RULE 126

Search and Seizure

Section 1. Search warrant defined. — A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and
directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring it before the court. (1)
Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. — An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the
crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. (n)
Section 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. (2a)
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. (3a)
Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements, together with the affidavits submitted. (4a)
Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based or that there is probable
cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules. (5a)
Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. — The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose
and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate
himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. (6)
Section 8. Search of house, room, or premise to be made in presence of two witnesses. — No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made
except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality. (7a)
Section 9. Time of making search. — The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or
in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. (8)
Section 10. Validity of search warrant. — A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from its date. Thereafter it shall be void. (9a)
Section 11. Receipt for the property seized. — The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant
of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least two witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property. (10a)
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon. — (a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to
the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to
whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of
this Rule has been complained with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been
complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return,
the result, and other actions of the judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.(11a)
Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. (12a)
Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. — A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence
obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion
may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequent
filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court. (n)

Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales,

Clerk of Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila
A.M. No. P-08-2519
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2155-P)

And

Anonymous Letter-Complaint
against Clerk of Court Atty. Henry P. Favorito of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Clerk of Court Atty. Miguel Morales of Branch 17, Clerk of Court
Amie Grace Arreola of Branch 4, Administrative Officer III William Calda of the Office of the Clerk of Court and Stenographer Isabel Siwa of
Branch 16, all of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila.
A.M. No. P-08-2520
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2156-P)

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO-MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:
November 19, 2008
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x
RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court are two anonymous complaints: docketed as A.M. No. P-08-2519 charging Atty. Miguel Morales (Atty. Morales), Branch Clerk of Court,
Branch 17, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila of misconduct; and A.M. No. P-08-2520 charging Atty. Morales, together with Isabel Siwa (Siwa),
Court Stenographer, Branch 16; William Calda (Calda), Administrative Officer III, Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC); Amie Grace Arreola (Arreola), Branch
Clerk of Court, Branch 4, and Atty. Henry P. Favorito (Atty. Favorito), Clerk of Court VI, OCC, all of the MeTC, Manila of misconduct, graft and corruption
and moonlighting.

A.M. No. P-08-2519

In an unsigned and undated letter which the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received on February 24, 2005, the writers, who claim to be employees
of the OCC-MeTC of Manila, allege that Atty. Morales, then detailed at the OCC, was consuming his working hours filing and attending to personal cases,
such as administrative cases against employees in his old sala, using office supplies, equipment and utilities. The writers aver that Atty. Moraless conduct has
demoralized them and they resorted to filing an anonymous complaint in fear of retaliation from Atty. Morales.[1]

Assistant Court Administrator (ACA) now Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Reuben P. dela Cruz, conducted a discreet investigation on March 8, 2005 to
verify the allegations of the complaint. However, since the office of Atty. Morales was located at the innermost section of the Docket/Appeals Section of the
OCC, DCA Dela Cruz failed to extensively make an observation of the actuations of Atty. Morales. On March 16, 2005, a spot investigation was conducted by
DCA Dela Cruz together with four NBI agents, a crime photographer and a support staff. The team was able to access the personal computer of Atty. Morales
and print two documents stored in its hard drive, a Petition for Relief from Judgment for the case entitled, Manolo N. Blanquera, et al. v. Heirs of Lamberto N.
Blanquera in the name of Atty. Jose P. Icaonapo, Jr. (Atty. Icaonapo) filed with the Court of Appeals, and a Pre-trial Brief for the case entitled, Pentacapital
Investment Corp. v. Toyoharu Aoki, et al. also in the name of Atty. Icaonapo, which was filed before Branch 1, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila. Atty.
Morales's computer was seized and taken to the custody of the OCA.[2] Upon Atty. Morales's motion however, the Court ordered the release of said computer
with an order to the Management Information Systems Office of the Supreme Court to first retrieve the files stored therein.[3]

Atty. Morales filed a letter-complaint addressed to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. against DCA Dela Cruz and his companions for alleged conspiracy
and culpable violation of Secs. 1,[4] 2[5] & 3[6] of Art. III of the Constitution relative to the spot investigation. Said letter-complaint was indorsed by the
Chief Justice to the Court Administrator on March 31, 2005 for appropriate action.[7] Atty. Morales's wife, Francisca Landicho-Morales also filed a letter-
complaint dated February 15, 2005 against Judge Crispin B. Bravo, Presiding Judge of MeTC Branch 16 Manila, Lenin Bravo, former Clerk of the said branch
and Judge Cristina Javalera-Sulit, Presiding Judge of MeTC Branch 18, Manila for violations of the law and ethical standards which was indorsed by Chief
Justice Davide to the Court Administrator for preliminary inquiry.[8] Although diligent efforts were made to ascertain from the OCA Legal Office the current
status of Atty. Morales's case against DCA Dela Cruz, the same however, could not be determined.

Parenthetically, Atty. Favorito, together with more than a hundred employees of the MeTC Manila, wrote an undated letter to Chief Justice Davide assailing
the spot investigation conducted by DCA Dela Cruz.[9] Said letter was indorsed by Chief Justice Davide to DCA Dela Cruz on March 28, 2005 for his
comment.[10] No comment can be found in the records of herein administrative cases.
In a 1st Indorsement dated April 14, 2005, then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) directed Atty.
Morales to comment on the undated anonymous letter-complaint.[11]

In his Manifestation which the OCA received on April 27, 2005, Atty. Morales alleged that: the anonymous letter-complaint should not have been given due
course as there is no truth to the allegations therein; the OCA took almost a year to act on the anonymous letter-complaint which did not have the proper
indorsement from the Office of the Chief Justice; even though he brought to the OCC his personal computer, such act is not prohibited; he did not use his
computer to write pleadings during office hours and neither did he use paper of the OCC; the raid conducted by DCA Dela Cruz without search and seizure
orders violated his right to privacy and the articles seized therewith should be considered inadmissible.[12]

In a letter dated April 12, 2005, Atty. Morales applied for optional retirement[13] which the Court approved in its Resolution dated October 12, 2005 subject to
the withholding of his benefits pending resolution of cases against him, the instant case included.[14]

A.M. No. P-08-2520

In another unsigned letter dated April 1, 2004, the writers who claim to be employees of the OCC-MeTC, Manila, charge Atty. Morales, Arreola, Atty.
Favorito, Calda and Siwa of the following offenses: Atty. Morales and Arreola, who are both detailed in the OCC, leave the office after logging-in only to
return in the afternoon, which acts are allowed by Atty. Favorito; Atty. Morales and Arreola were not given assignments and whenever they are at the office,
they do nothing but play computer games; Siwa is also allowed by Atty. Favorito to lend money and rediscount checks during office hours using court
premises; many people from different offices go to the OCC because of the business of Siwa; Atty. Favorito also allows two of Siwa's personal maids to use
the OCC as their office in rediscounting checks; and Atty. Favorito and Calda charge P50.00 to P500.00 from sureties claiming said amounts to be processing
fees without issuing receipts therefor.[15]

In the same spot investigation conducted by DCA De La Cruz on March 16, 2005, a partly hidden plastic box was discovered containing the amount of
P65,390.00 and six commercial checks, which Siwa voluntarily opened to the team. These were also confiscated and turned over to the custody of the
OCA.[16]

In a letter to then Chief Justice Davide dated April 12, 2005, Siwa requested that said money and personal belongings that were confiscated be returned to her
immediately and that a formal investigation be conducted regarding DCA Dela Cruz's conduct during the spot investigation.[17] The seized items were later
returned to Siwa[18] while her letter-complaint was indorsed by the Chief Justice to the Court Administrator on April 18, 2005 for appropriate action.[19] As
with the complaint filed by Atty. Morales, however, the status of Siwa's complaint could not be ascertained despite diligent efforts at inquiring about the matter
from the OCA Legal Office.

In a 1st Indorsement dated April 14, 2005, the OCA directed Atty. Morales, Atty. Favorito, Calda, Arreola and Siwa to comment on the letter-complaint.[20]
Atty. Morales submitted the same Manifestation he submitted in A.M. P-08-2519.

Siwa in her Comment avers that: the anonymous letter-complaint should not have been given due course as it contravened Sec. 46(c) of Executive Order No.
292 and the implementing rules; it was not subscribed and sworn to by the complainant and there is no obvious truth to the allegations therein; while she
admits that she is involved in the business of rediscounting checks, such is a legitimate endeavor, in fact, there are other employees of the court engaged in the
same business; she is also not aware of any rule prohibiting her from engaging in said endeavor; she does not use the OCC to conduct her business and she is
mindful of her duties as a government employee; thus, she has a staff to do the encashment of the checks; there were rare occasions when her staff members
were stationed at the corridors to lend cash to employees but while said occasions may have occurred during office hours, her staff cannot be blamed for the
same since the employees go to them; she has never neglected her duty as a court stenographer -- in fact, her last performance rating was very satisfactory; it is
a known fact that because of the meager pay given to government employees, most augment their income by engaging in business; she should not be singled
out for being enterprising and industrious; and it is unfair to accuse her of wrongdoing at a time when she has voluntarily retired from government service due
to health reasons.[21]

A month after the incident, Siwa filed for optional retirement[22] which the Court approved in its Resolution[23] dated October 12, 2005, with the proviso that
the amount of P30,000.00 shall be retained from the money value of her earned leave credits pending resolution of the present case.

Calda explains in his letter dated April 25, 2005 that: the fees of P50.00 and P500.00 were charged in connection with the filing of surety and cash bonds
pursuant to Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court and that corresponding official receipts were issued; at nighttime, he is the one authorized to approve the
filing of surety bonds since he is the highest ranking officer of a skeletal force detailed for night court duty; he has been with the MeTC for 16 years, rose in
rank, was never involved in any controversy and would never tarnish his reputation.[24]

Arreola asserts that: her record of arrival and departure was always signed by her superiors without question because it reflected the correct entries; she is
always in the office even when there is typhoon; and she has proven herself useful in the OCC by answering queries of litigants and verifications from other
offices and attending to complaints.[25]

In compliance, Atty. Favorito adopted the comments of Atty. Morales, Calda and Arreola and denied that he committed the acts alluded to in the anonymous
letter-complaint.[26] Atty. Favorito also incorporated in his comment a letter of the employees of the OCC-MTC Manila disowning the alleged anonymous
complaint.[27]

In a Resolution dated July 27, 2005, the Court, upon recommendation of the OCA, consolidated the two complaints and referred the same to the Executive
Judge of the MeTC, Manila for investigation, report and recommendation.[28]

Report of the Investigating Judge

In her Report dated September 1, 2006, MeTC Executive Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez-Estoesta states that discreet observation of the daily working
activities of Atty. Morales and Siwa could no longer be done as the two had already availed themselves of their optional retirement; thus, random interviews
with employees who had proximate working activities with them were resorted to, as well as perusal of court records.[29]

The following employees were interviewed: Rueben Duque, Clerk of Court, Branch 16, MeTC; Beneluz Dumlao, Records Officer I; Marilou Magbag, Clerk
III; Estrella Rafael, Records Officer I; Lydia dela Cruz, Records Officer III; Raymundo Bilbao, Clerk III; Marie Joy Valle, Clerk IV, and Ma. Lizabeth
Marcelino, Administrative Officer II, all of the OCC; Rosie Jose, freelance bondswoman, and Norberto D. Soriano, authorized representative of the
Commonwealth Insurance Company.[30]

After conducting her investigation, Judge Estoesta found:

Insofar as Atty. Morales, Atty. Favorito, Calda and Arreola are concerned, the investigation immediately stumbled into a dead end. No one from the OCC
personnel who were interviewed would give a categorical and positive statement affirming the charges against the said personnel. While almost all confirmed
that Atty. Morales maintained his own computer and printer at the OCC, nobody could state for certain that what he worked on were pleadings for private
cases. Rafael, who was seated right next to Atty. Morales at the OCC merely said that what preoccupied Atty. Morales were his own administrative cases. She
did not notice Atty. Morales engage in private work in his computer although she saw Atty. Icaonapo drop by the office every now and then to personally see
Atty. Morales. Rafael explained however that this could be because Atty. Icaonapo was the counsel of Atty. Morales in his administrative cases. While
documents referring to private cases were found in the hard drive of the computer of Atty. Morales, and while the writing style is similar to that of the
Manifestation he filed in this case, still no definite conclusion could be drawn that he has composed the said pleadings at the OCC during official working
hours. A close examination of the Pre-Trial Brief signed by Atty. Icaonapo and filed with the RTC Branch 1, Manila also revealed that the paper and the
printer used were not the same as that used in the office of Atty. Morales.[31]

There was also no evidence to support charges of extortion against Atty. Favorito and Calda. Two bondsmen who were randomly interviewed denied that Atty.
Favorito and Calda exacted illegal sums from them. The amounts they charged could actually refer to legal fees.[32]

As to Arreola, the charge against her also has no basis. The interviewees were unanimous in saying that Arreola was always around the office, and that while
she fetched her son from a nearby school, she did so during lunch or after office hours. Random checks on Arreola also revealed that she was always at the
OCC and at Branch 30 where she was reassigned.[33]

As to Siwa, she candidly admitted that she was engaged in lending and discounting activities at her station, through her own staff which she had maintained for
said purpose. Because of her business, a number of employees, even those from other government agencies, usually huddled at her station to hold transactions.
Branch Clerk of Court Ruben Duque relates that a number of people would often go to their office looking for Siwa for lending and rediscounting. Assuming
that Siwa is not prohibited from engaging in said business, still it has distracted her from her duties as a stenographer. A random check on the court records of
Branch 16 showed that Siwa had not yet submitted a complete transcription of 7 stenographic notes in 5 cases, 3 of which already had decisions rendered. In
one case, the testimonies of two prosecution witnesses had to be re-taken to fill in the gap which not only wasted precious time of the court but also distressed
the efforts of the prosecution in the presentation of its case.[34]

Judge Estoesta recommended as follows:

1. In OCA IPI No. 05-2155-P [now A.M. No. P-08-2519], with no substantial evidence taken to prove the charges in the anonymous letter-complaint filed
against Atty. Miguel C. Morales, it is RECOMMENDED that the same be ordered dismissed;

2. In OCA IPI No. 05-2156-P [now A.M. No. P-2520], likewise, with no substantial evidence taken to prove the charges in the anonymous letter-complaint
filed against Atty. Miguel C. Morales, Atty. Henry P. Favorito, William Calda and Amie Grace Arreola, it is RECOMMENDED that the same be ordered
dismissed insofar as said court employees are concerned; and

3. In OCA IPI No. 05-2156-P [now A.M. No. P-08-2520] insofar as it concerns Ms. Isabel Siwa, it is RECOMMENDED that she be directed to explain why
she still has stenographic notes pending for transcription despite having already availed of an optional retirement pay.[35]

The report was referred to the OCA for its evaluation, report and recommendation.[36]

OCA Report and Recommendation

The OCA, through ACA Antonio H. Dujua, in its November 7, 2007 Memorandum, states that it does not entirely concur with the findings and
recommendation of Judge Estoesta.
Instead the OCA submits the following findings.

On Atty. Morales: The allegation that Atty. Morales had been using his personal computer to draft pleadings for private counsels was established in the spot
inspection on March 16, 2005. The hard drive of Atty. Moraless computer yielded a pre-trial brief and a petition for relief from judgment with the name of
Atty. Icaonapo. The said pre-trial brief was the same pleading that was submitted to RTC Branch 1, Manila by Atty. Icaonapo on February 10, 2003. Atty.
Morales in his Manifestation dated April 25, 2005 failed to refute the evidence that emanated from his computer and instead chided the OCA for confiscating
the same.

