G.R. No. 158466.
June 15, 2004 This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
PABLO V. OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND MARIO B. CRESPO a.k.a. MARK
JIMENEZ, respondents.
Election Law; Election Code; There must be a final judgment before the
election in order that the votes of a disqualified candidate can be considered
“stray”.—In Codilla, Sr. vs. De Venecia, we expounded on the application of
Section 6, R.A. No. 6646. There, we emphasized that there must be a final
judgment before the electionin order that the votes of a disqualified candidate
can be considered “stray”.
Same; Same; The subsequent disqualification of a candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes does not entitle the candidate who
garnered the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner. —
Anent the second issue, we revert back to the settled jurisprudence that the
subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained the highest number
of votes does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner. This principle has been reiterated
in a number our decisions, such as Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC, Abella vs.
COMELEC, Benito vs. COMELEC and Domino vs. COMELEC. As a matter of
fact, even as early as 1912, it was held that the candidate who lost in an
election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event that the candidate who
won is found to be ineligible for the office for which he was elected.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Pete Quirino-Quadra for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Froilan Bacungan & Associates for private respondent Mr. Jimenez.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to
the repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a
declaration of election in favor of the person who obtained a plurality of votes
and does not entitle a candidate receiving the next highest number of votes
to be declared elected.1
Procedure, as amended, filed by petitioner Pablo V. Ocampo. He alleged that
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), herein public
respondent, committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing in HRET Case No.
01-024, Pablo Ocampo vs. Mario “Mark Jimenez” Crespo, the (a)
Resolution2 dated March 27, 2003 holding that “protestant” (herein petitioner)
cannot be proclaimed the duly elected Representative of the 6th District of
Manila since being a second placer, he “cannot be proclaimed the first among
the remaining qualified candidates”; and (b) Resolution3 dated June 2, 2003
denying his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are uncontroverted:
On May 23, 2001, the Manila City Board of Canvassers proclaimed private
respondent Mario B. Crespo, a.k.a. Mark Jimenez, the duly elected
Congressman of the 6th District of Manila pursuant to the May 14, 2001
elections. He was credited with 32,097 votes or a margin of 768 votes over
petitioner who obtained 31,329 votes.
On May 31, 2001, petitioner filed with the HRET an electoral
protest4 against private respondent, impugning the election in 807 precincts
in the 6th District of Manila on the following grounds: (1) misreading of votes
garnered by petitioner; (2) falsification of election returns; (3) substitution of
election returns; (4) use of marked, spurious, fake and stray ballots; and (5)
presence of ballots written by one person or two persons. The case was
docketed as HRET Case No. 01-024. Petitioner prayed that a revision and
appreciation of the ballots in the 807 contested precincts be conducted; and
that, thereafter, he be proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of the 6th
District of Manila.
On June 18, 2001, private respondent filed his answer with counter-
protest5 vehemently denying that he engaged in massive vote buying. He also
opposed petitioner’s allegation that there is a need for the revision and
appreciation of ballots.
After the preliminary conference between the parties on July 12, 2001,
the HRET issued a Resolution6 limiting the issues to: first, whether massive
vote-buying was committed by private respondent; and second, whether
petitioner can be proclaimed the duly elected Representative of the 6th District
of Manila.
Meanwhile, on March 6, 2003, the HRET, in HRET Cases Nos. 01-
020, Bienvenido Abante & Prudencio Jalandoni vs. Mario Crespo, and 01-
023, Rosenda Ann M. Ocampo vs. Mario Crespo, issued Resolutions declaring
that private respondent is “ineligible for the Office of Representative of Sixth
District of Manila for lack of residence in the district” and ordering “him to
vacate his office.”7 Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied.8
On March 12, 2003, petitioner filed a motion to implement Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 6646,9 which reads:
“Section 6. Effects of Disqualification Case.—Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest and, upon motion of the complain-ant or any intervenor, may during
the pendency thereof, order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.”
Petitioner averred that since private respondent was declared disqualified in
HRET Cases Nos. 01-020 and 01-023, the votes cast for him should not be
counted. And having garnered the second highest number of votes, he
(petitioner) should be declared the winner in the May 14, 2001 elections and
proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.
On March 26, 2003, private respondent filed an opposition to petitioner’s
motion to implement the afore-quoted provision.
On March 27, 2003, the HRET issued a Resolution holding that private
respondent was guilty of vote-buying and disqualifying him as Congressman
of the 6th District of Manila. Anent the second issue of whether petitioner can
be proclaimed the duly elected Congressman, the HRET held:
“x x x Jurisprudence has long established the doctrine that a second placer
cannot be proclaimed the first among the remaining qualified candidates. The
fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected
does not necessarily give the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes the right to be declared the winner of the elective office. x x
x 2) DENY protestant’s (petitioner) Motion to Implement Section 6, Republic
It is of no moment that there is only a margin of 768 votes between
protestant and protestee. Whether the margin is ten or ten thousand, it still
remains that protestant did not receive the mandate of the majority during
the elections. Thus, to proclaim him as the duly elected representative in the
stead of protestee would be anathema to the most basic precepts of
republicanism and democracy as enshrined within our Constitution. In effect,
we would be advocating a massive disenfranchisement of the majority of the
voters of the sixth district of Manila.
Congressional elections are different from local government elections. In
local government elections, when the winning candidate for governor or
mayor is subsequently disqualified, the vice-governor or the vice-mayor, as
the case may be, succeeds to the position by virtue of the Local Government
Code. It is different in elections for representative. When a voter chooses his
congressional candidate, he chooses only one. If his choice is concurred in by
the majority of voters, that candidate is declared the winner. Voters are not
afforded the opportunity of electing a ‘substitute congressman’ in the
eventuality that their first choice dies, resigns, is disqualified, or in any other
way leaves the post vacant. There can only be one representative for that
particular legislative district. There are no runners-up or second placers. Thus,
when the person vested with the mandate of the majority is disqualified from
holding the post he was elected to, the only recourse to ascertain the new
choice of the electorate is to hold another election. x x x
This does not mean that the Sixth Legislative District of Manila will be without
adequate representation in Congress. Article VI, Section 9 of the Constitution,
and Republic Act No. 6645 allows Congress to call a special election to fill up
this vacancy. There are at least 13 months until the next congressional
elections, which is more than sufficient time within which to hold a special
election to enable the electorate of the Sixth District of Manila to elect their
representative.
For this reason, the Tribunal holds that protestant cannot be proclaimed
as the duly elected representative of the Sixth legislative District of Manila.
In view of the conclusion herein reached, it is unnecessary to rule on the
recount and revision of ballots in the protested and counter-protested
precincts.
WHEREFORE, the Tribunal Resolved to:
xxx xxx
Act No. 6646 by declaring the votes cast for Mario Crespo as stray votes.”
Petitioner filed a partial motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence,
the present petition for certiorari.
Petitioner contends that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion
when it ruled that “it is unnecessary to rule on the recount and revision of
ballots in the protested and counter-protested precincts.” He maintains that it
is the ministerial duty of the HRET to implement the provisions of Section 6,
R.A. No. 6646 specifically providing that “any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted.”
In his comment, private respondent counters that what the law requires
is that the disqualification by final judgment takes place before the election.
Here, the HRET Resolutions disqualifying him as Representative of the 6th
District of Manila were rendered long after the May 14, 2001 elections. He
also claims that the Resolutions are not yet final and executory because they
are the subjects of certiorari proceedings before this Court. Hence, all his
votes shall be counted and none shall be considered stray.
The HRET, in its comment, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
merely reiterates its ruling.
The petition must be dismissed.
The issues here are: (1) whether the votes cast in favor of private
respondent should not be counted pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646;
and (2) whether petitioner, a second placer in the May 14, 2001 congressional
elections, can be proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District
of Manila.
The issues raised are not novel. In Codilla, Sr. vs. De Venecia,10 we
expounded on the application of Section 6, R.A. No. 6646. There, we
emphasized that there must be a final judgment before the election in order
that the votes of a disqualified candidate can be considered “stray”, thus:
“Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code
require a final judgment before the election for the votes of a disqualified
candidate to be considered “stray.” Hence, when a candidate has not yet been
disqualified by final judgment during the election day and was voted for, the
votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to
disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides.”
The obvious rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a
candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election
day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any intention to misapply
their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified
to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of
government.11
In the present case, private respondent was declared disqualified almost
twenty-two (22) months after the May 14, 2001 elections. Obviously, the
requirement of “final judgment before election” is absent. Therefore,
petitioner can not invoke Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.
Anent the second issue, we revert back to the settled jurisprudence that the
subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained the highest number
of votes does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner.12 This principle has been
reiterated in a number our decisions, such as Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC,13 Abella
vs. COMELEC,14 Benito vs. COMELEC15 and Domino vs. COMELEC.16 As a
matter of fact, even as early as 1912, it was held that the candidate who lost
in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event that the candidate
who won is found to be ineligible for the office for which he was elected.17
In Geronimo vs. Ramos,18 if the winning candidate is not qualified and
cannot qualify for the office to which he was elected, a permanent vacancy is
thus created. The second placer is just that, a second placer—he lost in the
elections, he was repudiated by either the majority or plurality of voters. He
could not be proclaimed winner as he could not be considered the first among
the qualified candidates. To rule otherwise is to misconstrue the nature of the
democratic electoral process and the sociological and psychological
underpinnings behind voters’ preferences.19
At any rate, the petition has become moot and academic. The Twelfth
Congress formally adjourned on June 11, 2004. And on May 17, 2004, the City
Board of Canvassers proclaimed Bienvenido Abante the duly elected
Congressman of the Sixth District of Manila pursuant to the May 10, 2004
elections.
In the recent case of Enrile vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal,20 we ruled that
a case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy
between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the
merits. Worth reiterating is our pronouncement in Gancho-on vs. Secretary of
Labor and Employment, thus:21
“It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted
to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual
interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the
issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so
that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no
actual substantial relief to which petitioner would be entitled and which would
be negated by the dismissal of the petition.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,

Sr. Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., No part. Participated in HRET case.
Vitug and Corona, JJ., On Official Leave.
Panganiban, J., No part. Participated in deliberations in HRET.
Quisumbing, J., No part. Prior action in HRET.
Ynares-Santiago, J., On Leave.
Petition dismissed.

Note.—Jurisprudence provides that all votes cast in an election must be

considered, otherwise voters shall be disenfranchised. ( Immam vs.
Commission on Elections, 322 SCRA 866 [2000])
 G.R. No. 192984. February 28, 2012
ROLANDO D. LAYUG, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
MARIANO VELARDE (alias “BROTHER MIKE”) and BUHAY PARTY-
LIST, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Congress; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET); The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of its Members.—Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of its Members. Section 5 (1) of the same Article identifies who
the “members” of the House are: Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring added).
Same; Same; The members of the House of Representatives are of two
kinds: (1) members who shall be elected from legislative districts; and (2)
those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.—Clearly, the members of the
House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1) members who shall be elected
from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. In this case, Buhay Party-List was entitled to two seats in the
House that went to its first two nominees, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr.
and William Irwin C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother Mike, being the fifth
nominee, did not get a seat and thus had not become a member of the House
of Representatives. Indubitably, the HRET has no jurisdiction over the issue
of Brother Mike’s qualifications.
Same; Same; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); Party-List System
Act; Section 6 of said Party-List System Act states that “the COMELEC may
motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional
or sectoral party, organization or coalition.”—Neither does the HRET have
jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay Party-List, as it is vested by law,
specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the COMELEC. Section 6 of
said Act states that “the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition xxx.” Accordingly, in the case of Abayon vs. HRET,
We ruled that the HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed
the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list
and Bantay party-list insofar as they sought the disqualifications of said party-
lists. Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review decisions, orders, or
resolutions of the COMELEC provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution and Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that
has jurisdiction to hear the instant petition.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Every pleading
must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either
case his address which should not be a post office box.—A party may sue or
defend an action pro se. Under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court,
“(e)very pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him,
stating in either case his address which should not be a post office box.” x x x
From the fact alone that the address which Layug furnished the COMELEC was
incorrect, his pretensions regarding the validity of the proceedings and
promulgation of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010 for being in violation of
his constitutional right to due process are doomed to fail. His refusal to rectify
the error despite knowledge thereof impels Us to conclude that he deliberately
stated an inexistent address with the end in view of delaying the proceedings
upon the plea of lack of due process. As the COMELEC aptly pointed out,
Layug contemptuously made a mockery of election laws and procedure by
appearing before the Commission by himself or by different counsels when he
wants to, and giving a fictitious address to ensure that he does not receive
mails addressed to him. He cannot thus be allowed to profit from his own
wrongdoing. To rule otherwise, considering the circumstances in the instant
case, would place the date of receipt of pleadings, judgments and processes
within Layug’s power to determine at his pleasure. This, We cannot
countenance.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; Mandamus, as a remedy, is
available to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty.
It cannot compel the doing of an act involving the exercise of discretion one
way or the other.—Mandamus, as a remedy, is available to compel the doing
of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. It cannot compel the doing of
an act involving the exercise of discretion one way or the other. Section 3,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court clearly provides: SEC. 3. Petition for
mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act
required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.
Same; Civil Procedure; Motions; A motion without a notice of hearing is
considered pro forma.—It should likewise be pointed out that the aforesaid
Motion for Reconsideration was filed without the requisite notice of hearing.
We have held time and again that the failure to comply with the mandatory
requirements under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court renders
the motion defective. As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is
considered pro forma. None of the acceptable exceptions obtain in this case.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Evasco, Abinales & Evasco Law Offices for petitioner.
A.H. Labay & Associates Law Office for private respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer
for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, petitioner Rolando
D. Layug seeks to (1) enjoin the implementation of the Resolution 1 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division, dated June 15, 2010,
which denied his petition to disqualify respondent Buhay Hayaan Yumabong
Party-List (hereinafter Buhay Party-List) from participating in the 2010 Party-
List Elections, and Mariano Velarde (Brother Mike) from being its nominee; (2)
nullify Buhay Party-List’s proclamation under COMELEC En Banc NBC
Resolution2 No. 10-034 dated July 30, 2010; and (3) compel the COMELEC En
Banc to rule on his Motion for Reconsideration3 dated 28 July 2010.
The Facts
On March 31, 2010, petitioner Rolando D. Layug (Layug), in his capacity as a
taxpayer and concerned citizen, filed pro se a Petition to Disqualify4 (SPA No.
10-016 [DCN]) Buhay Party-List from participating in the May 10, 2010
elections, and Brother Mike from being its nominee. He argued that Buhay
Party-List is a mere “extension of the El Shaddai,” which is a religious sect. As
such, it is disqualified from being a party-list under Section 5, Paragraph 2,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,5 as well as Section 6, Paragraph 1 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941,6otherwise known as the “Party-List System Act.”
Neither does Brother Mike, who is allegedly a billionaire real estate
businessman and the spiritual leader of El Shaddai, qualify as “one who
belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sector xxx”, as required of
party-list nominees under Section 6 (7) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807,7 the
“Rules on Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List
Groups/Organizations Participating in the May 10, 2010 Automated National
and Local Elections.”
In their Answer8 thereto, Buhay Party-List and Brother Mike claimed that
Buhay Party-List is not a religious sect but a political party possessing all the
qualifications of a party-list. It is composed of groups for the elderly, the
women, the youth, the handicapped, as well as the professionals, and Brother
Mike belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented elderly group. They
likewise argued that nominees from a political party such as Buhay Party-List
need not even come from the marginalized and underrepresented sector.
Record shows that Layug received a copy of the aforesaid Answer only at
the hearing conducted on April 20, 2010 after his lawyer, Atty. Rustico B.
Gagate, manifested that his client has not received the same. Counsel for
private respondents explained that their liaison officer found Layug’s given
address—#70 Dr. Pilapil St., Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City—to be
inexistent. To this, Atty. Gagate was said to have retorted as follows: “ The
good counsel for the respondent could send any Answer or processes or
pleadings to may (sic) address at Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya Your Honor, they
could come over all the way to Nueva Vizcaya, we will entertain him.”9
On June 15, 2010, the COMELEC Second Division issued a
Resolution10 denying the petition for lack of substantial evidence. A copy
thereof was sent to Layug via registered mail at #70 Dr. Pilapil Street,
Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City. However, the mail was returned unserved
with the following notation of the postmaster: “1st 6/23/10 unknown; 2nd
6/25/10 unknown; and 3rd attempt 6/28/10 RTS INSUFFICIENT ADDRESS.”
Subsequently, in its Order11dated July 26, 2010, the COMELEC Second Division
found Layug to be a “phantom petitioner” by “seeing to it that pleadings,
orders and judicial notices addressed to him are not received by him because
the address he gave and maintains is fictitious”. Accordingly, Layug was
deemed to have received on June 23, 2010 a copy of the Resolution dated
June 15, 2010 and, there being no motion for reconsideration filed within the
reglementary period, said Resolution was declared final and executory. It was
entered12 in the Book of Entries of Judgment on July 28, 2010.
As a consequence of such entry, the COMELEC En Banc, sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers for Party-List, promulgated on July 30, 2010
NBC Resolution No. 10-03413 proclaiming Buhay Party-List as a winner entitled
to two (2) seats in the House of Representatives. Being the fifth nominee,
however, Brother Mike was not proclaimed as the representative of Buhay
Party-List.
Meanwhile, on July 28, 2010, Layug moved for reconsideration of the
Resolution dated June 15, 2010 before the COMELEC En Banc claiming denial
of due process for failure of the COMELEC to serve him, his representatives
or counsels a copy of said Resolution. He alleged that it was only on July 26,
2010, after learning about it in the newspapers, that he personally secured a
copy of the Resolution from the COMELEC.14 His motion for reconsideration,
however, was denied by the COMELEC Second Division in its Order 15 dated
August 4, 2010 for being filed out of time.
The Issues
Aggrieved, Layug filed this petition imputing grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the COMELEC for the following acts and omissions:
I. THE COMELEC SECOND DIVISION DID NOT ISSUE A NOTICE OF
PROMULGATION TO THE PETITIONER’S COUNSEL AS REQUIRED BY RULE 13
OF THE RULES OF COURT, THEREBY COMMITTING A CLEAR VIOLATION OF
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS; and
II. BY ISSUING THE 30 JULY 2010 RESOLUTION, THE COMELEC EN
BANC UNLAWFULLY NEGLECTED THE PERFORMANCE OF AN ACT WHICH THE
LAW SPECIFICALLY ENJOINS AS A DUTY RESULTING FROM ITS OFFICE,
WHICH IS TO HEAR AND DECIDE THE PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION WHICH WAS TIMELY FILED.16
In their respective Comments17 to the petition, respondents assail the
jurisdiction of the Court arguing that, with the proclamation of Buhay Party-
List on July 30, 2010 and the assumption into office of its representatives,
Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin C. Tieng, it is now the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal that has the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction over questions relating to their qualifications.
With regard to the issue on denial of due process, respondents maintain that,
by providing an incorrect address to which a copy of the Resolution dated
June 15, 2010 was duly sent and by refusing to rectify the error in the first
instance when it was brought to his attention, Layug cannot now be heard to
complain.
We rule for the respondents.
The Ruling of the Court
I. The Court not the HRET
has jurisdiction over the
present petition..
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its Members.
Section 5 (1) of the same Article identifies who the “members” of the House
are:
“Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall
be elected from legislative districtsapportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.”
(Underscoring added).
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1)
members who shall be elected from legislative districts; and (2) those who
shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations.18 In this case, Buhay Party-List was
entitled to two seats in the House that went to its first two nominees, Mariano
Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin C. Tieng. On the other hand,
Brother Mike, being the ifth nominee, did not get a seat and thus had not
become a member of the House of Representatives. Indubitably,
the HRET has no jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike’s qualifications.
Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay
Party-List, as it is vested by law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon
the COMELEC. Section 6 of said Act states that “the COMELEC may motu
proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel,
after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition xxx.” Accordingly, in the case
of Abayon vs. HRET,19 We ruled that the HRETdid not gravely abuse its
discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat
Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list insofar as they sought the
disqualifications of said party-lists.
Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review decisions, orders, or
resolutions of the COMELEC provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution20 andSection 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure21that
has jurisdiction to hear the instant petition.
II. Layug was not denied
due process.
A party may sue or defend an action pro se.22 Under Section 3, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court, “(e)very pleading must be signed by the party or counsel
representing him, stating in either case his address which should not be a post
office box.”
A judicious perusal of the records shows that Layug filed pro se both the
Petition to Disqualify23 and his Position Paper24 before the COMELEC Second
Division. In the Petition to Disqualify, he stated his address as #70 Dr. Pilapil
Street, Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City. While Atty. Rustico B. Gagate
appeared as counsel for Layug during the hearing conducted on April 20,
2010, he nonetheless failed to provide either his or his client’s complete and
correct address despite the manifestation that counsel for private respondents
could not personally serve the Answer on Layug due to the inexistence of the
given address. Neither did the Position Paper that was subsequently filed pro
se on April 23, 2010 indicate any forwarding address.
It should be stressed that a copy of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010 was
mailed to Layug at his stated address at #70 Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay
San Miguel, Pasig City, which however was returned to sender (COMELEC)
after three attempts due to insufficiency of said address, as evidenced by
certified true copies of the registry return receipt, 25 as well as the
envelope26 containing the Resolution; the Letter27 of Pasig City Central Post
Office Postmaster VI Erlina M. Pecante; the Certification28 dated November 2,
2010 of the Postmaster of Pasig City Post Office; and the Affidavit of
Service29 of COMELEC Bailiff Arturo F. Forel dated August 13, 2010.
Consequently, the COMELEC deemed Layug to have received a copy of the
Resolution on June 23, 2010, the date the postmaster made his first attempt
to serve it. There being no motion for reconsideration filed, the COMELEC
issued an Order30 on July 26, 2010 declaring the Resolution final and
executory, which thereafter became the basis for the issuance of the assailed
COMELEC En Banc’s NBC Resolution31 No. 10-034 dated July 30, 2010.
From the fact alone that the address which Layug furnished the COMELEC was
incorrect, his pretensions regarding the validity of the proceedings and
promulgation of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010 for being in violation of
his constitutional right to due process are doomed to fail. 32 His refusal to
rectify the error despite knowledge thereof impels Us to conclude that he
deliberately stated an inexistent address with the end in view of delaying the
proceedings upon the plea of lack of due process. As the COMELEC aptly
pointed out, Layug contemptuously made a mockery of election laws and
procedure by appearing before the Commission by himself or by different
counsels when he wants to, and giving a fictitious address to ensure that he
does not receive mails addressed to him.33 He cannot thus be allowed to profit
from his own wrongdoing. To rule otherwise, considering the circumstances
in the instant case, would place the date of receipt of pleadings, judgments
and processes within Layug’s power to determine at his pleasure. This, We
cannot countenance.
It bears stressing that the finality of a decision or resolution is a
jurisdictional event which cannot be made to depend on the convenience of a
party.34 Decisions or resolutions must attain finality at some point and its
attainment of finality should not be made dependent on the will of a party.
In sum, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction attributable to the COMELEC in issuing NBC Resolution
No. 10-034 dated July 30, 2010 proclaiming Buhay Party-List as a winner in
the May 10, 2010 elections on the basis of the final and executory Resolution
dated June 15, 2010 denying the petition to disqualify private respondents.
III. Mandamus does not lie to
compel the COMELEC En
Banc to rule on Layug’s Mo-
tion for Reconsideration.
Mandamus, as a remedy, is available to compel the doing of an act
specifically enjoined by law as a duty. It cannot compel the doing of an act
involving the exercise of discretion one way or the other.35 Section 3, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court clearly provides:
“SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy SO ORDERED.
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with Corona (C.J.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta,
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the Bersamin, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza and Reyes, JJ., concur.
respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, Del Castillo, J., On Official Leave.
to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and Sereno, J., On Leave.
to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts
of the respondent.” (Emphasis supplied) Petition dismissed.

In this case, the COMELEC En Banc cannot be compelled to resolve
Layug’s Motion for Reconsideration36of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010
that was filed on July 28, 2010 after said Resolution had already attained
finality. In fact, the COMELEC Second Division denied the same Motion in its
Order37 dated August 4, 2010 precisely for the reason that it was filed out of
time.
Notes.—Once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has
been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as
member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s (HRET’s) own jurisdiction begins. (Abayon
vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 612 SCRA 375 [2010])

It should likewise be pointed out that the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration
was filed without the requisite notice of hearing. We have held time and again
that the failure to comply with the mandatory requirements under Sections
438 and 539 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court renders the motion defective. As
a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma.40 None
of the acceptable exceptions obtain in this case.
In an exercise as important as an election, the Comelec cannot make a
declaration and impose a deadline for the correction of errors and omissions
prior to printing, of the published list of participating party-list groups in the
election, and, thereafter, expect everyone to accept its excuses when it
backtracks on its announced declaration. (Philippine Guardians Brotherhood,
Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 646 SCRA 63 [2011])

Moreover, the Motion was filed by a new counsel – Evasco, Abinales and
Evasco Law Offices – without a valid substitution or withdrawal of the former
counsel. Thus said the COMELEC:

“5. In spite of the finding that petitioner’s given address ‘#70 Dr. Pilapil
St., Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City’ cannot be found, a new counsel, ‘Evasco
Abinales and Evasco Law Offices’ filed on July 20, 2010, an ‘ENTRY OF
APPEARANCE AS COUNSEL (for petitioner Layug) WITH MANIFESTATION’, at
the bottom of which appear the name and signature of petitioner Roland D.
Layug expressing his conforme, with his given (sic) at the same ‘#70 Dr. Pilapil
St., Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City;’ it is noted that the entry of appearance
of a new counsel is without the benefit of the withdrawal of the former
counsel.”41

Considering, therefore, Layug’s utter disregard of the rules of procedure

for which he deserves no empathy, the Court finds that the COMELEC
exercised its discretion within the bounds of the law thus warranting the
dismissal of the instant case.
 [No. L-10405. December 29, 1960]
WENCESLAO PASCUAL, in his official capacity as Provincial Governor
of Rizal, petitioner and appellant vs. THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, ET AL., respondents and appellees.
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE
POWERS; APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC REVENUES ONLY FOR
PUBLIC PURPOSES; WHAT DETERMINES VALIDITY OF A PUBLIC
EXPENDITURE.—"It is a general rule that the legislature is without
power to appropriate public revenues for anything but a public
purpose. * * * It is the essential character of the direct object of the
expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax and
not the magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the degree to
which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public
welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental
advantage to the public or to the state, which results from the
promotion of private interests, and the prosperity of private
enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use of public
money." (23 R. L. C. pp. 398-450).
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; UNDERLYING REASON FOR THE RULE.—Generally,
under the express or implied provisions of the constitution, public
funds may be used only for a public purpose. The right of the
legislature to appropriate public funds is correlative with its right to
tax, and, under constitutional provisions against taxation except for
public purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax for one
purpose and the devotion thereof to another purpose, no
appropriation of state funds can be made for other than a public
purpose. (81 C. J. S. p. 1147).
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; TEST OF CONSTITUTIONALITY.—The test of the
constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is
whether the statute is designed to promote the public interests, as
opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although
such advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public. (81
C. J. S. p. 1147).
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POWERS OF CONGRESS AT THE TIME OF
PASSAGE OF A STATUTE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.—The validity of
a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its
passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed,
subsequently thereto, unless the latter consist of an amendment of
the organic law, removing, with retrospective operation, the
constitutional limitation infringed by said statute.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; APPROPRIATION FOR A PRIVATE PURPOSE NULL
AND VOID; SUBSEQUENT DONATION TO GOVERNMENT NOT
CURATIVE OF DEFECT.—Where the land on which projected feeder
roads are to be constructed belongs to a private person, an
appropriation made by Congress for that purpose is null and void,
and a donation to the Government, made over five (5) months after
the approval and effectivity of the Act for the purpose of giving a
"semblance of legality" to the appropriation, does not cure the basic
defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification of said donation need
not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said
appropriation.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF TAXPAYERS TO CONTEST
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LEGISLATION.—The relation between
the people of the Philippines and its taxpayers, on the one hand, and
the Republic of the Philippines, on the other, is not identical to that
obtaining between the people and taxpayers of the U.S. and its
Federal Government. It is closer, from a domestic viewpoint, to that
existing between the people and taxpayers of each state and the
government thereof, except that the authority of the Republic of the
Philippines over the people of the Philippines is more fully direct than
that of the states of the Union, insofar as the simple and unitary type
of our national government is not subject to limitations analogous to
those imposed by the Federal Constitution upon the states of the
Union, and those imposed upon the Federal Government in the
interest of the states of the Union. For this reason, the rule
recognizing the right of taxpayers to assail the constitutionality of a
legislation appropriating local or state public funds—which has been
upheld by the Federal Supreme Court (Crampton vs.Zabriskie, 101
U.S. 601)—has greater application in the Philippines than that
adopted with respect to acts of Congress of the United States
appropriating federal funds.
7.CONTRACTS; DEFENSE OF ILLEGALITY; EXCEPTIONS TO
ARTICLE 1421 OF THE CIVIL CODE.—Article 1421 of the Civil Code
is subject to exceptions. For instance, the creditors of a party to an
illegal contract may, under the conditions set forth in Article 1177 of
said Code, exercise the rights and actions of the latter, except only
those which are inherent in his person, including his right to the
 annulment of said contract, even though such creditors are not and the sum of P85,000.00 appropriated therein for the construction of the
affected by the same, except indirectly, in the manner indicated in projected feeder roads in question; that the municipal council of Pasig
said legal provision. endorsed said letter of respondent Zulueta to the District Engineer of Rizal,
who, up to the present "has not made any endorsement thereon"; that
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig). inasmuch as the projected feeder roads in question were private property at
Enriquez, J. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. the time of the passage and approval of Republic Act No. 920, the
Asst. Fiscal Noli M. Cortes and Jose P. Santos for appellant. appropriation of P85,000.00 therein made, for the construction,
Asst. Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and Solicitor A. A. Torres for reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of said projected feeder
appellee. roads, was "illegal and, therefore, void ab initio"; that said appropriation of
P85,000.00 was made by Congress because its members were made to
CONCEPCIÓN, J.: believe that the projected feeder roads in question were "public roads and not
private streets of a private subdivision'"; that, "in order to give a semblance
of legality, when there is absolutely none, to the aforementioned
Appeal, by petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, from a decision of the Court of First
appropriation", respondent Zulueta executed, on December 12, 1953, while
Instance of Rizal, dismissing the above entitled case and dissolving the writ of
he was a member of the Senate of the Philippines, an alleged deed of
preliminary injunction therein issued, without costs.
donation—copy of which is annexed to the petition—of the four (4) parcels of
land constituting said projected feeder roads, in favor of the Government of
On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial Governor of
the Republic of the Philippines; that said alleged deed of donation was, on the
Rizal, instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the
same date, accepted by the then Executive Secretary; that being subject to
ground that Republic Act No. 920, entitled "An Act Appropriating Funds for
an onerous condition, said donation partook of the nature of a contract; that,
Public Works", approved on June 20, 1953, contained, in section 1-C (a)
as such, said donation violated the provision of our fundamental law
thereof, an item (43[h]) of P85,000.00, "for the construction, reconstruction,
prohibiting members of Congress from being directly or indirectly financially
repair, extension and improvement" of "Pasig feeder road terminals (Gen.
interested in any contract with the Government, and, hence, is
Roxas—Gen. Araneta—Gen. Lucban—Gen. Capinpin—Gen. Segundo—Gen.
unconstitutional, as well as null and void ab initio, for the construction of the
Delgado—Gen. Malvar—Gen. Lim)"; that, at the time of the passage and
projected feeder roads in question with public funds would greatly enhance
approval of said Act, the aforementioned feeder roads were "nothing but
or increase the value of the aforementioned subdivision of respondent
projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed, * * * within the
Zulueta, "aside from relieving him from the burden of constructing his
Antonio Subdivision * * * situated at * * * Pasig, Rizal" (according to the
subdivision streets or roads at his own expense"; that the construction of said
tracings attached to the petition as Annexes A and B, near Shaw Boulevard,
projected feeder roads was then being undertaken by the Bureau of Public
not far away from the intersection between the latter and Highway 54), which
Highways; and that, unless restrained by the court, the respondents would
projected feeder roads "do not connect any government property or any
continue to execute, comply with, follow and implement the aforementioned
important premises to the main highway"; that the aforementioned Antonio
illegal provision of law, "to the irreparable damage, detriment and prejudice
Subdivision (as well as the lands on which said feeder roads were to be
not only to the petitioner but to the Filipino nation."
constructed) were private properties of respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who, at
the time of the passage and approval of said Act, was a member of the Senate
Petitioner prayed, therefore, that the contested item of Republic Act No.
of the Philippines; that on May 29, 1953, respondent Zulueta, addressed a
920 be declared null and void; that the alleged deed of donation of the feeder
letter to the Municipal Council of Pasig, Rizal, offering to donate said projected
roads in question be "declared unconstitutional and, therefore, illegal"; that a
feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig, Rizal; that, on June 13, 1953, the
writ of injunction be issued enjoining the Secretary of Public Works and
offer was accepted by the council, subject to the condition "that the donor
Communications, the Director of the Bureau of Public Works, the
would submit a plan of the said roads and agree to change the names of two
Commissioner of the Bureau of Public Highways and Jose C. Zulueta from
of them"; that no deed of donation in favor of the municipality of Pasig was,
ordering or allowing the continuance of the above-mentioned feeder roads
however, executed; that on July 10, 1953, respondent Zulueta wrote another
project, and from making and securing any new and further releases on the
letter to said council, calling attention to the approval of Republic Act No. 920,
aforementioned item of Republic Act No. 920, and the disbursing officers of
the Department of Public Works and Communications, the Bureau of Public
Works and the Bureau of Public Highways from making any further payments
out of said funds provided for in Republic Act No. 920; and that pending final
hearing on the merits, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the
aforementioned parties respondent f rom making and securing any new and
further releases on the aforesaid item of Republic Act No. 920 and from
making any further payments out of said illegally appropriated funds.
Respondents moved to dismiss the petition upon the ground that petitioner
had "no legal capacity to sue", and that the petition did "not state a cause of
action". In support to this motion, respondent Zulueta alleged that the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, not its provincial governor, should represent the
Province of Rizal, pursuant to section 1683 of the Revised Administrative
Code; that said respondent is "not aware of any law which makes illegal the
appropriation of public funds for the improvement of * * * private property";
and that, the constitutional provision invoked by petitioner is inapplicable to
the donation in question, the same being a pure act of liberality, not a
contract. The other respondents, in turn, maintained that petitioner could not
assail the appropriation in question because "there is no actual bona, fide case
* * * in which the validity of Republic Act No. 920 is necessarily involved" and
petitioner "has not shown that he has a personal and substantial interest" in
said Act "and that its enforcement has caused or will cause him a direct injury".
Acting upon said motions to dismiss, the lower court rendered the
aforementioned decision, dated October 29, 1953, holding that, since public
interest is involved in this case, the Provincial Governor of Rizal and the
provincial fiscal thereof who represents him therein, "have the requisite
personalities" to question the constitutionality of the disputed item of Republic
Act No. 920; that "the legislature is without power to appropriate public
revenues for anything but a public purpose", that the construction and
improvement of the feeder roads in question, if such roads were private
property, would not be a public purpose; that, being subject to the following
condition:
"The within donation is hereby made upon the condition that the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines will use the parcels of land hereby donated
for street purposes only and for no other purposes whatsoever; it being
expressly understood that should the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines violate the condition hereby imposed upon it, the title to the land
hereby donated shall, upon such violation, ipso facto revert to the DONOR,
JOSE C. ZULUETA." (Italics supplied.)
which is onerous, the donation in question is a contract; that said donation or
contract is "absolutely forbidden by the Constitution" and consequently
"illegal", for Article 1409 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, declares inexistent
and void from the very beginning contracts "whose cause, object or purpose
is contrary to law, morals * * * or public policy"; that the legality of said
donation may not be contested, however, by petitioner herein, because his
"interests are not directly affected" thereby; and that, accordingly, the
appropriation in question "should be upheld" and the case dismissed.
At the outset, it should be noted that we are concerned with a decision
granting the aforementioned motions to dismiss, which as such, are deemed
to have admitted hypothetically the allegations of fact made in the petition of
appellant herein. According to said petition, respondent Zulueta is the owner
of several parcels of residential land, situated in Pasig, Rizal, and known as
the Antonio Subdivision, certain portions of which had been reserved for the
projected feeder roads aforementioned, which, admittedly, were private
property of said respondent when Republic Act No. 920, appropriating
P85,000.00 for the "construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and
improvement" of said roads, was passed by Congress, as well as when it was
approved by the President on June 20, 1953. The petition further alleges that
the construction of said feeder roads, to be undertaken with the
aforementioned appropriation of P85,000.00, would have the effect of
relieving respondent Zulueta of the burden of constructing his subdivision
streets or roads at his own expenses,1 and would "greatly enhance or increase
the value of the subdivision" of said respondent. The lower court held that
under these circumstances, the appropriation in question was "clearly for a
private, not a public purpose."
Respondents do not deny the accuracy of this conclusion, which is self-
evident.2 However, respondent Zulueta contended, in his motion to dismiss
that:
"A law passed by Congress and approved by the President can never be illegal
because Congress is the source of all laws * * *. Aside from the fact that the
movant is not aware of any law which makes illegal the appropriation of public
funds for the improvement of what we, in the meantime, may assume as
private property * * *." (Record on Appeal, p. 33.)
The first proposition must be rejected most emphatically, it being inconsistent
with the nature of the Government established under the Constitution of the
Philippines and the system of checks and balances underlying our political
structure. Moreover, it is refuted by the decisions of this Court invalidating
legislative enactments deemed violative of the Constitution or organic laws.3
As regards the legal feasibility of appropriating public funds for a private
purpose, the principle according to Ruling Case Law, is this:
"It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public
revenue for anything but a public purpose. * * * It is the essential character
of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity as
justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the
degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public
welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidentaladvantage
to the public or to the state, which results from the promotion of private
interests and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify
their aid by the use of public money." (25 R.L.C. pp. 398-400; Italics supplied.)
The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum in the following language:
"In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for
public purposes only, discussed supra sec. 14, money raised by taxation can
be expended only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private
individuals." (85 C.J.S. pp. 645-646; italics supplied.)
Explaining the reason underlying said rule, Corpus Juris Secundum states:
"Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the constitution, public
funds may be used only for a public purpose.The right of the legislature to
appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax, and, under constitutional
provisions against taxation except for public purposes and prohibiting the
collection of a tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof to another
purpose, no appropriation of state funds can be made for other than a public
purpose. * * *
* * * * * * *
"The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public
funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public interests, as
opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each
advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public. * * * ." (81 C.J.S.
p. 1147; italics supplied.)
Needless to say, this Court is fully in accord with the foregoing views which,
apart from being patently sound, are a necessary corollary to our democratic
system of government, which, as such, exists primarily for the promotion of
the general welfare. Besides, reflecting as they do, the established
jurisprudence in the United States, after whose constitutional system ours has
been patterned, said views and jurisprudence are, likewise, part and parcel of
our own constitutional law.
This notwithstanding, the lower court felt constrained to uphold the
appropriation in question, upon the ground that petitioner may not contest
the legality of the donation above referred to because the same does not
affect him directly. This conclusion is, presumably, based upon the following
premises, namely: (1) that, if valid, said donation cured the constitutional
infirmity of the aforementioned appropriation; (2) that the latter may not be
annulled without a previous declaration of unconstitutionality of the said
donation; and (3) that the rule set forth in Article 1421 of the Civil Code is
absolute, and admits of no exception. We do not agree with these premises.
The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of
its passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts
performed, subsequently thereto, unless the latter consist of an amendment
of the organic law, removing, with retrospective operation, the constitutional
limitation infringed by said statute. Referring to the P85,000.00 appropriation
for the projected feeder roads in question, the legality thereof depended upon
whether said roads were public or private property when the bill, which, later
on, became Republic Act No. 920, was passed by Congress, or, when said bill
was approved by the President and the disbursement of said sum became
effective, or on June 20, 1953 (see section 13 of said Act). Inasmuch as the
land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged
then to respondent Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a
private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.4 The donation to the
Government, over five (5) months after the approval and effectivity of said
Act, made, according to the petition, for the purpose of giving a "semblance
of legality", or legalizing, the appropriation in question, did not cure its
aforementioned basic defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification of said
donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said
appropriation.
Again, Article 1421 of our Civil Code, like many other statutory
enactments, is subject to exceptions. For instance, the creditors of a party to
an illegal contract may, under the conditions set forth in Article 1177 of said
Code, exercise the rights and actions of the latter, except only those which
are inherent in his person, including, therefore, his right to the annulment of
said contract, even though such creditors are not affected by the same, except
indirectly, in the manner indicated in said legal provision
Again, it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by
one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet,
there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws
providing for the disbursement of public funds,5 upon the theory that "the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of
administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such
funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.6 Although there
are some decisions to the contrary,7the prevailing view in the United States is
stated in the American Jurisprudence as follows:
"In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite
standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute the general rule is that not
only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers, have sufficient interest
in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and may
therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of
public moneys." (11 Am. Jur. 761; italics supplied.)
However, this view was not favored by the Supreme Court of the U.S. in
Frothingham vs. Mellon (262 U.S. 447), insofar as federal laws are concerned,
upon the ground that the relationship of a taxpayer of the U.S. to its Federal
Government is different from that of a taxpayer of a municipal corporation to
its government. Indeed, under the composite system of government existing
in the U.S., the states of the Union are integral part of the Federation from
an international viewpoint, but, each state enjoys internally a substantial
measure of sovereignty, subject to the limitations imposed by the Federal
Constitution. In fact, the same was made by representatives of each state of
the Union, not of the people of the U.S., except insofar as the former
represented the people of the respective States, and the people of each State
has, independently of that of the others, ratified said Constitution. In other
words, the Federal Constitution and the Federal statutes have become binding
upon the people of the U.S. in consequence of an act of, and, in this
sense, through the respective states of the Union of which they are citizens.
The peculiar nature of the relation between said people and the Federal
Government of the U.S. is reflected in the election of its President, who is
chosen directly, not by the people of the U.S., but by electors chosen by each
State, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct (Article II, section
2, of the Federal Constitution).
The relation between the people of the Philippines and its taxpayers, on the
one hand, and the Republic of the Philippines, on the other, is not identical to
that obtaining between the people and taxpayers of the U.S. and its Federal
Government. It is closer, from a domestic viewpoint, to that existing between
the people and taxpayers of each state and the government thereof, except
that the authority of the Republic of the Philippines over the people of the
Philippines is more fully direct than that of the states of the Union, insofar as
the simple and unitarytype of our national government is not subject to
limitations analogous to those imposed by the those imposed upon the Federal
Government in the interest of the states of the Union. For this reason, the rule
recognizing the right of taxpayers to assail the constitutionality of a legislation
appropriating local or state public funds—which has been upheld by the
Federal Supreme Court (Crampton vs. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601)—has greater
application in the Philippines than that adopted with respect to acts of
Congress of the United States appropriating federal funds.
Indeed, in the Province of Tayabas vs. Perez (56 Phil., 257), involving the
expropriation of a land by the Province of Tayabas, two (2) taxpayers thereof
were allowed to intervene for the purpose of contesting the price being paid
to the owner thereof, as unduly exhorbitant. It is true that
in Custodio vs. President of the Senate (42 Off. Gaz., 1243), a taxpayer and
employee of the Government was not permitted to question the
constitutionality of an appropriation for backpay of members of Congress.
However, in Rodriguez vs. Treasurer of the Philippines and Barredo vs.
Commission on Elections (84 Phil., 368; 45 Off. Gaz., 4411), we entertained
the action of taxpayers impugning the validity of certain appropriations of
public funds, and invalidated the same. Moreover, the reason that impelled
this Court to take such position in said two (2) cases—the importance of the
issues therein raised—is present in the case at bar. Again, like the petitioners
in the Rodriguez and Barredo cases, petitioner herein is not merely a taxpayer.
The Province of Rizal, which he represents officially as its Provincial Governor,
is our most populated political subdivision.7 and, the taxpayers therein bear a
substantial portion of the burden of taxation, in the Philippines.
Hence, it is our considered opinion that the circumstances surrounding this
case sufficiently justify petitioner's action in contesting the appropriation and
donation in question; that this action should not have been dismissed by the
lower court; and that the writ of preliminary injunction should have been
maintained.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the
records are remanded to the lower court for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of this instance against
respondent Jose C. Zulueta. It is so ordered.
Parás, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.
B. L., Barrera, Gutiérrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed, records remanded to lower court for further
proceedings.