Kierulf vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No.

99301

How much -MORAL-, exemplary and actual damages are victims of vehicular accidents entitled to?

Second Issue: -MORAL- Damages

Complainants aver that the -MORAL- damages awarded by Respondent Court are "clearly and woefully
not enough." The established guideline in awarding -MORAL- damages takes into consideration several factors,
some of which are the social and financial standing of the injured parties and [17] their wounded -MORAL-
feelings and personal pride.[18] The Kierulf spouses add that the Respondent Court should have considered
another factor: the loss of their conjugal fellowship and the impairment or destruction of their sexual life. [19]
The spouses aver that the disfigurement of Lucila's physical appearance cannot but affect their marital right
to "consortium" which would have remained normal were it not for the accident. Thus the -MORAL- damages
awarded in favor of Lucila should be increased to P1,000,000.00, not only for Lucila but also for her husband
Victor who also suffered "psychologically." A California case, Rodriguez vs. Bethlehem Steel Corporation,[20]
is cited as authority for the claim of damages by reason of loss of marital consortium, i.e. loss of conjugal
fellowship and sexual relations.[21]
Pantranco rebuts that Victor's claim of -MORAL- damages on alleged loss of consortium is without legal
basis. Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides that only the person suffering the injury may claim -MORAL-
damages. Additionally, no evidence was adduced to show that the consortium had indeed been impaired and the
Court cannot presume that marital relations disappeared with the accident. [22]
The Courts notes that the Rodriguez case clearly reversed the original common law view first enunciated in
the case of Deshotel vs. Atchison,[23] that a wife could not recover for the loss of her husband's services by the
act of a third party. Rodriguez ruled that when a person is injured to the extent that he/she is no longer capable of
giving love, affection, comfort and sexual relations to his or her spouse, that spouse has suffered a direct and real
personal loss. The loss is immediate and consequential rather than remote and unforeseeable; it is personal to the
spouse and separate and distinct from that of the injured person.
Rodriguez involved a couple in their early 20s, who were married for only 16 months and full of dreams of
building a family of their own, when the husband was struck and almost paralyzed by a falling 600-pound pipe.
The wife testified how her life had deteriorated because her husband became a lifelong invalid, confined to the
home, bedridden and in constant need of assistance for his bodily functions; and how her social, recreational and
sexual life had been severely restricted. It also deprived her of the chance to bear their children. As a constant
witness to her husband's pain, mental anguish and frustration, she was always nervous, tense, depressed and had
trouble sleeping, eating and concentrating. Thus, the California court awarded her damages for loss of
consortium.
Whether Rodriguez may be cited as authority to support the award of -MORAL- damages to Victor and/or
Lucila Kierulf for "loss of consortium," however, cannot be properly considered in this case.
Victor's claim for deprivation of his right to consortium, although argued before Respondent Court, is not
supported by the evidence on record. His wife might have been badly disfigured, but he had not testified that, in
consequence thereof, his right to marital consortium was affected. Clearly, Victor (and for that matter, Lucila)
had failed to make out a case for loss of consortium, unlike the Rodriguez spouse. Again, we emphasize that this
claim is factual in origin and must find basis not only in the evidence presented but also in the findings of the
Respondent Court. For lack of factual basis, such claim cannot be ruled upon by this Court at this time.

Epilogue
This Court cannot remind the bench and the bar often enough that in order that -MORAL- damages may be
awarded, there must be pleading and proof of -MORAL- suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. While no
proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that -MORAL- damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity
being left to the discretion of the court,[39] it is nevertheless essential that the claimant should satisfactorily
show the existence of the factual basis of damages [40] and its causal connection to defendant's acts. This is so
because -MORAL- damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
[41] In Francisco vs. GSIS,[42] the Court held that there must be clear testimony on the anguish and other
forms of mental suffering. Thus, if the plaintiff fails to take the witness stand and testify as to his/her social
humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, -MORAL- damages cannot be awarded. In Cocoland Development
Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission,[43] the Court held that "additional facts must be
pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of -MORAL- damages under the Civil Code, these being, x x x social
humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc., that resulted therefrom."
-MORAL- damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that
will serve to alleviate the -MORAL- suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable
action.[44] Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus, it must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted.[45] Since each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances,
there is no hard and fast rule in determining the proper amount. The yardstick should be that the amount awarded
should not be so palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or
corruption on the part of the trial judge.[46] Neither should it be so little or so paltry that it rubs salt to the injury
already inflicted on plaintiffs.

Zenith Insurance Corp. v (G.R. No. 85296

As regards the award of -MORAL- and exemplary damages, the rules under the Civil Code of the Philippines
shall govern.
"The purpose of -MORAL- damages is essentially indemnity or reparation, not punishment or correction.
-MORAL- damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant, they
are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the -MORAL- suffering he has undergone by reason of the defendant's culpable action." (J. Cezar S.
Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, Revised Edition, p. 539) (See also R and B Surety & Insurance
Co., Inc. v. IAC, G.R. No. 64515, June 22, 1984; 129 SCRA 745). While it is true that no proof of pecuniary loss
is necessary in order that -MORAL- damages may be adjudicated, the assessment of which is left to the
discretion of the court according to the circumstances of each case (Art. 2216, New Civil Code), it is equally true
that in awarding -MORAL- damages in case of breach of contract, there must be a showing that the breach was
wanton and deliberately injurious or the one responsible acted fraudently or in bad faith (Perez v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-20238, January 30,1965; 13 SCRA 137; Solis v. Salvador, G.R. No. L-17022, August 14,
1965; 14 SCRA 887). In the instant case, there was a finding that private respondent was given a "run-around"
for two months, which is the basis for the award of the damages granted under the Insurance Code for
unreasonable delay in the payment of the claim. However, the act of petitioner of delaying payment for two
months cannot be considered as so wanton or malevolent to justify an award of P20,000.00 as -MORAL-
damages, taking into consideration also the fact that the actual damage on the car was only P3,460. In the pre-
trial of the case, it was shown that there was no total disclaimer by respondent. The reason for petitioner's failure
to indemnify private respondent within the two-month period was that the parties could not come to an
agreement as regards the amount of the actual damage on the car. The amount of P10,000.00 prayed for by
private respondent as -MORAL- damages is equitable.
On the other hand, exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good (Art. 2229, New Civil Code of the Philippines). In the case of Noda v. Cruz-Arnaldo, G.R. No. 57322, June
22,1987; 151 SCRA 227, exemplary damages were not awarded as the insurance company had not acted in
wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. The same is true in the case at bar.

Immaculate Concepcion Academy vs. AMA Computer College Inc (GR No. 173757

Aside from seeking the dismissal of the complaint, ICA and Dr. Campos separately seek -MORAL- and
exemplary damages in the amount of P90 million and P10 million plus attorneys fees and cost of suit.