On Siwa: While she insisted that the anonymous letter should not have been given due course, she admitted in her April 28, 2005 Manifestation to being
involved in the business of rediscounting checks, claiming that she was not the only employee engaged in the same, and that she maintained her own personnel
to do the rediscounting which stretched to the premises of the MeTC-OCC where Atty. Favorito is the Clerk of Court.[37]

The OCA concluded that: Atty. Morales and Siwa should be found guilty of gross misconduct. Atty. Morales, for preparing pleadings for private counsels and
litigants; and Siwa, for engaging in the business of rediscounting checks during office hours; gross misconduct carries the penalty of dismissal from the service
even for the first offense, and while Atty. Morales and Siwa have already left the judiciary, the Court can still direct the forfeiture of their benefits; Atty.
Favorito should also be held liable for neglect of duty because as Clerk of Court of the MeTC-OCC, he was negligent in allowing the nefarious activities of
Atty. Morales and Siwa to happen right inside the confines of the MeTC-OCC.[38]

On Arreola and Calda: The OCA agrees with Judge Estoesta that the charges against them should be dismissed for lack of concrete evidence.[39]

The OCA then recommended:

(a) That (resigned) Clerk of Court Miguel C. Morales, Branch 17, and (retired) Court Stenographer Isabel A. Siwa, Branch 16, both of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Manila be found GUILTY of Gross Misconduct with forfeiture of the benefits due them excluding accrued leave credits;
(b) That Clerk of Court Henry P. Favorito of the MeTC-OCC, Manila be found GUILTY of Simple Neglect of Duty and suspended without pay for a period of
one (1) month and one (1) day, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely; and

(c) That the charges made in the April 1, 2004 anonymous letter against Clerk of Court Amie Grace A. Arreola, Branch 4 and Administrative Officer III
William Calda, OCC, both of the MeTC, Manila be DISMISSED for lack of merit.[40]

The Court's Ruling.

The Court partly adopts the findings and recommendations of the OCA with some modifications.

An anonymous complaint is always received with great caution, originating as it does from an unknown author. Such a complaint, however does not justify
outright dismissal for being baseless or unfounded for the allegations therein may be easily verified and may, without much difficulty, be substantiated and
established by other competent evidence. Indeed, complainants identity would hardly be material where the matter involved is of public interest.[41]

Liability of Atty. Morales.

The two anonymous letters charge Atty. Morales with the following offenses: attending to personal cases while using official time, office supplies, equipment
and utilities, leaving the office after logging-in in the morning only to return in the afternoon, and playing computer games whenever he was at the office.

It is undisputed that pleadings for private cases were found in Atty. Morales's personal computer in the MeTC-OCC and Atty. Morales could not provide any
satisfactory explanation therefor. Such fact, by itself, could already make Atty. Morales liable for simple misconduct for it hints of impropriety on his part. The
Court has always stressed that all members of the judiciary should be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to their duties in the judicial
branch but also to their behavior outside the court as private individuals, in order that the integrity and good name of the courts of justice shall be
preserved.[42]

Atty. Morales, in defense, argues that since the pleadings were acquired from his personal computer which DCA Dela Cruz confiscated without any valid
search and seizure order, such evidence should be considered as the fruits of a poisonous tree as it violated his right to privacy.

Both the Investigating Justice and the OCA failed to discuss this matter. The Court however finds it proper to squarely address such issue, without prejudice to
the outcome of the administrative case filed by Atty. Morales against DCA Dela Cruz regarding the same incident. The finding of guilt or exoneration of Atty.
Morales hinges on this very crucial question: Are the pleadings found in Atty. Morales's personal computer admissible in the present administrative case
against him?

The Court answers in the negative.

Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, which
is provided for under Section 2, Article III thereof.[43] The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution also bars the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of such right.[44] The fact that the present case is administrative in nature does not render the above principle inoperative. As
expounded in Zulueta v. Court of Appeals,[45] any violation of the aforestated constitutional right renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.

There are exceptions to this rule one of which is consented warrantless search.[46]

DCA Dela Cruz in his report claims that that they were able to obtain the subject pleadings with the consent of Atty. Morales.[47] The Court finds however
that such allegation on his part, even with a similar allegation from one of his staff,[48] is not sufficient to make the present case fall under the category of a
valid warrantless search.

Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred and must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.[49] It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise
illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.[50] The burden of proving,
by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given lies with the State.[51] Acquiescence in
the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed and courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.[52]
To constitute a valid consent or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it must be shown that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person
involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.[53]

In this case, what is missing is a showing that Atty. Morales had an actual intention to relinquish his right. While he may have agreed to the opening of his
personal computer and the printing of files therefrom, in the presence of DCA Dela Cruz, his staff and some NBI agents during the March 16, 2005 spot
investigation, it is also of record that Atty. Morales immediately filed an administrative case against said persons questioning the validity of the investigation,
specifically invoking his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.

While Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the exacting standards required of every court employee, unfortunately, the Court cannot use the evidence
obtained from his personal computer against him for it violated his constitutional right.

As the Court has staunchly declared:

The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and
government becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in
the fundamental law way above the articles on governmental power.

The right against unreasonable search and seizure in turn is at the top of the hierarchy of rights, next only to, if not on the same plane as, the right to life, liberty
and property, which is protected by the due process clause. This is as it should be for, as stressed by a couple of noted freedom advocates, the right to personal
security which, along with the right to privacy, is the foundation of the right against unreasonable search and seizure includes the right to exist, and the right to
enjoyment of life while existing.

xxxx

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may
at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.[54]

And as there is no other evidence, apart from the pleadings, retrieved from the unduly confiscated personal computer of Atty. Morales, to hold him
administratively liable, the Court has no choice but to dismiss the charges herein against him for insufficiency of evidence.
Liability of Siwa.

The Court agrees with the OCA that Siwa should be administratively disciplined for engaging in the business of lending and rediscounting checks.

Siwa admits engaging in the business of lending and rediscounting checks, claiming that it was a legitimate endeavor needed to augment her meager income as
a court employee; that she is not aware of any rule prohibiting her from engaging in the business of rediscounting checks; that there are other employees
engaged in the same business; and that she employs her own staff to do the encashment of the checks as she always attends to and never neglects her duties as
a stenographer.[55]

Siwa is clearly mistaken.

Officials and employees of the judiciary are prohibited from engaging directly in any private business, vocation, or profession even outside office hours to
ensure that full-time officers of the court render full-time service so that there may be no undue delay in the administration of justice and in the disposition of
cases.[56] The nature of work of court employees requires them to serve with the highest degree of efficiency and responsibility and the entire time of judiciary
officials and employees must be devoted to government service to ensure efficient and speedy administration of justice.[57] Indeed, the Court has always
stressed that court employees must strictly observe official time and devote every second moment of such time to public service.[58] And while the
compensation may be meager, that is the sacrifice judicial employees must be willing to take.
As pronounced by the Court in Biyaheros Mart Livelihood Association, Inc. v. Cabusao, Jr.:

Government service demands great sacrifice. One who cannot live with the modest salary of a public office has no business staying in the service. He is free to
seek greener pastures elsewhere. The public trust character of the office proscribes him from employing the facilities or using official time for private business
or purposes.[59]

Siwa's offense is compounded by the fact that she was previously verbally instructed by her superior, MeTC Branch 16 Presiding Judge Crispin B. Bravo, to
stop using court premises for her business. But she ignored the same, prompting the latter to issue a written Memorandum dated January 18, 2005 asking her to
explain why she was still using the office in transacting/attending to her lending and rediscounting business when she was already verbally instructed to desist
therefrom in December 2004.[60]

Siwa apologized and promised not to let it happen again, in her letter dated January 21, 2005.[61] Siwa also admitted that she was using her house-helper in the
rediscounting of checks and allowed the latter to use the court premises in the conduct of the same.[62]

Her allegation that she never neglected her duty as a stenographer is also belied by the findings of the Investigating Judge, who in her random check of records,
discovered that Siwa had not yet submitted a complete transcription of 7 stenographic notes in 5 cases (3 criminal and 2 civil cases), in three of which
decisions were already rendered.[63] In one case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses had to be re-taken.[64] Thus, contrary to Siwa's assertion, she
was not able to satisfactorily perform her duties as a court stenographer while engaging in private business.

Her argument that her business is a legal endeavor also cannot excuse her from liability. Many moonlighting activities pertain to legal acts that otherwise
would be countenanced if the actors were not employed in the public sector. And while moonlighting is not normally considered a serious misconduct,
nonetheless, by the very nature of the position held, it amounts to a malfeasance in office.[65]

Siwa conducted her business within the court's premises, which placed the image of the judiciary, of which she is part, in a bad light. Time and again, the Court
has held that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat; thus the conduct of a person
serving the judiciary must, at all times, be characterized by propriety and decorum, and be above suspicion so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for
the judiciary.[66]

Siwa's infraction constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service which, under Sec. 52 A (20) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, carries the penalty of suspension of 6 months and 1 day to 1 year for the first offense and dismissal for the second
offense. Since this is her first offense and considering the October 12, 2005 Resolution of the Court in A.M. No. 12096-Ret. which approved Siwa's application
for optional retirement, retaining only the amount of P30,000.00 from the money value of her earned leave credits pending resolution of the instant case, the
Court finds she should be imposed the penalty of fine in the amount of P30,000.00.

Liability of Atty. Favorito.

There is no evidence to show that Atty. Favorito knows or should have known that Atty. Morales had copies of pleadings for private cases in his personal
computer for which Atty. Favorito could be held liable for neglect of duty as supervisor. As to Siwa's lending and rediscounting activities, however, the Court
finds that Atty. Favorito was remiss in addressing said matter which activity took place in the court's premises which was under his responsibility.

Clarifications, however, should be made.

The OCA in its Memorandum dated November 7, 2007 stated that:

x x x in her April 28, 2005 Manifestation, Siwa admitted to being involved in the business of rediscounting checks, claiming that 'she is not the only employee
engaged in the same business.' Respondent [Siwa] even had the audacity to admit that she 'maintained my own personnel' to do the rediscounting which
stretched to the premises of the MeTC-OCC, where respondent Favorito is the Clerk of Court.[67] (Emphasis supplied)

A review of the records, however, would show that what Siwa submitted is not a Manifestation but a Comment dated April 28, 2005 and there, instead of
stating that her rediscounting activities stretched to the premises of the MeTC-OCC, she actually denied that she used the OCC to conduct said business.
Pertinent portions of said Comment reads:

4.1. Respondent admits that she is involved in the business of rediscounting checks x x x.

xxxx

4.2. Respondent, however, denies that she uses the Office of the Clerk of Court to conduct this business x x x.

4.3. There are other occasions when the said staff will be stationed at the corridors to lend emergency cash to employees in need. The said occasions may have
occurred during office hours, for which, the respondent's staff may not be blamed since it was the employees themselves who go to them. However, these
instances were rare. It should also be emphasized that these transactions occurred outside of the offices and within the common or public areas.[68] (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, Siwa never admitted that her business stretched to the premises of the OCC-MeTC but only claimed that her staff used corridors which were common or
public areas for their transactions.

Still, Atty. Favorito failed to address such matter and to prevent such activities from taking place, even if they were conducted in the corridors, since such areas
are still part of the court's premises. As Clerk of Court of the OCC, it is Atty. Favorito's duty to plan, direct, supervise and coordinate the activities of all
divisions/sections/units in the OCC.[69] He should therefore be reprimanded for his failure to duly supervise and prevent such activities from happening within
his area of responsibility.

Liability of Atty. Favorito and Calda on the extortion charges.

On the claim that Atty. Favorito and Caldo extorted money from sureties without issuing receipts therefor, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the
findings of the Investigating Judge and the OCA.

Investigating Judge Estoesta found that:

x x x the charges of extortion levelled against Atty. Henry P. Favorito and Mr. William Calda x x x suffered from loose ends.

Random interviews with two (2) bondsmen denied that Atty. Favorito and Mr. Calda exacted such amounts.

The P50.00 and P500.00 specified to as processing fee could actually refer to the Legal Fees mandated under Section 8 (o) and Section 21 (c) of Rule 141, as
follows x x x

Here, it is obvious that the anonymous letter-complainant has no understanding whatsoever of the legal fees charged by Office of the Clerk of Court.

This actually hints of the fact that said anonymous letter-complainant may not be a personnel of the Office of the Clerk of Court after all.

The extortion charge slapped against Atty. Favorito and Mr. Calda, therefore, rings empty.[70]

Such finding was affirmed by the OCA in its Memorandum dated November 7, 2007 which recommended the dismissal of said charges against Atty. Favorito
and Calda for lack of concrete proof.[71]
Liability of Arreola on absence during office hours.
As with the extortion charges against Atty. Favorito and Calda, the Court finds no sufficient evidence to hold Arreola administratively liable.

As reported by Judge Estoesta:

x x x the charge against Ms. Amie Grace Arreola regarding her habit of leaving the office after logging-in found no concrete corroboration.

The interviewees were actually unanimous in saying that Ms. Arreola was not prone to such habit as she is always around the office. Ms. Arreola may have
been known to fetch her son at a nearby school but she has always done so during lunch hours and after office hours.

As a matter of fact, at a time when the MeTC was stricken by a debilitating brown-out schedule in the afternoon sometime [in] July 2006, Ms. Arreola was still
around, having been one of the skeletal force who volunteered to stay on. The undersigned has personally seen her around 5:30 p.m. of the same day.

As a matter of fact, several random checks on Ms. Arreola by the undersigned herself revealed that she has always been around at the OCC and at Branch 30
where she was re-assigned as Branch Clerk of Court. At times, personal visits were made, interspersed by telephone calls between 8:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m.
where Ms. Arreola proved herself to be always at the office.

Needless to say, therefore, the charge against Ms. Arreola is certainly without basis.[72]
The OCA agreed with the said finding and likewise recommended the dismissal of the charges against Arreola.[73]

It is well-settled that in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the
complaint. That is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, what will prevail is that respondent has regularly performed his or her duties.[74] Reliance on
mere allegations, conjectures and suppositions will leave an administrative complaint with no leg to stand on, and charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation cannot be given credence.[75]

Since there is no proof, apart from the allegations of the letter-complaint, to hold Atty. Favorito, Calda and Arreola liable for the afore- stated charges against
them, the Court deems it proper to dismiss said charges for lack of merit.

Other matters.

In view of the initial findings of Investigating Judge Estoesta that Siwa was remiss in her duty of transcribing stenographic notes assigned to her, the OCA is
hereby directed to conduct an audit investigation on Siwa's transcription of stenographic notes to determine the full extent of the notes she failed to transcribe
on time. If warranted, such matter shall be treated as a separate case to be given a new docket number and assigned to another ponente for evaluation.

The OCA should also report on the status of the complaint filed by Atty. Morales which the Court received on March 31, 2005, the complaint of Isabel Siwa
dated April 12, 2005, and the letter-complaint of Atty. Favorito together with other MeTC employees which the Court received on March 28, 2005, against
DCA Dela Cruz, regarding the spot investigation conducted on March 16, 2005 regarding this case.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Isabel Siwa, Court Stenographer of Branch 16, Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and is FINED in the amount of P30,000.00 to be deducted from the money value of her leave credits which was set aside per Resolution
dated October 12, 2005 in A.M No. 12096-Ret. entitled Application for Retirement Benefits under Section 13-A of R.A. No. 8291 of Ms. Isabel A. Siwa,
Court Stenographer II, MeTC, Manila, Branch 16.

Atty. Henry P. Favorito, Clerk of Court of the Office of the Clerk of Court is REPRIMANDED for his failure to supervise the lending and rediscounting
activites of Siwa which took place in the court's premises. The extortion charges against him are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The charges against Atty. Miguel Morales, former Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 17, are DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. Deputy Court
Administrator Reuben de la Cruz is advised to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties.

