. Therefore there
is no basis that only Congress can determine the region center.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS
G.R. NO. 122156. February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided
to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the eventual
“strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability
and performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to
buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad,
a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior
to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel matched the bid price and sent a manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS
refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the
sale may be consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the
Court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision.
2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
3. Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondents in refusing the matching bid of the petitioner.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
1. It is a self-executing provision.
1. Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of
the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision
which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary
or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
2. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution
itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction
of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred
to the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power
to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
3. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
 operation. It is per sejudicially enforceable. When our Constitution
mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency
and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings.
Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. The Court agree.
1. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.
When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to
the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have
very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage
of the Filipinos.
2. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the
present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it
first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become
the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine
history.
3. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the
purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and
controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have
actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the
MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the
hotel edifice stands.
3. It is not premature.
1. In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a
public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid
of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed
to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid
of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the
Court is to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of
the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor
contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to
be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous
skirting of the basic law.
2. The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may
discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the
Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are
given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business
in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in
the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed
to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of
the forum.
4. There was grave abuse of discretion.
1. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino
group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that
government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by
its mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the consequences
to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is
regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy the indiscretion while
there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the
habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions
and parameters for its actions.
2. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong
Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no
alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to
execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with
the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules
after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to
CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute
the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary
clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
Petitioner: RAMON ARANDA
Respondent: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Promulgated: August 24, 2011
G.R. No. 172331
FACTS:
 Subject of a petition for original registration before the RTC is a parcel of
land situated in San Andres, Malvar, Batangas with an area of 9,103
square meters and designated as Lot 3730, Psc 47, Malvar Cadastre.
 ICTSI Warehousing, Inc. originally filed The petition represented by its
Chairman, Enrique K. Razon, Jr.
 OSG filed its opposition on grounds that the land applied for is part of the
public domain and the applicant has not acquired a registrable title.
 ICTSI-WI sought leave of court to amend the application citing the
reasons:
1. petition was not accompanied by a certification of non-forum
shopping;
2. the statement of technical description was based merely on the
boundaries set forth in the tax declaration; and
3. due to a technicality, the sale between the vendor and applicant
corporation cannot push through and consequently the tax
declaration is still in the name of vendor Ramon Aranda and the land
cannot be transferred and declared in the name of ICTSI-WI.
 RTC admitted the Amended Application for Registration of Title this time
filed in the name of Ramon Aranda.
 Petitioner prayed that should the Land Registration Act be not applicable
to this case, he invokes the liberal provisions of Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, having been in continuous
possession of the subject land in the concept of owner, publicly, openly
and adversely for more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the
application.
 petitioners sister Merlita A. Enriquez testified that in 1965 her father
Anatalio Aranda donated the subject land to his brother, as evidenced by
documents Pagpapatunay ng Pagkakaloob ng Lupa executed on June 7,
2000. As to the donation made by his father to his brother Ramon, she
recalled there was such a document but it was eaten by rats.
 Luis Olan, testified that his father Lucio Olan originally owned the land.
They had open, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the land in
the concept of owner until his father sold the land in 1946 to Anatalio
Aranda. The children of Anatalio then took over in tilling the land,
planting it with rice and corn and adding a few coconut trees. He does not
have any copy of the document of sale because his mother gave it to
Anatalio.
 RTC granted the application and ordering the issuance of a decree of
registration in favor of petitioner.
 CA held that petitioners evidence does not satisfactorily establish the
character and duration of possession required by law, as petitioner failed
to prove specific acts showing the nature of the possession by his
predecessors-in-interest. The CA also did not give evidentiary weight to
the documents Pagpapatunay ng Pagkakaloob ng Lupa and Pagpapatunay
ng Bilihang Lampasan ng Lupa, both prepared only in the year 2000 when
the application for registration was filed, as factual proof of ownership by
the parties to the compromise agreement.
ISSUE: WON the deeds of confirmation of the 1946 sale in favor of Anatalio
Aranda and the 1965 donation to petitioner are competent proof of transfer of
ownership
HELD: The Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529) provides for original
registration of land in an ordinary registration proceeding. Under Section
14(1)[14] thereof, a petition may be granted upon compliance with the following
requisites: (a) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain; (b) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation; and (c) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is
the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Unless public
land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State,
it remains part of the inalienable public domain. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application
is alienable or disposable.[15]
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute.[16] The applicant may also secure a certification from the
Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. [17]
In this case, the Assistant Regional Executive Director For Operations-Mainland
Provinces of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), in
compliance with the directive of the trial court, issued a certification stating that the
subject property falls within the Alienable and Disposable Land, Project No. 22-A of
Lipa, Batangas per LC Map 718 certified on March 26, 1928.[18] However, in the
Certification[19] dated January 14, 2000 issued by the DENR CENR Officer
of Batangas City, Pancrasio M. Alcantara, which was submitted in evidence by the
petitioner, it states that:
 This is to certify that based on projection from the
technical reference map of this Office, Lot No. 3730, Ap-04-
009883, situated at Barangay San Andres, Malvar, Batangas
containing an area of NINE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
THREE AND FORTY SEVEN (9,103.47) SQUARE METERS
and shown at the reverse side hereof has been verified to be
within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE
under Project No. 39, Land Classification Map No. 3601
certified on 22 December 1997 except for twenty meters strip
of land along the creek bounding on the northeastern portion
which is to be maintained as streambank protection.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner has not explained the discrepancies in the dates of
classification[20] mentioned in the foregoing government
certifications. Consequently, the status of the land applied for as alienable and
disposable was not clearly established.
We also agree with the CA that petitioners evidence failed to show that he possessed
the property in the manner and for the duration required by law.
Petitioner presented tax declarations and the deeds of confirmation of the 1946 sale
from the original owner (Lucio Olan) to Anatalio Aranda and the 1965 donation
made by the latter in favor of petitioner. But as found by the CA, the history of the
land shows that it was declared for taxation purposes for the first time only in 1981.