To be entitled to -MORAL- damages, ICA needed to prove that it had a good reputation and that AMAs action
besmirched the same.[11] Such proof is wanting in this case. As for Dr. Campos, he has amply proved that he
suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, and social humiliation following AMAs unfounded accusation that he
fraudulently misled AMA regarding the structural condition of ICAs building. However, due to his untimely
demise before the finality of this case, his claim for -MORAL- damages does not survive and is not
transmissible to his substitutes, for being extremely personal to him. [12]

Since AMA acted in a reckless, wanton, oppressive, and malevolent manner in imputing fraud and deceit on ICA
and Dr. Campos, the Court finds ground for awarding them exemplary damages. Further, the Court holds that,
having been compelled to litigate in order to protect their interests, ICA and Dr. Campos are also entitled to
attorneys fees.
Expert Travel & Tours, Inc. vs. CA (G.R. No. 130030

In this recourse, petitioner confines itself to the following related legal issues; viz.:
I. Can -MORAL- damages be recovered in a clearly unfounded suit?
 II. Can -MORAL- damages be awarded for negligence or quasi-delict that did not result to
physical injury to the offended party?2
There is merit in the petition.
-MORAL- damages are not punitive in nature but are designed to
compensate3 and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, -MORAL- shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly
caused to a person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, -MORAL- damages, nevertheless, must
somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted. 4 Such damages, to be recoverable,
must be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission the factual basis for which is satisfactorily established
by the aggrieved party.5 An award of -MORAL- damages would require certain conditions to be met; to wit: (1)
First, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2)
second, there must be a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of
the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of
damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219. 6 Under the provisions of this law, in culpa
contractual or breach of contract, -MORAL- damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith
or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation
and, exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries. 7
By special rule in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code, -MORAL- damages may also be
awarded in case the death of a passenger results from a breach of carriage. In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a)
when an act or omission causes physical injuries, or (b) where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, 8
-MORAL- damages may aptly be recovered. This rule also applies, as aforestated, to contracts when breached
by tort. In culpa criminal, -MORAL- damages could be lawfully due when the accused is found guilty of
physical injuries, lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention, illegal arrest, illegal
search, or defamation. Malicious prosecution can also give rise to a claim for -MORAL- damages. The term
"analogous cases," referred to in Article 2219, following the ejusdem generis rule, must be held similar to those
expressly enumerated by the law. 9
Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit can at times be a legal justification for an award of
attorney's fees, 10 such filing, however, has almost invariably been held not to be a ground for an award of
-MORAL-
damages. 11 The rationale for the rule is that the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
litigate. The anguish suffered by a person for having been made a defendant in a civil suit would be no different
from the usual worry and anxiety suffered by anyone who is haled to court, a situation that cannot by itself be a
cogent reason for the award of -MORAL- damages. 12 If the rule were otherwise, then -MORAL- damages
must every time be awarded in favor of the prevailing defendant against an unsuccessful plaintiff. 13
The Court confirms, once again, the foregoing rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the award of -MORAL- damages to respondent Ricardo Lo
under the assailed decision is DELETED. In its other aspects, the appealed decision shall remain undisturbed.
No costs.1âwphi1.nêt
Compania Maritima vs. Allied Free Worker's Union (G.R. No. L·28999; May 24, 1977)

First assignment of error. - The appellants contend that the trial court erred in awarding to the company actual
damages, amounting to P450,000, -MORAL- damages, of P50,000 and attorney's Considering of P20,000, and
in holding that the four officers of the union are solidarily liable for the said damages.

If to improve the arrastre and stevedoring service, the company had to incur expenses. for the purchase of
forklifts, pallet boards, tarpaulins and wire rope slings and for the operation of the forklifts, the union should not
be required to reimburse the company for those expenses. The company should bear those expenses. because the
same redounded to its benefit.
The trial court erred in ordering the union and its officials to pay the amount of the said expenses. as damages, to
the company.
-MORAL- damages and attorney's fees. - Considering that the consignees. claim for -MORAL- damages, was
based on the same facts on which it predicated its claim for actual deduction which we have found to be
groundless, it follows that the company, a juridical person, is not entitled to -MORAL- damages.
Anyway, the company did not plead and prove -MORAL- damages. It merely claimed -MORAL- damages, in
the prayer of its complaint. That is not sufficient (Darang vs. Ty Belizar, L-19487, January 31, 1967, 19 SCRA
214, 222).
Under the facts of this case, we do not find any justification for awarding attorney's Considering to the company.
Hence, the trial court's award of P20,000 as attorney's Considering is set aside.
Miranda·Ribaya vs. Carbonell (G.R. No. L·49390

The Court modifies the decisions of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals insofar as they denied petitioner's
claim for damages and awards to petitioners -MORAL- and exemplary damages in the amount of 25% of the
principal sum adjudged in their favor for the mental anguish and suffering undergone by them as a result of the
defraudation wantonly, oppressively and malevolently committed by private respondents and by way of example
and correction for the public good.
Herein petitioners interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals insofar as the trial court failed to grant their
claim for -MORAL- and exemplary damages, but respondent appellate court rejected their appeal and affirmed
the appealed decision, finding that (1) as to -MORAL- damages, petitioner (therein appellant) Niceta Ribaya
had not mentioned in her testimony in the trial court that she has suffered "mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and -MORAL- shock"; and (2) as to exemplary damages, these damages cannot be recovered
as a matter of right and it was not prepared to disturb the lower court's exercise of discretion in this regard.
Hence this petition for review, which we find to be meritorious.
Respondent court, from its wrong premise, then as erroneously concluded that "(I)n order that -MORAL-
damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of -MORAL- suffering, mental anguish, fright and
the like (San Miguel Brewery, Inc. vs. Magno, 21 SCRA 292). While in the complaint of plaintiffs-appellants
there is an allegation of mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and -MORAL- shock, there is no
proof of the alleged mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and -MORAL- shock. There must be
clear testimony on the mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and similar injuries. Plaintiff must
testify to his said injury (Francisco vs. Government Service Insurance System, 7 SCRA 577). It would seem that
'physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, -MORAL- shock, and similar
injury must be testified to by the plaintiff, and not merely inferred from certain proven facts, like having
sleepless nights. Having sleepness nights is not necessarily due to mental anguish, serious anxiety and the like.
In denying petitioner's claim for damages because of petitioner Niceta's failure to "mention in her testimony that
she suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety or wounded feelings" respondent court misread the case of
Francisco vs. Government Service Insurance System cited by it. There, this Court had sustained the trial court's
appealed decision denying the therein prevailing plaintiff's claim for -MORAL- and exemplary damages "not
only on account of the plaintiff's failure to take the witness stand and testify to her social humiliation, wounded
feelings, anxiety, etc., but primarily because a breach of contract like that of defendant, not being malicious or
fraudulent, does not warrant the award of -MORAL- damages. 2
We do not share respondent court's narrow view that petitioner Niceta's failure to use in her testimony the precise
legal terms or "sacramental phrases" of "mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings or -MORAL-
shock" and the like justifies the denial of the claim for damages. It is sufficient that these exact terms have been
pleaded in the complaint 3 and evidence has been adduced, as cited above, amply supporting the averments of
the complaint. Indeed, petitioner Niceta vividly portrayed in simple terms the -MORAL- shock and suffering
she underwent as a result of respondents' wanton abuse of her good faith and confidence.
Thus, petitioners' testimonial evidence to the effect that petitioner Niceta suffered "extremely" and that for three
months she could not sleep was a clear demonstration of her physical suffering, mental anguish and serious
anxiety and similar injury, resulting from respondents' malevolent acts that show her to be clearly entitled to
-MORAL- damages. 4
Petitioners having established the more damages, are entitled in addition thereto, to exemplary damages.The
wantonness and malevolence through which respondents defrauded petitioners, deceitfully incurring and then
evading settlement of their just liability certainly justifies the award of exemplary damages by way of example
and correction for the public good and also to serve as a deterrent to the commission of similar misdeeds by
others, 5 even if the transaction were viewed as a breach of civil contract.
Del Rosario vs CA (G.R. No. 118325; Jan. 29, 1997)

