G.R. No. 139789.
May 12, 2000 On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K.
ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, respondents. Mesm
G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in
conjugal bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and living in
conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, 1 or by
which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. 2 Slx
"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to
produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and
cause of his capture and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court
or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf."3
It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the great object of which is
the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause.4 It is issued
when one is deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented from exercising legal
custody over another person.5
The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio6 is to reverse the decision7 of the Court of Appeals
and its resolution8 dismissing the application for habeas corpus to have the custody of
her husband, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio and enforce consortium as the wife.
On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio 9 is to annul that portion of the
decision of the Court of Appeals giving Erlinda K. Ilusorio visitation rights to her
husband and to enjoin Erlinda and the Court of Appeals from enforcing the visitation
rights.
The undisputed facts are as follows: Scslx
Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued
at millions of pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the
Board and President of Baguio Country Club.
lived together for a period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated from bed and
board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala
Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country
Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely: Ramon Ilusorio (age
55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age
48); and Shereen (age 39).
On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from the United States, he stayed
with Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda
(Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200
mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor in New
York, U.S.A. As a consequence, Potenciano’s health deteriorated.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a
petition10 for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to
the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano
Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium,
Makati. Slxsc
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas
corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that
respondents11 refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband and
prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.
After due hearing, on April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered decision the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, judgment is hereby
rendered:
"(1) Ordering, for humanitarian consideration and upon petitioner’s manifestation,
respondents Erlinda K. Ilusorio Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio-Yap, the administrator of
Cleveland Condominium or anywhere in its place, his guards and Potenciano
Ilusorio’s staff especially Ms. Aurora Montemayor to allow visitation rights to
Potenciano Ilusorio’s wife, Erlinda Ilusorio and all her children, notwithstanding any
list limiting visitors thereof, under penalty of contempt in case of violation of refusal
thereof; xxx
"(2) ORDERING that the writ of habeas corpus previously issued be recalled and the
herein petition for habeas corpus be DENIED DUE COURSE, as it is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject of the petition.
"SO ORDERED."12
Hence, the two petitions, which were consolidated and are herein jointly decided.
As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention,13 or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld
from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully
denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due
process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and
where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. 14 It is
devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint,
as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. 15 Jksmä â Ó
deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his
fundamental constitutional right. Esä m
The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a
petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right. The ruling
is not consistent with the finding of subject’s sanity.
When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that the same
shall be enforced under penalty of contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply.
Such assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary.

The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal.16
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.17 The illegal restraint of liberty must be
actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.18
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact
that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does
not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge
on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his
actions.
After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful restraint
on his liberty.
The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio did not request
the administrator of the Cleveland Condominium not to allow his wife and other
children from seeing or visiting him. He made it clear that he did not object to seeing
them.
The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a
parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the
husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without
threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his
wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried
out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial
authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.
WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of
merit. No costs.
In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies the decision of the
Court of Appeals insofar as it gives visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s mental state, the Court of Appeals observed that
he was of sound and alert mind, having answered all the relevant questions to the
satisfaction of the court.

Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this
case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or
live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members but
these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before
the Court of Appeals that he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing
people. With that declaration, and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no
reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.