On the other hand, the Certification issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Malvar
stated that petitioner, who supposedly received the property from his father in 1965,
had been paying the corresponding taxes for said land for more than five consecutive
years including the current year [1999], or beginning 1994 only or just three years
before the filing of the application for original registration. While, as a rule, tax
declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner,
for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or constructive possession they constitute at least proof that the holder has a
claim of title over the property.[21]
Petitioner likewise failed to prove the alleged possession of his predecessors-in-
interest. His witness Luis Olan testified that he had been visiting the land along with
his father Lucio since he was 6 years old (he was 70 years old at the time he
testified), or as early as 1936. Yet, there was no evidence that Lucio Olan declared
the property for tax purposes at anytime before he sold it to Anatalio Aranda. There
is also no showing that Anatalio Aranda declared the property in his name from the
time he bought it from Lucio Olan. And even assuming that Lucio actually planted
rice and corn on the land, such statement is not sufficient to establish possession in
the concept of owner as contemplated by law. Mere casual cultivation of the land
does not amount to exclusive and notorious possession that would give rise to
ownership.[22] Specific acts of dominion must be clearly shown by the applicant.
We have held that a person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on
the basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his
claim by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., he must prove his title and should not
rely on the absence or weakness of the evidence of the oppositors. [23] Furthermore,
the court has the bounden duty, even in the absence of any opposition, to require the
petitioner to show, by a preponderance of evidence and by positive and absolute
proof, so far as possible, that he is the owner in fee simple of the lands which he is
attempting to register.[24] Since petitioner failed to meet the quantum of proof
required by law, the CA was correct in reversing the trial court and dismissing his
application for judicial confirmation of title.
WHEREFORE, the present petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The
Decision dated July 26, 2005 and Resolution dated April 11, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73067 are AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against the petitioner.
6. Utilization of natural resources
A. Miners Association vs Factoran Jr.
Facts: The petition seeks a ruling from this court on the validity of two
Administrative Orders 57 and 82 issued by the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to carry out the provisions of Executive Orders
279 and 211. This petition arose from the fact that the 1987 Constitution provided
for a different system of exploration, development and utilization of the country’s
natural resources. Unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions that allow the utilization
of inalienable lands of public domain through “license, concession or lease”, the
1987 Constitution provides for the full control and supervision by the state of the
exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural resources. Pres.
Cory Aquino promulgated EO 211, which prescribes the interim procedures in the
processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and
utilization of minerals in accordance to the 1987 Constitution. In addition, Pres.
Aquino also promulgated EO 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to negotiate and
conclude joint venture, co-production or production-sharing agreements for the
exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources and prescribing the
guidelines for such agreements and those agreements involving technical or
financial assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals. In line with EO 279, the DENR Secretary
issued AO 57 “Guidelines of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement under EO 279”
and AO 82 “Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSA) through negotiation. Petitioner, Miners Association of the
Philippines, mainly contend that the DENR Secretary issued both AOs 57 and 82 in
excess of his rule-making power because these are inconsistent with the provisions
of EO 279.
Issue: whether AO Nos. 57 and 82, which are promulgated by the DENR, are valid
and constitutional
Held: AO Nos. 57 and 82 are both constitutional and valid. This is due to the fact
that EO 279, in effect, gave the Secretary of Natural Resources the authority to
conclude joint venture, co-production, or production sharing agreements for the
exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources. Furthermore, the
constitutionality of these administrative orders goes to show that the utilization of
inalienable lands of public domain is not merely done through “license, concession
or lease” since the options are now also open to the State through direct undertaking
or by entering into co-production, joint venture, or production sharing agreements.
La Bugal-B’Laan v. Ramos
G.R. No. 127882.
December 1, 2004
Facts:
The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the
constitutionality of (1) Republic Act 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2)
its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order [DAO] 96-
40); and (3) the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated 30
March 1995, executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation
(Philippines), Inc. (WMCP).
On 27 January 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision, granting the
Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942,
DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and
WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the
1987 Constitution. The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to
service contracts,[9] which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were
subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over
our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of
our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.
The Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors who had criticized service
contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the foreign contractor exclusive management and
control of the enterprise, including operation of the field in the event petroleum was
discovered; control of production, expansion and development; nearly unfettered
control over the disposition and sale of the products discovered/extracted; effective
ownership of the natural resource at the point of extraction; and beneficial
ownership of our economic resources. According to the Decision, the 1987
Constitution (Section 2 of Article XII) effectively banned such service contracts.
Subsequently, Victor O. Ramos (Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources [DENR]), Horacio Ramos (Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau
[MGB-DENR]), Ruben Torres (Executive Secretary), and the WMC (Philippines)
Inc. filed separate Motions for Reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of control over the
EDU of our natural resources?
Held:
The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to “enter into
agreements with foreign owned corporations.” On the other hand, Congress may
review the action of the President once it is notified of “every contract entered into
in accordance with this [constitutional] provision within thirty days from its
execution.” In contrast to this express mandate of the President and Congress in the
exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources, Article XII of
the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should the President
and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in this regard, the courts may -- in a
proper case -- exercise their residual duty under Article VIII. Clearly then, the
judiciary should not inordinately interfere in the exercise of this presidential power
of control over the EDU of our natural resources.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and
coordinate branches of government, the Court must restrain itself from intruding into
policy matters and must allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in
using the resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to
eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry for viable
employment opportunities in the country. “The judiciary is loath to interfere with the
due exercise by coequal branches of government of their official functions.” As
aptly spelled out seven decades ago by Justice George Malcolm, “Just as the
Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction
usurpations by any other department of government, so should it as strictly confine
its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it
by the Organic Act.” Let the development of the mining industry be the
responsibility of the political branches of government. And let not the Court
interfere inordinately and unnecessarily. The Constitution of the Philippines is the
supreme law of the land. It is the repository of all the aspirations and hopes of all the
people.