Its grant of MORAL and exemplary damages was justified by the Trial Court as follows:27
Form the evidence presented, plaintiffs' sufferings have been duly and substantially proven by
the defendant's fraudulent actuation and breach of warranty, and thereby entitled for the claim of
damages and litigation costs as enunciated by the testimony of the plaintiff... that the damages to
his house caused sufferings and feelings of shock. helplessness, fears, embarrassment and anger,
thereby entitling him to MORAL Damages which should be assessed at P500,000.00.
"The MORAL damages. . . . (are awarded) for indemnity or reparation not punishment or
correction, that is, an award to entitle the injured party to obtain means (of) diversions and
amusement that will serve to alleviate the MORAL sufferings he has undergone by reason of
defendant's culpable action. (RNB Surety and Ins. Co. v. IAC, G.R No. 64515, June 22, 1984,
129 SCRA 745)."
That MFC did in truth act with bad faith, in flagrant breach of its express warranties made to the general public
and in wanton disregard of the rights of the Del Rosarios who relied on those warranties, is adequately
demonstrated by the recorded proofs. The law explicitly authorizes the award of MORAL damages "in breaches
of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith." 28 There being, moreover, satisfactory
evidence of the psychological and mental trauma actually suffered by the Del Rosarios, the grant to them of
MORAL damages is warranted. Over a period of about a month. they experienced "feelings of shock,
helplessness, fear, embarrassment and anger."29 As declared by this Court in Makabili v. Court of Appeals,30
among other precedents:
It is essential. . . . in the award of damages that the claimant must have satisfactorily proven
during the trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to
defendant's acts. This is so because MORAL damages though incapable of pecuniary
estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury
suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer (Enervida v. De la Torre, 55 SCRA 340
[1974.] and are allowable only when specifically prayed for in the complaint. (San Miguel
Brewery, Inc. v. Magno, 21 SCRA 292 [1968])
As reflected in the records of the case, the Court of Appeals was in agreement with the findings
of the trial court that petitioners suffered anguish, embarrassment and mental sufferings due to
the failure of private respondent to perform its obligation to petitioners. According to the Court
of Appeals, private respondent acted in wanton disregard of the rights of petitioners. These
pronouncements lay the basis and justification for this Court to award petitioners MORAL and
exemplary damages."
This Court also agrees with the Trial Court that exemplary damages are properly exigible of MFC, "Article
2229 of the Civil Code provides that such damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good, While exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they need not be proved,
although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to MORAL, temperate or compensatory damages before the
court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded."31 "Exemplary
damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a
negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions." 32
However, the same statutory and jurisprudential standards just mentioned dictate reduction of the amounts of
MORAL and exemplary damages fixed by the Trial Court. There is, to be sure, no hard and fast rule for
determining what would be a fair amount of MORAL (or exemplary) damages, each case having to be
governed by its attendant particulars, Generally, the amount of MORAL damages should be commensurate with
the actual loss or injury suffered. In the case of PNB v. C.A, just cited,33 this Court quoted with approval the
following observation from RCPI v. Rodriguez, 34 viz.:
. . . Nevertheless, we find the award of P100,000.00 as MORAL damages in favor of respondent
Rodriguez excessive and unconscionable. In the case of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport
System, Inc. (148 SCRA 440 [1987]) we said: ". . . [I]t is undisputed that the trial courts are
given discretion to determine the amount of MORAL damages (Alcantara v. Surro, 93 Phil.
472) and that the Court of Appeals can only modify or change the amount awarded when they
are palpably and scandalously excessive "so as to indicate that it was the result of passion,
prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court" (Gellada v. Warner Barnes & Co., Inc., 57
O.G. [4] 7347, 7358; Sadie v. Bacharach Motors Co., Inc., 57 O.G. [4] 636 and Adone v.
Bacharach Motor Co., Inc., 57 O.G. 656). But in more recent cases where the awards of
MORAL and exemplary damages are far too excessive compared to the actual loses sustained
by the aggrieved party, this Court ruled that they should be reduced to more reasonable amounts.
. . . (Emphasis ours.)
In other words, the MORAL damages awarded must be commensurate with the loss or injury
suffered.
In the same case (PNB v. CA), this Court35 found the amount of exemplary damages required to be paid
(P1,000,000.00) "too excessive" and reduced it to an "equitable level" (P25,000.00).
. . . (T)he award of P1,000,000.00 exemplary damages is also far too excessive and should
likewise be reduced to an equitable level. Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one
party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb
socially deleterious actions.
In another case involving strikingly analogous facts decided in 1994, Geraldez vs. CA.,36 where no actual
damages were adjudicated but MORAL and exemplary damages in similar amounts (P500.000.00 and
P300,000.00, respectively) were awarded by the Trial Court, as in this case, this Court reduced the amount of
MORAL damages to P100,000.00 and of exemplary damages to P50,000.00. The Court sees no reason to adopt
a different treatment in the case at bar, and accordingly reduces the MORAL damages from P500,000.00 to
P100,000.00, and the exemplary damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00.
People vs. Obligado (G.R. No. 171735

With respect to the award of damages, to conform with recent jurisprudence, the appellant is ordered to pay
₱75,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto.8
Both the RTC and CA did not award indemnity for loss of earning capacity despite the testimony of the victim’s
widow that he earned ₱5,000 per month as a driver. Such indemnity is not awarded in the absence of
documentary evidence except where the victim was either self-employed or was a daily wage worker earning
less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. 9 Since it was neither alleged nor proved that the victim
was either self-employed or was a daily wage worker, indemnity for loss of earning cannot be awarded to the
heirs of the victim.1awphi1
Settled is the rule that only receipted expenses can be the basis of actual damages arising from funeral
expenditures.10 All the prosecution presented was a receipt from the funeral parlor amounting to ₱15,000. Since
the receipted expenses of the victim’s family was less than ₱25,000, temperate damages in the said amount can
be awarded in lieu of actual damages.11 Accordingly, the heirs of the victim are not entitled to actual damages
but to temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.
Moreover, inasmuch as MORAL damages are mandatory in cases of murder (without need to allege and prove
such damages), appellant is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim ₱50,000. 12
Lastly, since the killing of the victim was attended by treachery, his heirs are entitled to exemplary damages in
the amount of ₱25,000.13
WHEREFORE, the December 20, 2005 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01608 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Alejo Obligado y Magdaraog is found guilty of murder
as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
He is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim Felix Oliveros y Rañada ₱75,000 as civil indemnity ex
delicto, ₱25,000 as temperate damages, ₱50,000 as MORAL damages and ₱25,000 as exemplary damages.
Arcona vs. CA (G.R. No. 134784; Dec. 9, 2002)

