1
Rule 126 – Searches and Seizures
AAA v. Carbonell (2007)
This petition for certiorari assails the December 16,
2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27,
San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 6983,
dismissing the rape case filed against private
respondent Jaime O. Arzadon for lack of probable
cause; and its February 3, 2006 Order denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner worked as a secretary at the Arzadon
Automotive and Car Service Center from February
28, 2001 to August 16, 2001. On May 27, 2001 at
about 6:30 p.m., Arzadon asked her to deliver a
book to an office located at another building but
when she returned to their office, the lights had
been turned off and the gate was
closed.Nevertheless, she went inside to get her
handbag.
On her way out, she saw Arzadon
standing beside a parked van holding a pipe. He
told her to go near him and upon reaching his side,
he threatened her with the pipe and forced her to
lie on the pavement. He removed her pants and
underwear, and inserted his penis into her
vagina. She wept and cried out for help but to no
avail because there was nobody else in the
premises.
Petitioner did not report the incident
because Arzadon threatened to kill her and her
family. But when she discovered that she was
pregnant as a consequence of the rape, she
narrated the incident to her parents. On July 24,
2002, petitioner filed a complaint for rape against
Arzadon.
On September 16, 2002, Assistant City Prosecutor
Imelda Cosalan issued a Resolution finding
probable cause and recommending the filing of an
information for rape. Arzadon moved for
reconsideration and during the clarificatory
hearing held on October 11, 2002, petitioner
testified before the investigating
prosecutor. However, she failed to attend the next
hearing hence, the case was provisionally
dismissed.
On March 5, 2003, petitioner filed
another Affidavit-Complaints with a 242289. However, the proceedings have been
comprehensive account of the alleged rape
incident. The case was assigned to 2ndAssistant
Provincial Prosecutor Georgina Hidalgo. During the
preliminary investigation, petitioner appeared for
clarificatory questioning. On June 11, 2003, the
investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution
finding that a prima facie case of rape exists and
recommending the filing of the information.
Arzadon moved for reconsideration and requested
that a panel of prosecutors be constituted to
review the case. Thus, a panel of prosecutors was
created and after the clarificatory questioning, the
panel issued on October 13, 2003 a Resolution
finding probable cause and denying Arzadons
motion for reconsideration.
An Information for rape was filed before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, San Fernando, La
Union on February 6, 2004, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 6415.Thereafter, Arzadon filed a Motion
to Hold in Abeyance All Court Proceedings
Including the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest and
to Determine Probable Cause for the Purpose of
Issuing a Warrant of Arrest. On March 18, 2004,
respondent Judge Antonio A. Carbonell granted
the motion and directed petitioner and her
witnesses to take the witness stand for
determination of probable cause.
Arzadon also appealed the Resolution
of the panel of prosecutors finding probable cause
before the Department of Justice. On July 9, 2004,
then Acting Secretary of Justice Merceditas
Gutierrez found no probable cause and directed
the withdrawal of the Information in Criminal Case
No. 641
Upon motion for reconsideration by
petitioner, however, Secretary of Justice Raul
Gonzales reversed the July 9, 2004 Resolution and
issued another Resolution finding that probable
cause exists. Thus, a new Information for rape was
filed against Arzadon docketed as Criminal Case
No. 6983.
Consequently, Arzadon filed an Urgent Motion for
Judicial Determination of Probable Cause for the
Purpose of Issuing a Warrant of Arrest. In an Order
dated August 11, 2005, respondent Judge
Carbonell granted the motion and directed
petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness
stand.
Instead of taking the witness stand,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
claiming that the documentary evidence
sufficiently established the existence of probable
cause. Pending resolution thereof, she likewise
filed a petition with this Court for the transfer of
venue of Criminal Case No. 6983. The case was
docketed as Administrative Matter No. 05-12-756-
RTC and entitled Re: Transfer of Venue of Criminal
Case No. 6983, formerly Criminal Case No. 6415,
from the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, San
Fernando City, La Union, to any Court in
Metro Manila.
In a Resolution dated January 18,
2006, the Court granted petitioners request for
transfer of venue. The case was raffled to the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-
suspended pending the resolution of this petition.
Meanwhile, on December 16, 2005,
respondent Judge Carbonell issued the assailed
Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of
probable cause.Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the judge is not required
to personally examine the complainant and her
witnesses in satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. She argues that respondent Judge Carbonell
should have taken into consideration the
documentary evidence as well as the transcript of
stenographic notes which sufficiently established
the existence of probable cause.
Arzadon claims that the petition should be
dismissed outright for being the wrong mode of
appeal, it appearing that the issues raised by
petitioner properly fall under an action

for certiorari under Rule 65, and not Rule 45, of
the Rules of Court.
Respondent Judge Carbonell argues in
his Comment that the finding of probable cause by
the investigating prosecutor is not binding or
obligatory, and that he was justified in requiring
petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness
stand in order to determine probable cause.
Issue: whether respondent Judge
Carbonell acted with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of
probable cause.
The petition has merit.
A petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 is distinct from a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in that the
former brings up for review errors of judgment
while the latter concerns errors of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is
not an allowable ground under Rule 45. However,
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
may be considered a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 where it is alleged that the respondents
abused their discretion in their questioned actions,
as in the instant case. While petitioner claims to
have brought the instant action under Rule 45, the
grounds raised herein involve an alleged grave
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Judge Carbonell. Accordingly, the Court shall treat
the same as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
However, we must point out the
procedural error committed by petitioner in
directly filing the instant petition before this Court
instead of the Court of Appeals, thereby violating
the principle of judicial hierarchy of courts. It is
well-settled that although the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts
have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. In
this case, however, the gravity of the offense
charged and the length of time that has passed
since the filing of the complaint for rape, compel
us to resolve the present controversy in order to
avoid further delay.
We thus proceed to the issue of
whether respondent Judge Carbonell acted with
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal
Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause.
We rule in the affirmative.
Respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed
Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause
on the ground that petitioner and her witnesses
failed to comply with his orders to take the witness
stand. Thus
In RESUME therefore, as
indubitably borne out by the case
record and considering that the
Private Prosecutor, despite several
admonitions contumaciously nay
contemptuously refused to
comply/obey this Courts Orders of
2
March 18, 2004, August 11, 2005 and
eight (8) other similar Orders issued in
open Court that directed the
complainant/witnesses to take the
witness stand to be asked
probing/clarificatory questions
consonant with cited jurisprudential
rulings of the Supreme Court, this
Court in the exercise of its discretion
and sound judgment finds and so
holds that NO probable cause was
established to warrant the issuance of
an arrest order and the further
prosecution of the instant case.
Record also shows in no
unclear terms that in all the scheduled
hearings of the case, the accused had
always been present. A contrario, the
private complainant failed to appear
during the last four (4) consecutive
settings despite due notice without
giving any explanation, which to the
mind of the Court may indicate an
apparent lack of interest in the further
prosecution of this case. That failure
may even be construed as a
confirmation of the Defenses
contention reflected in the case
record, that the only party interested
in this case is the Private prosecutor,
prodded by the accuseds alleged
hostile siblings to continue with the
case.
He claims that under Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.
However, in the leading case
of Soliven v. Makasiar, the Court explained that
this constitutional provision does not mandatorily
require the judge to personally examine the
complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may
opt to personally evaluate the report and
supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutors
report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses. Thus:
The addition of the word
personally after the word determined
and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to
issue warrants to other responsible
officers as may be authorized by law,
has apparently convinced petitioner
Beltran that the Constitution now
requires the judge to personally
examine the complainant and his
witnesses in his determination of
probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest. This is not an
accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution
underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In
satisfying himself of the existence of

probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the judge is not
required to personally examine the
complainant and his
witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by
the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscals report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this
procedure, otherwise judges would by
unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of
criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before their courts.
We reiterated the above ruling in the
case of Webb v. De Leon,[24] where we held that
before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely
determine the probability, not the certainty, of
guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not
conduct a de novo hearing to determine the
existence of probable cause. They just personally
review the initial determination of the prosecutor
finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence.[25]
It is well to remember that there is a
distinction between the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest and the preliminary investigation
proper which ascertains whether the offender
should be held for trial or be released. The
determination of probable cause for purposes of
issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the
judge. The preliminary investigation proper
whether or not there is reasonable ground to
believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged is the function of the investigating
prosecutor.[26]
True, there are cases where the
circumstances may call for the judges personal
examination of the complainant and his witnesses.
But it must be emphasized that such personal
examination is not mandatory and indispensable in
the determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. The necessity
arises only when there is an utter failure of the
evidence to show the existence of probable
cause.[27] Otherwise, the judge may rely on the
report of the investigating prosecutor, provided
that he likewise evaluates the documentary
evidence in support thereof.
Indeed, what the law requires
as personal determination on the part of the judge
is that he should not rely solely on the report of
the investigating prosecutor. In Okabe v.
Gutierrez,[28] we stressed that the judge should
consider not only the report of the investigating
prosecutor but also the affidavit and the
documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-
3
affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well
as the transcript of stenographic notes taken
during the preliminary investigation, if any,
submitted to the court by the investigating
prosecutor upon the filing of the Information.[29] If
the report, taken together with the supporting
evidence, is sufficient to sustain a finding of
probable cause, it is not compulsory that a
personal examination of the complainant and his
witnesses be conducted.
In this case, respondent Judge
Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983
without taking into consideration the June 11,
2003 Resolution of 2nd Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Georgina Hidalgo, the October 13, 2003
Resolution of the panel of prosecutors, and the
July 1, 2005 Resolution of the Department of
Justice, all of which sustain a finding of probable
cause against Arzadon. Moreover, he failed to
evaluate the evidence in support
thereof. Respondent judges finding of lack of
probable cause was premised only on the
complainants and her witnesses absence during
the hearing scheduled by the respondent judge for
the judicial determination of probable cause.
Petitioner narrated in detail the
alleged rape incident both in her Sinumpaang
Salaysay[30] dated July 24, 2002 and Complaint-
Affidavit[31] dated March 5, 2003. She attended
several clarificatory hearings that were conducted
in the instant case. The transcript of stenographic
notes[32] of the hearing held on October 11,
2002shows that she positively identified Arzadon
as her assailant, and the specific time and place of
the incident. She also claimed that she bore a child
as a result of the rape and, in support of her
contentions, presented the child and her birth
certificate as evidence. In contrast, Arzadon merely
relied on the defense of alibi which is the weakest
of all defenses.
After a careful examination of the
records, we find that there is sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause. The gravamen of rape is
the carnal knowledge by the accused of the private
complainant under any of the circumstances
provided in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended.[33] Petitioner has categorically stated
that Arzadon raped her, recounting her ordeal in
detail during the preliminary investigations. Taken
with the other evidence presented before the
investigating prosecutors, such is sufficient for
purposes of establishing probable cause. It is well-
settled that a finding of probable cause need not
be based on clear and convincing evidence beyond
reasonable doubt. Probable cause is that which
engenders a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial. It does not require that the evidence would
justify conviction. [34]
It is clear therefore that respondent
Judge Carbonell gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of
probable cause on the ground that petitioner and
her witnesses failed to take the witness
stand. Considering there is ample evidence and
sufficient basis on record to support a finding of
probable cause, it was unnecessary for him to take
the further step of examining the petitioner and
her witnesses. Moreover, he erred in holding that

petitioners absences in the scheduled hearings
were indicative of a lack of interest in prosecuting
the case. In fact, the records show that she has
relentlessly pursued the same.
Needless to say, a full-blown trial is to
be preferred to ferret out the truth.[35] As it were,
the incidents of this case have been pending for
almost five years without having even passed the
preliminary investigation stage. Suffice to say that
the credibility of petitioner may be tested during
the trial where the respective allegations and
defenses of the complainant and the accused are
properly ventilated. It is only then that the truth as
to Arzadons innocence or guilt can be determined.
Petition GRANTED. REMANDED to RTC
Manila.
Antiquera v. People (2013)
On January 13, 2004 the second Assistant City
Prosecutor of Pasay City charged the accused
George Codes Antiquera* and Corazon Olivenza
Cruz with illegal ·possession of paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs 1 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case 04-0100-
CFM. 2 Since the accused Cruz jumped bail, the
court tried her in absentia. 3
The prosecution evidence shows that at around
4:45 a.m. of February 11, 2004, PO1 Gregorio
Recio, PO1 Laurence Cabutihan, P/Insp. Eric Ibon,
PO1 Rodelio Rania, and two civilian operatives on
board a patrol car and a tricycle were conducting a
police visibility patrol on David Street, Pasay City,
when they saw two unidentified men rush out of
house number 107-C and immediately boarded a
jeep.
Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the
police officers approached the house from where
the men came and peeked through the partially
opened door. PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan saw
accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter
and a pink lighter. Beside him was his live-in
partner, Cruz, who was holding an aluminum foil
and an improvised burner. They sat facing each
other at the living room. This prompted the police
officers to enter the house, introduce themselves,
and arrest Antiquera and Cruz.4
While inspecting the immediate surroundings, PO1
Cabutihan saw a wooden jewelry box atop a table.
It contained an improvised burner, wok, scissors,
10 small transparent plastic sachets with traces of
white crystalline substance, improvised scoop, and
seven unused strips of aluminum foil. The police
officers confiscated all these and brought
Antiquera and Cruz to the Drug Enforcement Unit
of the Philippine National Police in Pasay City for
further investigation and testing.5
A forensic chemical officer examined the
confiscated drug paraphernalia and found them
positive for traces of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu."6
Accused Antiquera gave a different story. He said
that on the date and time in question, he and Cruz
were asleep in their house when he was roused by
knocking on the door. When he went to open it,
three armed police officers forced themselves into
the house. One of them shoved him and said,
4
"D’yan ka lang, pusher ka." He was handcuffed and
someone instructed two of the officers to go to his
room. The police later brought accused Antiquera
and Cruz to the police station and there informed
them of the charges against them. They were
shown a box that the police said had been
recovered from his house.7
On July 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a Decision8 that
found accused Antiquera and Cruz guilty of the
crime charged and sentenced them to a prison
term ranging from six months and one day to two
years and four months, and to pay a fine of
₱10,000.00 each and the costs of the suit.
The RTC said that the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the police caught accused
Antiquera and Cruz in the act of using shabu and
having drug paraphernalia in their possession.
Since no ill motive could be attributed to PO1
Recio and PO1 Cabutihan, the court accorded full
faith and credit to their testimony and rejected the
self-serving claim of Antiquera.
The trial court gave no weight to accused
Antiquera’s claim of illegal arrest, given PO1 Recio
and PO1 Cabutihan’s credible testimony that, prior
to their arrest, they saw Antiquera and Cruz in a
pot session at their living room and in possession
of drug paraphernalia. The police officers were
thus justified in arresting the two without a
warrant pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure.9
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a
Decision10 on September 21, 2007 affirming in full
the decision of the trial court. The accused moved
for reconsideration but the CA denied it.11 The
accused is now before this Court seeking acquittal.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in finding accused
Antiquera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of drug paraphernalia based on the
evidence of the police officers that they saw him
and Cruz in the act of possessing drug
paraphernalia.
Ruling: The prosecution’s theory, upheld by both
the RTC and the CA, is that it was a case of valid
warrantless arrest in that the police officers saw
accused Antiquera and Cruz through the door of
their house, in the act of having a pot session. That
valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right
as well to search the living room for objects
relating to the crime and thus seize the
paraphernalia they found there.
The prosecution contends that, since the seized
paraphernalia tested positive for shabu, they were
no doubt used for smoking, consuming,
administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing
dangerous drug into the body in violation of
Section 12 of Republic Act 9165. That the accused
tested negative for shabu, said the prosecution,
had no bearing on the crime charged which was
for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, not for
illegal use of dangerous drugs. The prosecution
added that even assuming that the arrest of the
accused was irregular, he is already considered to
have waived his right to question the validity of his
arrest when he voluntarily submitted himself to
the court’s jurisdiction by entering a plea of not
guilty.12

Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that a "peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense." This is an
arrest in flagrante delicto.13 The overt act
constituting the crime is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.14
But the circumstances here do not make out a case
of arrest made in flagrante delicto.
1. The police officers claim that they were alerted
when they saw two unidentified men suddenly
rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they
suspected that a crime had been committed, the
natural thing for them to do was to give chase to
the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given
that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle.
Running after the fleeing suspects was the more
urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to
the house even when they heard no cry for help
from it.
2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice
anything amiss going on in the house from the
street where they stood. Indeed, even as they
peeked through its partially opened door, they saw
no activity that warranted their entering it. Thus,
PO1 Cabutihan testified:
Q – So how were you able to know, to see the
interior of the house if the door was only open by
6 inches? Or did you have to push the door?
A – We pushed the door, Your Honor.
Q – But before you saw them, you just had to push
the door wide open to peep through its opening
because you did not know what was happening
inside?
A – Yes, Your Honor.
Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view
of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest
of accused Antiquera without warrant under the
above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest
was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted
from it was likewise illegal.16 Consequently, the
various drug paraphernalia that the police officers
allegedly found in the house and seized are
inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid
search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug
paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime
charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the
accused.17
The failure of the accused to object to the
irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to
sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver
of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the
illegal warrantless arrest.18
Petitioner ACQUITTED for lack of sufficient
evidence. CA decision REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
Terry v. Ohio (1968)
Facts. The officer noticed the Petitioner talking
with another individual on a street corner while
5
repeatedly walking up and down the same street.
The men would periodically peer into a store
window and then talk some more. The men also
spoke to a third man whom they eventually
followed up the street. The officer believed that
the Petitioner and the other men were “casing” a
store for a potential robbery. The officer decided
to approach the men for questioning, and given
the nature of the behavior the officer decided to
perform a quick search of the men before
questioning. A quick frisking of the Petitioner
produced a concealed weapon and the Petitioner
was charged with carrying a concealed weapon.
Issue: Whether a search for weapons without
probable cause for arrest is an unreasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution
Held: 1. The Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment, "protects people, not places," and
therefore applies as much to the citizen on the
streets as well as at home or elsewhere.
2. The issue in this case is not the abstract
propriety of the police conduct, but the
admissibility against petitioner of the evidence
uncovered by the search and seizure.
3. The exclusionary rule cannot properly be
invoked to exclude the products of legitimate and
restrained police investigative techniques, and this
Court's approval of such techniques should not
discourage remedies other than the exclusionary
rule to curtail police abuses for which that is not an
effective sanction.
4. The Fourth Amendment applies to "stop and
frisk" procedures such as those followed here.
(a) Whenever a police officer accosts an individual
and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
"seized" that person within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.
(b) A careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a
person's clothing in an attempt to find weapons is
a "search" under that Amendment
5. Where a reasonably prudent officer is warranted
in the circumstances of a given case in believing
that his safety or that of others is endangered, he
may make a reasonable search for weapons of the
person believed by him to be armed and
dangerous regardless of whether he has probable
cause to arrest that individual for crime or the
absolute certainty that the individual is armed
(a) Though the police must, whenever practicable,
secure a warrant to make a search and seizure,
that procedure cannot be followed where swift
action based upon on-the-spot observations of the
officer on the beat is required
(b) The reasonableness of any particular search
and seizure must be assessed in light of the
particular circumstances against the standard of
whether a man of reasonable caution is warranted
in believing that the action taken was appropriate.
(c) The officer here was performing a legitimate
function of investigating suspicious conduct when
he decided to approach petitioner and his
companions. P. 22.

(d) An officer justified in believing that an
individual whose suspicious behavior he is
investigating at close range is armed may, to
neutralize the threat of physical harm, take
necessary measures to determine whether that
person is carrying a weapon.
(e) A search for weapons in the absence of
probable cause to arrest must be strictly
circumscribed by the exigencies of the situation.
(f) An officer may make an intrusion short of arrest
where he has reasonable apprehension of danger
before being possessed of information justifying
arrest.
6. The officer's protective seizure of petitioner and
his companions and the limited search which he
made were reasonable, both at their inception and
as conducted.
(a) The actions of petitioner and his companions
were consistent with the officer's hypothesis that
they were contemplating a daylight robbery and
were armed.
(b) The officer's search was confined to what was
minimally necessary to determine whether the
men were armed, and the intrusion, which was
made for the sole purpose of protecting himself
and others nearby, was confined to ascertaining
the presence of weapons.
7. The revolver seized from petitioner was properly
admitted into evidence against him, since the
search which led to its seizure was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. PETITION
AFFIRMED.
People v. Aminuddin (1988)
Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly
after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at
about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC
officers who were in fact waiting for him simply
accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what
looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of
suspect articles were confiscated from him and
later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination.
When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act was filed against him. 2 Later, the information
was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who
had also been arrested with him that same evening
and likewise investigated. 3 Both were arraigned
and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal
filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on
the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting
officers absolving her after a 'thorough
investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and trial
proceeded only against the accused-appellant,
who was eventually convicted .6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had
earlier received a tip from one of their informers
that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel
bound for Iloilo City and was carrying
marijuana. 7 He was Identified by name. 8Acting on
this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June
25, 1984, and approached him as he descended
from the gangplank after the informer had pointed
to him. 9 They detained him and inspected the bag
he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos
of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by
an NBI forensic examiner, 10who testified that she
6
conducted microscopic, chemical and
chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of
this finding, the corresponding charge was then
filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the
marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was
his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and
two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was
arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed.
His bag was confiscated without a search warrant.
At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to
force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana,
the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in
the chest and arms even as he parried the blows
while he was still handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did
not even know what marijuana looked like and
that his business was selling watches and
sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the
marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying
was not properly Identified and could have been
any of several bundles kept in the stock room of
the PC headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its
own examination of the accused that he claimed to
have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried
only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo
for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare,
not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin
testified that he kept the two watches in a secret
pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not
discovered when he was bodily searched by the
arresting officers nor were they damaged as a
result of his manhandling. 16 He also said he sold
one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the
other, although the watches belonged not to him
but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he
said did not even know. 18 The trial court also
rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing
that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries
sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual
findings, considering that it was the trial judge who
had immediate access to the testimony of the
witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their
credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice,
meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face
and dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or
expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal
record. But the trial judge sees all of this,
discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the
falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the
trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant
was not really beaten up because he did not
complain about it later nor did he submit to a
medical examination. That is hardly fair or realistic.
It is possible Aminnudin never had that
opportunity as he was at that time under
detention by the PC authorities and in fact has
never been set free since he was arrested in 1984
and up to the present. No bail has been allowed
for his release.
There is one point that deserves closer
examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim
that he was arrested and searched without
warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in
his possession inadmissible in evidence against him
under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even

discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor
General dismissed this after an all-too-short
argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid
because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of
the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This
made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful
arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the
PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that
they had no warrant when they arrested
Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying.
Their only justification was the tip they had earlier
received from a reliable and regular informer who
reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in
Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony
varies as to the time they received the tip, one
saying it was two days before the arrest, 20 another
two weeks 21 and a third "weeks before June
25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the
declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt.
Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:
Q You mentioned an intelligence report,
you mean with respect to the coming of
Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence
report?
A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it
was supported by reliable sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of
the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking
of marijuana leaves on that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984
when we received this information from
that particular informer, prior to June 25,
1984 we have already reports of the
particular operation which was being
participated by Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence
report two days before June 25, 1984
with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside
from this intelligence report?
A Well, I have received also other reports
but not pertaining to the coming of
Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal
gambling operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information
which you said two days before June 25,
1984, did you also receive daily report
regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received
reports on the activities of Idel
Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that
information?
A It came to my hand which was written
in a required sheet of information, maybe
for security reason and we cannot
Identify the person.
Q But you received it from your regular
informer?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were
more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is
coming with drugs?
A Marijuana, sir.
7
Q And this information respecting Idel
Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with
marijuana was received by you many
days before you received the intelligence
report in writing?
A Not a report of the particular coming of
Aminnudin but his activities.
Q You only knew that he was coming on
June 25,1984 two days before?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984
you did not know that minnudin was
coming?
A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity,
did not know that he was coming but on
June 23, 1984 that was the time when I
received the information that he was
coming. Regarding the reports on his
activities, we have reports that he was
already consummated the act of selling
and shipping marijuana stuff.
COURT:
Q And as a result of that report, you put
him under surveillance?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the
name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the
woman.
Q So that even before you received the
official report on June 23, 1984, you had
already gathered information to the
effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to
Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Q You did not try to secure a search
warrant for the seizure or search of the
subject mentioned in your intelligence
report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?
A Because we were very very sure that
our operation will yield positive result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it
will yield positive result you do not need
a search warrant anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary. 23
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement,
especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of
the PC. The Supreme Court cannot countenance
such a statement. This is still a government of laws
and not of men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to
be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon
probable cause to be
determined personally by the
judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and
particularly describing the place

to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest
or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable
cause. Contrary to the averments of the
government, the accused-appellant was not
caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be
committed or had just been committed to justify
the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be
invoked to dispense with the obtention of the
warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for
example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft
are subject to warrantless searches and seizures
for violation of the customs law because these
vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From
the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it
is clear that they had at least two days within
which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest
and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on
the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The
vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was
certain. And from the information they had
received, they could have persuaded a judge that
there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the
issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No
effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of
Rights was ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the head of the arresting
team, had determined on his own authority that a
"search warrant was not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained
the warrantless arrest of violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown
that they were caught red-handed, as a result of
what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of
the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly
applicable because at the precise time of arrest the
accused was in the act of selling the prohibited
drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not,
at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime
nor was it shown that he was about to do so or
that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and
there was no outward indication that called for his
arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the
other passengers innocently disembarking from
the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed
to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he
suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension. It was the furtive finger that
triggered his arrest. The Identification by the
informer was the probable cause as determined by
the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them
to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest
him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring
democracy in our country after fourteen years of
the despised dictatorship, when any one could be
picked up at will, detained without charges and
punished without trial, we will have only ourselves
to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to
return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the
8
Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of
Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant
is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest
that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a
finding that he is guilty. The constitutional
presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be
so declared even if his defense is weak as long as
the prosecution is not strong enough to convict
him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly
seized from Aminnudin, the case of the
prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be
admitted, and should never have been considered
by the trial court for the simple fact is that the
marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the
poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous
phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful
arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and
the warrantless arrest did not come under the
exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence,
the warrantless search was also illegal and the
evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the
government against drug addiction and commends
the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against
those who would inflict this malediction upon our
people, especially the susceptible youth. But as
demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be
more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights
for the protection of the liberty of every individual
in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its
protection the innocent and the guilty alike against
any manner of high- handedness from the
authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are
not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a
price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes,
again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals
should escape than that the government should
play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the
free society to violate a law to enforce another,
especially if the law violated is the Constitution
itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally
seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-
appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt and he must therefore be
discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is
REVERSED and the accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.
People v. Mengote (1992)
Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted
of illegal possession of firearms on the strength
mainly of the stolen pistol found on his person at
the moment of his warrantless arrest. In this
appeal, he pleads that the weapon was not
admissible as evidence against him because it had
been illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of
the poisonous tree. The Government disagrees. It
insists that the revolver was validly received in
evidence by the trial judge because its seizure was

incidental to an arrest that was doubtless lawful
even if admittedly without warrant.
The incident occurred shortly before noon of
August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District
received a telephone call from an informer that
there were three suspicious-looking persons at the
corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in
Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of
plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the
place. As later narrated at the trial by Patrolmen
Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan, 1 they there
saw two men "looking from side to side," one of
whom was holding his abdomen. They approached
these persons and identified themselves as
policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away
but were unable to escape because the other
lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were
then searched. One of them, who turned out to be
the accused-appellant, was found with a .38
caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live
bullets in the chamber. His companion, later
identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife
secreted in his front right pants pocket. The
weapons were taken from them. Mengote and
Morellos were then turned over to police
headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence
Division.
On August 11, 1987, the following information was
filed against the accused-appellant before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Besides the police officers, one other witness
presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto
Danganan, who identified the subject weapon as
among the articles stolen from him during the
robbery in his house in Malabon on June 13, 1987.
He pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers. He
had duly reported the robbery to the police,
indicating the articles stolen from him, including
the revolver. 2 For his part, Mengote made no
effort to prove that he owned the firearm or that
he was licensed to possess it and claimed instead
that the weapon had been "Planted" on him at the
time of his arrest. 3
The gun, together with the live bullets and its
holster, were offered and admitted over the
objection of the defense. As previously stated, the
weapon was the principal evidence that led to
Mengote's conviction for violation of P.D. 1866. He
was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. 4
It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the
revolver should not have been admitted in
evidence because of its illegal seizure. no warrant
therefor having been previously obtained. Neither
could it have been seized as an incident of a lawful
arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself
unlawful, having been also effected without a
warrant. The defense also contends that the
testimony regarding the alleged robbery in
Danganan's house was irrelevant and should also
have been disregarded by the trial court.
The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill
of Rights:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to
be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects
9
against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon
probable cause to be
determined personally by the
judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and
particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of
communication and
correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when
public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
There is no question that evidence obtained as a
result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible
in any proceeding for any purpose. That is the
absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of
the Constitution. This is the celebrated
exclusionary rule based on the justification given
by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the
prosecution, which itself controls the seizing
officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong
will the wrong be repressed." The Solicitor
General, while conceding the rule, maintains that it
is not applicable in the case at bar. His reason is
that the arrest and search of Mengote and the
seizure of the revolver from him were lawful under
Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court reading
as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant
when lawful. — A peace officer
or private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has
committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact
just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal
establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from
one confinement to another.

In cases failing under
paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof,
the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police
station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.
We have carefully examined the wording of this
Rule and cannot see how we can agree with the
prosecution.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as
Mengote was not an escapee from a penal
institution when he was arrested. We therefore
confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of
his arrest under either Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this
section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1)
after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an
offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in
the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in
question, the accused-appellant was merely
"looking from side to side" and "holding his
abdomen," according to the arresting officers
themselves. There was apparently no offense that
had just been committed or was being actually
committed or at least being attempted by
Mengote in their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual
existence of an offense was not necessary as long
as Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion
on the part of the arresting officers and induced in
them the belief that an offense had been
committed and that the accused-appellant had
committed it." The question is, What offense?
What offense could possibly have been suggested
by a person "looking from side to side" and
"holding his abdomen" and in a place not exactly
forsaken?
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the
setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. It
might have been different if Mengote bad been
apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place
where he had no reason to be, like a darkened
alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was
arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded
street shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep
with I his companion. He was not skulking in the
shadows but walking in the clear light of day.
There was nothing clandestine about his being on
that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the
noonday sun.
On the other hand, there could have been a
number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his
eyes were darting from side to side and be was
holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in
the minds of the arresting officers, as the
prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been
shown what their suspicion was all about. In fact,
the policemen themselves testified that they were
dispatched to that place only because of the
telephone call from the informer that there were
"suspicious-looking" persons in that vicinity who
10
were about to commit a robbery at North Bay
Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he
thought the men looked suspicious nor did he
elaborate on the impending crime.
In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, 5 the
Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the
accused because there was a bulge in his waist
that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer
and, upon inspection, turned out to be a pouch
containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, 6 the
accused boarded a bus and placed the buri bag she
was carrying behind the seat of the arresting
officer while she herself sat in the seat before him.
His suspicion aroused, be surreptitiously examined
the bag, which he found to contain marijuana. He
then and there made the warrantless arrest and
seizure that we subsequently upheld on the
ground that probable cause had been sufficiently
established.
The case before us is different because there was
nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion
other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on
his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination
could it have been inferred from these acts that an
offense had just been committed, or was actually
being committed, or was at least being attempted
in their presence.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, 7 where
the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the
accused was unconstitutional. This was effected
while be was coming down a vessel, to all
appearances no less innocent than the other
disembarking passengers. He had not committed
nor was be actually committing or attempting to
commit an offense in the presence of the arresting
officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In
short, there was no probable cause that, as the
prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed with
the constitutional requirement of a warrant.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less
stringent requirements have also not been
satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at
the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact
just been committed and that the arresting officers
had personal knowledge of facts indicating that
Mengote had committed it. All they had was
hearsay information from the telephone caller,
and about a crime that had yet to be committed.
The truth is that they did not know then what
offense, if at all, had been committed and neither
were they aware of the participation therein of the
accused-appellant. It was only later, after
Danganan had appeared at the Police
headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in
his house and of Mengote's supposed involvement
therein. 8 As for the illegal possession of the
firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen
discovered this only after he had been searched
and the investigation conducted later revealed
that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to
possess it.
Before these events, the Peace officers had no
knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the
fact (or suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying
a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of
Danganan's house.