The charges against William Calda, Administrative Officer of the Office of the Clerk of Court, and Amie Grace Arreola, formerly Branch Clerk of Court of
Branch 4 now Clerk of Court of Branch 30, both of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to conduct an audit investigation on Isabel Siwa's transcription of stenographic notes in view of the
finding of Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez-Estoesta in her Investigation Report dated September 1, 2006 in A.M. No. P-08-2519 and A.M. P-08-2520
(formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2155-P and A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2156-P) that Siwa has not submitted a complete transcription of stenographic notes in
several cases assigned to her. Said matter shall be treated as a separate case, to be given a new docket number and assigned to a new ponente for final
resolution.

SO ORDERED

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Appellee,

- versus -

RAUL NUEZ y REVILLEZA,

Appellant.
G.R. No. 177148

Present:

Quisumbing, J., Chairperson,

ynares-santiago,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,**
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*** and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:
June 30, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR. H.C. No. 02420. The appellate
court affirmed the Decision[2] dated February 11, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, which convicted appellant in
Criminal Case No. 8614-01-C for violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, also known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended
by Rep. Act No. 7659.[3]
On June 25, 2001, Raul R. Nuez was formally charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended. The Information reads:
That at around 6:00 oclock in the morning of the 24th day of April 2001[4] at Brgy. San Antonio, Municipality of Los Ba[]os, Province of Laguna and within
the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, and in a search conducted at his residence as stated above, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody thirty[-]one (31) heat sealed transparent plastic sachets
containing methamp[h]etamine hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu, a regulated drug, with a total weight of 233.93 grams in violation of the
aforementioned provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
The facts are as follows:
At 6:00 a.m. on April 26, 2001, operatives of the Sta. Cruz, Laguna Police Detectives in coordination with the Los Baos Police Station (LBPS) and IID Mobile
Force conducted a search in the house of Raul R. Nuez based on reports of drug possession. The group, led by Commanding Officer Arwin Pagkalinawan,
included SPO1 Odelon Ilagan, SPO3 Eduardo Paz, PO1 Ronnie Orfano, PO2 Gerry Crisostomo, PO2 Alexander Camantigue, PO2 Joseph Ortega and Senior
Inspector Uriquia.
Before proceeding to appellants residence in Barangay San Antonio, the group summoned Barangay Captain Mario Mundin and Chief Tanod Alfredo Joaquin
to assist them in serving the search warrant. Upon arriving at appellants house, Mundin called on appellant to come out. Thereafter, Commanding Officer
Pagkalinawan showed Nuez the warrant. SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Crisostomo then surveyed appellants room in his presence while his family, PO2 Ortega and
the two barangay officials remained in the living room. SPO1 Ilagan found thirty-one (31) packets of shabu, lighters, improvised burners, tooters, and
aluminum foil with shabu residue and a ladys wallet containing P4,610 inside appellants dresser. The group also confiscated a component, camera, electric
planer, grinder, drill, jigsaw, electric tester, and assorted carpentry tools on suspicion that they were acquired in exchange for shabu. Following the search,
SPO1 Ilagan issued a Receipt for Property Seized[6] and a Certification of Orderly Search[7] which appellant signed.
In a Decision dated February 11, 2002, the RTC convicted appellant and sentenced him as follows:
WHEREFORE, this court finds the accused guilty, beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Republic Act 6425 as amended and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and all its accessory penalties under the law. Accused is ordered to pay the fine of two million pesos.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Appellant elevated the case to this Court on appeal, but the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals on May 2, 2006, pursuant to our ruling in People v.
Mateo.[9] On January 19, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming appellants conviction. The appellate court dismissed appellants defense of
frame-up and upheld the credibility of SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Ortega. It observed that the inconsistencies in their testimony were minor at best, and did not
relate to the elements of the crime.
The appellate court in its decision decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated February 11, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Calamba, Laguna is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[10]
From the appellate courts decision, appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. This Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so desire.
However, both the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the appellant manifested that they are adopting their briefs before the appellate court.
In his brief, appellant contends that
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCORDING GREATER WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION AND
DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF FRAME-UP INTERPOSED BY [THE] ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE IMPUTED CRIME
DESPITE THE INHERENT WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE.[11]
Simply, the issue is whether appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Possession of Regulated Drugs under the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Appellant insists that the shabu found in his room was planted. He points out variances in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which cast doubt on his
culpability: first, SPO1 Ilagan testified that they picked up the barangay officials before going to appellants house but PO2 Ortega claimed that Chief Tanod
Joaquin was already with them when they left the police station; second, while SPO1 Ilagan confirmed the presence of the accused during the search, PO2
Ortega related otherwise. More importantly, appellant assails the validity of the search warrant as it did not indicate his exact address but only the barangay and
street of his residence. He maintains that none of the occupants witnessed the search as they were all kept in the living room. Finally, appellant questions why
the prosecution did not call the barangay officials as witnesses to shed light on the details of the search.
Conversely, the OSG argues that appellants guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. It agrees with the trial court that appellant failed to overcome the
presumption that the law enforcement agents regularly performed their duties. Further, the OSG brands the testimonies of appellant, his wife and their child as
self-serving, absent ill-motives ascribed to the search team. It brushes aside appellants protest, on the validity of the search warrant, for having been belatedly
made.
After considering carefully the contentions of the parties and the records of this case, we are in agreement that appellants petition lacks merit.
Appellant was indicted for possession of regulated drugs under Section 16 of Rep. Act No. 6425 as amended which provides:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the
provisions of Section 20 hereof.
To be liable for the crime, the following elements must concur: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by
law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.[12] All these were found present in the instant
case.
While appellant interposes the defense of frame-up, we view such claim with disfavor as it can easily be fabricated and is commonly used as a facile refuge in
drug cases.[13] In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses
especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.[14]
In this case, SPO1 Ilagan found shabu in appellants room; but appellant retorts that it was planted. The latters daughter, Liezel Nuez, testified on the alleged
planting of evidence as follows:
xxxx
Q: While you were walking towards the direction of your bath room at that time have you notice anything which catches your attention?
A: I saw a man inside the room taking a plastic from his bag, sir.
Q: Did you also notice, what did that man do with that plastic in the bag?
A: He put under the bed fronting the door, sir.
xxxx
Q: Can you describe to this Honorable Court what was that something that the man took out from his bag and placed the same underneath your parents bed?
A: It is a plastic containing like a tawas, sir.
Q: Have you noticed Miss Witness about how many plastic bag (sic) did the man take from his bag?
A: Only one, sir.[15] [Emphasis supplied.]

xxxx
Assuming arguendo that an officer placed a sachet of shabu under appellants bed, appellant had not advanced any reason to account for the thirty-one (31)
packets of shabu and drug paraphernalia collected from the dresser in his room. Instead, he readily signed the Receipt for Property Seized and the Certification
of Orderly Search. Neither did appellants daughter identify the police officer who allegedly planted evidence. Absent any compelling proof why SPO1 Ilagan
would falsely testify against appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty stands and we agree that his testimony is worthy of full
faith and credit.[16]
In a further effort to impeach the credibility of the policemen, appellant questions the non-presentation of the barangay officials who purportedly observed the
search. The matter of presentation of witnesses, however, is neither for accused nor even for the trial court to decide. Discretion belongs to the prosecutor as to
how the State should present its case. The prosecutor has the right to choose whom he would present as witness.[17] It bears stressing that by no means did the
barangay officials become part of the prosecution when they were asked to witness the search. Hence, even the accused could have presented them to testify
thereon.
Appellant alleges that SPO1 Ilagan verified his presence inside the room during the search in contrast to PO2 Ortegas account. The records, however, disclose
otherwise. On direct examination, PO2 Ortega recounted:
FISCAL:
Q: What did you do next?
WITNESS:
A: Capt. Mundin together with Raul and then the three of us went to the room of Raul Nuez, sir.
xxxx
Q: So, among the group that went to the room of Raul Nuez who went inside?
A: It was Raul Nuez, Sgt. Ilagan, Crisostomo who are inside the room. I stayed near the door along with Brgy. Capt. Mundin and Chief Tanod who were
looking at what was going on, sir.[18] [Emphasis supplied.]
On cross-examination, PO2 Ortega did not falter:
xxxx
Q: Who among you went inside the room of Raul Nuez?
A: Sgt. Ilagan, Crisostomo, Raul Nuez, myself, Chief Tanod Alfredo and Capt. Mundin, sir.[19] [Emphasis supplied.]
Besides, any objection to the legality of the search warrant and the admissibility of the evidence obtained thereby was deemed waived when no objection was
raised by appellant during trial. For sure, the right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures, like any other right, can be waived and the waiver
may be made expressly or impliedly.[20]
As regards the contradiction in the testimonies of SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Ortega as to whether they picked up Chief Tanod Joaquin at the barangay hall, the
same is inconsequential. After all, the witnesses testimonies need only corroborate one another on material details surrounding the actual commission of the
crime.[21]
Here, we find the testimonies of SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Ortega believable and consistent on material points: appellant was shown the search warrant; the search
was conducted in the latters presence; and SPO1 Ilagan found shabu in appellants dresser. It has been ruled that an affirmative testimony coming from credible
witnesses without motive to perjure is far stronger than a negative testimony. Records show that appellant and the police officers were strangers to each other.
Hence, there is no reason to suggest that the police officers were ill-motivated in apprehending appellant.[22]
Turning to the objects which may be confiscated during the search, Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court is pertinent:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
As a rule, only the personal properties described in the search warrant may be seized by the authorities.[23] In the case at bar, Search Warrant No. 42[24]
specifically authorized the taking of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and paraphernalia(s) only. By the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statute
describes things of a particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic word will usually be limited to things of a similar nature
with those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the statement which would repel such inference.[25]
Thus, we are here constrained to point out an irregularity in the search conducted. Certainly, the ladys wallet, cash, grinder, camera, component, speakers,
electric planer, jigsaw, electric tester, saws, hammer, drill, and bolo were not encompassed by the word paraphernalia as they bear no relation to the use or
manufacture of drugs. In seizing the said items then, the police officers exercised their own discretion and determined for themselves which items in appellants
residence they believed were proceeds of the crime or means of committing the offense. This is, in our view, absolutely impermissible.[26]
The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly described in the warrant is to limit the things to be taken to those, and
only those particularly described in the search warrant -- to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. A search
warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating
to a crime.[27] Accordingly, the objects taken which were not specified in the search warrant should be restored to appellant.
Lastly, we find the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court proper. Under Section 20(3)[28] of Rep. Act No. 6425 as amended by
Rep. Act No. 7659, possession of 200 grams or more of shabu (methamphetamine hydrochloride) renders the accused liable to suffer the maximum penalty
under Section 16 of Rep. Act No. 6425, which is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000 to P10,000,000.
In the case at bar, appellant was found in possession of 233.93 grams of shabu. Hence there being no modifying circumstance proven, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with its accessory penalties, and P2,000,000 fine which the Court of Appeals meted on appellant is in order.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR. H.C. No. 02420 is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
the official custodian of the objects taken during the search which are not otherwise regulated drugs or drug paraphernalia, is ORDERED to return them to
appellant.
SO ORDERED

ARTHUR DEL ROSARIO and G.R. No. 180595

ALEXANDER DEL ROSARIO,
Petitioners, Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.
HELLENOR D. DONATO, JR.
and RAFAEL V. GONZAGA, Promulgated:
Respondents.
March 5, 2010
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the need for plaintiff to state the facts constituting his cause of action and the correct forum for actions for damages arising from alleged
wrongful procurement and enforcement of a search warrant issued in connection with an alleged criminal violation of the intellectual property law.

The Facts and the Case

On January 23, 2002 Philip Morris Products, Inc. (Philip Morris) wrote the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), requesting assistance in curtailing the
proliferation of fake Marlboro cigarettes in Angeles City, Pampanga. After doing surveillance work in that city, respondent Hellenor Donato, Jr., the NBI agent
assigned to the case, succeeded in confirming the storage and sale of such fake cigarettes at the house at 51 New York Street, Villasol Subdivision, Angeles
City, that belonged to petitioner Alexander del Rosario.

On March 5, 2002 respondent Donato applied for a search warrant with Branch 57 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City to search the subject
premises. But it took a week later or on March 12, 2002 for the RTC to hear the application and issue the search warrant. Although Donato felt that the delayed
hearing compromised the operation, the NBI agents led by respondent Rafael V. Gonzaga proceeded to implement the warrant. Their search yielded no fake
Marlboro cigarettes.

Subsequently, petitioners Alexander and Arthur del Rosario (the Del Rosarios) filed a complaint for P50 million in damages against respondents NBI agents
Donato and Gonzaga and two others before the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 62, in Civil Case 10584. On August 6, 2003 respondents NBI agents answered
the complaint with a motion to dismiss on the grounds of: a) the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action; b) forum shopping; and c) the NBI agents
immunity from suit, they being sued as such agents. The RTC denied the motion on March 25, 2003. The NBI agents filed a motion for reconsideration but the
RTC denied the same on June 27, 2003.

Dissatisfied, respondents NBI agents filed a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 79496. On June 29, 2007 the
latter court granted the petition and annulled the RTCs orders, first, in alleging merely that the NBI agents unlawfully procured the search warrant without
stating the facts that made the procurement unlawful, the complaint failed to state a cause of action; and second, the Del Rosarios were guilty of forum
shopping in that they should have filed their claim for damages against the NBI agents through a motion for compensation with the court that issued the search
warrant.

The Del Rosarios sought reconsideration of the decision but the CA denied it on November 19, 2007, prompting them to file this petition for review.

The Issues Presented

The petition presents two issues:

1. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the complaint of the Del Rosarios did not state a cause of action; and

2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the Del Rosarios were guilty of forum shopping.

The Courts Rulings

One. The CA held that the Del Rosarios complaint before the RTC failed to state a cause of action against respondents NBI agents. Such complaint said that
the NBI agents unlawfully procured and enforced the search warrant issued against the Del Rosarios but it failed to state the ultimate facts from which they
drew such conclusion.

The test of sufficiency of a complaint is whether or not, assuming the truth of the facts that plaintiff alleges in it, the court can render judgment granting him
the judicial assistance he seeks.[1] And judgment would be right only if the facts he alleges constitute a cause of action that consists of three elements: (1) the
plaintiffs legal right in the matter; (2) the defendants corresponding obligation to honor or respect such right; and (3) the defendants subsequent violation of the
right. Absent any of these, the complaint would have failed to state a cause of action.[2]

According to the Del Rosarios, the following allegations in their complaint state a cause or causes of action against respondents NBI agents:

2.4 On 12 March 2002, elements of the [NBI] x x x led by Defendant Rafael I. Gonzaga x x x entered by force the premises belonging to Plaintiff Alexander
del Rosario situated at No. 51 New York Street, Villasol Subdivision, Angeles City, pursuant to a Search Warrant unlawfully obtained from the [RTC] of
Angeles City, Branch 57 x x x.

xxxx

2.6 Contrary to the sworn statements given before the court by defendants Hellenor D. Donato Jr. x x x and contrary to the allegation in Search Warrant No.
02-09A, no fake Marlboro cigarettes and their packaging were found at No. 51 New York Street, Villasol Subdivision, Angeles City x x x.

2.7 The inclusion of Plaintiff Arthur del Rosario in Search Warrant No. 02-09 had no factual basis considering that the premises searched is the property solely
of Plaintiff Alexander del Rosario.
2.8 Worse the enforcement of Searched [sic] Warrant No. 02-09 was just part of the series of raids and searches that was conducted in Angeles City and
Pampanga, which was done with much publicity in the community and had tended to include the Plaintiffs in the same category as other persons and entities
who were in fact found to be dealing with fake Marlboro cigarettes.

xxxx

3.2 The baseless sworn allegations that Plaintiffs had under their control and possession counterfeit Marlboro cigarettes and packaging to obtain a search
warrant, and the malicious service of the such warrant at the residential premises of Plaintiff Alexander del Rosario in full and plain view of members of the
community, as part of the series of raids and operations conducted within Angeles City and Pampanga during that period, has tainted irreversibly the good
names which Plaintiffs have painstakingly built and maintained over the years.

xxxx

3.4 Plaintiffs were subjected to so much humiliation and embarrassment by the raid conducted on the subject residential premises, and subjected them to much
unwarranted speculation of engaging in the sale of fake merchandise.