With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may
not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will
G.R. No. 148468 January 28, 2003
ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL LEANDRO
MENDOZA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 148769 January 28, 2003
EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 149116 January 28, 2003
EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner Edward Serapio,
assailing the resolutions of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his
petition for bail, motion for a reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition for
habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein
petitioner is one of the accused together with former President Joseph E. Estrada,
Jose "Jinggoy" P. Estrada and several others.
The records show that petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the
Legal Counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-profit
foundation established in February 2000 ostensibly for the purpose of providing
educational opportunities for the poor and underprivileged but deserving Muslim
youth and students, and support to research and advance studies of young Muslim
educators and scientists.
Sometime in April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation, received on its
behalf a donation in the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200 Million) from
Ilocos Sur Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson through the latter's assistant Mrs. Yolanda
Ricaforte. Petitioner received the donation and turned over the said amount to the
Foundation's treasurer who later deposited it in the Foundation's account with the
Equitable PCI Bank.
In the latter part of the year 2000, Gov. Singson publicly accused then President
Joseph E. Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in several illegal activities, including
its operation on the illegal numbers game known as jueteng. This triggered the filing
with the Office of the Ombudsman of several criminal complaints against Joseph
Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner, together with other persons. Among such
complaints were: Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption, versus Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1754; Graft
Free Philippines Foundation, Inc., versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio,
et al., docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1755; and Leonardo De Vera, Romeo
T. Capulong and Dennis B. Funa, versus Joseph Estrada, Yolanda Ricaforte, Edward
Serapio, Raul De Guzman, Danilo Reyes and Mila Reforma, docketed as OMB Crim.
Case No. 0-00-1757.
Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit dated February 21, 2001. The
other respondents likewise filed their respective counter-affidavits. The Office of the
Ombudsman conducted a preliminary investigation of the complaints and on April 4,
2001, issued a joint resolution recommending, inter alia, that Joseph Estrada,
petitioner and several others be charged with the criminal offense of plunder.
On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several Informations
against former President Estrada, who earlier had resigned from his post as President
of the Republic of the Philippines. One of these Informations, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 26558, charged Joseph Estrada with plunder. On April 18, 2001, the
Ombudsman filed an amended Information in said case charging Estrada and several
co-accused, including petitioner, with said crime. No bail was recommended for the
provisional release of all the accused, including petitioner. The case was raffled to a
special division which was subsequently created by the Supreme Court. The
amended Information reads:
"That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS
OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY,
BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS,
BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION,
AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION OR INFLUENCE, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire
BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
[P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING
HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE
OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR
SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL
INSTANCES MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00),
MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF
GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with
co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION
OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR
misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit public fund in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or
less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION
PESOS [P200,000,000.00]) tobacco excise tax share allocated for
the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang,
Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos
Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling FOR HIS PERSONAL
GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) TO PURCHASE, 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS,
MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS),
329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE
BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS
ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED
SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS
SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
[P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OR MORE OR
LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION
FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN
PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES OF SHARES
OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
[189,700,000.00] MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE
CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN
THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME
"JOSE VELARDE";
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS,
SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES, the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE
BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY
THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
[P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS
ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE" AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI
BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW."1
On April 5, 2001, petitioner obtained a copy of the Ombudsman's Joint Resolution
finding probable cause against him for plunder. The next day, April 6, 2001, he filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation.2 Petitioner likewise filed on said date, this time with the
Sandiganbayan, an Urgent Omnibus Motion: (a) To Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest and Further Proceedings; (b) To Conduct a Determination of
Probable Cause; (c) For Leave to File Accused's Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation; and (d) To Direct the Ombudsman to Conduct a Reinvestigation of
the Charges against accused Edward Serapio.3
On April 10, 2001, the Ombudsman issued an order denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and/or reinvestigation on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the
amended Information charging petitioner with plunder had already been filed with the
Sandiganbayan.4
In a parallel development, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on April 25, 2001
in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding probable cause to justify the issuance of warrants
of arrest for the accused, including petitioner. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan issued
an Order on the same date for the arrest of petitioner.5 When apprised of said order,
petitioner voluntarily surrendered at 9:45 p.m. on the same day to Philippine National
Police Chief Gen. Leandro Mendoza. Petitioner has since been detained at Camp
Crame for said charge.
The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, including petitioner, in
Criminal Case No. 26558 on June 27, 2001. In the meantime, on April 27, 2001,
petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail which was set for
hearing on May 4, 2001.6 For his part, petitioner's co-accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada
filed on April 20, 2001 a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that he was entitled to
bail as a matter of right.
During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioner's Urgent Petition for Bail, the
prosecution moved for the resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier than the
June 27, 2001 schedule. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the
prosecution and issued an order declaring that the petition for bail can and should be
heard beforepetitioner's arraignment on June 27, 2001 and even before the other
accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 filed their respective petitions for bail.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the hearing for the reception of evidence on
petitioner's petition for bail on May 21 to 25, 2001.
On May 17, 2001, four days before the hearing on petitioner's petition for bail, the
Ombudsman filed an urgent motion for early arraignment of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy
Estrada and petitioner and a motion for joint bail hearings of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy
Estrada and petitioner. The following day, petitioner filed a manifestation questioning
the propriety of including Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada in the hearing on his
(petitioner's) petition for bail.
The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on May 18, 2001 resetting the hearings on
petitioner's petition for bail to June 18 to 28, 2001 to enable the court to resolve the
prosecution's pending motions as well as petitioner's motion that his petition for bail
be heard as early as possible, which motion the prosecution opposed.
On May 31, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner's April
6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion. The court ruled that the issues posed by petitioner
had already been resolved in its April 25, 2001 Resolution finding probable cause to
hold petitioner and his co-accused for trial.7 Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said May 31, 2001 Resolution.
On June 1, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the attendance of
petitioner as well as all the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 during the
hearings on the petitions for bail under pain of waiver of cross-examination. The
Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent powers to proceed with the trial of the case in the
manner it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination
of the case, directed the other accused to participate in the said bail hearing
considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, whatever
evidence is adduced during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically
reproduced at the trial.8
However, instead of proceeding with the bail hearing set by it on June 18, 2001, the
Sandiganbayan issued an Order on June 15, 2001 canceling the said bail hearing
due to pending incidents yet to be resolved and reset anew the hearing to June 26,
2001.9
On the eve of said hearing, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of its May 31, 2001 Resolution. The bail
hearing on June 26, 2001 did not again proceed because on said date petitioner filed
with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the amended Information on the grounds
that as against him, the amended Information does not allege a combination or series
of overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder; as against him, the amended
Information does not allege a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy; the money alleged in paragraph (a) of the amended
Information to have been illegally received or collected does not constitute "ill-gotten
wealth" as defined in Section 1(d) of Republic Act No. 7080; and the amended
Information charges him of bribery and illegal gambling.10 By way of riposte, the
prosecution objected to the holding of bail hearing until petitioner agreed to withdraw
his motion to quash. The prosecution contended that petitioner's motion to quash the
amended Information was antithetical to his petition for bail.
The Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment of accused and the hearing on the petition
for bail of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 26558 for July 10, 2001 to enable it to
resolve the pending incidents and the motion to quash of petitioner. However, even
before the Sandiganbayan could resolve the pending motions of petitioner and the
prosecution, petitioner filed with this Court on June 29, 2001 a Petition for Habeas
Corpus and Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148468, praying that the Court declare
void the questioned orders, resolutions and actions of the Sandiganbayan on his
claim that he was thereby effectively denied of his right to due process. Petitioner
likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus; that the People be
declared to have waived their right to present evidence in opposition to his petition for
bail; and, premised on the failure of the People to adduce strong evidence of
petitioner's guilt of plunder, that he be granted provisional liberty on bail after due
proceedings.11
Meanwhile, on June 28, 2001, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada filed with the Sandiganbayan a
motion praying that said court resolve his motion to fix his bail.
On July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion
to quash the amended Information. Petitioner, through counsel, received on said date
a copy of said resolution.12 The motion to fix bail filed by Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada was
also resolved by the Sandiganbayan.
On July 10, 2001, just before his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 26558, petitioner
manifested to the Sandiganbayan that he was going to file a motion for
reconsideration of the July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his motion to quash and for
the deferment of his arraignment. The Sandiganbayan, however, declared that there
was no provision in the Rules of Court or in the Sandiganbayan's rules granting the
right to petitioner to file a motion for the reconsideration of an interlocutory order
issued by it and ordered petitioner to orally argue his motion for reconsideration.
When petitioner refused, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with his arraignment.
Petitioner refused to plead, impelling the court to enter a plea of not guilty for him.
On July 20, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court a Petition for Certiorari, docketed
as G.R. No. 148769, alleging that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing its July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his motion to quash,
notwithstanding the fact that material inculpatory allegations of the amended
Information against him do not constitute the crime of plunder; and that he is charged,
under the said amended Information, for more than one offense. Jose "Jinggoy"
Estrada likewise filed petition for certiorari with the Court docketed as G.R. No.
148965 for the nullification of a resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to
fix bail.
On August 9, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court another Petition for
Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 149116, assailing the Sandiganbayan's Resolution
dated 31 May 2001 which denied his April 6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion and its
June 25, 2001 Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration of its May 31, 2001
Resolution.
Re: G.R. No. 148769
Petitioner avers that:
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION, IN DENYING PETITIONER SERAPIO'S MOTION TO
QUASH NOTWITHSTANDING THAT —
I is not ill-gotten wealth as defined in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080.
THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED INFORMATION AS AGAINST
PETITIONER SERAPIO DO NOT CONSTITUTE THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.
A The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio, does not allege a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder.
B The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio, does not allege a
pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy.
C The money described in paragraph (a) of the Amended Information and
alleged to have been illegally received or collected does not constitute 'ill-
gotten wealth' as defined in Section 1(d), Republic Act No. 7080, as
amended.
II
THE AMENDED INFORMATION CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE."13
Petitioner asserts that, on the face of the amended Information, he is charged with
plunder only in paragraph (a) which reads:
"(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL
INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR
LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE,
PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT,
BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG'
ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR
PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;"14
Petitioner asserts that there is no allegation in paragraph (a) of the amended
Information of a "combination or series of overt or criminal acts" constituting plunder
as described in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080 as amended. Neither does the amended
Information allege "a pattern of criminal acts." He avers that his single act of toleration
or protection of illegal gambling impelled by a single criminal resolution does not
constitute the requisite "combination or series of acts" for plunder. He further claims
that the consideration consisting of gifts, percentages or kickbacks in furtherance of
said resolution turned over to and received by former President Joseph E. Estrada
"on several occasions" does not cure the defect in the amended information.
Petitioner insists that on the face of the amended Information he is charged only with
bribery or illegal gambling and not of plunder.
Petitioner argues that the P540 million which forms part of the P4,097,804,173.17
amassed by former President Joseph E. Estrada in confabulation with his co-accused
We do not agree with petitioner. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that:
"Sec. 6 Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information
is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall
be included in the complaint or information."15
The acts or omissions complained or must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged and enable the court to know the proper judgment. The Information must
allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference
to the definition and elements of the specific crimes. The purpose of the requirement
of alleging all the elements of the crime in the Information is to inform an accused of
the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare for
his defense.16 Another purpose is to enable accused, if found guilty, to plead his
conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.17 The use of derivatives
or synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense charged is
sufficient.18
In this case, the amended Information specifically alleges that all the accused,
including petitioner, connived and conspired with former President Joseph E. Estrada
to commit plunder "through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts
or similar schemes or means." And in paragraph (a) of the amended Information,
petitioner and his co-accused are charged with receiving or collecting, directly or
indirectly, on several instances money in the aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00.
In Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), et al.,19 we held that
the word "series" is synonymous with the clause "on several instances"; it refers to a
repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in Section 1(d) of the law. We
further held that the word "combination" contemplates the commission of at least any
two different predicate acts in any of the said items. We ruled that "plainly,
subparagraph (a) of the amended information charges accused therein, including
petitioner, with plunder committed by a series of the same predicate act under
Section 1(d)(2) of the law" and that:
 "x x x Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several
instances, money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or
protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of
those who conspired with former President Estrada in committing the
offense. This predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item
[2] of the enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080. x x x." 20
It is not necessary to allege in the amended Information a pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy because as Section 3 of
R.A. 7080 specifically provides, the same is evidentiary and the general rule is that
matters of evidence need not be alleged in the Information. 21
The Court also ruled in Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan22 that the
aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17 inclusive of the P545 million alleged in
paragraph (a) of the amended information is ill-gotten wealth as contemplated in
Section 1, paragraph 1(d) of Republic Act 7080, as amended, and that all the
accused in paragraph (a) to (d) of the amended information conspired and
confederated with former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate
or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17.
Under the amended Information, all the accused, including petitioner, are charged of
having conspired and confabulated together in committing plunder. When two or more
persons conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of others. In
contemplation of law, the act of the conspirator is the act of each of
them.23Conspirators are one man, they breathe one breath, they speak one voice,
they wield one arm and the law says that the acts, words and declarations of each,
while in the pursuit of the common design, are the acts, words and declarations of
all.24
Petitioner asserts that he is charged under the amended information of bribery and
illegal gambling and others. The Sandiganbayan, for its part, held that petitioner is not
charged with the predicate acts of bribery and illegal gambling but is charged only
with one crime that of plunder:
"THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE INFORMATION CHARGES MORE THAN
ONE OFFENSE
According to the accused Estradas and Edward Serapio the information
charges more than one offense, namely, bribery (Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code), malversation of public funds or property (Article 217, Revised
Penal Code) and violations of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act (RA No. 3019) and
Section 7(d) of RA 6713.
This contention is patently unmeritorious. The acts alleged in the information
are not charged as separate offenses but as predicate acts of the crime of
plunder.
It should be stressed that the Anti-Plunder law specifically Section 1(d)
thereof does not make any express reference to any specific provision of
laws, other than R.A. No. 7080, as amended, which coincidentally may
penalize as a separate crime any of the overt or criminal acts enumerated
therein. The said acts which form part of the combination or series of act are
described in their generic sense. Thus, aside from 'malversation' of public
funds, the law also uses the generic terms 'misappropriation', 'conversion' or
'misuse' of said fund. The fact that the acts involved may likewise be
penalized under other laws is incidental. The said acts are mentioned only
as predicate acts of the crime of plunder and the allegations relative thereto
are not to be taken or to be understood as allegations charging separate
criminal offenses punished under the Revised Penal Code, the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees."25
This Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan. It is clear on the face of the amended
Information that petitioner and his co-accused are charged only with one crime of
plunder and not with the predicate acts or crimes of plunder. It bears stressing that
the predicate acts merely constitute acts of plunder and are not crimes separate and
independent of the crime of plunder. Resultantly then, the petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 149116
Petitioner assails the May 31, 2001 Joint Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying
his April 4, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion contending that:
"GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN SUMMARILY DENYING PETITIONER SERAPIO'S URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (RE: RESOLUTION
DATED 31 MAY 2001), NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE OMBUDSMAN HAD
TOTALLY DISREGARDED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND COMMITTED GRAVE
AND MANIFEST ERRORS OF LAW SERIOUSLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE RIGHTS
AND INTERESTS OF PETITIONER SERAPIO, AND THERE IS NO PROBABLE
CAUSE TO SUPPORT AN INDICTMENT FOR PLUNDER AS AGAINST
PETITIONER SERAPIO."26
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying his omnibus motion to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest as well as the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 26558; to conduct a
determination of probable cause; and to direct the Ombudsman to conduct a
reinvestigation of the charges him. Petitioner asseverates that the Ombudsman had
totally disregarded exculpatory evidence and committed grave abuse of discretion in
charging him with plunder. He further argues that there exists no probable cause to
support an indictment for plunder as against him.27
Petitioner points out that the joint resolution of the Ombudsman does not even
mention him in relation to the collection and receipt of jueteng money which started in
199828 and that the Ombudsman inexplicably arrived at the conclusion that the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation was a money laundering front organization put up by
Joseph Estrada, assisted by petitioner, even though the latter presented evidence
that said Foundation is a bona fide and legitimate private foundation.29 More
importantly, he claims, said joint resolution does not indicate that he knew that the
P200 million he received for the Foundation came from jueteng.30
Petitioner insists that he cannot be charged with plunder since: (1) the P200 million
he received does not constitute "ill-gotten wealth" as defined in Section 1(d) of R.A.
No. 7080;31 (2) there is no evidence linking him to the collection and receipt
of jueteng money;32 (3) there was no showing that petitioner participated in a pattern
of criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, or that his act of receiving the P200 million
constitutes an overt criminal act of plunder.33
Petitioner argues further that his motion for reinvestigation is premised on the
absolute lack of evidence to support a finding of probable cause for plunder as
against him,34 and hence he should be spared from the inconvenience, burden and
expense of a public trial.35
Petitioner also avers that the discretion of government prosecutors is not beyond
judicial scrutiny. He asserts that while this Court does not ordinarily look into the
existence of probable cause to charge a person for an offense in a given case, it may
do so in exceptional circumstances, which are present in this case: (1) to afford
adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid oppression; (3) when the acts of the officer are
without or in excess of authority; and (4) where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance.36 Petitioner claims that he raised proper grounds
for a reinvestigation by asserting that in issuing the questioned joint resolution, the
Ombudsman disregarded evidence exculpating petitioner from the charge of plunder
and committed errors of law or irregularities which have been prejudicial to his
interest.37 He also states that during the joint preliminary investigations for the various
charges against Joseph Estrada and his associates, of which the plunder charge was
only one of the eight charges against Estrada et al., he was not furnished with copies
of the other complaints nor given the opportunity to refute the evidence presented in
relation to the other seven cases, even though the evidence presented therein were
also used against him, although he was only charged in the plunder case.38
The People maintain that the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioner's omnibus motion. They assert that since the Ombudsman found
probable cause to charge petitioner with the crime of plunder, the Sandiganbayan is
bound to assume jurisdiction over the case and to proceed to try the same. They
further argue that "a finding of probable cause is merely preliminary and prefatory of
the eventual determination of guilt or innocence of the accused," and that petitioner
still has the chance to interpose his defenses in a full blown trial where his guilt or
innocence may finally be determined.39
The People also point out that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner's omnibus motion asking for, among others, a
reinvestigation by the Ombudsman, because his motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's joint resolution did not raise the grounds of either newly discovered
evidence, or errors of law or irregularities, which under Republic Act No. 6770 are the
only grounds upon which a motion for reconsideration may be filed. 40
The People likewise insist that there exists probable cause to charge petitioner with
plunder as a co-conspirator of Joseph Estrada.41
This Court does not agree with petitioner.
Case law has it that the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman's discretion in
the conduct of preliminary investigations. Thus, in Raro vs. Sandiganbayan42 , the
Court ruled:
"x x x. In the performance of his task to determine probable cause, the
Ombudsman's discretion is paramount. Thus, in Camanag vs. Guerrero, this
Court said:
'x x x. (S)uffice it to state that this Court has adopted a policy of
non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and
leaves to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion
in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence as will establish 'probable cause' for filing of information
against the supposed offender."
In Cruz, Jr. vs. People,43 the Court ruled thus:
"Furthermore, the Ombudsman's findings are essentially factual in nature.
Accordingly, in assailing said findings on the contention that the
Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner
is liable for estafa through falsification of public documents, petitioner is
clearly raising questions of fact here. His arguments are anchored on the
propriety or error in the Ombudsman's appreciation of facts. Petitioner
cannot be unaware that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in
the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither
question of fact nor even of law are entertained, but only questions of lack or
excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Insofar as the third issue
is concerned, we find that no grave abuse of discretion has been committed
by respondents which would warrant the granting of the writ of certiorari."
Petitioner is burdened to allege and establish that the Sandiganbayan and the
Ombudsman for that matter committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing their
resolution and joint resolution, respectively. Petitioner failed to discharge his burden.
Indeed, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman in finding probable cause against petitioner for
plunder. Neither did the Sandiganbayan abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's
motion for reinvestigation of the charges against him in the amended Information. In
its Resolution of April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the finding of the
Ombudsman that probable cause exists against petitioner and his co-accused for the
crime of plunder, thus:
 "In the light of the foregoing and considering the allegations of the Amended
Information dated 18 April 2001 charging the accused with the offense of
PLUNDER and examining carefully the evidence submitted in support
thereof consisting of the affidavits and sworn statements and testimonies of
prosecution witnesses and several other pieces of documentary evidence,
as well as the respective counter-affidavits of accused former President
Joseph Estrada dated March 20, 2001, Jose "Jinggoy" Pimentel Estrada
dated February 20, 2001, Yolanda T. Ricaforte dated January 21, 2001 and
Edward S. Serapio dated February 21, 2001, the Court finds and so holds
that probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify issuance of
warrants of arrest of accused former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
Mayor Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or
Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a Delia Rajas." 44
Likewise, in its Resolution dated May 31, 2001 of petitioner's omnibus motion, the
Sandiganbayan noted that a preliminary investigation was fully conducted in
accordance with Rule II, Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of the Ombudsman,
pursuant to Sections 18, 23 and 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act
of 1989); and that all the basic complaints and evidence in support thereof were
served upon all the accused.45 It was in light of such findings that the Sandiganbayan
held that there was no basis for the allegation that accused therein (including
petitioner) were deprived of the right to seek a reconsideration of the Ombudsman's
Resolution dated April 4, 2001 finding probable cause to charge them with plunder
after the conduct of preliminary investigation in connection therewith. In addition, the
Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's resolution, but failed to show in his motion that there were newly
discovered evidence, or that the preliminary investigation was tainted by errors of law
or irregularities, which are the only grounds for which a reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's resolution may be granted.46
It bears stressing that the right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional
right, but is merely a right conferred by statute.47 The absence of a preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render the
same defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or
constitute a ground for quashing the Information.48 If the lack of a preliminary
investigation does not render the Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the
court over the case, with more reason can it be said that the denial of a motion for
reinvestigation cannot invalidate the Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction
over the case. Neither can it be said that petitioner had been deprived of due process.
He was afforded the opportunity to refute the charges against him during the
preliminary investigation.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to determine whether a crime has
been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the person
accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. 49 As the
Court held in Webb vs. De Leon, "[a] finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.'' 50
Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or any other officer
authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to said
officer's finding and determination of probable cause, since the determination of the
existence of probable cause is the function of the prosecutor.51 The Court agrees with
the Sandiganbayan that petitioner failed to establish that the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman was tainted with irregularity or that its findings stated
in the joint resolution dated April 4, 2001 are not supported by the facts, and that a
reinvestigation was necessary.
Certiorari will not lie to invalidate the Sandiganbayan's resolution denying petitioner's
motion for reinvestigation since there is nothing to substantiate petitioner's claim that
it gravely abused its discretion in ruling that there was no need to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case.52
The ruling in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals53 that an accused shall not be deemed to
have waived his right to ask for a preliminary investigation after he had been
arraigned over his objection and despite his insistence on the conduct of said
investigation prior to trial on the merits does not apply in the instant case because
petitioner merely prayed for a reinvestigation on the ground of a newly-discovered
evidence. Irrefragably, a preliminary investigation had been conducted by the
Ombudsman prior to the filing of the amended Information, and that petitioner had
participated therein by filing his counter-affidavit. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan
had already denied his motion for reinvestigation as well as his motion for
reconsideration thereon prior to his arraignment.54 In sum then, the petition is
dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 148468
As synthesized by the Court from the petition and the pleadings of the parties, the
issues for resolution are: (1) Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before
hearings of his petition for bail may be conducted; (2) Whether petitioner may file a
motion to quash the amended Information during the pendency of his petition for bail;
(3) Whether a joint hearing of the petition for bail of petitioner and those of the other
accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 is mandatory; (4) Whether the People waived
their right to adduce evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner and
failed to adduce strong evidence of guilt of petitioner for the crime charged; and (5)
Whether petitioner was deprived of his right to due process in Criminal Case No.
26558 and should thus be released from detention via a writ of habeas corpus.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave
abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it deferred the
hearing of his petition for bail to July 10, 2001, arraigned him on said date and
entered a plea of not guilty for him when he refused to be arraigned. He insists that
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, does not require that he be arraigned
first prior to the conduct of bail hearings since the latter can stand alone and must, of
necessity, be heard immediately.55 Petitioner maintains that his arraignment before
the bail hearings are set is not necessary since he would not plead guilty to the
offense charged, as is evident in his earlier statements insisting on his innocence
during the Senate investigation of the juetengscandal and the preliminary
investigation before the Ombudsman.56 Neither would the prosecution be prejudiced
even if it would present all its evidence before his arraignment because, under the
Revised Penal Code, a voluntary confession of guilt is mitigating only if made prior to
the presentation of evidence for the prosecution,57 and petitioner admitted that he
cannot repudiate the evidence or proceedings taken during the bail hearings because
Rule 114, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that evidence
present during bail hearings are automatically reproduced during the trial. 58 Petitioner
likewise assures the prosecution that he is willing to be arraigned prior to the posting
of a bail bond should he be granted bail.59
The People insist that arraignment is necessary before bail hearings may be
commenced, because it is only upon arraignment that the issues are joined. The
People stress that it is only when an accused pleads not guilty may he file a petition
for bail and if he pleads guilty to the charge, there would be no more need for him to
file said petition. Moreover, since it is during arraignment that the accused is first
informed of the precise charge against him, he must be arraigned prior to the bail
hearings to prevent him from later assailing the validity of the bail hearings on the
ground that he was not properly informed of the charge against him, especially
considering that, under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence
presented during such proceedings are considered automatically reproduced at the
trial.60 Likewise, the arraignment of accused prior to bail hearings diminishes the
possibility of an accused's flight from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because
trial in absentia may be had only if an accused escapes after he has been
arraigned.61 The People also contend that the conduct of bail hearings prior to
arraignment would extend to an accused the undeserved privilege of being appraised
of the prosecution's evidence before he pleads guilty for purposes of penalty
reduction.62
Although petitioner had already been arraigned on July 10, 2001 and a plea of not
guilty had been entered by the Sandiganbayan on his behalf, thereby rendering the
issue as to whether an arraignment is necessary before the conduct of bail hearings
in petitioner's case moot, the Court takes this opportunity to discuss the controlling
precepts thereon pursuant to its symbolic function of educating the bench and bar. 63
The contention of petitioner is well-taken. The arraignment of an accused is not a
prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to
petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or
voluntary surrender.64 An accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a
petition for bail.
In Lavides vs. Court of Appeals,65 this Court ruled on the issue of whether an accused
must first be arraigned before he may be granted bail. Lavides involved an accused
charged with violation of Section 5(b) Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special Protection
of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), an offense
punishable by reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. The
accused therein assailed, inter alia, the trial court's imposition of the condition that he
should first be arraigned before he is allowed to post bail. We held therein that "in
cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the
accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash." 66
However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be taken to mean that the hearing
on a petition for bail should at all times precede arraignment, because the rule is that
a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may
apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or
information is filed against him.67 The Court's pronouncement in Lavides should be
understood in light of the fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as
well as a motion to quash the informations filed against him. Hence, we explained
therein that to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be
to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to
quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be
resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to
quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. This
would undermine his constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a valid
complaint or Information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. 68
It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of
hearings on his application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may
apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment. The ruling in Lavides also
implies that an application for bail in a case involving an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death may also be heard even before an accused is
arraigned. Further, if the court finds in such case that the accused is entitled to bail
because the evidence against him is not strong, he may be granted provisional liberty
even prior to arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be "authorized" under the
circumstances. In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment of petitioner before
proceeding with the hearing of his petition for bail.
With respect to the second issue of whether petitioner may file a motion to quash
during the pendency of his petition for bail, petitioner maintains that a motion to quash
and a petition for bail are not inconsistent, and may proceed independently of each
other. While he agrees with the prosecution that a motion to quash may in some
instances result in the termination of the criminal proceedings and in the release of
the accused therein, thus rendering the petition for bail moot and academic, he
opines that such is not always the case; hence, an accused in detention cannot be
forced to speculate on the outcome of a motion to quash and decide whether or not to
file a petition for bail or to withdraw one that has been filed. 69 He also insists that the
grant of a motion to quash does not automatically result in the discharge of an
accused from detention nor render moot an application for bail under Rule 117,
Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court.70
The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists between an application of an
accused for bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail is the security given for the
release of a person in the custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to
guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions set forth
under the Rules of Court.71 Its purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person
charged with an offense until his conviction while at the same time securing his
appearance at the trial.72 As stated earlier, a person may apply for bail from the
moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary
surrender.73
On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an
accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of
the Information.74 An accused may file a motion to quash the Information, as a
general rule, before arraignment.75
These two reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each other.
Certainly, the right of an accused right to seek provisional liberty when charged with
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetuaor life imprisonment, or when
charged with an offense punishable by such penalties but after due hearing, evidence
of his guilt is found not to be strong, does not preclude his right to assail the validity of
the Information charging him with such offense. It must be conceded, however, that if
a motion to quash a criminal complaint or Information on the ground that the same
does not charge any offense is granted and the case is dismissed and the accused is
ordered released, the petition for bail of an accused may become moot and
academic.
We now resolve the issue of whether or not it is mandatory that the hearings on the
petitions for bail of petitioner and accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada in Criminal Case
No. 26558 and the trial of the said case as against former President Joseph E.
Estrada be heard jointly.
Petitioner argues that the conduct of joint bail hearings would negate his right to have
his petition for bail resolved in a summary proceeding since said hearings might be
converted into a full blown trial on the merits by the prosecution. 76
For their part, the People claim that joint bail hearings will save the court from having
to hear the same witnesses and the parties from presenting the same evidence where
it would allow separate bail hearings for the accused who are charged as co-
conspirators in the crime of plunder.77
In issuing its June 1, 2001 Order directing all accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 to
participate in the bail hearings, the Sandiganbayan explained that the directive was
made was in the interest of the speedy disposition of the case. It stated:
" x x x The obvious fact is, if the rest of the accused other than the accused
Serapio were to be excused from participating in the hearing on the motion
for bail of accused Serapio, under the pretext that the same does not
concern them and that they will participate in any hearing where evidence is
presented by the prosecution only if and when they will already have filed
their petitions for bail, or should they decide not to file any, that they will
participate only during the trial proper itself, then everybody will be faced
with the daunting prospects of having to go through the process of
introducing the same witness and pieces of evidence two times, three times
or four times, as many times as there are petitions for bail filed. Obviously,
such procedure is not conducive to the speedy termination of a case. Neither
can such procedure be characterized as an orderly proceeding." 78
There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Rules of
Procedure of the Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or more petitions for
bail filed by different accused or that a petition for bail of an accused be heard
simultaneously with the trial of the case against the other accused. The matter of
whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of two or more petitions for bail filed by two
different accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly with the trial against
another accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown, the Court will
not interfere with the exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its discretion.
It may be underscored that in the exercise of its discretion, the Sandiganbayan must
take into account not only the convenience of the State, including the prosecution, but
also that of the accused and the witnesses of both the prosecution and the accused
and the right of accused to a speedy trial. The Sandiganbayan must also consider the
complexities of the cases and of the factual and legal issues involving petitioner and
the other accused. After all, if this Court may echo the observation of the United
States Supreme Court, the State has a stake, with every citizen, in his being afforded
our historic individual protections, including those surrounding criminal prosecutions.
About them, this Court dares not become careless or complacent when that fashion
has become rampant over the earth.79
It must be borne in mind that in Ocampo vs. Bernabe,80 this Court held that in a
petition for bail hearing, the court is to conduct only a summary hearing, meaning
such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to
determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. The court does not try the
merits or enter into any inquiry as to the weight that ought to be given to the evidence
against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further
evidence may be offered therein. It may confine itself to receiving such evidence as
has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the
examination and cross-examination of witnesses, and reducing to a reasonable
minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to
the purpose of the hearing.
A joint hearing of two separate petitions for bail by two accused will of course avoid
duplication of time and effort of both the prosecution and the courts and minimizes the
prejudice to the accused, especially so if both movants for bail are charged of having
conspired in the commission of the same crime and the prosecution adduces
essentially the same evident against them. However, in the cases at bar, the joinder
of the hearings of the petition for bail of petitioner with the trial of the case against
former President Joseph E. Estrada is an entirely different matter. For, with the
participation of the former president in the hearing of petitioner's petition for bail, the
proceeding assumes a completely different dimension. The proceedings will no longer
be summary. As against former President Joseph E. Estrada, the proceedings will be
a full-blown trial which is antithetical to the nature of a bail hearing. Moreover,
following our ruling in Jose Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, supra where we stated that
Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada can only be charged with conspiracy to commit the acts
alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the amended Information since it is not clear from the
latter if the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) thereof conspired with each other to
assist Joseph Estrada to amass ill-gotten wealth, we hold that petitioner can only be
charged with having conspired with the other co-accused named in sub-paragraph (a)
by "receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money x x x
from illegal gambling, x x x in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal
gambling.81Thus, with respect to petitioner, all that the prosecution needs to adduce
to prove that the evidence against him for the charge of plunder is strong are those
related to the alleged receipt or collection of money from illegal gambling as
described in sub-paragraph (a) of the amended Information. With the joinder of the
hearing of petitioner's petition for bail and the trial of the former President, the latter
will have the right to cross-examine intensively and extensively the witnesses for the
prosecution in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner. If petitioner will adduce
evidence in support of his petition after the prosecution shall have concluded its
evidence, the former President may insist on cross-examining petitioner and his
witnesses. The joinder of the hearing of petitioner's bail petition with the trial of former
President Joseph E. Estrada will be prejudicial to petitioner as it will unduly delay the
determination of the issue of the right of petitioner to obtain provisional liberty and
seek relief from this Court if his petition is denied by the respondent court. The
indispensability of the speedy resolution of an application for bail was succinctly
explained by Cooley in his treatise Constitutional Limitations, thus:
"For, if there were any mode short of confinement which would with
reasonable certainty insure the attendance of the accused to answer the
accusation, it would not be justifiable to inflict upon him that indignity, when
the effect is to subject him in a greater or lesser degree, to the punishment
of a guilty person, while as yet it is not determined that he has not committed
any crime."82
While the Sandiganbayan, as the court trying Criminal Case No. 26558, is
empowered "to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it determines best
conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case," 83the Court
finds that it gravely abused its discretion in ordering that the petition for bail of
petitioner and the trial of former President Joseph E. Estrada be held jointly. It bears
stressing that the Sandiganbayan itself acknowledged in its May 4, 2001 Order the
"pre-eminent position and superiority of the rights of [petitioner] to have the matter of
his provisional liberty resolved . . . without unnecessary delay," 84 only to make a volte
face and declare that after all the hearing of petition for bail of petitioner and Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada and the trial as against former President Joseph E. Estrada should
be held simultaneously. In ordering that petitioner's petition for bail to be heard jointly
with the trial of the case against his co-accused former President Joseph E. Estrada,
the Sandiganbayan in effect allowed further and unnecessary delay in the resolution
thereof to the prejudice of petitioner. In fine then, the Sandiganbayan committed a
grave abuse of its discretion in ordering a simultaneous hearing of petitioner's petition
for bail with the trial of the case against former President Joseph E. Estrada on its
merits.
With respect to petitioner's allegations that the prosecution tried to delay the bail
hearings by filing dilatory motions, the People aver that it is petitioner and his co-
accused who caused the delay in the trial of Criminal Case No. 26558 by their filing of
numerous manifestations and pleadings with the Sandiganbayan. 85 They assert that
they filed the motion for joint bail hearing and motion for earlier arraignment around
the original schedule for the bail hearings which was on May 21–25, 2001.86
They argue further that bail is not a matter of right in capital offenses. 87 In support
thereof, they cite Article III, Sec 13 of the Constitution, which states that —
"All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required."88
The People also cited Rule 114, Secs. 7 and 4 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provide:
"Sec. 7 Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution.
Sec. 4 Bail, a matter of right, exception. — All persons in custody shall be
admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on
recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule x x x (b) and before
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment."89
Irrefragably, a person charged with a capital offense is not absolutely denied the
opportunity to obtain provisional liberty on bail pending the judgment of his case.
However, as to such person, bail is not a matter of right but is discretionary upon the
court.90 Had the rule been otherwise, the Rules would not have provided for an
application for bail by a person charged with a capital offense under Rule 114,
Section 8 which states:
"Sec. 8 Burden of proof in bail application. — At the hearing of an application
for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong.
The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered
automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the
court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the latter is
dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify."91
Under the foregoing provision, there must be a showing that the evidence of guilt
against a person charged with a capital offense is not strong for the court to grant him
bail. Thus, upon an application for bail by the person charged with a capital offense, a
hearing thereon must be conducted, where the prosecution must be accorded an
opportunity to discharge its burden of proving that the evidence of guilt against an
accused is strong.92 The prosecution shall be accorded the opportunity to present all
the evidence it may deem necessary for this purpose.93When it is satisfactorily
demonstrated that the evidence of guilt is strong, it is the court's duty to deny the
application for bail. However, when the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a
matter of right.94
In this case, petitioner is not entitled to bail as a matter of right at this stage of the
proceedings. Petitioner's claim that the prosecution had refused to present evidence
to prove his guilt for purposes of his bail application and that the Sandiganbayan has
refused to grant a hearing thereon is not borne by the records. The prosecution did
not waive, expressly or even impliedly, its right to adduce evidence in opposition to
the petition for bail of petitioner. It must be noted that the Sandiganbayan had already
scheduled the hearing dates for petitioner's application for bail but the same were
reset due to pending incidents raised in several motions filed by the parties, which
incidents had to be resolved by the court prior to the bail hearings. The bail hearing
was eventually scheduled by the Sandiganbayan on July 10, 2001 but the hearing did
not push through due to the filing of this petition on June 29, 2001.
The delay in the conduct of hearings on petitioner's application for bail is therefore not
imputable solely to the Sandiganbayan or to the prosecution. Petitioner is also partly
to blame therefor, as is evident from the following list of motions filed by him and by
the prosecution:
Motions filed by petitioner:
• Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 6, 2001, for (1) leave to file
motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation and to direct ombudsman to
conduct reinvestigation; (2) conduct a determination of probable cause as
would suggest the issuance of house arrest; (3) hold in abeyance the
issuance of warrant of arrest and other proceedings pending determination
of probable cause;
• Motion for Early Resolution, dated May 24, 2001;
• Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance Implementation or Service of
Warrant of Arrest for Immediate Grant of bail or For Release on
Recognizance, dated April 25, 2001;
• Urgent Motion to allow Accused Serapio to Vote at Obando, Bulacan,
dated May 11, 2001;
• Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, dated May 22, 2001, praying for
Resolution of May 18, 2001 be set aside and bail hearings be set at the
earliest possible time;
• Urgent Motion for Immediate Release on Bail or Recognizance, dated
May 27, 2001;
• Motion for Reconsideration of denial of Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated
June 13, 2001, praying that he be allowed to file a Motion for
Reinvestigation; and
• Motion to Quash, dated June 26, 2001.95
Motions filed by the prosecution:
• Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated May 8, 2001;96
• Motion for Joint Bail Hearings of Accused Joseph Estrada, Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada and Edward Serapio, dated May 8, 2001;97
• Opposition to the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Omnibus
Motion to Adjust Earlier Arraignment, dated May 25, 2001;98 and
• Omnibus Motion for Examination, Testimony and Transcription in
Filipino, dated June 19, 2001.99
The other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 also contributed to the aforesaid delay
by their filing of the following motions:
• Motion to Quash or Suspend, dated April 24, 2001, filed by Jinggoy
Estrada, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080 and praying that the
Amended Information be quashed;
• Very Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 30, 2001, filed by Jinggoy
Estrada, praying that he be (1)excluded from the Amended Information for
lack of probable cause; (2) released from custody; or in the alternative, (3)
be allowed to post bail;
• Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Place on House Arrest, dated April 25,
2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be placed on
house arrest during the pendency of the case;
• Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May 2, 2001, filed by Joseph
and Jinggoy Estrada;
• Supplemental Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May 2, 2001,
filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
• Omnibus Motion, dated May 7, 2001, filed by Joseph Estrada, praying
by reinvestigation of the case by the Ombudsman or the outright dismissal of
the case;
• Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension, dated May 2, 2001, filed by
Jinggoy Estrada, requesting for five (5) days within which to respond to the
Opposition to Motion to Quash in view of the holidays and election-related
distractions;
• Opposition to Urgent Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated May 10,
2001, filed by Joseph Estrada;
• Omnibus Manifestation on voting and custodial arrangement, dated
May 11, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be
placed on house arrest;
• Manifestation regarding house arrest, dated May 6, 2001, filed by
Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
• Summation regarding house arrest, dated May 23, 2001, filed by
Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
• Urgent Manifestation & Motion, dated May 6, 2001 filed by Jinggoy
Estrada;
• Manifestation, dated May 28, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy
Estrada, praying that they be allowed to be confined in Tanay;
• Motion to charge as Accused Luis "Chavit" Singson, filed by Joseph
Estrada;
• Omnibus Motion, dated June 11, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy
Estrada, seeking reconsideration of denial of requests for house arrest, for
detention in Tanay or Camp Crame; motion for inhibition of Justice Badoy;
• Urgent Motion to Allow Accused to Clear His Desk as Mayor of San
Juan, Metro Manila, dated June 28, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada;
• Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 9, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada, praying that the resolution compelling them to be present
at petitioner Serapio's hearing for bail be reconsidered;
• Motion to Quash, dated June 7, 2001, filed by Joseph Estrada;
• Still Another Manifestation, dated June 14, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada stating that Bishop Teodoro Bacani favors their house
arrest;
• Manifestation, dated June 15, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy
Estrada, waiving their right to be present at the June 18 and 21, 2001 bail
hearings and reserving their right to trial with assessors;
• Omnibus Motion for Instructions: 30-Day House Arrest; Production,
Inspection and Copying of Documents; and Possible Trial with Assessors,
dated June 19, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
• Urgent Motion for Additional Time to Wind Up Affairs, dated June 20,
2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada;
• Manifestation, dated June 22, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, asking
for free dates for parties, claiming that denial of bail is cruel and inhuman,
reiterating request for gag order of prosecution witnesses, availing of
production, inspection and copying of documents, requesting for status of
alias case; and
• Compliance, dated June 25, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada,
requesting for permission to attend some municipal affairs in San Juan,
Metro Manila.100
Furthermore, the Court has previously ruled that even in cases where the prosecution
refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail by an accused
charged with a capital offense, the trial court is still under duty to conduct a hearing
on said application.101 The rationale for such requirement was explained in Narciso
vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz (supra), citing Basco vs. Rapatalo:102
"When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of
showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong,
being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. This discretion
by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence
is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the
weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not
duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper
exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted
to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to
introduce his own evidence in rebuttal."103
Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from detention until the Sandiganbayan
conducts a hearing of his application for bail and resolve the same in his favor. Even
then, there must first be a finding that the evidence against petitioner is not strong
before he may be granted bail.
Anent the issue of the propriety of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus for
petitioner, he contends that he is entitled to the issuance of said writ because the
State, through the prosecution's refusal to present evidence and by the
Sandiganbayan's refusal to grant a bail hearing, has failed to discharge its burden of
proving that as against him, evidence of guilt for the capital offense of plunder is
strong. Petitioner contends that the prosecution launched "a seemingly endless
barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves" to prevent the conduct of bail hearings.
Specifically, the prosecution moved for petitioner's arraignment before the
commencement of bail hearings and insisted on joint bail hearings for petitioner,
Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada despite the fact that it was only petitioner who
asked for a bail hearing; manifested that it would present its evidence as if it is the
presentation of the evidence in chief, meaning that the bail hearings would be
concluded only after the prosecution presented its entire case upon the accused; and
argued that petitioner's motion to quash and his petition for bail are inconsistent, and
therefore, petitioner should choose to pursue only one of these two remedies. 104 He such discretion in refusing to grant bail,118 or has not even exercised said discretion.
further claims that the Sandiganbayan, through its questioned orders and resolutions The proper recourse is to file an application for bail with the court where the criminal
postponing the bail hearings effectively denied him of his right to bail and to due case is pending and to allow hearings thereon to proceed.
process of law.105
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be unjustified but would also
Petitioner also maintains that the issuance by the Sandiganbayan of new orders preempt the Sandiganbayan's resolution of the pending application for bail of
canceling the bail hearings which it had earlier set did not render moot and academic petitioner. The recourse of petitioner is to forthwith proceed with the hearing on his
the petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, since said orders have resulted in application for bail.
a continuing deprivation of petitioner's right to bail.106 He argues further that the fact
that he was arrested and is detained pursuant to valid process does not by itself IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
negate the efficacy of the remedy of habeas corpus. In support of his contention,
petitioner cites Moncupa vs. Enrile,107 where the Court held that habeas
corpus extends to instances where the detention, while valid from its inception, has 1 In G.R. No. 148769 and G.R. No. 149116, the petitions are DISMISSED. The
later become arbitrary.108 resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan subject of said petitions are AFFIRMED;
and
However, the People insist that habeas corpus is not proper because petitioner was
arrested pursuant to the amended information which was earlier filed in court, 109 the 2 In G.R. No. 148468, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The resolution of
warrant of arrest issuant pursuant thereto was valid, and petitioner voluntarily respondent Sandiganbayan, Annex "L" of the petition, ordering a joint hearing of
surrendered to the authorities.110 petitioner's petition for bail and the trial of Criminal Case No. 26558 as against former
President Joseph E. Estrada is SET ASIDE; the arraignment of petitioner on July 10,
2001 is also SET ASIDE.
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to
be restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court
which jurisdiction to do so.111 In exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be No costs.
granted by the courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a
valid arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as "the SO ORDERED.
fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and
lawless state action" due to "its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural
mazes."112 Thus, in previous cases, we issued the writ where the deprivation of
liberty, while initially valid under the law, had later become invalid,113 and even though
the persons praying for its issuance were not completely deprived of their liberty.114