On the other hand, the award of MORAL damages in the sum of P 10,000.00 must be increased to P50,000.00.
As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional
pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and
anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not
only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and
support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. For this reason,
MORAL damages must be awarded even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs’ emotional
suffering.17
Finally, the award of actual damages in the amount of P10,000.00 does not appear to have been substantiated.
Only those expenses which are duly proven, or those that appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection
with the death, wake or burial of the victim, will be recognized in court.18 Hence, the same must be
deleted.1awph!l.net
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals, finding petitioner Carlos Arvuna y Morban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide, attended by
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Napoleon Ong the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner is further ordered to pay the heirs of
the deceased MORAL damages in the increased amount of P50,000.00. The award of actual damages is deleted
for lack of factual and legal basis.
People vs. Malicsi (G.R. No. 175833; Jan. 29, 2008)

We find that the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on appellant. The
appellate court also correctly affirmed the award by the trial court of P200,000 in MORAL damages. MORAL
damages are automatically granted to the rape victim without presentation of further proof other than the
commission of the crime.24

People vs. Guanzon (G.R. No. 187077; Feb. 23, 2011)

Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory upon the
finding of the fact of rape.47 MORAL damages in rape cases should be awarded without need of showing that
the victim suffered trauma, with mental, physical, and psychological sufferings constituting the basis thereof.
These are too obvious to still require their recital by the victim at the trial.48
Sombilon, Jr. vs. People (G.R. No. 175528; Sept. 30, 2009)

With regard to the awarded MORAL damages in the amount of ₱10,000.00, the same should be increased to
₱30,000.00. In People v. Solmoro24 we declared that upon a finding of guilt of the accused for acts of
lasciviousness, the amount of ₱30,000.00 as MORAL damages may be further awarded to the victim in the
same way that MORAL damages are awarded to victims of rape even without need of proof because it is
assumed that they suffered MORAL injury. Considering the immeasurable pain and anguish that the victim had
to suffer in the hands of the petitioner; the trauma that she had to endure even after the incident; and the sexual
perversity of petitioner, who is a police officer, the award of MORAL damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 is
proper.

Industrial Insurance Co. vs. Bondad (G.R. No. 136722;

In justifying the award of attorney's fees and other litigation expenses, the appellate court held that respondents
were compelled to litigate an unfounded suit because of petitioner's negligence and lack of prudence in not
verifying the facts before filing this action. In affirming the award of MORAL damages, it accepted the trial
court's justification that respondents had "been recklessly and without basis . . . impleaded by the plaintiff in
spite of the clear language in the Traffic Investigation Report . . . submitted by Pfc. Agapito Domingo." 16
We agree.
Attorney's fees may be awarded by a court if one who claims it is compelled to litigate with third persons or to
incur expenses to protect one's interests by reason of an unjustified act or omission on the part of the party from
whom it is sought. 17
In this case, the records show that petitioner's suit against respondents was manifestly unjustified. In the first
place, the contact between the vehicles of respondents and of MORALes was completely due to the impact of
the onrushing bus. This fact is manifest in the police investigation report and, significantly, in the findings of
facts of both lower courts.
In the same vein, we affirm the award of MORAL damages. To sustain this award, it must be shown that (1) the
claimant suffered injury, and (2) such injury sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the
Civil Code. It is not enough that the claimant alleges mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social
humiliation, and the like as a result of the acts of the other party. It is necessary that such acts be shown to have
been tainted with bad faith or ill motive. 19
In the case at bar, it has been shown that the petitioner acted in bad faith in compelling respondents to litigate an
unfounded claim. As a result, Respondent Ligorio Bondad "could no longer concentrate on his job." Moreover,
Pablo Bondad became sick and even suffered a mild stroke. Indeed, respondents' anxiety is not difficult to
understand. They were innocently attending to a flat tire on the shoulder of the road; the next thing they knew,
they were already being blamed for an accident. Worse, they were forced to commute all the way from Laguna to
Makati in order to attend the hearings. Under the circumstances of this case, the award of MORAL damages is
justified.
Likewise, we affirm the award of exemplary damages because petitioner's conduct needlessly dragged innocent
bystanders into an unfounded litigation. Indeed, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to MORAL, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. 20
In sum, the Court affirms the award of MORAL damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation
expenses. The facts of this case clearly show that petitioner was motivated by bad faith in impleading
respondents. Indeed, a person's right to litigate, as a rule, should not be penalized. This right, however, must be
exercised in good faith. 21
One final note. Respondents pray that the amount of actual, MORAL and exemplary damages awarded by the
trial court be reinstated. 22 We cannot do so in this case because they did not appeal the CA Decision.
Jurisprudentially, they are deemed to be satisfied with it and thus cannot be allowed to attack it belatedly in their
Memorandum.1âwphi1.nêt
Flores vs. Pineda (G.R. No. 158996; Nov. 14, 2008)

In addition to the award for actual damages, the respondent heirs of Teresita are likewise entitled to P50,000.00
as death indemnity pursuant to Article 2206 of the Civil Code, which states that "the amount of damages for
death caused by a xxx quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos,53 even though there may have been
mitigating circumstances xxx." This is a question of law that the CA missed in its decision and which we now
decide in the respondents' favor.
The same article allows the recovery of moral damages in case of death caused by a quasi-delict and enumerates
the spouse, legitimate or illegitimate ascendants or descendants as the persons entitled thereto. Moral damages
are designed to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered, that is, for the mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings which the respondents herein must have surely felt with the unexpected loss of their daughter.
We affirm the appellate court's award of P400,000.00 by way of moral damages to the respondents.
We similarly affirm the grant of exemplary damages. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good.54 Because of the petitioner spouses' negligence in subjecting Teresita to an
operation without first recognizing and addressing her diabetic condition, the appellate court awarded
exemplary damages to the respondents in the amount of P100,000.00. Public policy requires such imposition to
suppress the wanton acts of an offender.55 We therefore affirm the CA's award as an example to the medical
profession and to stress that the public good requires stricter measures to avoid the repetition of the type of
medical malpractice that happened in this case.
With the award of exemplary damages, the grant of attorney's fees is legally in order. 56 We therefore reverse
the CA decision deleting these awards, and grant the respondents the amount of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees
taking into consideration the legal route this case has taken.
Macalinao vs. Ong (G.R. No. 146635; Dec. 14, 2005)

The Court of Appeals held that the actual or compensatory damage sought by respondents for the injuries they
sustained in the form of hospital bills were already liquidated and were ascertained. Accordingly, the 6% interest
per annum should commence to run from the time the judicial demand was made or from the filing of the
complaint and not from the date of judgment. The Court of Appeals also awarded attorney's fees equivalent to
30% of the total amount recovered based on the retainer agreement of the parties. The appellate court also held
that respondents are entitled to exemplary and moral damages. Finally, it affirmed the ruling of the trial court
that the claim of CDCP against Phoenix had already prescribed.