The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should not be used
to strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it
should be construed to grant the President and Congress sufficient discretion and
reasonable leeway to enable them to attract foreign investments and expertise, as
well as to secure for our people and our posterity the blessings of prosperity and
peace. The Court fully sympathize with the plight of La Bugal B’laan and other
tribal groups, and commend their efforts to uplift their communities. However, the
Court cannot justify the invalidation of an otherwise constitutional statute along with
its implementing rules, or the nullification of an otherwise legal and binding FTAA
contract. The Court believes that it is not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of
discretion to the Chief Executive, given the nature and complexity of such
agreements, the humongous amounts of capital and financing required for large-
scale mining operations, the complicated technology needed, and the intricacies of
international trade, coupled with the State’s need to maintain flexibility in its
dealings, in order to preserve and enhance our country’s competitiveness in world
markets. On the basis of this control standard, the Court upholds the constitutionality
of the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations - insofar as
they relate to financial and technical agreements - as well as the subject Financial
and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA).
ALVAREZ VS. PICOP
Facts : PICOP filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43
converted into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA). In the middle
of the processing of PICOP’s application, however, PICOP refused to attend further
meetings with the DENR. Instead, on 2 September 2002, PICOP filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus against then
DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez to compel the DENR Secretary to sign,
execute and deliver an IFMA to PICOP, as well as to –
Issue the corresponding IFMA assignment number on the area covered by the
IFMA, formerly TLA No. 43, as amended; b) to issue the necessary permit allowing
petitioner to act and harvest timber from the said area of TLA No. 43, sufficient to
meet the raw material requirements of petitioner’s pulp and paper mills in
accordance with the warranty and agreement of July 29, 1969 between the
government and PICOP’s predecessor-in-interest; and c) to honor and respect the
Government Warranties and contractual obligations to PICOP strictly in accordance
with the warranty and agreement dated July 29, [1969] between the government and
PICOP’s predecessor-in-interest. x x
PICOP had tried to put a cloud of ambiguity over Section 59 of Republic Act No.
8371:
a) Ancestral domains – Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to all areas generally
belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural
resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by
ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually
since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war,
force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and
private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic,
social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and
disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of
water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be
exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for
their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs
who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;
Verily, in interpreting the term "held under claim of ownership," the Supreme Court
could not have meant to include claims that had just been filed and not yet
recognized under the provisions of DENR Administrative Order No. 2 Series of
1993, nor to any other community / ancestral domain program prior to R.A. 8371.
One can not imagine the terrible damage and chaos to the country, its economy, its
people and its future if a mere claim filed for the issuance of a CADC or CADT will
already provide those who filed the application, the authority or right to stop the
renewal or issuance of any concession, license or lease or any production-sharing
agreement. The same interpretation will give such applicants through a mere
application the right to stop or suspend any project that they can cite for not
satisfying the requirements of the consultation process of R.A. 8371. If such
interpretation gets enshrined in the statures of the land, the unscrupulous and the
extortionists can put any ongoing or future project or activity to a stop in any part of
the country citing their right from having filed an application for issuance of a
CADC or CADT claim and the legal doctrine established by the Supreme Court in
this PICOP case.
We are not sure whether PICOP’s counsels are deliberately trying to mislead us, or
are just plainly ignorant of basic precepts of law. The term "claim" in the phrase
"claim of ownership" is not a document of any sort. It is an attitude towards
something. The phrase "claim of ownership" means "the possession of a piece of
property with the intention of claiming it in hostility to the true owner."86 It is also
defined as "a party’s manifest intention to take over land, regardless of title or
right."87 Other than in Republic Act No. 8371, the phrase "claim of ownership" is
thoroughly discussed in issues relating to acquisitive prescription in Civil Law.
Before PICOP’s counsels could attribute to us an assertion that a mere attitude or
intention would stop the renewal or issuance of any concession, license or lease or
any production-sharing agreement, we should stress beforehand that this attitude or
intention must be clearly shown by overt acts and, as required by Section 3(a),
should have been in existence "since time immemorial, continuously to the present
except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit,
stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings
entered into by government and private individuals/corporations."
(REPUBLIC VS. QUASHA – NO DIGEST)
.R. Nos. 152613 & 152628 APEX MINING CO., INC., vs. Southeast Mindanao
Gold Mining Corp.,(SEM) et. al
G.R. No. 152619-20 BALITE COMMUNAL PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE
vs. southeast mindanao gold mining corp.
G.R. No. 152870-71 THE MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD AND ITS
MEMBERS, THE HON. VICTOR O. RAMOS (Chairman), UNDERSECRETARY
VIRGILIO MARCELO (Member) and DIRECTOR HORACIO RAMOS (Member)
vs. southeast mindanao gold mining corporation
FACTS:
A motion for reconsideration was filed by SEM. The Assailed Decision held that the
assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of SEM violated one of the
conditions stipulated in the permit. It also ruled that the transfer of EP 133 violated
Presidential Decree No. 463, which requires that the assignment of a mining right be
made with the prior approval of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). Moreover, the Assailed Decision pointed out that EP
133 expired by non-renewal since it was not renewed before or after its expiration. It
likewise upheld the validity of Proclamation No. 297 absent any question against its
validity. In view of this, and
considering that under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as the
“Mining Act of 1995,” mining operations in mineral re
servations may be undertaken directly by the State or through a contractor, the Court
deemed the issue of ownership of priority right over the contested Diwalwal Gold
Rush Area as having been overtaken by the said proclamation. Thus, it was held in
the Assailed Decision that it is now within the prerogative of the Executive
Department to undertake directly the mining operations of the disputed area or to
award the operations to private entities including petitioners Apex and Balite,
subject to applicable laws, rules and regulations, and provided that these private
entities are qualified. Apex, for its part, filed a Motion for Clarification of the
Assailed Decision, praying that the
Court elucidate on the Decision’s pronouncement that “mining operations, are
now, therefore within the
full control of the State through the executive branch.” Moreover, Apex asks this
Court to order the
Mines and Geosciences Board (MGB) to accept its application for an exploration
permit. Balite echoes the same concern as that of Apex on the actual takeover by the
State of the mining industry in the disputed area to the exclusion of the private
sector. In addition, Balite prays for this Court to direct MGB to accept its application
for an exploration permit. CamiloBanad, et al., likewise filed a motion for
reconsideration and prayed that the disputed area be awarded to them. In the
Resolution, the Court En Banc resolved to accept the instant cases.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the transfer or assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 by MMC to
SEM was validly made without violating any of the terms and conditions set forth in
Presidential Decree No. 463 and EP 133 itself.
