PEOPLE VS. CUSI, JR.

FACTS: Respondents were charged with robbery in band with homicide, to which they
pleaded not guilty. During the trial, and while Sgt. Lucio Bano of the Police Force of Digos,
Davao was testifying as a prosecution witness regarding the extrajudicial confession
made to him by the accused Puesca, he said that the latter, aside from admitting his
participation in the commission of the offense charged, revealed that other persons
conspired with him to commit the offense, mentioning the name of each and everyone of
them. Following up this testimony, the prosecuting officer asked the witness to mention
in court the names of Puesca's alleged co-conspirators. Counsel for the accused-
respondents Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo objected to this, upon the ground that whatever
the witness would say would be hearsay as far as his clients were concerned. The
respondent judge resolved the objection directing the witness to answer the question but
without mentioning or giving the names of the accused who had interposed the objection.
In other words, the witness was allowed to answer the question and name his co-
conspirators except those who had raised the objection. The prosecuting officer's motion
for reconsideration of this ruling was denied. Hence the present petition
for certiorari praying that the abovementioned ruling of the respondent judge be declared
erroneous and for a further order directing said respondent judge to allow witness Bano
to answer the question in full.

ISSUE:

RULING: In the present case, the purpose of the prosecuting officer, as manifested by
him in the discussions below, is nothing more than to establish the fact that the accused
Puesca had mentioned to Sgt. Bano the names of those who conspired with him to
commit the offense charged, without claiming that Puesca's statement or the answer to
be given by Sgt. Bano would be competent and admissible evidence to show that the
persons so named really conspired with Puesca. For this limited purpose, we believe that
the question propounded to the witness was proper and the latter should have been
allowed to answer it in full, with the understanding, however, that his answer shall not to
be taken as competent evidence to show that the persons named really and actually
conspired with Puesca and later took part in the commission of the offense.

On the other hand, the fact which the prosecuting officer intended to establish would seem
to be relevant to explain why the police force of the place where the offense was
committed subsequently questioned and investigated the persons allegedly named by
Puesca.

Page 1 of 19
 CSC VS. BELAGAN

FACTS: Magdalena Gapuz filed an application with Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) Office in Baguio City for permit to operate a pre-school. One of the
requisites for the issuance of the permit was the inspection of the school premises by the
DECS Division Office.

Respondent Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of DECS and Complainant Gapuz visited

the school. In the course of inspection, while both descending the stairs, respondent
suddenly placed his arms around complainant’s shoulders and kissed her cheek. Gapuz
then wrote a letter-complaint for sexual indignities and harassment to former DECS
Secretary Ricardo Gloria. Respondent Belagan was then placed under suspension.
Meanwhile Ligaya Annawi, a public school teacher at Fort Del Pilar Elementary School,
alleged in her complaint accusing respondent of several sexual harassment acts and
imputation of dereliction of duty.

DECS conducted joint investigation of the complaints of Gapuz and Annawi, of which
respondent was found guilty and was ordered dismissed from service.

Respondent filed Motion for Reconsideration contending that he has never been charged
of any offense in his 37 years of service, and by contrast, Gapuz was charged with several
offenses of Defamation, Slight Physical Injuries, Grave Theats, Malicious Mischief, Unjust
Vexation, Light Threats, and Grave Oral Threats on separation occasions. Thus, the
numerous cases filed against Gapuz case doubt on her character, integrity and credibility.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complainant Gapuz is credible as a witness.

RULING: Respondent failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted in any of the criminal
cases specified by respondent. The general rule prevailing in a great majority of
jurisdictions is that it is not permissible to show that a witness has been arrested or that
he has been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or confined in jail for the
purpose of impairing his credibility.26 This view has usually been based upon one or more
of the following grounds or theories: (a) that a mere unproven charge against the witness
does not logically tend to affect his credibility, (b) that innocent persons are often arrested
or accused of a crime, (c) that one accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent until
his guilt is legally established, and (d) that a witness may not be impeached or discredited
by evidence of particular acts of misconduct.27 Significantly, the same Section 11, Rule
132 of our Revised Rules on Evidence provides that a witness may not be impeached by
evidence of particular wrongful acts. Such evidence is rejected because of the confusion
of issues and the waste of time that would be involved, and because the witness may not
be prepared to expose the falsity of such wrongful acts. 28 As it happened in this case,
Magdalena was not able to explain or rebut each of the charges against her listed by
respondent.

