Greco Belgica vs Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa

May 21, 2014

710 SCRA 1 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Local Government – Invalid Delegation

Legislative Department – Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power

This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the
lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from “Congressional
Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the
annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard projects” (infrastructure projects like
roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs,
IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for the
realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator
concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes
from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since 1976, and (b) the
Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by
Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles.
Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government
organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going
to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes
of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the
other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the
law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators
themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they
enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled
that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only
recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator
concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people legislative power
but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated
by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of
war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to
is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in
the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it
state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem
to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator
can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the
appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose
a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs),
the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of
the members of the house of representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project
by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national
officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on
local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a
personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section
29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any
appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by
PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part
of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and for other
purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund
(the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated
therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
RELATED NEWS: July 1, 2014 | SC strikes down certain provisions of DAP as unconstitutional
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BAI SEMA vs COMELEC

Today is Friday, August 03, 2018

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

DECISION

The Case

Cotabato City as part of the legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. 2

The Facts

district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.3 Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic A
MM in the plebiscite held in November 1989.

cle VI of RA 9054,5 enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in t

are hereby separated from the Province of Maguindanao and constituted into a distinct and independent province, which is hereby created, to be known as the Province o

or and majority of the regular members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

they will choose or where they are residents: Provided, that where an elective position in both provinces becomes vacant as a consequence of the creation of the Provinc
fied in the next local elections; Provided, further, that they shall continue to receive the salaries they are receiving at the time of the approval of this Act until the new readj

of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanao

tatus of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province" under MMA Act 201.

ato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao." Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELEC’s La

ending the enactment of the appropriate law by Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of

guindanao’s first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.8
e legislative district in question as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City)."91avvphi1

" prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that
Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the status quo in Maguindanao’s first legislative district despite the COMELEC’s earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating

tended that (1) Sema wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its adm
ariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.

certificate of candidacy filed on 29 March 2007, Sema indicated that she was seeking election as representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City." Respond
Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC could not reapportion Maguindanao’s first legislative district to make Cotabato City its sole component unit as the power to r

cted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902.

eated by the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a nation

hen a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute — which cannot provide otherwise —
cle VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution mandate the apportionment of a legislative district in newly created provinces.

Resolution Nos. 07-0407 and 7902 and joined causes with Sema, contending that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is "self-executing." Thus, every new province

d in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is one that is created by an act of Congress taking into account the provisions in RA 7160 on the creation of provinces; (b)
zing a legislative district in every province the ARMM Regional Assembly creates will lead to the disproportionate representation of the ARMM in the House of Representa

rticle VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created u

raised in the oral arguments. 16 On the question of the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the parties in G.R. No. 177597 adopted the following positions

ARMM of the power to create provinces under Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to the autonomous regions, through their organic acts, legislative pow
VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to "prescribe standards lower than those mandated" in RA 7160 in the creation of provinces contravenes Sec

s: (a) the power to create provinces was not among those granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution and (b) the grant under Sectio
ion Clause; and

on the COMELEC adopted in its Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007) and contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional because

resentatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province, Sema and respondent Dilangalen reiterated in their Memoranda the positio

19 February 2008, the Court ordered G.R. No. 178628 consolidated with G.R. No. 177597. The petition in G.R. No. 178628 echoed Sema's contention that the COMELE
Resolution No. 7902 as a temporary measure pending the enactment by Congress of the "appropriate law."

The Issues

ELEC Resolution No. 7902; and

Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597.

 te provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and

suant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for

quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]"), despite

The Ruling of the Court

he ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC Resolutio

On the Preliminary Matters

ial functions."21 On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an act "which the law specifically
ff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City." These, however, do not justify the outright dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 because Sema also prayed for the issu

Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City" mooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent Dilangalen’s election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the v
riff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City" will be included in the canvassing of ballots. However, this incidental consequence is no reason for us not to proceed with the
onal provinces.

On the Main Issues

Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly
Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan

t in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly

irst, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the

slative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to cr
ect to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under th

palities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not o
h any provision of the Constitution.

and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following

s Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative d
city’s population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Or

egislative district. The threshold issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of Re

ntatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of t
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

stricts based on the standards provided in this section. (Emphasis supplied)

of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to cr
gislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC,29 we held that the "power of redistricting x x x is

gislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Onl
f the superior legislative body.

exclusive authority to create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitutio

ous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:

n legislative districts for Congress.

egislative power x x x except on the following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x." Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact law
vity of the law. 30

sentatives, is a national official.31 It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative
dy that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office.

jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assembly’s legislative powers "[w]ithin its territorial ju

ortion legislative districts by abstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA Act 201 provides that:

phasis supplied)

e at least one representative." Thus, the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is unconstitutional.

ast two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. (Emphasis supplied)

d shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the numbe
creased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twen

ber in the House of Representatives in the 14 May 2007 elections. As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that "when a province is cr
nce, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for congressional representation in the old and new provinces, was unconstitutional for "creati[ng] congressional districts w

e several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one Member. The Congress shall by
ho shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. Each representative district shall comprise as far as practicable, contiguous and compact

"each province shall have at least one member" in the House of Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of several representative districts within a province
e, not only from the general tenor of the provision above quoted, but, also, from the fact that the apportionment therein alluded to refers to that which is made by an Act of
onment.

haps, if the consequence thereof were to exceed the maximum of 120 representative districts prescribed in the Constitution, which is not the effect of the legislation under

w enacted by Congress creating a province and (2) the creation of the legislative districts will not result in breaching the maximum number of legislative districts provided
bly.

gislative districts, but also from Congress’ power to create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative
stricts belongs exclusively to Congress. It merely prevents any other legislative body, except Congress, from creating provinces because for a legislative body to create a
district.

City as the lone component of the first legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a legislative district by itself because as of the census
d fifty thousand x x x, shall have at least one representative."

I of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, name

he membership of a superior legislative body, the House of Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed in the Constitution (unless a national law provides oth

000 residents will be negated because the ARMM Regional Assembly need not comply with the requirement in Section 461(a)(ii) of RA 7160 that every province created

RMM Regional Assembly’s continuous creation of provinces or cities within the ARMM.

MM Regional Assembly can create provinces:

presentatives in the House of Representatives without Congress agreeing to it, is that what you are saying? That can be done, under your theory[?]

0) [population], x x x, and they will each have one representative x x x to Congress without any national law, is that what you are saying?
 without a national law[,] that is legally possible, correct?

54, envisioned or intended these disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to cr

to the Constitution which states, "[A]ny province that may hereafter be created x x x shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member," refers
are 219 38 district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the House of Representatives. Since party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of total membership
need now for Congress to increase by law the allowable membership of the House, even before Congress can create new provinces.

ly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and na
within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."

rt will not pass upon the constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and barangays that does not comply with the criteria established in Section 461 of RA 7160, as m

ces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Co
nded to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province sha
provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabu

danao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance ap

mbly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating th

ANG LADLAD PARTY VS

COMELEC (2010)
16 Nov 2017

[G.R. No. 190582; April 8, 2010] Constitutional Law| Political Law| Party List
FACTS:
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Ang Ladlad applied for
registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application was first denied on the ground that
it has no substantial membership base and on second, was dismissed based on moral grounds.

ISSUE:
Whether COMELEC erred in denying Ang Ladlad as Party-List Representative.

RULING:
Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated allegation of
non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is
not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941
or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang
Ladlad’s morality, or lack thereof.

The Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Rather than relying on
religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on
whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere
conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes
and in ways that have primarily secular effects.

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have
the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political
parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of
general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate
in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors.

The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioner’s application for party-list

accreditation.