The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of
petitioner. The general rule that habeas corpus does not lie where the person alleged
to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court which had jurisdiction to issue the same115 applies, because petitioner is under
detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan on April 25,
2001 after the filing by the Ombudsman of the amended information for plunder
against petitioner and his co-accused. Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered
himself to the authorities on April 25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant for his arrest
had been issued.

The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile116 that habeas corpus will lie where the deprivation
of liberty which was initially valid has become arbitrary in view of subsequent
developments finds no application in the present case because the hearing on
petitioner's application for bail has yet to commence. As stated earlier, they delay in
the hearing of petitioner's petition for bail cannot be pinned solely on the
Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution for that matter. Petitioner himself is partly to be
blamed. Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for
asserting one's right to bail.117 It cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to bail
not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the latter has not abused
G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001 Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the
"rebellion" were thereafter effected.
PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O. MANCAO,
petitioners, Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a "state of rebellion,"
vs. which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, the following four related
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and petitions were filed before the Court –
P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents.
(1) G. R. No. 147780 for prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus (with
---------------------------------------- an urgent application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction) filed by Panfilio M. Lacson, Michael Ray B. Aquino, and Cezar
G.R. No. 147781 May 10, 2001 O. Mancao; (2) G. R. No. 147781 for mandamus and/or review of the factual basis for
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with prayer for the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with prayer for a temporary
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner, restraining order filed by Miriam Defensor-Santiago; (3) G. R. No. 147799 for
vs. prohibition and injunction with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
ANGELO REYES, Secretary of National Defense, ET AL., respondents. restraining order filed by Ronaldo A. Lumbao; and (4) G. R. No. 147810 for certiorari
and prohibition filed by the political party Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino.
----------------------------------------
All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by President
G.R. No. 147799 May 10, 2001 Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue
thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law. Significantly, on May 6, 2001,
RONALDO A. LUMBAO, petitioner, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a "state of
vs. rebellion" in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, and academic. As to petitioners' claim that the proclamation of a "state of rebellion" is
P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO being used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice
BERROYA, respondents. denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in connection
with the "rebellion." He states that what is extant are general instructions to law
enforcement officers and military agencies to implement Proclamation No. 38. Indeed,
---------------------------------------- as stated in respondents' Joint Comments:

G.R. No. 147810 May 10, 2001 [I]t is already the declared intention of the Justice Department and
police authorities to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts
THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, petitioner, for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001 which means that
vs. preliminary investigations will henceforth be conducted.
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, (Comment, G.R. No. 147780, p. 28; G.R. No. 147781, p. 18; G.R.
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR GENERAL LEANDRO No. 147799, p. 16; G.R. No. 147810, p. 24)
MENDOZA, respondents.
With this declaration, petitioners' apprehensions as to warrantless arrests should be
RESOLUTION laid to rest.

MELO, J.:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and violent mob
armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly
weapons" assaulting and attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation
No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region.
She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National
In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless
arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by
petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a "state of rebellion."
Moreover, petitioners' contention in G. R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition), 147781
(Defensor-Santiago Petition), and 147799 (Lumbao Petition) that they are under
imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the
extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to
warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.
Such an individual may ask for a preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court, where he may adduce evidence in his defense, or he may submit
himself to inquest proceedings to determine whether or not he should remain under
custody and correspondingly be charged in court. Further, a person subject of a
warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within the
periods provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, otherwise the arresting
officer could be held liable for delay in the delivery of detained persons. Should the
detention be without legal ground, the person arrested can charge the arresting
officer with arbitrary detention. All this is without prejudice to his filing an action for
damages against the arresting officer under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Verily,
petitioners have a surfeit of other remedies which they can avail themselves of,
thereby making the prayer for prohibition and mandamus improper at this time
(Section 2 and 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court).1âwphi1.nêt
Aside from the foregoing reasons, several considerations likewise inevitably call for
the dismissal of the petitions at bar.
G.R. No. 147780
In connection with their alleged impending warrantless arrest, petitioners Lacson,
Aquino, and mancao pray that the "appropriate court before whom the informations
against petitioners are filed be directed to desist from arraigning and proceeding with
the trial of the case, until the instant petition is finally resolved." This relief is clearly
premature considering that as of this date, no complaints or charges have been filed
against any of the petitioners for any crime. And in the event that the same are later
filed, this Court cannot enjoin criminal prosecution conducted in accordance with the
Rules of Court, for by that time any arrest would have been in pursuant of a duly
issued warrant.
As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be
declared null and void ab initio, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly
assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders in their petition. They are not
even expressing intention to leave the country in the near future. The prayer to set
aside the same must be made in proper proceedings initiated for that purpose.
Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application
for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for
since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint (Ngaya-an v. Balweg,
200 SCRA 149 [1991]), a matter which remains speculative up to this very day.
G.R. No. 147781
The petition herein is denominated by petitioner Defensor-Santiago as one
for mandamus. It is basic in matters relating to petitions for mandamus that the legal
right of the petitioner to the performance of a particular act which is sought to be
compelled must be clear and complete. Mandamus will not issue unless the right to
relief is clear at the time of the award (Palileo v. Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil. 272). Up to the
present time, petitioner Defensor Santiago has not shown that she is in imminent
danger of being arrested without a warrant. In point of fact, the authorities have
categorically stated that petitioner will not be arrested without a warrant.
G.R. No. 147799
Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People's Movement against Poverty (PMAP), for his
part, argues that the declaration of a "state of rebellion" is violative of the doctrine of
separation of powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which
has the constitutional prerogative to "determine or interpret" what took place on May
1, 2001, and that the declaration of a state of rebellion cannot be an exception to the
general rule on the allocation of the governmental powers.
We disagree. To be sure, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution expressly provides
that "[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion…" Thus, we held
in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, (G.R. No. 141284, August 15,
2000):
x x x The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily
quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered
for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not
always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards
that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at
such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain
pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the
courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might
decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature
not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast
intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified
as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of
the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in
emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass
destruction of property. x x x
(at pp.22-23)
The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
exercise of this power. However, this is no longer feasible at this time, Proclamation
No. 38 having been lifted.
G.R. No. 147810
Petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino is not a real party-in-interest. The rule
requires that a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an
injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an
invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial
powers in his behalf (KMU Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 [1994]). Here,
petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the
Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be
threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and
supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of
rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal right has
been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or
infringement.

At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief,
petitioner claiming that its right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly is
affected by the declaration of a "state of rebellion" and that said proclamation is
invalid for being contrary to the Constitution.

However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords little comfort to
petitioner, this Court not having jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition.
Section 5[1], Article VIII of the Constitution limits the original jurisdiction of the Court
to cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. However,