Essentially, however, all that the Del Rosarios allege is that respondents NBI agents used an unlawfully obtained search warrant against them, evidenced by the
fact that, contrary to the sworn statements used to get such warrant, the NBI agents found no fake Marlboro cigarettes in petitioner Alexander del Rosarios
premises.

But a judicially ordered search that fails to yield the described illicit article does not of itself render the courts order unlawful. The Del Rosarios did not allege
that respondents NBI agents violated their right by fabricating testimonies to convince the RTC of Angeles City to issue the search warrant. Their allegation
that the NBI agents used an unlawfully obtained search warrant is a mere conclusion of law. While a motion to dismiss assumes as true the facts alleged in the
complaint, such admission does not extend to conclusions of law.[3] Statements of mere conclusions of law expose the complaint to a motion to dismiss on
ground of failure to state a cause of action.[4]

Further, the allegation that the search warrant in this case was served in a malicious manner is also not sufficient. Allegations of bad faith, malice, and other
related words without ultimate facts to support the same are mere conclusions of law.[5]

The Del Rosarios broad assertion in their complaint that the search was conducted in full and plain view of members of the community does not likewise
support their claim that such search was maliciously enforced. There is nothing inherently wrong with search warrants being enforced in full view of
neighbors. In fact, when the respondent or his representative is not present during the search, the rules require that it be done in the presence of two residents of
the same locality. These safeguards exist to protect persons from possible abuses that may occur if searches were done surreptitiously or clandestinely.

Two. Invoking Section 21 of this Courts Administrative Matter (A.M.) 02-1-06-SC (not A.O. 01-1-06-SC as cited), the CA held that, rather than file a separate
action for damages, the Del Rosarios should have filed their claim for compensation in the same proceeding and with the same court that issued the writ of
search and seizure. The Del Rosarios were thus guilty of forum shopping.

A.M. 02-1-06-SC, the Rule on Search and Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights, provides:

SEC. 21. Claim for damages. Where the writ [of search and seizure] is discharged on any of the grounds provided in this Rule, or where it is found after trial
that there has been no infringement or threat of infringement of an intellectual property right, the court, upon motion of the alleged infringing defendant or
expected adverse party and after due hearing, shall order the applicant to compensate the defendant or expected adverse party upon the cash bond, surety bond
or other equivalent security for any injury or damage the latter suffered by the issuance and enforcement of the writ. Should the damages exceed the amount of
the bond, the applicant shall be liable for the payment of the excess.

When a complaint is already filed in court, the motion shall be filed with the same court during the trial or before appeal is perfected or before judgment
becomes executory, with due notice to the applicant, setting forth the facts showing the defendants right to damages and the amount thereof. The award of
damages shall be included in the judgment in the main case.

Where no complaint is filed against the expected adverse party, the motion shall be filed with the court which issued the writ. In such a case, the court shall set
the motion for summary hearing and immediately determine the expected adverse partys right to damages.

A judgment in favor of the applicant in its principal claim should not necessarily bar the alleged infringing defendant from recovering damages where he
suffered losses by reason of the wrongful issuance or enforcement of the writ.

The damages provided for in this section shall be independent from the damages claimed by the defendant in his counterclaim.

But the subject search warrant was not issued under A.M. 02-1-06-SC, which governed the issuance of a writ of search and seizure in a civil action for
infringement filed by an intellectual property right owner against the supposed infringer of his trademark or name. Philip Morris, the manufacturer of Marlboro
cigarettes, did not go by this route. Philip Morris did not file a civil action for infringement of its trademark against the Del Rosarios before the RTC of
Angeles City.

Instead, Philip Morris sought assistance from the NBI for the apprehension and criminal prosecution of those reportedly appropriating its trademark and selling
fake Marlboro cigarettes. In turn, the NBI instituted a police action that included applying for a search and seizure warrant under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Rule
126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure (not under the provisions of A.M. 02-1-06-SC) against the Del Rosarios upon the belief that they were storing and
selling fake Marlboro cigarettes in violation of the penal provisions of the intellectual property law.

The proceeding under Rule 126, a limited criminal one, does not provide for the filing of counterclaims for damages against those who may have improperly
sought the issuance of the search warrant. Consequently, the Del Rosarios had the right to seek damages, if the circumstances warranted, by separate civil
action for the wrong inflicted on them by an improperly obtained or enforced search warrant. Unfortunately, their complaint, as worded, failed to state a proper
cause of action.

Petitioner Arthur del Rosario claims that respondents NBI agents wrongfully included him as respondent in their application for a search warrant since he
neither owned the house at 51 New York Street nor resided in it. But the rules do not require respondents in search warrant proceedings to be residents of the
premises to be searched. If this were the case, criminals in possession of illegal articles could simply use other peoples residence for storing such articles to
avoid being raided and searched.
The Del Rosarios raise a number of procedural issues: a) the supposed failure of respondents NBI agents to file their motion for reconsideration of the RTC
order denying their motion to dismiss within 15 days of receipt of the order; b) their resort to a special civil action of certiorari to challenge the RTCs denial of
their motion to dismiss; c) the propriety of their inclusion of a motion to dismiss in their answer; d) the CAs grant to them in 2003 of a 15-day extension to file
a petition for certiorari after the lapse of 60 days when the Court did not yet come out with a ruling that barred such extension; and e) their being represented
by private counsel rather than by the Office of the Solicitor General.

With the Courts rulings in the principal issues raised in this case, it finds no sufficient reason to further dwell on the lesser issues that the Del Rosarios raise
above. Besides, the Court finds no error in the CAs disposition of the same.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 79496 dated June 29, 2007 and its
Resolution dated November 19, 2007 for the reasons stated in this Decision, with the MODIFICATION that Civil Case 10584 is DISMISSED without
prejudice.

SO ORDERED

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

- versus

ESTELA TUAN y BALUDDA,

Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 176066

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,*
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:

August 11, 2010

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For review is the Decision[1] dated September 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00381, which affirmed with modification the
Decision[2] dated April 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Baguio City, finding accused-appellant Estela Tuan y Baludda guilty in Criminal
Case No. 17619-R, of illegal possession of marijuana under Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended; and in Criminal Case No. 17620-R, of violating Presidential Decree No. 1866, otherwise known as the Illegal Possession of Firearms, as
amended.

On April 5, 2000, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC against accused-appellant for illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of
firearm. The Informations read:

Criminal Case No. 17619-R

The undersigned Public Prosecutor accuses ESTELA TUAN Y BALUDDA of the crime of VIOLATION OF SEC. 8, ART. II OF REPUBLIC ACT 6425, AS
AMENDED (Illegal Possession of Marijuana), committed as follows:

That on or about 24th day of January 2000, at Barangay Gabriela Silang, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused did then and there willfully and unlawfully have in her possession, custody, and control the following, to wit:

a) Nine (9) bricks of dried Marijuana leaves with an approximate total weight of 18.750 kgs., and

b) One (1) plastic bag containing dried Marijuana leaves weighing approximately .3 kg.

without any authority of law to do so in violation of the above-cited provision of law.[3]

Criminal Case No. 17620-R

The undersigned Public Prosecutor accuses ESTELA TUAN Y BALUDDA of the crime of VIOLATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1866, AS
AMENDED (Illegal Possession of Firearm), committed as follows:

That on or about the 24th day of January 2000, at Barangay Gabriela Silang, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully and unlawfully have in her possession, custody, and control one (1) Cal. .357 S & W revolver, a
high-powered firearm, without any license, permit or authority duly issued by the government to possess or keep the same in violation of the above-cited
law.[4]

Upon her arraignment on April 18, 2000, accused-appellant, assisted by her counsel de parte, pleaded NOT GUILTY to both charges.[5] Pre-trial and trial
proper then ensued.

During trial, the prosecution presented four witnesses: Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Modesto F. Carrera (Carrera), Police Officer (PO) 2 Jaime Chavez
(Chavez), SPO2 Fernando Fernandez (Fernandez), and Forensic Chemist II Marina Carina Madrigal (Madrigal).

The events, as recounted by the prosecution, are as follows:

At around nine oclock in the morning on January 24, 2000, two male informants namely, Jerry Tudlong (Tudlong) and Frank Lad-ing (Lad-ing) arrived at the
office of the 14th Regional CIDG (Criminal Investigation and Detention Group) at DPS Compound, Marcoville, Baguio City, and reported to SPO2
Fernandez, Chief of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU), that a certain Estela Tuan had been selling marijuana at Barangay Gabriela Silang, Baguio
City. Present at that time were Police Superintendent Isagani Neres, Regional Officer of the 14th Regional CIDG; Chief Inspector Reynaldo Piay, Deputy
Regional Officer; and other police officers.[6]

SPO2 Fernandez set out to verify the report of Tudlong and Lad-ing. At around one oclock in the afternoon of the same day, he gave Tudlong and Lad-ing
P300.00 to buy marijuana, and then accompanied the two informants to the accused-appellants house. Tudlong and Lad-ing entered accused-appellants house,
while SPO2 Fernandez waited at the adjacent house. After thirty minutes, Tudlong and Lad-ing came out of accused-appellants house and showed SPO2
Fernandez the marijuana leaves they bought. After returning to the CIDG regional office, SPO2 Fernandez requested the laboratory examination of the leaves
bought from accused-appellant. When said laboratory examination yielded positive results for marijuana, SPO2 Fernandez prepared an Application for Search
Warrant for accused-appellants house.
SPO2 Fernandez, together with Tudlong and Lad-ing, filed the Application for a Search Warrant before Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (Judge Cortes) of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Baguio City, Branch IV, at about one oclock in the afternoon on January 25, 2000. Two hours later, at around three
oclock, Judge Cortes personally examined SPO2 Fernandez, Tudlong, and Lad-ing, after which, she issued a Search Warrant, being satisfied of the existence of
probable cause. The Search Warrant read:

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

GREETINGS:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned of the existence of facts upon which the application for Search Warrant is based, after personally examining
by searching questions under oath SPO2 Fernando V. Fernandez of the CAR Criminal Investigation and Detection Group with office address at DPS
Compound, Utility Road, Baguio City and his witnesses namely: Frank Lad-ing of Happy Hallow, Baguio City and Jerry Tudlong, of Barangay Kitma, Baguio
City, after having been duly sworn to, who executed sworn statements and deposition as witneses, that there is a probable cause to believe that a Violation of
R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659 has been committed and that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that Estela Tuan, has in her possession and
control at her resident at Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City, the following:

- Undetermined Quantity of Marijuana Dried Leaves and/or Marijuana Hashish

xxxx

which are subject of the offense which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at anytime in the day the house of the accused Estela Tuan at Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City,
and forthwith seize and take possession of the following:

- Undetermined Quantity of Marijuana Dried Leaves and/or Marijuana Hashish

x x x nothing follows x x x

and bring said items to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.

This Search Warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from date of issue, thereafter, it shall be void.

The officers must conduct the search and seize the above-mentioned personal items in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of her family
or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.

The officers seizing the items must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the house in whose presence the search and seizure were
made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of the 2 witnesses mentioned, leave a receipt in the place in which the seized items were found;
thereafter, deliver the items seized to the undersigned judge together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.

Baguio City, Philippines, this 25th day of January, 2000.

(SGD)ILUMINADA CABATO-CORTES
Executive Judge
MTCC, Branch IV[7]
Upon receipt of the Search Warrant, SPO2 Fernandez, his team supervisor Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Castel, SPO1 Carrera, Police Senior Inspector
Ricarte Marquez and PO2 Chavez implemented the warrant. Before going to the accused-appellants house, SPO2 Fernandez invited barangay officials to be
present when the Search Warrant was to be served, but since no one was available, he requested one Eliza Pascual (Pascual), accused-appellants neighbor, to
come along.
The CIDG team thereafter proceeded to accused-appellants house. Even though accused-appellant was not around, the CIDG team was allowed entry into the
house by Magno Baludda (Magno), accused-appellants father, after he was shown a copy of the Search Warrant. SPO2 Fernandez and Police Senior Inspector
Ricarte Marquez guarded the surroundings of the house,[8] while SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez searched inside.

SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez began searching the rooms on the first floor in the presence of Magno and Pascual. They continued their search on the second
floor. They saw a movable cabinet in accused-appellants room, below which they found a brick of marijuana and a firearm. At around six oclock that evening,
accused-appellant arrived with her son. The police officers asked accused-appellant to open a built-in cabinet, in which they saw eight more bricks of
marijuana.[9] PO2 Chavez issued a receipt for the items confiscated from accused-appellant[10] and a certification stating that the items were confiscated and
recovered from the house and in accused-appellants presence.

The nine bricks of marijuana were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination.

The defense, on the other hand, had an entirely different version of what transpired that day. It presented four witnesses, namely, accused-appellant herself;
Beniasan Tuan (Beniasan), accused-appellants husband; Magno, accused-appellants father; and Mabini Maskay (Maskay), the Barangay Captain of Barangay
Gabriela Silang.
In her testimony, accused-appellant declared that she worked as a vendor at Hangar Market. Sometime in January 2000, while she was selling vegetables at
Hangar Market, her son arrived with two police officers who asked her to go home because of a letter from the court.[11] At about six oclock in the afternoon,
she and her husband Beniasan reached their residence and found a green paper bag with marijuana in their sala. According to the police officers, they got the
bag from a room on the first floor of accused-appellants house. Accused-appellant explained that the room where the bag of marijuana was found was
previously rented by boarders. The boarders padlocked the room because they still had things inside and they had paid their rent up to the end of January
2000.[12] The police officers also informed accused-appellant that they got a gun from under a cabinet in the latters room, which accused-appellant disputed
since her room was always left open and it was where her children play.[13] Accused-appellant alleged that a Search Warrant was issued for her house because
of a quarrel with her neighbor named Lourdes Estillore (Estillore). Accused-appellant filed a complaint for the demolition of Estillores house which was
constructed on the road.[14]

Beniasan supported the testimony of his wife, accused-appellant. He narrated that he and accused-appellant were at their Hangar Market stall when two police
officers came and asked them to go home. Beniasan and accused-appellant arrived at their residence at around six oclock in the evening and were shown the
marijuana the police officers supposedly got from the first floor of the house. The police officers then made Beniasan sign a certification of the list of items
purportedly confiscated from the house.[15]
Magno testified that he resided at the first floor of accused-appellants residence. He was present when the search was conducted but denied that the Search
Warrant was shown to him.[16] He attested that the confiscated items were found from the vacant room at the first floor of accused-appellants house which
was previously occupied by boarders. Said room was padlocked but was forced open by the police officers. In the course of the police officers search, they
pulled something from under the bed that was wrapped in green cellophane, but Magno did not know the contents thereof.[17] The police officers also
searched the rooms of accused-appellant and her children at the second floor of the house, during which they allegedly found a gun under the cabinet in
accused-appellants room. Magno claimed that he did not personally witness the finding of the gun and was merely informed about it by the police officers.[18]

Maskay, the Barangay Captain of Barangay Gabriela Silang, Baguio City, was the last to testify for the defense. He corroborated accused-appellants allegation
that the latter had a quarrel with Estillore, and this could be the reason behind the filing of the present criminal cases. He further remembered that the members
of the CIDG went to his office on January 24, 2000 to ask about the location of accused-appellants house.[19]

The RTC, in its Decision dated April 9, 2002, found accused-appellant guilty as charged and adjudged thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 17619-R, the Court finds the accused Estela Tuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of marijuana
(nine [9] bricks of dried marijuana leaves with an approximate weight of 18.750 kilograms and the one [1] plastic bag containing the dried marijuana weighing
about .3 kilograms) in violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Section 13 of Republic Act 7659 as charged in the
information and sentences her to the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The nine (9) bricks of dried marijuana leaves with an approximate weight of 18.750 kilograms and one (1) plastic bag containing dried marijuana leaves
weighing approximately .3 kilograms (Exhibit F, F-1, F-1-A to F-1-J) are ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the State to be destroyed immediately in
accordance with law.

