CLT v High Grade
principle of separation of powers as it is an encroachment into the
FACTS:
The properties in dispute were formerly part of the notorious Maysilo
Estate left by Gonzalo Tuason, the vastness of which measures
1,660.26 hectares, stretching across Caloocan City, Valenzuela, and
Malabon, covered by five (5) mother titles or Original Certificate of
Title (OCT). One of the mother titles is OCT No. 994, the mother title in
dispute. Later on, smaller lots forming part of the Maysilo Estate were
sold to different persons. Several subsequent subdivisions,
consolidations, and one expropriation of the Estate, spawned
numerous legal disputes, living-up to the name "Land of Caveat
Emptor."1 One of these disputed lots was Lot 26, the property subject
of this litigation.
The conflict arose due to an overlapping of the properties of CLT and
Hi-Grade, which prompted CLT to file a case for Annulment of Transfer
Certificates of Title, Recovery of Possession, and Damages before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City.
VERSION OF HI-GRADE
VERSION OF CLT
RTC: Hi-Grade's title, the older title, cannot prevail over CLT's title
because it suffers from patent defects and infirmities. Although Hi-
Grade paid realty taxes on the subject properties, it is not considered
as a conclusive proof of ownership.
CA: REVERSED RTC DECISION
Upholding the validity of TCT Nos. 237450 and T-146941 of appellant
Hi-Grade Feeds Corporation.
During the pendency of the appeal, Hi-Grade filed a Motion to Admit
and Take Judicial Notice of Committee Report on Senate Inquiry into
Maysilo Estate Submitted by the Committees on Justice and Human
Rights and on Urban Planning, Housing and Resettlement (Senate
Report) on 1 July 1998. The Court of Appeals granted the motion in a
Resolution9 dated 31 August 1998. Included in the Resolution,
however, is a statement that although the Court of Appeals takes
judicial notice of the Senate Report, the Court of Appeals is not bound
by the findings and conclusions therein.
In the meantime, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf
of the Republic and in representation of the Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority, filed a Petition for Intervention dated 25
August 1998. The OSG averred that its intervention is indispensable as
it is pursuant to its duty to preserve the integrity of the Torrens system
of registration and to protect the Assurance Fund, in connection with
which it can initiate necessary actions for the annulment of titles
irregularly and fraudulently issued. The Court of Appeals granted the
OSG motion. The Court of Appeals resolved the issue on intervention
in the appealed Decision dated 18 June 2003. According to the Court
of Appeals, due to the magnitude and significance that will affect the
stability and integrity of the Torrens system, the State has sufficient
interest in the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the taking judicial notice of the Senate Report is a
violation of the Rules of Court and CLT's right to due process
RULING:
CLT avers that taking judicial notice of the Senate Report is a violation
of the Rules of Court and CLT's right to due process. First, the Senate
Report is inadmissible and should not be given any probative value
because it was obtained in violation of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
considering that the Senate Report is unauthenticated and is thus
deemed hearsay evidence. Contrary to the mandatory procedure
under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which requires examination of
documentary and testimonial evidence, the Senate Report was not put
to proof and CLT was deprived of the opportunity to conduct a cross-
examination on the Senate Report. And it is also contended that the
right of CLT to due process was violated because the proceedings in
the Senate were conducted without notice to CLT. Finally, the
admission in evidence of the Senate Report violated the time-honored
jurisdiction exclusive to the courts.
CLT misses the point. Taking judicial notice of acts of the Senate is well
within the ambit of the law. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence provides:
SECTION 1 . Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take
judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence
and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of
government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of
legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the
laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions,
(1a) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may
properly take and act on without proof because these facts are already
known to them;13 it is the duty of the court to assume something as a
matter of fact without need of further evidentiary
support.14 Otherwise stated, by the taking of judicial notice, the court
dispenses with the traditional form of presentation of
evidence, i.e. the rigorous rules of evidence and court proceedings
such as cross-examination.
The Senate Report, an official act of the legislative department, may
be taken judicial notice of.
CLT posits that the Court of Appeals violated the time-honored
principle of separation of powers when it took judicial notice of the
Senate Report. This contention is baseless. We adopt the
pronouncements of this Court in Angeles v. The Secretary of Justice:
To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ and Senate
reports regarding OCT No. 994. In the 2007 Manotok case, this Court
constituted a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the cases
on remand, declaring as follows:
Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s], we are not prepared to adopt
the findings made by the DOJ and the Senate, or even consider
whether these are admissible as evidence, though such questions may
be considered by the Court of Appeals upon the initiative of the
parties, x x x The reports cannot conclusively supersede or overturn
judicial decisions, but if admissible they may be taken into account as
evidence on the same level as the other pieces of evidence submitted
by the parties. The fact that they were rendered by the DOJ and the
Senate should not, in itself, persuade the courts to accept them without
inquiry. The facts and arguments presented in the reports must still
undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis, and certainly the courts will have
the discretion to accept or reject them.17 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Thus, the Senate Report shall not be conclusive upon the courts, but
will be examined and evaluated based on its probative value. The Court
of Appeals explained quite pointedly why the taking of judicial notice
of the Senate Report does not violate the republican principle. Thus:
However, the question of the binding effect of that Report upon this
Court is altogether a different matter. Certainly, a determination by
any branch of government on a justiciable matter which is properly
before this Court for adjudication does not bind the latter. The finding
of the Senate committees may be the appropriate basis for remedial
legislation but when the issue of the validity of a Torrens title is
submitted to a court for resolution, only the latter has the competence
to make such a determination and once final, the same binds not only
the parties but all agencies of government.
Page | 1
That there is such a document as the Senate Report was all that was
conceded by the Court of Appeals. It did not allow the Senate Report
to determine the decision on the case.
ADORACION CAROLINO v. GEN. GENEROSO SENGA,
Facts:
On December 1, 1976, Jeremias A. Carolino, petitioner's husband,
retired[3] from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) with the rank
of Colonel under General Order No. 1208 dated November 29, 1976,
pursuant to the provisions of Sections 1(A) and 10 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 340,[4] as amended.
He started receiving his monthly retirement pay in the amount of
P18,315.00 in December 1976 until the same was withheld by
respondents in March 2005.
It appeared that the termination of Jeremias' pension was done
pursuant to Disposition Form[7] dated October 29, 2004, which was
approved by the Chief of Staff and made effective in January 2005. In
the said Disposition Form, the AFP Judge Advocate General... opined
that under the provisions of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of RA No. 340, retired
military personnel are disqualified from receiving pension benefits
once incapable to render military service as a result of his having sworn
allegiance to a foreign country. It was also mentioned... that
termination of retirement benefits of pensioner of the AFP could be
done pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1638[8] which provides that the name of a retiree who loses his
Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired... list and his
retirement benefits terminated upon such loss. It being in consonance
with the policy consideration that all retirement laws inconsistent with
the provisions of PD No. 1638 are repealed and modified accordingly.
On February 26, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision[10] granting the
petition for mandamus
Respondents sought reconsideration,[12] but the RTC denied the
same in an Order
Jeremias died on September 30, 2007[15] and was substituted by his
wife, herein petitioner.
On May 25, 2009, the CA granted respondents' appeal.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution
dated September 10, 2009.
Issues:
Whether or not there is violation of Due Process.
PD 1638 should not have been applied and cannot be used against
petitioner as her husband's retirement and pension were granted to
him by the AFP under RA 340 which was not superseded by PD 1638,
a later statute.
Petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of mandamus to compel the
reinstatement of his pension and benefits from the AFP under RA 340
as PD 1638 was not applicable to him.
Ruling:
It has been held that before a right to retirement benefits or pension
vests in an employee, he must have met the stated conditions of
eligibility with respect to the nature of employment, age, and length
of service.[22] Undeniably, petitioner's husband had complied with the
conditions of eligibility to retirement benefits as he was then receiving
his retirement benefits on a monthly basis until it was terminated.
Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he
acquires a vested right to the benefits that is protected by the due
process clause.[23] It is only upon retirement that military personnel
acquire a vested right to retirement benefits.[24] Retirees enjoy a
protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to
immediate payment under pre-existing law.[25]
In Ayog v. Cusi,[26] we expounded the nature of a vested right, thus:
"A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the
property of some particular person or persons as a present interest"
(16 C.J.S. 1173). It is "the privilege to enjoy property legally vested, to
enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of property conferred by the
existing law" (12 C.J.S. 955, Note 46, No. 6) or "some right or interest
in property which has become fixed and established and is no longer
open to doubt or controversy" (Downs vs. Blount 170 Fed. 15, 20, cited
in Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 502).
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. "A
state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the
enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or
by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate
exercise of the police power" (16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
It has been observed that, generally, the term "vested right" expresses
the concept of present fixed interest, which in right reason and natural
justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an
innately just and imperative right which an enlightened free society,
sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny (16
C.J.S. 1174, Note 71, No. 5, citing Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc.
vs. Rosenthal, 192 Atl. 2nd 587).[27]
Petitioner's husband acquired vested right to the payment of his
retirement benefits which must be respected and cannot be affected
by the subsequent enactment of PD No. 1638 which provides that loss
of Filipino citizenship terminates retirement benefits. Vested rights
include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a
demand, but also an exemption from new obligations after the right
has vested.
In fact, Sections 33 and 35 of PD No. 1638 recognize such vested right,
to wit:
Section 33. Nothing in this Decree shall be construed in any manner to
reduce whatever retirement and separation pay or gratuity or other
monetary benefits which any person is heretofore receiving or is
entitled to receive under the provisions of existing law.
xxxx
Section. 35. Except those necessary to give effect to the provisions of
this Decree and to preserve the rights granted to retired or separated
military personnel, all laws, rules and regulations inconsistent with the
provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 33 of PD No. 1638 is clear that the law has no intention to
reduce or to revoke whatever retirement benefits being enjoyed by a
retiree at the time of its passage. Hence, Section 35 provides for an
exception to what the decree repealed or modified, i.e., except those
necessary to preserve the rights granted to retired or separated
military personnel.
Page | 2
YINLU BICOL MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. TRANS-ASIA OIL
AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
[G.R. No. 207942, January 12, 2015, BERSAMIN, J.:]
DOCTRINE: Rights pertaining to mining patents issued pursuant to the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and existing prior to November 15, 1935 are
vested rights that cannot be impaired.
FACTS:
1. This case involves 13 mining claims over the area located in Barrio
Larap, Municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, a
portion of which was owned and mined by Philippine Iron Mines,
Inc. (PIMI), which ceased operations in 1975 due to financial
losses.
a. PIMI’s portion (known as the PIMI Larap Mines) was sold in a
foreclosure sale to the Manila Banking Corporation (MBC) and
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB, later Banco De
Oro, or BDO).
2. The Government then opened the area for exploration.
a. Trans-Asia Oil and Energy Development Corporation (Trans-Asia)
then explored the area from 1986 onwards.
i. In 1996, it entered into an operating agreement with Philex
Mining Corporation over the area, their agreement being duly
registered by the Mining Recorder Section of Regional Office No.
V of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).
3. 1997: Trans-Asia filed an application for the approval of Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) over the area in that
Regional Office of the DENR, through the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau (MGB), in Daraga, Albay.
a. The application, which was amended in 1999, was granted on July
28, 2007 under MPSA No. 252-2007-V, by which Trans-Asia was
given the exclusive right to explore, develop and utilize the mineral
deposits in the portion of the mineral lands.