in G.R. No. 147780, 147781, and 147799, respondents, consistent and congruent
with their undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives,
and all persons acting for and in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting
petitioners therein without the required judicial warrant for all acts committed in
relation to or in connection with the may 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175864 June 8, 2007
ANISAH IMPAL SANGCA, petitioner,
vs.
THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF CEBU CITY and THE PRESIDING JUDGE, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 58, Cebu City, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On January 4, 2007, petitioner Anisah Impal Sangca filed the instant petition praying
for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and the release of Lovely Impal Adam who
was detained in the Cebu City Jail for alleged violation of Section 5, Article 2 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The facts are as follows:
In the first week of July 2006, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA),
Regional Office VII, received information that Adam was engaged in illegal drug
trafficking activities in Cebu City and neighboring cities and municipalities. After
evaluating the information, Police Chief Inspector Josefino Ligan, PDEA VII Asst.
Regional Director for Administration/Operation, together with FO1 Rayford A. Yap and
PO2 Dindo M. Tuliao, planned an entrapment operation.
The events leading to the arrest of Adam, as summarized in the Resolution of the
Department of Justice dated November 10, 2006, are as follows:
On July 7, 2006, at about 2:00 P.M., Yap and Tuliao were able to contact the
informant and inquired from him if he was really sincere with his words and
the latter replied affirmatively. Ligan immediately composed a team and
planned for an entrapment operation against respondent and her cohorts. A
short briefing was conducted where Yap was tasked to receive the shabu
while Tuliao would be the back up and at the same time the arresting officer.
They prepared a Pre-Operation Report and the same was coordinated with
the Tactical Operation Center of Cebu City Police Office. The pre-arranged
signal in the operation was that Yap would miscall them once the transaction
is consummated. x x x
On or about 9:30 P.M. of the same day, the team, including Yap, Tuliao and
the informant, proceeded to Fuente Osmeña, Cebu City for the said
purpose. Upon arrival thereat, Yap and the informant proceeded to Pizza
Hut while Tuliao stayed behind near the parking area and so with the
members of the team closely watching them. When Yap and the informant
entered Pizza Hut, respondent was already there waiting for them. They
immediately approached her and the informant introduced Yap to
respondent as his former customer. They had a short conversation and Yap
asked respondent if she has with her the item. Respondent told him that it is
in her car at the parking area. Respondent asked where the money is. Yap
told her no problem as long as she has the item, he will give her the money.
Respondent instructed Yap to go with her at the parking area so that she
could give it to him and there, she got inside her car. She took the shabu
inside the compartment of her Toyota Fortuner with plate number YCX 965
and handed to him one (1) packed medium size of heat sealed transparent
plastic sachet filled with white crystalline substance believed to be shabu.
Upon receiving the said item, Yap pressed it to determine if it was really
shabu or not and when he noticed that it was shabu, he immediately
miscalled the members of the team informing them that the transaction was
consummated and subsequently held respondent. He then introduced
himself as PDEA 7 operative. Tuliao, who was just at the side of the car,
assisted Yap in apprehending the suspect. They also seized her cellular
phone and the Toyota Fortuner which she used in delivering and
transporting illegal drugs. Thereafter, they informed her that she is under
arrest for violation of Section 5, Article II, RA 9165 and likewise apprised her
of the Miranda Doctrine in the language she knew and understood but she
opted to remain silent. After which, they asked her name and she introduced
herself as Lovely Adam y Impal, 29 years old, married, businesswoman and
a resident of Celiron, Iligan City. They brought her along with the confiscated
items to their office for proper disposition. Later on, they found out that the
item that Yap bought from respondent, marked "LA" dated 07-07-06 with
Yap’s signature, weighing 50.27 grams which was submitted before the PNP
Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis, yielded positive results for the
presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu, a dangerous drug.
Respondent denies the charge against her. She claims that she is a trader of
ready to wear clothing. As such, she frequently travels to different Asian
countries to buy goods for sale in Cebu and in Mindanao. She supplies
various boutiques in Cebu City, including Salad Dressing at SM, D. Blaz.,
Beauty Land and Lovely’s Closet. She also operates a beauty parlor in
Talamban.
Respondent claims that on July 7, 2006, at around 10:00 in the evening, she
was at Pizza Hut, Fuente Osmeña Boulevard, together with her four children
and their "yayas". A friend of hers, Ana, had called her earlier in the day
saying that she would pay off her loan to her (respondent) at Pizza Hut that
evening. Ana arrived a short time later. They were eating when Ana received
a call over her cellphone. From the gist of it, Ana was talking to a certain
Rose. Respondent did not mind them because the conversation was only
between Ana and Rose. A short time later, a woman, who was introduced to
her by Ana as a certain Rose, arrived. Ana and Rose then proceeded to talk
with each other, and respondent did not mind them. A while after,
respondent saw Ana hand over a parcel to Rose, and the latter, on the other
hand, hand a green bag to Ana. Rose then left. As respondent was about to
leave, Ana requested that she be allowed to hitch a ride and respondent
agreed. When they were outside, respondent noticed a vehicle blocking her
car, making it impossible for her to back out into the road, without hitting the
car. She then beeped her car. Instead of moving their car, one of the men
went down and thereafter, entered her vehicle and demanded for the bag
that was allegedly given to Ana by Rose. Respondent told them to ask Ana
since they claimed that it was given to Ana. However, the men pointed their
 guns at respondent, including her children, claiming that they were elements
of PDEA and they were placing her under arrest for illegal drug trafficking.
They then grabbed respondent’s green bag and from then on, she was
never able to recover the contents thereof, including the bag itself.
Thereafter, respondent was brought to the PDEA office where a certain
Ryan Rubi was also booked for alleged drug trafficking. During her
conversation with Ryan Rubi, she found out that he was arrested a few
hours earlier likewise by the PDEA, and during his alleged arrest, he was
required to produce a drug trafficker in exchange for his release. Having
been unable to produce any, he was charged. The name of Rose cropped
up, and he said that during his arrest, the police officers informed him that
they were after Rose. His wife was out to raise money for his release, or to
produce a drug trafficker so that he can be released. It was further
ascertained by Ryan Rubi that this Rose was actually arrested by the police
officers but was conditionally released on condition that she would produce
someone who would take her place. Thereafter, he claimed that he
overheard them refer to a certain Ana, who said that she would also produce
respondent to take her place. The circumstances of respondent’s arrest and
that of the said Ryan Rubi are closely intertwined. In the police blotter, the
vehicle pertaining to respondent, which is the Toyota Fortuner was ascribed
to Ryan Rubi, while the latter’s vehicle was ascribed to her. x x x1
The inquest prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case but was disapproved
by the City Prosecutor. Consequently, an information charging Adam with violation of
Section 5, Article 2 of R.A. No. 9165 was filed and docketed as Criminal Case No.
CBU-77562 before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 58.
On petition for review before the Department of Justice, Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez
found no probable cause to hold Adam liable for the offense charged, to wit:
A very thorough and careful scrutiny of the records, particularly the affidavit
of arrest, reveals that no payment was ever made by the police officers for
the supposed object of the buy-bust operations. The police officers have not
even alleged in their affidavits that payment was made to respondent in
exchange for the shabu. No buy-bust money was ever presented. The
certificate of inventory does not show any buy-bust money. These stick out
like a sore thumb in the case at bar.
Suffice it to say that one of the essential elements to be established in the
prosecution of the drug "buy-bust" cases, that is, "the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefore" is wanting. It was aptly said in the case of
People v. Alilin, 206 SCRA 773, that: "To sustain a conviction for selling
prohibited drugs, the same must be clearly and unmistakably established." 2
The Justice Secretary directed the City Prosecutor of Cebu City to withdraw the
information.3 PDEA filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Justice
Secretary on December 8, 2006.4
In his Comment, Judge Gabriel T. Ingles, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 58, stated that at the hearing of the motion to withdraw
information on January 5, 2007, it was found that:
In the affidavit of FO1 Rayford A. Yap and PO2 Dindo M. Tuliao, there is
indeed no mention of their preparation of a buy bust money before, during or
after their briefing prior to the alleged buy bust operation, nor is there any
mention of the price or consideration of the sale. What is merely stated is
that they had enough money.
xxxx
Further convincing this court that there was no buy bust money prepared are
the following:
a) In the "Pre-Operation Report" dated July 7, 2006, bearing
Control Number 07-07-2006-03, there is no mention of the buy-bust
money in the operational requirements;
b) In the "Excerpt From the Records of the PDEA 7 Blotter/Logbook
bearing the same date and entry number 02422;
c) In another "Excerpt From the Records of the PDEA 7
Blotter/Logbook bearing the same date and entry number 02422
there is a mention in "Facts of the Case" the recovery of "3 bundles
of boodle money with two (2) pieces of genuine five hundred peso
bills wrapped with newspaper and packed with packaging tape."
However, while the name of the suspect is indicated in this excerpt
is Lovely Adam y Impal and the evidence enumerated are as
follows:
1) one (1) medium size of heat sealed transparent plastic
sachet filled with crystalline substance believed to be
shabu;
2) one (1) unit Nokia cellphone;
3) one (1) unit Toyota Fortuner with plate number XCX
956 registered under the name of Lovely Adam;"
the narration of the facts of the case in said excerpt also included the
following statement: "Likewise, the apprehending officers seized one (1) unit
cellular phone (Sony Erickson) and the Mitsubishi Lancer with plate number
GHC color black registered under the name of Roberto Rubi, which was
used by the aforementioned suspects in transporting illegal drugs."
 This Roberto Rubi could not have been arrested together with accused
herein because there is no mention of such fact in the Affidavit of Officers
Yap and Tuliao.

In fact, the head of the arresting team of herein accused Josefino D. Liga[n]
filed a Motion to Withdraw Said Excerpt because there was an inadvertent
interchange of facts in another case obviously against Mr. Rubi.

The problem, however, is that from the Excerpts presented, it is not clear to
this court to which case the mention of boodle money applies. This court
cannot merely assume or conclude that the boodle money has reference to
the case of herein accused because as stated, nowhere in the separate
affidavits of office[r]s Tuliao and Yap can one find any mention of such. It is
not even mentioned in the other "Excerpt" also dated July 10, 2006 also
submitted by the PDEA.5

Finding that Adam could not be held liable for the crime charged, Judge Ingles issued
an Order on January 26, 2007 granting the Motion to Withdraw Information and
ordering the release of the accused, unless otherwise held for another valid ground.
The dispositive portion of the Order reads:

Accordingly, the "Motion to Withdraw Information" is hereby GRANTED and

the accused is ordered immediately released unless another valid ground
exists for her continued detention.

The prosecution and/or PDEA are/is ordered to turn over to this court within
three (3) days from receipt hereof the dangerous drug described in the
information which shall in turn be confiscated in favor of the state for proper
disposition unless the prosecution intends to refile or file another case
against the accused which it deems appropriate as double jeopardy has not
attached.

SO ORDERED.6

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in

which any person is deprived of his liberty, or in which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled to it. Its essential object and purpose is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from it if such
restraint is illegal. The singular function of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect
and secure the basic freedom of physical liberty.7

In the instant case, records show that Adam has been released upon order of the trial
judge on January 26, 2007. Therefore, the petition has become moot.8

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160739 July 17, 2013
ANITA MANGILA, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN, ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR II LUCIA
JUDY SOLINAP, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (DIRECTOR
REYNALDO WYCOCO), Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Restraint that is lawful and pursuant to a court process cannot be inquired into
through habeas corpus.
Antecedents
On June 16, 2003, seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila and
four others with syndicated estafa in violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689, and with violations of Section 7(b)
of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) were
filed in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities in Puerto Princesa City (MTCC), docketed
as Criminal Cases No. 16916 to No. 16922. The complaints arose from the recruiting
and promising of employment by Mangila and the others to the private complainants
as overseas contract workers in Toronto, Canada, and from the collection of visa
processing fees, membership fees and on-line application the private complainants
without lawful authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA).1
On the following day, June 17, 2003, Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan, Presiding Judge
of the MTCC, conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints. After
examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued
a warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts without bail. 2 On the next day, the
entire records of the cases, including the warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the
City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City for further proceedings and appropriate action
in accordance with the prevailing rules.3
As a consequence, Mangila was arrested on June 18, 2003 and detained at the
headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). 4
Claiming that Judge Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation; that the preliminary investigation he conducted was not yet completed
when he issued the warrant of arrest; and that the issuance of the warrant of arrest
was without sufficient justification or without a prior finding of probable cause, Mangila
filed in the Court of Appeals (CA)a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her release
from detention. Her petition averred that the remedy of habeas corpus was available
to her because she could no longer file a motion to quash or a motion to recall the
warrant of arrest considering that Judge Pangilinan had already forwarded the entire
records of the case to the City Prosecutor who had no authority to lift or recall the
warrant.5
In its resolution promulgated on October 14, 2003,6 the CA denied the petition for
habeas corpus for its lack of merit, explaining:
As a general rule, a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted where relief may be had
or could have been procured by resort to another general remedy. As pointed out in
Luna vs. Plaza, if petitioner is detained by virtue of a warrant of arrest, which is
allegedly invalid, the remedy available to her is not a petition for habeas corpus but a
petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a petition for a reinvestigation of the case by
the Municipal Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal.
Section 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the
Municipal Judge who conducted the preliminary investigation shall transmit his
resolution, together with the record of the case, including the warrant of arrest, to the
Provincial Prosecutor, who shall review the same and order the release of an
accused who is detained if no probable cause is found against him. Thus, the proper
remedy available to petitioner is for her to file with the Provincial Prosecutor a motion
to be released from detention on the grounds alleged in the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.7
Mangila moved for the reconsideration of the denial of her petition for habeas
corpus,8 but the CA denied the motion on November 19, 2003.9
Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to obtain the
release of Mangila from detention?
Ruling of the Court
The petition for review lacks merit.
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a speedy and
effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. In Caballes v. Court of
Appeals,10 the Court discoursed on the nature of the special proceeding of habeas
corpus in the following manner:
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding
governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended. In Ex Parte Billings, it was
held that habeas corpus is that of a civil proceeding in character. It seeks the
enforcement of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of
which the complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act and
the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies
even when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and secure freedom. When a
prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit and
prosecutes a case in that court.
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the
trial court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The
writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised
relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is
addressed to the question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for
any reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for
other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of exceptional
circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial.
The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before
resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances are extant. In another case, it
was held that habeas corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a means of
reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving the questions of jurisdiction
occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional
safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed. It has
also been held that where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and
irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by
habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal.
Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when
instituted for the sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the
judge in order that the cause of his detention may be inquired into and his statements
final. The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but
upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence,
the only parties before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding
the petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved is whether the
custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied
if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias.
A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a "palladium of liberty," is a prerogative
writ which does not issue as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court
or judge. It is, however, a writ of right on proper formalities being made by proof.
Resort to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which a complaint is made
but unto the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act, and the immediate purpose to be
served is relief from illegal restraint. The primary, if not the only object of the writ of
habeas corpus ad subjuciendum, is to determine the legality of the restraint under
which a person is held.11 (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention,
and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee.
Equally well-settled however, is that the writ will not issue where the person in whose
behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record.12
There is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged against Mangila
and her cohorts on June 16, 2003,Judge Pangilinan, as the Presiding Judge of the
MTCC, was empowered to conduct preliminary investigations involving "all crimes
cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions." His authority
was expressly provided in Section 2, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
Section 2.Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations.
– The following may conduct preliminary investigations:
(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;
(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.
Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall include all crimes
cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions. (2a)
Under Section 6(b) of Rule 112of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
investigating judge could issue a warrant of arrest during the preliminary investigation
even without awaiting its conclusion should he find after an examination in writing and
under oath of the complainant and the witnesses in the form of searching questions
and answers that a probable cause existed, and that there was a necessity of placing
the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice.1âwphi1 In the context of this rule, Judge Pangilinan issued the warrant of
arrest against Mangila and her cohorts. Consequently, the CA properly denied
Mangila’s petition for habeas corpus because she had been arrested and detained by
virtue of the warrant issued for her arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial officer
undeniably possessing the legal authority to do so.
It is relevant to point out at this juncture that the authority of the MTC and MTCC
judges to conduct preliminary investigations was removed only effective on October
3, 2005 pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC.
With Mangila’s arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order lawfully
issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy
to relieve her from the restraint on her liberty. This is because the restraint, being
lawful and pursuant to a court process, could not be inquired into through habeas
corpus. To quote the dictum enunciated by Justice Malcolm in Quintos v. Director of
Prisons:13
The writ of habeas corpus secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his
detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have ascertained if
he is held under lawful authority. The function of habeas corpus, where the party who
has appealed to its aid is in custody under process, does not extend beyond an
inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court by which it was issued and the validity of the
process upon its face. It is not a writ of error. xxx (Bold underscoring supplied for
emphasis)
Accordingly, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court explicitly states:
Section 4.When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule
be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an
offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
of the detainee if no probable cause should beultimately found against her. In the
context of the rule, Mangila had no need to seek the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus to secure her release from detention. Her proper recourse was to bring the
supposed irregularities attending the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the
issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the attention of the City Prosecutor, who had
been meanwhile given the most direct access to the entire records of the case,
including the warrant of arrest, following Judge Pangilinan’s transmittal of them to the
City Prosecutor for appropriate action.17 We agree with the CA, therefore, that the writ
of habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for another available remedy.18
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on October 14, 2003
and November 19, 2003 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 79745; and ORDERS the petitioner to
pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Still, Mangila harps on the procedural flaws supposedly committed by Judge

Pangilinan in her attempt to convince the Court on her entitlement to the issuance of
the writ of habeas corpus. She insists that the illegality and invalidity of the warrant of
arrest because of its having been issued without an exhaustive examination of the
complainants and the witnesses in writing and under oath; without a prior finding of
probable cause; and without consideration of the necessity for its issuance in order
not to frustrate the ends of justice were enough reasons for granting the writ of
habeas corpus.14

Mangila fails to persuade.

To begin with, Judge Pangilinan issued the order of arrest after examining Palayon,
one of the complainants against Mangila and her cohorts. If he, as the investigating
judge, considered Palayon’s evidence sufficient for finding probable cause against
her and her cohorts, which finding the Court justifiably presumes from his act of
referring the case and its records to the Office of the City Prosecutor on the day
immediately following the preliminary investigation he conducted, her petition for
habeas corpus could not be the proper remedy by which she could assail the
adequacy of the adverse finding. Even granting that there was a failure to adhere to
the law or rule, such failure would not be the equivalent of a violation of her
constitutional rights.15

Secondly, it was not procedurally correct for her to impugn the issuance of the
warrant of arrest by hinting that the investigating judge did not at all consider the
necessity of determining the existence of probable cause for its issuance due to time
constraints and in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, for that consideration was
presumed.

And, lastly, it was clear that under Section 5,16 Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the resolution of the investigating judge was not final but was still
subject to the review by the public prosecutor who had the power to order the release
G.R. No. 210636 July 28, 2014
MA. HAZELINA A. TUJANMILITANTE IN BEHALF OF THE MINOR CRISELDA M.
CADA, Petitioner,
vs.
RAQUEL M. CADA-DEAPERA, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
with prayer for injunctive relief seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision1 dated May 17, 2013 as well as its Resolution dated December 27, 2013 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 123759. In the main, petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 130 in Caloocan City (RTC-Caloocan) to hear and
decide a special civil action for habeas corpus in relation to the custody of a minor
residing in Quezon City.
The Facts
On March 24, 2011, respondent Raquel M. Cada-Deapera filed before the R TC-
Caloocan a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus, docketed as Special Civil
Action Case No. C-4344. In the said petition, respondent demanded the immediate
issuance of the special writ, directing petitioner Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante to
produce before the court respondent's biological daughter, minor Criselda M. Cada
(Criselda), and to return to her the custody over the child. Additionally, respondent
indicated that petitioner has three (3) known addresses where she can be served with
summons and other court processes, to wit: (1) 24 Bangkal St., Amparo Village,
Novaliches, Caloocan City; (2) 118B K9Street, Kamias, Quezon City; and (3) her
office at the Ombudsman-Office of the Special Prosecutor, 5th Floor, Sandiganbayan,
Centennial Building, Commonwealth Avenue cor. Batasan Road, Quezon City.2
The next day, on March 25, 2011, the RTC-Caloocan issued a writ of habeas corpus,
ordering petitioner to bring the child to court on March 28, 2011. Despite diligent
efforts and several attempts, however, the Sheriff was unsuccessful in personally
serving petitioner copies of the habeas corpus petition and of the writ. Instead, on
March 29, 2011, the Sheriff left copies of the court processes at petitioner’s Caloocan
residence, as witnessed by respondent’s counsel and barangay
officials.3 Nevertheless, petitioner failed to appear at the scheduled hearings before
the RTC-Caloocan.
Meanwhile, on March 31, 2011, petitioner filed a Petition for Guardianship over the
person of Criselda before the RTC, Branch 89 in Quezon City (RTC-Quezon City).
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition for guardianship on the ground of
litis pendentia, among others. Thereafter, or on June 3, 2011, respondent filed a
criminal case for kidnapping before the Office of the City Prosecutor – Quezon City
against petitioner and her counsel.
On July 12, 2011, the RTC-Quezon City granted respondent’s motion and dismissed
the guardianship case due to the pendency of the habeas corpuspetition before RTC-
Caloocan.4
The falloof the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,the subject motion is hereby
GRANTED.Accordingly, the case is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.5
Then, on August 4, 2011, Raquel moved for the ex parte issuance of an alias writ of
habeas corpus before the RTC-Caloocan, which was granted by the trial court on
August 8, 2011. On even date, the court directed the Sheriff to serve the alias writ
upon petitioner at the Office of the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City on
August 10, 2011.6 In compliance, the Sheriff served petitioner the August 8, 2011
Order as well as the Alias Writ during the preliminary investigation of the kidnapping
case.7
Following this development, petitioner, by way of special appearance, moved for the
quashal of the writ and prayed before the RTC Caloocan for the dismissal of the
habeas corpus petition,8 claiming, among others, that she was not personally served
with summons. Thus, as argued by petitioner, jurisdiction over her and
Criselda’sperson was not acquired by the RTCCaloocan.
Ruling of the Trial Court
On January 20, 2012, the RTC-Caloocan issued an Order denying petitioner’s
omnibus motion, citing Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz,9 where the Court held that a writ of
habeas corpus, being an extraordinary process requiring immediate proceeding and
action, plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons in ordinary civil actions, in
that, by service of said writ, the Court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent, as petitioner herein.10
Moreover, personal service, the RTC said, does not necessarily require that service
be made exclusively at petitioner’s given address, for service may be made
elsewhere or wherever she may be found for as long as she was handed a copy of
the court process in person by anyone authorized by law. Since the sheriff was able
to personally serve petitioner a copy of the writ, albeit in Quezon City, the RTC-
Caloocan validly acquired jurisdiction over her person. 11 The dispositive portion of the
Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Very Urgent Motion (Motion to Quash Alias
Writ; Motion to Dismiss)filed by respondent Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante dated
August 11, 2011 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
In the meantime, respondent Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante is hereby directed to
appear and bring Criselda Martinez Cada before this Court on February 10, 2012 at
8:30 o’clock in the morning.
SO ORDERED.12
Aggrieved, petitioner, via certiorari to the CA, assailed the issued Order.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Over a year later, the CA, in the challenged Decision dated May 17,
2013,13 dismissed the petition for certiorari in the following wise:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
Regional Trial Court, Branch 130 of Caloocan City is DIRECTED to proceed with due
dispatch in Spec. Proc. Case No. C-4344 for Habeas Corpus, giving utmost
consideration tothe best interest of the now nearly 14-year old child.
SO ORDERED.14
In so ruling, the CA held that jurisdiction was properly laid when respondent filed the
habeas corpus petition before the designated Family Court in Caloocan City. 15 It also
relied on the certification issued by the punong barangay of Brgy. 179, Caloocan City,
stating that petitioner is a bona fide resident thereof, as well as the medical certificate
issued by Criselda’s doctor on April 1, 2011, indicating that her address is "Amparo
Village, KC."16 Anent the RTC-Caloocan’s jurisdiction, the appellate court ruled that
service of summons is not required under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC,
otherwise known as the Rules on Custody of Minors and Habeas Corpus in Relation
to Custody of Minors. According tothe CA, the rules on summons contemplated in
ordinary civil actions have no place in petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, it being a special proceeding.17
Petitioner sought reconsideration ofthe above Decision but the same was denied by
the CA in its December 27, 2013 Resolution.1âwphi1
Hence, this Petition.
The Issues
At the core of this controversy isthe issue of whether or not the RTC Caloocan has
jurisdiction over the habeascorpus petition filed by respondent and, assuming
arguendo it does, whether or not it validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and the
person of Criselda. Likewise pivotal is the enforce ability of the writ issued by RTC-
Caloocan in Quezon City where petitioner was served a copy thereof.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit. The RTC-Caloocan correctly took cognizance of the habeas
corpus petition. Subsequently, it acquired jurisdiction over petitioner when the latter
was served with a copy of the writ in Quezon City.
The RTC-Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus proceeding
Arguing that the RTC-Caloocan lacked jurisdiction over the case, petitioner relies on
Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and maintains that the habeas corpus petition
should have been filed before the family court that has jurisdiction over her place of
residence or that of the minor or wherever the minor may be found.18 As to
respondent, she asserts, among others, that the applicable rule is not Section 3 but
Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC.19
We find for respondent.
In the case at bar, what respondent filed was a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and Rule 102 of the Rules
of Court.20 As provided:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ of habeas
corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall
beenforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
However, the petition may be filed with the regular court in the absence of the
presiding judge of the Family Court, provided, however, that the regular court shall
refer the case tothe Family Court as soon as its presiding judge returns to duty.
The petition may also be filed with the appropriate regular courts in places where
there are no Family Courts.
The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be enforceable in the
judicial region where they belong.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with
any of its members and, if so granted,the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular
court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found
for hearing and decision on the merits.
Upon return of the writ, the court shall decide the issue on custody of minors. The
appellate court, or the member thereof, issuing the writ shall be furnished a copy of
the decision. (emphasis added)
Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region, petitions for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they be filed under Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court orpursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may therefore be
filed withany of the proper RTCs within the judicial region where enforcement thereof
is sought.21
On this point, Section 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129), otherwise known as SO ORDERED.
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, finds relevance. Said provision, which
contains the enumeration of judicial regions in the country, states:

Section 13. Creation of Regional Trial Courts. – There are hereby created thirteen
Regional Trial Courts, one for each of the following judicial regions:

xxxx

The National Capital Judicial Region, consisting of the cities of Manila, Quezon,
Pasay, Caloocan and Mandaluyong, and the municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San
Juan, Makati, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa,
and Valenzuela. (emphasis ours)

In view of the afore-quoted provision,it is indubitable that the filing of a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before a family court in any of the cities
enumerated is proper as long as the writ is sought to be enforced within the National
Capital Judicial Region, as here.