The accused Estela Tuan being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited 4/5 of her preventive imprisonment in the service of her sentence in accordance
with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code; and

2. In Criminal Case No. 17620-R, the Court finds the accused Estela Tuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of firearms (one
[1] caliber .357 S & W revolver), a high powered firearm, without any license, permit or authority issued by the Government to keep the same in violation of
Section 1, Republic Act No. 8294 which amended Section 1 of PD 1866 as charged in the information and hereby sentences her, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, to imprisonment ranging from 4 years 9 months and 10 days of prision correccional in its maximum period as Minimum to 6 years and 8
months of prision mayor in its minimum period as Maximum and a fine of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The firearm caliber .357 S & W revolver without serial number is ordered forfeited in favor of the State to be disposed of immediately in accordance with law.
The accused Estela Tuan being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited 4/5 of her preventive imprisonment in the service of her sentence in accordance
with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.[20]

The records of the two criminal cases were forwarded to this Court by the RTC, but the Court issued a Resolution[21] dated October 13, 2004 transferring said
records to the Court of Appeals pursuant to People v. Mateo.[22]
On September 21, 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision.

The Court of Appeals held that the contested search and consequent seizure of the marijuana bricks were done pursuant to the Search Warrant validly issued by
the MTCC. There was no showing of procedural defects or lapses in the issuance of said Search Warrant as the records support that the issuing judge
determined probable cause only after conducting the searching inquiry and personal examination of the applicant and the latters witnesses, in compliance with
the requirements of the Constitution. Hence, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal possession of marijuana.
The Court of Appeals, however, modified the appealed RTC judgment by acquitting accused-appellant of the charge for illegal possession of firearm.
According to the appellate court, the records were bereft of evidence that the gun supposedly confiscated from accused-appellant was unlicensed. The absence
of a firearm license was simply presumed by the police officers because the gun was a defective paltik with no serial number. That the said condition of the
gun did not dispense with the need for the prosecution to establish that it was unlicensed through the testimony or certification of the appropriate officer from
the Board of the Firearms and Explosives Bureau of the Philippine National Police.

In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 6, dated April 9,
2002, is hereby MODIFIED such that the conviction of accused-appellant for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, RA 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED while her
conviction for Violation of PD 1866, as amended, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant is accordingly ACQUITTED of the latter offense.[23]

In its Resolution dated October 20, 2006, the Court of Appeals gave due course to accused-appellants Partial Notice of Appeal and accordingly forwarded the
records of the case to this Court.

This Court then issued a Resolution[24] dated February 28, 2007 directing the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30
days from notice. Accused-appellant[25] opted not to file a supplemental brief and manifested that she was adopting her arguments in the Appellants Brief
since the same had already assiduously discussed her innocence of the crime charged. The People[26] likewise manifested that it would no longer file a
supplemental brief as the issues have all been addressed in its Appellees Brief.

Accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors in her Brief: [27]

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND CONTRADICTORY
TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE OFFICERS.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING AS VOID THE SEARCH WARRANT ISSUED AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Given that accused-appellant was already acquitted of the charge of violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 on the ground of reasonable doubt in Criminal
Case No. 17620-R, her instant appeal relates only to her conviction for illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs in Criminal Case No. 17619-R. The
Court can no longer pass upon the propriety of accused-appellants acquittal in Criminal Case No. 17620-R because of the rule that a judgment acquitting the
accused is final and immediately executory upon its promulgation, and that accordingly, the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in
double jeopardy. Such acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy whether it happens at the trial court or on appeal at the Court of
Appeals.[28]

In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, such as Criminal Case No. 17619-R, a case becomes a contest of credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies. In such a situation, this Court generally relies upon the assessment by the trial court, which had the distinct advantage of observing the conduct or
demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. Hence, its factual findings are accorded respect even finality absent any showing that certain facts of
weight and substance bearing on the elements of the crime have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.[29]

The Court finds no reason to deviate from the general rule in the case at bar.

Illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs is committed when the following elements concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object
which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said
drug.[30]

All the foregoing elements were duly proven to exist in Criminal Case No. 17619-R. The search conducted by SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez in accused-
appellants house yielded nine bricks of marijuana. Marijuana is a prohibited drug, thus, accused-appellants possession thereof could not have been authorized
by law in any way. Accused-appellant evidently possessed the marijuana freely and consciously, even offering the same for sale. The bricks of marijuana were
found in accused-appellants residence over which she had complete control. In fact, some of the marijuana were found in accused-appellants own room.

Accused-appellant challenges the judgment of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, finding her guilty of illegal possession of marijuana, by pointing out
certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses that supposedly manifested their lack of credibility, i.e., the date of the test buy and the
manner by which the doors of the rooms of the house were opened.

These alleged inconsistencies and contradictions pertain to minor details and are so inconsequential that they do not in any way affect the credibility of the
witnesses nor detract from the established fact of illegal possession of marijuana by accused-appellant at her house. The Court has previously held that
discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do
not impair their credibility. Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the principal
occurrence.[31]

Inconsistencies as to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor the veracity or weight of their testimonies. Such
minor inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen their credibility as they negate any suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed.[32]

Accused-appellant further questions the non-presentation as witnesses of Lad-ing and Tudlong, the informants, and Pascual, the neighbor who supposedly
witnessed the implementation of the Search Warrant, during the joint trial of Criminal Case Nos. 17619-R and 17620-R before the RTC. This Court though is
unconvinced that such non-presentation of witnesses is fatal to Criminal Case No. 17619-R.

The prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to determine whom to present as witnesses. The prosecution need not present each and every witness but only
such as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other
witnesses may, therefore, be dispensed with if they are merely corroborative in nature. The Court has ruled that the non-presentation of corroborative witnesses
does not constitute suppression of evidence and is not fatal to the prosecutions case.[33]
Although Criminal Case No. 17619-R involves illegal possession of marijuana, the following pronouncement of this Court in People v. Salazar,[34] relating to
the illegal sale of the same drug, still rings true:

Neither is her right to confront witnesses against her affected by the prosecution's failure to present the informer who pointed to her as a drug pusher. The
presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony
would be merely corroborative and cumulative. In a case involving the sale of illegal drugs, what should be proven beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of the
sale itself. Hence, like the non-presentation of the marked money used in buying the contraband, the non-presentation of the informer on the witness stand
would not necessarily create a hiatus in the prosecutions' evidence. (Emphasis ours.)

Lastly, accused-appellant insists that the items allegedly seized from her house are inadmissible as evidence because the Search Warrant issued for her house
was invalid for failing to comply with the constitutional and statutory requirements. Accused-appellant specifically pointed out the following defects which
made said Search Warrant void: (1) the informants, Lad-ing and Tudlong, made misrepresentation of facts in the Application for Search Warrant filed with the
MTCC; (2) Judge Cortes of the MTCC failed to consider the informants admission that they themselves were selling marijuana; and (3) the Search Warrant
failed to particularly describe the place to be searched because the house was a two-storey building composed of several rooms.

The right of a person against unreasonable searches and seizure is recognized and protected by no less than the Constitution, particularly, Sections 2 and 3(2)
of Article III which provide:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

SEC. 3. x x x

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Emphases ours.)

Accordingly, Sections 4 and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure laid down the following requisites for the issuance of a valid search
warrant:

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers,
in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements, together with the affidavits submitted.

Therefore, the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause
must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine,
under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized.[35]

There is no dispute herein that the second and third factors for a validly issued search warrant were complied with, i.e., personal determination of probable
cause by Judge Cortes; and examination, under oath or affirmation, of SPO2 Fernandez and the two informants, Lad-ing and Tudlong, by Judge Cortes. What
is left for the Court to determine is compliance with the first and fourth factors, i.e., existence of probable cause; and particular description of the place to be
searched and things to be seized.

In People v. Aruta,[36] the Court defined probable cause as follows:

Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.

It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our rules
of evidence of which his knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in abundance. The
same quantum of evidence is required in determining probable cause relative to search. Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial
evidence that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be
searched.

A magistrates determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial
basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in
the place sought to be searched.[37] Such substantial basis exists in this case.

Judge Cortes found probable cause for the issuance of the Search Warrant for accused-appellants residence after said judges personal examination of SPO2
Fernandez, the applicant; and Lad-ing and Tudlong, the informants.

SPO2 Fernandez based his Application for Search Warrant not only on the information relayed to him by Lad-ing and Tudlong. He also arranged for a test buy
and conducted surveillance of accused-appellant. He testified before Judge Cortes:

COURT:
Q. You are applying for a Search Warrant and you alleged in your application that Estela Tuan of Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City, is in possession of dried
marijuana leaves and marijuana hashish, how did you come to know about this matter?
A. Through the two male persons by the name of Frank Lad-ing and Jerry Tudlong, Your Honor.

Q. When did these two male persons report to your office?

A. January 22, Your Honor.

Q. This year?
A. Yes, your honor.

Q. To whom did they report?

A. To me personally, Your Honor.

Q. How did they report the matter?

A. They reported that a certain Estela Tuan is selling dried Marijuana leaves and marijuana hashish, Your Honor.

Q. What else?
A. She is not only selling marijuana but also selling vegetables at the Trading Post in La Trinidad, Your Honor.

Q. They just told you, she is selling marijuana and selling vegetables, that is already sufficient proof or sufficient probable cause she is in possession of
marijuana, what else did they report?
A. That they are also selling marijuana in large volume at their house.

Q. What did you do when you asked them regarding that matter?
A. They had a test buy and they were able to buy some commodities yesterday, Your honor.

Q. Who bought?
A. Tudlong and Lad-ing, Your Honor.

Q. How did you go about it?

A. I accompanied the said persons and kept watch over them and gave them money after which, they were able to purchase and when they purchased the said
items or drugs, they were even informed that if you wanted to sell then you could come and get. Your Honor.

COURT:

Q. Where is that P300.00?

A. It is with them, Your Honor.

Q. You did not entrap her?

A. No, Your Honor, because it is only a test buy.

Q: And that was January 22. Why did you not apply immediately for search warrant?
A: Because we still have to look at the area and see to it that there are really some buyers or people who would go and leave the place, Your Honor.

Q: What did you observe?

A: Well, there are persons who would go inside and after going inside, they would come out bringing along with them something else.

Q: Did you not interview these people?

A: No, Your Honor. We did not bother.[38]

Lad-ing and Tudlong affirmed before Judge Cortes that they were the ones who informed SPO2 Fernandez that accused-appellant was keeping and selling
marijuana at her house, and that they took part in the test buy.

Lad-ing narrated:

COURT:

Q: Mr. Lad-ing, you said that you are working at the Trading Post. What kind of work do you have there?
A: I am a middleman of the vegetable dealers, Your Honor.

COURT:

Q: Did you come to know of this person Estela Tuan?

A: Yes, Your Honor, because there was an incident wherein we were conducting our line of business when they came and joined us and we became partners,
Your Honor.

Q: You said, they, how many of you?

A: A certain Jerry Tudlong, Estela Tuan and myself, Your Honor.

Q: In other words, Estela Tuan went with you and later on she became your partner in that business?
A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: And so what happened when she became a partner of your business?

A: When we were about to divide our profit, we then went at their residence at Gabriela Silang, Baguio City, Your Honor.

Q: What happened?
A: While we then sitted ourselves at the sala, she told us that if we wanted to earn some more, she told us that she has in her possession marijuana which could
be sold, Your Honor.

Q: And so, what happened?

A: After which, she showed the marijuana, Your Honor.

Q: Where was the marijuana?

A: It was placed in a cellophane, in a newspaper, Your Honor.

Q: How big?
A: A dimension of 10 x 4 inches, Your Honor.

Q: With that size, where did she show you the box of this cellophane?
A: At the place where we were sitted at the receiving room, Your Honor.

Q: In other words, she went to get it and then presented or showed it to you?
A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Where did she go, if you know?

A: Because at the sala, there is a certain room located at the side that is the place where she got the same, Your Honor.

Q: Where is this house of Estela Tuan located, is it along the road or inside the road or what?
A: It is near the road but you have to walk in a little distance, Your Honor.

Q: Will you describe the place where Estela Tuan is residing?

A: Well, it is a two storey house, the walls are made of galvanized iron Sheets, Your Honor.

COURT:

Q: Do you know who are staying there?

A: I do not know who is living with her, however, that is her residence, Your Honor.

Q: How many times did you go there?

A: It was my second time to go at that time we were sent by PO Fernandez to purchase marijuana, Your Honor.

Q: Where is the marijuana now?

A: It is in the possession of PO Fernandez, Your Honor.

Q: Where is the marijuana placed?

A: In a newspaper, Your Honor.

Q: What happened next?

A: We handed to her the amount of P300.00, your Honor.

Q: And she gave you that marijuana?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

Q: How many rooms are there in the first floor of the house of Estela Tuan?
A: Three rooms, Your Honor, it has a dining room and beside the place is the receiving room where we sitted ourselves, Your Honor.

Q: When you already bought marijuana from her, what did she tell you, if any?
A; Well, if we would be interested to buy more, I still have stocks here, Your Honor.[39]

Tudlong recounted in more detail what happened during the test buy:

COURT:

Q: My question is, when she told you that she has some substance for sale for profit and you mentioned marijuana, did you talk immediately with Frank or
what did you do?
A: We reported the matter to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, your Honor.

xxxx

Q: What time?
A: We went to the office at 9:00 9:30 oclock in the morning, Your Honor.

Q: When you went there, what did you do?

A: The amount of P300.00 was given to Frank and we were instructed to purchase, Your Honor.

Q: Did you go?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx
Q: Will you tell what happened when you went to the house of the woman?
A: Well, we were allowed to go inside the house after which, we were made to sit down at the receiving area or sala, Your Honor.

Q: When you went there, you were allowed to enter immediately?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Who allowed you to enter?

A: The female person, Your Honor.

Q: What happened when you were asked to be sitted?

A: During that time, Frank and the female person were the ones conferring, Your Honor.

Q: Did you hear what they were talking about?

A: That Frank was purchasing marijuana, Your Honor.

Q: What did the woman tell you?

A: After we handed the money, a plastic which was transparent, was then handed to Frank, it was a plastic and there was a newspaper inside, Your Honor.

xxxx

Q: So, you did not actually see what is in the newspaper?

A: No, Your Honor, however, I know that that is marijuana.

Q: Why?
A: Because that was our purpose, to buy marijuana, Your Honor.

Q: And you have not gotten marijuana without Estela Tuan informing you?
A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Will you tell us what kind of materials were used in the house of Estela Tuan?
A: Two storey, the walls are made of GI sheets, Your Honor.\

Q: Is the house beside the road or do you have to walk?

A: It is near the road. Upon reaching the road, you still have to walk a short distance, Your Honor.

Q: Where did Estela Tuan get the newspaper placed in a transparent plastic?
A: She got it from a room because were then made to wait at the sala, Your Honor.

Q: Did she tell you how much she can sell marijuana?
A: She told us, Your Honor.

Q: What?
A: Well, the marijuana that we purchased was worth P300.00[.] However, we could divide it into two small packs and we could sell it at P20.00 per piece so
that you can also have some gain.

COURT:

Q: After that, to whom did you sell?

A: We did not sell the marijuana, Your Honor.