In the landmark case of People v. Burgos, 9 this
Court declared:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113,
the officer arresting a person
who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to
commit an offense must
have personal knowledge of the
fact. The offense must also be
committed in his presence or
within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of
Police, 80 Phil. 859). (Emphasis
supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
In arrests without a warrant
under Section 6(b), however, it
is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested
has committed a crime. A crime
must in fact or actually have
been committed first. That a
crime has actually been
committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to
suspect that a crime may have
been committed. The fact of the
commission of the offense must
be undisputed. The test of
reasonable ground applies only
to the identity of the
perpetrator. (Emphasis
supplied)
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih v. Castro, 10 thus:
If the arrest was made under
Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules
of Court in connection with a
crime about to be committed,
being committed, or just
committed, what was that
crime? There is no allegation in
the record of such a
falsification. Parenthetically, it
may be observed that under the
Revised Rule 113, Section
5(b), the officer making the
arrest must have personal
knowledge of the ground
therefor as stressed in the
recent case of People v.
Burgos. (Emphasis supplied)
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could
be summarily arrested and searched just because
he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly
because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer
could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty
look on suspicion that he may have committed a
criminal act or is actually committing or attempting
it. This simply cannot be done in a free society.
This is not a police state where order is exalted
over liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part
of the arresting officer may be justified in the
name of security.
There is no need to discuss the other issues raised
by the accused-appellant as the ruling we here
make is sufficient to sustain his exoneration.
11
Without the evidence of the firearm taken from
him at the time of his illegal arrest, the prosecution
has lost its most important exhibit and must
therefore fail. The testimonial evidence against
Mengote (which is based on the said firearm) is
not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime imputed to him.
We commend Atty. Violeta Calvo-Drilon for her
able and spirited defense of the accused-appellant
not only in the brief but also in the reply brief,
which she did not have to file but did so just the
same to stress the constitutional rights of her
client. The fact that she was acting only as a
counsel de oficio with no expectation of material
reward makes her representation even more
commendable.
The Court feels that if the peace officers had been
more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of Rights,
the prosecution of the accused-appellant might
have succeeded. As it happened, they allowed
their over-zealousness to get the better of them,
resulting in their disregard of the requirements of
a valid search and seizure that rendered
inadmissible the vital evidence they had invalidly
seized.
This should be a lesson to other peace officers.
Their impulsiveness may be the very cause of the
acquittal of persons who deserve to be convicted,
escaping the clutches of the law because, ironically
enough, it has not been observed by those who
are supposed to enforce it.
Accused-appellant ACQUITTED.
People v. Claudio (1988)
The information filed against the accused alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of
July 1981, in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-
named ACCUSED without being
lawfully authorized, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully
and knowingly transport 1.1
kilos of Marijuana dried leaves,
which are prohibited drugs for
the purpose of selling the same
from Baguio City to Olongapo
City.
The lower court established her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt on the basis of the prosecution's
evidence as follows:
To prove the guilt of the
accused, the prosecution
offered the following document
and testimonial evidence as
follows: Exhibit "A" Letter
request for Examination of
suspected marijuana dried
leaves weighing approximately
1.1 kilos dated July 25, 1981; "B"
plastic container; "B- 1"-
marijuana contained in the
plastic container; "B-1-a"—

another plastic container; "C"—
Chemistry Report No. D-668-
81;"C-1" Findings: Positive for
marijuana; "D,","D-1," "D-2"and
"D-3; "E" and "E-1" photographs
of accused with Pat. Daniel
Obiña and Pauline Tiongco
showing the marijuana, "F"—
Victory Liner Ticket No.
84977;"G"—Sworn Statement of
Pat. Daniel Obiña, "H" Request
for Field Test on suspected
marijuana from accused by P/Lt.
Antonio V. Galindo;"H-1"—date
of of the request; "L"—
Certificate of Field Test dated
July 22, 1981; "B-2" and "B-2a"
additional Wrapping paper; and
the testimonies of witnesses of
the prosecution, Theresa Ann
Bugayong; Pat. Daniel Obiño,
Cpl. Paulino Tiongco, Cpl.
Ernesto Abello and Sgt. Leoncio
Bagang.
Theresa Ann Bugayong—22
years old, single, Forensic
Chemist and a resident of 1150
Sampaloc, Metro Manila
testified that she received a
request from the Task Force
Bagong Buhay, Olongapo City,
dated July 25, 1981, on
specimen marijuana submitted
for examination. The specimen
consisted of 900 grams of
suspected dried marijuana
flowering tops wrapped in a
newspaper placed in a plastic
bag with a marking "MB Store"
(Exh. "B").
The examination conducted by
her proved to be positive for
marijuana. After her
examination, she prepared
Chemistry Report No. D-668-81
dated July 29,1981 (Exhs. "C"
and "C-l"). She conducted three
eliminations; microscopic
examination, the duguenoi
levine test and thirdly, the
confirmatory examination of
thin layer chromatographic test.
The said specimen was
submitted to them by OIC
Danilo Santiago, a
representative of the CANU,
Olongapo City.
The second witness for the
prosecution was Daniel Obiña,
37 years old, married,
policeman and residing at 34
Corpuz St., East Tapinac,
Olongapo City. Obiña testified
that he has been a member of
the INP, since 1970 up to the
present. He was assigned in
June, 1972 at the Investigation
Division as operative. His job
then was among other things to
follow up reports in their office,
12
recover stolen items and
apprehend suspects. On July
21,1981, he was on Detached
Service with the ANTI-
NARCOTICS Unit; and that on
that date, he came from Baguio
City and arrived in Olongapo
City at about 1:30 o'clock in the
afternoon having left Baguio at
about 8:30 o'clock in the
morning. He took the Victory
Liner in going back to Olongapo
City. His family lives in Baguio
City. On board the Victory Liner,
he was seated on the second
seat at the back. While he was
thus seated, suspect Anita
Claudio boarded the same bus
and took the seat in front of him
after putting a bag which she
was carrying at the back of the
seat of Obiña. The bag placed by
suspect behind his seat was a
wooven buri bag made of plastic
containing some vegetables.
The act of the accused putting
her bag behind Pat. Obiña's seat
aroused his suspicion and made
him felt (sic) nervous. With the
feeling that there was some
unusual, he had the urge to
search the woven plastic bag.
But it was only at San Fernando,
Pampanga when he was able to
go to the bag. He inserted one
of his fingers in a plastic bag
located at the bottom of the
woven bag and smelt marijuana.
The plastic woven bag
appearing to contain camote
tops on the top has a big bundle
of plastic of marijuana at the
bottom. He could recognize the
smell of marijuana because he
was assigned at that time at the
ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. He did
not, however, do anything after
he discovered that there was
marijuana inside the plastic bag
of the accused until they
reached Olongapo City and the
accused alighted from the bus in
front of the Caltex Gasoline
Station in Sta. Rita. Right after
the accused alighted from the
bus, policeman Obina
intercepted her and showed her
his Id Identifying himself as a
policeman and told her he will
search her bag because of the
suspicion that she was carrying
marijuana inside said bag. In
reply, accused told him, "Please
go with me, let us settle this at
home." However, the witness
did not heed her plea and
instead handcuffed her right
hand and with her, boarded a
tricycle right away and brought
the suspect to the police
headquarters with her bag
appearing to contain
vegetables.

At the police headquarters
Investigation Section, the bag
was searched in the presence of
Investigator Cpl. Tiongco; Pat.
Obiña, the accused and Sgt.
Leoncio Bagang. Inside the
plastic bag was found a big
bundle of plastic containing
marijuana weighing about one
kilo. Witness stated that he
could detect marijuana even
before the application of
chemicals because of one year
and a half assignment with the
CANU. After the marijuana was
taken from the bag of the
accused, photographs were
taken of the accused and the
marijuana confiscated from her
possession with Pat. Obiña and
that of Investigator Tiongco,
accused and himself Identified
photographs shown to him in
open Court. (Exhs. "D," "D-l,"
"D-2" and "D-3"). Witness was
likewise shown a plastic bag of
marijuana contained in a plastic
container (Exhs. "B," "B-1" and
"B-1 -a") and Identified it as the
one confiscated from the
accused and pointed to his
initials on the newspaper
wrapping which also shows the
date and time, although the
wrapper at the time he testified
appeared to be soiled already.
The marijuana was allegedly still
fresh when confiscated.
To prove further that the
accused transported the
confiscated marijuana from
Baguio City to Olongapo City,
witness Identified Victory Liner
Ticket No. 684977 which was
confiscated from the accused
and for Identification purposes,
the witness presented the body
number of the bus he wrote at
the back of the ticket which is
"309" (Exhs. "F" and "F-l").
Regarding himself, he did not
pay his fare from Baguio City
because as a policeman, he
used his badge and a free ride.
On cross-examination, witness
stated that he went to Baguio
City on July 15,1981 and
underwent treatment of his
heart while he was there. He
was given a furlough for medical
treatment. He stayed in Baguio
City for about five days and
returned to Olongapo City on
July 21, 1981. Prior to July 21,
1981, witness never knew the
accused, and the first time he
saw her was in Baguio when she
boarded the same Victory Liner
he took. When the accused who
was bringing with her a woven
plastic bag placed the bag right
behind his seat instead of
13
placing it in front of her or
beside her seat. Witness Obiña
became suspicious and his
suspicion was confirmed when
they reached San Fernando,
Pampanga, after he checked the
buri bag. The bus stopped at
said town to load some
gasoline. Witness inserted one
of his fingers inside the buri bag
and thereafter smelt marijuana.
He confirmed his testimony on
direct that when witness
confronted accused he was
invited to go with her in order
to settle the matter to which he
refused. Accused further
testified that from the time the
accused placed her bag behind
his seat from Baguio City, he felt
so nervous and had to take his
medicine at the Tarlac Station. It
was only after having taken his
medicine that his apprehension
was contained and thus was
able to insert his right hand
inside the buri bag in San
Fernando, Pampanga. His
fingers reached the very bottom
of the bag. He Identified his
sworn statement regarding this
incident given on July 21, 1981
which is Exhibit "G." Witness
likewise Identified accused Anita
Claudio in open court.
Paulino Tiongco, 52 years old,
married and resident of 31
Canada St., East Bajac Bajac,
Olongapo City, testified that as a
policeman on the afternoon of
July 21, 1981, he was inside the
Investigation Division of the
Police Station, Olongapo City. As
Duty Investigator, between 1:45
and 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of the same day, Pat.
Daniel Obiña arrived at the
Police Station with a woman
and Identified her in the
courtroom as Anita Claudio. Pat.
Obiña reported to him that he
apprehended Anita Claudio
inside the Victory Liner bus for
possession of marijuana dried
leaves. The marijuana leaves
were contained in a buri bag
with some vegetables such as
camote tops, bananas and some
other vegetables. The marijuana
was placed in a plastic wrapper
with the name National Book
Store colored black and white.
Witness Identified the wrapper
(Exh. "B-2"). The bag contained
the markings of Pat. Obiña
which are his initials, (Exhs. "B-
2-a"), and numbers 210781
representing the date which
was placed by Pat. Obiña after
Cpl. Tiongco examined the
suspected marijuana.

After examining and seeing the
marijuana together with the
vegetables, he interviewed
apprehending officer Obiña and
reduced his statements in
writing. Cpl. Tiongco Identifled
the sworn statement of Obiña
(Exh. "G"). He also interviewed
accused Anita Claudio who was
all the while inside the
Investigation room seated on a
chair. After appraising her of her
constitutional rights, he asked
the accused whether she was
willing to give her written
statements to which the
accused refused. Hence, no
statements were taken of her.
However, pictures were taken
inside the investigation room.
Exhs. "D" and "E," series which
were already previously
Identified by Pat. Obiña,
Witness Identified the persons
appearing in the pictures as that
of Pat. Obiña and the accused
and also of himself. Thereafter,
the marijuana contained in the
plastic bag were turned over to
Lt. Galindo and Anita Claudio
was detained.
Ernesto Abello, 41 years old,
married and residing at No. 29
Alba Street, East Tapinac,
Olongapo City, testified he was
since March 1972 a policeman
and was stationed at Police
Station 21, Olongapo City,
Metrodiscom. However, in
1981, he was already assigned
to the CANU General Anti-
NARCOTICS Unit. On July 22,
1981, he reported for work at
the CANU and received from Lt.
Galindo more than a kilo of
suspected marijuana dried
leaves. As requested by Lt.
Galindo he conducted a field
test on this marijuana which he
received from Lt. Galindo, as
evidenced by a request signed
by him dated July 22,1981 (Exh.
"H").
In connection with the field test
conducted by him on the
specimen, he prepared a
Certificate of Fleld Test dated
July 22,1981 (Exhs. "I"). The
Certificate of Field Test
indicated the presence of tetra-
hydrocannabinol (THC), an
active substance that can be
only be found in marijuana, a
prohibited drug. Cpl. Abello
Identified a plastic bag of
marijuana received from Lt.
Galindo which he later give to
CIC Danilo Santiago, the
Evidence Custodian, for the
latter to bring the specimen to
the PC Crime Laboratory.
14
The last witness for the
prosecution was Leoncio
Bagang, 40 years old, married,
residing at No. 27 Jones St., East
Tapinac, Olongapo City, a
policeman of Olongapo City,
assigned with Police Station
"21." He has been a policeman
since 1966 up to the present. In
July, 1981, he was then assigned
at the Patrol Division and his
duty was to patrol the city
proper from Magsaysay Drive
up to east Bajac Bajac.
He narrated that on July
21,1981, between the hours of
1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, he was at the Caltex
Gasoline Station, East Bajac
Bajac, Olongapo City along Rizal
Avenue. He was then on duty
patrol using a motorcycle. While
he was at the said place, he saw
Pat. Obiña alighted from the
Victory Liner bus ordering
somebody to alight from the
same bus. When he heard Pat.
Obiña he approached him and
asked him what was happening.
Pat. Obiña told him he
apprehended a certain woman
possessing dried marijuana. The
woman was still then inside the
bus. Pat. Obiña then brought
the woman to the police
department who was bringing
with her a buri bag. They
boarded a tricycle, the woman
riding inside the tricycle while
Pat. Obiña sat behind the driver.
He then followed in his
motorcycle the said tricycle to
police station. He went inside
the Investigation Section of the
Police Station and he was there
when Pat. Obiña reported to
Cpl. Tiongco his apprehension of
the woman possessing
marijuana. He saw the
marijuana for the first time
inside the Investigation Section
placed in a buri bag covered
with newspaper. He witnessed
the taking out of the marijuana
from inside the bag by Pat.
Obiña in the presence of Cpl.
Tiongco and the woman or the
accused in this case, and
himself. Policeman Bagang
Identified the accused in open
Court. When asked about the
nature of the marijuana when it
was brought out from the bag,
he said that the marijuana was
dried but not well dried. Aside
from the marijuana inside the
buri bag, there were vegetables
and bananas, Witness Identified
in open Court, the marijuana he
saw found in the buri bag of the
accused. His means of
Identification was the signature
of Pat. Obiña, (Exh. "B-1"). He

likewise Identified a newspaper
wrapping which was already
torn.
While in the Investigation
Division, witness Bagang heard
the accused's answer to Cpl.
Tiongco's questions that she
was going to deliver the
marijuana to Sta. Rita. He,
however, did not linger long at
the investigation Division. After
he saw the marijuana and heard
the answer of the accused to
Cpl. Tiongcos question the place
of delivery of the marijuana, he
left the police station. Witness
likewise Identified an initial DO-
21-07-81 already marked as
Exhibit "B-2." DO which is an
initial, and not a signature,
stands for Daniel Obiña. After
the testimony of Leoncio
Bagang, the prosecution rested
its case.
Issues:
I: CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A.
6425 IS IMPROPER IF ONE OR SOME OF THE
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE IS OR ARE ABSENT.
II: CONVICTION CAN NOT BE HAD UNDER SECTION
4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IF THE ALLEGED BUYMAN
WAS NOT PRESENTED TO TESTIFY.
III: APPELLANTS CONVICTION FOR DELIVERY (SEC.
4, ART II, OF R.A. 6424) IS WRONG BECAUSE SOME
MATERIAL FACTS WERE OVERLOOKED AND NOT
CONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT.
The accused alleges that she is only liable, at the
most, for possession under Sec. 8, Art. II of Rep.
Act No. 6425 and not for violating Sec. 4 of the
same Act.
The latter section, Sec. 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration,
Delivery Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited
Drugs.—The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a
fine ranging from twenty
thousand to thirty thousand
pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a
broker in any of such
transactions. If the victim of the
offense is a minor, or should a
prohibited drug involved in any
offense under this Section be
the proximate cause of the
death of a victim thereof, the
maximum penalty herein
provided shall be imposed.
15
Claudio contends that there was no delivery as
there was no recipient of the prohibited drugs.
Therefore, she may not be convicted under Sec. 4
of Rep. Act No. 6425.
The contention is without merit. A closer perusal
of the subject provision shows that it is not only
delivery which is penalized but also the sale,
administration, distribution and transportation of
probihited drugs. Claudio was caught transporting
1.1 kilos of marijuana, thus the lower court did not
err in finding her guilty of violating Sec. 4.
The accused also alleges that before the
completion of delivery, the intention of the
possessor is unknown.
This allegation is also unavailing. It is undisputed
that Claudio had in her possession 1.1 kilos of
marijuana. This is a considerable quantity. As held
in the case of People v. Toledo, (140 SCRA 259,
267) "the possession of such considerable quantity
as three plastic bags of marijuana leaves and seeds
coupled with the fact that he is not a user of
prohibited drugs cannot indicate anything except
the intention of the accused to sell, distribute and
deliver said marijuana.
The accused next contends the warrantless search,
seizure and apprehension as unlawful.
The applicable provisions on this issue are found in
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides:
.. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has
committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.
Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides:
Section 12. Search incident to
lawful arrest.— A person
lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may
be used as proof of the
commission of an offense,
without a search warrant. (12a)
Appellant Claudio was caught transporting
prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel Obiña did not need a
warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught
in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being
an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful.
(Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there
was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of
marijuana.
The accused takes inconsistent positions in her
appellant's brief. At first, she does not deny having
had with her marijuana at the time of her arrest.
Instead, she claims that she should just be guilty of
possession. In a complete turnabout, in the latter
portion of said brief, she claims that the evidence