2. Whether Southeast Mindanao Mining Corp. acquired a vested right over the
disputed area, which constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution.
3. Whether the assailed Decision dated 23 June 2006 of the Third Division in this
case is contrary to and overturns the earlier Decision of this Court in Apex v. Garcia
(G.R. No. 92605, 16 July 1991, 199 SCRA 278).
4. Whether the issuance of Proclamation No. 297 declaring the disputed area as
mineral reservation outweighs the claims of SEM, Apex Mining Co. Inc. and Balite
Communal Portal Mining Cooperative over the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.
5. Whether the issue of the legality/constitutionality of Proclamation No. 297 was
belatedly raised.
HELD:
1. The assailed Decision did not overturn the 16 July 1991 Decision in Apex Mining
Co., Inc. v. Garcia. The former was decided on facts and issues that were not
attendant in the latter, such as the expiration of EP 133, the violation of the condition
embodied in EP 133 prohibiting its assignment, and the unauthorized and invalid
assignment of EP 133 by MMC to SEM, since this assignment was effected without
the approval of the Secretary of DENR;
2. SEM did not acquire vested right over the disputed area because its supposed right
was extinguished by the expiration of its exploration permit and by its violation of
the condition prohibiting the assignment of EP 133 by MMC to SEM. In addition,
even assuming that SEM has a valid exploration permit, such is a mere license that
can be withdrawn by the State. In fact, the same has been withdrawn by the issuance
of Proclamation No. 297, which places the disputed area under the full control of the
State through the Executive Department;
3. The approval requirement under Section 97 of Presidential Decree No. 463
applies to the assignment of EP 133 by MMC to SEM, since the exploration permit
is an interest in a mining lease contract;
4. The issue of the constitutionality and the legality of Proclamation No. 297 was
raised belatedly, as SEM questions the same for the first time in its Motion for
Reconsideration. Even if the issue were to be entertained, the said proclamation is
found to be in harmony with the Constitution and other existing statutes;
5. The motion for reconsideration of CamiloBanad, et al. cannot be passed upon
because they are not parties to the instant cases;
6. The prayers of Apex and Balite asking the Court to direct the MGB to accept
their applications for exploration permits cannot be granted, since it is the Executive
Department that has the prerogative to accept such applications, if ever it decides to
award the mining operations in the disputed area to a private entity;
APEX MINING CO., INC., v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp. et al.
G.R. Nos. 152613 & 152628, November 20, 2009
FACTS
In its June 2006 decision, the Supreme Court held that
 the assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of SEM violated
one of the conditions stipulated in the permit, that the same shall be for the
exclusive use and benefit of Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) or its
duly authorized agents. Because SEM did not claim or submit evidence
that it was a designated agent of MMC, the latter cannot be considered as
an agent of the former that can use EP 133 and benefit from it.
 the transfer of EP 133 violated Presidential Decree No. 463, which
requires that the assignment of a mining right be made with the prior
approval of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
 the EP 133 expired by non-renewal since it was not renewed before or
after its expiration.
 Proclamation No. 297 is valid absent any question against its validity. IN
relation, under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942, mining operations in
mineral reservations may be undertaken directly by the State or through a
contractor, the Court deemed the issue of ownership of priority right as
having been overtaken by the said proclamation.
 It is now within the prerogative of the Executive Department to undertake
directly the mining operations of the disputed area or to award the
operations to private entities such as Apex, subject to applicable laws,
rules and regulations, and provided that these private entities are qualified.
Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM) filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s assailed decision. Apex filed a Motion for
Clarification asking that the Court elucidate on the Decision’s pronouncement that
“mining operations, are now, therefore within the full control of the State through
the executive branch.” Moreover it asked the Court to order the Mines and
Geosciences Board (MGB) to accept its application for an exploration permit. Balite
echoes the same concern as that of Apex on the actual takeover by the State of the
mining industry in the disputed area to the exclusion of the private sector. In
addition, Balite prayed that the Court will direct MGB to accept its application for
an exploration permit.
ISSUES
1. Whether the transfer or assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 by
MMC to SEM was validly made without violating any of the terms and
conditions set forth in Presidential Decree No. 463 and EP 133 itself.
2. Whether Southeast Mindanao Mining Corp. acquired a vested right over
the disputed area, which constitutes a property right protected by the
Constitution.
3. Assuming that the legality/constitutionality of Proclamation No. 297 was
timely raised, whether said proclamation violates Article XII, Section 4 of
the Constitution.
4. Whether RA 7942 is the applicable law.
RULING
1. No, the assignment of EP 133 violated its terms and conditions and Sec.
97, PD 463. Section 97 is entitled, “Assignment of Mining Rights.” This
hints that before mining rights — namely, the rights to explore, develop
and utilize — are transferred or assigned, prior approval must be obtained
from the DENR Secretary. An exploration permit, thus, cannot be assigned
without the imprimatur of the Secretary of the DENR.
While Presidential Decree No. 463 has already been repealed by Executive Order
No. 279, the administrative aspect of the former law nonetheless remains
applicable. Hence, the transfer or assignment of exploration permits still needs the
prior approval of the Secretary of the DENR.