Petitioner's claim that paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion of the trial court's decision is ambiguous and
arbitrary and also entitles respondents to recover twice is without basis. In the body of the trial court's decision, it
was clearly stated that petitioner and its driver Payunan, Jr., are jointly and solidarily liable for moral damages in
the amount of P50,000.00 to respondent Fletcher and P25,000.00 to respondent Estrella. 20 Moreover, there
could be no double recovery because the award in paragraph 2 is for moral damages while the award in
paragraph 1 is for actual damages and attorney's fees.
Petitioner next claims that the damages, attorney's fees, and legal interest awarded by the Court of Appeals are
excessive.
Moral damages may be recovered in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. 21 The award of moral damages in
favor of Fletcher and Estrella in the amount of P80,000.00 must be reduced since prevailing jurisprudence fixed
the same at P50,000.00.22 While moral damages are not intended to enrich the plaintiff at the expense of the
defendant, the award should nonetheless be commensurate to the suffering inflicted. 23
The Court of Appeals correctly awarded respondents exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 each.
Exemplary damages may be awarded in addition to moral and compensatory damages. 24 Article 2231 of the
Civil Code also states that in quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.25 In this case, petitioner's driver was driving recklessly at the time its truck rammed the BLTB bus.
Petitioner, who has direct and primary liability for the negligent conduct of its subordinates, was also found
negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees. In Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals,26 we held, thus:
ART. 2229 of the Civil Code also provides that such damages may be imposed, by way of example or
correction for the public good. While exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they
need not be proved, although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be
awarded. Exemplary Damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as
a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.
Sulpicio Lines, Inc. vs. Curso (G.R. No. 157009

Are the surviving brothers and sisters of a passenger of a vessel that sinks during a voyage entitled to recover
moral damages from the vessel owner as common carrier?
This is the question presented in the appeal taken by the common carrier from the reversal by the Court of
Appeals (CA) of the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissing the complaint for various damages
filed by the surviving brothers and sisters of the late Dr. Cenon E. Curso upon a finding that force majeure had
caused the sinking. The CA awarded moral and other damages to the surviving brothers and sisters.
The petition is meritorious.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract,
unless there is fraud or bad faith.8 As an exception, moral damages may be awarded in case of breach of contract
of carriage that results in the death of a passenger, 9 in accordance with Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206
(3), of the Civil Code, which provide:
Article 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance with Title XVIII of
this Book, concerning Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of
contract by a common carrier.
Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand
pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity
shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the
court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had
no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article 291, the recipient
who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may
demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact
duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
The foregoing legal provisions set forth the persons entitled to moral damages. The omission from Article 2206
(3) of the brothers and sisters of the deceased passenger reveals the legislative intent to exclude them from the
recovery of moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius.10 The solemn power and duty of the courts to interpret and apply the law do not include the power to
correct the law by reading into it what is not written therein. 11 Thus, the CA erred in awarding moral damages to
the respondents.
The petitioner has correctly relied on the holding in Receiver for North Negros Sugar Company, Inc. v.
Ybañez,12 to the effect that in case of death caused by quasi-delict, the brother of the deceased was not entitled
to the award of moral damages based on Article 2206 of the Civil Code.
Essentially, the purpose of moral damages is indemnity or reparation, that is, to enable the injured party to obtain
the means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason
of the tragic event. According to Villanueva v. Salvador, 13 the conditions for awarding moral damages are: (a)
there must be an injury, whether physical, mental, or psychological, clearly substantiated by the claimant; (b)
there must be a culpable act or omission factually established; (c) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant
must be the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (d) the award of damages is predicated
on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
To be entitled to moral damages, the respondents must have a right based upon law. It is true that under Article
100314 of the Civil Code they succeeded to the entire estate of the late Dr. Curso in the absence of the latter’s
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, and surviving spouse. However, they were not included among
the persons entitled to recover moral damages, as enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped or abused referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also
recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this
article, in the order named.1avvphi1
Article 2219 circumscribes the instances in which moral damages may be awarded. The provision does not
include succession in the collateral line as a source of the right to recover moral damages. The usage of the
phrase analogous cases in the provision means simply that the situation must be held similar to those expressly
enumerated in the law in question15 following the ejusdem generis rule. Hence, Article 1003 of the Civil Code
is not concerned with recovery of moral damages.
In fine, moral damages may be recovered in an action upon breach of contract of carriage only when: (a) where
death of a passenger results, or (b) it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud and bad faith, even if death
does not result.16 Article 2206 of the Civil Code entitles the descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, and
surviving spouse of the deceased passenger to demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death
of the deceased.17
ABS·CBN vs. CA (G.R. No. 128690; Jan. 21, 1999)

Accordingly, respondent court sustained the award of actual damages consisting in the cost of print
advertisements and the premium payments for the counterbond, there being adequate proof of the pecuniary loss
which RBS had suffered as a result of the filing of the complaint by ABS-CBN. As to the award of moral
damages, the Court of Appeals found reasonable basis therefor, holding that RBS's reputation was debased by
the filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-92-12309 and by the non-showing of the film "Maging Sino Ka
Man." Respondent court also held that exemplary damages were correctly imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good in view of the filing of the complaint despite petitioner's knowledge that the
contract with VIVA had not been perfected, It also upheld the award of attorney's fees, reasoning that with ABS-
CBN's act of instituting Civil Case No, Q-92-1209, RBS was "unnecessarily forced to litigate." The appellate
court, however, reduced the awards of moral damages to P2 million, exemplary damages to P2 million, and
attorney's fees to P500, 000.00.

ABS-CBN further contends that there was no clear basis for the awards of moral and exemplary damages. The
controversy involving ABS-CBN and RBS did not in any way originate from business transaction between them.
The claims for such damages did not arise from any contractual dealings or from specific acts committed by
ABS-CBN against RBS that may be characterized as wanton, fraudulent, or reckless; they arose by virtue only of
the filing of the complaint, An award of moral and exemplary damages is not warranted where the record is
bereft of any proof that a party acted maliciously or in bad faith in filing an action. 27 In any case, free resort to
courts for redress of wrongs is a matter of public policy. The law recognizes the right of every one to sue for that
which he honestly believes to be his right without fear of standing trial for damages where by lack of sufficient
evidence, legal technicalities, or a different interpretation of the laws on the matter, the case would lose ground.
28 One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. 29 If damage results front the filing of the
complaint, it is damnum absque injuria. 30 Besides, moral damages are generally not awarded in favor of a
juridical person, unless it enjoys a good reputation that was debased by the offending party resulting in social
humiliation.31

As regards moral and exemplary damages, RBS asserts that ABS-CBN filed the case and secured injunctions
purely for the purpose of harassing and prejudicing RBS. Pursuant then to Article 19 and 21 of the Civil Code,
ABS-CBN must be held liable for such damages. Citing Tolentino,34 damages may be awarded in cases of
abuse of rights even if the act done is not illicit and there is abuse of rights were plaintiff institutes and action
purely for the purpose of harassing or prejudicing the defendant.