against her were mere fabrications and the
marijuana allegedly found in her possession was
only planted.
We have carefully examined the records of the
case and we find no ground to alter the trial
court's findings and appreciation of the evidence
presented.
Credence is accorded to the prosecution's
evidence, more so as it consisted mainly of
testimonies of policemen. Law enforcers are
presumed to have regularly performed their duty
in the absence of proof to the contrary (People v.
De Jesus, 145 SCRA 521). We also find no reason
from the records why the prosecution witnesses
should fabricate their testimonies and implicate
appellant in such a serious crime (See People v.
Bautista, 147 SCRA 500).
The accused testified that she was not on that bus
that came from Baguio City but rather she was in
Olongapo City all that time. She alleged that she
was arrested by Pat. Obiña for no reason at all.
In the case at bar, alibi does not deserve much
credit as it was established only by the accused
herself (People v. De la Cruz, 148 SCRA 582).
Judgment appealed from AFFIRMED.
People v. Tangliben (1990)
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 41, Third Judicial Region at San
Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 41, finding appellant
Medel Tangliben y Bernardino guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as
amended) and sentencing him to life
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000 and to pay
the costs.
Willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have his
possession, control and custody one (1) bag of
dried marijuana leaves with an approximate
weight of one (1) kilo and to transport (sic) the
same to Olongapo City, without authority of law to
do so.
The prosecution's evidence upon which the finding
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt was based is
narrated by the trial court as follows:
It appears from the evidence presented
by the prosecution that in the late
evening of March 2, 1982, Patrolmen
Silverio Quevedo and Romeo L. Punzalan
of the San Fernando Police Station,
together with Barangay Tanod Macario
Sacdalan, were conducting surveillance
mission at the Victory Liner Terminal
compound located at Barangay San
Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga; that
the surveillance was aimed not only
against persons who may commit
misdemeanors at the said place but also
on persons who may be engaging in the
traffic of dangerous drugs based on
informations supplied by informers; that
it was around 9:30 in the evening that
said Patrolmen noticed a person caring a
traveling who was acting suspiciously and
16
they confronted him; that the person was
requested by Patrolmen Quevedo and
Punzalan to open the red traveling bag
but the person refused, only to accede
later on when the patrolmen identified
themselves; that found inside the bag
were marijuana leaves wrapped in a
plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo,
more or less; that the person was asked
of his name and the reason why he was
at the said place and he gave his name as
Medel Tangliben and explained that he
was waiting for a ride to Olongapo City to
deliver the marijuana leaves; that the
accused was taken to the police
headquarters at San Fernando,
Pampanga, for further investigation; and
that Pat. Silverio Quevedo submitted to
his Station Commander his Investigator's
Report.
It appears also from the prosecution's
evidence that in the following morning or
on March 3, 1982, Pat. Silverio Quevedo
asked his co-policeman Pat. Roberto
Quevedo, who happens to be his brother
and who has had special training on
narcotics, to conduct a field test on a
little portion of the marijuana leaves and
to have the remaining portion examined
by the PCCL at Camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga; that Pat. Roberto
Quevedo conducted a field test on the
marijuana leaves and found positive
result for marijuana (Exhibit E); that the
remaining bigger quantity of the
marijuana leaves were taken to the PCCL
at Camp Olivas by Pat. Roberto Quevedo
that same day of March 3, 1982 and
when examined, the same were also
found to be marijuana.
Only the accused testified in his defense. His
testimony is narrated by the trial court as follows:
The accused declared that he got married
on October 25, 1981 and his wife begot a
child on June 10, 1982; that he was
formerly employed in the poultry farm of
his uncle Alejandro Caluma in Antipolo,
Rizal; that he is engaged in the business
of selling poultry medicine and feeds,
including chicks, and used to conduct his
business at Taytay, Rizal; that he goes to
Subic at times in connection with his
business and whenever he is in Subic, he
used to buy C-rations from one Nena
Ballon and dispose the same in Manila;
that he never left his residence at
Antipolo, Rizal, on March 2, 1982; that on
March 3, 1982, he went to Subic to
collect a balance of P100.00 from a
customer thereat and to buy C-rations;
that he was able to meet Nena Ballon at
6:00 o'clock in the evening and he stayed
in Nena's house up to 8:00 o'clock
because he had a drinking spree with
Nena's son; that he tried to catch the
8:00 o'clock trip to Manila from Olongapo
City but he failed and was able to take
the bus only by 9:00 o'clock that evening
that it was a Victory Liner Bus that he
rode and because he was tipsy, he did

not notice that the bus was only bound
for San Fernando, Pampanga; that upon
alighting at the Victory Liner Compound
at San Fernando, Pampanga he crossed
the street to wait for a bus going to
Manila; that while thus waiting for a bus,
a man whom he came to know later as
Pat. Punzalan, approached him and asked
him if he has any residence certificate;
that when he took out his wallet, Pat.
Punzalan got the wallet and took all the
money inside the wallet amounting to
P545.00; that Pat. Punzalan told him that
he'll be taken to the municipal building
for verification as he may be an NPA
member; that at the municipal building,
he saw a policeman, identified by him
later as Pat. Silverio Quevedo, sleeping
but was awakened when he arrived that
Pat. Quevedo took him upstairs and told
him to take out everything from his
pocket saying that the prisoners inside
the jail may get the same from him; that
inside his pocket was a fifty-peso bill and
Pat. Quevedo took the same, telling him
that it shall be returned to him but that it
was never returned to him; that he was
thereafter placed under detention and
somebody told him that he is being
charged with possession of marijuana
and if he would like to be bailed out,
somebody is willing to help him; and, that
when he was visited by his wife, he told
his wife that Patrolman Silverio Quevedo
took away all his money but he told his
wife not to complain anymore as it would
be useless.
Appellant, through counsel de oficio Atty. Enrique
Chan, raised the lone assignment of error in his
appeal:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
AND FINDING HIM GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED ON INSUFFICIENT AND
DOUBTFUL EVIDENCE.
The Solicitor-General likewise filed his brief,
basically reiterating ating the lower court's
findings.
However, before this Court had the chance to act
on appeal, counsel de oficio Atty. Enrique Chan
died. Thereafter, this court appointed a new
counsel de oficio, Atty. Katz Tierra and pursuant
thereto, the Deputy Clerk of Court, in behalf of the
Clerk of Court, required the new counsel to file her
appellant's brief. The latter complied and, in her
brief, raised the following assignment of errors:
I board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
AS EVIDENCE THE PACKAGE OF
MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AS IT WAS A
PRODUCT OF AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH
WITHOUT A WARRANT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
AS EVIDENCE THE ALLEGED PACKAGE OF
MARIJUANA LEAVES AS THE LEAVES
17
SUPPOSEDLY SEIZED FROM ACCUSED
WHEN IT WAS NEVER AUTHENTICATED.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
RULING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED
TO PROVE THE GUILT OF DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT.
It is contended that the marijuana allegedly seized
from the accused was a product of an unlawful
search without a warrant and is therefore
inadmissible in evidence.
This contention is devoid of merit.
One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring
a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful
arrest. Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 12. Search incident to a lawful
arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of
the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant.
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides:
. . . A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense.
Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was
carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This
case therefore falls squarely within the exception.
The warrantless search was incident to a lawful
arrest and is consequently valid.
In the case of People v. Claudia, 160 SCRA 646,
[1988] this Court, confronted with the same issue,
held that:
Appellant Claudio was caught
transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel
did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio
as the latter was caught in flagrante
delicto. The warrantless search being an
incident to a lawful arrest is in itself
lawful. (Nolasco V. Paño, 147 SCRA 509).
Therefore, there was no infirmity in the
seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.
We are not unmindful of the decision of this Court
in People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 [1988]. In
that case the PC officers had earlier received a tip
from an informer that accused-appellant. was on
carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip, they waited
for him one evening, approached him as he
descended from the gangplank, detained him and
inspected the bag he was carrying. Said bag
contained marijuana leaves. The Court held that
the marijuana could not be admitted in evidence
since it was seized illegally. The records show,
however, that there were certain facts, not sing in
the case before us, which led the Court to declare
the seizure as invalid. As stated therein:

The present case presented no such
urgency From the conflicting declarations
of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they
had at react two days within which they
could have obtained a warrant of arrest
and search Aminnudin who was coming
to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name
was known. The vehicle was identified.
The date of its arrival was certain. And
from the information they had received,
they could have persuaded a judge that
there was probable cause, indeed, to
justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they
did nothing. No effort was made to
comply with the law. The Bill of Rights
was ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the head of the
arresting team, had determined on his
own authority that a "search warrant was
not necessary."
In contrast, the case before us presented urgency.
Although the trial court's decision did not mention
it, the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that
there was an informer who pointed to the
accused-appellant as carrying marijuana. (TSN, pp.
52-53) Faced with such on-the-spot information,
the police officers had to act quickly. There was
not enough time to secure a search warrant. We
cannot therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin to
the case at bar. To require search warrants during
on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal
possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors,
smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc.
would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible
to contain the crimes with which these persons are
associated.
Accused-appellant likewise asserts that the
package of marijuana leaves supposedly seized
from him was never authenticated and therefore
should not have been admitted as evidence. He
capitalizes on the fact that the marijuana package
brought by patrolman Roberto Quevedo to the PC
Crime Laboratory for examination did not contain
a tag bearing the name of the accused. We rule,
however, that since Patrolman Quevedo testified
that he gave the marijuana package together with
a letter-request for examination, and the forensic
chemist Marilene Salangad likewise testified that
she received the marijuana together with the
letter-request and said letter-request bore the
name of the accused, then the requirements of
proper authentication of evidence were
sufficiently complied with. The marijuana package
examined by the forensic checklist was
satisfactorily identified as the one seized from
accused.
Even assuming arguendo that the marijuana sent
to the PC Crime Laboratory was not properly
authenticated, still, we cannot discount the
separate field test conducted by witness Roberto
Quevedo which yielded positive results for
marijuana.
Lastly, the appellant claims that the evidence upon
which he was convicted was insufficient and
doubtful and that the prosecution failed to prove
his guilt.
In attacking the sufficiency of evidence, the
appellant avers that the informer should have
18
been presented before the lower court. We
discard this argument as a futile attempt to revive
an already settled issue. This Court has ruled in
several cases that non-presentation of the
informer, where his testimony would be merely
corroborative or cumulative, is not fatal to the
prosecution's case. (People v. Asio, G.R. No. 84960,
September 1, 1989; (People v. Viola, G.R. No.
64262, March 16, 1989; People v. Capulong, 160
SCRA 533 [1988]; People v. Cerelegia, 147 SCRA
538).
As to doubtfulness of evidence, well-settled is the
rule that findings of the trial court on the issue of
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are
entitled to great respect and accorded the highest
consideration by the appellate court. Since
credibility is a matter that is peculiarly within the
province of the trial judge, who had first hand
opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor
and behavior of witnesses both for the prosecution
and the defense at the time of their testimony
(People v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, February 21,
1989; People v. Turla, 167 SCRA 278), we find no
reason to disturb the following findings:
The testimony of prosecution witnesses
Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo
Punzalan are positive and sufficiently
clean to show the commission by the
accused of the offense herein chatted.
These prosecution witnesses have no
motive to fabricate the facts and to foist
a very serious offense against the
accused. The knowledge on what these
witnesses testified to were (sic) acquired
by them in the official performance of
their duties and then, (sic) being no
showing that they are prejudiced against
the accused, their testimonies deserve
full credit.
The testimonies of the afore-mentioned
petitioner that what they found in the
possession of the accused were
marijuana leaves were corroborated by
the examination findings conducted by
Pat. October to Salangad of the PCCL,
with station at camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga
Moreover, if there is truth in the
testimony of the accused to the effect
that Pat. Punzalan got all the money from
his wallet when he was accosted at the
Victory Liner Terminal and was told just
to keep quiet otherwise he will be
"salvaged" why will Pat. Punzalan still
bring the accused to the municipal
Building for interrogation and/or
verification? Would not Pat. Punzalan be
exposing his identity to the accused? This
is unnatural. And this is also true on the
testimony to the accused that Pat.
Silverio Quevedo got his fifty-peso bill
arid never returned the same to him. If
the policemen really got any money from
the accused and that the marijuana
leaves do not belong to the accused, why
will the two policemen still produce in
Court as evidence that expensive-looking
traveling red bag taken from the accused
and which contained the marijuana in

question if the instant case is a mere
fabrication?
As already stated, all the evidence, oral
and documentary, presented by the
prosecution in this case were all based on
personal knowledge acquired by the
prosecution witnesses in the regular
performance of their official duties and
there is nothing in their testimonies to
show that they are bias (sic) or that they
have any prejudice against the herein
accused. Between the testimonies of
these prosecution witnesses and that of
the uncorroborated and self-serving
testimony of the accused, the former
should prevail.
Likewise, the appellant chose to limit his defense
to his own testimony. He could have availed
himself through compulsory court processes of
several witnesses to buttress his defense. Since not
one other witness was presented nor was any
justification for the non-appearance given, the
inadequacy of his lone and uncorroborated
testimony remains. It cannot prevail vis-a-vis the
positive testimonies given by the prosecution
witnesses.
Moreover, the appellant's having jumped bail is
akin to flight which, as correctly observed by the
lower court, is an added circumstance tending to
establish his guilt.
We take exception, however, to the trial court's
finding that:
The dried marijuana leaves found in the
possession of the accused weighs one (1)
kilo, more or less. The intent to transport
the same is clear from the testimony of
Pat. Silverio Quevedo who declared,
among other things, that when he
confronted the accused that night, the
latter told him that he (accused) is
bringing the marijuana leaves to
Olongapo City. Moreover, considering the
quantity of the marijuana leaves found in
the possession of the accused and the
place he was arrested which is at San
Fernando, Pampanga, a place where the
accused is not residing, it can be said that
the intent to transport the marijuana
leaves has been clearly established.
The alleged extrajudicial confession of the accused
which, on the other hand, he categorically denied
in court, that he is transporting the marijuana
leaves to Olongapo City cannot be relied upon.
Even assuming it to be true, the extrajudicial
confession cannot be admitted because it does not
appear in the records that the accused, during
custodial investigation, was apprised of his rights
to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed
of such rights. In People v. Duero 104 SCRA 379
[1981], the Court pronounced that "inasmuch as
the prosecution failed to prove that before Duero
made his alleged oral confession he was informed
of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel
and because there is no proof that he knowingly
and intelligently waived those rights, his
confession is inadmissible in evidence. This ruling
19
was reiterated in People v. Tolentino, 145 SCRA
597 [1986], where the Court added that:
In effect, the Court not only abrogated
the rule on presumption of regularity of
official acts relative to admissibility of
statements taken during in-custody
interrogation but likewise dispelled any
doubt as to the full adoption of
the Miranda doctrine in this jurisdiction.
It is now incumbent upon the prosecution
to prove during a trial that prior to
questioning, the confessant was warned
of his constitutionally protected rights.
The trial judge likewise found the marijuana to
weigh one kilo, more or less, and from this finding
extracted a clear intent to transport the marijuana
leaves. It may be pointed out, however, that
although the information stated the weight to be
approximately one kilo, the forensic chemist who
examined the marijuana leaves testified that the
marijuana weighed only 600 grams Such amount is
not a considerable quantity as to conclusively
confer upon the accused an intent to transport the
marijuana leaves.
Nor can it be said that the intent to transport is
clearly established from the fact that the accused
was arrested at San Fernando, Pampanga, a place
which is not his residence. Conviction of a crime
with an extremely severe penalty must be based
on evidence which is clearer and more convincing
than the inferences in this case.
What was therefore proved beyond reasonable
doubt is not his intent to transport the marijuana
leaves but his actual session.
The offense committed by the appellant is
possession of marijuana under Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 as amended).
Judgment of convition AFFIRMED but MODIFIED.
6y, 1d-12y + Php6k fine.
People v. Maspil (1999)
This petition is an appeal from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime
of illegal transportation of
marijuana as charged and
hereby sentences EACH of them
to suffer LIFE IMPRISONMENT;
to pay a fine of P20,000.00,
In Criminal Case No. 4263-R, the information filed
against the two accused alleged:
the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and
mutually aiding each other, and
without any authority of law,
did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly
transport and carry in transit
from Sinto, Bauko, Mt. Province
to Atok, Benguet One Hundred

