People vs. Pangilinan GR No. 152662 June 2012
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of
Facts: On Sept.16, 1997, Virginia Malolos filed an affidavit-
complaint for estafa and violation of BP22 against Pangilinan.
On Dec.5,1997, Pangilinan filed a civil case for accounting,
recovery of comm. Documents, enforceability of contract and
specific performance against Malolos. 5 days after, Pangilinan
filed a petition to suspend proceedings on the ground of
prejudicial question. On March 2, 1998, assistant city
prosecutor recommended the suspension of the criminal
proceedings pending the outcome of the civil action filed by
Pangilinan against Malolos. On Feb.13,2000, two counts for
violation of BP22 were filed against Pangilinan. Pangilinan then
filed an obnibus motion to quash alleging that her criminal
liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription. The
motion was granted.
Issue: Did the action for BP22 prescribe?
Ruling: NO. Pursuant to Sec. 2 of Act 3326, as amended,
prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person. Proceedings referred to in sec.2 of
Act 3326 are “judicial proceedings”, which means the filing of
the complaint or information with the proper court. Otherwise
stated, the running of the prescriptive period shall be stayed on
the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date
before that. Sec. 2 of Act 3326 governs the computation of
prescriptive periods of both ordinances and special laws.
ACT 3326:
Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless
otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance w/ the ff. rules: a)xxx; b) after four years for
those punished by imprisonment for more than one
month but less than two years; c)xxx.
Sec. 2.
the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings
are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin
to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
Since BP 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of
imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more than one
year or by a fine for its violation, it therefore prescribes in 4
years in accordance with the aforcited law. The running of the
prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the
institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
The affidavit-complaint for the violations were filed against
Pangilinan on Sept.16,1997. The cases reached the MeTC of
Quezon City only on Feb 13,2000 because in the meanwhile
Pangilinan filed a civil cases and asked for suspension of the
the proceedings based on prejudicial question. Clearly, it was
Pangilinan’s own motion for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings which she predicated on her civil case for
accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated
proceedings only in 2000.
PEOPLE vs. GENOSA, G.R. No. 135981, January 15 2004.
FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by
his wife Marivic Genosa, appelant. During their first year of
marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently
thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always quarrel
and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified
that every time her husband came home drunk, he would
provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her
husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified during the
trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the victim
quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant
was able to run to another room. Appellant admitted having
killed the victim with the use of a gun. The information for
parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of
death of the victim was by beating through the use of a lead
pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn
child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an
aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty
of death.
On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed
an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable
Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-
examination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of
Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to
determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband;
and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the
records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in
the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the
testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme
Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the
appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for reception of
expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered
woman syndrome” plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on
the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo,
were presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently
submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the
“battered woman syndrome” as constituting self defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
RULING: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed
to prove that she is afflicted with the “battered woman
syndrome”.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is
repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological
behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he
wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women
include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with
men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered
woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least
twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship
with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in
the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is
characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence,” which has
three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute
battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least,
nonviolent) phase.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-
defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. First, each
of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have
characterized at least two battering episodes between the
appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute
battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have
produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she
needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of
the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not
necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused,
based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former
against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could
satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of
the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly
established.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of
violence” supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and
Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents
but appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering
episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the
third phase of the cycle.
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship
does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her
abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context
of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that the
one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one’s
life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and
actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code
provides that the following requisites of self-defense must
concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-
defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -
- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a
person. In the present case, however, according to the
testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval
between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack
upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his
violent behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom. During
that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The
reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had
ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented
an actual threat on her life or safety.
The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion
and obfuscation were, however, taken in favor of appellant. It
should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological
paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise
from the same set of facts.
The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the
severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon
appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time
resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to
an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without
depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an
impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and
obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present
when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst
of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a
legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To
appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should
concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to
produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far
removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable
length of time, during which the accused might recover her
normal equanimity.