Page 2 of 19
But more than anything else, what convinces us to sustain the Resolution of the CSC is the fact
that it is supported by substantial evidence. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
Magdalena testified in a straightforward, candid and spontaneous manner. Her testimony is
replete with details, such as the number of times she and respondent inspected the pre-school,
the specific part of the stairs where respondent kissed her, and the matter about her transient
boarders during summer. Magdalena would not have normally thought about these details if she
were not telling the truth.

Page 3 of 19
 PEOPLE VS. BRIOSO

FACTS: Accused Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza were charged with the crime of murder
for killing Silvino Daria. Motive for the killing appears to have been the disapproval of
Sivino and Susana of Mariano Taeza’s courtship of their daughter, Angelita. Mariano
Taeza is a nephew of Silvino by a first degree cousin. The records of the case show that
on the night of December 23, 1966 spouses Silvino Daria and Susana Tumalip were in
their house. Prosecution’s eyewitness Cecilia Bernal was a niece and neighbour of the
spouses who lived only six (6) meters away from the spouses’ house. She narrated that
she was alarmed by the barking of dogs so she peeped through a crack in the wall of her
house. She saw accused carrying a long gun and heading towards Silvino’s house. Her
suspicions awakened, she went downstairs and shielded by the fence. She witnessed
appellant point a gun at the bamboo wall of Daria’s house. Two detonations followed and
thereafter she heard Daria moaning and his wife calling for help, saying her husband had
been shot. Bernal went to the house and found the victim prostrate, wounded and unable
to speak. The wife of the victim rushed to Silvino and he told her that he was shot by Juan
Brioso and Mariano Taeza. Silvino Daria perished one hour later as a result of gunshot
wounds in the abdomen and leg. A few days later, Cecilia Bernal and the widow, Susana
Tumalip, executed affidavits pointing to the two accused as the killers. Both accused
interposed alibi as their defense.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in relying on the uncorroborated and
contradictory testimony and statement of the prosecution witness Cecilia Bernal

RULING: The house of Cecilia Bernal was only six meters away from that of Silvino
Daria's. The night was brightly illuminated by the moon. Cecilia Bernal had known both
accused for a long time and it is admitted that they also know her. There could have been
no difficulty in identifying the accused under the circumstances.

Cecilia Bernal had no motive to impute falsely this heinous charge of murder against the
above-said accused, considering that Mariano Taeza is a nephew of the deceased by a
first degree cousin. Even Juan Brioso specifically said that he knew of no reason why she
should testify against him. Hence, her statement that she came to court only to tell the
truth should be believed. The witness also stated that she was hard of hearing and could
not understand some of the questions; thus, the alleged inconsistencies in her testimony
do not detract from the "positive and straightforward"1 identification of the accused as the
ones who were seen at the scene of the crime and who actually shot Silvino Daria.

Moreover, the testimony of Cecilia Bernal finds corroboration in the declaration of the
victim, who told his wife that it was Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza who shot him. This
statement does satisfy the requirements of an ante mortem statement. Judged by the
nature and extent of his wounds, Silvino Daria must have realized the seriousness of his
condition, and it can be safely inferred that he made the same under the consciousness
of impending death,considering that he died only one hour after being shot.

Page 4 of 19
 PEOPLE VS. GADDI

FACTS: At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 11, 1981, at San Bartolome,
Novaliches, Quezon City, Ernesto Guzman saw appellant Nerio Gaddi and the victim
Augusto Esguerra drinking gin. In the morning of the following day, December 12, 1981,
appellant told Ernesto Guzman that he killed his drinking partner Augusto Esguerra and
dumped his body in a toilet pit. Guzman advised appellant to surrender to the police. After
work, Guzman went to the police and reported what appellant told him.

Accused Gaddi alleged that on December 11, 1981, at around 2:00 to 5:00 p.m., he was
drinking with Augusta Esguerra (Bong Kuleleng) near the house of Ernesto Guzman. At
about 5:00 p.m., be was requested by Ernesto Guzman to buy gin. He left Ernesto
Guzman and Augusta Esguerra (who were allegedly drinking) in order to buy a bottle of
gin in a nearby store, about 200 meters away. At the store, he met an acquaintance and
they talked for a while before returning. Upon his arrival at the place (where they had a
drinking spree) he noticed stain of blood in the place where they had been drinking and
Augusta Esguerra, alias Bong Kuleleng was not there anymore. He inquired from Ernesto
Guzman the whereabouts of Augusta Esguerra and was told that the latter "went home
already". He then asked Guzman about the blood and was told that it was the blood stain
of a "butchered chicken." At about 12:00 o'clock midnight, Ernesto Guzman informed him
about the killing of Augusta Esguerra. Guzman narrated to him that Bong Kuleleng
(Augusta Esguerra) held his rooster by the neck and that his tattoo mark BCJ (Batang
City Jail) will be erased by him. He did not report the killing to the authorities. Guzman
likewise requested ban to admit the killing but he refused. While in the house, Guzman
filed the case ahead. He was later arrested and investigated while looking for the corpse.
When brought to the police station, he was forced to admit the killing of Augusto Esguerra

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Ernesto Guman cannot be given credence for
being hearsay.

RULING: A confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the

strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly
confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience

Proof that a person confessed to the commission of a crime can be presented in evidence
without violating the hearsay rule [Section 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court]
which only prohibits a witness from testifying as to those facts which he merely learned
from other persons but not as to those facts which he "knows of his own knowledge: that
is, which are derived from his own perception." Hence, while the testimony of a witness
regarding the statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the
fact asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose
of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement
was made or the tenor of such statement. Here, when Guzman testified that the appellant,

Page 5 of 19
who probably was bothered by his conscience, admitted the killing to him, there was no
violation of the hearsay rule as Guzman was testifying to a fact which he knows of his
own personal knowledge; that is, be was testifying to the fact that the appellant told him
that he stabbed Augusta Esguerra and not to the truth of the appellant's statement.

Page 6 of 19
 LEAKE VS. HAGERT

FACTS: On October 25, 1966, Allen Leake (plaintiff) was driving his tractor and plow on
a public highway after sunset. Charlotte Hagert (defendant) drove her car into the rear of
Leake’s plow, which was being towed by his tractor. Leake sued Hagert, alleging that her
negligence was the sole and proximate cause for his personal injuries and the damages
to his plow and tractor. Hagert counterclaimed, alleging that the sole and proximate cause
of the crash was Leake’s negligence. At trial, the trial court admitted testimony from
Edward Gross, an adjuster who conducted an investigation of the accident. Gross testified
that he spoke to Leake’s son, who told him that a rear red light on the tractor had been
broken for some time. At least three other witnesses testified about the condition of the
rear red light. The jury returned a verdict dismissing both Leake’s and Hagert’s claims.
Leake filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. Leake appealed the
dismissal and the denial of his motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Edward Gross is inadmissible for being
hearsay.

RULING: The hearsay rule prohibits use of a person's assertion, as equivalent to

testimony of the fact asserted, unless the assertor is brought to testify in court on the
stand, where he may be probed and cross-examined as to the grounds of his assertion
and his qualifications to make it. Allen Leake contends that whether or not the red lens
was out at the time of the accident is a material question of fact, determinative as to the
contributory negligence by Allen Leake, and whether he complied with the standards
which requires that every tractor, when operating upon a highway of this state at any time
from one-half hour after sunset to a half-hour before sunrise, be equipped with at least
one lamp displaying a red light visible, when lighted, from a distance of one thousand feet
to the rear of such tractor. Leake's son did not testify in the present action; he was not a
party to the action; his statement was not made under oath; his statement was not subject
to cross-examination; and he was not available as a witness at the time of trial because
he was in the Army and overseas. We find that it was error for the trial court to admit into
evidence the testimony concerning what Leake's son said to Edward Gross; the son's
statement was hearsay and should have been excluded.

Page 7 of 19
 RICHMOND VS. ANCHUELO

FACTS: Anchuello, who was blind, employed Richmond, a doctor, to treat his eyes.
Plaintiff did so, without success, and brought this action to recover for his services. The
principal question in the case is, What was the contract between the parties?

Richmond claimed that he was to receive 200 pesos in any event, and if he effected a
cure he was to receive 500 pesos more. Anchuello claimed that if a cure was effected
Richmond was to receive 200 pesos, but if no cure was effected he was to receive
nothing. The court below found upon the evidence in favor of Richmond, and we think this
finding is supported by the proof.

At the trial Anchuello presented a witness, Jose Pastor, and offered to prove by him that
Anchuello, on returning from Richmond’s office, had stated to the witness that Richmond
had agreed to cure him for 200 pesos, and not to charge anything if no cure was effected.
The judge excluded this evidence, to which ruling Anchuello excepted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Jose Pastor is admissible.

RULING: It will be noticed that the witness did not offer to testify to anything which
Richmond had said, but offered to testify to what Anchuello said that Richmond had said.
The witness did not know that Richmond had made these statements; he only knew that
Anchuello said that Richmond had made them. Such evidence is inadmissible, according
to the provisions of section 276 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Page 8 of 19
 NICOLAS VS. ENRIQUEZ

FACTS: At the trial of a criminal case for concubinage filed in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal by Corazon Vizcarra against the defendant Jimmy William Nelson and his co-
defendant Priscilla Fontanosa, the court ruled out testimony of three prosecution
witnesses tending to show that a boy named Paul William Nelson, born in Cavite on
September 17, 1949, was the son of both defendants. The said testimony was objected
to as immaterial, but the objection was sustained on the ground that inquiry into the
paternity of a natural child is forbidden except in actions for forcible acknowledgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not prior sexual relations between defendants can be admitted to be
used as evidence

RULING: It is a rule of evidence that what one did at one time is no proof of his having
done the same or a similar thing at another time. But the rule is not absolute, for it is
subject to the exceptions enumerated in section 17 of Rule 123, Rules of Court, which
reads —

SEC. 17. Evidence of similar acts. — Evidence that one did or ommitted to do a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or ommitted to do
the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a
specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or
usage, and the like.

We are not persuaded that the preferred evidence, when viewed in the light of facts
brought out in the present case, would come under any of the exceptions named. It
appears from the order containing the questioned ruling that the boy Paul was born five
years before complainant's marriage to one of the defendants. This means that the
previous sexual relations sought to be proved were far removed in point of time from the
illicit act now complained of, and having, moreover, taken place when there was as yet
no legal impediment to the same, they furnish no rational basis for the inference that they
would be continued after complainant's marriage to one of the defendants had created
such impediment and made continuance of sexual relations between the defendants a
crime.

The evidence objected to being immaterial and irrelevant, the trial court cannot be
compelled to admit it regardless of whether or not the New Civil Code permits
investigation or inquiry into the paternity of a natural child except in actions for forcible
acknowledgement.

Page 9 of 19
 BALDRIDGE VS. MATTHEWS

FACTS: The gravamen of the tort is the indulgence by the offender in sexual intercourse
with another's wife without her husband's consent: "One who, without the husband's
consent, has sexual intercourse with a married woman is liable to the husband for the
harm thereby caused to any of his legally protected marital interests."

At trial, the plaintiff, in support of his allegation that his wife and the defendant had stayed
overnight in a hotel tryst, sought to show that they had baggage with them when the
defendant registered himself and companion as "Mr. & Mrs. W.D. Miller". The significance
of the baggage would be in its confirmation of an intended overnight sojourn. To prove
the presence of the baggage, the plaintiff called as a witness the hotel room clerk who
was on duty when the defendant registered. The clerk testified, over the defendant's
objection, that the room was not paid for in advance and that it was the uniform practice
of the hotel to require payment in advance for lodging when the registrant was without
luggage. The appellant argues that the testimony in respect of the hotel's practice was
inadmissible since evidence as to how an act was done on other occasions is irrelevant
for the purpose of showing what was done on a particular occasion

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the hotel room clerk is admissible as evidence

RULING: In so contending, the defendant fails to reflect accurately the rationale of the
pertinent principles involved. The probative value of a person's habit or custom, as
showing what was done on a particular occasion, is not open to doubt. Whether evidence
of such usage or habit is admissible to show what occurred in a specific instance depends
on the "invariable regularity" of the usage or habit. To be admissible the usage must have
"sufficient regularity to make it probable that it would be carried out in every instance or
in most instances": Wigmore, loc. cit. supra. In the present case, it seems clear that the
clerk's testimony as to the hotel's usage is such as to come within the compass of the
Wigmore definition.

The cases cited by the defendant in this connection are not apposite. None of them
involved usage or habit even remotely approaching fixed regularity. For example, in the
Roney case, supra, the only evidence of usage was that, on a single previous occasion,
an insurance agent did not fill out an application blank as he had at other times; in the
Veit case, supra, the only evidence of usage, was that on a previous occasion the
decedent had tampered with certain steam appliances. There was no showing of custom
or usage in those cases such as there is in the present instance.

Page 10 of 19
 PEOPLE VS. STEELE

FACTS: The defendant, Stephen Steele, pleaded not guilty to an indictment which
charged that he "did offer to unlawfully sell a narcotic drug and then did unlawfully sell to
John Stribling, Junior a quantity of a certain purported narcotic drug". He waived a jury
trial, was found guilty after a trial before a judge, and was sentenced to the penitentiary
for a term of not less than two nor more than six years. Upon this writ of error he contends
that the allegations of the indictment were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that prejudicial testimony was admitted over his objection.

An informer, Robert Jackson, a Federal narcotics agent, Joseph Dino, Jr., and a State
narcotics agent, John Stribling, Jr., testified for the People. Jackson testified that about
two weeks before December 11, 1958, the defendant had told him that he could buy
narcotics from the defendant and had given him his phone number. Several narcotics
agents were present about 6:30 P.M. on December 11, when Jackson telephoned the
defendant. The defendant was not in, but he returned the call later. Jackson told him that
he wanted to buy an ounce of raw heroin. The defendant said it would cost $400, and
they arranged to meet. Agent Dino listened to the conversation on an extension
telephone, and corroborated Jackson's testimony with respect to it.

Stribling accompanied Jackson to the meeting place. There the defendant questioned
Stribling's presence, saying to Jackson, "Aw, what's this here?" Jackson replied "He's all
right. He's with me." Jackson testified that he then "stepped out of the picture and Officer
Stribling and him transacted the business."Stribling gave the defendant a roll of bills, the
serial numbers of which had been recorded, and the defendant gave him a small package
wrapped in paper. Stribling then returned to Jackson's *144 apartment and performed a
field test which showed that the substance in the package was not narcotics. Chemical
analysis later disclosed it to be quinine hydrochloride.

Agent Dino testified that he observed the meeting while sitting in a parked automobile
and that he placed the defendant under arrest after the transaction was completed.
Stribling testified that after the defendant was arrested, he denied dealing in narcotics but
said that he needed the money and "When you find a sucker, bump his head." Dino's
testimony corroborated this conversation.

The defendant denied that he had offered to sell narcotics. He testified that he had seen
Jackson several weeks before the arrest, at which time Jackson had complained of being
sick and had asked him if he had any quinine. He went home and got Jackson the quinine.
He testified that he wanted a job, and gave Jackson his phone number so that Jackson
could call him if he learned of anyone who was looking for a doorman or houseman. He
also testified that when he spoke to Jackson on the telephone Jackson asked if he had
any more of "the stuff you gave me the other day," and also requested him to keep some
money that Jackson had won gambling because "I don't want my old lady to know it." He
testified that he gave the quinine to Jackson, but that "the other fellow" gave him the
money.

Page 11 of 19
The statute under which the defendant was prosecuted provides: "Whoever agrees,
consents or in any manner offers to unlawfully sell any narcotic drugs to any person, and
then sells to any person any non-narcotic substance or material shall be imprisoned". The
defendant contends, and the People agree, that to establish guilt the proof must show
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant offered to sell narcotics to Stribling, and
sold a non-narcotic substance to him. The defendant urges, however, that the evidence
shows that if any offer to sell was made, it was made to Jackson, and not to Stribling.

The interpretation that the parties have placed upon the statute and the indictment would
seem to exclude the case in which A offers to sell a narcotic drug to B, who communicates
the offer to C, to whom A then sells a non-narcotic substance.

ISSUE:

RULING: We express no opinion as to the correctness of this interpretation, for the court
was justified in finding from the evidence in this case that the defendant offered to sell a
narcotic drug to Stribling. Stribling testified that he said to the defendant, "$400 is a lot of
money for an ounce of heroin. I have to be sure that it's good stuff. He says `It's good. It's
good. Let's deal.'" This testimony was sufficient to establish an offer to sell narcotics to
Stribling, and the sale to him was established by his testimony that "He handed me the
package with one hand and I handed him the roll of bills with the other."

The defendant also contends that the court erred in admitting prejudicial evidence over
his objection. Jackson was the first witness for the prosecution. On direct examination,
after he had given his name and address and had stated that he used narcotics, he was
asked, "What kind of business dealings did you have with the defendant prior to
December 11, 1958." Over objection he was permitted to answer, "Buying narcotics." The
defendant's motion for a mistrial was denied.

The People suggest that this evidence of other offenses may be justified by our decision
in People v. Aldridge, 19 Ill. 2d 176, 180. The circumstances here, however, differ from
those in the Aldridge case. There the reference to prior offenses was not elicited at the
outset of the prosecution's case, but came in the course of the defendants' assertion of
their innocence upon direct examination by their own attorney. It was in that context that
we pointed out that the "testimony tended to negative the possibility of innocent *146 or
inadvertent conduct on the part of the defendants, and to establish their guilty knowledge,
and so would apparently have been admissible even if offered by the prosecution."

The unique nature of the crime with which the defendant was here charged must be taken
into account in determining the admissibility of the evidence. This case does not involve
a prosecution for the sale of narcotics, but rather a prosecution for offering to sell narcotics
and then selling a different substance. The element of deceit is thus a principal ingredient
in the offense, and the overtones are those of confidence game, or of obtaining money
under false pretenses. Evidence of earlier transactions in narcotics supports an inference
that those earlier sales were part of a course of conduct designed to induce the belief that
what was now offered for sale was also a narcotic drug. That evidence also makes it more

Page 12 of 19
likely that on the present occasion the defendant offered to sell narcotics rather than some
other substance, and it tends to show that the defendant knew that what he was selling
was not a narcotic drug. The evidence of other transactions was thus independently
relevant apart from its tendency to show the bad character of the accused, and so its
admission was not improper.

Page 13 of 19
 US VS. MERCADO

FACTS: These defendants were charged with the crime of coaccion in the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Bulacan. On the 13th of March, 1912, one Claro Mercado
presented a complaint against the defendants in the court of the justice of the peace of
Baliuag. The justice of the peace conducted a preliminary examination and found that
there was probable cause for believing that the defendants were guilty of the crime
charged and held them for trial in the Court of First Instance. On the 21st of March, 1912,
the prosecuting attorney of said province presented the complaint, which alleged:

That the said accused on December 22, 1911, in the municipality of Baliuag,
Province of Bulacan, P. I., did willfully and criminally, without legitimate authority
therefore, and by means of violence or force employed upon the person of Claro
Mercado, prevent the latter from rendering aid to Maria R. Mateo in order that
Santiago Mercado might at his pleasure maltreat the said Maria R. Mateo, in a
violation of law.

After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the Honorable Alberto
Barretto, judge, found the defendants guilty of the crime in the complaint, without any
aggravating or extenuating circumstances, and sentenced each of them to be imprisoned
for a period of two months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties of
the law, to pay a fine of 325 pesetas and in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment, allowing to the defendants one-half of the time they had already suffered
in prison, and each to pay one-third part of the costs.

Mr. Ricardo Gonzalez Lloret, attorney for the private prosecutor, asked the witness for
the defense, the said Santiago Mercado, who is mentioned in the complaint presented in
said cause, the following question:

How many times have you been convicted of assault upon other persons?

To this question, the defendant Tomas Mercado objected on the ground that the question
was impertinent. Mr. Lloret explained the purpose of his question by saying:

I wish to demonstrate that he has a pugnacious disposition. I have had occasion

to defend him in various causes for assault.

ISSUE: Whether or not the question posed tends to show that defendants were either
quilty or not guilty of the crime charged.

RULING: Generally speaking, a witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom
he has been called, except by showing (a) that he has made contradictory statements: or
(b) by showing that his general reputation for the truth, honesty, or integrity is bad. (Sec.
342, Act No. 190.) The question to which the defendant objected neither attempted to
show that the witness had made contradictory statements nor that his general reputation
for truth, honesty, or integrity was bad. While you cannot impeach the credibility of a

Page 14 of 19
witness, except by showing that he has made contradictory statements or that his general
reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, yet, nevertheless, you may show by an
examination of the witness himself or from the record of the judgment, that he has been
convicted of a high crime. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) In the present case, the other offense
to which the question above related was not a high crime, as that term is generally used,
and we assume that the phrase "high crime," as used in section 342, is used in its ordinary
signification. High crimes are generally defined as such immoral and unlawful acts as are
nearly allied and equal in guilt to felonies. We believe that the objection to the above
question was properly interposed and should have been sustained. The question now
arises, did the admission of the question prejudice the rights of the defendants? If there
was proof enough adduced during the trial of the cause, excluding the particular proof
brought out by this question to show that the defendants are guilty of the crime. then the
question and answer and the ruling of the court upon the same did not affect prejudicially
the interests of the defendants. Errors committed by the trial court, which are not
prejudicial to the rights of the parties, should be disregarded by the court. In our opinion
the evidence clearly shows that the witness committed the assault to which reference is
made in the complaint in the present cause. Whether he had committed other assaults or
not was a matter of no importance in the present action. The admission or rejection,
therefore, of the proof to which such question related could in no way prejudice the rights
of the defendants.

Page 15 of 19
 PEOPLE VS. LAQUINON

FACTS: On November 13, 1972, at about 11:30 o'clock in the evening, Samama Buat,
barrio captain of Clib, Hagonoy, Davao del Sur, was at his residence in barrio Clib. In a
short while he heard gunshots coming from the bank of a river some three hundred meters
to the south of his house. Then, his brother, Leocario Buat, arrived and told him that a
man was shouting for help at the bank of the river. Samama Buat told his brother to call
the barrio councilman. Thereafter, he proceeded to the place where the unidentified man
was. His brother, Leocario and the barrio councilman also arrived there. Samama Buat
found the man lying on the sand and asked who he was. The man answered, "I am Pablo
Remonde". Remonde's two hands were tied on his back. He was lying face down.

Samama Buat then took the "ante mortem" statement of Pablo Remonde. He asked him
who he was to which he answered that he was Pablo Remonde. Samama Buat asked
"who shot you" and Remonde said that it was Gregorio Laquinon. He asked Pablo
Remonde whether from the gunshot wounds he suffered he would survive to which the
victim answered "I do not know”. After that, barrio captain Buat went to the municipality
of Hagonoy and reported to Vice Mayor Antonio Biran the shooting of Pablo Remonde.
Vice Mayor Biran went to the scene of the incident and asked the victim who shot him to
which the latter answered that he was shot by Gregorio Laquinon. Pablo Remonde was
placed on a jeep of the Vice Mayor and brought to the hospital (p. 23, Id,). Pablo Remonde
was admitted to the Canos Hospital in Digos, Davao del Sur where he was attended to
by Dr. Alfonso Llanos. Dr. Llanos performed an operation on the victim from whose body
a slug was recovered. Pablo Remonde died in the hospital on November 16, 1972
because of bullet wounds.

The accused-appellant prays for the reversal of the appealed judgment on the ground
that the lower court erred in finding him guilty of the crime charged on the basis of the
statement attributed to the deceased Pablo Remonde which reads:

Q State your name and other personal circumstances.

A Pablo Remonde y Saballa, 24 years old, laborer and resident of Pob. this mun.
Q Who shot you?
A Mr. Laquinon, a person who ran for councilor before the ticket of Liberal last local
election and son of Suelo Maravllias whose name I don't know.
Q Why you were shot by said persons above?
A They are suspecting me that I'm an informer of Vice Mayor Viran regarding KM .
Q Do you think you'll die with your wound?
A I don't know sir.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony presented is considered as a dying declaration or

ante-mortem declaration

RULING: The fact that the deceased had named the son of Suelo Maravillas who turned
out as Cristino Nerosa as one of those who shot him in his dying declaration does not
make the deceased an incompetent witness. Nor does it render said dying declaration

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incredible of belief. The testimony of the accused that he and Nerosa separated and that
he alone brought the deceased to Noli Cabardo is not corroborated. It may be that Nerosa
was with the accused when the latter shot the deceased, as stated in the dying
declaration, but that the accused testified that Nerosa was not with him when he brought
the deceased to Noli Cabardo in order to free Nerosa from criminal liability.

Nor does the testimony of Barrio Captain Samama Buat that the place was dark and that
the victim had told him that he was shot by members of the KM make the deceased an
incompetent witness. On the contrary, it strengthens the statement of the deceased since
the accused is a member of the KM.

But the dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as an ante-
mortem declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not.
The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in extremist, "at the point
of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is the sole basis for admitting this
kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule." 1

It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was made
immediately after the incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time
to concoct a charge against the accused.

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 US VS EVANGELISTA

FACTS: Romana R. Evangelista was the tenant of a portion of a building situated on

Carriedo Street, Manila, and used the ground floor for a store where were sold hats and
various other articles, while the upper floor was used as living quarters for herself and a
number of student boarders. On June 2, 1912, at 7:01 p.m., the fire department answered
an alarm of fire which proved to be in that part of the building occupied by the appellant.
At the time the firemen arrived, dense black smoke was issuing from under the eaves of
the building, and the fumes of burning coal oil were plainly discernible. The fire originated
in the second floor of the building in the appellant's living quarters. Before the fire was
finally extinguished, the building was damaged, according to the testimony of record, in
the amount of P10,562.

The acting chief of the fire department testified that the fire could not been burning more
than three or four minutes when he arrived. He declared positively that the fire could not
have gained the headway it had or caused the damage it did if coal oil had not been used,
and that the whole place appeared to have been saturated with coal oil.

Three insurance polices taken out by the appellant were introduced by the prosecution.

Teodorico Fungo, who was the servant of the appellant at the time of this first fire, testified
that early on that morning, while boiling some milk, the appellant ordered him to go
downstairs and light some papers in a box standing in the court just between the
appellant's door and the door to the piano store. Witness refused to do so, and then saw
the appellant to go downstairs with a bottle of petroleum and saturate the papers in the
box with the petroleum, after which she came back upstairs and sent him out to purchase
four centavos worth of petroleum. Upon his return she took the petroleum from him and
went downstairs. Pretty soon be heard people downstairs crying, "Fire, fire," and then he
heard the appellant saying the same thing to her son. Witness then wrapped up his things
and left the house. The testimony of this witness was objected to on the ground that at
the time of the trial he was living at the house of a member of the city secret-service force
who assisted in the investigation of the origin of the fire occuring on June 2, without paying
for his accommodations. This witness, however, testified that he was washing dishes at
this house, and evidently he was acting as a servant. In any event, this fact would not
effect his competency as a witness. It was established by indisputable evidence that a
fire occurred as stated above on May 31, and that unmistakable evidences of
incendiarism were found by the fire department.

ISSUE: Whether or not the introduction of all evidence relative to the fire of May 31 is
admissible as evidence.

RULING: In People vs. Shainwold (51 Ca., 468), the court said:

On a trial for arson, the prosecution may prove that the prisoner had attempted to
set fire to the house on a day previous to the burning alleged in the indictment, for

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 the purpose of showing the intent of the prisoner in subsequently setting fire to the
house.

In Knights vs. State (58 Neb., 225; 78 N.W., 508), the court said: "Where a person is
charged with the commission of a specific crime, testimony may be received of other
similar acts, committed about the same time, for the purpose only of establishing the
criminal intent of the accused."

And in People vs. Lattimore (86 Cal., 403; 24 Pac., 1091), a similar ruling was made,
when the court said that "evidence tending to show that defendant started the former fire
was admissible to prove intent." This principle has been applied by the courts of many
jurisdictions. (3 Cyc., 1007; 1 Wigmore on Evidence, §§ 303, 354.) There was no error in
receiving the evidence as to the fire occurring on May 31 to show intent.

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