Eleven Kilos and Nine Grams
(111.9 kilos), more or less, of
dried marijuana leaves which
are sources of dangerous and
prohibited drugs and from
which dangerous and prohibited
drugs may be derived and
manufactured
The narration of facts by the trial court is as
follows:
According to Jerry Valeroso, Sgt. Amador
Ablang and Sgt. Florentino Baillo, all
members of the First Narcotics Regional
Unit of the Narcotics Command stationed
in Baguio City, on October 30, 1986, they
established a checkpoint in front of the
Municipal Hall at Sayangan, Atok,
Benguet, which is along the Halsema
Highway, to check on vehicles proceeding
to Baguio City because their Commanding
Officer, Maj. Basilio Cablayan had been
earlier tipped off by some confidential
informers that the herein accused Maspil
and Basking would be transporting a
large volume of marijuana to Baguio City.
The informers went along with the
operatives to Sayangan.
At about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning
of November 1, the operatives
intercepted a Sarao type jeep driven by
Maspil with Bagking as his companion.
Upon inspection, the jeep was found
loaded with two (2) plastic sacks, one (1)
jute sack, and three (3) big round tin cans
which, when opened contained several
bundles of suspected dried marijuana
leaves
Maspil and Basking were arrested and
the suspected marijuana leaves were
confiscated.
The confiscated items were later on
referred to the PC Crime Laboratory,
Regional Unit 1, for examination. Forensic
Chemist Carlos V. Figuerroa performed
the requested examination and
determined that the specimen, with an
aggregate weight of 115.66 kilos, were
positive to the standard tests for
marijuana.
The accused admitted that the marijuana
dried leaves were indeed confiscated
from the jeep being then driven by
Maspil with Bagking as his helper.
However, they claimed that the
prohibited drugs belonged to two of their
passengers who loaded them in the jeep
as paying cargo for Baguio City without
the accused knowing that they were
marijuana.
The accused declared that on October 31,
1986, at the burned area along Lakandula
Street, Baguio City, a certain Mrs. Luisa
Mendoza hired the jeep of Maspil to
transport her stock of dried fish and
canned goods contained in cartons to
Abatan, Buguias, Benguet, because her
20
own vehicle broke down. They left Baguio
City at about 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon (11:30 in the morning,
according to Bagking) with Mrs.
Mendoza, her helper and salesgirls on
board the jeep with Maspil as driver and
Bagking as his own helper. They arrived
at Abatan at about 6:00 o'clock in the
evening.
After unloading their cargo, Maspil and
Bagking repaired to a restaurant for their
dinner before undertaking the trip back
to Baguio City. While thus eating, they
were approached by two persons, one of
whom they would learn later on to be a
certain Danny Buteng. Buteng inquired if
they were going to Baguio City and upon
being given an affirmative answer, he
said that he would ride with them and
that he has some cargo. Asked what the
cargo was, Buteng replied that they were
flowers in closed tin cans and sealed
sacks for the commemoration of All Souls
Day in Baguio City. After Buteng had
agreed to Maspil's condition that he
would pay for the space to be occupied
by his cargo, Buteng himself and his
companion loaded the cargo and fixed
them inside Maspil's jeep.
Maspil and Bagking left Abatan at about
7:00 o'clock that same evening of
October 31. Aside from Buteng and
companion they had four other
passengers. These four other passengers
alighted at Natubleng, Buguias, Benguet.
Upon reaching Sayangan, Atok, Benguet,
Maspil stopped at the Marosan
Restaurant where they intended to take
coffee. Their remaining passengers-
Buteng and companion alighted and went
to the restaurant. However, a soldier
waved at Maspil to drive to where he
was, which Maspil did. The soldier
secured Maspil's permission to inspect
their cargo after which he grabbed Maspil
on the latter's left shoulder and asked
who owned the cargo. Maspil told the
soldier that the cargo belonged to their
passengers who went to the restaurant.
The soldier called for his companions and
they went to look for Maspil's passengers
in the restaurant. Later on, they returned
and placed Maspil and Bagking under
arrest since their cargo turned out to be
marijuana.
Lawrence Balonglong, alias Banawe, a
radio reporter of DZWX Bombo Radio
who was invited by Lt Valeroso to witness
the operation, affirmed the unsuccessful
pursuit of the alleged two companions of
Maspil and Bagking. He recalled that he
was awakened from his sleep at the
townhall in Sayangan after the arrest of
Maspil and Bagking. When he went to the
scene, the NARCOM operatives boarded
the jeep of Maspil to chase the two
companions of Maspil and Bagking.
Balonglong climbed on top of the jeep
with his camera to join the chase. They

proceeded toward the direction of
Bontoc but failed to catch anyone. Hence,
they returned.
Thereupon, Maspil and Bagking were
taken to the townhall where they were
allegedly maltreated to admit ownership
of the confiscated marijuana. At about
4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
November 1, the soldiers took them away
from Sayangan to be transferred to their
station at Baguio City. On their way,
particularly at Km. 32 or 34, they met
Mike Maspil, an elder brother of Moises
Maspil, and the soldiers called for him
and then Lt. Valeroso and his men
mauled him on the road.
Mike testified that between 3:00 and
4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
November 1, he was informed by a
neighbor that his brother Moises was
detained at the Atok Municipal Jail. So he
called for Jose Pos-el and James
Longages, his driver and helper,
respectively, to go along with him to see
Moises. They rode in his jeep. On the
way, they met the group of Lt. Valeroso.
For no apparent reason, Lt. Valeroso
boxed and kicked him several times.
Thereafter, Lt. Valeroso placed him under
arrest together with his driver and helper.
They were all brought to a shoe store on
Gen. Luna Road, Baguio City, together
with Moises and Bagking. There, Lt.
Valeroso got his wallet containing P21000
and Seiko wrist watch but the receipt was
issued by a certain Miss Pingil, a
companion of Valeroso. He was released
after nine days. He then went to Lt.
Valeroso to claim his wallet, money and
watch but he was told that they were
with Miss Pingil. However, when he went
to Miss Pingil, the latter said that the
items were with Lt. Valeroso. He sought
the assistance of then Tourism Deputy
Minister Honorato Aquino who assigned
a lawyer to assist him. The lawyer advised
him to file a case against Lt. Valeroso but
because of the intervening congressional
elections, the matter has never been
pursued.
The appellants raise the following assignment of
errors in their appeal, to wit:
III. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE ACCUSED KNEW THAT THE CARGO THEY
WERE TRANSPORTING WAS MARIJUANA.
IV THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN
EVIDENCE THE ALLEGED CONFISCATED
MARIJUANA.
The main defense of the appellants is their claim
that the prohibited drugs belonged to their two
passengers who loaded them in the jeep as paying
cargo without the appellants knowing that the
cargo was marijuana.
Another ground stated by the appellants for the
inadmissibility in evidence of the confiscated
marijuana is that the marijuana allegedly seized
21
from them was a product of an unlawful search
without a warrant.
In the case of Valmonte v. de Villa, G.R. No. 83988,
September 29, 1989, the Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
True, the manning of
checkpoints by the military is
susceptible of abuse by the men
in uniform, in the same manner
that all government power is
susceptible of abuse. But at the
cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and
even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpoints during these
abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable
limits are part of the price we
pay for an orderly society and a
peaceful community.
The search was conducted within reasonable
limits. There was information that a sizeable
volume of marijuana will be transported to take
advantage of the All Saints Day holiday wherein
there will be a lot of people going to and from
Baguio City (T.S.N., September 16, 1987, p. 6). In
fact, during the three day (October 30, 1986 to
November 1, 1986) duration of the checkpoint,
there were also other drug related arrests made
aside from that of the two appellants.
But even without the Valmonte ruling, the search
would still be valid. This case involves a search
incident to a lawful arrest which is one of the
exceptions to the general rule requiring a search
warrant. This exception is embodied in Section 12
of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides:
Sec. 12. Search incident to
lawful arrest. A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of
the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.
and Rule 113, Section 5 (11) which state:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant;
when lawful. A peace officer or
a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has
committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.
This case falls squarely within the exceptions. The
appellants were caught in flagrante delicto since
they were transporting the prohibited drugs at the
time of their arrest. (People v. Tangliben, G.R. No.
63630, April 6, 1990) A crime was actually being
committed.

The appellants, however, cite the case of People V.
Aminnudin, (163 SCRA 402 [1988]. In said case, the
PC officers received information that the accused-
appellant, on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City,
was carrying marijuana. When the accused-
appellant was descending the gangplank, the PC
officers detained him and inspected the bag that
he was carrying and found marijuana. The Court
ruled that since the marijuana was seized illegally,
it is inadmissible in evidence.
There are certain facts of the said case which are
not present in the case before us. In
the Aminnudin case, the records showed that
there was sufficient time and adequate
information for the PC officers to have obtained a
warrant. The officers knew the name of the
accused, that the accused was on board M/V
Wilcon 9, bound to Iloilo and the exact date of the
arrival of the said vessel.
On the other hand, in this case there was no
information as to the exact description of the
vehicle and no definite time of the arrival. A
jeepney cannot be equated with a passenger ship
on the high seas. The ruling in the Aminnudin case,
is not applicable to the case at bar.
Appealed decision AFFIRMED.
People v. Acol (2013)
Two passengers who were apprehended after they
supposedly staged a hold-up inside a passenger
jeepney on September 29, 1990 were haled to
court, not for the felonious asportation, but for
possession of the two unlicensed firearms and
bullets recovered from them which were
instrumental in the commission of the robo
Of the two persons accused, only Pio Boses
interposed an appeal from the trial court's
judgment inasmuch as Tirso Acol y Barnubal had
escaped from incarceration thereby abating any
review of his culpability for the misdeed.
The People's inculpatory accusations during the
joint trial were to the effect that at around 3:45 in
the morning of September 29, 1990, when Percival
Tan was driving his jeepney, two men boarded the
vehicle in Cubao. When they crossed Pasay Road,
the two wayfarers, together with two other
companions, announced a hold-up. Percival Tan
was instructed to proceed atop the Magallanes
interchange where the other passengers were
divested of their personal belongings, including the
jacket of passenger Rene Araneta. Thereafter, the
robbers alighted at the Shell Gas Station near the
Magallanes Commercial Center after which
Percival Tan and his passengers went to Fort
Bonifacio to report the crime. A CAPCOM team
was forthwith formed to track down the culprits.
Victim Rene Araneta who went with the
responding police officers, upon seeing four
persons, one of whom was wearing his stolen
jacket, walking casually towards Fort Bonifacio,
told the police authorities to accost said persons.
After the CAPCOM officers introduced themselves,
the four men scampered to different directions but
three of them, namely, Tirso Acol, Pio Boses, and
Albert Blanco, were apprehended. Tirso Acol and
Pio Boses were each found in possession of an
unlicensed .38 caliber revolver with bullets. After
the arrest, the three men were brought to Fort
22
Bonifacio and were identified by Percival Tan and
the passengers who ganged up on the accused.
To reinforce the theory of unauthorized possession
of firearms, Sgt. Garcia presented a certification
issued by the Firearms and Explosives Unit stating
that the accused are not licensed firearm holders.
On the other hand, Pio Boses and Tirso Acol
pleaded innocent to the charges levelled against
them, proferring a general denial.
Accused-appellant Pio Boses asserted on the
witness stand that after establishing his residence
at Pasay City for about six months, he engaged in
the business of vending "balut". During the
incident in question, he recalled that while so
engaged in his trade, three persons allegedly
acosted him, took his money, "balut" and "penoy",
and that he was thereafter brought to a cell where
he was forced to confess ownership of one gun
which was shown to him. He nonetheless denied
participation in the hold up.
For his part, Tirso Acol, a laborer and at that time
having resided in Metro Manila for about two
months, recollected that he spent the night at his
cousin's house in Parañaque on September 28,
1990, and that he left Parañaque at around 5 in
the morning of September 29, 1990. According to
him, the jeepney he was then riding developed
engine trouble, and alighting therefrom he was
arrested for no apparent reason. When he was
brought to the cell, he was allegedly coerced into
admiting possession of the other gun. Just like his
co-accused, he too, denied knowledge of the hold
up.
The court a quo was unpersuaded by these general
denials, observing:
As can be gathered from the
foregoing testimonies of the
accused, the line of defense
they have adopted is one of
denial. Indeed, they denied that
the firearms and ammunition in
question were found in their
persons in the early morning of
September 29, 1989. They also
denied the truth of the
testimonies of Sgt. Faltado,
Percival Tan, and Rene Araneta.
The defense however did not
cite any valid reasons for the
Court not to give credence to
the testimonies. In the
circumstance, the Court is
constrained to consider the
testimonies of the accused to be
self-serving. In the face of the
positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, the
Court can only take their denials
with the proverbial grain of salt.
Verily, it is simply hard for the
Court to believe that the
accused are simple provincial
who are lost in the big city; that
accused Pio Boses who is a
resident of Pasay City, does not
know well-known places in
Metro Manila such as the South

Super Highway and the Fort
Bonifacio-Nichols interchange;
that he did not know the streets
where he plied his trade as a
balut vendor. Indeed, how can
this be true when he himself
admitted that from 7:00 p.m. of
September 28, 1989, he spent
his time walking in the street in
the area and yet he never
claimed he had ever lost his
way.
The same is true with accused
Tirso Acol. The Court is
convinced that he lied on the
witness stand. He claimed that
he was in the place where he
was arrested because he had
just come from the residence of
his cousin, Genny Acol, and the
passenger jeepney he had
boarded on his way home just
happened to break down at that
place. In the mind of the Court
this alibi of the accused is too
much of a coincidence, and too
convenient an excuse, for the
Court to believe. In this
connection, the Court notes his
testimony on cross examination
that he was unable to get in
touch with his relatives,
including Genny Acol, for
possible assistance and to get
Genny Acol to corroborate his
testimony, because the latter
had already left for the province
and that none of his other
relatives knew that he had been
charged in this case. But when
queried how he was able to say
this, he testified that he had
written to his uncle and that he
received a reply letter from him
and that it was from this reply
letter of his uncle that he
learned that Genny Acol had
already left for the province.
This testimony of accused Tirso
Acol, if it accomplished
anything, helped convinced the
Court that he is given to lying.
For sure, if he had written to his
uncle and that the latter had
replied to him, it is plain that he
must have informed his uncle
about the case and that the
latter knew about the case and
the fact that he was in jail and
needed help. In any event,
established jurisprudence
dictates that between the
positive testimonies of
prosecution witnesses and the
denials of the accused the Court
must place its reliance on the
former. As a matter of fact,
jurisprudence also indicates that
greater weight must be given to
the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses when
they are officers of the law.
(People vs. Mostoles, Jr., 124
23
SCRA 906; People vs. Patog, 144
SCRA 129).
As initially intimated herein, Tirso Acol escaped
from detention during the trial below, thus
obviating any review of his conviction, as indeed,
even if he had appealed and thereafter escaped,
he would be considered as having abandoned his
appeal (People vs. Quinitan, 197 SCRA 32
[1991]; Section 8, Rule 124, Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure).
With respect to Pio Boses, he chose to articulate
his protestation of innocence by claiming that the
trial court below erred:
III
. . . IN ADMITTING THE
PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE SINCE
THE ARRESTING OFFICERS
ADMITTED THEY WERE NOT
ARMED WITH A WARRANT OF
ARREST, NOR A SEARCH
WARRANT WHEN THEY CHASED
AND FRISKED ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS AND PROCEEDED
TO ARREST THEM.
With respect to the so-called warrantless arrest of
accused--appellant, we are of the view that the
search falls within the purview of Section 5(b) of
Rule 113 which serves as an exception to the
requisite warrant prior to arrest:
When an offense has in fact
been committed, and the has
personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it;
inasmuch as the police team was formed and
dispatched to look for the persons responsible for
the crime on account of the information related by
Percival Tan and Rene Araneta that they had just
been robbed (People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756
[1993]; People vs. Tonog, Jr., 205 SCRA 772
[1992]). And since accused-appellant's arrest was
lawful, it follows that the search made incidental
thereto was valid (People vs. Tanilon, 221 SCRA
671 [1993]). Moreover, the unlicensed firearms
were found when the police team apprehended
the accused for the robbery and not for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition (People vs.
Cruz, 165 SCRA 135 [1988]). The principle imparted
by Justice Padilla in Cruz was based on the ruling of
this Court in Magoncia vs. Palacio (90 Phil. 771
[1948]) that:
. . . When, in pursuing an illegal
action or in the commission of a
criminal offense, the offending
police officers should happen to
discover a criminal offense
being committed by any person,
they are not precluded from
performing their duties as police
officers for the apprehension of
the guilty person and the taking
of the corpus delicti.
Appealed decision AFFIRMED and MODIFIED.