Q: I thought you are going to sell marijuana and so you went there?
A: We were just instructed by PO Fernandez to verify what we are telling him was true, Your Honor.[40]

Accused-appellants contention that MTCC Judge Cortes failed to consider the informants admission that they themselves were selling marijuana is utterly
without merit. First, even after carefully reviewing the testimonies of Lad-ing and Tudlong before Judge Cortes, this Court did not find a categorical admission
by either of the two informants that they themselves were selling marijuana. In fact, Tudlong expressly denied that he and Lad-ing sold the marijuana, having
only bought the same from the accused-appellant for the test buy. Moreover, even if the informants were also selling marijuana, it would not have affected the
validity of the Search Warrant for accused-appellants house. The criminal liabilities of accused-appellant and the informants would be separate and distinct.
The investigation and prosecution of one could proceed independently of the other.

Equally without merit is accused-appellants assertion that the Search Warrant did not describe with particularity the place to be searched.

A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on
inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.[41] In the case at bar, the address and description of the
place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific enough. There was only one house located at the stated address, which was accused-appellants
residence, consisting of a structure with two floors and composed of several rooms.

In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the validity of the Search Warrant for accused-appellants house issued by MTCC Judge Cortes, and any items
seized as a result of the search conducted by virtue thereof, may be presented as evidence against the accused-appellant.

Since it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the accused-appellant is, indeed, guilty of violation of Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the
Court shall now consider the appropriate penalty to be imposed upon her.

Article II, Section 8, in relation to Section 20(3), of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, provides:
SEC. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs.- The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
(As amended by R.A. 7659)

Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. - The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8
and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following
quantities:

1. 40 grams or more of opium;

2. 40 grams or more of morphine;

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;

4. 40 grams or more of heroin;

5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana;

6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride; or

8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous
Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose. (Emphasis supplied.)

Pursuant to Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, illegal possession of 750 grams or more of the prohibited drug marijuana is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. Accused-appellant had in her possession a total of 19,050 grams of marijuana, for which she was properly sentenced to
reclusion perpetua by the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

In the same vein, the fine of P500,000.00 imposed upon accused-appellant by the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is also correct, as the same is still
within the range of fines imposable on any person who possessed prohibited drugs without any authority, under Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00381, is hereby AFFIRMED
in toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ROMER SY TAN,
Petitioner,

-versus-

SY TIONG GUE, FELICIDAD CHAN SY, SY CHIM, SY TIONG SAN, SY YU BUN, SY YU SHIONG, SY YU SAN, and BRYAN SY LIM,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 174570

Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
PERALTA, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

December 15, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

PERALTA, J.:

On February 17, 2010, this Court rendered a Decision[1] in G.R. No. 174570 entitled Romer Sy Tan v. Sy Tiong Gue, et al., the decretal portion of which
reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated December 29, 2005 and August 18, 2006, respectively, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81389 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the RTC dated September 1, 2003 and October 28, 2003 are
REINSTATED. The validity of Search Warrant Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 is SUSTAINED.

On March 22, 2010, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration[2] wherein respondents informed this Court, albeit belatedly, that the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) granted their motion for the withdrawal of the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 06-241375. As such, respondents prayed that the decision be
reconsidered and set aside and that the quashal of the subject search warrants be rendered moot and academic on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case.

In his Comment[3] dated July 7, 2010, petitioner maintains that the motion is a mere reiteration of what respondents have previously alleged in their Comment
and which have been passed upon by this Court in the subject decision. Petitioner alleges that he also filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila a
Complaint for Qualified Theft against the respondents based on the same incidents and that should the Information for Qualified Theft be filed with the proper
court, the items seized by virtue of the subject search warrants will be used as evidence therein.

On August 6, 2010, respondents filed their Reply.

On September 8, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution[4] wherein respondents were required to submit a certified true copy of the Order of the RTC dated
November 14, 2008, which granted their motion to withdraw the information.

On October 22, 2010, respondents complied with the Courts directive and submitted a certified true copy of the Order.[5]

In granting the motion to withdraw the Information, the RTC took into consideration the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
90368 dated August 29, 2006, which affirmed the findings of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Secretary of Justice that the elements of Robbery, i.e.,
unlawful taking with intent to gain, with force and intimidation, were absent. Thus, there was lack of probable cause, warranting the withdrawal of the
Information.[6] The RTC also considered that the said pronouncements of the CA were affirmed by no less than this Court in G.R. No. 177829 in the
Resolution[7] dated November 12, 2007.

Accordingly, the RTC granted respondents motion to withdraw the information without prejudice, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the motion to withdraw information is hereby GRANTED and the case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

Consequently, in view of the withdrawal of the Information for Robbery, the quashal of the subject search warrants and the determination of the issue of
whether or not there was probable cause warranting the issuance by the RTC of the said search warrants for respondents alleged acts of robbery has been
rendered moot and academic. Verily, there is no more reason to further delve into the propriety of the quashal of the search warrants as it has no more practical
legal effect.[8]

Furthermore, even if an Information for Qualified Theft be later filed on the basis of the same incident subject matter of the dismissed case of robbery,
petitioner cannot include the seized items as part of the evidence therein. Contrary to petitioners contention, he cannot use the items seized as evidence in any
other offense except in that in which the subject search warrants were issued. Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

Thus, a search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection with only one specific offense alleged in an application on the basis of the
applicants personal knowledge and his or her witnesses. Petitioner cannot, therefore, utilize the evidence seized by virtue of the search warrants issued in
connection with the case of Robbery in a separate case of Qualified Theft, even if both cases emanated from the same incident.

Moreover, considering that the withdrawal of the Information was based on the findings of the CA, as affirmed by this Court, that there was no probable cause
to indict respondents for the crime of Robbery absent the essential element of unlawful taking, which is likewise an essential element for the crime of Qualified
Theft, all offenses which are necessarily included in the crime of Robbery can no longer be filed, much more, prosper.

Based on the foregoing, the Court resolves to Grant the motion.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents is GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated February 17,
2010 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The petition filed by Romer Sy Tan is DENIED for being MOOT and ACADEMIC.

SO ORDERED

BRICCIO Ricky A. POLLO,

Petitioner,

- versus -

CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID,

DIRECTOR IV RACQUEL DE GUZMAN BUENSALIDA,
DIRECTOR IV LYDIA A.
CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III
G.R. No. 181881

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,*
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
ENGELBERT ANTHONY D. UNITE AND THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
Respondents.
Promulgated:

October 18, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was charged administratively and eventually dismissed from the
service. The employees personal files stored in the computer were used by the government employer as evidence of misconduct.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] dated October 11, 2007 and Resolution[2]
dated February 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 98224) filed by petitioner Briccio Ricky
A. Pollo to nullify the proceedings conducted by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which found him guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 and penalized him with dismissal.
The factual antecedents:
Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison
Division (PALD) under the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na program of the CSC.
On January 3, 2007 at around 2:30 p.m., an unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David which was marked
Confidential and sent through a courier service (LBC) from a certain Alan San Pascual of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, was received by the Integrated
Records Management Office (IRMO) at the CSC Central Office. Following office practice in which documents marked Confidential are left unopened and
instead sent to the addressee, the aforesaid letter was given directly to Chairperson David.
The letter-complaint reads:
The Chairwoman
Civil Service Commission
Batasan Hills, Quezon City

Dear Madam Chairwoman,

Belated Merry Christmas and Advance Happy New Year!

As a concerned citizen of my beloved country, I would like to ask from you personally if it is just alright for an employee of your agency to be a lawyer of an
accused govt employee having a pending case in the csc. I honestly think this is a violation of law and unfair to others and your office.
I have known that a person have been lawyered by one of your attorny in the region 4 office. He is the chief of the Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya na
division. He have been helping many who have pending cases in the Csc. The justice in our govt system will not be served if this will continue. Please
investigate this anomaly because our perception of your clean and good office is being tainted.

Concerned Govt employee[3]

Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in information technology (IT), and issued a memo directing them to
conduct an investigation and specifically to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.[4] After some
briefing, the team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office at Panay Avenue, Quezon City. Upon their arrival thereat around 5:30 p.m., the team informed
the officials of the CSC-ROIV, respondents Director IV Lydia Castillo (Director Castillo) and Director III Engelbert Unite (Director Unite) of Chairperson
Davids directive.
The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal Services Division (LSD) was witnessed by several employees, together with
Directors Castillo and Unite who closely monitored said activity. At around 6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent text messages to petitioner and the head of LSD,
who were both out of the office at the time, informing them of the ongoing copying of computer files in their divisions upon orders of the CSC Chair. The text
messages received by petitioner read:
Gud p.m. This is Atty. Unite FYI: Co people are going over the PCs of PALD and LSD per instruction of the Chairman. If you can make it here now it would
be better.
All PCs Of PALD and LSD are being backed up per memo of the chair.
CO IT people arrived just now for this purpose. We were not also informed about this.
We cant do anything about it its a directive from chair.
Memo of the chair was referring to an anonymous complaint; ill send a copy of the memo via mms[5]
Petitioner replied also thru text message that he was leaving the matter to Director Unite and that he will just get a lawyer. Another text message received by
petitioner from PALD staff also reported the presence of the team from CSC main office: Sir may mga taga C.O. daw sa kuarto natin.[6] At around 10:00 p.m.
of the same day, the investigating team finished their task. The next day, all the computers in the PALD were sealed and secured for the purpose of preserving
all the files stored therein. Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned over to
Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSCs Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17
diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or
letters[7] in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause
Order[8] dated January 11, 2007, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from
notice.
Evaluating the subject documents obtained from petitioners personal files, Chairperson David made the following observations:
Most of the foregoing files are drafts of legal pleadings or documents that are related to or connected with administrative cases that may broadly be lumped as
pending either in the CSCRO No. IV, the CSC-NCR, the CSC-Central Office or other tribunals. It is also of note that most of these draft pleadings are for and
on behalves of parties, who are facing charges as respondents in administrative cases. This gives rise to the inference that the one who prepared them was
knowingly, deliberately and willfully aiding and advancing interests adverse and inimical to the interest of the CSC as the central personnel agency of the
government tasked to discipline misfeasance and malfeasance in the government service. The number of pleadings so prepared further demonstrates that such
person is not merely engaged in an isolated practice but pursues it with seeming regularity. It would also be the height of naivete or credulity, and certainly
against common human experience, to believe that the person concerned had engaged in this customary practice without any consideration, and in fact, one of
the retrieved files (item 13 above) appears to insinuate the collection of fees. That these draft pleadings were obtained from the computer assigned to Pollo
invariably raises the presumption that he was the one responsible or had a hand in their drafting or preparation since the computer of origin was within his
direct control and disposition.[9]
Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint which had no attachments to it, because he is not a
lawyer and neither is he lawyering for people with cases in the CSC. He accused CSC officials of conducting a fishing expedition when they unlawfully copied
and printed personal files in his computer, and subsequently asking him to submit his comment which violated his right against self-incrimination. He asserted
that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave, citing the letter dated January 8, 2007 in which he informed Director
Castillo that the files in his computer were his personal files and those of his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that he is not authorizing their
sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless
search and seizure. He pointed out that though government property, the temporary use and ownership of the computer issued under a Memorandum of Receipt
(MR) is ceded to the employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership, including its use for personal purposes. As to the anonymous letter, petitioner
argued that it is not actionable as it failed to comply with the requirements of a formal complaint under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (URACC). In view of the illegal search, the files/documents copied from his computer without his consent is thus inadmissible as evidence, being
fruits of a poisonous tree.[10]
On February 26, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 070382[11] finding prima facie case against the petitioner and charging him with Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees). Petitioner was directed to submit his answer under oath within five days from notice and indicate whether he elects a formal
investigation. Since the charges fall under Section 19 of the URACC, petitioner was likewise placed under 90 days preventive suspension effective
immediately upon receipt of the resolution. Petitioner received a copy of Resolution No. 070382 on March 1, 2007.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an
illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court. Petitioner reiterated that he never aided any
people with pending cases at the CSC and alleged that those files found in his computer were prepared not by him but by certain persons whom he permitted,
at one time or another, to make use of his computer out of close association or friendship. Attached to the motion were the affidavit of Atty. Ponciano R.
Solosa who entrusted his own files to be kept at petitioners CPU and Atty. Eric N. Estrellado, the latter being Atty. Solosas client who attested that petitioner
had nothing to do with the pleadings or bill for legal fees because in truth he owed legal fees to Atty. Solosa and not to petitioner. Petitioner contended that the
case should be deferred in view of the prejudicial question raised in the criminal complaint he filed before the Ombudsman against Director Buensalida, whom
petitioner believes had instigated this administrative case. He also prayed for the lifting of the preventive suspension imposed on him. In its Resolution No.
070519[12] dated March 19, 2007, the CSC denied the omnibus motion. The CSC resolved to treat the said motion as petitioners answer.
On March 14, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Petition[13] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 98224, assailing both the January
11, 2007 Show-Cause Order and Resolution No. 070382 dated February 26, 2007 as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
total absence of jurisdiction. Prior to this, however, petitioner lodged an administrative/criminal complaint against respondents Directors Racquel D.G.
Buensalida (Chief of Staff, Office of the CSC Chairman) and Lydia A. Castillo (CSC-RO IV) before the Office of the Ombudsman, and a separate complaint
for disbarment against Director Buensalida.[14]
On April 17, 2007, petitioner received a notice of hearing from the CSC setting the formal investigation of the case on April 30, 2007. On April 25, 2007, he
filed in the CA an Urgent Motion for the issuance of TRO and preliminary injunction.[15] Since he failed to attend the pre-hearing conference scheduled on
April 30, 2007, the CSC reset the same to May 17, 2007 with warning that the failure of petitioner and/or his counsel to appear in the said pre-hearing
conference shall entitle the prosecution to proceed with the formal investigation ex-parte.[16] Petitioner moved to defer or to reset the pre-hearing conference,
claiming that the investigation proceedings should be held in abeyance pending the resolution of his petition by the CA. The CSC denied his request and again
scheduled the pre-hearing conference on May 18, 2007 with similar warning on the consequences of petitioner and/or his counsels non-appearance.[17] This
prompted petitioner to file another motion in the CA, to cite the respondents, including the hearing officer, in indirect contempt.[18]
On June 12, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 071134[19] denying petitioners motion to set aside the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings and to
inhibit the designated hearing officer, Atty. Bernard G. Jimenez. The hearing officer was directed to proceed with the investigation proper with dispatch.
In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to the formal
investigation which then proceeded ex parte.
On July 24, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 071420,[20] the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby finds Briccio A. Pollo, a.k.a. Ricky A. Pollo GUILTY of Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of Republic Act 6713. He is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE
SERVICE with all its accessory penalties, namely, disqualification to hold public office, forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of civil service
eligibilities and bar from taking future civil service examinations.[21]
On the paramount issue of the legality of the search conducted on petitioners computer, the CSC noted the dearth of jurisprudence relevant to the factual milieu
of this case where the government as employer invades the private files of an employee stored in the computer assigned to him for his official use, in the course
of initial investigation of possible misconduct committed by said employee and without the latters consent or participation. The CSC thus turned to relevant
rulings of the United States Supreme Court, and cited the leading case of OConnor v. Ortega[22] as authority for the view that government agencies, in their
capacity as employers, rather than law enforcers, could validly conduct search and seizure in the governmental workplace without meeting the probable cause
or warrant requirement for search and seizure. Another ruling cited by the CSC is the more recent case of United States v. Mark L. Simons[23] which declared
that the federal agencys computer use policy foreclosed any inference of reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of its employees. Though the Court
therein recognized that such policy did not, at the same time, erode the respondents legitimate expectation of privacy in the office in which the computer was
installed, still, the warrantless search of the employees office was upheld as valid because a government employer is entitled to conduct a warrantless search
pursuant to an investigation of work-related misconduct provided the search is reasonable in its inception and scope.
With the foregoing American jurisprudence as benchmark, the CSC held that petitioner has no reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the computer
he was using in the regional office in view of the CSC computer use policy which unequivocally declared that a CSC employee cannot assert any privacy right
to a computer assigned to him. Even assuming that there was no such administrative policy, the CSC was of the view that the search of petitioners computer
successfully passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the aforecited authorities. The CSC stressed that it
pursued the search in its capacity as government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving work-related misconduct,
which exempts it from the warrant requirement under the Constitution. With the matter of admissibility of the evidence having been resolved, the CSC then
ruled that the totality of evidence adequately supports the charges of grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
violation of R.A. No. 6713 against the petitioner. These grave infractions justified petitioners dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties.
In his Memorandum[24] filed in the CA, petitioner moved to incorporate the above resolution dismissing him from the service in his main petition, in lieu of
the filing of an appeal via a Rule 43 petition. In a subsequent motion, he likewise prayed for the inclusion of Resolution No. 071800[25] which denied his
motion for reconsideration.
By Decision dated October 11, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondents CSC
officials. The CA held that: (1) petitioner was not charged on the basis of the anonymous letter but from the initiative of the CSC after a fact-finding
investigation was conducted and the results thereof yielded a prima facie case against him; (2) it could not be said that in ordering the back-up of files in
petitioners computer and later confiscating the same, Chairperson David had encroached on the authority of a judge in view of the CSC computer policy
declaring the computers as government property and that employee-users thereof have no reasonable expectation of privacy in anything they create, store,
send, or receive on the computer system; and (3) there is nothing contemptuous in CSCs act of proceeding with the formal investigation as there was no
restraining order or injunction issued by the CA.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brought this appeal arguing that
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED SERIOUS IRREGULARITY AND BLATANT ERRORS IN
LAW AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT IS ACTIONABLE UNDER E.O.
292 WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT THE CONTRARY IS EXPLICITLY PROVIDED UNDER 2nd PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 8 OF CSC
RESOLUTION NO. 99-1936, WHICH IS AN [AMENDMENT] TO THE ORIGINAL RULES PER CSC RESOLUTION NO. 94-0521;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED PALPABLE ERRORS IN LAW AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER CANNOT INVOKE HIS RIGHT TO PRIVACY, TO UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND
SEIZURE, AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, BY VIRTUE OF OFFICE MEMORANDUM NO. 10 S. 2002, A MERE INTERNAL MEMORANDUM
SIGNED SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY BY RESPONDENT DAVID AND NOT BY THE COLLEGIAL COMMISSION CONSIDERING THAT
POLICY MATTERS INVOLVING SUB[S]TANTIAL RIGHTS CANNOT BE COVERED BY AN OFFICE MEMORANDUM WHICH IS LIMITED TO
PROCEDURAL AND ROUTINARY INSTRUCTION;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT MEMO SEARCH
DATED JANUARY 3, 2007 AND THE TAKING OF DOCUMENTS IN THE EVENING THEREOF FROM 7:00 TO 10:00 P.M. IS NOT GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION LIMITING THE DEFINITION [OF] GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO ONE INVOLVING AND TAINTED WITH PERSONAL
HOSTILITY. IT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DATA STORED IN THE GOVERNMENT COMPUTERS ARE GOVERNMENT
PROPERTIES INCLUDING THE PERSONAL FILES WHEN THE CONTRARY IS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 14 OF OM. 10 s. 2002. AND
GRIEVOUSLY ERRED STILL WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT DAVID BY VIRTUE OF O.M. 10 DID NOT ENCROACH ON THE DUTIES
AND FUNCTIONS OF A JUDGE PURSUANT TO ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION;
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER ALL OTHER NEW ARGUMENTS, ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE HEREUNTO
SUBMITTED AS WELL AS ITS FAILURE TO EVALUATE AND TAKE ACTION ON THE 2 MOTIONS TO ADMIT AND INCORPORATE CSC
RESOLUTION NOS. 07-1420 DATED JULY 24, 2007 AND CSC RESOLUTION 07-1800 DATED SEPTEMBER 10, 2007. IT DID NOT RULE
LIKEWISE ON THE FOUR URGENT MOTION TO RESOLVE ANCILLARY PRAYER FOR TRO.[26]
Squarely raised by the petitioner is the legality of the search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files without his knowledge and
consent, alleged as a transgression on his constitutional right to privacy.
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure
under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,[27] which provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of unreasonable searches and seizures.[28] But to fully understand this
concept and application for the purpose of resolving the issue at hand, it is essential that we examine the doctrine in the light of pronouncements in another
jurisdiction. As the Court declared in People v. Marti[29]:
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Sec. 1[3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the
United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.[30]
In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States,[31] the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in electronically recording a conversation made by
petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a search and seizure. Because the petitioner had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. In the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, it was further noted that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first,
that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable (objective).[32]
In Mancusi v. DeForte[33] which addressed the reasonable expectations of private employees in the workplace, the US Supreme Court held that a union
employee had Fourth Amendment rights with regard to an office at union headquarters that he shared with other union officials, even as the latter or their
guests could enter the office. The Court thus recognized that employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police.
That the Fourth Amendment equally applies to a government workplace was addressed in the 1987 case of OConnor v. Ortega[34] where a physician, Dr.
Magno Ortega, who was employed by a state hospital, claimed a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights when hospital officials investigating charges of
mismanagement of the psychiatric residency program, sexual harassment of female hospital employees and other irregularities involving his private patients
under the state medical aid program, searched his office and seized personal items from his desk and filing cabinets. In that case, the Court categorically
declared that [i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a private employer.[35] A plurality
of four Justices concurred that the correct analysis has two steps: first, because some government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that
no expectation of privacy is reasonable, a court must consider [t]he operational realities of the workplace in order to determine whether an employees Fourth
Amendment rights are implicated; and next, where an employee has a legitimate privacy expectation, an employers intrusion on that expectation for
noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all
the circumstances.[36]
On the matter of government employees reasonable expectations of privacy in their workplace, OConnor teaches:
x x x Public employees expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the private sector, may be
reduced by virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation. x x x The employees expectation of privacy must be assessed in the
context of the employment relation. An office is seldom a private enclave free from entry by supervisors, other employees, and business and personal invitees.
Instead, in many cases offices are continually entered by fellow employees and other visitors during the workday for conferences, consultations, and other
work-related visits. Simply put, it is the nature of government offices that others such as fellow employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general
public may have frequent access to an individuals office. We agree with JUSTICE SCALIA that [c]onstitutional protection against unreasonable searches by
the government does not disappear merely because the government has the right to make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as employer, x x x but some
government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable. x x x Given the great variety of work
environments in the public sector, the question of whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.[37]
(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
On the basis of the established rule in previous cases, the US Supreme Court declared that Dr. Ortegas Fourth Amendment rights are implicated only if the
conduct of the hospital officials infringed an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider as reasonable. Given the undisputed evidence that
respondent Dr. Ortega did not share his desk or file cabinets with any other employees, kept personal correspondence and other private items in his own office
while those work-related files (on physicians in residency training) were stored outside his office, and there being no evidence that the hospital had established
any reasonable regulation or policy discouraging employees from storing personal papers and effects in their desks or file cabinets (although the absence of
such a policy does not create any expectation of privacy where it would not otherwise exist), the Court concluded that Dr. Ortega has a reasonable expectation
of privacy at least in his desk and file cabinets.[38]
Proceeding to the next inquiry as to whether the search conducted by hospital officials was reasonable, the OConnor plurality decision discussed the following
principles:
Having determined that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, the Court of Appeals simply concluded without discussion that the
searchwas not a reasonable search under the fourth amendment. x x x [t]o hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by [public
employers] is only to begin the inquiry into the standards governing such searches[W]hat is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes
place. x x x Thus, we must determine the appropriate standard of reasonableness applicable to the search. A determination of the standard of reasonableness
applicable to a particular class of searches requires balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individuals Fourth Amendment interests against
the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion. x x x In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, we must balance the
invasion of the employees legitimate expectations of privacy against the governments need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the
workplace.
xxxx
In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the employer wished to enter an employees office, desk, or file cabinets for a work-related
purpose would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would be unduly burdensome. Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures in such cases upon
supervisors, who would otherwise have no reason to be familiar with such procedures, is simply unreasonable. In contrast to other circumstances in which we
have required warrants, supervisors in offices such as at the Hospital are hardly in the business of investigating the violation of criminal laws. Rather, work-
related searches are merely incident to the primary business of the agency. Under these circumstances, the imposition of a warrant requirement would conflict
with the common-sense realization that government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter. x x x
xxxx
The governmental interest justifying work-related intrusions by public employers is the efficient and proper operation of the workplace. Government agencies
provide myriad services to the public, and the work of these agencies would suffer if employers were required to have probable cause before they entered an
employees desk for the purpose of finding a file or piece of office correspondence. Indeed, it is difficult to give the concept of probable cause, rooted as it is in
the criminal investigatory context, much meaning when the purpose of a search is to retrieve a file for work-related reasons. Similarly, the concept of probable
cause has little meaning for a routine inventory conducted by public employers for the purpose of securing state property. x x x To ensure the efficient and
proper operation of the agency, therefore, public employers must be given wide latitude to enter employee offices for work-related, noninvestigatory reasons.
We come to a similar conclusion for searches conducted pursuant to an investigation of work-related employee misconduct. Even when employers conduct an
investigation, they have an interest substantially different from the normal need for law enforcement. x x x Public employers have an interest in ensuring that
their agencies operate in an effective and efficient manner, and the work of these agencies inevitably suffers from the inefficiency, incompetence,
mismanagement, or other work-related misfeasance of its employees. Indeed, in many cases, public employees are entrusted with tremendous responsibility,
and the consequences of their misconduct or incompetence to both the agency and the public interest can be severe. In contrast to law enforcement officials,
therefore, public employers are not enforcers of the criminal law; instead, public employers have a direct and overriding interest in ensuring that the work of
the agency is conducted in a proper and efficient manner. In our view, therefore, a probable cause requirement for searches of the type at issue here would
impose intolerable burdens on public employers. The delay in correcting the employee misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather than
reasonable suspicion will be translated into tangible and often irreparable damage to the agencys work, and ultimately to the public interest. x x x
xxxx
In sum, we conclude that the special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement make theprobable-cause requirement impracticable, x x x for
legitimate, work-related noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations of work-related misconduct. A standard of reasonableness will neither unduly
burden the efforts of government employers to ensure the efficient and proper operation of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of
public employees. We hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for
noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all
the circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable:
Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider whether theaction was justified at its inception, x x x ;
second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in
the first place, x x x
Ordinarily, a search of an employees office by a supervisor will be justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search
will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose such
as to retrieve a needed file. x x x The search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search
and not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the [misconduct]. x x x[39] (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Since the District Court granted summary judgment without a hearing on the factual dispute as to the character of the search and neither was there any finding
made as to the scope of the search that was undertaken, the case was remanded to said court for the determination of the justification for the search and seizure,
and evaluation of the reasonableness of both the inception of the search and its scope.
In OConnor the Court recognized that special needs authorize warrantless searches involving public employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid
down a balancing test under which government interests are weighed against the employees reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test
implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant requirement, which are related to law enforcement.[40]
OConnor was applied in subsequent cases raising issues on employees privacy rights in the workplace. One of these cases involved a government employers
search of an office computer, United States v. Mark L. Simons[41] where the defendant Simons, an employee of a division of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), was convicted of receiving and possessing materials containing child pornography. Simons was provided with an office which he did not share with
anyone, and a computer with Internet access. The agency had instituted a policy on computer use stating that employees were to use the Internet for official
government business only and that accessing unlawful material was specifically prohibited. The policy also stated that users shall understand that the agency
will periodically audit, inspect, and/or monitor the users Internet access as deemed appropriate. CIA agents instructed its contractor for the management of the
agencys computer network, upon initial discovery of prohibited internet activity originating from Simons computer, to conduct a remote monitoring and
examination of Simons computer. After confirming that Simons had indeed downloaded pictures that were pornographic in nature, all the files on the hard
drive of Simons computer were copied from a remote work station. Days later, the contractors representative finally entered Simons office, removed the
original hard drive on Simons computer, replaced it with a copy, and gave the original to the agency security officer. Thereafter, the agency secured warrants
and searched Simons office in the evening when Simons was not around. The search team copied the contents of Simons computer; computer diskettes found
in Simons desk drawer; computer files stored on the zip drive or on zip drive diskettes; videotapes; and various documents, including personal correspondence.
At his trial, Simons moved to suppress these evidence, arguing that the searches of his office and computer violated his Fourth Amendment rights. After a
hearing, the district court denied the motion and Simons was found guilty as charged.
Simons appealed his convictions. The US Supreme Court ruled that the searches of Simons computer and office did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights
and the first search warrant was valid. It held that the search remains valid under the OConnor exception to the warrant requirement because evidence of the
crime was discovered in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection. Simons violation of the agencys Internet policy happened also to be a
violation of criminal law; this does not mean that said employer lost the capacity and interests of an employer. The warrantless entry into Simons office was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment standard announced in OConnor because at the inception of the search, the employer had reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the hard drive would yield evidence of misconduct, as the employer was already aware that Simons had misused his Internet access to
download over a thousand pornographic images. The retrieval of the hard drive was reasonably related to the objective of the search, and the search was not
excessively intrusive. Thus, while Simons had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, he did not have such legitimate expectation of privacy with
regard to the files in his computer.
x x x To establish a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, Simons must first prove that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place
searched or the item seized. x x x And, in order to prove a legitimate expectation of privacy, Simons must show that his subjective expectation of privacy is
one that society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. x x x
xxxx
x x x We conclude that the remote searches of Simons computer did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights because, in light of the Internet policy, Simons
lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the files downloaded from the Internet. Additionally, we conclude that Simons Fourth Amendment rights were not
violated by FBIS retrieval of Simons hard drive from his office.
Simons did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to the record or fruits of his Internet use in light of the FBIS Internet policy. The policy
clearly stated that FBIS would audit, inspect, and/or monitor employees use of the Internet, including all file transfers, all websites visited, and all e-mail
messages, as deemed appropriate. x x x This policy placed employees on notice that they could not reasonably expect that their Internet activity would be
private. Therefore, regardless of whether Simons subjectively believed that the files he transferred from the Internet were private, such a belief was not
objectively reasonable after FBIS notified him that it would be overseeing his Internet use. x x x Accordingly, FBIS actions in remotely searching and seizing
the computer files Simons downloaded from the Internet did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
xxxx
The burden is on Simons to prove that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office. x x x Here, Simons has shown that he had an office that he did
not share. As noted above, the operational realities of Simons workplace may have diminished his legitimate privacy expectations. However, there is no
evidence in the record of any workplace practices, procedures, or regulations that had such an effect. We therefore conclude that, on this record, Simons
possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office.
xxxx
In the final analysis, this case involves an employees supervisor entering the employees government office and retrieving a piece of government equipment in
which the employee had absolutely no expectation of privacy equipment that the employer knew contained evidence of crimes committed by the employee in
the employees office. This situation may be contrasted with one in which the criminal acts of a government employee were unrelated to his employment. Here,
there was a conjunction of the conduct that violated the employers policy and the conduct that violated the criminal law. We consider that FBIS intrusion into
Simons office to retrieve the hard drive is one in which a reasonable employer might engage. x x x[42] (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
This Court, in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board[43] which involved the constitutionality of a provision in R.A. No. 9165 requiring
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and
persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses, have also recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the
workplace.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the
meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation
of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the
companys work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the
employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree
of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld. (Emphasis supplied.)
Applying the analysis and principles announced in OConnor and Simons to the case at bar, we now address the following questions: (1) Did petitioner have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the
hard drive on petitioners computer reasonable in its inception and scope?
In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider include (1) the employees relationship to the item seized; (2) whether the item was in the
immediate control of the employee when it was seized; and (3) whether the employee took actions to maintain his privacy in the item. These factors are
relevant to both the subjective and objective prongs of the reasonableness inquiry, and we consider the two questions together.[44] Thus, where the employee
used a password on his computer, did not share his office with co-workers and kept the same locked, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy and any search
of that space and items located therein must comply with the Fourth Amendment.[45]
We answer the first in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued
computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his
office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other
employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have
visitors in his office like friends, associates and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request. He
described his office as full of people, his friends, unknown people and that in the past 22 years he had been discharging his functions at the PALD, he is
personally assisting incoming clients, receiving documents, drafting cases on appeals, in charge of accomplishment report, Mamamayan Muna Program, Public
Sector Unionism, Correction of name, accreditation of service, and hardly had anytime for himself alone, that in fact he stays in the office as a paying
customer.[46] Under this scenario, it can hardly be deduced that petitioner had such expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof of the aforementioned factual circumstances, that petitioner had at least a subjective
expectation of privacy in his computer as he claims, such is negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of office computers, as in Simons.
Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 Computer Use Policy (CUP) explicitly provides:
POLICY
1. The Computer Resources are the property of the Civil Service Commission and may be used only for legitimate business purposes.