4. August 31 2007: Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation (Yinlu) informed
the DENR by letter that it had acquired the mining patents of PIMI
from MBC/BDO by way of a deed of absolute sale, stating that the
areas covered by its mining patents were within the areas of Trans-
Asia’s MPSA
5. September 14, 2007: Trans-Asia informed Yinlu by letter that it
would commence exploration works in Yinlu’s areas pursuant to
the MPSA, and requested Yinlu to allow its personnel to access
the areas for the works to be undertaken.
a. Yinlu replied that Trans-Asia could proceed with its exploration
works on its own private property in the Calambayungan area, not
in the areas covered by its (Yinlu) mining patents.
6. TransAsia found out that the registration of its MPSA had been put
on hold because of Yinlu’s request to register the deed of absolute
sale in its favor.
7. DENR Secretary directed MGB Regional Office V to verify the
validity of the mining patents of Yinlu.
a. MGB Regional Office V informed the Office of the DENR Secretary
that there was no record on file showing the existence of the
mining patents of Yinlu. Accordingly, the parties were required to
submit their respective position papers
8. DENR Sec Atienza ordered the amendment of Trans-Asia’s MPSA
by excluding therefrom the mineral lands covered by Yinlu’s
mining patents
a. DENR Sec. Jose L. Atienza, Jr in his order found that the mining
patents had been issued to PIMI in 1930 as evidenced by and
indicated in PIMI’s certificates of title submitted by Yinlu; and that
the patents were validly transferred to and were now owned by
Yinlu.
b. He rejected Trans-Asia’s argument that Yinlu’s patents had no
effect and were deemed abandoned because Yinlu had failed to
register them pursuant to Section 101 of Presidential Decree No.
463, as amended.
c. He refuted Trans-Asia’s contention that there was a continuing
requirement under the Philippine Bill of 1902 for the mining patent
holder to undertake improvements in order to have the patents
subsist, and that Yinlu failed to perform its obligation to register
and to undertake the improvement, observing that the
requirement was not an absolute imposition.
i. He noted that the suspension of PIMI’s operation in 1974 due to
financial losses and the foreclosure of its mortgaged properties
by the creditor banks (MBC/PCIB) constituted force majeure that
justified PIMI’s failure in 1974 to comply with the registration
requirement under P.D. No. 463;
ii. that the Philippine Bill of 1902, which was the basis for issuing the
patents, allowed the private ownership of minerals, rendering the
minerals covered by the patents to be segregated from the public
domain and be considered private property; and
iii. that the Regalian doctrine, under which the State owned all
natural resources, was adopted only by the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions
9. Office of the President affirmed the DENR Sec’s Order.
a. Under the Philippine Constitution, there is an absolute
prohibition against alienation of natural resources. Mining
locations may only be subject to concession or lease.
i. The only exception is where a location of a mining claim was
perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the government
under the 1935 Constitution was inaugurated, and according to
the laws existing at that time a valid location of a mining claim
segregated the area from the public domain, and the locator is
entitled to a grant of the beneficial ownership of the claim and
the right to a patent therefore.
b. The right of the locator to the mining patent is a vested right, and
the Constitution recognizes such right as an exception to the
prohibition against alienation of natural resources.
i. The right of the appellee as the beneficial owner of the subject
mining patents in this case, therefore, is superior to the claims of
appellant
ii. The existence of the TCT’s in the name of appellee further
bolsters the existence of the mining patents. Under PD 1529, also
known as the Property Registration Decree, once a title is cleared
of all claims or where none exists, the ownership over the real
property covered by the Torrens title becomes conclusive and
indefeasible even as against the government.
10. CA: It agreed with the DENR Secretary and the OP that Yinlu held
mining patents over the disputed mining areas, but ruled that
Yinlu was required to register the patents under PD No. 463 in
order for the patents to be recognized in its favor.
a. It found that Yinlu and its predecessors-in-interest did not register
the patents pursuant to PD No. 463; hence, the patents lapsed
and had no more effect
11. Yinlu asserts the following:
a. The mining patents of Yinlu were registered pursuant to Act No.
496 (Land Registration Act of 1902) in relation to the Philippine
Bill of 1902 (Act of Congress of July 1 , 1902), the governing law
on the registration of mineral patents, were valid, existing and
indefeasible.
i. Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902: allowed citizens of the
United States and of the Philippine Islands to explore, occupy and
purchase mineral lands
ii. Section 27 of the Philippine Bill of 1902: after the exploration and
claim of the mineral land, the owner of the claim and of the
mineral patents was entitled to all the minerals found in the area
subject of the claim
iii. its registered mineral patents, being valid and existing, could not
be defeated by adverse, open and notorious possession and
prescription;
Page | 3
b. substantive rights over mineral claims perfected under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 subsisted despite the changes of the
Philippine Constitution and of the mining laws
i. Constitution could not impair vested rights;
ii. Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No. 463 would impair its vested
rights under its mineral patents if said provisions were applied to
it;
iii. Section 99 of PD No. 463 expressly prohibited the application of
Section 100 and Section 101 to vested rights.
ISSUE: Whether Yinlu’s mining patents constitute vested rights
and could not be disregarded.
HELD: YES
1. A mining patent pertains to a title granted by the government for
the said mining claim.
2. Under the 1935 Constitution, which took effect on November 15
1935, the alienation of natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, was expressly prohibited.
a. The natural resources being referred therein included mineral
lands of public domain, but not mineral lands that at the time the
1935 Constitution took effect no longer formed part of the public
domain.
b. Prohibition against the alienation of natural resources did not
apply to a mining claim or patent existing prior to November 15,
1935.
c. McDaniel v. Apacible: A mining claim perfected under the law is
property in the highest sense, which may be sold and conveyed
and will pass by descent. It has the effect of a grant (patent) by
the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession
of the lands located.
d. The owner of a perfected valid appropriation of public mineral
lands is entitled to the exclusive possession and enjoyment
against everyone, including the Government itself. Where there
is a valid and perfected location of a mining claim, the area
becomes segregated from the public domain and the property of
the locator.
e. A valid and subsisting location of mineral land, made and kept up
in accordance with the provisions of the statutes of the United
States, has the effect of a grant by the United States of the
present and exclusive possession of the lands located, and this
exclusive right of possession and enjoyment continues during the
entire life of the location. There is no provision for, nor suggestion
of, a prior termination thereof.
3. Even without a patent, the possessory right of a qualified locator
after discovery of minerals upon the claim is a property right in
the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title
to the land is in the Government, and it is capable of transfer by
conveyance, inheritance, or devise.
a. the mining claim under consideration no longer formed part of the
public domain when the provisions of Article XII of the Constitution
became effective, it does not come within the prohibition against
the alienation of natural resources; and the petitioner has the right
to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and
conditions prescribed by law.
4. Although Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No. 463 require
registration and annual work obligations, Section 99 of PD No.
463 nevertheless expressly provides that the provisions of PD No.
463 shall not apply if their application will impair vested rights
under other mining laws
Section 99. Non-impairment of Vested or Acquired Substantive
Rights. Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by
this Decree which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with order mining laws previously in force
shall have no retroactive effect. Provided, That the provisions of
this Decree which are procedural in nature shall prevail.
a. A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the
property of some particular person or persons as a present
interest.
i. It is “the privilege to enjoy property legally vested, to enforce
contracts, and enjoy the rights of property conferred by existing
law” or “some right or interest in property which has become fixed
and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy”
b. The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested
rights. ‘A state may not impair vested rights by legislative
enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a
municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the
State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power’
c. It has been observed that, generally, the term “vested right”
expresses the concept of present fixed interest, which in right
reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary
State action, or an innately just an imperative right which an
enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable
individual rights, cannot deny
d. Republic v. Court of Appeals: that mining rights acquired under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and prior to the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution were vested rights that could not be impaired even by
the Government.
e. In the present case: the mining patents of Yinlu were issued
pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and were subsisting prior to
the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Consequently, Yinlu and its
predecessors-in-interest had acquired vested rights in the disputed
mineral lands that could not and should not be impaired even in
light of their past failure to comply with the requirement of
registration and annual work obligations.
Relevantly, we advert to the DENR's finding that PIMI's failure to
register the patents in 1974 pursuant to PD No. 463 was excusable
because of its suffering financial losses at that time, which
eventually led to the foreclosure of the mortgages on its assets by
the MBC and PCIB as its creditors.[60] The failure of Yinlu's
predecessors-in-interest to register and perform annual work
obligations did not automatically mean that they had already
abandoned their mining rights, and that such rights had already
lapsed. For one, the DENR itself declared that it had not issued any
specific order cancelling the mining patents.[61] Also, the tenets of
due process required that Yinlu and its predecessors-in-interest be
given written notice of their non-compliance with PD No. 463 and
the ample opportunity to comply. If they still failed to comply
despite such notice and opportunity, then written notice must
further be given informing them of the cancellation of their mining
patents. In the absence of any showing that the DENR had provided
the written notice and opportunity to Yinlu and its predecessors-
in-interest to that effect, it would really be inequitable to consider
them to have abandoned their patents, or to consider the patents
as having lapsed. Verily, as held in McDaniel and Gold Creek, supra,
a mining patent obtained under the Philippine Bill of 1902 was a
protected private property. The protection should be basic and
guaranteed, for no less than Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution decrees that no person shall be deprived of property
without due process of law.
Nonetheless, we deem it significant to remind that Yinlu has been
directed by the DENR to henceforth conduct its mining operations
in accordance with Republic Act No. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of
1995) and its implementing rules and regulations.
REPUBLIC v. JESUS M. MUPAS
Facts:
Page | 4
Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal to
the Government – through the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) and the Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA) – for the construction and development of the NAIA-IPT III
under a build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) arrangement.
On the other hand, Paircargo Consortium – composed of People’s Air Cargo
and Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Philippine Air and Grounds Services,
Inc. (PAGS), and Security Bank Corporation (Security Bank) – submitted its
competitive proposal to the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee
(PBAC).Paircargo Consortium offered to pay the Government a total of
P17.75 billion as guaranteed payment for 27 years while AEDC offered to pay
the Government a total of P135 million for the same period. Hence, DOTC
awarded the project to Paircargo Consortium (that later organized itself as
PIATCO). A Concession Agreement with PIATCO for the construction,
development, and operation of the NAIA-IPT III under a build-operate-
transfer scheme was made to authorized PIATCO to build, operate, and
maintain the NAIA-IPT III during the concession period of twenty-five (25)
years.
On March 31, 2000, PIATCO engaged the services of Takenaka and Asahikosan
to aid in constructing the project. However, PIATCO defaulted on its
obligation to pay Takenaka and Asahikosan pursuant to their respective
contracts. Takenaka and Asahikosan agreed to defer PIATCO’s payments until
June 2003. In 2002, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo declared in her
speech that the Government would not honor the PIATCO contracts. On the
same day, Takenaka and Asahikosan notified PIATCO that they
were suspending the construction of the NAIA-IPT III for PIATCO’s failure to
provide adequate security. September 17, 2002, petitioners Demosthenes
Agan, et al., asked the Court to nullify the PIATCO contracts, and to prohibit
the DOTC and the MIAA from implementing these contracts for being
contrary to law. The case, entitled Agan v. PIATCO, was docketed as G.R. No.
15500.
May 5, 2003, the Court nullified the PIATCO contracts after finding that
Paircargo Consortium (that later incorporated into PIATCO) was not a duly
pre-qualified bidder for failure to meet the minimum equity requirements for
the NAIA-IPT III project.
Security Bank (member of the Paircargo Consortium) invested its entire net
worth in a single undertaking or enterprise in gross violation of Section 21-B
of the General Banking Act (which limits a commercial bank’s equity
investment, whether allied or non-allied, to fifteen percent (15%) of its net
worth).
PIATCO contracts contained provisions that substantially departed from the
draft Concession Agreement
December 21, 2004, the Government filed a complaint for expropriation of
the NAIA-IPT III before the RTC of Pasay, Branch 11
RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of the Government. Citing City of
Manila v. Serrano,23 the RTC held that that it had the ministerial duty to issue
a writ of possession upon: (1) the filing of the complaint for expropriation
sufficient in form and substance, and (2) the Government’s deposit of the
amount equivalent to the property’s assessed value, pursuant to Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court
January 4, 2005, the RTC modified its December 21, 2004 order and directed:
(1) the Land Bank to immediately release to PIATCO the amount of
US$62,343,175.7725cralawred that would be deducted from the just
compensation; (2) the Government to submit to the RTC a Certificate of
Availability of Funds for the payment of just compensation; and (3) the
Government to maintain and preserve the NAIA-IPT III pending the
expropriation proceedings and the full payment of just compensation. The
RTC likewise prohibited the Government from performing acts of ownership
over the NAIA-IPT III such as awarding concessions or leasing any part of the
NAIA-IPT III to other parties
RTC appointed three Commissioners28 to determine just compensation
without consulting the Government and PIATCO
Republic v. Gingoyon Case, G.R. No. 166429
Government, et al., filed a petition for certiorari with the Court assailing the
validity of the January 4, 7, and 10, 2005 orders of the RTC in the expropriation
case
, the Court did not recognize the London awards in favor of Takenaka and
Asahikosan. Under Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a foreign
judgment would not bind Philippine courts unless the judgment is recognized
and enforced in this jurisdiction. Philippine courts may annul a foreign
judgment for lack of jurisdiction, lack of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
clear mistake of law or fact, or when the foreign judgment is contrary to
public policy
PIATCO, as builder of the NAIA-IPT III, must first receive just compensation in
accordance with law and equity before the Government may take over the
NAIA-IPT
Government should not pay for the portions of the NAIA-IPT III that were
defective – as per rtc
(a) failed structural elements in the NAIA-IPT III;
(b) inferior quality of material works;
(c) constructed areas that are unnecessary to the use of an international
airport terminal;
(d) cost of seismic and gravity load structural retrofits for the failed elements;
(e) cost of completing the items listed in the JAC project status summary
report of February 28, 2003; and
(f) cost of seismic and gravity load structural retrofits for the failed elements
in the elevated roadway structures.
RTC stated that just compensation is limited to the value of the improvement
at the time of the filing of the expropriation complaint. The payment of just
compensation does not include the right to be compensated of the franchise
to operate the airport, and the increased value of improvements due to
inflation rate.
PIATCO, Takenaka, and Asahikosan sought to nullify the RTC decision for
alleged violation of their right to due process. They complained that they
were only furnished copies of the BOC Final Report only after the
promulgation of the May 23, 2011 decision.103 They averred that the RTC
violated Sections 7 and 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court which provide that
the clerk of court shall serve copies of the commissioners’ report on all
interested parties, with notice that they be allowed ten days within which to
file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire
the offer to pay through an escrow account is not equivalent to direct
payment. PIATCO further denied the Government’s allegations that there
were several claimants on the just compensation
RTC ruled that it has residual jurisdiction to adjudicate the Government’s
Manifestation and Motion considering that the motion was filed prior to the
parties’ filing of the Notice of Appeal. The RTC opined that the Manifestation
and Motion was akin to a motion for execution pending appeal. The
Manifestation and Motion showed the Government’s intent to voluntarily
comply with the May 23, 2011 decision which was pending appeal before the
CA. Under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the RTC has the residual
power to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the parties’
rights, and to order the execution of a decision pending appeal. Furthermore,
Section 6, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court provides that courts have incidental
power to issue orders that are necessary to effectuate their judgments.
The CA Rulings
CA upheld the validity of the RTC’s May 23, 2011 decision. The CA ruled that
the parties did not need to be furnished the BOC Final Report since RA 8974
is silent on the appointment of the BOC, as held in Gingoyon.
However, the CA modified the RTC rulings and arrived at its own formula of
the NAIA-IPT III’s replacement cost
The CA likewise observed that PIATCO’s summarized computation of
attendant costs was self-serving and unsubstantiated by relevant evidence.
Page | 5
CA further ordered Takenaka and Asahikosan to share in the expenses of the
BOC. Since Takenaka and Asahikosan’s inputs on the construction costs of
the NAIA-IPT III were heard by the RTC, they should share in the expenses of
the BOC.
Upon finality of judgment, interest on the sum due by then shall be at 6% per
annum until fully paid pursuant to BSP Circular No. 799, series of 2013 which
took effect on 01 July 2013, and which effectively modified the interest rate
rulings in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. Eastern Shipping was
the basis of the Court’s earlier imposition of a 12% interest from finality of
judgment.
The Action to Enforce the London Awards, Civil Case No. 06-171
In a decision dated September 6, 2010, the RTC recognized the validity of the
London awards in Claim Nos. HT-04-248 and HT-05-269 and declared these
awards as enforceable in the Philippine jurisdiction. The RTC thus ordered
PIATCO to pay Takenaka and Asahikosan the sum of $85.7
million.124cralawrednad
G.R. No. 209917 is the Government’s petition for review on certiorari128 to
partially reverse the CA’s August 22, 2013 Amended Decision129 and its
October 29, 2013 Resolution130 in CA-G.R. CV No. 98029.
G.R. No. 209696 is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Takenaka and
Asahikosan to partially reverse the CA’s August 22, 2013 Amended Decision
and its October 29, 2013 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No.
98029.131cralawrednad
G.R. No. 209731 is PIATCO’s petition for review on certiorari to reverse the
CA’s August 22, 2013 Amended Decision, and October 29, 2013 Resolution
in CA-G.R. CV No. 98029.132cralawrednad
G.R. Nos. 209917, 209696 & 209731 originally arose from the Government’s
complaint for expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III filed with the RTC of Pasay,
Branch 117 in Civil Case No. 04-0876. The main issue before the Court in
these petitions is the valuation of the just compensation due for the
Government’s expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III.
G.R. No. 181892 is the Government’s petition for certiorari with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order,133 assailing the May 3, 2007,
May 18, 2008; and January 7, 2008 orders of the RTC of Pasay City, Branch
117 in Civil Case No. 04-0876.134cralawrednad
This petition likewise arose from the Government’s complaint for
expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III. The main issue in this petition is the
propriety of the appointment of DG Jones and Partners as an independent
appraiser of the NAIA-IPT III.
G.R. No. 202166 is PIATCO’s petition for review on certiorari135 to assail the
CA’s March 13, 2012 decision136 and May 31, 2012 Resolution137 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 96502. The petition arose from Takenaka and Asahikosan’s action to
enforce the London awards before the RTC of Makati, Branch 143 in Civil
Case No. 06-171. As previously mentioned, this case was not consolidated
with the four (4) cases above and shall thus be separately ruled upon by the
Court.
The Government’s Position (G.R. Nos. 209917, 209731, and 209696)
partially reverse the CA rulings and to deduct from the replacement cost of
US$300,206,693.00 the following items: (a) depreciation in the amount of
US$36,814,612.00; and (b) PIATCO’s non-compliance with contract
specifications in the amount of US$113,944,044.0
ISSUE: Whether the RTC’s May 23, 2011 decision in Civil Case No. 04-0876 is
null and void for violation of PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan’s right to
procedural due process
Ruling:
The parties were afforded procedural due process despite their non-receipt of
the BOC Final Report prior to the promulgation of the RTC’s May 23, 2011
Decision.
The May 23, 2011 decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 04-0876 is valid. The
parties were afforded procedural due process since their respective
positions, counter-positions, and evidence were considered by the trial court
in rendering the decision.
Before ruling on the substantive issues posed, we first resolve the issue of
whether the CA erred in ruling that the RTC’s May 23, 2011 decision is valid.
PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan challenge the validity of the RTC’s decision
for alleged violation of their right to due process. They point out that the RTC
promulgated its decision in Civil Case No. 04-0876 on May 23, 2011,
immediately after the release of the BOC’s Final Report on March 31, 2011.
They complain that since the RTC’s clerk of court did not furnish the parties
copies of the Final Report, the trial court violated Sections 7 and 8, Rule 67
of the Rules of Court as they failed to object to the Final Report’s contents.
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that the clerk of court shall serve
copies of the commissioners’ final report on all interested parties upon the
filing of the report. Each party shall have ten days within which to file their
objections to the report’s findings.[170]
Upon the expiration of the ten-day period or after all the parties have filed
their objections and after hearing, the trial court may: (a) accept the report
and render judgment in accordance therewith; (b) for cause shown,
recommit the report to the commissioners for further report of facts; (c) set
aside the report and appoint new commissioners; (d) partially accept the
report; and (e) make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to
the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of
expropriation; and to the defendant, the just compensation for the property
so taken.[171]
We rule that the parties’ failure to receive the Final Report did not render
the May 23, 2011 Decision null and void.
The essence of procedural due process is the right to be heard.[172] The
procedural due process requirements in an eminent domain case are
satisfied if the parties are given the opportunity to present their evidence
before the commissioners whose findings (together with the pleadings,
evidence of the parties, and the entire record of the case) are reviewed and
considered by the expropriation court. It is the parties’ total failure to
present evidence on just compensation that renders the trial court’s ruling
void. The opportunity to present evidence during the trial remains to be the
vital requirement in the observance of due process.[173]
The record will show that the parties exhaustively discussed their positions
in this case before the BOC, the trial court, the appellate court, and this
Court. They had ample opportunity to refute and respond to each other’s
positions with the aid of their own appraisers and experts. Each party, in fact,
submitted countervailing evidence on the valuation of the NAIA-IPT III. They
also filed numerous and voluminous pleadings and motions before the lower
courts and before this Court.
The mere failure of the RTC’s clerk of court to send the parties copies of the
BOC Final Report is not substantial enough under the attendant
circumstances to affect and nullify the whole proceedings. Litigation is not a
game of technicalities. Strong public interests require that this Court
judiciously and decisively settle the amount of just compensation in the
expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III. We cannot further delay this more-than-a-
decade case and let interests accrue on just compensation by remanding the
case once more to the trial court.
Page | 6
ACAMPADO V. SPS. COSMILLA
G.R. No. 198531, September 25, 2015
FACTS:
The present petition stems from the Petition for the Declaration of the
Nullity of Document filed by respondents against petitioners before
the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 6. In their Amended Complaint6
docketed as SPL. Civil Case No. 6644, respondents Spouses Cosmilla
alleged that the sale of their share on the subject property was
effected thru a forged Special Power of Attorney (SPA) and is therefore
null and void. After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision
dated 31 March 2005 dismissing the complaint of the respondents for
failure to prove by preponderance of evidence that the signatures of
the respondents in the SPA were forged.
Aggrieved, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 on 6
May 2005 seeking for the reversal of the earlier RTC Decision. For
failure of the respondents, however, to comply with the requirement
of notice of hearing as required under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of
the Revised Rules of Court, the court a quo denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.
Ascribing grave abuse of discretion, respondents elevated the matter
to the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and TRO seeking
to annul and set aside the RTC Order dated 16 May 2005. For lack of
merit, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition filed by the
respondents.
On Motion for Reconsideration by Respondents, however, the Court
of Appeals reversed its earlier Resolution and allowed the relaxation
of the procedural in a Resolution dated 28 June 2007. Hence, the
appellate court vacated the 16 May 2005 Order of the RTC directed
the court a quo to thresh out the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
the respondents on the merits.
In a Resolution dated 19 August 2011, the Court of Appeals denied the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents have complied with the requirement
of notice of hearing as required under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
RULING:
PETITIONERS. Rule 15 Secs 4-6 The foregoing requirements — that the
notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the
time and place for the hearing of the motion — are mandatory, and if
not religiously complied with, the motion becomes pro forma. A
motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and
5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper which
the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court has no
authority to act upon. The logic for such requirement is simple: a
motion invariably contains a prayer which the movant makes to the
court which is usually in the interest of the adverse party to oppose.
The notice of hearing to the adverse party is therefore a form of due
process; it gives the other party the opportunity to properly vent his
opposition to the prayer of the movant. In keeping with the principles
of due process, therefore, a motion which does not afford the adverse
party a chance to oppose should simply be disregarded. Principles of
natural justice demand that a right of a party should not be affected
without giving it an opportunity to be heard.
Harsh as they may seem, these rules were introduced to avoid
capricious change of mind in order to provide due process to both
parties and to ensure impartiality in the trial.[26]
It is important, however, to note that these doctrines refer exclusively
to a motion, since a motion invariably contains a prayer, which the
movant makes to the court, which is to repeat usually in the interest
of the adverse party to oppose and in the observance of due process,
the other party must be given the opportunity to oppose the
motion.[27] In keeping with the principles of due process, therefore, a
motion which does not afford the adverse party the chance to oppose
it should simply be disregarded.[28] Failure to comply with the required
notice and hearing is a fatal defect that is deleterious to respondents
cause.[29]
In New Japan Motors, Inc. v. Perucho,[30] the Court dismissed the
motion for reconsideration that was unaccompanied by a notice of
hearing as a piece of paper unworthy of judicial cognizance:
"Under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, x x x a motion
is required to be accompanied by a notice of hearing which must be
served by the applicant on all parties concerned at least three (3) days
before the hearing thereof. Section 6 of the same rule commands that
'(n)o motion shall be acted upon by the Court, without proof of service
of the notice thereof x x x.' It is therefore patent that the motion for
reconsideration in question is fatally defective for it did not contain any
notice of hearing. We have already consistently held in a number of
cases that the requirements of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court are mandatory and that failure to comply with the same
is fatal to movant's cause." (Emphasis supplied)
Nevertheless, the three-day requirement is not a hard and fast rule.
Where a party has been given an opportunity to be heard, the time to
study the motion and oppose it, there is compliance with the rule. The
test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have
time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the
grounds upon which it is based.
We here follow the rule and so pronounce that contrary to the findings
of the appellate court, petitioners were not given ample opportunity
to vent their side on the issue since they were not able to promptly
receive a copy of the notice of hearing impinging the latter's right to
due process. We consulted the records and we found that no notice of
hearing was appended to the Motion for Reconsideration[34] of the
respondent. As discussed above, a motion for reconsideration is a
litigated motion where the right of the adverse party will be affected
by its admission. The adverse party in this case had the right to resist
the motion because it may result to the reversal of a prior favorable
decision. The proof of service was therefore indispensable in order to
avoid surprises on the opposite party. The absence thereof is fatal to
the motion.
It bears stressing that a motion without notice and hearing, is pro
forma, a mere scrap of paper that cannot be acted by the court.[35] It
presents no question that the court can decide.[36] The court has no
reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it.[37]
Indisputably, any motion that does not contain proof of service and
notice to the adverse party is not entitled to judicial cognizance.[3
Considering that the running of the period towards the finality of the
judgment was not stopped, the RTC Decision dated 31 March 2005
became final and executory. Every litigation must come to an end once
a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable.
Page | 7
138 MANILA MINING CORPORATION vs LOWITO AMOR, ET. AL
FACTS: (chronological order)
1. Respondents Lowito Amor, Rollybie Ceredon, Julius Cesar, Ronito
Martinez and Fermin Tabili, Jr. were regular employees of
petitioner Manila Mining Corporation, a domestic corporation
which operated a mining claim in Placer, Surigao del Norte,
2. In compliance with existing environmental laws, petitioner
maintained a tailing pond, a tailings containment facility required
for the storage of waste materials generated by its mining
operations. When the mine tailings being pumped into the tailing
pond reached the maximum level in, petitioner temporarily shut
down its mining operations pending approval of its application to
increase said facilty’s capacity by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources-Environment Management Bureau
(DENR-EMB).
3. Although the DENR-EMB issued a temporary authority for it to be
able to continue operating the tailing pond for another six (6)
months and to increase its capacity, petitioner failed to secure an
extension permit when said temporary authority eventually
lapsed.
4. Petitioner served a notice, informing its employees and the
Department of Labor and Employment Regional Office No. XII
(DOLE) of the temporary suspension of its operations for six
months and the temporary lay-off of two-thirds of its
employees. After the lapse of said period, petitioner notified the
DOLE that it was extending the temporary shutdown of its
operations for another six months.
5. Adversely affected by petitioner’s continued failure to resume its
operations, respondents filed the complaint for constructive
dismissal and monetary claims before the Regional Arbitration
Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
6. Executive Labor Arbiter Benjamin E. Pelaez held petitioner liable
for constructive dismissal in view of the suspension of its
operations beyond the six-month period allowed under Article
2867 of the Labor Code of the Philippines - finding that the cause
of suspension of petitioner’s business was not beyond its control.
The labor arbiter awarded, among others, separation pay to
respondents.
7. The NLRC reversed the appealed decision. Finding that the
continued suspension of petitioner’s operations was due to
circumstances beyond its control, the NLRC ruled that, under
Article 283 of the Labor Code, respondents were not even entitled
to separation pay considering the eventual closure of their
employer’s business due to serious business losses or financial
reverses.
8. Respondents filed the Rule 65 petition for certiorari before the
CA. Aside from the fact that the Labor Arbiter decision had
already attained finality, respondents faulted the NLRC for
applying Article 283 of the Labor Code absent allegation and
proof of compliance with the requirements for the closure of an
employer’s business due to serious business losses. On the other
hand, petitioner insist that the cessation of its operations was due
to causes beyond its control, petitioner argued that the
subsequent closure of its business due to business losses
exempted it from paying separation pay.
9. The CA rendered the herein assailed decision, granting
respondents’ petition and decreed that the Labor Arbiter’s
Decision had already attained finality and, for said reason, had
been placed beyond the NLRC’s power of review.
10. Petitioner seeks the reversal of the CA’s resolution.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural
right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law.[23] A party who seeks to avail of the right must,
therefore, comply with the requirements of the rules, failing which the
right to appeal is invariably lost.[24] Insofar as appeals from decisions of
the Labor Arbiter are concerned, Article 223 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines[25] provides that, “(d)ecisions, awards, or orders of the
Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the [NLRC] by
any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from the receipt of
such decisions, awards or orders.” In case of a judgment involving a
monetary award, the same provision mandates that, “an appeal by the
employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
[NLRC] in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from.” Alongside the requirement that “the
appellant shall furnish a copy of the memorandum of appeal to the
other party,” the foregoing requisites for the perfection of an appeal
are reiterated under Sections 1, 4 and 6, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of
Procedure in force at the time petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiter’s
25 October 2004 Decision
Having received the Labor Arbiter’s Decision on 24 November
2004,[26] petitioner had ten (10) calendar days or until 4 December
2004 within which to perfect an appeal. Considering that the latter
date fell on a Saturday, petitioner had until the next working day, 6
December 2004, within which to comply with the requirements for the
perfection of its appeal. Our perusal of the record shows that, despite
bearing the date 3 December 2004, petitioner’s memorandum of
appeal was subscribed before Notary Public Ronald Rex Recidoro only
on 6 December 2004.[27] Without proof as to the actual date of filing
of said pleading being presented by both parties, the CA discounted
the timeliness of its filing in light of the established fact that the copy
thereof intended for respondents was only served by registered mail
on 7 February 2005.[28] Since proof of service of the memorandum on
appeal is required for the perfection of an appeal from the decision of
the Labor Arbiter, the CA ruled that “respondents filed its appeal not
earlier than 07 February 200[5], which is way beyond the ten-day
reglementary period to appeal.”[29]
As allegation is not evidence, however, the rule is settled that the
burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts the affirmative of
an issue.[30] As the parties claiming the non-perfection of petitioner’s
appeal, it was, therefore, respondents who had the burden of proving
that said memorandum of appeal was, indeed, filed out of time. By and
of itself, the fact that the copy of memorandum of appeal intended for
respondents was served upon them by registered mail only on 7
February 2005 does not necessarily mean that petitioner’s appeal
from the Labor Arbiter’s decision was filed out of time. On the principle
that justice should not be sacrificed for technicality,[31] it has been
ruled that the failure of a party to serve a copy of the memorandum
to the opposing party is not a jurisdictional defect and does not bar the
NLRC from entertaining the appeal.[32] Considering that such an
omission is merely regarded as a formal lapse or an excusable
neglect,[33] the CA reversibly erred in ruling that, under the
circumstances, petitioner could not have filed its appeal earlier than 7
February 2005.
The question regarding the appeal bond rises from the record which
shows that, in addition to its memorandum of appeal, petitioner filed
a 6 December 2004 motion for the reduction of the appeal bond on
the ground that the cash equivalent of the monetary award and/or
cost of the surety bond have proven to be prohibitive in view of the
tremendous business losses it allegedly sustained. As supposed
Page | 8
measure of its good faith in complying with the Rules, petitioner
attached to its motion Philam Bank Check No. 0000627153, dated 6
December 2004, in the amount of P100,000.00 only. As pointed out by
respondents, however, said check was subsequently dishonored upon
presentment for payment for insufficiency of funds. In its 1 April 2005
Ex-Parte Manifestation, petitioner informed the NLRC that it “only
learned belatedly that the same check was dishonored” as there
appeared to be “an inadvertent mix-up as other checks issued for [its]
other obligations were negotiated ahead [thereof], leaving an
insufficient balance in its account.” As a consequence, petitioner
claimed that “the deficiency in deposit has been promptly and
immediately replenished as soon as the check's dishonor was
reported” and that the same may already be re-deposited at any of
NLRC's depositary banks.[34]
The issue that has bedevilled labor litigation for long has been clarified
by the ruling in McBurnie v. Ganzon, et al.,[35] which built on and
extended the ruling that while it is true that reduction of the appeal
bond has been allowed in meritorious cases[36] on the principle that
substantial justice is better served by allowing appeals on the
merits,[37] it has been ruled that the employer should comply with the
following conditions: (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based
on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the
monetary award is posted by the appellant, otherwise the filing of the
motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to
perfect an appeal.[38]
Respondent correctly called attention to the fact that the check
submitted by petitioner was dishonored upon presentment for
payment, thereby rendering the tender thereof ineffectual. Although
the NLRC chose not to address the issue of the perfection of the appeal
as well as the reduction of the bond in its Resolution dated 25 April
2005, the record shows that petitioner only manifested its deposit of
the funds for the check 24 days before the resolution of its appeal or
116 days after its right to appeal the Labor Arbiter’s decision had
expired. Having filed its motion and memorandum on the very last day
of the reglementary period for appeal, moreover, petitioner had no
one but itself to blame for failing to post the full amount pending the
NLRC’s action on its motion for reduction of the appeal bond. If
redundancy be risked it must be emphasized that the posting of a bond
is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving
monetary awards from the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Since it is the
posting of a cash or surety bond which confers jurisdiction upon the
NLRC,[40] the rule is settled that non-compliance is fatal and has the
effect of rendering the award final and executory.
Viewed in the light of the foregoing considerations, the CA cannot be
faulted for no longer discussing the merits of petitioner’s case.
Although appeal is an essential part of our judicial process, it has been
held, time and again, that the right thereto is not a natural right or a
part of due process but is merely a statutory privilege. Thus, the
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and
failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render
the judgment final and executory. Once a decision attains finality, it
becomes the law of the case and can no longer be revised, reviewed,
changed or altered. The basic rule of finality of judgment is grounded
on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that,
at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award
of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date
fixed by law.
JAYLO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
What are the repercussions of the failure of the accused to appear,
without justifiable cause, at the promulgation of a judgment of
conviction? With the resolution of this singular issue, the Court writes
finis to the 24-year-old controversy before us.
Summary: In a Decision dated 17 April 2007, the Sandiganbayan found
Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona, and Habalo guilty of homicide. During the
promulgation of the Sandiganbayan’s judgment on 17 April 2007,
none of the accused appeared despite notice.38 The court promulgated
the Decision in absentia, and the judgment was entered in the criminal
docket. The bail bonds of the accused were cancelled, and warrants
for their arrest issued.
FACTS
Reynaldo (Jaylo), William (Valenzona) and Antonio (Habalo) were
convicted by the Sandiganbayan for Homicide for the killing of Estella,
Franco and Rolando in a drug buy bust operation at the Magallanes
Commercial Center on July 10, 1990. During the promulgation on April
17, 2007, none of the accused despite notice, appeared and thus the
decision was promulgated in absentia and the judgment entered in the
criminal docket. Their bail bonds were cancelled and warrants for their
arrest issued.
On April 30, 2007, the accused thru counsel filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the Decision, but on November 29, 2007, the
Sandiganbayan took no action on the motion and ordered the
implementation of the warrants of arrest, holding that the 15-day
period from the promulgation of the judgment had long passed
without any of the accused giving any reason for their non-appearance
during the promulgation. Under Section 6 Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court, the accused have lost the remedies available under the Rules
against the Sandiganbayan’s judgment of conviction, including the
filing of a motion for reconsideration. Their motion for reconsideration
denied, they filed a petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court, holding that Section 6 Rule 120 cannot diminish,
modify or increase substantive rights like the filing of a motion for
reconsideration under P.D. 1606, and the conditions set by Section 6
Rule 120 does not obtain in their case. They also appealed the merits
of their conviction for homicide by the Sandiganbayan.
Issues:
1. WON Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court cannot diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights like the filing of a motion for
reconsideration provided under Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1606.44
2. WON The conditions under Section 6 Rule 120 of the Rules of Court do
not obtain in the instant case.
Ruling:
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear
was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in
these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest.
Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of
these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the
scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a
justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within
fifteen (15) days from notice. (6a) (Emphasis supplied)
The promulgation of judgment shall proceed even in the absence of
the accused despite notice. The promulgation in absentia shall be
made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving a
copy thereof to the accused at their last known address or through
counsel. The court shall also order the arrest of the accused if the
judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without
Page | 9
justifiable cause
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without
justifiable cause, the accused shall lose the remedies available in the
Rules of Court against the judgment. Thus, it is incumbent upon the
accused to appear on the scheduled date of promulgation, because it
determines the availability of their possible remedies against the
judgment of conviction. When the accused fail to present themselves
at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction, they lose the
remedies of filing a motion for a new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121)
and an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122).
When the accused on bail fail to present themselves at the
promulgation of a judgment of conviction, they are considered to have
lost their standing in court.47 Without any standing in court, the
accused cannot invoke its jurisdiction to seek relief.48
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per
se the right of the convicted accused to avail of the remedies under
the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without justifiable
cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of
conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies
against the judgment.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court
diminishes or modifies the substantive rights of petitioners. It only
works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to “provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases.”57 This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy
disposition of criminal cases – delay arising from the simple
expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled
promulgation of the judgment of conviction.
For the failure of petitioners to regain their standing in court and avail
themselves of the remedies against the judgment of conviction, the
Decision of the Sandiganbayan attained finality 15 days reckoned from
17 April 2007.
In view thereof, this Court no longer has the power to conduct a review
of the findings and conclusions in the Decision of the Sandiganbayan.
The Decision is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment, or
reversal.63 Thus, there is no need to pass upon the issues raised by
petitioners assailing it.
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away
substantive rights; it merely provides the manner through which an
existing right may be implemented.
According to petitioners, Section 7 of P.D. 1606 did not provide for any
situation as to when the right to file a motion for reconsideration may
be deemed lost. Thus, it is available at all times and the Rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court cannot operate to diminish or
modify the right of a convicted accused to file a motion for
reconsideration. Furthermore, they argue, the right to file a motion for
reconsideration is a statutory grant, and not merely a remedy
"available in [the] Rules," as provided under Section 6 of Rule 120 of
the Rules of Court. Thus, according to them, their absence at the
promulgation of judgment before the Sandiganbayan cannot be
deemed to have resulted in the loss of their rightto file a motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioners’ argument lacks merit.
Like an appeal, the right to file a motion for reconsideration is a
statutory grant or privilege. As a statutory right, the filing of a motion
for reconsideration is to be exercised in accordance with and in the
manner provided by law. Thus, a party filing a motion for
reconsideration must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in
the Rules of Court.
It bears stressing that the provision on which petitioners base their
claim states that "[a] petition for reconsideration of any final order or
decision may be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or
notice of the final order or judgment." In Social Security Commission
v. Court of Appeals, we enunciated that the term "may" denotes a
mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option. Those granted this
opportunity may choose to exercise it or not. If they do, they must
comply with the conditions attached thereto.
It is well to note that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court also
provides the remedy by which the accused who were absent during
the promulgation may reverse the forfeiture of the remedies available
to them against the judgment of conviction. In order to regain their
standing in court, the accused must do as follows: 1) surrender and 2)
file a motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies, stating the
reasons for their absence, within 15 days from the date of the
promulgation of judgment.
Petitioners did not surrender within 15 days from the promulgation of
the judgment of conviction. Neither did they ask for leave of court to
avail themselves of the remedies, and state the reasons for their
absence. Even if we were to assume that the failure of Jaylo to appear
at the promulgation was due to failure to receive notice thereof, it is
not a justifiable reason. He should have filed a notice of change of
address before the Sandiganbayan.
IN THE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER AND THE GENERAL WELFARE
CLAUSE, PROPERTY RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS MAY BE SUBJECTED TO
RESTRAINTS AND BURDENS IN ORDER TO FULFIL THE OBJECTIVES OF
THE GOVERNMENT.
Crisostomo B. Aquino vs. Municipality Of Malay, Aklan
G.R. No. 211356; September 29, 2014
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
FACTS:
In a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner
Crisostomo Aquino, the president and chief executive officer of
Boracay Island West Cove, assailed the decisions of the Municipality of
Malay, Aklan for denying his application for zoning compliance and
issuing demolition closure and demolition order and the CA for
denying his petition for certiorari for being the improper remedy.
Petitioner’s application for zoning compliance and building permit
covering the construction of an additional three-storey hotel over a
parcel of land covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism
Purposes (FLAgT) were denied by the Municipal Zoning Administrator
on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the "no
build zone" demarcated in a Municipal Ordinance. Thereafter, the
respondent issued a 1) Cease and Desist Order enjoining the expansion
of the resort, and 2) EO No. 10 ordering the closure and demolition of
Boracay West Cove’s hotel. EO 10 was partially implemented on June
10, 2011. Also, respondents demolished the improvements introduced
by Boracay West Cove.
Petitioner alleged that the order was issued and executed with grave
abuse of discretion. He argued that judicial proceedings should first be
Page | 10
conducted before the respondent mayor could order the demolition
of the company’s establishment.
On the other hand, respondents argued that the demolition needed
no court order because the municipal mayor has the express power
under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of
illegally constructed buildings.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the procedural due process (of due notice
and hearing) was complied with.
2. Whether or not judicial proceedings should first be
conducted before the respondent mayor could order the
demolition of the company’s establishment.
RULING:
1. Yes, the procedural due process (of due notice and hearing)
was complied with.
First, basic is the rule that public officers enjoy the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duties. The burden is on the
petitioner herein to prove that Boracay West Cove was deprived of the
opportunity to be heard before EO 10 was issued. Regrettably, copies
of the Cease and Desist Order issued by the LGU and of the assailed
EO 10 itself were never attached to the petition before this Court,
which documents could have readily shed light on whether or not
petitioner has been accorded the 10-day grace period provided in
Section 10 of the Ordinance. In view of this fact, the presumption of
regularity must be sustained.
Second, as quoted by petitioner in his petition before the CA, the
assailed EO 10 states that petitioner received notices from the
municipality government on March 7 and 28, 2011, requiring Boracay
West Cove to comply with the zoning ordinance and yet it failed to do
so. If such was the case, the grace period can be deemed observed and
the establishment was already ripe for closure and demolition by the
time EO 10 was issued in June.
2. No, petitioner’s right to due process was not violated for lack
of judicial proceedings prior to the issuance of demolition
order.
The government may enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to
promote the general welfare. One such piece of legislation is the Local
Government Code (LGC), which authorizes city and municipal
governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue
demolition orders and to hear issues involving property rights of
individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution
thereon. Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which
empowered the mayor to order the closure and removal of illegally
constructed establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits.
Though the court agreed with Petitioner’s contention that, under the
LGC, the Sanggunian does not have the power to authorize the
extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of a nuisance per
accidens, still the SC ruled that the LGU may nevertheless properly
order the hotel’s demolition without due hearing thereon in a tribunal,
because in the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause
provided in the Constitution, property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of
the government.
Hence, the right to due process was satisfied in the case at bar.
1. BROWN MADONNA PRESS INC., THADDEUS ANTHONY A. CABANGON,
FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (now Fortune General Insurance
Corporation) and/or ANTONIO CABANGON CHUA,
vs.
MARIA ROSARIO M. CASAS,
FACTS:
In 1984, Casas was hired as an accounting clerk at Fortune General
Insurance. She eventually rose from the ranks; she was transferred to
BMPI, another ALC member company, as its Vice President for Finance
and Administration.
Casas met with BMPI’s company president, and the Vice President for
the Central Human Resource Department of the ALC Group of
Companies. During the meeting, Casas was allegedly told not to report
to work anymore starting January 8, 2007, upon the instructions of
Cabangon-Chua, ALC’s Chairman Emeritus. Casas claims that the
reason for her abrupt dismissal was not disclosed to her, but she was
promised a separation pay. She thus packed her things and left.
BMPI, on the other hand, asserts that it was Casas who requested a
graceful exit from the company. The meeting was supposedly held to
confront Casas about certain complaints against her, and about the
growing rift between her and another company officer. BMPI asserts
that Casas opted to leave the company to avoid an administrative
investigation against her and to give her the chance to jumpstart her
career outside the company. She succeeded in convincing Cabangon
to grant her some form of financial assistance as they were friends.4
Casas no longer reported for work and BMPI, for its part, started the
processing of her clearance. Casas sent Cabangon-Chua a letter asking
for the reconsideration of his decision to terminate her employment.
Cabangon-Chua did not act on this letter.
Casas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and for payment of
separation pay, backwages, retirement benefits and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE: WON Casas had been illegally dismissed.
(Did she voluntarily resign from, or abandon her work at, BMPI, or was
she summarily dismissed by Cabangon?)
HELD: YES, Casas had been illegally dismissed.
The CA did not err in affirming the NLRC’s factual finding that Casas
had been dismissed from work
In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of proving that
the employee’s dismissal was legal.1âwphi1However, to discharge this
burden, the employee must first prove, by substantial evidence, that
he had been dismissed from employment.
The CA, in affirming the NLRC’s conclusion that Casas had been
dismissed, gave emphasis to the existence of two documents on
record: first, the unsigned clearance and quitclaim document
unilaterally prepared by BMPI, and second, the letter Casas sent to
Cabangon-Chua, asking the latter to reconsider her termination.
These pieces of evidence sufficiently establish Casas’ dismissal from
the company.
The Clearance and Quitclaim document discloses that Casas would
"cease to be connected with the company at the close of office on
January 16, 2007." The document, which was even introduced as
evidence by the petitioners, was prepared unilaterally at Cabangon’s
instructions. It shows the company’s intent to sever its employment
relationship with Casas. Considered together with the letter Casas sent
Cabangon-Chua asking for her reinstatement on May 17, 2007, these
documents back Casas’sr assertion that she was compelled to leave
her job on January 5, 2007.
As their main defense, BMPI and Cabangon claim that they never
dismissed Casas from work, and that she instead requested a graceful
exit from the company.
Jurisprudence has established that employers interposing their
employee’s resignation as a defense from illegal dismissal cases have
the burden of proving that the employee indeed voluntarily
resigned.33 Resignation — the formal pronouncement or
relinquishment of a position or office — is the voluntary act of an
employee compelled by personal reason(s) to disassociate himself
Page | 11
from employment.34 It is done with the intention of relinquishing an
office, accompanied by the act manifesting this intent.35
In the present case, the petitioners allege that Casas asked for a
graceful exit from the company to avoid an administrative
investigation against her. They claim that Casas had grossly failed to
manage and take control of BMPI’s ex-deal assets, which caused the
company serious losses. When Casas was confronted about these
reports of mismanagement, she voluntarily resigned from office in
exchange for separation pay.
NLRC and CA correctly disregarded these allegations in concluding that
Casas had been terminated from office.
First, the pieces of evidence that the petitioners submitted are
insufficient to establish their claim. To prove that Casas voluntarily
abandoned her work, the petitioners submitted affidavits from their
employees, Domingo Almoninia, Jr. and Victoria C. Nava, who both
testified to the events leading to a private conversation between Casas
and Cabangon.
Domingo Almoninia, Jr., BMPI’s former Chief Audit Executive,
Testified36 that he had informed Cabangon of reports regarding
Casas’s mismanagement of BMPI’s ex-deal assets on January 5, 2007.
Casas, together with Vice President for Human Resources Victoria
Nava, were then summoned to Cabangon’s room. According to
Almoninia, he witnessed Cabangon confront Casas regarding reports
about her mismanagement and certain unauthorized transactions. In
the course of the discussion, Cabangon allegedly told Casas that the
reports against her would have to be investigated, and instructed her
to settle her differences with a certain Mr. Tayag. Casas asked
Cabangon if she was being dismissed, to which the latter answered in
the negative. Both Almoninia and Nava were then asked to leave the
room.
Nava, on the other hand, corroborated Almoninia’s narration, and
added insinuations that Casas had been having problems in the
company.37
In considering their affidavits, we emphasize that neither Almoninia
nor Nava were present in the private conversation that ensued
between Cabangon and Casas, after the confrontation that they
witnessed. This leaves Cabangon’s claim that Casas asked for a graceful
exit from the company uncorroborated; what stands is Casas’
statement contradicting the claim that she had not been dismissed
from her job.
Second, Cabangon failed to provide any documentary evidence
supporting Casas’ voluntary resignation. BMPI failed to show any
resignation letter from Casas. The Clearance and Quitclaim document,
which shows Casas’ severance from the company, does not contain
her signature.38 Neither was Casas given any return to work order,
notice of infraction, or notice of termination, all of which could have
supported BMPI’s theory that Casas was never prevented from going
back to work.
Third, Cabangon, Almoninia and Nava’s testimonies show that Casas
could have entertained the motive to resign from her work, but does
not prove her intent to leave her office. Intent to relinquish one’s
office is determined from the acts of an employee before and after the
alleged resignation. Casas’ acts after allegedly resigning from work
negate this intent: she wrote a letter asking Cabangon-Chua to
reconsider her termination from office; she refused to sign the
Clearance and Quitclaim document; and she filed an illegal dismissal
case against her employers.
The CA did not err in affirming the NLRC’s conclusion that Casas’
dismissal violated the procedural requirements of the Labor Code
The sudden termination from office was without just cause and violated
procedural due process.
According to the NLRC, despite the serious allegations that the BMPI
lodged against Casas, it never asked her to explain her acts, and
instead opted to sever its employment relations with her. On this basis
alone, the NLRC concluded that Casas’ dismissal had been illegal and
non-compliant with procedural due process.
Casas had been dismissed prior to any probe on her reported violation
of company rules and regulations.
In determining whether an employee’s dismissal had been legal, the
inquiry focuses on whether the dismissal violated his right to
substantial and procedural due process. An employee’s right not to be
dismissed without just or authorized cause as provided by law, is
covered by his right to substantial due process. Compliance with
procedure provided in the Labor Code, on the other hand, constitutes
the procedural due process right of an employee.
The violation of either the substantial due process right or the
procedural due process right of an employee produces different
results. Termination without a just or authorized cause renders the
dismissal invalid, and entitles the employee to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time the compensation was not paid
up to the time of actual reinstatement.
An employee’s removal for just or authorized cause but without
complying with the proper procedure, on the other hand, does not
invalidate the dismissal. It obligates the erring employer to pay
nominal damages to the employee, as penalty for not complying with
the procedural requirements of due process.
Thus, two separate inquiries must be made in resolving illegal dismissal
cases: first, whether the dismissal had been made in accordance with
the procedure set in the Labor Code; and second, whether the
dismissal had been for just or authorized cause.
There can be no doubt that the procedural requirements had not been
complied with in the present case: shortly after a private conversation
between Cabangon and Casas, Casas took her belongings from the
office and left the building. As explained earlier, Casas’s acts after this
private conversation reveal that she had been summarily dismissed:
Casas gave no resignation letter, refused to sign the Clearance and
Quitclaim document that the company issued, and sent a letter asking
for her reinstatement.
Notably, the private conversation that led to Casas’s summary
dismissal did not conform, in any way, to the procedural due process
requirements embodied in Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, viz:
RULE XIV Termination of Employment
SECTION 1. Security of tenure and due process. — No workers shall be
dismissed except for a just or authorized cause provided by law and
after due process.
SECTION 2. Notice of dismissal.— Any employer who seeks to dismiss
a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts
or omission constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of
abandonment of work, the notice shall be served at the worker's last
known address.
xxx
SECTION 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the
allegations stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a
reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall
afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
SECTION 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately
notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly
the reasons therefor.
Cabangon failed to show any written notice provided to Casas
informing her of the charges against her, and neither had she been
informed in writing of her dismissal and the reasons behind it.
Even assuming arguendo that Casas had indeed voluntarily abandoned
her work – an uncorroborated claim by Cabangon – Cabangon had the
duty to give Casas a written notice of the grounds leading to her
dismissal.
Page | 12
Thus, Cabangon failed to comply with the two-notice requirement due process rights that guarantee against overreach from the
under the law, resulting in a violation of Casas’s right to procedural due government.
process. Although statutory in nature, the procedural and substantive due
The CA did not err in finding no grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC’s process requirements in illegal dismissal cases stem from the
decision to hold that Casas had been dismissed without just protection that the Constitution provides labor – the Constitution has
cause tasked the State to promote the workers’ security of tenure, humane
Casas’s dismissal had not been for just cause, because at the time she conditions of work, and a living wage. These guarantees, as well as a
was dismissed, not one of the charges against her had been proven. host of other rights and responsibilities, find implementation through
Casas was, at the time of her dismissal, presumed innocent until the Labor Code, which fleshed out the concept of security of
proven guilty; thus, there existed no just cause to terminate her tenure54 as the continuance of regular employment until an
employment at the time she was summarily dismissed. employee's services are terminated because of just or authorized
In reaching this conclusion, the CA reviewed whether the NLRC acted causes enumerated in the law.
with grave abuse of discretion in holding that Casas’s dismissal had no Thus, despite the differences in origin and application between
just cause. The NLRC, in its decision, held that Casas’s dismissal had constitutional due process rights and the statutory requirements in
not been for just cause because she was not even allowed to explain the Labor Code, we have applied concepts implementing
the supposed acts that had been inimical to BMPI’s interests. constitutional due process rights to the statutory due process
In affirming the NLRC’s decision, the CA clarified the application of requirements of the Labor Code. We did this in the present case, when
procedural and substantial due process in the present case: Casas had we emphasized the need for substantial evidence to support the just
not been given the two-notice requirement in the law, and hence, her cause for the employee's dismissal at the time her services were
procedural due process rights had been violated. And because not one terminated. In the same way that the crime charged against an
of the allegations against her had been proven at the time she was accused must first be proven before his or her right to liberty is taken
summarily dismissed, there existed no cause to terminate her services. away, or that a government employee's infraction must first be proven
We have, in the past, affirmed the NLRC in ruling that an employee’s before the accused is deprived of the right to continue !o hold office,
act not proven at the time he had been dismissed does not constitute so too, must just cause against an employee be proven before he or
just cause for his dismissal. In other words, for an act to justify an she may be deprived of a means of livelihood. Otherwise, the
employee’s dismissal, it should have been proven, with substantial employee's right to substantive due process would be violated.
evidence, at the time he was dismissed. Otherwise, the dismissal In these lights, and in order to give full effect to the embodiment of
would not be for just cause. substantive due process in illegal dismissal cases, it is necessary to rule,
This conclusion finds support in cases emphasizing that an that an employee, in this present case Casas, cannot be terminated
unsubstantiated accusation will not ripen into a holding that there is from service without sufficient substantial evidence of the just cause
just cause for dismissal.47 A mere accusation of wrongdoing is not that would merit her dismissal.
sufficient cause for a valid dismissal of an employee. The facts for
which a dismissal is based should be backed by substantial evidence at
the time the employee is dismissed, and not at the time his dismissal
is being questioned before the courts.
In the present case, the petitioners allege that Casas had committed
various infractions that would have warranted disciplinary action
against her. At the time that Casas was dismissed, however, these
alleged infractions were mere speculations. The present petition for
review on certiorari admits this reality in two instances: first, in the
body of the petition itself stating that at the time of the January 5,
2007 meeting, disciplinary proceedings had yet to be initiated against
Casas and that the reports against her would still have to be
verified;48 and second, through its annexes, which provided that the
result of the investigation in the ex-deal assets that Casas allegedly
mismanaged was produced only on February 17, 2007, or a full month
after Casas’ dismissal.
Thus, at the time Cabangon asked Casas to leave her employment, all
he had as basis for Casas’s dismissal were speculations. Worse,
Cabangon’s summary dismissal of Casas left her with little opportunity
to adequately defend herself from the allegations against her.
In these lights, we support the CA in holding that Casas’ summary
dismissal had not been for just cause.
Just cause must be proven with substantial evidence at the time of
dismissal
At its core, substantive due process guarantees a right to liberty that
cannot be taken away or unduly constricted, except through valid
causes provided in the law.
The concepts of procedural and substantive due process had been
carried over and applied to illegal dismissal cases, although notably,
employers are not governmental bodies to which these rights usually
refer. Agabon v. NLRC51 described the due process required in
dismissing employees as statutory – requirements that the law
imposes on employers to comply with, in contrast to constitutional
ATTY. JANET D. NACION v. COA

Page | 13
FACTS:
Petitioner was administratively charged by Commission on Audit (COA)
for grave misconduct. She was assigned by COA in Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewage System (MWSS).
During the petitioner’s assignment in MWSS from 2001 to 2003, she
availed of the MWSS Multi-Purpose Loan Program, such as car loan,
housing loan, and received benefits and bonuses from the latter.
Petitioner avers that she availed of the housing and car loan in an
honest belief that she could avail of the benefits in the absence of any
prohibition thereon, considering that COA Resolution that prohibited
COA personnel from availing of all forms of loan, monetary benefits
from agencies under their jurisdiction was issued only on 2004. She
denied receiving any allowances and bonuses and argued that the
documents submitted to establish the same are not conclusive
evidence that she indeed received the money. COA cited violation of
Sec. 18 of RA 6758 prohibiting COA personnel from receiving salaries,
bonuses, allowances or other emoluments from government entity,
local government unit, GOCCs and government financial institution,
except the compensation directly paid by COA. She was given one-year
suspension as penalty, finding in her favor mitigating circumstances
her waiver of the formal investigation and admission of availment of
MWSS Housing and Car Loans.
The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. She avers that
she was denied of the right to due process as she argues that the
records during her tenure with the MWSS should not have been
included by the audit team in its investigations, as no office order
covering it was issued by the COA Chairman.
ISSUE:
whether or not the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in finding
Nacion guilty of grave misconduct and violation of reasonable office
rules and regulations.
To support her petition against the COA, Nacion invokes due process
as she argues that the records during her tenure with the MWSS
should not have been included by the audit team in its investigations,
as no office order covering it was issued by the COA Chairman.
Furthermore, the documentary evidence considered by the Fraud
Audit and Investigation Office (FAIO) did not constitute substantial
evidence to prove the commission of the offenses with which she was
charged.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is bereft of merit. At the outset, the Court reiterates:
The concept is well-entrenched: grave abuse of discretion exists when
there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the
judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice,
whim, and despotism. Not every error in the proceedings, or every
erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of
discretion. The abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be
so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of
law.[20] (Citations omitted)
Thus, the Court emphasized in Dycoco v. Court of Appeals[21] that "[a]n
act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse
of discretion when such act is done in a 'capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.'"[22]
Upon review, the Court holds that no such grave abuse of discretion
may be attributed to the COA for the procedure it observed, its factual
findings and conclusions in Nacion's case.
Due Process in Administrative Proceedings
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is the
opportunity to explain one's side or seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of, and to submit any evidence he may
have in support of his defense. The demands of due process are
sufficiently met when the parties are given the opportunity to be heard
before judgment is rendered.[23] Given this and the circumstances
under which the rulings of the COA were issued, the Court finds no
violation of Nacion's right to due process. As the Office of the Solicitor
General correctly argued, the constitution of a separate fact-finding
team specifically for Nacion's case was not necessary for the
satisfaction of such right.
It bears stressing that Nacion was formally charged by Chairperson
Tan, following evidence that pointed to irregularities committed while
she was with the MWSS. Being the COA Chairperson who, under the
law, could initiate administrative proceedings motu proprio, no written
complaint against Nacion from another person was necessary. Section
2 of the COA Memorandum No. 76-48,[24] which Nacion herself
invokes, provides:
Sec. 2. How commenced.
(1) Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a
subordinate official or employee of the Commission by the Chairman
motu proprio, or upon sworn, written complaint of any other person.
(Sec. 38 [a], PD 807).
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
The power of the COA to discipline its officials then could not be
limited by the procedure being insisted upon by Nacion. Neither is the
authority of the Chairperson to commence the action through the
issuance of the formal charge restricted by the requirement of a prior
written complaint. As may be gleaned from the cited provision, a
written complaint under oath is demanded only when the
administrative case is commenced by a person other than the COA
Chairperson.
Contrary to Nacion's claim, the COA also did not act beyond its
jurisdiction when her case was considered by the FAIO investigating
team, notwithstanding the fact that the office order which
commanded an inquiry upon MWSS personnel merely referred to
alleged unauthorized receipt of bonuses and benefits from the agency
by Atty. Norberto Cabibihan (Atty. Cabibihan) and his staff. Since
Nacion's stint in MWSS was before Atty. Cabibihan's, she argued that
the team should not have looked into the records and circumstances
during her term. In including benefits received during her term, Nacion
claimed that the investigating team acted beyond its jurisdiction and
deprived her of the right to due process.
The contention fails to persuade; a separate office order was not
necessary for the audit team's investigation of Nacion's case. It should
be emphasized that prior to the issuance of the formal charge, the
investigations conducted by the team were merely fact-finding. The
crucial point was the COA's observance of the demands of due process
prior to its finding or decision that Nacion was administratively liable.
The formation of a separate fact-finding team that should look
specifically into Nacion's acts was not necessary to satisfy the
requirement. The formal charge was as yet to be issued by the COA
Chairperson, and Nacion's formal investigation commenced only after
she had filed her answer to the charge. It was undisputed that Nacion,
despite a chance, did not request for such formal investigation, a
circumstance which the COA later considered as mitigating. In any
case, she was still accorded before the COA a reasonable opportunity
to present her defenses, through her answer to the formal charge and
eventually, motion for reconsideration of the COA's decision.
Page | 14
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA-
NEW BATAAN, COMPOSTELAVALLEY PROVINCE, Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL
AND BAR COUNCIL, Respondent. |
 Petitioner applied for a position as a judge in a second level court
but JBC did not include his name in the list of applicants since he
failed to qualify.
 This is because the JBC put priority to incumbent judges who
served their position for at least five years and petitioner here
only served as judged for more than a year.
 The petitioner assailed, inter alia, the authority of the JBC to add
another qualification (5-year-qualitification) because the said
qualification was already prescribed
 The Supreme Court ruled that the internal process of choosing
people who would qualify done by the JBC was valid since under
Sect. 8 (5), Art. VIII of the Constitution gave the JBC principal
function of recommending appointees to the judiciary
FACTS:
Herein petitioner, Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva was a presiding judge
of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Compostela- New Bataas,
Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a first-level
court. He applied on second-level courts such as Branch 31, Tagum
City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Adusan Del
Sur.
The Judicial and Bar Council’s (JBC) Office of Recruitment, Selection
and Nomination, informed the petitioner through a letter that we
failed to qualify for the said position he applied on. On the same day,
petitioner sent a letter (electronic mail). He seeks reconsideration of
his non-inclusion in the list of the considered applicants. He also
protested the inclusion of applicants who failed the prejudicature
examination.
Through a letter, the JBC Executive officer informed him that his
protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc. Still
the non-inclusion of his name in the list of applicants was upheld. The
reason was, the JBS’s long standing policy of giving priority to
incumbent judges that served their current position for at least five
years. Since the petitioner only served as a judged for more than a
year only, his name was not included in the list.
Petitioner argues that: 1.) Qualifications was already prescribed so the
JBC could add no more, 2.) The five-year-requirement violates the
equal protection and due process clauses of the constitution, 3.) The
same requirement violates theconstitutional provision on Social
Justice and Human Rights for Equal Opportunity of employment, and
4.) The requirement of passing the prejudicature exam should be
mandatory.
Respondents argue that 1.) The writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot
issue to prevent the JBC from performing itsprincipal function under the
constitution to recommend appointees to the judiciary because the JBC
is not a tribunalexercising judicial or quasi-judicial function, 2.) Remedy
of mandamus and declaratory relief will not lie because petitioner
doesnot have any legal right that need to be protected, 3.) Legal
protection clause is not violated because the 5-year-requirement
is performance and experience based, and 4.) No violation of due
process since the policy is merely internal in nature.
HELD:
Equal Protection
There is no question that JBC employs standards to have a rational
basis to screen applicants who cannot be all accommodated and
appointed to a vacancy in the judiciary, to determine who is best
qualified among the applicants, and not to discriminate against any
particular individual or class.
The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the
universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction; what it requires is simply equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Hence, the Court has
affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets
a suspect class, the classification stands as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end.[21]
"The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude
classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment
under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not
arbitrary."[22] "The mere fact that the legislative classification may
result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal
protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation
by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby
rendered invalid."[23]
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC merely
exercised its discretion in accordance with the constitutional
requirement and its rules that a member of the Judiciary must be of
proven competence, integrity, probity and independence.[24] "To
ensure the fulfillment of these standards in every member of the
Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to screen aspiring judges and
justices, among others, making certain that the nominees submitted
to the President are all qualified and suitably best for appointment. In
this way, the appointing process itself is shielded from the possibility
of extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and mediocre
and, more importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified."[25]
Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing
recommended appointees does not constitute a violation of the equal
protection clause. The JBC does not discriminate when it employs
number of years of service to screen and differentiate applicants from
the competition. The number of years of service provides a relevant
basis to determine proven competence which may be measured by
experience, among other factors. The difference in treatment
between lower court judges who have served at least five years and
those who have served less than five years, on the other hand, was
rationalized by JBC as follows:
Formulating policies which streamline the selection process falls
squarely under the purview of the JBC. No other constitutional body is
bestowed with the mandate and competency to set criteria for
applicants that refer to the more general categories of probity,
integrity and independence.
The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a second-level
court, which is five years experience as judge of a first-level court, is a
direct adherence to the qualities prescribed by the Constitution.
Placing a premium on many years of judicial experience, the JBC is
merely applying one of the stringent constitutional standards requiring
that a member of the judiciary be of "proven competence." In
determining competence, the JBC considers, among other
qualifications, experience and performance.
Based on the JBC's collective judgment, those who have been judges
of first-level courts for five (5) years are better qualified for promotion
to second-level courts. It deems length of experience as a judge as
indicative of conversance with the law and court procedure. Five years
is considered as a sufficient span of time for one to acquire
professional skills for the next level court, declog the dockets, put in
place improved procedures and an efficient case management system,
adjust to the work environment, and gain extensive experience in the
judicial process.
A five-year stint in the Judiciary can also provide evidence of
the integrity, probity, and independence of judges seeking promotion.
Page | 15
To merit JBC's nomination for their promotion, they must have had a
"record of, and reputation for, honesty, integrity, incorruptibility,
irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical
standards." Likewise, their decisions must be reflective of the
soundness of their judgment, courage, rectitude, cold neutrality and
strength of character.