Abelita v. Doria (2009)
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing
the 10 July 2004 Decision and 18 October 2004
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 217 (trial court), in Civil Case No. Q-98-
33442 for Damages.
Facts: Judge Felimon Abelita III (petitioner) filed a
complaint for Damages under Articles 32(4) and (9)
of the Civil Code against P/Supt. German B. Doria
(P/Supt. Doria) and SPO3 Cesar Ramirez (SPO3
Ramirez). Petitioner alleged in his complaint that
on 24 March 1996, at around 12 noon, he and his
wife were on their way to their house in
Bagumbayan, Masbate, Masbate when P/Supt.
Doria and SPO3 Ramirez (respondents),
accompanied by 10 unidentified police officers,
requested them to proceed to the Provincial PNP
Headquarters at Camp Boni Serrano, Masbate,
Masbate. Petitioner was suspicious of the request
and told respondents that he would proceed to the
PNP Headquarters after he had brought his wife
home. Petitioner alleged that when he parked his
car in front of their house, SPO3 Ramirez grabbed
him, forcibly took the key to his Totoya Lite Ace
van, barged into the vehicle, and conducted a
search without a warrant. The search resulted to
the seizure of a licensed shotgun. Petitioner
presented the shotguns license to
respondents. Thereafter, SPO3 Ramirez continued
his search and then produced a .45 caliber pistol
which he allegedly found inside the
vehicle. Respondents arrested petitioner and
detained him, without any appropriate charge, at
the PNP special detention cell.
P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a
telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a
shooting incident in Barangay Nursery. He
dispatched a team headed by SPO3 Ramirez to
investigate the incident. SPO3 Ramirez later
reported that a certain William Sia was wounded
while petitioner, who was implicated in the
incident, and his wife just left the place of the
incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for petitioner and
when he found him, he informed him of the
incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested petitioner
to go with him to the police headquarters as he
was reported to be involved in the
incident. Petitioner agreed but suddenly sped up
his vehicle and proceeded to his residence. P/Supt.
Doria and his companions chased petitioner. Upon
reaching petitioners residence, they caught up
with petitioner as he was about to run towards his
house. The police officers saw a gun in the front
seat of the vehicle beside the drivers seat as
petitioner opened the door. They also saw a
shotgun at the back of the drivers seat. The police
officers confiscated the firearms and arrested
petitioner. P/Supt. Doria alleged that his men also
arrested other persons who were identified to be
with petitioner during the shooting
incident. Petitioner was charged with illegal
possession of firearms and frustrated murder. An
administrative case was also filed against
petitioner before this Court.
In its 10 July 2004 Decision, the trial court
dismissed petitioners complaint.
The trial court found that petitioner was at the
scene of the shooting incident in Barangay
Nursery. The trial court ruled that the police
officers who conducted the search were of the
24
belief, based on reasonable grounds, that
petitioner was involved in the incident and that
the firearm used in the commission of the offense
was in his possession. The trial court ruled that
petitioners warrantless arrest and the warrantless
seizure of the firearms were valid and legal. The
trial court gave more credence to the testimonies
of respondents who were presumed to have
performed their duties in accordance with law. The
trial court rejected petitioners claim of frame-up as
weak and insufficient to overthrow the positive
testimonies of the police officers who conducted
the arrest and the incidental search. The trial court
concluded that petitioners claim for damages
under Article 32 of the Civil Code is not warranted
under the circumstances.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
In its 18 October 2004 Order, the trial court denied
the motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The issues in this case are the following:
1. Whether the
warrantless arrest
and warrantless
search and seizure
were illegal under
Section 5, Rule
113 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal
Procedure;
The petition has no merit.
Application of Section 5, Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
Petitioner alleges that his arrest and the search
were unlawful under Section 5, Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Petitioner
alleges that for the warrantless arrest to be lawful,
the arresting officer must have personal
knowledge of facts that the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. Petitioner
alleges that the alleged shooting incident was just
relayed to the arresting officers, and thus they
have no personal knowledge of facts as required
by the Rules.
We do not agree.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure states:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant;
when lawful. A peace officer or
a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has
committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and

(c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal
establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be
valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the offender
has just committed an offense; and (2) the
arresting peace officer or private person has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it
Personal knowledge of facts must be based on
probable cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause
of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the
peace officers making the arrest.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure does not require the arresting officers
to personally witness the commission of the
offense with their own eyes. In this case, P/Supt.
Doria received a report about the alleged shooting
incident. SPO3 Ramirez investigated the report
and learned from witnesses that petitioner was
involved in the incident. They were able to track
down petitioner, but when invited to the police
headquarters to shed light on the incident,
petitioner initially agreed then sped up his vehicle,
prompting the police authorities to give
chase. Petitioners act of trying to get away,
coupled with the incident report which they
investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable
suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to
the existence of probable cause.
Plain View Doctrine
The seizure of the firearms was justified under the
plain view doctrine.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in
the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented as evidence. The
plain view doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer
in search of the evidence has a prior justification
for an intrusion or is in a position from which he
can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item
he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
In this case, the police authorities were in the area
because that was where they caught up with
petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearms
inside the vehicle when petitioner opened the
door. Since a shooting incident just took place and
25
it was reported that petitioner was involved in the
incident, it was apparent to the police officers that
the firearms may be evidence of a crime. Hence,
they were justified in seizing the firearms.
Petition DENIED. RTC decision AFFIRMED.
Worldwide Web Corporation v. People (2014)
Petitioners filed the present Petitions under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the
Decision1 dated 20 August 2003 and the
Resolution2 dated 27 November 2003 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) reversing the quashal of the search
warrants previously issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC).
Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the
Regional Intelligence Special Operations Office
(RISOO) of the Philippine National Police filed
applications for warrants3 before the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 78, to search the office
premises of petitioner Worldwide Web
Corporation (WWC)4 located at the 11th floor, IBM
Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Libis,
Quezon City, as well as the office premises of
petitioner Planet Internet Corporation (Planet
Internet)5 located at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square
Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio,
Pasig City. The applications alleged that petitioners
were conducting illegal toll bypass operations,
which amounted to theft and violation of
Presidential Decree No. 401 (Penalizing the
Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or
Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered
Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the
damage and prejudice of the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).6
On 25 September 2001, the trial court conducted a
hearing on the applications for search warrants.
The applicant and Jose Enrico Rivera (Rivera) and
Raymund Gali (Gali) of the Alternative Calling
Pattern Detection Division of PLDT testified as
witnesses.
According to Rivera, a legitimate international long
distance call should pass through the local
exchange or public switch telephone network
(PSTN) on to the toll center of one of the
international gateway facilities (IGFs)7 in the
Philippines.8 The call is then transmitted to the
other country through voice circuits, either via
fiber optic submarine cable or microwave radio
using satellite facilities, and passes the toll center
of one of the IGFs in the destination country. The
toll center would then meter the call, which will
pass through the PSTN of the called number to
complete the circuit. In contrast, petitioners were
able to provide international long distance call
services to any part of the world by using PLDT’s
telephone lines, but bypassing its IGF. This scheme
constitutes toll bypass, a "method of routing and
completing international long distance calls using
lines, cables, antenna and/or wave or frequency
which connects directly to the local or domestic
exchange facilities of the originating country or the
country where the call is originated."9
On the other hand, Gali claimed that a phone
number serviced by PLDT and registered to WWC
was used to provide a service called GlobalTalk,
"an internet-based international call service, which
can be availed of via prepaid or billed/post-paid
 26

accounts."10 During a test call using GlobalTalk, 1. Search Warrant No. Q-01-
Gali dialed the local PLDT telephone number 3856,16 issued for violation of paragraph
6891135, the given access line. After a voice one (1) of Article 308 (theft) in relation to
prompt required him to enter the user code and Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code
personal identification number (PIN) provided against WWC, Adriel S. Mirto, Kevin L.
under a GlobalTalk pre-paid account, he was then Tan, Cherryll L. Yu, Carmelo J. Canto, III,
requested to enter the destination number, which Ferdinand B. Masi, Message One
included the country code, phone number and a International Corporation, Adriel S. Mirto,
pound (#) sign. The call was completed to a phone Nova Christine L. Dela Cruz, Robertson S.
number in Taiwan. However, when he checked the Chiang, and Nolan B. Sison with business
records, it showed that the call was only directed address at 11/F IBM Plaza Building, No.
to the local number 6891135. This indicated that 188 Eastwood City, Cyberpark Libis,
the international test call using GlobalTalk Quezon City:
bypassed PLDT’s IGF.
a) Computers or any equipment
Based on the records of PLDT, telephone number or device capable of accepting
6891135 is registered to WWC with address at UN information, applying the
2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald process of the information and
Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig supplying the results of this
City.11 However, upon an ocular inspection process;
conducted by Rivera at this address, it was found
that the occupant of the unit is Planet Internet, b) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or
which also uses the telephone lines registered to equipment or device used for
WWC.12 These telephone lines are interconnected recording or storing
to a server and used as dial-up access information; and c) Manuals,
lines/numbers of WWC. application forms, access codes,
billing statements, receipts,
Gali further alleged that because PLDT lines and contracts, communications and
equipment had been illegally connected by documents relating to securing
petitioners to a piece of equipment that routed and using telephone lines
the international calls and bypassed PLDT’s IGF, and/or equipment.
they violated Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 401 as
amended,13 on unauthorized installation of 2. Search Warrant No. Q-01-
telephone connections. Petitioners also committed 3857,17 issued for violation of P.D. 401
theft, because through their misuse of PLDT phone against Planet Internet
lines/numbers and equipment and with clear Corporation/Mercury One, Robertson S.
intent to gain, they illegally stole business and Chiang, Nikki S. Chiang, Maria Sy Be
revenues that rightly belong to PLDT. Moreover, Chiang, Ben C. Javellana, Carmelita
they acted contrary to the letter and intent of Tuason with business address at UN
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7925, because in bypassing 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building,
the IGF of PLDT, they evaded the payment of Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio,
access and bypass charges in its favor while "piggy- Pasig City:
backing" on its multi-million dollar facilities and
infrastructure, thus stealing its business revenues
a) Modems or Routers or any
from international long distance calls. Further,
equipment or device that
petitioners acted in gross violation of
enables data terminal
Memorandum Circular No. 6-2-92 of the National
equipment such as computers
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) prohibiting
to communicate with other data
the use of customs premises equipment (CPE)
terminal equipment via a
without first securing type approval license from
telephone line;
the latter.
b) Computers or any equipment
Based on a five-day sampling of the phone line of
or device capable of accepting
petitioners, PLDT computed a monthly revenue
information applying the
loss of ₱764,718.09. PLDT likewise alleged that
prescribed process of the
petitioners deprived it of foreign exchange
information and supplying the
revenues, and evaded the payment of taxes,
results of this process;
license fees, and charges, to the prejudice of the
government.
c) Lines, Cables and Antennas or
equipment or device capable of
During the hearing, the trial court required the
transmitting air waves or
identification of the office premises/units to be
frequency, such as an IPL and
searched, as well as their floor plans showing the
telephone lines and equipment;
location of particular computers and servers that
would be taken.14
d) Multiplexers or any
equipment or device that
On 26 September 2001, the RTC granted the
enables two or more signals
application for search warrants.15 Accordingly, the
from different sources to pass
following warrants were issued against the office
through a common cable or
premises of petitioners, authorizing police officers
transmission line;
to seize various items:

e) PABX or Switching
Equipment, Tapes or equipment
or device capable of connecting
telephone lines;
f) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or
equipment or device used for
recording or storing
information; and
g) Manuals, application forms,
access codes, billing statement,
receipts, contracts, checks,
orders, communications and
documents, lease and/or
subscription agreements or
contracts, communications and
documents relating to securing
and using telephone lines
and/or equipment.
3. Search Warrant No. Q-01-
3858,18 issued for violation of paragraph
one (1) of Article 308 (theft) in relation to
Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code
against Planet Internet
Corporation/Mercury One, Robertson S.
Chiang, Nikki S. Chiang, Maria Sy Be
Chiang, Ben C. Javellana, Carmelita
Tuason with business address at UN
2103, 21/F Orient Square Building,
Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio,
Pasig City:
a) Modems or Routers or any
equipment or device that
enables data terminal
equipment such as computers
to communicate with other data
terminal equipment via a
telephone line;
b) Computers or any equipment
or device capable of accepting
information applying the
prescribed process of the
information and supplying the
results of this process;
c) Lines, Cables and Antennas or
equipment or device capable of
transmitting air waves or
frequency, such as an IPL and
telephone lines and equipment;
d) Multiplexers or any
equipment or device that
enables two or more signals
from different sources to pass
through a common cable or
transmission line;
e) PABX or Switching
Equipment, Tapes or equipment
or device capable of connecting
telephone lines;
f) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or
equipment or device used for
recording or storing
information; and
g) Manuals, application forms,
access codes, billing statement,
receipts, contracts, checks,
orders, communications and
documents, lease and/or
subscription agreements or
contracts, communications and
27
documents relating to securing
and using telephone lines
and/or equipment.
The warrants were implemented on the same day
by RISOO operatives of the National Capital Region
Police Office.
Over a hundred items were seized,19 including 15
central processing units (CPUs), 10 monitors,
numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files, and a
laptop computer.20 Planet Internet notes that even
personal diskettes of its employees were
confiscated; and areas not devoted to the
transmission of international calls, such as the
President’s Office and the Information Desk, were
searched. Voltage regulators, as well as reserve
and broken computers, were also seized.
Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu,21 and Planet
Internet22 filed their respective motions to quash
the search warrants, citing basically the same
grounds: (1) the search warrants were issued
without probable cause, since the acts complained
of did not constitute theft; (2) toll bypass, the act
complained of, was not a crime; (3) the search
warrants were general warrants; and (4) the
objects seized pursuant thereto were "fruits of the
poisonous tree."
PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition23 to the
motions to quash.
In the hearing of the motions to quash on 19
October 2001, the test calls alluded to by Gali in
his Affidavit were shown to have passed the IGF of
Eastern Telecommunications (Philippines) Inc.
(Eastern) and of Capital Wireless
(Capwire).24 Planet Internet explained that Eastern
and Capwire both provided international direct
dialing services, which Planet Internet marketed by
virtue of a "Reseller Agreement." Planet Internet
used PLDT lines for the first phase of the call; but
for the second phase, it used the IGF of either
Eastern or Capwire. Planet Internet religiously paid
PLDT for its domestic phone bills and Eastern and
Capwire for its IGF usage. None of these
contentions were refuted by PLDT.
The RTC granted the motions to quash on the
ground that the warrants issued were in the nature
of general warrants.25 Thus, the properties seized
under the said warrants were ordered released to
petitioners.
PLDT moved for reconsideration,26 but its motion
was denied27 on the ground that it had failed to get
the conformity of the City Prosecutor prior to filing
the motion, as required under Section 5, Rule 110
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
CA RULING: PLDT appealed to the CA. The CA
reversed and set aside the assailed RTC
Resolutions and declared the search warrants valid
and effective.
Petitioners separately moved for reconsideration
of the CA ruling.29 Among the points raised was
that PLDT should have filed a petition for certiorari
rather than an appeal when it questioned the RTC
Resolution before the CA. The appellate court
denied the Motions for Reconsideration.30

Rule 45 Petitions were separately filed by
petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu,31 and Planet
Internet32 to assail the CA Decision and Resolution.
The Court consolidated the two Petitions.33
ISSUES: I. Whether the CA erred in giving due
course to PLDT’s appeal despite the following
procedural infirmities:
1. PLDT, without the conformity of the
public prosecutor, had no personality to question
the quashal of the search warrants;
2. PLDT assailed the quashal orders via an
appeal rather than a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
II. Whether the assailed search warrants were
issued upon probable cause, considering that the
acts complained of allegedly do not constitute
theft.
III. Whether the CA seriously erred in holding that
the assailed search warrants were not general
warrants.
Ruling: 1. An application for a search warrant is not
a criminal
action; conformity of the public prosecutor is not
necessary to
give the aggrieved party personality to question an
order
quashing search warrants.
Petitioners contend that PLDT had no personality
to question the quashal of the search warrants
without the conformity of the public prosecutor.
They argue that it violated Section 5, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All
criminal actions commenced by a complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the prosecutor.
The above provision states the general rule that
the public prosecutor has direction and control of
the prosecution of "(a)ll criminal actions
commenced by a complaint or information."
However, a search warrant is obtained, not by the
filing of a complaint or an information, but by the
filing of an application therefor.34
Furthermore, as we held in Malaloan v. Court of
Appeals,35 an application for a search warrant is a
"special criminal process," rather than a criminal
action:
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously
equating the application for and the obtention of a
search warrant with the institution and
prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It
would thus categorize what is only a special
criminal process, the power to issue which is
inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal
action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific
courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact
that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the
issuance of a search warrant are completely
different from those for the institution of a
criminal action.
28
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest
or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A
search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an
order in writing issued in the name of the People
of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to
a peace officer, commanding him to search for
personal property and bring it before the court. A
search warrant is in the nature of a criminal
process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special
and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and
made necessary because of a public necessity.
In American jurisdictions, from which we have
taken our jural concept and provisions on search
warrants, such warrant is definitively considered
merely as a process, generally issued by a court in
the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a
criminal action to be entertained by a court
pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize
this fact for purposes of both issues as formulated
in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities
herein.36(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is
not a criminal action. Meanwhile, we have
consistently recognized the right of parties to
question orders quashing those
warrants.37 Accordingly, we sustain the CA’s ruling
that the conformity of the public prosecutor is not
necessary before an aggrieved party moves for
reconsideration of an order granting a motion to
quash search warrants.
2. An order quashing a search warrant, which was
issued
independently prior to the filing of a criminal
action, partakes
of a final order that can be the proper subject of
an appeal.
Petitioners also claim that since the RTC ruling on
the motions to quash was interlocutory, it cannot
be appealed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
PLDT should have filed a Rule 65 petition instead.
Petitioners cite, as authority for their position,
Marcelo v. de Guzman.38 The Court held therein as
follows:
But is the order of Judge de Guzman denying the
motion to quash the search warrant and to return
the properties seized thereunder final in character,
or is it merely interlocutory? In Cruz vs. Dinglasan,
this Court, citing American jurisprudence, resolved
this issue thus:
Where accused in criminal proceeding has
petitioned for the return of goods seized, the order
of restoration by an inferior court is interlocutory
and hence, not appealable; likewise, a denial, by
the US District Court, of defendant's petition for
the return of the articles seized under a warrant is
such an interlocutory order. (56 C.J. 1253).
A final order is defined as one which disposes of
the whole subject matter or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to
be done but to enforce by execution what has
been determined; on the other hand an order is
interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case
completely, but leaves something more to be done
upon its merits. Tested against this criterion, the
search warrant issued in Criminal Case No. 558 is
indisputably of interlocutory character because it

leaves something more to be done in the said
criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of
the accused therein.39
Petitioners’ reliance upon Marcelo is misplaced.
An application for a search warrant is a judicial
process conducted either as an incident in a main
criminal case already filed in court or in
anticipation of one yet to be filed.40 Whether the
criminal case (of which the search warrant is an
incident) has already been filed before the trial
court is significant for the purpose of determining
the proper remedy from a grant or denial of a
motion to quash a search warrant.
Where the search warrant is issued as an incident
in a pending criminal case, as it was in Marcelo, the
quashal of a search warrant is merely
interlocutory. There is still "something more to be
done in the said criminal case, i.e., the
determination of the guilt of the accused
therein."41
In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for
and issued in anticipation of a criminal case yet to
be filed, the order quashing the warrant (and
denial of a motion for reconsideration of the grant)
ends the judicial process. There is nothing more to
be done thereafter.
Thus, the CA correctly ruled that Marcelo does not
apply to this case. Here, the applications for search
warrants were instituted as principal proceedings
and not as incidents to pending criminal actions.
When the search warrants issued were
subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was
nothing left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the
quashal of the search warrants were final orders,
not interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly
taken therefrom.
II.
Trial judges determine probable cause in the
exercise of their
judicial functions. A trial judge’s finding of
probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant is accorded
respect by
reviewing courts when the finding has substantial
basis.
Petitioners claim that no probable cause existed to
justify the issuance of the search warrants.
The rules pertaining to the issuance of search
warrants are enshrined in Section 2, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
29
In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause
requires "such facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and the objects
sought in connection with that offense are in the
place to be searched."42
There is no exact test for the determination of
probable cause43 in the issuance of search
warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on the
finding of trial judges in the process of exercising
their judicial function.44 They determine probable
cause based on "evidence showing that, more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and
that it was committed" by the offender.45
When a finding of probable cause for the issuance
of a search warrant is made by a trial judge, the
finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts:
It is presumed that a judicial function has been
regularly performed, absent a showing to the
contrary. A magistrate’s determination of probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid
great deference by a reviewing court, as long as
there was substantial basis for that determination.
Substantial basis means that the questions of the
examining judge brought out such facts and
circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed, and the objects in connection
with the offense sought to be seized are in the
place sought to be searched.46
The transcript of stenographic notes during the
hearing for the application for search warrants on
25 September 2001 shows that Judge Percival
Mandap Lopez asked searching questions to the
witnesses and particularly sought clarification on
the alleged illegal toll bypass operations of
petitioners, as well as the pieces of evidence
presented. Thus, the Court will no longer disturb
the finding of probable cause by the trial judge
during the hearing for the application for the
search warrants.
However, petitioners insist that the determination
of the existence of probable cause necessitates the
prior determination of whether a crime or an
offense was committed in the first place. In
support of their contention that there was no
probable cause for the issuance of the search
warrants, petitioners put forward the adage
nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege – there is no
crime when there is no law punishing it.
Petitioners argue that there is no law punishing toll
bypass, the act complained of by PLDT. Thus, no
offense was committed that would justify the
issuance of the search warrants.
According to PLDT, toll bypass enables
international calls to appear as local calls and not
overseas calls, thus effectively evading payment to
the PLDT of access, termination or bypass charges,
and accounting rates; payment to the government
of taxes; and compliance with NTC regulatory
requirements. PLDT concludes that toll bypass is
prohibited, because it deprives "legitimate
telephone operators, like PLDT… of the
compensation which it is entitled to had the call
been properly routed through its network."47 As
such, toll bypass operations constitute theft,

because all of the elements of the crime are
present therein.
On the other hand, petitioners WWC and Cherryll
Yu argue that there is no theft to speak of, because
the properties allegedly taken from PLDT partake
of the nature of "future earnings and lost business
opportunities" and, as such, are uncertain,
anticipative, speculative, contingent, and
conditional. PLDT cannot be deprived of such
unrealized earnings and opportunities because
these do not belong to it in the first place.
Upon a review of the records of the case, we
understand that the Affidavits of Rivera and Gali
that accompanied the applications for the search
warrants charge petitioners with the crime, not of
toll bypass perse, but of theft of PLDT’s
international long distance call business
committed by means of the alleged toll bypass
operations.
For theft to be committed in this case, the
following elements must be shown to exist: (1) the
taking by petitioners (2) of PLDT’s personal
property (3) with intent to gain (4) without the
consent of PLDT (5) accomplished without the use
of violence against or intimidation of persons or
the use of force upon things.48
Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu only take issue
with categorizing the earnings and business as
personal properties of PLDT. However, in Laurel v.
Abrogar,49 we have already held that the use of
PLDT’s communications facilities without its
consent constitutes theft of its telephone services
and business
nternational long distance calls," the matter
alleged to be stolen in the instant case, take the
form of electrical energy, it cannot be said that
such international long distance calls were
personal properties belonging to PLDT since the
latter could not have acquired ownership over
such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments,
enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using
its complex communications infrastructure and
facilities. PLDT not being the owner of said
telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that
such telephone calls were taken without its
consent.
It is the use of these communications facilities
without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the
crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the
telephone services and business.
Therefore, the business of providing
telecommunication and the telephone service are
personal property under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, and the act of engaging in ISR is an act
of "subtraction" penalized under said article.
However, the Amended Information describes the
thing taken as, "international long distance calls,"
and only later mentions "stealing the business
from PLDT" as the manner by which the gain was
derived by the accused. In order to correct this
inaccuracy of description, this case must be
remanded to the trial court and the prosecution
directed to amend the Amended Information, to
clearly state that the property subject of the theft
are the services and business of respondent PLDT.
Parenthetically, this amendment is not
30
necessitated by a mistake in charging the proper
offense, which would have called for the dismissal
of the information under Rule 110, Section 14 and
Rule 119, Section 19 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. To be sure, the crime is
properly designated as one of theft. The purpose
of the amendment is simply to ensure that the
accused is fully and sufficiently apprised of the
nature and cause of the charge against him, and
thus guaranteed of his rights under the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
In Laurel, we reviewed the existing laws and
jurisprudence on the generally accepted concept
of personal property in civil law as "anything
susceptible of appropriation."50 It includes
ownership of telephone services, which are
protected by the penal provisions on theft. We
therein upheld the Amended Information charging
the petitioner with the crime of theft against PLDT
inasmuch as the allegation was that the former
was engaged in international simple resale (ISR) or
"the unauthorized routing and completing of
international long distance calls using lines, cables,
antennae, and/or air wave frequency and
connecting these calls directly to the local or
domestic exchange facilities of the country where
destined."51 We reasoned that since PLDT encodes,
augments, enhances, decodes and transmits
telephone calls using its complex communications
infrastructure and facilities, the use of these
communications facilities without its consent
constitutes theft, which is the unlawful taking of
telephone services and business. We then
concluded that the business of providing
telecommunications and telephone services is
personal property under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, and that the act of engaging in ISR is
an act of "subtraction" penalized under said
article.
Furthermore, toll bypass operations could not
have been accomplished without the installation of
telecommunications equipment to the PLDT
telephone lines. Thus, petitioners may also be held
liable for violation of P.D. 401, to wit:
Section 1. Any person who installs any water,
electrical, telephone or piped gas connection
without previous authority from the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System, the Manila
Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company , or the Manila Gas
Corporation, as the case may be, tampers and/or
uses tampered water, electrical or gas meters,
jumpers or other devices whereby water,
electricity or piped gas is stolen; steals or pilfers
water, electric or piped gas meters, or water,
electric and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes
or conduits; knowingly possesses stolen or pilfered
water, electrical or gas meters as well as stolen or
pilfered water, electrical and/or telephone wires,
or piped gas pipes and conduits, shall, upon
conviction, be punished with prision correccional
in its minimum period or a fine ranging from two
thousand to six thousand pesos, or both .
(Emphasis supplied)
The peculiar circumstances attending the situation
compel us to rule further on the matter of
probable cause. During the hearing of the motions
to quash the search warrants, the test calls
conducted by witnesses for PLDT were shown to

have connected to the IGF of either Eastern or
Capwire to complete the international calls.
A trial judge’s finding of probable cause may be set
aside and the search warrant issued by him based
on his finding may be quashed if the person
against whom the warrant is issued presents clear
and convincing evidence that when the police
officers and witnesses testified, they committed a
deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the
truth on matters that are essential or necessary to
a showing of probable cause.52 In that case, the
finding of probable cause is a nullity, because the
trial judge was intentionally misled by the
witnesses.53
On the other hand, innocent and negligent
omissions or misrepresentation of witnesses will
not cause the quashal of a search warrant.54 In this
case, the testimonies of Rivera and Gali that the
test calls they conducted did not pass through
PLDT’s IGF are true. They neglected, however, to
look into the possibility that the test calls may have
passed through other IGFs in the Philippines, which
was exactly what happened. Nevertheless, the
witnesses did not commit a deliberate falsehood.
Even Planet Internet stated that the conclusion
that the test calls bypassed all IGFs in the country
was made "carelessly and haphazardly."55
On this score, the quashal of the search warrants is
not in order. It must be noted that the trial judge
did not quash the warrants in this case based on
lack of probable cause. Instead, the issue before us
is whether the CA erred in reversing the RTC,
which ruled that the search warrants are general
warrants.
III.
The requirement of particularity in the description
of things to
be seized is fulfilled when the items described in
the search
warrant bear a direct relation to the offense for
which the
warrant is sought.
Petitioners claim that the subject search warrants
were in the nature of general warrants because
the descriptions therein of the objects to be seized
are so broad and all-encompassing as to give the
implementing officers wide discretion over which
articles to seize. In fact, the CA observed that the
targets of the search warrants were not illegal per
se, and that they were "innocuous goods." Thus,
the police officers were given blanket authority to
determine whether the objects were legal or not,
as in fact even pieces of computer equipment not
involved in telecommunications or Internet service
were confiscated.
On the other hand, PLDT claims that a search
warrant already fulfills the requirement of
particularity of description when it is as specific as
the circumstances will ordinarily
allow.56 Furthermore, it cites Kho v. Makalintal,57 in
which the Court allowed leeway in the description
of things to be seized, taking into consideration the
effort and the time element involved in the
prosecution of criminal cases.
31
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its
Comment58 filed with the CA, likewise prayed for
the reversal of the quashal of the search warrants
in view of the OSG’s position that the scheme was
a case of electronic theft, and that the items
sought to be seized could not be described with
calibrated precision. According to the OSG,
assuming that the seized items could also be used
for other legitimate businesses, the fact remains
that the items were used in the commission of an
offense.
A general warrant is defined as "(a) search or
arrest warrant that is not particular as to the
person to be arrested or the property to be
seized."59 It is one that allows the "seizure of one
thing under a warrant describing another" and
gives the officer executing the warrant the
discretion over which items to take.60
Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the
person, against whom the warrant is issued,
vulnerable to abuses.1âwphi1Our Constitution
guarantees our right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and safeguards have been
put in place to ensure that people and their
properties are searched only for the most
compelling and lawful reasons.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no such search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.In
furtherance of this constitutional provision,
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
amplify the rules regarding the following places
and items to be searched under a search warrant:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search
warrant may be issued for the search and seizure
of personal property: a) Subject of the offense; b)
Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits
of the offense; or c) Used or intended to be used
as the means of committing an offense.
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A
search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.
Within the context of the above legal
requirements for valid search warrants, the Court
has been mindful of the difficulty faced by law
enforcement officers in describing the items to be
searched, especially when these items are
technical in nature, and when the extent of the

illegal operation is largely unknown to them.
Vallejo v. Court of Appeals61 ruled as follows:
The things to be seized must be described with
particularity. Technical precision of description is
not required. It is only necessary that there be
reasonable particularity and certainty as to the
identity of the property to be searched for and
seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere
roving commission. Indeed, the law does not
require that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute detail as to leave
no room for doubt on the part of the searching
authorities. If this were the rule, it would be
virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a
warrant as they would not know exactly what kind
of things to look for. Any description of the place
or thing to be searched that will enable the officer
making the search with reasonable certainty to
locate such place or thing is sufficient. (Emphasis
supplied)
Furthermore, the Court also had occasion to rule
that the particularity of the description of the
place to be searched and the things to be seized is
required “wherever and whenever it is
feasible.”62 A search warrant need not describe the
items to be seized in precise and minute
detail.63 The warrant is valid when it enables the
police officers to readily identify the properties to
be seized and leaves them with no discretion
regarding the articles to be seized.64
In this case, considering that items that looked like
“innocuous goods” were being used to pursue an
illegal operation that amounts to theft, law
enforcement officers would be hard put to secure
a search warrant if they were required to pinpoint
items with one hundred percent precision. In
People v. Veloso, we pronounced that “[t]he police
should not be hindered in the performance of their
duties, which are difficult enough of performance
under the best of conditions, by superficial
adherence to technicality or far-fetched judicial
interference.”65
A search warrant fulfills the requirement of
particularity in the description of the things to be
seized when the things described are limited to
those that bear a direct relation to the offense for
which the warrant is being issued.66
To our mind, PLDT was able to establish the
connection between the items to be searched as
identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of
its telephone services and business. Prior to the
application for the search warrants, Rivera
conducted ocular inspection of the premises of
petitioners a d was then able to confirm that they
had utilized various telecommunications
equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables,
antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX
or switching equipment, a d support equipment
such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and
other documentary records to support the illegal
toll bypass operations.”67
Petitions DENIED. CA decision AFFIRMED.
32
Sesbreno v. CA (2014)
Facts: At the time material to the petition, VECO
was a public utility corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines. VECO
engaged in the sale and distribution of electricity
within Metropolitan Cebu. Sesbreño was one of
VECO’s customers under the metered service
contract they had entered into on March 2,
1982.3 Respondent Vicente E. Garcia was VECO’s
President, General Manager and Chairman of its
Board of Directors. Respondent Jose E. Garcia was
VECO’s Vice-President, Treasurer and a Member of
its Board of Directors. Respondent Angelita
Lhuillier was another Member of VECO’s Board of
Directors. Respondent Juan Coromina was VECO’s
Assistant Treasurer, while respondent Norberto
Abellana was the Head of VECO’s Billing Section
whose main function was to compute back billings
of customers found to have violated their
contracts.
To ensure that its electric meters were properly
functioning, and that none of it meters had been
tampered with, VECO employed respondents Engr.
Felipe Constantino and Ronald Arcilla as violation
of contract (VOC) inspectors.4 Respondent Sgt.
Demetrio Balicha, who belonged to the 341st
Constabulary Company, Cebu Metropolitan
Command, Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City,
accompanied and escorted the VOC inspectors
during their inspection of the households of its
customers on May 11, 1989 pursuant to a mission
order issued to him.5
The CA summarized the antecedent facts as
follows:
Reduced to its essentials, however, the facts of this
case are actually simple enough, although the
voluminous records might indicate otherwise. It all
has to do with an incident that occurred at around
4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of May 11, 1989. On
that day, the Violation of Contracts (VOC) Team of
defendants-appellees Constantino and Arcilla and
their PC escort, Balicha, conducted a routine
inspection of the houses at La Paloma Village,
Labangon, Cebu City, including that of plaintiff-
appellant Sesbreño, for illegal connections, meter
tampering, seals, conduit pipes, jumpers, wiring
connections, and meter installations. After Bebe
Baledio, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño’s maid,
unlocked the gate, they inspected the electric
meter and found that it had been turned upside
down. Defendant-appellant Arcilla took
photographs of the upturned electric meter. With
Chuchie Garcia, Peter Sesbreño and one of the
maids present, they removed said meter and
replaced it with a new one. At that time, plaintiff-
appellant Sesbreño was in his office and no one
called to inform him of the inspection. The VOC
Team then asked for and received Chuchie Garcia’s
permission to enter the house itself to examine the
kind and number of appliances and light fixtures in
the household and determine its electrical load.
Afterwards, Chuchie Garcia signed the Inspection
Division Report, which showed the condition of the
electric meter on May 11, 1989 when the VOC
Team inspected it, with notice that it would be
subjected to a laboratory test. She also signed a
Load Survey Sheet that showed the electrical load
of plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño.
But according to plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño there
was nothing routine or proper at all with what the

VOC Team did on May 11, 1989 in his house. Their
entry to his house and the surrounding premises
was effected without his permission and over the
objections of his maids. They threatened, forced or
coerced their way into his house. They unscrewed
the electric meter, turned it upside down and took
photographs thereof. They then replaced it with a
new electric meter. They searched the house and
its rooms without his permission or a search
warrant. They forced a visitor to sign two
documents, making her appear to be his
representative or agent. Afterwards, he found that
some of his personal effects were missing,
apparently stolen by the VOC Team when they
searched the house.6
RTC: On August 19, 1994, the RTC rendered
judgment dismissing the complaint.7 It did not
accord credence to the testimonies of Sesbreño’s
witnesses, Bebe Baledio, his housemaid, and
Roberto Lopez, a part-time salesman, due to
inconsistencies on material points in their
respective testimonies. It observed that Baledio
could not make up her mind as to whether
Sesbreño’s children were in the house when the
VOC inspection team detached and replaced the
electric meter. Likewise, it considered unbelievable
that Lopez should hear the exchanges between
Constantino, Arcilla and Balicha, on one hand, and
Baledio, on the other, considering that Lopez could
not even hear the conversation between two
persons six feet away from where he was seated
during the simulation done in court, the same
distance he supposedly had from the gate of
Sesbreño’s house during the incident. It pointed
out that Lopez’s presence at the gate during the
incident was even contradicted by his own
testimony indicating that an elderly woman had
opened the gate for the VECO personnel, because
it was Baledio, a lady in her 20s, who had
repeatedly stated on her direct and cross
examinations that she had let the VECO personnel
in. It concluded that for Lopez to do nothing at all
upon seeing a person being threatened by another
in the manner he described was simply contrary to
human experience.
In contrast, the RTC believed the evidence of the
respondents showing that the VOC inspection
team had found the electric meter in Sesbreño’s
residence turned upside down to prevent the
accurate registering of the electricity consumption
of the household, causing them to detach and
replace the meter. It held as unbelievable that the
team forcibly entered the house through threats
and intimidation; that they themselves turned the
electric meter upside down in order to incriminate
him for theft of electricity, because the fact that
the team and Sesbreño had not known each other
before then rendered it unlikely for the team to
fabricate charges against him; and that Sesbreño’s
non-presentation of Chuchie Garcia left her
allegation of her being forced to sign the two
documents by the team unsubstantiated.
CA: Sesbreño appealed, but the CA affirmed the
RTC on March 10, 2003,8 holding thusly:
plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño’s account is simply too
implausible or far-fetched to be believed. For one
thing, the inspection on his household was just one
of many others that the VOC Team had conducted
in that subdivision. Yet, none but plaintiff-
33
appellant Sesbreño complained of the alleged acts
of the VOC Team. Considering that there is no
proof that they also perpetrated the same illegal
acts on other customers in the guise of conducting
a Violation of Contracts inspection, plaintiff-
appellant Sesbreño likewise failed to show why he
alone was singled out. It is also difficult to believe
that the VOC Team would be brazen enough to
want to antagonize a person such as plaintiff-
appellant Sesbreño. There is no evidence that the
VOC Team harbored any evil motive or grudge
against plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño, who is a total
stranger to them. Until he came along, they did
not have any prior criminal records to speak of, or
at least, no evidence thereof was presented. It is
equally difficult to believe that their superiors
would authorize or condone their alleged illegal
acts. Especially so since there is no indication that
prior to the incident on May 11, 1989, there was
already bad blood or animosity between plaintiff-
appellant Sesbreño and defendant appellees to
warrant such a malevolent response. In fact, since
availing of defendant-appellee VECO’s power
services, the relationship between them appears
to have been uneventful.
It becomes all the more apparent that the charges
stemming from the May 11, 1989 incident were
fabricated when taken together with the lower
court’s evaluation of the alleged theft of plaintiff-
appellant Sesbreño’s personal effects. It stated
that on August 8, 1989, plaintiff-appellant
Sesbreño wrote the barangay captain of Punta
Princesa and accused Chuchie Garcia and Victoria
Villarta alias Victoria Rocamora of theft of some of
his things that earlier he claimed had been stolen
by members of the VOC Team. When he was
confronted with these facts, plaintiff-appellant
Sesbreño further claimed that the items allegedly
stolen by Chuchie Garcia were part of the loot
taken by defendants-appellees Constantino and
Arcilla. Yet not once did plaintiff-appellant
Sesbreño or any of his witnesses mention that a
conspiracy existed between these people. Clearly,
much like his other allegations, it is nothing more
than an afterthought by plaintiff-appellant
Sesbreño.
All in all, the allegations against defendants-
appellees appear to be nothing more than a put-on
to save face. For the simple truth is that the
inspection exposed plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño as
a likely cheat and thief.
Neither is this Court swayed by the testimonies of
Baledio and Lopez.1âwphi1 The lower court rightly
described their testimonies as fraught by
discrepancies and inconsistencies on material
points and even called Lopez a perjured witness.
On the other hand, it is odd that plaintiff-appellant
Sesbreño chose not to present the witness whose
testimony was very crucial. But even though
Chuchie Garcia never testified, her absence speaks
volumes. Whereas plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño
claimed that the VOC Team forced her to sign two
documents that made her appear to be his
authorized agent or representative, the latter
claimed otherwise and that she also gave them
permission to enter and search the house. The
person most qualified to refute the VOC Team’s
claim is Chuchie Garcia herself. It is axiomatic that
he who asserts a fact or claim must prove it. He
cannot transfer that burden to the person against

whom he asserts such fact or claim. When certain
evidence is suppressed, the presumption is that it
will adversely affect the cause of the party
suppressing it, should it come to light.
Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration,
Sesbreño appealed.
Issue: Was Sesbreño entitled to recover damages
for abuse of rights?
Ruling: The appeal has no merit.
Sesbreño’s main contention is that the inspection
of his residence by the VOC team was an
unreasonable search for being carried out without
a warrant and for being allegedly done with malice
or bad faith.
Before dealing with the contention, we have to
note that two distinct portions of Sesbreño’s
residence were inspected by the VOS team – the
garage where the electric meter was installed, and
the main premises where the four bedrooms, living
rooms, dining room and kitchen were located.
Anent the inspection of the garage where the
meter was installed, the respondents assert that
the VOC team had the continuing authority from
Sesbreño as the consumer to enter his premises at
all reasonable hours to conduct an inspection of
the meter without being liable for trespass to
dwelling. The authority emanated from paragraph
9 of the metered service contract entered into
between VECO and each of its consumers, which
provided as follows:
9. The CONSUMER agrees to allow properly
authorized employees or representatives of the
COMPANY to enter his premises at all reasonable
hours without being liable to trespass to dwelling
for the purpose of inspecting, installing, reading,
removing, testing, replacing or otherwise disposing
of its property, and/or removing the COMPANY’S
property in the event of the termination of the
contract for any cause.11
Sesbreño contends, however, that paragraph 9 did
not give Constantino, Arcilla and Balicha the
blanket authority to enter at will because the only
property VECO owned in his premises was the
meter; hence, Constantino and Arcilla should enter
only the garage. He denies that they had the right
to enter the main portion of the house and inspect
the various rooms and the appliances therein
because those were not the properties of VECO.
He posits that Balicha, who was not an employee
of VECO, had no authority whatsoever to enter his
house and conduct a search. He concludes that
their search was unreasonable, and entitled him to
damages in light of their admission that they had
entered and inspected his premises without a
search warrant.12
We do not accept Sesbreño’s conclusion.
Paragraph 9 clothed the entire VOC team with
unquestioned authority to enter the garage to
inspect the meter. The members of the team
obviously met the conditions imposed by
paragraph 9 for an authorized entry. Firstly, their
entry had the objective of conducting the routine
inspection of the meter.13Secondly, the entry and
34
inspection were confined to the garage where the
meter was installed.14 Thirdly, the entry was
effected at around 4 o’clock p.m., a reasonable
hour.15 And, fourthly, the persons who inspected
the meter were duly authorized for the purpose by
VECO.
Although Balicha was not himself an employee of
VECO,16 his participation was to render police
assistance to ensure the personal security of
Constantino and Arcilla during the inspection,
rendering him a necessary part of the team as an
authorized representative. Under the
circumstances, he was authorized to enter
considering that paragraph 9 expressly extended
such authority to "properly authorized employees
or representatives" of VECO.
It is true, as Sesbreño urges, that paragraph 9 did
not cover the entry into the main premises of the
residence. Did this necessarily mean that any entry
by the VOS team into the main premises required a
search warrant to be first secured?
Sesbreño insists so, citing Section 2, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution, the clause guaranteeing the
right of every individual against unreasonable
searches and seizures, viz:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
He states that a violation of this constitutional
guaranty rendered VECO and its VOS team liable to
him for damages by virtue of Article 32 (9) of the
Civil Code, which pertinently provides:
Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any
private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the
latter for damages:
(9) The right to be secured in one’s person, house,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures;
Sesbreño’s insistence has no legal and factual
basis.
The constitutional guaranty against unlawful
searches and seizures is intended as a restraint
against the Government and its agents tasked with
law enforcement. It is to be invoked only to ensure
freedom from arbitrary and unreasonable exercise
of State power. The Court has made this clear in its
pronouncements, including that made in People v.
Marti,17 viz:
If the search is made upon the request of law
enforcers, a warrant must generally be first
secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality.

However, if the search is made at the behest or
initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as
in the case at bar, and without the intervention of
police authorities, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the
act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is
involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals
so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.18
It is worth noting that the VOC inspectors decided
to enter the main premises only after finding the
meter of Sesbreño turned upside down, hanging
and its disc not rotating. Their doing so would
enable them to determine the unbilled electricity
consumed by his household. The circumstances
justified their decision, and their inspection of the
main premises was a continuation of the
authorized entry. There was no question then that
their ability to determine the unbilled electricity
called for them to see for themselves the usage of
electricity inside. Not being agents of the State,
they did not have to first obtain a search warrant
to do so.
Balicha’s presence participation in the entry did
not make the inspection a search by an agent of
the State within the ambit of the guaranty. As
already mentioned, Balicha was part of the team
by virtue of his mission order authorizing him to
assist and escort the team during its routine
inspection.19 Consequently, the entry into the main
premises of the house by the VOC team did not
constitute a violation of the guaranty.
Our holding could be different had Sesbreño
persuasively demonstrated the intervention of
malice or bad faith on the part of Constantino and
Arcilla during their inspection of the main
premises, or any excessiveness committed by them
in the course of the inspection. But Sesbreño did
not. On the other hand, the CA correctly observed
that the inspection did not zero in on Sesbreño’s
residence because the other houses within the
area were similarly subjected to the routine
inspection.20 This, we think, eliminated any notion
of malice or bad faith.
Clearly, Sesbreño did not establish his claim for
damages if the respondents were not guilty of
abuse of rights. To stress, the concept of abuse of
rights prescribes that a person should not use his
right unjustly or in bad faith; otherwise, he may be
liable to another who suffers injury. The rationale
for the concept is to present some basic principles
to be followed for the rightful relationship
between human beings and the stability of social
order.21Moreover, according to a or modify the orders of Judge Paredes. But in
commentator,22 "the exercise of right ends when
the right disappears, and it disappears when it is
abused, especially to the prejudice of others[;] [i]t
cannot be said that a person exercises a right when
he unnecessarily prejudices another." Article 19 of
the Civil Code23 sets the standards to be observed
in the exercise of one’s rights and in the
performance of one’s duties, namely: (a) to act
with justice; (b) to give everyone his due; and (c) to
observe honesty and good faith. The law thereby
recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights –
35
that in the exercise of the rights, the standards
under Article 19 must be observed.24
Although the act is not illegal, liability for damages
may arise should there be an abuse of rights, like
when the act is performed without prudence or in
bad faith. In order that liability may attach under
the concept of abuse of rights, the following
elements must be present, to wit: (a) the existence
of a legal right or duty, (b) which is exercised in
bad faith, and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing
or injuring another.25 There is no hard and fast rule
that can be applied to ascertain whether or not the
principle of abuse of rights is to be invoked. The
resolution of the issue depends on the
circumstances of each case.
Sesbreño asserts that he did not authorize Baledio
or Chuchie Garcia to let anyone enter his residence
in his absence; and that Baledio herself confirmed
that the members of the VOC team had
intimidated her into letting them in.
The assertion of Sesbreño is improper for
consideration in this appeal.1âwphi1 The RTC and
the CA unanimously found the testimonies of
Sesbreño’s witnesses implausible because of
inconsistencies on material points; and even
declared that the non-presentation of Garcia as a
witness was odd if not suspect. Considering that
such findings related to the credibility of the
witnesses and their testimonies, the Court cannot
review and undo them now because it is not a trier
of facts, and is not also tasked to analyze or weigh
evidence all over again.26 Verily, a review that may
tend to supplant the findings of the trial court that
had the first-hand opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses themselves should be
undertaken by the Court with prudent hesitation.
Only when Sesbreño could make a clear showing
of abuse in their appreciation of the evidence and
records by the trial and the appellate courts should
the Court do the unusual review of the factual
findings of the trial and appellate courts.27 Alas,
that showing was not made here.
Nor should the Court hold that Sesbreño was
denied due process by the refusal of the trial judge
to inhibit from the case. Although the trial judge
had issued an order for his voluntary inhibition, he
still rendered the judgment in the end in
compliance with the instruction of the Executive
Judge, whose exercise of her administrative
authority on the matter of the inhibition should be
respected.28 In this connection, we find to be apt
the following observation of the CA, to wit:
Both Judge Paredes and Judge Priscila Agana serve
the Regional Trial Court and are therefore of co-
equal rank. The latter has no authority to reverse
ordering Judge Paredes to continue hearing the
case, Judge Agana did not violate their co-equal
status or unilaterally increased her jurisdiction. It is
merely part of her administrative responsibilities
as Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, of which Judge Paredes is also a
member.29
Lastly, the Court finds nothing wrong if the writer
of the decision in the CA refused to inhibit from
participating in the resolution of the motion for
reconsideration filed by Sesbrefio. The motion for
 36

her inhibition was grounded on suspicion of her

bias and prejudice,30 but suspicion of bias and
prejudice were not enough grounds for
inhibition.31

Suffice it to say that the records are bereft of any

indication that even suggested that the Associate
Justices of the CA who participated in the
promulgation of the decision were tainted with
bias against him.

Petition for review on certiorari DENIED. Decision

AFFIRMED.