2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery
must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself. Besides,
equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by
an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to
have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from
the assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the
method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been
consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of
accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense
that might be put up by the party attacked.
The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have
naturally produced passion or obfuscation. The acute battering
she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse,
in spite of the fact that she was eight (8) months pregnant with
their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid
emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and
impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for
parricide. However, considering the presence of two (2)
mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating
circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant
has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby
imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may
immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due
determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being
held for some other lawful cause.
JOEMAR ORTEGA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 151085 August 20, 2008
FACTS: At the time of commission of rape, the accused was
only 13 years old, while the victim AAA was 6, both minors. It
was alleged that petitioner raped her three times on three
different occasions in 1996. The lower courts convicted him of
rape with criminal and civil liability imposed. The case was
pending when Republic Act 9344 (R.A. No. 9344) or the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, was enacted
amending the age of criminal irresponsibility being raised from 9
to 15 years old. Said law took effect on May 20, 2006. At the
time of the promulgation of judgment, the accused already
reached the age of majority. The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) claimed that petitioner is not exempt from criminal liability
because he is not anymore a child as defined by R.A. No. 9344.
The OSG further claimed that the retroactive effect of said law is
applicable only if the child-accused is still below 18 years old.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is exempt in the crime
alleged by reason of minority
HELD: Yes, the petitioner is exempt from criminal liability. For
one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances,
although he commits a crime, by the complete absence of any
of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the
act, no criminal liability arises. Hence, while there is a crime
committed, no criminal liability attaches.
By virtue of the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A.
9344), the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9
to 15 years old. Petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of
the commission of the alleged rape. The first paragraph of
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly provides that, a child fifteen
(15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the
offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the
child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to
Section 20 of this Act. The Court gives retroactive application
insofar as it favors the persons guilty of a felony. While the law
exempts the petitioner from criminal liability, however, he is not
exempt from civil liability. For this reason, petitioner and/or his
parents are liable to pay AAA civil indemnity.
People vs Arpon
Facts: Arpon was charged with 8 counts of rape. Once in 1995
(victim was 8 yrs old) and 7 times (victim was 12 yrs. Old) in
1999 (5 times in July and twice on August). At the time of the 1 st
rape the accused was 13 and during the 2nd rape he was 17.
Arpon was the uncle’s victim. Arpon pleaded not guilty to the
charges. The victim testified that her underwear was stripped
off, the accused pulled out his penis and put his penis inside her
and she said that he started doing a pumping motion and
though there was no blood, there was blood and it also her hurt
when she urinated.
The RTC gave credence to the testimony of the victim
and the Medico Legal Findings wherein there old, healed
incomplete lacerations on the victim’s genitalia. The court did
not recognize the alibi of the accused because it was still
possible that it was still physically possible that the accused
could come to the victim’s house during the time of the crime
since in his alibi he was situated in a place not far away from the
victim’s house. The RTC found the accused guilty of one count
of statutory rape and 7 counts of rape and the penalty
imposed was death.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision with the
modification that instead of the death penalty the penalty is
lowered to reclusion perpetua. The CA gave credence to the
testimony of the victim since it was straightforward, categorical
and candid and that the accused’s uncorroborated alibi could
not stand against the positive identification made by the victim.
Note (part ni siya sa actual Ruling but dili ni mao ag focus sa
case based sa atng topic sa syllabus): Accused filed an appeal
before the Supreme Court. The court found that there were only
3 counts of rape since the findings of the court in relation to the
testimony of the victim was that there was rape during 1995, the
rape that happened on July was only found to be one incident
and same with the rape that happened on August.
Issue: Is the accused entitled to a reduction of the penalty due
to the mitigating circumstance of minority?
Ruling:
Yes. The proper penalty should be reclusion perpetua for
each count.
The first paragraph of Section 7 of Republic Act No.
9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act
of 2006, provides for the rule on how to determine the age of a
child in conflict with the law:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. The child in
conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of
minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child
in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be
eighteen (18) years of age or older. The age of a
child may be determined from the child's birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or any other
pertinent documents. In the absence of these
documents, age may be based on information
from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other
persons, the physical appearance of the child and
other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the
age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her
favor.