2. Users shall be permitted access to Computer Resources to assist them in the performance of their respective jobs.

3. Use of the Computer Resources is a privilege that may be revoked at any given time.

xxxx
No Expectation of Privacy
4. No expectation of privacy. Users except the Members of the Commission shall not have an expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send, or
receive on the computer system.
The Head of the Office for Recruitment, Examination and Placement shall select and assign Users to handle the confidential examination data and processes.
5. Waiver of privacy rights. Users expressly waive any right to privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer through the Internet or
any other computer network. Users understand that the CSC may use human or automated means to monitor the use of its Computer Resources.
6. Non-exclusivity of Computer Resources. A computer resource is not a personal property or for the exclusive use of a User to whom a memorandum of
receipt (MR) has been issued. It can be shared or operated by other users. However, he is accountable therefor and must insure its care and maintenance.
xxxx
Passwords
12. Responsibility for passwords. Users shall be responsible for safeguarding their passwords for access to the computer system. Individual passwords shall not
be printed, stored online, or given to others. Users shall be responsible for all transactions made using their passwords. No User may access the computer
system with another Users password or account.
13. Passwords do not imply privacy. Use of passwords to gain access to the computer system or to encode particular files or messages does not imply that
Users have an expectation of privacy in the material they create or receive on the computer system. The Civil Service Commission has global passwords that
permit access to all materials stored on its networked computer system regardless of whether those materials have been encoded with a particular Users
password. Only members of the Commission shall authorize the application of the said global passwords.
x x x x[47] (Emphasis supplied.)
The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or
receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human means. This implies that on-
the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes.
One of the factors stated in OConnor which are relevant in determining whether an employees expectation of privacy in the workplace is reasonable is the
existence of a workplace privacy policy.[48] In one case, the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit held that a state university employee has not shown that he
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer files where the universitys computer policy, the computer user is informed not to expect privacy if the
university has a legitimate reason to conduct a search. The user is specifically told that computer files, including e-mail, can be searched when the university is
responding to a discovery request in the course of litigation. Petitioner employee thus cannot claim a violation of Fourth Amendment rights when university
officials conducted a warrantless search of his computer for work-related materials.[49]
As to the second point of inquiry on the reasonableness of the search conducted on petitioners computer, we answer in the affirmative.
The search of petitioners computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-
complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is
supposedly lawyering for individuals with pending cases in the CSC. Chairperson David stated in her sworn affidavit:
8. That prior to this, as early as 2006, the undersigned has received several text messages from unknown sources adverting to certain anomalies in Civil Service
Commission Regional Office IV (CSCRO IV) such as, staff working in another government agency, selling cases and aiding parties with pending cases, all
done during office hours and involved the use of government properties;
9. That said text messages were not investigated for lack of any verifiable leads and details sufficient to warrant an investigation;
10. That the anonymous letter provided the lead and details as it pinpointed the persons and divisions involved in the alleged irregularities happening in
CSCRO IV;
11. That in view of the seriousness of the allegations of irregularities happening in CSCRO IV and its effect on the integrity of the Commission, I decided to
form a team of Central Office staff to back up the files in the computers of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) and Legal Division;
x x x x[50]
A search by a government employer of an employees office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.[51] Thus, in the 2004 case decided by the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit, it was held
that where a government agencys computer use policy prohibited electronic messages with pornographic content and in addition expressly provided that
employees do not have any personal privacy rights regarding their use of the agency information systems and technology, the government employee had no
legitimate expectation of privacy as to the use and contents of his office computer, and therefore evidence found during warrantless search of the computer was
admissible in prosecution for child pornography. In that case, the defendant employees computer hard drive was first remotely examined by a computer
information technician after his supervisor received complaints that he was inaccessible and had copied and distributed non-work-related e-mail messages
throughout the office. When the supervisor confirmed that defendant had used his computer to access the prohibited websites, in contravention of the express
policy of the agency, his computer tower and floppy disks were taken and examined. A formal administrative investigation ensued and later search warrants
were secured by the police department. The initial remote search of the hard drive of petitioners computer, as well as the subsequent warrantless searches was
held as valid under the OConnor ruling that a public employer can investigate work-related misconduct so long as any search is justified at inception and is
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified it in the first place.[52]
Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioners computer was justified at its inception and scope. We quote with approval the CSCs discussion
on the reasonableness of its actions, consistent as it were with the guidelines established by OConnor:
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no doubt in the mind of the Commission that the search of Pollos computer
has successfully passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the above-discussed American authorities. It bears
emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its capacity as a government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation
involving a work-related misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. At the inception of the search, a complaint was
received recounting that a certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was lawyering for parties having pending cases with the said regional office or in the
Commission. The nature of the imputation was serious, as it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged in the
practice of lawyering for parties with pending cases before the Commission would be a highly repugnant scenario, then such a case would have shattering
repercussions. It would undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon the institutional integrity of the Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and in the process, render
it less effective in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and objective dispenser of administrative justice. It is settled that a court or an administrative tribunal
must not only be actually impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the general public would not have any trust and confidence in it.
Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out.
Thus, on the same date that the complaint was received, a search was forthwith conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned regional office.
That it was the computers that were subjected to the search was justified since these furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode and store
documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting out incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer
files, that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the
probable cause requirement would invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-related investigation.
Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission effected the warrantless search in an open and transparent manner. Officials and some employees of
the regional office, who happened to be in the vicinity, were on hand to observe the process until its completion. In addition, the respondent himself was duly
notified, through text messaging, of the search and the concomitant retrieval of files from his computer.
All in all, the Commission is convinced that the warrantless search done on computer assigned to Pollo was not, in any way, vitiated with unconstitutionality. It
was a reasonable exercise of the managerial prerogative of the Commission as an employer aimed at ensuring its operational effectiveness and efficiency by
going after the work-related misfeasance of its employees. Consequently, the evidence derived from the questioned search are deemed admissible.[53]
Petitioners claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. His other argument invoking the privacy of communication and
correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate intrusions
into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under the aforecited authorities. We likewise find no merit in his contention that OConnor and
Simons are not relevant because the present case does not involve a criminal offense like child pornography. As already mentioned, the search of petitioners
computer was justified there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the
investigation being conducted by CSC as government employer of such misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. This situation clearly falls under the
exception to the warrantless requirement in administrative searches defined in OConnor.
The Court is not unaware of our decision in Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila[54] involving a branch clerk (Atty. Morales) who was investigated on the basis of an anonymous letter alleging that he was consuming his working
hours filing and attending to personal cases, using office supplies, equipment and utilities. The OCA conducted a spot investigation aided by NBI agents. The
team was able to access Atty. Morales personal computer and print two documents stored in its hard drive, which turned out to be two pleadings, one filed in
the CA and another in the RTC of Manila, both in the name of another lawyer. Atty. Morales computer was seized and taken in custody of the OCA but was
later ordered released on his motion, but with order to the MISO to first retrieve the files stored therein. The OCA disagreed with the report of the Investigating
Judge that there was no evidence to support the charge against Atty. Morales as no one from the OCC personnel who were interviewed would give a
categorical and positive statement affirming the charges against Atty. Morales, along with other court personnel also charged in the same case. The OCA
recommended that Atty. Morales should be found guilty of gross misconduct. The Court En Banc held that while Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the
exacting standards required of every court employee, the Court cannot use the evidence obtained from his personal computer against him for it violated his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court found no evidence to support the claim of OCA that they were able to obtain the
subject pleadings with the consent of Atty. Morales, as in fact the latter immediately filed an administrative case against the persons who conducted the spot
investigation, questioning the validity of the investigation and specifically invoking his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. And as
there is no other evidence, apart from the pleadings, retrieved from the unduly confiscated personal computer of Atty. Morales, to hold him administratively
liable, the Court had no choice but to dismiss the charges against him for insufficiency of evidence.
The above case is to be distinguished from the case at bar because, unlike the former which involved a personal computer of a court employee, the computer
from which the personal files of herein petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government property the use of which the CSC has
absolute right to regulate and monitor. Such relationship of the petitioner with the item seized (office computer) and other relevant factors and circumstances
under American Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, notably the existence of CSC MO 10, S. 2007 on Computer Use Policy, failed to establish that petitioner
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the office computer assigned to him.
Having determined that the personal files copied from the office computer of petitioner are admissible in the administrative case against him, we now proceed
to the issue of whether the CSC was correct in finding the petitioner guilty of the charges and dismissing him from the service.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the CSC, are accorded not only respect but even finality if such findings are
supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise.[55]
The CSC based its findings on evidence consisting of a substantial number of drafts of legal pleadings and documents stored in his office computer, as well as
the sworn affidavits and testimonies of the witnesses it presented during the formal investigation. According to the CSC, these documents were confirmed to
be similar or exactly the same content-wise with those on the case records of some cases pending either with CSCRO No. IV, CSC-NCR or the Commission
Proper. There were also substantially similar copies of those pleadings filed with the CA and duly furnished the Commission. Further, the CSC found the
explanation given by petitioner, to the effect that those files retrieved from his computer hard drive actually belonged to his lawyer friends Estrellado and
Solosa whom he allowed the use of his computer for drafting their pleadings in the cases they handle, as implausible and doubtful under the circumstances. We
hold that the CSCs factual finding regarding the authorship of the subject pleadings and misuse of the office computer is well-supported by the evidence on
record, thus:
It is also striking to note that some of these documents were in the nature of pleadings responding to the orders, decisions or resolutions of these offices or
directly in opposition to them such as a petition for certiorari or a motion for reconsideration of CSC Resolution. This indicates that the author thereof
knowingly and willingly participated in the promotion or advancement of the interests of parties contrary or antagonistic to the Commission. Worse, the
appearance in one of the retrieved documents the phrase, Eric N. Estr[e]llado, Epal kulang ang bayad mo, lends plausibility to an inference that the preparation
or drafting of the legal pleadings was pursued with less than a laudable motivation. Whoever was responsible for these documents was simply doing the same
for the money a legal mercenary selling or purveying his expertise to the highest bidder, so to speak.
Inevitably, the fact that these documents were retrieved from the computer of Pollo raises the presumption that he was the author thereof. This is because he
had a control of the said computer. More significantly, one of the witnesses, Margarita Reyes, categorically testified seeing a written copy of one of the
pleadings found in the case records lying on the table of the respondent. This was the Petition for Review in the case of Estrellado addressed to the Court of
Appeals. The said circumstances indubitably demonstrate that Pollo was secretly undermining the interest of the Commission, his very own employer.
To deflect any culpability, Pollo would, however, want the Commission to believe that the documents were the personal files of some of his friends, including
one Attorney Ponciano Solosa, who incidentally served as his counsel of record during the formal investigation of this case. In fact, Atty. Solosa himself
executed a sworn affidavit to this effect. Unfortunately, this contention of the respondent was directly rebutted by the prosecution witness, Reyes, who testified
that during her entire stay in the PALD, she never saw Atty. Solosa using the computer assigned to the respondent. Reyes more particularly stated that she
worked in close proximity with Pollo and would have known if Atty. Solosa, whom she personally knows, was using the computer in question. Further, Atty.
Solosa himself was never presented during the formal investigation to confirm his sworn statement such that the same constitutes self-serving evidence
unworthy of weight and credence. The same is true with the other supporting affidavits, which Pollo submitted.
At any rate, even admitting for a moment the said contention of the respondent, it evinces the fact that he was unlawfully authorizing private persons to use the
computer assigned to him for official purpose, not only once but several times gauging by the number of pleadings, for ends not in conformity with the
interests of the Commission. He was, in effect, acting as a principal by indispensable cooperationOr at the very least, he should be responsible for serious
misconduct for repeatedly allowing CSC resources, that is, the computer and the electricity, to be utilized for purposes other than what they were officially
intended.
Further, the Commission cannot lend credence to the posturing of the appellant that the line appearing in one of the documents, Eric N. Estrellado, Epal kulang
ang bayad mo, was a private joke between the person alluded to therein, Eric N. Estrellado, and his counsel, Atty. Solosa, and not indicative of anything more
sinister. The same is too preposterous to be believed. Why would such a statement appear in a legal pleading stored in the computer assigned to the respondent,
unless he had something to do with it?[56]
Petitioner assails the CA in not ruling that the CSC should not have entertained an anonymous complaint since Section 8 of CSC Resolution No. 99-1936
(URACC) requires a verified complaint:
Rule II Disciplinary Cases
SEC. 8. Complaint. - A complaint against a civil service official or employee shall not be given due course unless it is in writing and subscribed and sworn to
by the complainant. However, in cases initiated by the proper disciplining authority, the complaint need not be under oath.
No anonymous complaint shall be entertained unless there is obvious truth or merit to the allegation therein or supported by documentary or direct evidence, in
which case the person complained of may be required to comment.
xxxx
We need not belabor this point raised by petitioner. The administrative complaint is deemed to have been initiated by the CSC itself when Chairperson David,
after a spot inspection and search of the files stored in the hard drive of computers in the two divisions adverted to in the anonymous letter -- as part of the
disciplining authoritys own fact-finding investigation and information-gathering -- found a prima facie case against the petitioner who was then directed to file
his comment. As this Court held in Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals[57] --
Under Sections 46 and 48 (1), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Book V of E.O. No. 292 and Section 8, Rule II of Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, a complaint may be initiated against a civil service officer or employee by the appropriate disciplining authority, even without being subscribed and
sworn to. Considering that the CSC, as the disciplining authority for Dumlao, filed the complaint, jurisdiction over Dumlao was validly acquired. (Emphasis
supplied.)
As to petitioners challenge on the validity of CSC OM 10, S. 2002 (CUP), the same deserves scant consideration. The alleged infirmity due to the said
memorandum order having been issued solely by the CSC Chair and not the Commission as a collegial body, upon which the dissent of Commissioner
Buenaflor is partly anchored, was already explained by Chairperson David in her Reply to the Addendum to Commissioner Buenaflors previous memo
expressing his dissent to the actions and disposition of the Commission in this case. According to Chairperson David, said memorandum order was in fact
exhaustively discussed, provision by provision in the January 23, 2002 Commission Meeting, attended by her and former Commissioners Erestain, Jr. and
Valmores. Hence, the Commission En Banc at the time saw no need to issue a Resolution for the purpose and further because the CUP being for internal use of
the Commission, the practice had been to issue a memorandum order.[58] Moreover, being an administrative rule that is merely internal in nature, or which
regulates only the personnel of the CSC and not the public, the CUP need not be published prior to its effectivity.[59]
In fine, no error or grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA in affirming the CSCs ruling that petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty,
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and violation of R.A. No. 6713. The gravity of these offenses justified the imposition on petitioner of the
ultimate penalty of dismissal with all its accessory penalties, pursuant to existing rules and regulations.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated October 11, 2007 and Resolution dated February 29, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98224 are AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED