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Case: Henares v.

LTRB

FACTS:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents LTFRB and
DOTC to require PUVs to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Asserting their right to clean air,
petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs
to use CNG as an alternative fuel. CNG is a natural gas comprised mostly of methane, it is colorless and odorless
and considered the cleanest fossil fuel. Compared to coal and petroleum, CNG produces much less pollutants.

ISSUE:
Can mandamus be issued against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel?

RULING:
NO. Plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus
commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel
the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents
LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. Mandamus will not generally lie from one
branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other.

Case: Ortigas & Co. vs Feati Bank & Trust Co.

FACTS:
In 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at Mandaluyong to Augusto
Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon
completion of payment a deed was executed with stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to be
exclusive for residential purposes only. This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles. Feati then
acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. In 1963, Feati started
construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes but could also be for residential use.
Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but Feati continued contending that the building was being
constructed according to the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along
the West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone. Decision ruled in favour of Feati.

ISSUE:
Whether the Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and commercial
zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of Titles.

HELD:
Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local Autonomy
Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the
Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the municipality should be “liberally
construed in its favor”, “to give more power to the local government in promoting economic conditions, social
welfare, and material progress in the community”. This is found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act.
Although non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in
exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace and order and the general welfare of the people in
the locality as it would not be a conducive residential area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and
noise which results in the surrounding industrial and commercial establishments.

Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.


Technology Developers v. CA

FACTS:
Petitioner, a domestic private corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of charcoal briquette,
received a letter from acting mayor Pablo N. Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the operation of the petitioner's
plant located at Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, until further order.

The letter likewise requested the Plant Manager to bring with him to the office of the mayor on
February 20, 1989 the following:
a) Building permit;
b) Mayor's permit;
c) Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and of other document.

At the requested conference, petitioner, through its representative, undertook to comply with
respondent's request for the production of the required documents.

Petitioner's attention having been called to its lack of mayor's permit, it sent its representatives to the
office of the mayor to secure the same but were not entertained.

On April 6, 1989, without previous and reasonable notice upon petitioner, respondent acting mayor
ordered the Municipality's station commander to padlock the premises of petitioner's plant, thus effectively
causing the stoppage of its operation.

Left with no recourse, petitioner instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with
preliminary injunction against private respondent

ISSUE:
Whether the acting mayor had a legal ground for ordering the stoppage of Technology Developer

RULING:
The lower courts were right in upholding the mayor’s order, reasoning that although the NPCC of the
Ministry of human Settlements (now Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources) has the task to determine the existence of pollution and violations of environmental
laws, the mayor by virtue of his police power has as much responsibility to protect its constituents from the
same and regulate the operation of establishments which pose relative threat to the community.

The Court, in considering the evidence presented, upheld the respondent, stressing the importance of the
general welfare of the community over and above the potential economic return of investment but is
detrimental to many.