In the past, the Court deemed sufficient the testimonial
evidence regarding the minority and age of the accused
provided the following conditions concur, namely: (1) the
absence of any other satisfactory evidence such as the birth
certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar documents that would
prove the date of birth of the accused; (2) the presence of
testimony from accused and/or a relative on the age and
minority of the accused at the time of the complained incident
without any objection on the part of the prosecution; and (3) lack
of any contrary evidence showing that the accused's and/or his
relatives' testimonies are untrue.
In the instant case, Arpon testified that he was born on
February 23, 1982 and that he was only 13 years old when the
first incident of rape allegedly happened in 1995. Other than his
testimony, no other evidence was presented to prove the date of
his birth. However, the records of this case show neither any
objection to the said testimony on the part of the prosecution,
nor any contrary evidence to dispute the same.
Although the acts of rape in this case were committed
before Republic Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, the
said law is still applicable given that Section 68 thereof
expressly states:
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been
Convicted and are Serving Sentences. Persons
who have been convicted and are serving
sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act,
and who were below the age of eighteen (18)
years at the time of the commission of the offense
for which they were convicted and are serving
sentence, shall likewise benefit from the
retroactive application of this Act. They shall be
entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under
this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted
accordingly. They shall be immediately released if
they are so qualified under this Act or other
applicable law.
Thus, in the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6
of Republic Act No. 9344 is explicit in providing that:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal
Responsibility. A child fifteen (15) years of age or
under at the time of the commission of the offense
shall be exempt from criminal liability. However,
the child shall be subjected to an intervention
program pursuant to Section 20 of the Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below
eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to
an intervention program, unless he/she has acted
with discernment, in which case, such child shall
be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein
established does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance
with existing laws.
Accordingly, for the first count of rape, which in the
information in Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46 was allegedly
committed in 1995, the testimony of the accused-appellant
sufficiently established that he was only 13 years old at that
time. In view of the failure of the prosecution to prove the exact
date and year of the first incident of rape, i.e., whether the same
occurred in 1995 or in 1998 as previously discussed, any doubt
therein should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more
beneficial to the latter. The accused-appellant is exempt from
criminal liability for the first count of rape pursuant to the
first paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344. The
accused-appellant, nevertheless, remains civilly liable therefor.
For the second and third counts of rape that were
committed in the year 1999, the accused-appellant was already
17 years old. The Court found that Arpon acted with
discernment. The fact that the accused-appellant acted with
discernment was satisfactorily established by the testimony of
AAA, which the Court found to be credible. Verily, AAA testified
that she at first did not tell anybody about the sexual assault she
suffered at the hands of the accused-appellant because the
latter told her that he would kill her mother if she did so. That the
accused-appellant had to threaten AAA in an effort to conceal
his dastardly acts only proved that he knew full well that what he
did was wrong and that he was aware of the consequences
thereof.
Accordant with the second paragraph of Article 68 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and in conformity with The
Court’s ruling in Sarcia, when the offender is a minor under
eighteen (18) years of age, the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty
because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority,
the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned
with. Thus, for the second and third counts of rape, the
proper penalty imposable upon the accused-appellant
is reclusion perpetua for each count.
Suspension of sentence under Sec 38 of RA 9344 is no
longer applicable since the accused is already 29 years old by
this time.
** Sorry taas. Ako nalang giapil tanan sa ruling kabahin sa
RA9344 kay gidiscuss og maayo sa case and in case mu-ask si
maam.
Madali vs. People
Facts: Raymond, Rodel, and Bernardino were charged with
murder. At the time the crime was committed, Raymond was
only 14 years old, while Rodel was 16 years old.
Issue: Should Raymond be imprisoned?
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court sustained the findings of fact of
the lower court, that the accused indeed committed the crime
charged. However, as to the criminal liability, Raymond is
exempt. Raymund, who was only 14 years of age at the time he
committed the crime, should be exempt from criminal liability
and should be released to the custody of his parents or guardian
pursuant to Sections 6 and 20 of Republic Act No. 9344.
Although the crime was committed on 13 April 1999 and
Republic Act No. 9344 took effect only on 20 May 2006, the said
law should be given retroactive effect in favor of Raymund who
was not shown to be a habitual criminal. This is based on Article
22 of the Revised Penal Code.
While Raymund is exempt from criminal liability, his civil liability
is not extinguished pursuant to the second paragraph of Section
6, Republic Act No. 9344.
Issue: Should Rodel be imprisoned?
Ruling: Yes. As to Rodels situation, it must be borne in mind that
he was 16 years old at the time of the commission of the crime.
A determination of whether he acted with or without discernment
is necessary pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344.
The Court of Appeals could not have been more accurate when
it opined that Rodel acted with discernment. Rodel, together
with his cohorts, warned Jovencio not to reveal their hideous act
to anyone; otherwise, they would kill him. Rodel knew, therefore,
that killing AAA was a condemnable act and should be kept in
secrecy. He fully appreciated the consequences of his unlawful
act.
Issue: What penalty should be imposed on Rodel?
Ruling: Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
to be imposed upon a person under 18 but above 15 shall be
the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law, but always in
the proper period. The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Pursuant to
Article 68, the maximum penalty should be within prision mayor,
which is a degree lower than reclusion temporal. Absent any
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the maximum penalty
should be in the medium period of prision mayor or 8 years and
1 day to 10 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the minimum should be anywhere within the penalty next lower
in degree, that is, prision correccional. Therefore, the penalty
imposed by the Court of Appeals, which is 6 months and one
day of prision correccional to 8 years and one day of prision
mayor, is in order.
Issue: Should the penalty be immediately imposed?
Ruling: No. The sentence to be imposed against Rodel should
be suspended pursuant to Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344.
instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court
shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence, without need of application. Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile
is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt. Upon suspension of sentence
and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the
court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as
provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with
the Law.
Jose vs. People GR162052 Jan.13, 2005
Facts: SPO1 Guevarra was assigned as poseur-buyer in a buy
bust operation stemming from an information received from an
unnamed informant. At about 4 in the afternoon, a Toyota
Corolla driven by Sonny Zarraga and accompanied by his co-
accused Alvin Jose (13y/o at the time of the commission of the
crime) arrived outside the Chowking restaurant in Calamba
Laguna. The unnamed informant approached the two accused.
Then, the informant informed Guevarra that Sonny Zarraga had
with him 100 grams of shabu. Guevarra then offered to buy the
shabu. Zarraga asked Guevarra if he had the money to buy 100
grams of shabu. Guevarra responded in the affirmative and
showed a bundle of money bills. Zarraga then asked Alvin Jose
to bring out the shabu. Zarraga handed over the shabu to
Guevarra. They were then arrested and charged as co-
conspirators for selling shabu.
Issue: Can Alvin Jose be charged as a co-conspirator?
Ruling: NO. Under Article 12(3) of the RPC, a minor over nine
years of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability if
charged with a felony. The law applies even if such minor is
charged with a crime defined and penalized by a special law.
The reason for the exemption is that a minor of such age is
presumed lacking the mental element of a crime the capacity to
know what is wrong as distinguished from what is right or to
determine the morality of human acts. However, such
presumption is rebuttable. For a minor at such an age to be
criminally liable, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that he acted with discernment, meaning he
knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such evidence
may include utterances of the minor; his overt acts before,
during and after the commission of the crime; the nature of the
weapon used; his attempt to silence a witness; his disposal of
evidence.

In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove beyond

reasonable doubt that the petitioner who was 13 y/o at the time
the crime was committed, acted with discernment relative to the
sale of shabu to the poseur-buyer.

Furthermore, it was Zarraga who drove the car and transacted

with the poseur-buyer relative to the sale of shabu. It was also
accused Zarraga who received the buy-money from the poseur-
buyer. Aside from bringing out and handing over the plastic bag
to accused Zarraga, petitioner Jose merely sat inside the car
and had no participation whatsoever in the transaction between
the accused Zarraga and the poseur-buyer.