As to moral damages the law is Section 1, Chapter 3, Title XVIII, Book IV of the Civil Code. Article 2217
thereof defines what are included in moral damages, while Article 2219 enumerates the cases where they may be
recovered, Article 2220 provides that moral damages may be recovered in breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. RBS's claim for moral damages could possibly fall only under item
(10) of Article 2219, thereof which reads:
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered.
and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.62 The award is not meant to enrich the complainant at the
expense of the defendant, but to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will
serve to obviate then moral suffering he has undergone. It is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the
possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.63 Trial courts
must then guard against the award of exorbitant damages; they should exercise balanced restrained and measured
objectivity to avoid suspicion that it was due to passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the trial court. 64
The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because, being an artificial person and
having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses, It cannot, therefore,
experience physical suffering and mental anguish, which call be experienced only by one having a nervous
system. 65 The statement in People v. Manero 66 and Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB 67 that a corporation may
recover moral damages if it "has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social humiliation" is an obiter
dictum. On this score alone the award for damages must be set aside, since RBS is a corporation.
The basic law on exemplary damages is Section 5, Chapter 3, Title XVIII, Book IV of the Civil Code. These are
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. 68 They are recoverable in criminal cases as part of the civil liability when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances; 69 in quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted with
gross negligence; 70 and in contracts and quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. 71
It may be reiterated that the claim of RBS against ABS-CBN is not based on contract, quasi-contract, delict, or
quasi-delict, Hence, the claims for moral and exemplary damages can only be based on Articles 19, 20, and 21
of the Civil Code.
The elements of abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) the existence of a legal right or duty, (2)
which is exercised in bad faith, and (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of
the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction; while
Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements; (1) there is an act which is legal,
(2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy, and (3) and it is done with intent
to injure. 72
Verily then, malice or bad faith is at the core of Articles 19, 20, and 21. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious
and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. 73 Such must be
substantiated by evidence. 74
There is no adequate proof that ABS-CBN was inspired by malice or bad faith. It was honestly convinced of the
merits of its cause after it had undergone serious negotiations culminating in its formal submission of a draft
contract. Settled is the rule that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and
subject the actor to damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. If
damages result from a person's exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria.
Filipinas Broadcasting Networks, Inc. vs. Ago Medical and Education Center- Bicol, et al. (G.R. No.
141994;

This petition for review1 assails the 4 January 1999 Decision2 and 26 January 2000 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40151. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the 14 December 1992
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 10, in Civil Case No. 8236. The Court of Appeals
held Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. and its broadcasters Hermogenes Alegre and Carmelo Rima liable for
libel and ordered them to solidarily pay Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of
Medicine moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.

Whether AMEC is entitled to moral damages

FBNI contends that AMEC is not entitled to moral damages because it is a corporation. 39
A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it cannot
experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral
shock.40 The Court of Appeals cites Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB, et al.41 to justify the award of moral
damages. However, the Court’s statement in Mambulao that "a corporation may have a good reputation which, if
besmirched, may also be a ground for the award of moral damages" is an obiter dictum.42
Nevertheless, AMEC’s claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of Article 2219 43 of the Civil Code. This
provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form of
defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a
juridical person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other form of defamation and claim
for moral damages.44
Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per se, the law implies damages.45 In such a case, evidence of an
honest mistake or the want of character or reputation of the party libeled goes only in mitigation of damages. 46
Neither in such a case is the plaintiff required to introduce evidence of actual damages as a condition precedent
to the recovery of some damages.47 In this case, the broadcasts are libelous per se. Thus, AMEC is entitled to
moral damages.
However, we find the award of ₱300,000 moral damages unreasonable. The record shows that even though the
broadcasts were libelous per se, AMEC has not suffered any substantial or material damage to its reputation.
Therefore, we reduce the award of moral damages from ₱300,000 to ₱150,000.
Armovit vs. CA (G.R. No. 88561

Nevertheless, the deletion of the nominal damages by the appellate court is well-taken since there is an award of
actual damages. Nominal damages cannot co-exist with actual or compensatory damages.
Vda. De Medina vs. Cresencia
The propriety of the damages awarded has not been questioned, Nevertheless, it is patent upon the record that the
award of P10,000 by way of nominal damages is untenable as a matter of law, since nominal damages cannot co-
exist with compensatory damages. The purpose of nominal damages is to vindicate or recognize a right that has
been violated, in order to preclude further contest thereon; “and not for the purpose of indemnifying the Plaintiff
for any loss suffered by him” (Articles 2221, 2223, new Civil Code.) Since the court below has already awarded
compensatory and exemplary damages that are in themselves a judicial recognition that Plaintiff’s right was
violated, the award of nominal damages is unnecessary and improper. Anyway, ten thousand pesos cannot, in
common sense, be deemed “nominal”.

Pleno vs. CA (G.R. No. 56505

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 64497 which
modified the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a vehicular accident case and reduced by one-half
the award for temperate damages, moral damages, and attorney's fees from a total of P430,000.00 to
P215,000.00. The awards for actual damages in the amount of P48,244.08 and exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 were affirmed.

Nevertheless, as stated earlier, the appellate court reduced the amount of temperate and moral damages as well as
the amount of attorney's fees on the ground that the awards were "too high" .The award of temperate damages
was reduced by the appellate court on the ground that the amount of P200,000.00 is rather "too high" especially
considering the fact that the driver De Luna is a mere driver and defendant-appellant Corporation is only
subsidiarily liable thereof. The award was reduced to P100,000.00.
The petitioner now assails the reduction of the damages as without justification. It specifically mentions the
findings of the trial court which were affirmed by the appellate court regarding the gravity of the injuries
suffered by the petitioner, the effect of the injuries upon him as a person, and his business as well as his standing
in society. And yet, it reduced the amount of damages.
As stated earlier, the employer's liability in quasi-delict is primary and solidary. The award of temperate, moral,
and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees lies upon the discretion of the court based on the facts and
circumstances of each case. (See Magbanua v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 137 SCRA 328; Siquenza v. Court
of Appeals, 137 SCRA 570; San Andres v. Court of Appeals, 116 SCRA 81; Sarkies Tours Phil., Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 124 SCRA 588; Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., supra.).
The court's discretion is, of course, subject to the condition that the award for damages is not excessive under the
attendant facts and circumstance of the case.
Temperate damages are included within the context of compensatory damages (Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) v. Court of Appeals, supra.). In arriving at a reasonable level of temperate damages to be
awarded, trial courts are guided by our ruling that:
... There are cases where from the nature of the case, defenite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be
offered, although the court is convinced that there has been such loss. For instance, injury to
one's commercial credit or to the goodwill of a business firm is often hard to show certainty in
terms of money. Should damages be denied for that reason? The judge should be empowered to
calculate moderate damages in such cases, rather than that the plaintiff should suffer, without
redress from the defendant's wrongful act. (Araneta v. Bank of America, 40 SCRA 144,145)
In the case of moral damages, the yardstick shaould be that the "amount awarded should not be palpably and
scandalously excessive" so as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of
the trial court (Gerada v. Warner Barnes & Co., Inc., 57 O.G. (4) 7347, 7358; Sadie v. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc.,
57 O.G. (4) 636; Adone v. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., 656 cited in Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System,
Inc., supra.).<äre||anº•1àw> Moreover, the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved parties and the gravity of the
injuries must be considered in arriving at reasonable levels (Siquenza v. Court of Appeals, supra, cited in
Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., supra.).
The trial court based the amounts of damages awarded to the petitioner on the following circumstances:
Coming now to the damages suffered by plaintiff Maximo Pleno, it is not controverted that
Pleno was hospitalized for about five months beginning December 21, 1971, the day of the
incident, up to May 9, 1972. While in the hospital, he underwent several major operations on his
legs and in spite of Id operations, a deformity still resulted and that his left leg is shorter than the
right. The medical expenses, hospital bills and doctor's fees were properly exhibited and not
rebutted by defendants. This being the case, actual expenses of P48,244.08 may be awarded.
 As to the loss or impairment of earning capacity, there is no doubt that Pleno is an enterpreneur
and the founder of his own corporation, the Mayon Ceramics Corporation. It appears also that he
is an industrious and resourceful person with several projects in line and were it not for the
incident, might have pushed them through. On the day of the incident, Pleno was driving
homeward with geologist Langley after an ocular inspection of the site of the Mayon Ceramics
Corporation. His actual income however has not been sufficiently established so that this Court
cannot award actual damages, but, an award of temperate or moderate damages may still be
made on loss or impairment of earning capacity. That Pleno sustained a permanent deformity due
to a shortened left leg and that he also suffers from double vision in his left eye is also
established. Because of this, he suffers from some inferiority complex and is no longer active in
business as well as in social life. In similar cases as in Borromeo v. Manila Electric Railroad Co.,
44 Phil 165; Cordage, et al. v. LTB Co., et al., L-11037, Dec. 29,1960, and in Araneta, et al. v.
Arreglado, et al., L-11394, Sept. 9, 1958, the proper award of damages were given.
There is also no doubt that due to the incident, Pleno underwent physical suffering, mental
anguish, fight, severe arudety and that he also underwent several major operations. As previously
stated, Pleno is the founder of Mayon Ceramics Corporation, manufacturer of the now famous
Crown Lynn ceramic wares. He is a mechanical engineer and the topnotcher of the professional
examination for mechanical engineering in 1938. From the record, most if not all of his children
excelled in academic studies here and abroad. The suffering, both mental and physical, which he
experienced, the anxiety and fright that he underwent are sufficiently proved, if not patent. He is
therefore entitled to moral damages. Pleno is also entitled to exemplary damages since it
appears that gross negligence was committed in the hiring of driver de Luna. In spite of his past
record, he was still hired by the corporation. As regards de Luna, the very fact that he left the
scene of the incident without assisting the victims and without reporting to the authorities
entitles an award of exemplary damages, so as to serve as an example that in cases of accidents
of this kind, the drivers involved should not leave their victims behind but should stop to assist
the victims or if this is not possible, to report the matter immediately to the authorities. That the
corporation did not also report the matter to the authorities and that their lawyer would attempt
to bribe the police officers in order that the incident would be kept a secret shows that the
corporation ratified the act of their employees and such act also shows bad faith. Hence, Id
corporation is able to pay exemplary damages.
The award of attorney's fees is also proper in this case considering the circumstances and that it
took more than five years of trial to finish this case. Also, plaintiffs counsel prepared lengthy and
exhausive memorandum. (pp- 48-50, Amended Joint Record on Appeal)
We rule that the lower court's awards of damages are more consonant with the factual circumstances of the
instant case. The trial court's findings of facts are clear and well-developed. Each item of damages is adequately
supported by evidence on record. On the other hand, there are no substantial reasons and no references to any
misimpressions of facts in the appellate decision. The Court of Appeals has shown no sufficient reasons for
altering factual findings which appear correct. We, therefore, affirm the lower court's awards of damages and
hold that the appellate court's reduction of the amounts of temperate and moral damages is not justified.
However, we modify the award of attorney's fees to P20,000.00 which we deem to be just and equitable under
the circumstances of the case.
Tiu vs. Platinum Plans (G.R. No. 163512; Feb. 28, 2007)

For review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated January 20, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
74972, and its Resolution2 dated May 4, 2004 denying reconsideration. The Court of Appeals had affirmed the
decision3 dated February 28, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 261, in an action for
damages, ordering petitioner to pay respondent ₱100,000 as liquidated damages.

Plainly stated, the core issue is whether the non-involvement clause is valid.
Petitioner avers that the non-involvement clause is offensive to public policy since the restraint imposed is much
greater than what is necessary to afford respondent a fair and reasonable protection. She adds that since the
products sold in the pre-need industry are more or less the same, the transfer to a rival company is acceptable.
Petitioner also points out that respondent did not invest in her training or improvement. At the time she joined
respondent, she already had the knowledge and expertise required in the pre-need industry. Finally, petitioner
argues that a strict application of the non-involvement clause would deprive her of the right to engage in the only
work she knows.
Respondent counters that the validity of a non-involvement clause has been sustained by the Supreme Court in a
long line of cases. It contends that the inclusion of the two-year non-involvement clause in petitioner’s contract
of employment was reasonable and needed since her job gave her access to the company’s confidential
marketing strategies. Respondent adds that the non-involvement clause merely enjoined her from engaging in
pre-need business akin to respondent’s within two years from petitioner’s separation from respondent. She had
not been prohibited from marketing other service plans.
As early as 1916, we already had the occasion to discuss the validity of a non-involvement clause. In Ferrazzini
v. Gsell,8 we said that such clause was unreasonable restraint of trade and therefore against public policy. In
Ferrazzini, the employee was prohibited from engaging in any business or occupation in the Philippines for a
period of five years after the termination of his employment contract and must first get the written permission of
his employer if he were to do so. The Court ruled that while the stipulation was indeed limited as to time and
space, it was not limited as to trade. Such prohibition, in effect, forces an employee to leave the Philippines to
work should his employer refuse to give a written permission.
In G. Martini, Ltd. v. Glaiserman,9 we also declared a similar stipulation as void for being an unreasonable
restraint of trade. There, the employee was prohibited from engaging in any business similar to that of his
employer for a period of one year. Since the employee was employed only in connection with the purchase and
export of abaca, among the many businesses of the employer, the Court considered the restraint too broad since
it effectively prevented the employee from working in any other business similar to his employer even if his
employment was limited only to one of its multifarious business activities.
However, in Del Castillo v. Richmond,10 we upheld a similar stipulation as legal, reasonable, and not contrary
to public policy. In the said case, the employee was restricted from opening, owning or having any connection
with any other drugstore within a radius of four miles from the employer’s place of business during the time the
employer was operating his drugstore. We said that a contract in restraint of trade is valid provided there is a
limitation upon either time or place and the restraint upon one party is not greater than the protection the other
party requires.
Finally, in Consulta v. Court of Appeals,11 we considered a non-involvement clause in accordance with Article
130612 of the Civil Code. While the complainant in that case was an independent agent and not an employee,
she was prohibited for one year from engaging directly or indirectly in activities of other companies that
compete with the business of her principal. We noted therein that the restriction did not prohibit the agent from
engaging in any other business, or from being connected with any other company, for as long as the business or
company did not compete with the principal’s business. Further, the prohibition applied only for one year after
the termination of the agent’s contract and was therefore a reasonable restriction designed to prevent acts
prejudicial to the employer.
Conformably then with the aforementioned pronouncements, a non-involvement clause is not necessarily void
for being in restraint of trade as long as there are reasonable limitations as to time, trade, and place.
In this case, the non-involvement clause has a time limit: two years from the time petitioner’s employment with
respondent ends. It is also limited as to trade, since it only prohibits petitioner from engaging in any pre-need
business akin to respondent’s.1awphi1.net
More significantly, since petitioner was the Senior Assistant Vice-President and Territorial Operations Head in
charge of respondent’s Hongkong and Asean operations, she had been privy to confidential and highly sensitive
marketing strategies of respondent’s business. To allow her to engage in a rival business soon after she leaves
would make respondent’s trade secrets vulnerable especially in a highly competitive marketing environment. In
sum, we find the non-involvement clause not contrary to public welfare and not greater than is necessary to
afford a fair and reasonable protection to respondent. 13
In any event, Article 1306 of the Civil Code provides that parties to a contract may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy.
Article 115914 of the same Code also provides that obligations arising from contracts have the force of law
between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. Courts cannot stipulate for the parties
nor amend their agreement where the same does not contravene law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy, for to do so would be to alter the real intent of the parties, and would run contrary to the function
of the courts to give force and effect thereto. 15 Not being contrary to public policy, the non-involvement clause,
which petitioner and respondent freely agreed upon, has the force of law between them, and thus, should be
complied with in good faith.16
Thus, as held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, petitioner is bound to pay respondent ₱100,000
as liquidated damages. While we have equitably reduced liquidated damages in certain cases, 17 we cannot
do so in this case, since it appears that even from the start, petitioner had not shown the least intention to
fulfill the non-involvement clause in good faith.
People vs. Catutig (G.R. No. 137842; Aug. 23, 2001)

Anent the award of damages, the trial court has correctly awarded P50,000.00 moral damages, an award that
rests on the jural foundation that the crime of rape necessarily brings with it shame, mental anguish, besmirched
reputation, moral shock and social humiliation to the offended party.[10] In addition, the offended party deserves
to receive the amount of P50,000.00 civil indemnity,[11] the equivalent of compensatory damages, and
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
An apparent discord in the award of exemplary damages in simple and qualified rape cases perhaps deserves
more than just a passing remark.
The Civil Code of the Philippines provides, in respect to exemplary or corrective damages, thusly:
ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from
fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
ART. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
ART. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in
a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
ART. 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not
they should be adjudicated.
ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is
entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or
not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no
proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court
may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show
that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for
liquidated damages.
ART. 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are renounced in advance shall be null and void.
The attendance of aggravating circumstances in the perpetration of the crime serves to increase the penalty (the
criminal liability aspect),[12] as well as to justify an award of exemplary or corrective damages (the civil
liability aspect),[13] moored on the greater perversity of the offender manifested in the commission of the felony
such as may be shown by (1) the motivating power itself, (2) the place of commission, (3) the means and ways
employed, (4) the time, or (5) the personal circumstances of the offender or the offended party or both. There are
various types of aggravating circumstances, among them, the ordinary and the qualifying. Relationship is an
alternative circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code.
Art. 15. Their concept. --Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as
aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and other conditions attending its
commission. They are relationship, intoxication, and degree of instruction and education of the offender.
The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the offended party is the
spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same
degree of the offender.
As a rule, relationship is held to be aggravating in crimes against chastity, such as rape and acts of
lasciviousness, whether the offender is a higher or a lower degree relative of the offended party. [14]
Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty
is to be imposed in rape cases when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. The Court has since held that the circumstances enumerated by
the amendatory law are to be regarded as special qualifying (aggravating) circumstances. Somehow doubts
linger on whether relationship may then be considered to warrant an award for exemplary damages where it is
used to qualify rape as a heinous crime, thereby becoming an element thereof, as would subject the offender to
the penalty of death. Heretofore, the Court has not categorically laid down a specific rule, preferring instead to
treat the issue on a case to case basis.
In People vs. Fundano,[15] People vs. Ramos,[16] People vs. Medina,[17] People vs. Dimapilis,[18] People vs.
Calayca,[19] People vs. Tabion,[20] People vs. Bayona,[21] People vs. Bayya,[22] and People vs. Nuez,[23]
along with still other cases, the Court has almost invariably appreciated relationship as an ordinary aggravating
circumstance in simple rape and thereby imposed exemplary damages upon the offender whether or not the
offense has been committed prior to or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659. Exceptionally, as in People
vs. Decena,[24] People vs. Perez,[25] People vs. Perez,[26] and People vs. Ambray,[27] the Court has denied
the award of exemplary damages following the effectivity of that law. In qualified rape cases, such as in People
vs. Magdato,[28] People vs. Arizapa,[29] and People vs. Alicante,[30] the Court decreed the payment of
exemplary damages to the offended party but it did not so do as in People vs. Alba, [31] People vs. Mengote,
[32] and People vs. Maglente.[33]
It may be time for the Court to abandon its pro hac vice stance and provide, for the guidance of the bar and the
bench, a kind of standard on the matter.
Also known as punitive or vindictive damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a
deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of
an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always,
used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to
account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an
injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, [34] the theory being that there should be compensation
for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant - associated with such circumstances as
willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud [35]-
that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of
damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these
damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the
future.[36]
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be
understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the
public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each
of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the
exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in
its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however,
is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an
award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is
ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating
circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability
of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of
Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
Relevantly, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, made effective on 01 December 2000, requires
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or information. Sections
8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court now provide:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given
by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of
the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusations. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
A court would thus be precluded from considering in its judgment the attendance of qualifying or aggravating
circumstances if the complaint or information is bereft of any allegation of the presence of such circumstances.
The retroactive application of procedural rules, nevertheless, cannot adversely affect the rights of the private
offended party that have become vested prior to the effectivity of said rules. Thus, in the case at bar, although
relationship has not been alleged in the information, the offense having been committed, however, prior to the
effectivity of the new rules, the civil liability already incurred by appellant remains unaffected thereby.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that appellant Danilo
Catubig y Horio is found guilty only of simple rape and not in its qualified form, and he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay complainant Dannilyn Catubig P50,000.00 civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 moral damages and P25,000.00 exemplary damages. Costs de oficio.
People vs. Llagas (G .R. No. 178873; April 24, 2009)

Respecting the civil aspect of the case, the Court finds that AAA is also entitled to an award of exemplary
damages which jurisprudence pegs at ₱25,000 as it was proven, although not alleged in the information, during
the trial that the use of deadly weapon attended the commission of the crime. It bears stating that while such
circumstance cannot be appreciated for the purpose of fixing a heavier penalty, it can be considered as basis for
an award of exemplary damages.