Hence, for the purpose of determining whether judges are worthy of
promotion to the next level court, it would be premature or difficult to
assess their merit if they have had less than one year of service on the
bench.[26] (Citations omitted and emphasis in the original)
At any rate, five years of service as a lower court judge is not the only
factor that determines the selection of candidates for RTC judge to be
appointed by the President. Persons with this qualification are neither
automatically selected nor do they automatically become nominees.
The applicants are chosen based on an array of factors and are
evaluated based on their individual merits. Thus, it cannot be said that
the questioned policy was arbitrary, capricious, or made without any
basis.
Clearly, the classification created by the challenged policy satisfies the
rational basis test. The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do
exist between lower court judges with five year experience and those
with less than five years of experience, like the petitioner, and the
classification enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and
relevant to its legitimate purpose. The Court, thus, rules that the
questioned policy does not infringe on the equal protection clause as
it is based on reasonable classification intended to gauge the proven
competence of the applicants. Therefore, the said policy is valid and
constitutional.
Due Process
The petitioner averred that the assailed policy violates procedural due
process for lack of publication and non-submission to the University of
the Philippines Law Center Office of the National Administrative
Register (ONAR). The petitioner said that the assailed policy will affect
all applying judges, thus, the said policy should have been published.
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the assailed JBC policy need
not be filed in the ONAR because the publication requirement in the
ONAR is confined to issuances of administrative agencies under the
Executive branch of the government.[27] Since the JBC is a body under
the supervision of the Supreme Court,[28] it is not covered by the
publication requirements of the Administrative Code.
Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as
judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicants to
second-level courts should have been published. As a general rule,
publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including
administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement
existing laws, attain binding force and effect. There are, however,
several exceptions to the requirement of publication, such as
interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, which
regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of
instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.[29]
Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative
rules and regulations exempted from the publication requirement. The
assailed policy involves a qualification standard by which the JBC shall
determine proven competence of an applicant. It is not an internal
regulation, because if it were, it would regulate and affect only the
members of the JBC and their staff. Notably, the selection process
involves a call to lawyers who meet the qualifications in the
Constitution and are willing to serve in the Judiciary to apply to these
vacant positions. Thus, it is but a natural consequence thereof that
potential applicants be informed of the requirements to the judicial
positions, so that they would be able to prepare for and comply with
them.
The Court also noted the fact that in JBC-009, otherwise known as the
Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, the JBC had put its criteria in
writing and listed the guidelines in determining competence,
independence, integrity and probity. Section 1, Paragraph 1 of Rule 9
expressly provides that applicants for the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan, should, as a general rule, have at least five years
of experience as an RTC judge, thus:
RULE 9 - SPECIAL GUIDELINES FOR NOMINATION TO A VACANCY IN
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SANDIGANBAYAN
Section 1. Additional criteria for nomination to the Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan. - In addition to the foregoing guidelines the
Council should consider the following in evaluating the merits of
applicants for a vacancy in the Court of Appeals and Sandiganbayan:
1. As a general rule, he must have at least five years of experience as a
judge of Regional Trial Court, except when he has in his favor
outstanding credentials, as evidenced by, inter alia, impressive
scholastic or educational record and performance in the Bar
examinations, excellent reputation for honesty, integrity, probity and
independence of mind; at least very satisfactory performance rating
for three (3) years preceding the filing of his application for
nomination; and excellent potentials for appellate judgeship.
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
The express declaration of these guidelines in JBC-009, which have
been duly published on the website of the JBC and in a newspaper of
general circulation suggests that the JBC is aware that these are not
mere internal rules, but are rules implementing the Constitution that
should be published. Thus, if the JBC were so-minded to add special
guidelines for determining competence of applicants for RTC judges,
then it could and should have amended its rules and published the
same. This, the JBC did not do as JBC-009 and its amendatory rule do
not have special guidelines for applicants to the RTC.
Moreover, jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a statute
should be published. Thus, by analogy, publication is also required for
the five-year requirement because it seeks to implement a
constitutional provision requiring proven competence from members
of the judiciary.
Nonetheless, the JBC's failure to publish the assailed policy has not
prejudiced the petitioner's private interest. At the risk of being
repetitive, the petitioner has no legal right to be included in the list of
nominees for judicial vacancies since the possession of the
constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the
Judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one's name be
included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion
in the shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the JBC.[30]
As to the issue that the JBC failed or refused to implement the
completion of the prejudicature program as a requirement for
appointment or promotion in the judiciary under R.A. No. 8557, this
ground of the petition, being unsubstantiated, was unfounded.
Clearly, it cannot be said that JBC unlawfully neglects the performance
of a duty enjoined by law.
Page | 16

Finally, the petitioner argued but failed to establish that the assailed
policy violates the constitutional provision under social justice and
human rights for equal opportunity of employment. The OSG
explained:
[T]he questioned policy does not violate equality of employment
opportunities. The constitutional provision does not call for
appointment to the Judiciary of all who might, for any number of
reasons, wish to apply. As with all professions, it is regulated by the
State. The office of a judge is no ordinary office. It is imbued with public
interest and is central in the administration of justice x x x. Applicants
who meet the constitutional and legal qualifications must vie and
withstand the competition and rigorous screening and selection
process. They must submit themselves to the selection criteria,
processes and discretion of respondent JBC, which has the
constitutional mandate of screening and selecting candidates whose
names will be in the list to be submitted to the President. So long as a
fair opportunity is available for all applicants who are evaluated on the
basis of their individual merits and abilities, the questioned policy
cannot be struck down as unconstitutional.[31] (Citations omitted)
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the petitioner has not
established a clear legal right to justify the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. The petitioner has merely filed an application with the JBC
for the position of RTC judge, and he has no clear legal right to be
nominated for that office nor to be selected and included in the list to
be submitted to the President which is subject to the discretion of the
JBC. The JBC has the power to determine who shall be recommended
to the judicial post. To be included in the list of applicants is a privilege
as one can only be chosen under existing criteria imposed by the JBC
itself. As such, prospective applicants, including the petitioner, cannot
claim any demandable right to take part in it if they fail to meet these
criteria. Hence, in the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of an
injunctive writ is not justified.
As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching for,
screening, and selecting applicants relative to recommending
appointees to the Judiciary, the JBC has the authority to determine
how best to perform such constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this
authority, the JBC issues various policies setting forth the guidelines to
be observed in the evaluation of applicants, and formulates rules and
guidelines in order to ensure that the rules are updated to respond to
existing circumstances. Its discretion is freed from legislative,
executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the JBC is shielded
from any outside pressure and improper influence. Limiting qualified
applicants in this case to those judges with five years of experience
was an exercise of discretion by the JBC. The potential applicants,
however, should have been informed of the requirements to the
judicial positions, so that they could properly prepare for and comply
with them. Hence, unless there are good and compelling reasons to do
so, the Court will refrain from interfering with the exercise of JBC's
powers, and will respect the initiative and independence inherent in
the latter.
KABATAAN PARTY LIST, et. al., Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 221318 December 16, 2015
FACTS:
RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a
mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters in order to
establish a clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of voters
through the adoption of biometric technology.
RA 10367 likewise directs that “registered voters
whose biometrics have not been captured shall submit themselves for
validation.” “Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the
last day of filing of application for registration for purposes of the May
2016 elections shall be deactivated x x x.”
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721 as amended by Resolutions No.
9863 and 10013. Among others, the said Resolution provides that:
“the registration records of voters without biometrics data who failed
to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of
applications for registration for the purpose of the May 9, 2016
National and Local Elections shall be deactivated.
Herein petitioners filed the instant petition with application for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing the constitutionality of
the biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, as
well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related
thereto. They contend that: (a) biometrics validation rises to the level
of an additional, substantial qualification where there is penalty of
deactivation;[41] (b) biometrics deactivation is not the disqualification
by law contemplated by the 1987 Constitution;[42] (c) biometrics
validation gravely violates the Constitution, considering that, applying
the strict scrutiny test, it is not poised with a compelling reason for
state regulation and hence, an unreasonable deprivation of the right
to suffrage;[43] (d) voters to be deactivated are not afforded due
process;[44] and (e) poor experience with biometrics should serve as
warning against exacting adherence to the system.[45] Albeit already
subject of a prior petition[46] filed before this Court, petitioners also
raise herein the argument that deactivation by November 16, 2015
would result in the premature termination of the registration period
contrary to Section 8[47] of RA 8189.[48] Ultimately, petitioners pray
that this Court declare RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9721, 9863, and 10013, unconstitutional and that the COMELEC be
commanded to desist from deactivating registered voters without
biometric information, to reinstate voters who are compliant with the
requisites of RA 8189 but have already been delisted, and to extend
the system of continuing registration and capture of biometric
information of voters until January 8, 2016.
ISSUE:
Petitioners further aver that RA 10367 and the COMELEC Resolution
Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013 violate the tenets of procedural due
process because of the short periods of time between hearings and
notice, and the summary nature of the deactivation proceedings.[102]
HELD:
Petitioners are mistaken.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that the COMELEC, through
Resolution No. 10013, had directed EOs to: (a) "[p]ost the lists of
voters without biometrics data in the bulletin boards of the
City/Municipal hall, Office of the Election Officer and in the barangay
hall along with the notice of ERB hearing;" and (b) [s]end individual
notices to the affected voters included in the generated list of voters
without biometrics data.[103] The same Resolution also accords
concerned individuals the opportunity to file their
Page | 17
opposition/objection to the deactivation of VRRs not later than
November 9, 2015 in accordance with the period prescribed in Section
4,[104] Chapter I, Resolution No. 9853. Meanwhile, Resolution Nos.
9721 and 9863 respectively state that "[d]eactivation x x x shall comply
with the requirements on posting, ERB hearing and service of
individual notices to the deactivated voters,"[105] and that the
"Reactivation for cases falling under this ground shall be made during
the November 16, 2015 Board hearing."[106] While the proceedings are
summary in nature, the urgency of finalizing the voters' list for the
upcoming May 2016 Elections calls for swift and immediate action on
the deactivation of VRRs of voters who fail to comply with the mandate
of RA 10367. After all, in the preparation for the May 2016 National
and Local Elections, time is of the essence. The summary nature of the
proceedings does not depart from the fact that petitioners were given
the opportunity to be heard.

Relatedly, it deserves emphasis that the public has been sufficiently

informed of the implementation of RA 10367 and its deactivation
feature. RA 10367 was duly published as early as February 22,
2013,[107] and took effect fifteen (15) days after.[108]Accordingly, dating
to the day of its publications, all are bound to know the terms of its
provisions, including the consequences of non-compliance. As
implemented, the process of biometrics validation commenced on July
1, 2013, or approximately two and a half (2 1/2) years before the
October 31, 2015 deadline. To add, the COMELEC conducted a massive
public information campaign, i.e., NoBio-NoBoto, from May 2014 until
October 31, 2015, or a period of eighteen (18) months, whereby voters
were reminded to update and validate their registration records. On
top of that, the COMELEC exerted efforts to make the validation
process more convenient for the public as it enlisted the assistance of
malls across Metro Manila to serve as satellite registration centers and
declared Sundays as working days for COMELEC offices within the
National Capital Region and in highly urbanized cities.[109] Considering
these steps, the Court finds that the public has been sufficiently
apprised of the implementation of RA 10367, and its penalty of
deactivation in case of failure to comply. Thus, there was no violation
of procedural due process.

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