In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan
City. Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region,
the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City.
Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is immaterial in view of the above
rule.

Anent petitioner’s insistence on the application of Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC,

a plain reading of said provision reveals that the provision invoked only applies to
petitions for custody of minors, and not to habeas corpus petitions. Thus:

Section 3. Where to file petition.- The petition for custody of minors shall be filed with
the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner resides or where the
minormay be found. (emphasis added)

Lastly, as regards petitioner’s assertion that the summons was improperly served,
suffice it to state thatservice of summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas
corpus petition, be it under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC.
As held in Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable
to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. 22

In view of the foregoing, We need not belabor the other issues raised.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
May 1 7, 2013 and its Resolution dated December 27, 2013 are AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.
 G.R. No. 197597, April 08, 2015
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, DATUKAN MALANG
SALIBO, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX, BJMP
BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA, TAGUIG CITY AND ALL OTHER
PERSONS ACTING ON HIS BEHALF AND/OR HAVING CUSTODY OF
DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to
mistaken identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful
process and is continuously being illegally detained.
This is a Petition for Review1 on Certiorari of the Court of Appeals
Decision2 reversing the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153,
Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice) granting Datukan Malang Salibo's
Petition for Habeas Corpus.
From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo
(Salibo) and other Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj
Pilgrimage.4 "While in Saudi Arabia, . . . Salibo visited and prayed in the
cities of Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah."5 He returned to the
Philippines on December 20, 2009.6
On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police
Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang.7
Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for
allegedly participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre.
He had a pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in People of
the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.8
Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police
Station to clear his name. There, he explained that he was not Butukan S.
Malang and that he could not have participated in the November 23, 2009
Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time.9
To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the police "pertinent
portions of his passport, boarding passes and other documents"10 tending
to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from
November 7 to December 19, 2009.11
The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him
because he was not Butukan S. Malang.12
Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off
page two of his passport that evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia on
November 7, 2009. They then detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police
Station for about three (3) days.13
The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group in Cotabato City, where he was detained for another 10
days. While in Cotabato City, the Criminal Investigation and Detention
Group allegedly made him sign and affix his thumbprint on documents.14
On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail
Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong
Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently detained.15
On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the
Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus16questioning the legality of his detention
and deprivation of his liberty.17 He maintained that he is not the accused
Butukan S. Malang.18
In the Resolution19 dated September 21, 2010, the Court of Appeals issued
a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making the Writ returnable to the Second Vice
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of
Justice).20 The Court of Appeals ordered the Warden of the Quezon City
Jail Annex to file a Return of the Writ one day before the scheduled
hearing and produce the person of Salibo at the 10:00 a.m. hearing set on
September 27, 2010.21
Proceedings before the trial court
On September 27, 2010, the jail guards of the Quezon City Jail Annex
brought Salibo before the trial court. The Warden, however, failed to file a
Return one day before the hearing. He also appeared without counsel
during the hearing.22
Thus, the trial court canceled the hearing and reset it to September 29,
2010 at 2:00 p.m.23
On September 28, 2010, the Warden filed the Return of the Writ.
However, during the September 29, 2010 hearing on the Return, the
Warden appeared with Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr., Legal
Officer/Administering Officer of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology.24
Salibo questioned the appearance of Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr. on behalf
of the Warden and argued that only the Office of the Solicitor General has
the authority to appear on behalf of a respondent in a habeas corpus
proceeding.25
The September 29, 2010 hearing, therefore, was canceled. The trial court
reset the hearing on the Return to October 1, 2010 at 9:00 a.m.26
The Return was finally heard on October 1, 2010. Assistant Solicitors Noel
Salo and Isar Pepito appeared on behalf of the Warden of the Quezon City
Jail Annex and argued that Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus should be
dismissed. Since Salibo was charged under a valid Information and
Warrant of Arrest, a petition for habeas corpus was "no longer availing."27
Salibo countered that the Information, Amended Information, Warrant of
Arrest, and Alias Warrant of Arrest referred to by the Warden all point to
Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, as accused. Reiterating
that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he was in Saudi Arabia on the
day of the Maguindanao Massacre, Salibo pleaded the trial court to order
his release from detention.28
The trial court found that Salibo was not "judicially charged"29 under any
resolution, information, or amended information. The Resolution,
Information, and Amended Information presented in court did not charge
Datukan Malang Salibo as an accused. He was also not validly arrested as
there was no Warrant of Arrest or Alias Warrant of Arrest against Datukan
Malang Salibo. Salibo, the trial court ruled, was not restrained of his liberty
under process issued by a court.30
The trial court was likewise convinced that Salibo was not the Butukan S.
Malang charged with murder in connection with the Maguindanao
Massacre. The National Bureau of Investigation Clearance dated August
27, 2009 showed that Salibo has not been charged of any crime as of the
date of the certificate.31 A Philippine passport bearing Salibo's picture
showed the name "Datukan Malang Salibo."32
Moreover, the trial court said that Salibo "established that [he] was out of
the country"33 from November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009. This fact
was supported by a Certification34 from Saudi Arabian Airlines confirming
Salibo's departure from and arrival in Manila on board its flights.35 A Flight
Manifest issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Saudi Arabian Airlines
Ticket No. 0652113 also showed this fact.36
Thus, in the Decision dated October 29, 2010, the trial court granted
Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered his immediate release
from detention.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
On appeal37 by the Warden, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and
set aside the trial court's Decision.38 Through its Decision dated April 19,
2011, the Court of Appeals dismissed Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Contrary to the trial court's finding, the Court of Appeals found that
Salibo's arrest and subsequent detention were made under a valid
Information and Warrant of Arrest.39 Even assuming that Salibo was not
the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, the Court of
Appeals said that "[t]he orderly course of trial must be pursued and the
usual remedies exhausted before the writ [of habeas corpus] may be
invoked[.]"40 According to the Court of Appeals, Salibo's proper remedy
was a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.41
Salibo filed a Motion for Reconsideration,42 which the Court of Appeals
denied in the Resolution43 dated July 6, 2011.
Proceedings before this court
On July 28, 2011,44 petitioner Salibo filed before this court the Petition for
Review (With Urgent Application for a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction). Respondent Warden filed a Comment,45 after which
petitioner Salibo filed a Reply.46
Petitioner Salibo maintains that he is not the Butukan S. Malang charged
with 57 counts of murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221,
Quezon City. Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals' finding, he, Datukan
Malang Salibo, was not duly charged in court. He is being illegally deprived
of his liberty and, therefore, his proper remedy is a Petition for Habeas
Corpus.47
Petitioner Salibo adds that respondent Warden erred in appealing the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City before the
Court of Appeals. Although the Court of Appeals delegated to the trial
court the authority to hear respondent Warden on the Return, the trial
court's Decision should be deemed a Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Therefore, respondent Warden should have directly filed his appeal before
this court.48
As for respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo was duly
charged in court. Even assuming that he is not the Butukan S. Malang
named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, petitioner Salibo should have
pursued the ordinary remedy of a Motion to Quash Information, not a
Petition for Habeas Corpus.49
The issues for our resolution are:
First, whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig
City on petitioner Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to
the Court of Appeals; and Second, whether petitioner Salibo's proper
remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

We grant the Petition.cralawlawlibrary
I
Contrary to petitioner Salibo's claim, respondent Warden correctly
appealed before the Court of Appeals.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition
filed before this court or any of its members,50 the Court of Appeals or any
of its members in instances authorized by law,51 or the Regional Trial
Court or any of its presiding judges.52 The court or judge grants the writ
and requires the officer or person having custody of the person allegedly
restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ.53A hearing on the return of
the writ is then conducted.54
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which
issued the writ.55 Should the court issuing the writ designate a lower court
to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall proceed to
decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the
lower court "acquire[s] the power and authority to determine the merits of
the [petition for habeas corpus.]"56 Therefore, the decision on the petition
is a decision appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over
decisions of the lower court.57
In Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, etc,58 "a petition for habeas corpus was filed
before this Court . . . [o]n behalf of. . . Alfredo B. Saulo [(Saulo)]."59 This
court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered respondent
Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary to file a Return of the
Writ. This court made the Writ returnable to the Court of First Instance of
Manila.60
After hearing the Commanding General on the Return, the Court of First
Instance denied Saulo's Petition for Habeas Corpus.61
Saulo appealed before this court, arguing that the Court of First Instance
heard the Petition for Habeas Corpus "not by virtue of its original
jurisdiction but merely delegation[.]"62 Consequently, "this Court should
have the final say regarding the issues raised in the petition, and only [this
court's decision] . . . should be regarded as operative."63
This court rejected Sciulo's argument and stated that his "logic is more
apparent than real."64 It ruled that when a superior court issues a writ of
habeas corpus, the superior court only resolves whether the respondent
should be ordered to show cause why the petitioner or the person in
whose behalf the petition was filed was being detained or deprived of his
or her liberty.65 However, once the superior court makes the writ
returnable to a lower court as allowed by the Rules of Court, the lower
court designated "does not thereby become merely a recommendatory
body, whose findings and conclusion[s] are devoid of effect[.]"66 The
decision on the petition for habeas corpus is a decision of the lower court,
not of the superior court.
In Medina v. Gen. Yan,67 Fortunato Medina (Medina) filed before this court
a Petition for Habeas Corpus. This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus,
making it returnable to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City.
After trial on the merits, the Court of First Instance granted Medina's
Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered that Medina be released from
detention.68
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court
of Appeals.69
Atty. Amelito Mutuc, counsel for Medina, filed before the Court of Appeals
a "Motion for Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court." The Court of
Appeals, however, denied the Motion.70
This court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the "Motion for
Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court," citing Saulo as legal
basis.71 The Court of First Instance of Rizal, in deciding Medina's Petition
for Habeas Corpus, "acquired the power and authority to determine the
merits of the case[.]"72Consequently, the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal on Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to
the Court of Appeals.73
In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus before
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas
Corpus, making it returnable to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig
City. The trial court then heard respondent Warden on his Return and
decided the Petition on the merits.
Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial court "acquired the
power and authority to determine the merits"74 of petitioner Salibo's
Petition. The decision on the Petition for Habeas Corpus, therefore, was
the decision of the trial court, not of the Court of Appeals. Since the Court
of Appeals is the court with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of trial
courts,75 respondent Warden correctly filed the appeal before the Court of
Appeals.cralawlawlibrary
II
Called the "great writ of liberty[,]"76 the writ of habeas corpus "was
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom."77 The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary78 and
summary79 in nature, consistent with the law's "zealous regard for
personal liberty."80
Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus
"shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."81 The primary
purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal."82 "Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient."83
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so
as to entitle a person to the efficient remedy of habeas corpus. It may be
availed of as a post-conviction remedy84 or when there is an alleged
violation of the liberty of abode.85 In other words, habeas corpus
effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally
protected in the right to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution.86 Habeas corpus being a remedy for a constitutional right,
courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny so that
the substantive right to liberty will not be further curtailed in the labyrinth
of other processes.87
In Gumabon, et al. v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,88 Mario Gumabon
(Gumabon), Bias Bagolbagol (Bagolbagol), Gaudencio Agapito (Agapito),
Epifanio Padua (Padua), and Paterno Palmares (Palmares) were convicted
of the complex crime of rebellion with murder. They commenced serving
their respective sentences of reclusion perpetua.89
While Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares were serving
their sentences, this court promulgated People v. Hernandez90 in 1956,
ruling that the complex crime of rebellion with murder does not exist.91
Based on the Hernandez ruling, Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua,
and Palmares filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus. They prayed for their
release from incarceration and argued that the Hernandez doctrine must
retroactively apply to them.92
This court ruled that Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares
properly availed of a petition for habeas corpus.93 Citing Harris v.
Nelson,94 this court said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[T]he writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action.
. . . The scope and flexibility of the writ — its capacity to reach all manner
of illegal detention — its ability to cut through barriers of form and
procedural mazes — have always been emphasized and jealously guarded
by courts and lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be
administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that
miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and
corrected.95cralawlawlibrary
In Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro,96 the Provincial Board of Mindoro
issued Resolution No. 25, Series of 1917. The Resolution ordered the
Mangyans removed from their native habitat and compelled them to
permanently settle in an 800-hectare reservation in Tigbao. Under the
Resolution, Mangyans who refused to establish themselves in the Tigbao
reservation were imprisoned.97
An application for habeas corpus was filed before this court on behalf of
Rubi and all the other Mangyans being held in the reservation.98 Since the
application questioned the legality of deprivation of liberty of Rubi and the
other Mangyans, this court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered
the Provincial Board of Mindoro to make a Return of the Writ.99
A Writ of Habeas Corpus was likewise issued in Villavicencio v.
Lukban.100 "[T]o exterminate vice,"101Mayor Justo Lukban of Manila
ordered the brothels in Manila closed. The female sex workers previously
employed by these brothels were rounded up and placed in ships bound
for Davao. The women were expelled from Manila and deported to Davao
without their consent.102
On application by relatives and friends of some of the deported women,
this court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered Mayor Justo
Lukban, among others, to make a Return of the Writ. Mayor Justo Lukban,
however, failed to make a Return, arguing that he did not have custody of
the women.103
This court cited Mayor Justo Lukban in contempt of court for failure to
make a Return of the Writ.104 As to the legality of his acts, this court ruled
that Mayor Justo Lukban illegally deprived the women he had deported to
Davao of their liberty, specifically, of their privilege of domicile.105 It said
that the women, "despite their being in a sense lepers of society[,] are
nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same
constitutional guaranties as are other citizens[.]"106 The women had the
right "to change their domicile from Manila to another locality."107
The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the
petition for the issuance of the writ. It is the writ that commands the
production of the body of the person allegedly restrained of his or her
liberty. On the other hand, it is in the final decision where a court
determines the legality of the restraint.
Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition for
its issuance, it is the issuance of the writ that is essential. The issuance of
the writ sets in motion the speedy judicial inquiry on the legality of any
deprivation of liberty. Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas corpus
even if the petition for its issuance "on [its] face [is] devoid of
merit[.]"108 Although the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be
suspended in cases of invasion, rebellion, or when the public safety
requires it,109 the writ itself may not be suspended.110
III