In addition, the terms of the permit was violated. Condition Number 6 categorically
states that the permit shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of MMC or its duly
authorized agents. While it may be true that SEM, the assignee of EP 133, is a
100% subsidiary corporation of MMC, records are bereft of any evidence showing
that the former is the duly authorized agent of the latter.
2. No, SEM does not acquire aver or prove that its mining rights had been
perfected and completed when the Philippine Bill of 1902 was still the
operative law.
It is impossible for SEM to successfully assert that it acquired mining rights over the
disputed area in accordance with the same bill, since it was only in 1984 that MMC,
SEM’s predecessor-in-interest, filed its declaration of locations and its prospecting
permit application in compliance with Presidential Decree No. 463. It was on 1 July
1985 and 10 March 1986 that a Prospecting Permit and EP 133, respectively, were
issued to MMC. Considering these facts, there is no possibility that MMC or SEM
could have acquired a perfected mining claim under the auspices of the Philippine
Bill of 1902.
SEM likens EP 133 with a building permit. SEM likewise equates its supposed
rights attached to the exploration permit with the rights that a private property land
owner has to said landholding. This analogy has no basis in law.
In addition, national wealth, such as mineral resources, are owned by the State and
not by their discoverer. The discoverer or locator can only develop and utilize said
minerals for his own benefit if he has complied with all the requirements set forth by
applicable laws and if the State has conferred on him such right through permits,
concessions or agreements. Without the imprimatur of the State, any mining
aspirant does not have any definitive right over the mineral land because, unlike a
private landholding, mineral land is owned by the State, and the same cannot be
alienated to any private person as explicitly stated in Section 2, Article XIV of the
1987 Constitution.
The right that SEM acquired was limited to exploration, only because MMC was a
mere holder of an exploration permit. As previously explained, SEM did not acquire
the rights inherent in the permit, as the assignment by MMC to SEM was done in
violation of the condition stipulated in the permit, and the assignment was effected
without the approval of the proper authority in contravention of the provision of the
mining law governing at that time. In addition, the permit expired on 6 July
1994. It is, therefore, quite clear that SEM has no right over the area.
An exploration permit does not automatically ripen into a right to extract and utilize
the minerals; much less does it develop into a vested right. The holder of an
exploration permit only has the right to conduct exploration works on the area
awarded. Presidential Decree No. 463 defined exploration as “the examination
and investigation of lands supposed to contain valuable minerals, by drilling,
trenching, shaft sinking, tunneling, test pitting and other means, for the
purpose of probing the presence of mineral deposits and the extent
thereof.” Exploration does not include development and exploitation of the
minerals found. Development is defined by the same statute as the steps
necessarily taken to reach an ore body or mineral deposit so that it can be
mined, whereas exploitation is defined as “the extraction and utilization of
mineral deposits.” An exploration permit is nothing more than a mere right
accorded to its holder to be given priority in the government’s consideration in the
granting of the right to develop and utilize the minerals over the area. An
exploration permit is merely inchoate, in that the holder still has to comply with the
terms and conditions embodied in the permit
SEM did not acquire the rights attached to EP 133, since their transfer was without
legal effect. Granting for the sake of argument that SEM was a valid transferee of
the permit, its right is not that of a mining contractor. An exploration permit
grantee is vested with the right to conduct exploration only, while an FTAA or
MPSA contractor is authorized to extract and carry off the mineral
resourcesthat may be discovered in the area. An exploration permit holder still has
to comply with the mining project feasibility and other requirements under the
mining law. It has to obtain approval of such accomplished requirements from the
appropriate government agencies. Upon obtaining this approval, the exploration
permit holder has to file an application for an FTAA or an MPSA and have it
approved also. Until the MPSA application of SEM is approved, it cannot lawfully
claim that it possesses the rights of an MPSA or FTAA holder. But again, SEM is
not qualified to apply for an FTAA or any mineral agreement, considering that it is
not a holder of a valid exploration permit, since EP 133 expired by non-renewal and
the transfer to it of the same permit has no legal value.
3. No, Proclamation No. 297 does not violate the following:
Article XII, Sec. 4: It is only after the specific limits of the forest lands shall have
been determined by the legislature will this constitutional restriction apply. SEM
does not allege nor present any evidence that Congress had already enacted a statute
determining with specific limits forest lands and national parks. In addition, there is
nothing in the constitutional provision that prohibits the President from declaring a
forest land as an environmentally critical area and from regulating the mining
operations therein by declaring it as a mineral reservation in order to prevent the
further degradation of the forest environment and to resolve the health and peace and
order problems that beset the area.
There is nothing contradictory between the two. Proclamation No. 297, a measure
to attain and maintain a rational and orderly balance between socio-economic
growth and environmental protection, jibes with the constitutional policy of
preserving and protecting the forest lands from being further devastated by
denudation. In other words, the proclamation in question is in line with Section 4,
Article XII of the Constitution, as the former fosters the preservation of the forest
environment of the Diwalwal area and is aimed at preventing the further degradation
of the same.
4. Yes, RA 7942 is the applicable law. Proclamation No. 297, declaring a
certain portion of land located in Monkayo, Compostela Valley, with an
area of 8,100 hectares, more or less, as a mineral reservation, was issued
by the President pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942, also
known as the “Philippine Mining Act of 1995.” Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 7942 authorizes the President to establish mineral reservations
Didipio v Gozun (Natural resources)
DIDIPIO v GOZUN
GR No. 157882
March 30, 2006
FACTS:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995, together with the Implementing Rules and
Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 96-40, s. 1996 (DAO 96-40) and of
the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into on 20 June
1994 by the Republic of the Philippines and Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC), a
corporation established under the laws of Australia and owned by its nationals.
Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single
company that now goes under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation
(CAMC), the controlling 99% of stockholders of which are Australian nationals.
on 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed an FTAA with AMC over a total land
area of 37,000 hectares covering the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and
Quirino. Included in this area is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.