It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the
person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or
order of the court.111 The restraint then has become legal,112 and the
remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic.113 Rule 102,
Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment
or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall
not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the
person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in
the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an
offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment.
In Ilagan v. Hon. Ponce Enrile,114 elements of the Philippine Constabulary-
Integrated National Police arrested Atty. Laurente C. Ilagan (Atty. Ilagan)
by virtue of a Mission Order allegedly issued by then Minister of National
Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile (Minister Enrile). On the day of Atty. Ilagan's
arrest,115from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Davao Chapter visited
Atty. Ilagan in Camp Catitipan, where he was detained.115
Among Atty. Ilagan's visitors was Atty. Antonio Arellano (Atty. Arellano).
Atty. Arellano, however, no longer left Camp Catitipan as the military
detained and arrested him based on an unsigned Mission Order.116
Three (3) days after the arrest of Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, the military
informed the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Davao Chapter of the
impending arrest of Atty. Marcos Risonar (Atty. Risonar). To verify his
arrest papers, Atty. Risonar went to Camp Catitipan. Like Atty. Arellano,
the military did not allow Atty. Risonar to leave. He was arrested based on
a Mission Order signed by General Echavarria, Regional Unified
Commander.117
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group,
and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism
filed before this court a Petition for Habeas Corpus in behalf of Attys.
Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar.118
This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and required Minister Enrile,
Armed Forces of the Philippines Acting Chief of Staff Lieutenant General
Fidel V. Ramos (General Ramos), and Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
National Police Regional Commander Brigadier General Dionisio Tan-Gatue
(General Tan-Gatue) to make a Return of the Writ.119 This court set the
hearing on the Return on May 23, 1985.120
In their Return, Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-Gatue
contended that the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was suspended
as to Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar by virtue of Proclamation No.
2045-A.121 The lawyers, according to respondents, allegedly "played active
roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines
and the National Democratic Front."122
After hearing respondents on their Return, this court ordered the
temporary release of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar on the
recognizance of their counsels, retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
and retired Associate Justice Jose B.L. Reyes.123
Instead of releasing Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar, however, Minister
Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-Gatue filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.124 They filed an Urgent Manifestation/Motion stating that
Informations for rebellion were filed against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and
Risonar. They prayed that this court dismiss the Petition for Habeas
Corpus for being moot and academic.125
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group,
and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism
opposed the motion. According to them, no preliminary investigation was
conducted before the filing of the Information. Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and
Risonar were deprived of their right to due process. Consequently, the
Information was void.126
This court dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus, ruling that it became
moot and academic with the filing of the Information against Attys. Ilagan,
Arellano, and Risonar in court:127ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been rendered moot
and academic by virtue of the filing of an Information against them for
Rebellion, a capital offense, before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City
and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them. The function of the
special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's
detention. Now that the detained attorneys' incarceration is by virtue of a
judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against them
before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, the remedy of habeas
corpus no longer lies. The Writ had served its purpose.128 (Citations
omitted)
This court likewise dismissed the Petitions for habeas corpus in Umil v.
Ramos.129 Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, Renato Villanueva, Amelia Roque,
Wilfredo Buenaobra, Atty. Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, Vicky A.
Ocaya, Deogracias Espiritu, and Narciso B. Nazareno were all arrested
without a warrant for their alleged membership in the Communist Party of
the Philippines/New People's Army.130
During the pendency of the habeas corpus proceedings, however,
Informations against them were filed before this court. The filing of the
Informations, according to this court, rendered the Petitions for habeas
corpus moot and academic, thus:131ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges
have been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is,
that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if such
person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be
allowed.132 (Emphasis in the original)
In such cases, instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary remedy
of a petition for habeas corpus, persons restrained under a lawful process
or order of the court must pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust
the usual remedies.133 This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash
the information or the warrant of arrest.134
At any time before a plea is entered,135 the accused may file a motion to
quash complaint or information based on any of the grounds enumerated
in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 3. Grounds.—The accused may move to quash the complaint or
information on any of the following grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of
the accused;.
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single
punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal
excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
In filing a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of a criminal
complaint or information filed against him [or her] for insufficiency on its
face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the
information."136 If the accused avails himself or herself of a motion to
quash, the accused "hypothetical[ly] admits the facts alleged in the
information."137 "Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic from the
information are not to be considered."138ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or
information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order [the]
amendment [of the complaint or information]."139 If the motion to quash is
based on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint or information
do not constitute an offense, the trial court shall give the prosecution "an
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment."140 If after amendment,
the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect, the trial
court shall quash the complaint or information.141
IV
However, Ilagan142 and Umil do not apply to this case. Petitioner Salibo
was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense. He
was not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was
illegally deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of
a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 221, Quezon City in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal
Ampatuan, Jr., et al. charged and accused Butukan S. Malang, not
Datukan Malang Salibo, of 57 counts of murder in connection with the
Maguindanao Massacre.
Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant.
Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court enumerates the instances when a
warrantless arrest may be made:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause
to believe based on- personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112.
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu
Hofer Police Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the
accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of
the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing
nor attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal
knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo
was also not an escapee prisoner.
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner
Salibo without a warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without
due process of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued.
The arrest of petitioner Salibo is similar to the arrest of Atty. Risonar in the
"disturbing"143 case of Ilagan.144 Like petitioner Salibo, Atty. Risonar went
to Camp Catitipan to verify and contest any arrest papers against him.
Then and there, Atty. Risonar was arrested without a warrant. In his
dissenting opinion in Ilagan,145 Justice Claudio Teehankee stated that the
lack of preliminary investigation deprived Atty. Risonar, together with
Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, of his right to due process of law — a ground
for the grant of a petition for habeas corpus:146
The majority decision holds that the filing of the information without
preliminary investigation falls within the exceptions of Rule 112, sec. 7 and
Rule 113, sec. 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Again, this is
erroneous premise. The fiscal misinvoked and misapplied the cited
rules. The petitioners are not persons "lawfully arrested without a
warrant." The fiscal could not rely on the stale and inoperative PDA of
January 25, 1985. Otherwise, the rules would be rendered nugatory, if all
that was needed was to get a PDA and then serve it at one's whim and
caprice when the very issuance of the PDA is premised on its imperative
urgency and necessity as declared by the President himself. The majority
decision then relies on Rule 113, Sec. 5 which authorizes arrests without
warrant by a citizen or by a police officer who witnessed the arrestee in
flagrante delicto, viz. in the act of committing the offense. Quite obviously,
the arrest was not a citizen's arrest nor were they caught in flagrante
delicto violating the law. In fact, this Court in promulgating the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure have tightened and made the rules more strict.
Thus, the Rule now requires that an offense "has in fact just been
committed." This connotes immediacy in point of time and excludes cases
under the old rule where an offense "has in fact been committed" no
matter how long ago. Similarly, the arrestor must have "personal
knowledge of factsindicating that the [arrestee] has committed it" (instead
of just "reasonable ground to believe that the [arrestee] has committed it"
under the old rule). Clearly, then, an information could not just be filed
against the petitioners without due process and preliminary
investigation.147 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information
and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash
Information apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash,
the defect he alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of
the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the
accused appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from
"Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo" will not cure the lack of
preliminary investigation in this case.
A motion for reinvestigation will' not cure the defect of lack of preliminary
investigation. The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest were issued on
the premise that Butukan S. Malang and Datukan Malang Salibo are the
same person. There is evidence, however, that the person detained by
virtue of these processes is not Butukan S. Malang but another person
named Datukan Malang Salibo.
Petitioner Salibo presented in evidence his Philippine passport,148 his
identification card from the Office on Muslim Affairs,149 his Tax
Identification Number card,150 and clearance from the National Bureau of
Investigation151 all bearing his picture and indicating the name "Datukan
Malang Salibo." None of these government-issued documents showed that
petitioner Salibo used the alias "Butukan S. Malang."
Moreover, there is evidence that petitioner Salibo was not in the country
on November 23, 2009 when the Maguindanao Massacre occurred.
A Certification152 from the Bureau of Immigration states that petitioner
Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009 and arrived in the
Philippines only on December 20, 2009. A Certification153 from Saudi
Arabian Airlines attests that petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on
board Saudi Arabian Airlines Flight SV869 on November 7, 2009 and that
he arrived in the Philippines on board Saudi Arabian Airlines SV870 on
December 20, 2009.cralawlawlibrary
V
People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. is probably
the most complex case pending in our courts. The case involves 57
victims154 and 197 accused, two (2) of which have become state
witnesses.155 As of November 23, 2014, 111 of the accused have been
arraigned, and 70 have filed petitions for bail of which 42 have already
been resolved.156 To require petitioner Salibo to undergo trial would be to
further illegally deprive him of his liberty. Urgency dictates that we resolve
his Petition in his favor given the strong evidence that he is not Butukan S.
Malang.
In ordering petitioner Salibo's release, we are prejudging neither his guilt
nor his innocence. However, between a citizen who has shown that he was
illegally deprived of his liberty without due process of law and the
government that has all the "manpower and the resources at [its]
command"157 to properly indict a citizen but failed to do so, we will rule in
favor of the citizen.
Should the government choose to prosecute petitioner Salibo, it must
pursue the proper remedies against him as provided in our Rules. Until
then, we rule that petitioner Salibo is illegally deprived of his liberty. His
Petition for Habeas Corpus must be granted.cralawred
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The
Court of Appeals Decision dated April 19, 2011 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Warden, Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig,
is ORDERED to immediately RELEASE petitioner Datukan Maiang Salibo
from detention.
The Letter of the Court of Appeals elevating the records of the case to this
court is hereby NOTED.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919
RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,
vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.
D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.
MALCOLM, J.:
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History
(Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary
of American jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the status of an Indian) with
words which, with a slight change in phraseology, can be made to introduce the
present opinion — This cause, in every point of view in which it can be placed, is of
the deepest interest. The legislative power of state, the controlling power of the
constitution and laws, the rights if they have any, the political existence of a people,
the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and
proceed first, to introduce the facts and the issues, next to give a history of the so
called "non-Christians," next to compare the status of the "non-Christians" with that of
the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the constitutional questions presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the
Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of
their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are
said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will,
and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the
prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted
resolution No. 25 which is as follows:
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following
resolution:
"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the
advancement of the non-Christian people of Mindoro, which were
all a failure,
"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other
measure is taken for the Mangyan work of this province, no
successful result will be obtained toward educating these people.
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one
place in order to make a permanent settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-
Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is
deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public
lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of
Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most convenient for the
Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it
"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares
of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for
the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval
of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this
reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously
recommended by the provincial governor."
2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of
Mindoro was approved by the Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.
3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued
executive order No. 2 which says:
"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current
series, has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for
the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable,
the Secretary of the Interior, on February 21, 1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of
Mindoro, pursuant to the provisions of section 2145 of the revised
Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the
townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco
River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place
in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan
Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.
 "Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon
conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance
with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code."
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph
1 and the executive order of the governor of the same province copied in
paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes
of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and
to introduce civilized customs among them.
5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling
within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance
with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being
detained by the sheriff of Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by virtue
of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board
thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a
site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved
by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior
as required by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section
of the Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which
the court is called upon the decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial
governor. — With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law
and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial
board.
In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759
of the same Code, which read as follows:
SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. —
Any non-Christian who shall refuse to comply with the directions lawfully
given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two thousand one
hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site
designated by said governor shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a
period not exceeding sixty days.
The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law.
The genealogical tree of this section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology,
would read: Section 2077, Administrative Code of 1916; section 62, Act No. 1397;
section 2 of various special provincial laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically
relating to the Manguianes; section 69, Act No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This
word, as will later be disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of the
Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase in its proper category, and in order to
understand the policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands with reference to
the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to set down a skeleton
history of the attitude assumed by the authorities towards these "non-Christians," with
particular regard for the legislation on the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.
The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand
are compiled in Book VI, Title III, in the following language.
LAW I.
The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21,
1551. Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on
September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November 10, 1568. Ordinance 149
of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578,
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).
In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and
the evangelical law, and in order that they may forget the blunders of their
ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they may live in harmony and in
a civilized manner, it has always been endeavored, with great care and
special attention, to use all the means most convenient to the attainment of
these purposes. To carry out this work with success, our Council of the
Indies and other religious persons met at various times; the prelates of new
Spain assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the
year one thousand five hundred and forty-six — all of which meetings were
actuated with a desire to serve God an our Kingdom. At these meetings it
was resolved that indios be made to live in communities, and not to live in
places divided and separated from one another by sierras and mountains,
wherein they are deprived of all spiritual and temporal benefits and wherein
they cannot profit from the aid of our ministers and from that which gives rise
to those human necessities which men are obliged to give one another.
Having realized that convenience of this resolution, our kings, our
predecessors, by different orders, have entrusted and ordered the viceroys,
presidents, and governors to execute with great care and moderation the
concentration of the indios into reducciones; and to deal with their doctrine
with such forbearance and gentleness, without causing inconveniences, so
that those who would not presently settle and who would see the good
 treatment and the protection of those already in settlements would, of their
own accord, present themselves, and it is ordained that they be not required
to pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has been
executed in the greater part of our Indies, we hereby order and decree that
the same be complied with in all the remaining parts of the Indies, and
the encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner and form
prescribed by the laws of this title.
xxx xxx xxx
LAW VIII.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10,
1618.
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF
THIS LAW.
The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should
have the facilities of waters. lands, and mountains, ingress and egress,
husbandry and passageway of one league long, wherein the indios can have
their live stock that they may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards.
LAW IX.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.
THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS
PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.
With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated
in reducciones. Provided they shall not be deprived of the lands and
granaries which they may have in the places left by them. We hereby order
that no change shall be made in this respect, and that they be allowed to
retain the lands held by them previously so that they may cultivate them and
profit therefrom.
xxx xxx xxx
LAW XIII.
THE SAME AS ABOVE.
THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE
KING, VICEROY, OR COURT.
No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the
right to alter or to remove thepueblos or the reducciones once constituted
and founded, without our express order or that of the viceroy, president, or
the royal district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos, priests,
or indios request such a change or consent to it by offering or giving
information to that en. And, because these claims are often made for private
interests and not for those of the indios, we hereby order that this law be
always complied with, otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently
obtained. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the
judge or encomendero who should violate this law.
LAW XV.
Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO
SHALL BE "INDIOS."
We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be
an indio of the same reduccion; if there be more than eighty houses, there
should be two mayors and two aldermen, also indios; and, even if the town
be a big one, there should, nevertheless, be more than two mayors and four
aldermen, If there be less than eighty indios but not less than forty, there
should be not more than one mayor and one alderman, who should annually
elect nine others, in the presence of the priests , as is the practice in town
inhabited by Spaniards and indios.
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar,
on May 8, 1581. At Madrid, on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on
July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and December 17, 1646.
For this law and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS,
NEGROES, "MESTIZOS," AND MULATTOES.
We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores,
or mestizos to live to live in the reduccionesand towns and towns of
the indios, because it has been found that some Spaniards who deal, trade,
live, and associate with the indios are men of troublesome nature, of dirty
ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless men; and, to
avoid the wrongs done them, the indios would leave their towns and
provinces; and the negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides maltreating
them and utilizing their services, contaminate them with their bad customs,
idleness, and also some of their blunders and vices which may corrupt and
pervert the goal which we desire to reach with regard to their salvation,
increase, and tranquillity. We hereby order the imposition of grave penalties
upon the commission of the acts above-mentioned which should not be
 tolerated in the towns, and that the viceroys, presidents, governors, and
courts take great care in executing the law within their powers and avail
themselves of the cooperation of the ministers who are truly honest. As
regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos), who
are children of indiasand born among them, and who are to inherit their
houses and haciendas, they all not be affected by this law, it appearing to be
a harsh thing to separate them from their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol. 2,
pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve
the condition of the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in
"reducciones," is found in the Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:
It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a
territory recognized as an integral part of a nation should respect and obey
the laws in force therein; while, on other hand, it is the duty to conscience
and to humanity for all governments to civilize those backward races that
might exist in the nation, and which living in the obscurity of ignorance, lack
of all the nations which enable them to grasp the moral and material
advantages that may be acquired in those towns under the protection and
vigilance afforded them by the same laws.
It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the
separation and isolation of the non-Christian races from the social life of the
civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer the commission of
depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of
the representative of the Government of the, metropolis.
It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied
themselves with this most important question, and that much has been
heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial of the missionary
fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate
races might be brought to the principles of Christianity, but the means and
the preaching employed to allure them have been insufficient to complete
the work undertaken. Neither have the punishments imposed been sufficient
in certain cases and in those which have not been guarded against, thus
giving and customs of isolation.
As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state
of things, taking into account the prestige which the country demands and
the inevitable duty which every government has in enforcing respect and
obedience to the national laws on the part of all who reside within the
territory under its control, I have proceeded in the premises by giving the
most careful study of this serious question which involves important interests
for civilization, from the moral and material as well as the political
standpoints. After hearing the illustrious opinions of all the local authorities,
ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also
after finding the unanimous conformity of the meeting held with the
Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the provincial
prelates of the orders of the Dominicans, Agustinians, Recoletos,
Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting of the Council of Authorities,
held for the object so indicated, I have arrived at an intimate conviction of the
inevitable necessity of proceeding in a practical manner for the submission
of the said pagan and isolated races, as well as of the manner and the only
form of accomplishing such a task.
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these
objects, I hereby promulgate the following:
DECREE.
1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this
date, to be governed by the common law, save those exceptions prescribed
in this decree which are bases upon the differences of instructions, of the
customs, and of the necessities of the different pagan races which occupy a
part of its territory.
2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races —
which may be divided into three classes; one, which comprises those which
live isolated and roaming about without forming a town nor a home; another,
made up of those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered completely
the social life; and the third, of those mountain and rebellious pagans —
shall be published in their respective dialects, and the officials, priests, and
missionaries of the provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in
the work of having these races learn these rules. These rules shall have
executive character, beginning with the first day of next April, and, as to their
compliance, they must be observed in the manner prescribed below.
3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed,
from now on, with all the means which their zeal may suggest to them, to the
taking of the census of the inhabitants of the towns or settlement already
subdued, and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment of
local authorities, if there be none as yet; for the construction of courts and
schools, and for the opening or fixing up of means of communication,
endeavoring, as regards the administrative organization of the said towns or
settlements, that this be finished before the first day of next July, so that at
the beginning of the fiscal year they shall have the same rights and
obligations which affect the remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only
exception that in the first two years they shall not be obliged to render
personal services other than those previously indicated.
4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands
appropriate for cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to
move their dwelling-houses; and only in case of absolute necessity shall a
new residence be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the place most
convenient for them and which prejudices the least their interest; and, in
either of these cases, an effort must be made to establish their homes with
the reach of the sound of the bell.
5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be
established an armed force composed precisely of native Christian, the
organization and service of which shall be determined in a regulations based
upon that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia Civil).
6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns
understand all the rights and duties affecting them and the liberty which they
have as to where and now they shall till their lands and sell the products
thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by
the Hacienda at the same price and conditions allowed other producers, and
with the prohibition against these new towns as well as the others from
engaging in commerce of any other transaction with the rebellious indios, the
violation of which shall be punished with deportation.
7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the
territory of the rebellious indios shall be fixed; and whoever should go
beyond the said limits shall be detained and assigned governmentally
wherever convenient.
8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the
fraternity of the Catholic Church, all by this fact along be exempt for eight
years from rendering personal labor.
9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not
subdued (aetas and mountains igorrots the following advantages in returns
for their voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity among their families;
concession of good lands and the right to cultivate them in the manner they
wish and in the way them deem most productive; support during a year, and
clothes upon effecting submission; respect for their habits and customs in so
far as the same are not opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their
own accord as to whether they want to be Christians or not; the
establishment of missions and families of recognized honesty who shall
teach, direct, protect, and give them security and trust them; the purchase or
facility of the sale of their harvests; the exemption from contributions and
tributes for ten years and from the quintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years;
and lastly, that those who are governed by the local authorities as the ones
who elect such officials under the direct charge of the authorities of the
province or district.
10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the
advantages offered, shall, in return, have the obligation of constituting their
new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools, and country roads which
place them in communication with one another and with the Christians;
provided, the location of these towns be distant from their actual residences,
when the latter do not have the good conditions of location and cultivations,
and provided further the putting of families in a place so selected by them be
authorized in the towns already constituted.
11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the
tribes, that, disregarding the peace, protection, and advantages offered
them, continue in their rebellious attitude on the first of next April, committing
from now on the crimes and vexations against the Christian towns; and for
the this purposes, the Captain General's Office shall proceed with the
organization of the divisions of the Army which, in conjunction with the rural
guards (cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of such tribes. On the
expiration of the term, they shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and
implements, and confiscate their products and cattle. Such a punishment
shall necessarily be repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the military
headquarters shall immediately order a detachment of the military staff to
study the zones where such operations shall take place and everything
conducive to the successful accomplishment of the same.
12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and
other subordinates to my authorities, local authorities, and other
subordinates to may authority, civil as well as military authorities, shall give
the most effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in all that is within
the attributes and the scope of the authority of each.
13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the
provinces in the southern part of the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the
preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied to them.
14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-
Royal Patron, a council or permanent commission which shall attend to and
decide all the questions relative to the application of the foregoing
regulations that may be brought to it for consultations by the chiefs of
provinces and priests and missionaries.
15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to
the foregoing, in brining about due compliance with this decree, shall be
promulgated by the respective official centers within their respective
jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administracion,
vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question
as to the best method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing
one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American
Government in the Philippines was President McKinley's Instructions to the
Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly approved and ratified by section 1 of the
Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of these instructions have
remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional legislation. One paragraph of
particular interest should here be quoted, namely:
 In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should
adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our
North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government
and under which many of these tribes are now living in peace and
contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling
to conform. Such tribal governments should, however, be subjected to wise
and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and
active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and
introduce civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an
Organic Act for the Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to
provide for a legislative body and, with this end in view, to name the prerequisites for
the organization of the Philippine Assembly. The Philippine Legislature, composed of
the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over
the Christian portion of the Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain
exclusive jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-
Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This transferred
the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and authority theretofore exercised by the
Philippine Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the Philippine
Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth district to be composed of the
Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department of Mindanao and
Sulu. The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint
senators and representatives for the territory which, at the time of the passage of the
Jones Law, was not represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth
district (sec. 16). The law establish a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-
Christian Tribes" which shall have general supervision over the public affairs of the
inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by appointed senators and
representatives( sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between
the territory not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory
which Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which is inhabited by
Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the
Philippine Commission and Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49
concerning the Province of Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO. 82, the Municipal Code;
;Act no. 83, the Provincial Government Act; Act No. 183, the Character of the city of
Manila; Act No. 7887, providing for the organization and government of the Moro
Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial Government Act; Act No. 1397, the
Township Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the organization of settlements;
Act No. 1963, the Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of the
Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been
carried forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the
primitive peoples. Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9,
1902, by the United States Philippine Commission, having reference to the Province
of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855,
1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were enacted for the provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan,
Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya,
Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an example of
these laws, because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:
No. 547. — AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
LOCAL CIVIL GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE
PROVINCE OF MINDORO.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine
Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not
progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them
under any form of municipal government, the provincial governor is
authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing
with these Manguianes to appoint officers from among them, to fix their
designations and badges of office, and to prescribe their powers and duties:
Provided, That the powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in excess
of those conferred upon township officers by Act Numbered Three hundred
and eighty-seven entitled "An Act providing for the establishment of local civil
Governments in the townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya."
SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial
governor is further authorized, when he deems such a course necessary in
the interest of law and order, to direct such Manguianes to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and
approved by the provincial board. Manguianes who refuse to comply with
such directions shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not
exceeding sixty days.
SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of
his province to acquire the knowledge and experience necessary for
successful local popular government, and his supervision and control over
them shall be exercised to this end, an to the end that law and order and
individual freedom shall be maintained.
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any
settlement of Manguianes has advanced sufficiently to make such a course
practicable, it may be organized under the provisions of sections one to
sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as
a township, and the geographical limits of such township shall be fixed by
the provincial board.
 SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the
passage of the same is hereby expedited in accordance with section two of
'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the Commission in the
enactment of laws,' passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, December 4, 1902.
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act
No. 1396 and 1397. The last named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in
general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by the Administrative Code of
1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the provisions in questions.
These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a
settled and consistent practice with reference to the methods to be followed for their
advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying
forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the
Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes."
These words are to be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the
Jones Law. They are also to be found in Act No. 253 of the Philippines Commission,
establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine
Legislature, carried forward into sections 701-705 of the Administrative Code of 1917,
reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws which contain the phrase, there can be
mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have
been the favorite nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the
coming into being of a Filipinized legislature. These terms can be found in sections
2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of 1916; sections 701-705, 2145, 2422,
2426, Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the
Philippine Legislatures, as well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall
include Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec.
2561, Administrative Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408, sec. 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course
result in giving to it a religious signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who
profess the Christian religion, and non-Christians, would be those who do not profess
the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of this view, there could also be cited
section 2576 of the last Administrative Code and certain well-known authorities, as
Zuñiga, "Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt,
"Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan
Filipinos." (See Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p.
300, note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to
ascertain what is its true meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be
seen by the provisions of many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the
authority of the Philippine Assembly was recognized in the "territory" of the Islands
not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers
similar recognition in the authorization of the twelfth senatorial district for the "territory
not now represented in the Philippine Assembly." The Philippines Legislature has,
time and again, adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to that "part" of the
Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code.
The first section of this article, preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the
article applicable only in specially organized provinces. The specially organized
provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes, and
Palawan. These are the provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has never seen
fit to give all the powers of local self-government. They do not, however, exactly
coincide with the portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular
representation. Nevertheless, it is still a geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some
of who are Christians and some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law
specifically recognizes this. ( Sec. 2422, Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception
is likewise inadquate. The reason it that the motive of the law relates not to a
particular people, because of their religion, or to a particular province because of its
location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated n the civilization or lack of
civilization of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words
usually introduce the term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The
Secretary of the Interior who for so many years had these people under his
jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact designation, speaks of the
"backward Philippine peoples, commonly known as the 'non-Christian tribes."' (See
Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third
Congress, third session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of the People
of the United States as to the future political status of the Philippine Islands and to
provide a more autonomous government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the
Secretary of the Interior of June 30, 1906, circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is
substantiated by reference to legislative, judicial, and executive authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and
sections 701 et seq, and sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917.
For instance, Act No. 253 charged the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to conduct
"systematic investigations with reference to non-Christian tribes . . . with special view
to determining the most practicable means for bringing about their advancement in
civilization and material property prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
United States vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here arose
as to the effect of a tribal marriage in connection with article 423 of the Penal code
concerning the husband who surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In discussing
the point, the court makes use of the following language:
. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a
tribal marriage of so-called non-Christians or members of uncivilized tribes,
celebrated within that province without compliance with the requisites
prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . . We hold also that the fact that the
accused is shown to be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low order of
intelligence, uncultured and uneducated, should be taken into consideration
as a second marked extenuating circumstance.
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have
been called upon to interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a member of
the Philippine Commission, drafted much of the legislation relating to the so-called
Christians and who had these people under his authority, was the former Secretary of
the Interior. Under date of June 30, 1906, this official addressed a letter to all
governor of provinces, organized under the Special Provincial Government Act, a
letter which later received recognition by the Governor-General and was circulated by
the Executive Secretary, reading as follows:
Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether
people who were originally non-Christian but have recently been baptized or
who are children of persons who have been recently baptized are, for the
purposes of Act 1396 and 1397, to be considered Christian or non-
Christians.
It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these
islands which are not advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable
designation which will fit all cases. The number of individual tribes is so great
that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of them in an Act. It was
finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the one most
satisfactory, but the real purpose of the Commission was not so much to
legislate for people having any particular religious belief as for those lacking
sufficient advancement so that they could, to their own advantage, be
brought under the Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code.
The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of
civilization to which the person baptized has attained at the time the act of
baptism is performed. For practical purposes, therefore, you will give the
member of so-called "wild tribes" of your province the benefit of the doubt
even though they may recently have embraced Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain
under the jurisdiction of regularly organized municipalities or what form of
government shall be afforded to them should be the degree of civilization to
which they have attained and you are requested to govern yourself
accordingly.
I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who
concurs in the opinion above expressed and who will have the necessary
instructions given to the governors of the provinces organized under the
Provincial Government Act. (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this
court, has the following to say on the subject:
As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but
while no other better classification has as yet been made the present
classification should be allowed to stand . . . I believe the term carries the
same meaning as the expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior
(of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the degree of civilization
rather than of religious denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of
religious denomination will make the law invalid as against that
Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the
Collector of Internal Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives to the cedula
taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the
Interior was requested on the point, who, by return indorsement, agreed with the
interpretation of the Collector of Internal Revenue. This Construction of the Collector
of Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):
The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from
the payment of cedula taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue has
interpreted this provision of law to mean not that persons who profess some
form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that all
other person are exempt; he has interpreted it to mean that all persons
preserving tribal relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt
from the cedula tax, and that all others, including Jews, Mohammedans,
Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax so long as they live in
cities or towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In other words, it is
 not so much a matter of a man's form of religious worship or profession that
decides whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it is more dependent
on whether he is living in a civilized manner or is associated with the
mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this
question has not come up as to whether a Christian, maintaining his
religious belief, but throwing his lot and living with a non-Christian tribe,
would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a
prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this office that he was exempt from
the cedula tax, inasmuch as he was not a Christian. This Office, however,
continued to collect cedula taxes from all the Jews, East Indians, Arabs,
Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of the cedula
taxes paid in this city are paid by men belonging to the nationalities
mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and other s are quite widely scattered
throughout the Islands, and a condition similar to that which exist in Manila
also exists in most of the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes are therefore
being collected by this Office in all parts of these Islands on the broad
ground that civilized people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized
people preserving their tribal relations are not subject thereto.
(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,
Collector of Internal Revenue.
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter
No. 327, approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial
treasurers. This letter in part reads:
In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers
regarding cedula taxes due from members of non-Christian tribes when they
come in from the hills for the purposes of settling down and becoming
members of the body politic of the Philippine Islands, the following
clarification of the laws governing such questions and digest of rulings
thereunder is hereby published for the information of all concerned:
Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by
reason of the fact that they do not profess Christianity, but because of their
uncivilized mode of life and low state of development. All inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes may be
divided into three classes in so far as the cedula tax law is concerned . . .
Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and
uncivilized mode of life, severs whatever tribal relations he may have had
and attaches himself civilized community, belonging a member of the body
politic, he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the same law that
governs the other members of that community and from and after the date
when he so attaches himself to the community the same cedula and other
taxes are due from him as from other members thereof. If he comes in after
the expiration of the delinquency period the same rule should apply to him
as to persons arriving from foreign countries or reaching the age of eighteen
subsequent to the expiration of such period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H
cedula, as the case may be, should be furnished him without penalty and
without requiring him to pay the tax for former years.
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in
determining whether or not a man is subject to the regular cedula tax is not
the circumstance that he does or does not profess Christianity, nor even his
maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the well
known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of advancement in civilization
and connection or lack of connection with some civilized community. For this
reason so called "Remontados" and "Montescos" will be classed by this
office as members of non-Christian tribes in so far as the application of the
Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though they belong to no
well recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of advancement and so forth
are practically the same as those of the Igorrots and members of other
recognized non-Christina tribes.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,
Collector of Internal Revenue,
Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.
The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal
Revenue Regulations No. 1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector
of Internal Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa,
Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the regulations is practically a
transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of
Constabulary request the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a non-
Christian who has been baptized by a minister of the Gospel. The precise questions
were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he entitled to the privileges of a
Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he commit an infraction of the law
and does the person selling same lay himself liable under the provision of Act No.
1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General Avanceña, after quoting the same authorities
hereinbefore set out, concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is
probable that the person in question remains a non-Christian, so that, in
purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the person selling the same
make themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions of Act No. 1639.
At least, I advise you that these should be the constructions place upon the
law until a court shall hold otherwise.
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
 With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has
in the provisions of the Administrative code which we are studying, we
submit that said phrase does not have its natural meaning which would
include all non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipino or
strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers to those uncivilized
members of the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines who, living without
home or fixed residence, roam in the mountains, beyond the reach of law
and order . . .
The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the
inhabitants of the Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as
distinguished from the common Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized
life, did not intended to establish a distinction based on the religious beliefs
of the individual, but, without dwelling on the difficulties which later would be
occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish
legislation employed to designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of
the Philippines.
The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077
and 2741 of Act No. 2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as
equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes of the Philippines, not only
because this is the evident intention of the law, but because to give it its
lateral meaning would make the law null and unconstitutional as making
distinctions base the religion of the individual.
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De.
David P. Barrows, then "Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the
population in the Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-Christian or Wild Tribes.
(Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq). The present Director
of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes that the classification likely to be used in
the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing
Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared in the
Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, a sub-division under the title non-Christian
tribes is, "Physical and Political Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes," which
sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture and not to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different
executive officials, specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian"
refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way , to geographical area, and, more directly,
to natives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of civilization, usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The
Philippine Census of 1903 divided them into four classes. Of the third class, are the
Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia
de los nombres de Rozas de Filipinas, says:
In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer,"
"pagan," "negro." It may be that the use of this word is applicable to a great
number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been applied only to certain
inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt this name was
given to those of that island who bear it to-day, but its employed in three
Filipino languages shows that the radical ngian had in all these languages a
sense to-day forgotten. In Pampango this ending still exists and signifies
"ancient," from which we can deduce that the name was applied to men
considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were pushed
back into the interior by the modern invaders, in whose language they were
called the "ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and
have not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid,
primitive, semi-nomadic people. They number approximately 15,000. The
manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in the
preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it
practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government. (See Census of
the Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)
III. COMPARATIVE — THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy
adopted by the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the
Government of the Philippines Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian
people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the United
States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is
insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been
treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government
of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward.
It is for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be
terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United
States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore
mentioned, tells how the Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those
humane designs of civilizing the neighboring Indians." After quoting the Act, the
opinion goes on — "This act avowedly contemplates the preservation of the Indian
nations as an object sought by the United States, and proposes to effect this object
by civilizing and converting them from hunters into agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United
States vs. Kagama ([1886], 118 U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to the clause of
the United States Constitution which gives Congress "power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The
court then proceeds to indicate a brief history of the position of the Indians in the
United States (a more extended account of which can be found in Marshall's opinion
in Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States,
both before and since the Revolution, to the people of the United States, has
always been an anomalous one and of a complex character.
Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of
American towards the Indians who were found here, the colonies before the
Revolution and the States and the United States since, have recognized in
the Indians a possessory right to the soil over which they roamed and
hunted and established occasional villages. But they asserted an ultimate
title in the land itself, by which the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or
transfer it to other nations or peoples without the consent of this paramount
authority. When a tribe wished to dispose of its lands, or any part of it, or the
State or the United States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was
the only mode in which this could be done. The United States recognized no
right in private persons, or in other nations, to make such a purchase by
treaty or otherwise. With the Indians themselves these relation are equally
difficult to define. They were, and always have been, regarded as having a
semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as
States, not as nation not a possessed of the fall attributes of sovereignty, but
as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social
relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State
within whose limits they resided.
The opinion then continues:
It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of
Congress. These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. The are
communities dependent on the United States. dependent largely for their
daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the
States, and receive from the no protection. Because of the local ill feeling,
the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest
enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the
course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in
which it has been promised, there arise the duty of protection, and with it the
power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress,
and by this court, whenever the question has arisen . . . The power of the
General Government over these remnants of race once powerful, now weak
and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the
safety of those among whom they dwell. it must exist in that government,
because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theater of its
exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has
never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the
tribes.
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to
be considered was whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such
that Congress could prohibit the introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands
notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to statehood. The court looked to the
reports of the different superintendent charged with guarding their interests and
founds that these Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of the
government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said "that
during the Spanish dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as wards
requiring special protection, where subjected to restraints and official supervisions in
the alienation of their property." And finally, we not the following: "Not only does the
Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the Indians
tribes, but long-continued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of
judicial decisions have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized
nation the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all
dependent Indian communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or
territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the
power of the courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the
subject has always been deemed political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of
the judicial department of the government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488;
U.S. vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U.S., 278; U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra;
Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the Cherokee
Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall, 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218; Thomas vs.Gay
[1898], 169 U.S.., 264; Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553;
Wallace vs. Adams [1907], 204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U.S., 84;
Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U.S., 286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S..,
598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281; 35 L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever,
therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as an Indian reservation, it has
full authority to pass such laws and authorize such measures as may be necessary to
give to the Indians thereon full protection in their persons and property.
(U.S. vs.Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken
line of judicial decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might