The CAMC FTAA grants in favor of CAMC the right of possession of the
Exploration Contract Area, the full right of ingress and egress and the right to
occupy the same. It also bestows CAMC the right not to be prevented from entry
into private lands by surface owners or occupants thereof when prospecting,
exploring and exploiting minerals therein.
Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc., an organization of farmers
and indigenous peoples organized under Philippine laws, representing a community
actually affected by the mining activities of CAMC, as well as other residents of
areas affected by the mining activities of CAMC.
ISSUES & RULINGS:
I
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 AND THE CAMC FTAA ARE
VOID BECAUSE THEY ALLOW THE UNJUST AND UNLAWFUL TAKING
OF PROPERTY WITHOUT PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION , IN
VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION.
NO.
The provision of the FTAA in question lays down the ways and means by which the
foreign-owned contractor, disqualified to own land, identifies to the government the
specific surface areas within the FTAA contract area to be acquired for the mine
infrastructure. The government then acquires ownership of the surface land areas on
behalf of the contractor, through a voluntary transaction in order to enable the latter
to proceed to fully implement the FTAA. Eminent domain is not yet called for at
this stage since there are still various avenues by which surface rights can be
acquired other than expropriation. The FTAA provision under attack merely
facilitates the implementation of the FTAA given to CAMC and shields it from
violating the Anti-Dummy Law.
There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law and its implementing rules
and regulations do not provide for just compensation in expropriating private
properties. Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 provide
for the payment of just compensation.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE MINING ACT AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES
AND REGULATIONS ARE VOID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR
SANCTIONING AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS OF
DETERMINING JUST COMPENSATION.
NO.
there is nothing in the provisions of the assailed law and its implementing rules and
regulations that exclude the courts from their jurisdiction to determine just
compensation in expropriation proceedings involving mining operations.
Although Section 105 confers upon the Panel of Arbitrators the authority to decide
cases where surface owners, occupants, concessionaires refuse permit holders entry,
thus, necessitating involuntary taking, this does not mean that the determination of
the just compensation by the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines Adjudication Board is
final and conclusive. The determination is only preliminary unless accepted by all
parties concerned. There is nothing wrong with the grant of primary jurisdiction by
the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines Adjudication Board to determine in a
preliminary matter the reasonable compensation due the affected landowners or
occupants. The original and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts to decide
determination of just compensation remains intact despite the preliminary
determination made by the administrative agency.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE, THROUGH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 AND
THE CAMC FTAA, ABDICATED ITS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY TO THE
FULL CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OVER NATURAL RESOURCES.
RA 7942 provides for the state's control and supervision over mining
operations. The following provisions thereof establish the mechanism of inspection
and visitorial rights over mining operations and institute reportorial requirements.
The setup under RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 hardly relegates the State to the role of a
“passive regulator” dependent on submitted plans and reports. On the contrary, the
government agencies concerned are empowered to approve or disapprove -- hence,
to influence, direct and change -- the various work programs and the corresponding
minimum expenditure commitments for each of the exploration, development and
utilization phases of the mining enterprise.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS' INTERPRETATION OF THE ROLE
OF WHOLLY FOREIGN AND FOREIGN-OWNED CORPORATIONS IN THEIR
INVOLVEMENT IN MINING ENTERPRISES, VIOLATES PARAGRAPH 4,
SECTION 2, ARTICLE XII OF THE CONSTITUTION.
the use of the word “involving” signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other
forms of assistance or activities having to do with, otherwise related to or
compatible with financial or technical assistance.
Thus, we come to the inevitable conclusion that there was a conscious and deliberate
decision to avoid the use of restrictive wording that bespeaks an intent not to use the
expression “agreements x x x involving either technical or financial assistance” in an
exclusionary and limiting manner.
V
WHETHER OR NOT THE 1987 CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS SERVICE
CONTRACTS
NO. The mere fact that the term service contracts found in the 1973 Constitution
was not carried over to the present constitution, sans any categorical statement
banning service contracts in mining activities, does not mean that service contracts
as understood in the 1973 Constitution was eradicated in the 1987 Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts with foreign
corporations as contractors who would invest in and operate and manage extractive
enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the State; this time,
however, safety measures were put in place to prevent abuses of the past regime.
the phrase agreements involving either technical or financial assistance, referred to
in paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety,
the new ones are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand;
and on the other, the government as principal or “owner” of the works. In the new
service contracts, the foreign contractors provide capital, technology and technical
know-how, and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of large-scale
mining/extractive enterprises; and the government, through its agencies (DENR,
MGB), actively exercises control and supervision over the entire operation.
OBITER DICTA: ! justiciable controversy: definite and concrete dispute touching
on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests which may be resolved
by a court of law through the application of a law. ! to exercise the power of judicial
review, the following must be extant (1) there must be an actual case calling for the
exercise of judicial power; - involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.
In the instant case, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights as
Rep. Act No. 7942 has been enacted, DAO 96-40 has been approved and an FTAAs
have been entered into. The FTAA holders have already been operating in various
provinces of the country.
(2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and - A question is considered ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. (3) the person challenging must have the “standing" -
personal or substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged,
alleging more than a generalized grievance.
By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act,
the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other
overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is
enough to awaken judicial duty.
! “taking” under the concept of eminent domain as entering upon private property
for more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority,
devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously
affecting it in such a way as to substantially oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment thereof.
requisites of taking in eminent domain, to wit:
(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;
(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected;
(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
! Taking in Eminent Domain Distinguished from Regulation in Police Power
The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state (and of those entities
to which the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to
public use upon payment of just compensation.On the other hand, police power is
the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property.
Although both police power and the power of eminent domain have the general
welfare for their object, and recent trends show a mingling of the two with the latter
being used as an implement of the former, there are still traditional distinctions
between the two.
Property condemned under police power is usually noxious or intended for a
noxious purpose; hence, no compensation shall be paid. Likewise, in the exercise of
police power, property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
state. Thus, an ordinance prohibiting theaters from selling tickets in excess of their
seating capacity (which would result in the diminution of profits of the theater-
owners) was upheld valid as this would promote the comfort, convenience and
safety of the customers.
where a property interest is merely restricted because the continued use thereof
would be injurious to public welfare, or where property is destroyed because its
continued existence would be injurious to public interest, there is no compensable
taking. However, when a property interest is appropriated and applied to some
public purpose, there is compensable taking.
! On different roles and responsibilities:
* DENR Secretary : accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned
corporations or foreign investors for contracts of agreements involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary,
the President may execute with the foreign proponent. (Executive Order No. 279,
1987)
! in re: easements and taking
In Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila, it was held that the imposition of burden over a
private property through easement was considered taking; hence, payment of just
compensation is required. The Court declared:

And, considering that the easement intended to be established, whatever may be the
object thereof, is not merely a real right that will encumber the property, but is one
tending to prevent the exclusive use of one portion of the same, by expropriating it
for public use which, be it what it may, can not be accomplished unless the owner of
the property condemned or seized be previously and duly indemnified, it is proper to
protect the appellant by means of the remedy employed in such cases, as it is only
adequate remedy when no other legal action can be resorted to, against an intent
which is nothing short of an arbitrary restriction imposed by the city by virtue of the
coercive power with which the same is invested.
! in order that one law may operate to repeal another law, the two laws must be
inconsistent.The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconciliable with the latter
act.
Republic vs Naguiat
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws
G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006
FACTS:
Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land
located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of
the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from its previous owners
and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than
thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage
or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal
or equitable, or in possession thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior
thereto, considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in question
have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable
property.
ISSUE:
Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands
of the public domain?
HELD:
No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of whether or not
respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and
continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is of little moment. For,
unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession;
occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership and be registered as title.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have
to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is merely
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what
the land actually looks like.
PICOP RESOURCES, INC.,petitioner, - versus BASE METALS MINERAL
RESOURCES ADJUDICATION BOARD, respondents. CORPORATION and
THE MINES
FACTS:
Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease Contracts over the mining
claims with the Bureau of Mines to extract and dispose of precious minerals found
within its mining claims. Since a portion of Banahaw Mining‟s mining claims was
located in petitioner PICOP‟s logging concession in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw
Mining and petitioner PICOP entered into a Memorandum of Agreement, whereby,
petitioner PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining an access/right of way to its mining
claims. Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims to applications for Mineral
Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA). While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw
Mining, decided to sell/assign its rights and interests in favor of private respondent
Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation (Base Metals. Base Metals amended
Banahaw Mining‟s pending MPSA applications with the Bureau of Mines to
substitute itself as applicant. petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-Sciences
Bureau (MGB), an Adverse Claim and/or Opposition to Base Metals‟ application
asserts that its concession areas are closed to mining operations as these are within
the Agusan-Surigao-Davao forest reserve established under Proclamation No. 369 of
then Gov. Gen. Dwight Davis. The area is allegedly also part of permanent forest
established under Republic Act No. 3092 (RA 3092), and overlaps the wilderness
area where mining applications are expressly prohibited under RA 7586. Hence, the
area is closed to mining operations under Sec. 19(f) of RA 7942.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the area covered by Base Metals‟ MPSA is closed to mining
activities
HELD:
PICOP failed to present any evidence that the area covered by the MPSA is a
protected wilderness area designated as an initial component of the NIPAS pursuant
to a law, presidential decree, presidential proclamation or executive order as
required by RA 7586. Although the above-cited area status and clearances,
particularly those pertaining to MPSA Nos. 012 and 013, state that portions thereof
are within the wilderness area of PICOP, there is no showing that this supposed
wilderness area has been proclaimed, designated or set aside as such, pursuant to a
law, presidential decree, presidential proclamation or executive order. It should be
emphasized that it is only when this area has been so designated that Sec. 20 of RA
7586, which prohibits mineral locating within protected areas, becomes operational.
From the foregoing, there is clearly no merit to PICOP's contention that the area
covered by Base Metals' MPSA is, by law, closed to mining activities.
PROVINCE OF RIZAL VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECEMBER 13, 2005
Facts:
This is a petition filed by the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San Mateo,
and various concerned citizens for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court
of Appeals, denying, for lack of cause of action, the petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary restraining order/writ of
preliminary injunction assailing the legality and constitutionality of Proclamation
No. 635.
At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its environs, parts
of the Marikina Watershed Reservation were set aside by the Office of the President
[President Ramos], through Proclamation No. 635, for use as a sanitary landfill and
similar waste disposal applications.
The petioners opposed the implementation of said order since the creation of
dump site under the territorial jurisdiction would compromise the health of their
constutents. Moreso, the the dump site is to be constructed in Watershed reservation.
Through their concerted efforts of the officials and residents of Province of Rizal
and Municipality of San Mateo, the dump site was closed. However, during the term
of President Estrada in 2003, the dumpsite was re-opened.
A temporary restraining order was then filed. Although petitioners did not raised
the question that the project was not consulted and approved by their appropriate
Sanggunian, the court take it into consideration since a mere MOA does not
guarantee the dump site’s permanent closure.
Issue:
Whether or not the consultation and approval of the Province of Rizal and
municipality of San Mateo is needed before the implementation of the project..
Ruling:
The court reiterated again that "the earth belongs in usufruct to the living."
Yes, as lucidly explained by the court: contrary to the averment of the
respondents, Proclamation No. 635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject
to the provisions of the Local Government Code, which was approved four years
earlier, on 10 October 1991.
Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state- "to require
all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultation with appropriate
local government units, non-governmental and people's organization, and other
concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented
in their respective jurisdiction." Likewise Section 27 requires prior consultations
before a program shall be implemented by government authorities ans the prior
approval of the Sanggunian is obtained." Corollarily as held in Lina , Jr. v. Paño,
Section 2 (c), requiring consultations with the appropriate local government units,
should apply to national government projects affecting the environmental or
ecological balance of the particular community implementing the project.