result in the issuance of habeas corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879],
Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing upon return to a writ of habeas
corpus issued against Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of Standing
Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition
alleged in substance that the relators are Indians who have formerly belonged to the
Ponca tribe of Indians, now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time
previously withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations
therewith, and had adopted the general habits of the whites, and were then
endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or
assistance from the general government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and
without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the United States, they were
arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent, George Crook. The
substance of the return to the writ was that the relators are individual members of,
and connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped form a
reservation situated some place within the limits of the Indian Territory — had
departed therefrom without permission from the Government; and, at the request of
the Secretary of the Interior, the General of the Army had issued an order which
required the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian
Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the relators to be
arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal
imprisonment by habeas corpus. The second question, of much greater importance,
related to the right of the Government to arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the
purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory from which it was alleged the Indian
escaped. In discussing this question, the court reviewed the policy the Government
had adopted in its dealing with the friendly tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing, the
court said: "Laws passed for the government of the Indian country, and for the
purpose of regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer upon certain
officers of the Government almost unlimited power over the persons who go upon the
reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether such an extensive discretionary
power is wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not , need not be
questioned. It is enough to know that the power rightfully exists, and, where existing,
the exercise of the power must be upheld." The decision concluded as follows:
The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:
1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United
States, and has, therefore, the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a
federal court, or before a federal judge, in all cases where he may be
confined or in custody under color of authority of the United States or where
he is restrained of liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the United
States.
2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the
military department of the Platte, has the custody of the relators, under color
of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws therefore.
3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to
the Indian Territory, as the respondent has been directed to do.
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the
more fortunate white race, and have the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness," so long as they obey the laws and do not trespass
on forbidden ground. And,
5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States,
and in violation of the laws thereof, the relators must be discharged from
custody, and it is so ordered.
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as
authority to determine that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of
the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act,
and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts. (See also In re Race
Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.
As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not
exactly identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian
reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken from different
parts of the country and placed on these reservation, without any previous
consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been
made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the
country. If any lesson can be drawn form the Indian policy of the United States, it is
that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the
government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to
upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as may forceful
reasons exists for the segregation as existed for the segregation of the different
Indian tribes in the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not
delegate this power to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the
Philippine Legislature has abdicated its authority and avoided its full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power
should be zealously protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however,
disclose that it has not bee violated in his instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by
Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The true
distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z.
R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by
Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be
committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature
may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom
t has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
(U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decision is to
give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the
enactment of section 21454 of the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature
merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial
board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the
law? Is not this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to
require the Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection and taking of one
hundred and sixty acres by the relator out of the lands ceded to the United States by
the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians. Section 463 of the United States Revised
Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of
the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may
prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out to
the Indian relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal,
especially in view of the long established practice of the Department, before saying
that this language was not broad enough to warrant a regulation obviously made for
the welfare of the rather helpless people concerned. The power of Congress is not
doubted. The Indians have been treated as wards of the nation. Some such
supervision was necessary, and has been exercised. In the absence of special
provisions naturally it would be exercised by the Indian Department." (See also as
corroborative authority, it any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204 U.S..,
364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court:
U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An
exception to the general rule. sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central
legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine
Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be
exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official
representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge "when such as course is
deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?" As officials charged with the
administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are
better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the
people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department
head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf
of his unknown clients, says that — "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous.
In limpid English, and in words as plain and unequivocal as language can express, it
provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians' and none other." The inevitable result,
them, is that the law "constitutes an attempt by the Legislature to discriminate
between individuals because of their religious beliefs, and is, consequently,
unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable — the
Legislature must be understood to mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial
construction is then excluded; religious equality is demanded by the Organic Law; the
statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as
hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the long continued meaning given
to a common expression, especially as classification of inhabitants according to
religious belief leads the court to what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative
action. We hold that the term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines
Islands of a low grade of civilization, and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code
of 1917, does not discriminate between individuals an account of religious
differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's
instructions of to the Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing
"That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the
equal protection of the laws." This constitutional limitation is derived from the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution — and these provisions, it
has been said "are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick
Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356.) The protection afforded the individual is then
as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:
Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible
with the possession of like liberty by every other. (Spencer, Social Statistics,
p. 94.)
Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized
licentiousness that trespasses on right. That authorized licentiousness that
trespasses on right. It is a legal and a refined idea, the offspring of high
civilization, which the savage never understood, and never can understand.
Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more restraint on
others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . that man is free who
is protected from injury. (II Webster's Works, p. 393.)
Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not
being forced to do what one ought not do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the
Laws.)
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac
according to one's own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions
essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others. (Field, J., in
Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)
Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times
and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold
restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good.
On any other basis, organized society could not exist with safety to its
members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself
would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all
 could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right
of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or
his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others . . . There is,
of course, a sphere with which the individual may asserts the supremacy of
his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government —
especially of any free government existing under a written Constitution — to
interfere with the exercise of that will. But it is equally true that in very well-
ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its
members, the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times,
under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be
enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may
demand." (Harlan, J., In Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.)
Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason
and the upright and honorable conscience of the individual. (Apolinario
Mabini.)
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a
civilized community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in
others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist
and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot
be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but
is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been
endowed by this Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the
common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of the
citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live an work where he will;
to earn his livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any avocations, an for that
purpose. to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to
his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief elements of the
guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose one's employment, the right to
labor, and the right of locomotion.
In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which
are ordinarily done by free men. (There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866],
4 Wall, 277; Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179
U.S., 274; Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902],
114 Wis., 530. See 6 R.C.L., 258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly
apparent. It is this: "Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty
regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual
and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being.
No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license.
The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law
for the common good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if
exercises without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally
natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of the
citizens may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order
and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. (See
Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing
Co. vs. Cruz [1914], 189 Al., 66.)
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law.
Daniel Webster, in the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before
the United States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic literature, said that the
meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty,
property, an immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern
society." To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial
proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice
are not requisite a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the
discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. (See
McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind
sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether
sanctioned by age and customs, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative
power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these
principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law."
(Hurtado vs.California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply . . .
"first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the
legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in
its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of
the state or to all of a class." (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on
appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due process of law depends
on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation."
(Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not
infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have
a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature.
We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made
later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to
the United States Constitution particularly as found in those portions of Philippine
Organic Law providing "That slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor shall
involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted." It is quite possible that the Thirteenth Amendment, since
reaching to "any place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in
the Philippine. However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with
necessary modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States
Criminal Code, prescribed the punishment for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary
servitude, together wit their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of enforced,
compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906], 203 U.S., 1.) The
term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any
servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude may have
been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for
their freedom. Next must come a description of the police power under which the
State must act if section 2145 is to be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at
this moment is the farreaching scope of the power, that it has become almost
possible to limit its weep, and that among its purposes is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the
people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its
resources and add to is wealth and prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113
U.S., 27.) What we are not interested in is the right of the government to restrain
liberty by the exercise of the police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with
self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be
said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill
Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.) Carried onward by the current of legislation, the
judiciary rarely attempt to dam the on rushing power of legislative discretion, provided
the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for
the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right
to exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the
public interest. "There can be not doubt that the exercise of the police power of the
Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only
by the Acts of Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at the foundation
of all republican forms of government." (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32
Phil., 580; U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before
finally deciding whether any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by
section 2145 of the Administrative Code, we should endeavor to ascertain the
intention of the Legislature in enacting this section. If legally possible, such legislative
intention should be effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the
Tigbao reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the
following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian
people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the
Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-
General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection
of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized
customs among the Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the
motives for its selection, the following:
To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken
together to Tigbao, the Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918,
made a trip to the place. There he found that the site selected is a good one;
that creditable progress has been made in the clearing of forests,
construction of buildings, etc., that there appears to be encouraging reaction
by the boys to the work of the school the requirements of which they appear
to meet with enthusiastic interest after the first weeks which are necessarily
a somewhat trying period for children wholly unaccustomed to orderly
behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the impression that the results
obtained during the period of less than one year since the beginning of the
institution definitely justify its continuance and development.
Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation.
Such was naturally to be expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon
his return to Manila, made the following statement to the press:
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those
who prefer to live a nomadic life and evade the influence of
civilization. The Government will follow its policy to organize them
into political communities and to educate their children with the
object of making them useful citizens of this country. To permit
them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden to the
state and on account of their ignorance, they will commit crimes
and make depredation, or if not they will be subject to involuntary
servitude by those who may want to abuse them."
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the
non-Christian people, has adopted as the polaris of his administration — "the
advancement of the non-Christian elements of our population to equality and
unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants." This is carried on by the
adoption of the following measures:
(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of
seminomadic race are induced to leave their wild habitat and settle in
organized communities.
(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public
health throughout the regions inhabited by the non-Christian people.
(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to
facilitate their development and the extention of government control.
(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among
non-Christians, to promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain
amicable relations among them and with the Christian people.
 (e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially
agriculture.
( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private
capital in, the fertile regions of Mindanao and Sulu.
The Secretary adds:
To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued
among the non-Christian people. These people are being taught and guided
to improve their living conditions in order that they may fully appreciate the
benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still given to nomadic habits
are being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and settle in organized
settlements. They are being made to understand that it is the purpose of the
Government to organize them politically into fixed and per manent
communities, thus bringing them under the control of the Government, to aid
them to live and work, protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse,
educate their children, and show them the advantages of leading a civilized
life with their civilized brothers. In short, they are being impressed with the
purposes and objectives of the Government of leading them to economic,
social, and political equality, and unification with the more highly civilized
inhabitants of the country. (See Report of the Department for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with
the so-called non-Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial,
and economic development and advancement in civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208,
2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes,
defines the aim of the Government towards the non-Christian people in the following
unequivocal terms:
It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the
work for advancement and liberty in favor of the region inhabited by non-
Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate means and in a systematical,
rapid, and complete manner the moral, material, economic, social, and
political development of those regions, always having in view the aim of
rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between, and complete fusion
of, all the Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of
the Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States,
proper wards of the Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may
not these unfortunates advance in the "habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be
advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan, carefully formulated, and apparently
working out for the ultimate good of these people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the
Government is evident. Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes,
leading a nomadic life, making depredations on their more fortunate neighbors,
uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing nothing for the advancement of the
Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to do by bringing than into a
reservation was to gather together the children for educational purposes, and to
improve the health and morals — was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. this
method was termed in Spanish times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea
adapted to the existing situation, has been followed with reference to the Manguianes
and other peoples of the same class, because it required, if they are to be improved,
that they be gathered together. On these few reservations there live under restraint in
some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the uncivilized
people. Segregation really constitutes protection for the manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we
know that the axiom is not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not
free, as civilized men are free, and they are not the equals of their more fortunate
brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with many but not all the rights which
citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the
Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag
upon the progress of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of
the Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are
again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and persons protected from
predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no argument to say that such
crimes are punished by the Penal Code, because these penalties are imposed after
commission of the offense and not before. If immigrants are to be encouraged to
develop the resources of the great Islands of Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive
regions, the Government must be in a position to guarantee peace and order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the
State. Illiteracy and thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to
protect itself from destruction must prod on the laggard and the sluggard. The great
law of overwhelming necessity is all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of
civilization, they (the manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction
— burning and destroying the forests and making illegal caiñgins thereon.
Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead injuring and damaging its
interests, what will ultimately become of these people with the sort of liberty
they wish to preserve and for which they are now fighting in court? They will
ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their
ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will
be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty
and does not practice liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the
right to do anything they will — going from one place to another in the
mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caiñgins
thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how
can they allege that they are being deprived thereof without due process of
law?
xxx xxx xxx
But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his
liberty without due process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not
have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightful
way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of
such class of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar,
that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare
and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this
people should be let along in the mountains and in a permanent state of
savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in
its true and noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the
Government has been placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or
guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as
the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience.
xxx xxx xxx
The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended
more and more towards the education and civilization of such people and
fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those people under the tutelage
of the Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times point to
a day which is not far distant when they will become useful citizens. In the
light of what has already been accomplished which has been winning the
gratitude of most of the backward people, shall we give up the noble work
simply because a certain element, believing that their personal interests
would be injured by such a measure has come forward and challenged the
authority of the Government to lead this people in the pat of civilization?
Shall we, after expending sweat, treasure, and even blood only to redeem
this people from the claws of ignorance and superstition, now willingly retire
because there has been erroneously invoked in their favor that
Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without
due process of law? To allow them to successfully invoke that Constitutional
guaranty at this time will leave the Government without recourse to pursue
the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus
left in a permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point to
attack by those who doubt, nay challenge, the ability of the nation to deal
with our backward brothers.
The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao.
There they are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions.
They are being made to understand that they object of the government is to
organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities. They are
being aided to live and work. Their children are being educated in a school
especially established for them. In short, everything is being done from them
in order that their advancement in civilization and material prosperity may be
assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make them slaves
or put them in a condition compelled to do services for another. They do not
work for anybody but for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary
servitude.
But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some
other places under penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is
invited to the fact that this people, living a nomadic and wayfaring life, do not
have permanent individual property. They move from one place to another
as the conditions of living warrants, and the entire space where they are
roving about is the property of the nation, the greater part being lands of
public domain. Wandering from one place to another on the public lands,
why can not the government adopt a measure to concentrate them in a
certain fixed place on the public lands, instead of permitting them to roam all
over the entire territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of
the public as owner of the lands about which they are roving and for the
proper accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the government.
For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to return
to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is
provinced for, you can not make them live together and the noble intention of
the Government of organizing them politically will come to naught.
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections
and to reach a general conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go
where he pleases. Could be not, however, be kept away from certain localities ? To
furnish an example from the Indian legislation. The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2
U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess
absolute freedom of locomotion. Again the same law provided for the apprehension of
marauding Indians. Without any doubt, this law and other similar were accepted and
followed time and again without question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and
defenseless people confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official.
What, it is asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed Manguian? The answer
would naturally be that the official into whose hands are given the enforcement of the
law would have little or not motive to oppress these people; on the contrary, the
presumption would all be that they would endeavor to carry out the purposes of the
law intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus confined,
there always exists the power of removal in the hands of superior officers, and the
courts are always open for a redress of grievances. When, however, only the validity
of the law is generally challenged and no particular case of oppression is called to the
attention of the courts, it would seems that the Judiciary should not unnecessarily
hamper the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may
the right and liberties of the individual members of society be subordinated to the will
of the Government? It is a question which has assailed the very existence of
government from the beginning of time. Now purely an ethical or philosophical
subject, nor now to be decided by force, it has been transferred to the peaceful forum
of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must realize that the very
existence of government renders imperatives a power to restrain the individual to
some extent, dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class attempted to be
benefited. As to the particular degree to which the Legislature and the Executive can
go in interfering with the rights of the citizen, this is, and for a along time to come will
be, impossible for the courts to determine.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms
of economics and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown as
widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of governmental activity. The
courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trial after the other two branches of
the government in this progressive march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot
fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an
unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic
remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without
when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained
for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due
process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of
law and equal protection of the law, there exists a law ; the law seems to be
reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed;
and it applies alike to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt,
would lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid. it the attitude which the
courts should assume towards the settled policy of the Government. In a late decision
with which we are in full accord, Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University (200
Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
writes:
We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every
really new question that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined
on that theory, when not determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case
or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior case. In balancing
conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes
will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or
principle. But public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast
its influence in all possible contingencies. Distinctions must be made from time to time
as sound reason and a true sense of justice may dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called
non-Christians has been in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental
policy has been effective in the Philippines from early days to the present. The idea to
unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception
of nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all must be approximately equal in
intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro must be
populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The public policy of the
Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino
people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must
be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the
country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the
Philippine Legislature, a coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the
best considered case is toward non-interference on the part of the courts whenever
political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms
for which he is justly famous, said that "constitutional law, like other mortal
contrivances, has to take some chances." (Blinn vs.Nelson [1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in
the final decision of the many grave questions which this case presents, the courts
must take "a chance," it should be with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the
effectuation of the general governmental policy, and with a view to the court's
performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that broad conception
which will make the courts as progressive and effective a force as are the other
departments of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code
does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny
to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in
accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude.
We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a
legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of
the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus
can, therefore, not issue. This is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes
against petitioners. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avanceña, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.
City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one
which this application for habeas corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be
expected to be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after all,
the cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the
basic principles of popular government, and if we give expression to the paramount
purpose for which the courts, as an independent power of such a government, were
constituted. The primary question is — Shall the judiciary permit a government of the
men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which
might prove profitable reading for other departments of the government, the facts are
these: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to
exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had
been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October
16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district
by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected
arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao,
as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard
cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At
any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the
chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban,
descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and
placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given
no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression
that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no
knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if
they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given
their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the
steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of
Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for
Davao during the night of October 25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were
landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of
Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and
the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification
that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila. The
further happenings to these women and the serious charges growing out of alleged ill-
treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to the disposition of this case.
Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married, others assumed more or
less clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different capacities, others
assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to
return to Manila.
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were
putting in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable
number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of
the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties,
was made to include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to Davao
and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application will be considered as
including them. The application set forth the salient facts, which need not be
repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo
Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of
Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the full
court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted
certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should
not be granted because the petitioners were not proper parties, because the action
should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of
Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the women under
their custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the
boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the
fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on
the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in
answer to question of a member of the court, that these women had been sent out of
Manila without their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4,
that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of
police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and
Feliciano Yñigo, an hacenderoof Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein
named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own
expense. On motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken before the
clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the day named in the order,
December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were
produced in court by the respondents. It has been shown that three of those who had
been able to come back to Manila through their own efforts, were notified by the
police and the secret service to appear before the court. The fiscal appeared,
repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when
pleading to the original petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila
to the provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto, and telegrams that had
passed between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao,
and offered certain affidavits showing that the women were contained with their life in
Mindanao and did not wish to return to Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging
that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the women
had never been under his control, because they were at liberty in the Province of
Davao, and because they had married or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent
Yñigo answered alleging that he did not have any of the women under his control and
that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court, after due
deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second order, which related that
the respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the
court nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that those of the
women not in Manila be brought before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann,
Sales, and Yñigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in written
statements voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of
that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should demonstrate some
other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was further stated that the
question of whether the respondents were in contempt of court would later be decided
and the reasons for the order announced in the final decision.
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women,
of certain detectives and policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was
taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of
the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13,
1919, the respondents technically presented before the Court the women who had
returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others who had been brought
to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns, once
again recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons
involved in the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that the respondents,
through their representatives and agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao with
their consent eight women; that eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on
notice that if they desired they could return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced
the right through sworn statements; that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by
other means, and that despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located.
Both counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda.
The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila,
Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando
Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yñigo,
an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and
Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal
requested that the replica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to respondents'
memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ
of habeas corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to do so.
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one hundred and seventy
women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and
without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly
hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble
attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case
is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was
deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to
cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and
practically admitted by the respondents.
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question — By authority
of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by
duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine
Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find —
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act
of congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after
a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733
of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and
punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No.
899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States, who may have been
convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other States have statutes
providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted of being
common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health authorities compel
vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person in the Culion leper
colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain for any
law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of
Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands —
and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless
not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as
are other citizens — to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the
contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being
expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his
residence.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so
important as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American
constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in
jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a
constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, even the
President of the United States, who has often been said to exercise more power than
any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express.
Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of
delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police could, at their mere behest or
even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen so
insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities
of the Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves
such power, then any other official can do the same. And if any official can exercise
the power, then all persons would have just as much right to do so. And if a prostitute
could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one locality to another within
the country, then officialdom can hold the same club over the head of any citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall
be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs,
or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor
condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will
sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." (Magna
Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter
how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard
individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller,
delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme
power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office
participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that
supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the
authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea,"
said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may
be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to
the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any
country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick
Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the
writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the
primary question was whether the courts should permit a government of men or a
government of laws to be established in the Philippine Islands.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of
the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.
The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may
recoup money damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an
action, but it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation
as that now before us.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands
provides:
Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a
general character in force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to
a place more than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile, except it
be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not
less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three thousand
two hundred and fifty pesetas.
Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation
of a general character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any
person to change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of
destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not
more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting
officers find that any public officer has violated this provision of law, these prosecutors
will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they have
defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime
and that the persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar to the instant
proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which will later be
referred to — "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by one
unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient answer that
the confinement was a crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until the
guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow process of criminal
procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas
corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ,
whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three
specific objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there
is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume
jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not restrained of their liberty by
respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of
police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they could
not bring the women from Davao.
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were
relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the
city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It
was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code
of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its
zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant
a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person
is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no application be made
therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of
First Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It is a
general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience,
petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of
first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be
granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the
Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or
before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent
on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of
First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which
to advance their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the
petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney,
were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts
of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of
their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be
taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate court. The failure of
the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ would have
amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the
writ was prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were
under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction
of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first
blush, this is a tenable position. On closer examination, acceptance of such dictum is
found to be perversive of the first principles of the writ of habeas corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of
liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into
all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom
of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of
that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant
region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they
had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings,
they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they
pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved
parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his
right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The
chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a
private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then,
when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim
that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction
over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the
respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the
order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be
compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally
parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason
why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no
authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the
same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to
Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to
restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to
avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright
of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily
evaded.
It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for
decision. Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination of the
authorities fails to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable courts
are however very persuasive in nature.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date
as to whether or not a writ of habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a
person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child under
guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to be detained in another
State. The membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable. It
was composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy,
justices. On the question presented the court was equally divided. Campbell, J., with
whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be quashed. Cooley, J., one
of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred
Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell
was predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English decisions, and
since, as will hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view, only
the following eloquent passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:
I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue
the present writ on the petition which was laid before us. . . .
It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six
centuries and a half have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and
rivers of blood shed for its establishment; after its many confirmations, until
Coke could declare in his speech on the petition of right that "Magna Charta
was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign," and after the extension of
its benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas
corpus acts, it should now be discovered that evasion of that great clause for
the protection of personal liberty, which is the life and soul of the whole
instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is important that it be
determined without delay, that the legislature may apply the proper remedy,
as I can not doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . .
. the defendant had no longer power to produce the child, that might be an
The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the
case of imprisonment within the state — seems to me to be based upon a
misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in
England that the court of king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and
enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not passed to give the right,
but to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon
this writ is, that it is directed to and served upon, not the person confined,
but his jailor. It does not reach the former except through the latter. The
officer or person who serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the
prisoner free, but the court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to
release his constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the
respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the
purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is the ordinary
mode of affording relief, and if any other means are resorted to, they are
only auxiliary to those which are usual. The place of confinement is,
therefore, not important to the relief, if the guilty party is within reach of
process, so that by the power of the court he can be compelled to release
his grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not increased by the
confinement being beyond the limits of the state, except as greater distance
may affect it. The important question is, where the power of control
exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of Jackson
[1867], 15 Mich., 416.)
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other
courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117
Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had
been taken out of English by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by
the Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother and her husband
directing the defendant to produce the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant
until a certain date to produce the child, but he did not do so. His return stated that
the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed over by him to another; that
it was no longer in his custody or control, and that it was impossible for him to obey
the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through Lord Esher,
M. R., said:
A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January
22. That writ commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before
a judge in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the
receipt of the writ, together with the cause of her being taken and
detained. That is a command to bring the child before the judge and must be
obeyed, unless some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the
nonproduction of the child. If it could be shown that by reason of his having
lawfully parted with the possession of the child before the issuing of the writ,
answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the
child, and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the
 writ without lawful excuse. Many efforts have been made in argument to shift
the question of contempt to some anterior period for the purpose of showing
that what was done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But
the question is not as to what was done before the issue of the writ. The
question is whether there has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it was
issued by not producing the child in obedience to its commands. (The
Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the same effect
the Irish case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The
Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was
directed to the defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia
three colored persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the
writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of
Washington; that, as he believed, they were removed beyond the District of Columbia
before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that they were then beyond his
control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis had removed
the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The
court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to
produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and refusing to produce them,
ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he should produce
the negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards
ordered that Davis be released upon the production of two of the negroes, for one of
the negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the
two negroes on the last day of the term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch
C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624;
Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered
by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas
corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders
of the Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they
did not, whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco
Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court
on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents
were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as
the record discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November
before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. According to the
response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there
were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be
permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort
naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on
the day named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were
open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the
command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of
sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3)
they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their
attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They
did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; they
did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present writings that
waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped
affidavits purporting to show that the women were contended with their life in Davao,
some of which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the
return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least
sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in the
municipality of Davao, and that about this number either returned at their own
expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been
warranted summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in
sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-production
of the persons were far from sufficient. The, authorities cited herein pertaining to
somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ
must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the Magistrate in referring to
an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that, having brought about that
state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the consequences; and we said
that he was bound to use every effort to get the child back; that he must do much
more than write letters for the purpose; that he must advertise in America, and even if
necessary himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man could do in
the matter; and that the court would only accept clear proof of an absolute
impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the return did not show that every
possible effort to produce the women was made by the respondents. That the court
forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did not wish to see
presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash between executive officials and
the judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents another chance to
demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become
more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to
Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in
rounding up the women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was
provided. While charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly contested case are to
be expected, and while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal
fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial
compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our
sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being
perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive investigation. If any particular
individual is still restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas
corpus proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance
with it, nothing further in this connection remains to be done.
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine will at once command such respect without
Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose being unduly oppressive — such an amount is P100.
Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila,
Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yñigo, In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is
an hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila. necessary. The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz
are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of
The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days
and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to
inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25,
justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a certain 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So ordered.
person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court must, to
vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express
order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce the body of a the hope that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly
person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment.
contempt committed in the face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In
re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)
Arellano, C.J., Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur.
Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result.
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human
imperfections, we cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible exception
of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its
authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the
orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this does not
exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance.
The hacendero Yñigo appears to have been drawn into the case through a
misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto
Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal
representative of the city government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the
court, his counter-motion to strike from the record the memorandum of attorney for
the petitioners, which brings him into this undesirable position, must be granted.
When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the official who was
primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to
accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the
constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who
later, as the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return
of the unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of
Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were
unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court was only tardily
and reluctantly acknowledged.

It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance
thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as
P400 each, which would reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal
with him as for a contempt. Some members of the court are inclined to this stern view.
It would also be possible to find that since respondent Lukban did comply
substantially with the second order of the court, he has purged his contempt of the
first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful view. Between the
two extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban to
obey the first mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the administration
of justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered only as