Relative to the case, during the oral arguments at the hearing for the temporary
restraining order, Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task
Force declared before the Court of Appeals that they had conducted the required
consultations. However, the ambivalence of his reply was brought to the fore when
at the height of the protest rally and barricade made by the residents of petitioners to
stop dump trucks from reaching the site, all the municipal mayors of the province of
Rizal openly declared their full support for the rally and notified the MMDA that
they would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their province.
Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of the
municipality, grants the sangguniang bayan the power to, among other things,
“enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare
of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of th(e) Code.” These
include:
(1) Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect the environment and
impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as
dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, illegal logging and
smuggling of logs, smuggling of natural resources products and of endangered
species of flora and fauna, slash and burn farming, and such other activities which
result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological
imbalance; [Section 447 (1)(vi)]
(2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the
jurisdiction of the municipality, adopting a comprehensive land use plan for the
municipality, reclassifying land within the jurisdiction of the city, subject to the
pertinent provisions of this Code, enacting integrated zoning ordinances in
consonance with the approved comprehensive land use plan, subject to existing
laws, rules and regulations; establishing fire limits or zones, particularly in populous
centers; and regulating the construction, repair or modification of buildings within
said fire limits or zones in accordance with the provisions of this Code;[Section 447
(2)(vi-ix)]
(3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of
the basic services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in
addition to said services and facilities, …providing for the establishment,
maintenance, protection, and conservation of communal forests and watersheds, tree
parks, greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest development projects ….and,
subject to existing laws, establishing and providing for the maintenance, repair and
operation of an efficient waterworks system to supply water for the inhabitants and
purifying the source of the water supply; regulating the construction, maintenance,
repair and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protecting the purity and
quantity of the water supply of the municipality and, for this purpose, extending the
coverage of appropriate ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of said
water supply and within one hundred (100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal,
aqueduct, pumping station, or watershed used in connection with the water service;
and regulating the consumption, use or wastage of water.”[Section 447 (5)(i) &
(vii)]
Briefly stated, under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met
before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of
local communities can be implemented:
(1) prior consultation with the affected local communities, and
(2)prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the project’s implementation is
illegal.
(NICASIO ALCANTARA VS. COMM. ON SETTLEMENT;
CUTARAN VS. DENR;
TANENGLIAN VS. LORENZO – NO DIGEST)
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA
PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-appellee, vs. MARCELLE D. VDA.DE
RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees,
oppositors-appellants.
FACTS:
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964,
with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios
was appointed administratrix of the estate.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the
property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the
widow “en plenodominio” in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or “free
portion” shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez “en nudapropriedad.” Furthermore,
one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow‟s usufruct and the
remaining two-third (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
-APPEAL for the partitioning of testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez (a Filipino
national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964) among principal beneficiaries:
Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez
-widow
-French who lives in Paris
-received ½ (as spouse) and usufructuary rights over 1/3 of the free portion
Roberto and Jorge Ramirez
-two grandnephews
-lives in Malate
-received the ½ (free portion)
Wanda de Wrobleski
-companion
-Austrian who lives in Spain
-received usufructuary rights of 2/3 of the free portion
-vulgar substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez
-Maria Luisa Palacios -administratix
-Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed because
a. vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda wrt widow’s usufruct and in favor of Juan
Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez, wrt to Wanda’s usufruct is INVALID
because first heirs (Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator
b. fideicommissary substitutions are INVALID because first heirs not related to the
second heirs or substitutes within the first degree as provided in Art 863 CC
c. grant of usufruct of real property in favor of an alien, Wanda, violated Art XIII
Sec 5
d. proposed partition of the testator’’s interest in the Santa Cruz Building between
widow and appellants violates testators express will to give this property to them
-LC: approved partition
ISSUE
WON the partition is valid insofar as
a. widow’s legitime
b. substitutions
c. usufruct of Wanda
HELD
a. YES, appellants do not question ½ because Marcelle is the widow[1]and over
which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any
kind whatsoever[2]
-the proposed creation by the admininstratix in favor of the testator’s widow of a
usufruct over 1/3 of the free portion of the testator’s estate cannot be made where it
will run counter to the testator’s express will. The Court erred for Marcelle who is
entitled to ½ of the estate “enpleno dominio” as her legitime and which is more than
what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the
estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testator’s
intention for as stated above his disposition even impaired her legitime and tended to
favor Wanda.
b. Vulgar substitutions are valid because dying before the testator is not the only
case where a vulgar substitution can be made. Also, according to Art 859 CC, cases
also include refusal or incapacity to accept inheritance therefore it is VALID.
BUT fideicommissary substitutions are VOID because Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace Ramirez are not related to Wande and according to Art 863 CC, it validates a
fideicommissary substitution provided that such substitution does not go beyond one
degreefrom the heir originally instituted. Another is that there is no absolute duty
imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufructuary to the substitutes and in fact the
apellee agrees that the testator contradicts the establishment of the fideicommissary
substitution when he permits the properties be subject to usufruct to be sold upon
mutual agreement ofthe usufructuaries and naked owners.
c. YES, usufruct of Wanda is VALID
-Art XIII[3]Sec 5 (1935): Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except toindividuals, corporations,
or associations qualified to acquire or hold land of the public domain in the
Philippines.[4]
The lower court upheld the usufruct thinking that the Constitution covers not only
succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession BUT SC is of the
opinion that this provision does not apply to testamentary succession for otherwise
the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would circumvent the
prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a
piece of land BUT an alienmay be bestowed USUFRUCTUARY RIGHTS over a
parcel of land in the Philippines. Therefore, the usufruct in favor of Wanda, although
a real right, is upheld because it does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary
(Wanda) and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by
the Constitution.
Decision:½ Marcelle (as legitime), ½ Jorge and Roberto Ramirez (free portion) in
naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with simple substitution
in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez