STATUTORY CASES

Case Title: G.R. No. L-19650 (September 29, 1966)

Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs. Enrico Palomar in his capacity as The
Postmaster General

1) Facts

The case before us now is a petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster
General Enrico Palomar, parying “that judgment be rendered declaring
its ‘Caltex Hooded Pump Contest’ not to be violative of the Postal Law, and
ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the
contest to the attention of the public”.

In 1960, Caltex launched a promotional scheme called “Caltex Hooded

Pump Contest� which calls for participants to “estimate the actual
number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense
during a specified period.� The contest is open to all “motor vehicle
owners and/or licensed drivres�. There is neither a fee or consideration
required nor a purchase required to be made. The forms are available upon
request at each Caltex station and there is also a sealed can where
accomplished entry stubs may be deposited.

Caltex wishes to use mails amongst the media for publicizing about the
contest, thus, Caltex sent representatives to the postal authorities for
advance clearing for the use of mails for the contest. However, the postal
authorities denied their request in view of sections 1954 (a), 1982, and 1983
of the Revised Administrative Code (Anti-lottery provisions of the Postal
Law), which prohibits the use of mail in conveying any information
concerning non-mailable schemes, such as lottery, gift enterprise, or similar
scheme.

Caltex sought for a reconsideration and stressed that there was no

consideration involved in the part of the contestant(s) but the Postmaster
General maintained their view and even threatened Caltex that if the contest
was conducted, “a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex)
and all its representativesâ€?. This leads to Caltex’s filing of this petition for
declaratory relief.

The court ruled that the “petitioner does not violate the Postal Law and
the respondent has no right to bar the public distribution or said rules by
the mails�. The respondent then appealed.

2) Issue(s)

a) Whether or not the petition states a sufficient cause of action for

declaratory relief?
b) Whether or not the proposed “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest�
violates the Postal Law?

3) Ruling

Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of

action for declaratory relief, and that the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” as
described in the rules submitted by the appellee does not transgress the
provisions of the Postal Law.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

4) Ratio

Declaratory Relief is the interpretation of several constitutional provisions.

Based on Section 1 Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action for declaratory
relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract
or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an
executive order, a regulation or an ordinance.

Requisites for Declaratory Relief:

- There is justiciable controversy
- The controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse
- The party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy
- The issue is ripe for judicial determination

* The “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest� is a mere “gratuitous

distribution of property by chance�. It does not qualify as a lottery due to
the lack of consideration. An act to be deemed as a lottery must constitute a
(1) prize, (2) chance, and (3) consideration. The participants are not required
to do anything or purchase anything from Caltex in order to participate in
the contest. The true test for having consideration is “whether the
participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and not whether
those conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the
distribution of the prize.�
 National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Eisma
GR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)
En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 concur with comments, 1 took no part,
1 on leave

Facts: On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment (Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga
City), a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective
bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao
manufacturing plant of the Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. (Zambowood).
On 17 April 1982, such employees charged the firm before the same office
for underpayment of monthly living allowances. On 3 May 1982, the union
issued a notice of strike against the firm, alleging illegal termination of
Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice;
nonpayment of living allowances; and “employment of oppressive alien
management personnel without proper permit. The strike began on 23 May
1982.

On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against
the officers and members of the union, for “damages for obstruction of
private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order.” The union filed a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of
the restraining order, and opposition to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction, contending that the incidents of picketing are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa
227 (Labor Code, Article 217) and not to the Court of First Instance. The
motion was denied. Hence, the petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.

Held: The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law.
Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated
that application is impossible or inadequate without them.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by

the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by
law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words
that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial
tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue
should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute in force. Therefore,
since (1) the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with
jurisdiction; since (2) Presidential Decree 1691 reverted the jurisdiction with
respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from
employer-employee relations to the labor arbiters after Presidential Decree
1367 transferred such jurisdiction to the ordinary courts, and since (3)
Batas Pambansa 130 made no change with respect to the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of
workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations;
Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original
jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it
can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial
court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred
on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from
picketing that accompanied a strike.

The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of certiorari, and nullified and
set aside the 20 July 1982 order issued by the court a quo. It granted the
writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of said court, or whoever acts in
his behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned, from taking any further
action on the civil case (Civil Case 716 [2751]), except for the purpose of
dismissing it. It also made permanent the restraining order issued on 5
August 1982.
 Paat v. CA
GR 111107, 10 January 1997 (266 SCRA 167)
Second Division, Torres Jr. (p): 4 concurring

Facts: On 19 May 1989, Victoria de Guzman’s truck was seized by

Department of Environment and Natural Resources personnel in Aritao,
Nueva Vizcaya while on its ways to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao,
Cagayan because the driver could not produce the required documents for
the forest products found concealed in the truck. On 23 May 1989, Aritao
CENRO’s Jovito Layugan issued an order of confiscation of the truck. Its
owner, De Guzman, failed to submit the required explanation within the
reglementary period set by Layugan. On 22 June 1989, DENR Regional
Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained the Alitao CENRO’s action of
confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of
Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order 277. De Guzman
filed for reconsideration but was denied.

The case was appealed to the Secretary of DENR. Pending resolution,

however, a suit for replevin (Civil Case 4031), was filed by De Guzman and
company against Layugan and Baggayan with the RTC Cagayan (Branch 2),
contending that the only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances used in the transporting illegal forest products, pursuant to the
second paragraph of Section 68. De Guzman further contended that the
seizure is illegal, as she did not use the truck in the commission of the crime
(of qualified theft under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code,
punishable under Section 68), as allegedly admitted by the Regional
Executive Director, releasing her from criminal liability. The trial court
thereafter issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to De Guzman. The
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court sustained the trial court’s order ruling that the question
involved is purely a legal one. Hence, the petition.

Issues:

 Whether construction admits that the authority to confiscate or to

forfeit conveyances belongs to the courts
 Whether the truck was used in the commission of an offense under
Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order
277

Held: The construction that conveyances are subject of confiscation by the

courts exclusively (pursuant to Section 28, paragraph 2) unduly restricts the
clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of
Section 68-A, aside to the fact that conveyances are not mentioned nor
included in the former provision. In the construction of statutes, it must be
read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute.
Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and
the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such
construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure
the benefits intended. In the case at bar, the phrase “to dispose of the same”
is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the
government. The only limitation is that it should be made “in accordance
with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.”

Further, when the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any
extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law. The language of
the amendatory executive order, when it eliminated the phrase “shall be
guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code “ and inserted the words “ shall be punished with
the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code,”
meant that the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing
forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent
now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the 16
October decision and 14 July 1992 resolution of the CA, made permanent
the restraining order promulgated on 27 September 1993, and directed the
DENR secretary to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.
 Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas
GR L-34568, 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA 369)
Second Division, Padilla (p): 4 concurring

Facts: On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a

petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte seeking the
adoption of minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. However, minors
Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad
litem, the petitioners herein filed an opposition to the said adoption. They
contended that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate
daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died on 1 March
1971, and therefore said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Article
335 of the Civil Code, which provides that those who have legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children or children by legal fiction
cannot adopt.

Issue: Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are
disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code.

Held: The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in
enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous.
When the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word “descendant,”
found in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned,
to “children.” The children thus mentioned have a clearly defined meaning in
law and do not include grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory
construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face
need not be interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or
doubtful meaning may be the subjects of statutory construction. In the
present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero
Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino
Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys.

The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the judgment of the
Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Special Proceedings 37),
wthout pronouncement as to costs.
 Paras v. Comelec (Resolution)
GR 123169, 4 November 1996 (264 SCRA 49)
En Banc, Francisco (p): 14 concurring

Facts: Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula,

Cabanatuan City who won during the 1994 barangay election. A petition for
his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the
barangay, which was approved by the Comelec. Petition signing was
scheduled on 14 October 1995, where at least 29.30% of the registered
voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law.
The Comelec also set the recall election on 13 November 1995, but which
was deferred to 16 December 1995 due to the petitioner’s opposition. To
prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC
Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction (Special Proceeding Civil Action
2254-AF), with the trial court issuing a restraining order. After conducting a
summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the
petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should
not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall
election was without Comelec approval.

In a resolution dated 5 January 1996, the Comelec, for the third time, re-
scheduled the recall election on 13 January 1996; hence, the instant
petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. The petitioner
contends that no recall can take place within one year preceding a regular
local election, the Sangguniang Kabataan elections slated on the first
Monday of May 1996. He cited Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo
to support the argument, the Court in which case considered the SK election
as a regular local election.

Issue: Whether the Sangguniang Kabataan election is to be construed as a

regular local election in a recall proceeding

Held: It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute

must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the
statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Further, the spirit,
rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute
must be read according to its spirit and intent. The too literal interpretation
of the law leads to absurdity which the Court cannot countenance. A too-
literal reading of the law constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat
the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in “the letter
that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth”. In the present case, Paragraph (b)
of Section 74 construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the
period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election.
The Sangguniang Kabataan elections cannot be considered a regular
election, as this would render inutile the recall provision of the Local
Government Code. It would be more in keeping with the intent of the recall
provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an
election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be
recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.

The Supreme Court, however, has to dismiss the petition for having become
moot and academic, as the next regular elections involving the barangay
office concerned were seven months away. Thus, the Temporary Restraining
Order issued on 12 January 1996, enjoining the recall election, was made
permanent.
 Floresca v. Philex Mining
GR L-30642., 30 April 1985 (136 SCRA 142)
En Banc, Makasiar (p): 7 concurring, 1 on leave, 2 took no part, others
dissenting

Facts: Several miners were killed in a cave-in at one of Philex Mining

Corporations’ mine sites. The heirs of the miners were able to recover under
the Workman’s Compensation Act (WCA). Thereafter, a special committee
report indicated that the company failed to provide the miners with
adequate safety protection. The heirs decided to file a complaint for
damages before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. Philex filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the action was based on an industrial
accident which is covered under the WCA and, therefore, the CFI has no
jurisdiction over the case. Philex argues that the work connected injuries are
compensable exclusively under Sections 5 and 46 of the WCA; and that the
WCA covers work-connected accidents even if the employer was negligent as
the WCA under Section 4-A imposes a 50% additional compensation in the
event that the employer is negligent. The heirs, however, contend that the
CFI has jurisdiction, as their complaint is not based on the WCA but on the
Civil Code provisions on damages arising out of negligence. The CFI
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs questioned the
dismissal before the Supreme Court.

Amici curiae submitted their respective memoranda, pursuant to the

resolution of 26 November 1976, involving the issue whether the action of
an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his death under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative; i.e.
(1: Exclusive) whether an injured employee or his heirs’ action is exclusively
restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, (2: Selective) whether an injured employee or
his heirs have a right of selection or choice of action between availing of the
worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the
regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral
and/or exemplary) from the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the
employer or of his other employees, or (3: Cumulative) whether an injured
employee or his heirs may avail cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the
limited compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and sue in
addition for damages in the regular courts. The opinions of the amici curiae
are diverse.

The Court in this same decision agreed with the argument that the action is
selective, i.e. that the injured worker or his heirs have the choice of
remedies, but that they cannot pursue both courses of action
simultaneously and balance the relative advantage of recourse under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act as against an ordinary action. It further held
that the petitioners who had received the benefits under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action
before the regular court, as the choice of the first remedy was based on
ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an
intelligent choice, but that upon the success of such bids before the lower
court, the payments made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should
be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.

Issue: Whether the Supreme Court, in determining the action to be

selective, is guilty of judicial legislation.

Held: The Court, through its majority, defended itself by holding that the
Court does not legislate but merely applies and gives effect to the
constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of
Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and later by
Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article II of the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by
Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New
Civil Code of 1950. Further, it reiterated its ruling in People vs. Licera: that
judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the
statute itself, pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution form part of this jurisdiction’s legal system. It argues that the
application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the
law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court’s
application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. Yet, the
Court argues that the Court can legislate, pursuant to Article 9 of the New
Civil Code, which provides that “No judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.”
Thus, even the legislator himself recognizes that in certain instances, the
court “do and must legislate” to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind
of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot
envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply.
 Aisporna v. CA
GR L-39419, 12 April 1982 (113 SCRA 459)
First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal Accident Policy was
issued by Perla Compania de Seguros, through its authorized agent Rodolfo
Aisporna, for a period of 12 months with the beneficiary designated as Ana
M. Isidro. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy. Mapalad
Aisporna participated actively with the aforementioned policy.

For reason unexplained, an information was filed against Mapalad Aisporna,

Rodolfo’s wife, with the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section
189 of the Insurance Act on 21 November 1970, or acting as an agent in the
soliciting insurance without securing the certificate of authority from the
office of the Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad contends that being the wife
of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and
that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called
by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent
and so she left a note on top of her husband’s desk to renew. On 2 August
1971, the trial court found Mapalad guilty and sentenced here to pay a fine
of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
the costs. On appeal and on 14 August 1974, the trial court’s decision was
affirmed by the appellate court (CA-GR 13243-CR). Hence, the present
recourse was filed on 22 October 1974. On 20 December 1974, the Office of
the Solicitor General, representing the Court of Appeals, submitted that
Aisporna may not be considered as having violated Section 189 of the
Insurance Act.

Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the scope or

intent of the Insurance Act

Held: Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the

statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be
studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part
of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts
and in order to produce harmonious whole. In the present case, the first
paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a person from acting as agent, subagent
or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance
without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance
Commissioner; while the second paragraph defines who is an insurance
agent within the intent of the section; while the third paragraph prescribes
the penalty to be imposed for its violation. The appellate court’s ruling that
the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section 189
but under its first paragraph is a reversible error, as the definition of
insurance agent in paragraph 2 applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section
189, which is “any person who for compensation shall be an insurance
agent within the intent of this section.” Without proof of compensation,
directly or indirectly, received from the insurance policy or contract,
Mapalad Aisporna may not be held to have violated Section 189 of the
Insurance Act.
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment and acquitted the
accused of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.
 China Bank v. Ortega (J)
GR L-34964, 31 January 1973 (49 SCRA 355)
Second Division, Makalintal (p): 7 concur, 2 took no part

Facts: On 17 December 1968, Vicente Acaban filed a complaint against B &

B Forest Development Corporation and Mariano Bautista for the collection
of sum of money. The trial court declared the defendants in default for
failure to answer within the reglementary period, and rendered its decision
on 20 January 1970.

To satisfy the judgment, Acaban sought the garnishment of the bank deposit
of B & B Forest Development Corporation with the China Bank. However,
Tan Kim Liong, the bank’s cashier, disallowed the same invoking the
provisions of Republic Act 1405, which prohibit the disclosure of any
information relative to bank deposits. On 4 March 1972, Tan Kim Lion was
ordered to inform the Court if there is a deposit by B & B Forest
Development in the China Bank, and if there is, to hold the same intact and
not allow any withdrawal until further order from the Court. Tan Kim Liong
moved to reconsider but was turned down. In the same order he was
directed to comply with the order of the Court, otherwise his arrest and
confinement will be ordered. Resisting the 2 orders, the China Bank and
Tan Kim Liong instituted the petition. Petitioners argue that the disclosure
of the information required by the court does not fall within any of the four
(4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2 ([1] upon written permission of the
depositor, [2] or in cases of impeachment, [3] or upon order of a competent
court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, [4] or in
cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation), and that if the questioned orders are complied with Tan Kim
Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5 and the bank exposed to a
possible damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation. Specifically
referring to the case, the position of the petitioners is that bank deposit of
judgment debtor B and B Forest Development Corporation cannot be subject
to garnishment to satisfy a final judgment against it in view of the
aforementioned provisions of law.

Issue: Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply

with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by
invoking the provisions of Republic Act 1405.

Held: From the discussion of the conference committee report of the two
houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry
into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being
garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed, there is no real
inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed, the
disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. Importantly, it was
not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach
of execution to satisfy a judgment. In the present case, the lower court did
not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest
Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required
Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether B & B Forest Development
Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for
purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the
same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order.

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the lower court dated 4 and 27
March 1972, with costs against the petitioners.
 Board of Administrators of the PVA v. Bautista
GR L-37867, 22 February 1982 (112 SRCA 59)
First Division, Guerrero (p): 5 concurring

Facts: Calixto Gasilao was a veteran in good standing during the last World
War that took active participation in the liberation drive against the enemy,
and due to his military service, he was rendered disabled. The Philippine
Veterans Administration, formerly the Philippine Veterans Board, (now
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) is an agency of the Government charged
with the administration of different laws giving various benefits in favor of
veterans and their orphans/or widows and parents. On July 23, 1955,
Gasilao filed a claim for disability pension under Section 9 of Republic Act
65, with the Philippine Veterans Board, alleging that he was suffering from
Pulmonary Tuberculosis (PTB), which he incurred in line of duty. Due to
Gasilao’s failure to complete his supporting papers and submit evidence to
establish his service-connected illness, his claim was disapproved by the
Board on 18 December 1955. On 8 August 1968, Gasilao was able to
complete his supporting papers and, after due investigation and processing,
the Board of Administrators found out that his disability was 100% thus he
was awarded the full benefits of section 9 of Republic Act 65.

Later on, Republic Act 5753 was approved on 22 June 1969, providing for
an increase in the basic pension and additional pension for the wife and
each of the unmarried minor children. Gasilao’s monthly pension was,
however, increased only on 15 January 1971, and by 25% of the increases
provided by law, due to the fact that it was only on said date that funds were
released for the purpose, and the amount so released was only sufficient to
pay only 25% of the increase. On 15 January 1972, more funds were
released to implement fully Republic Act 5753 and allow payment in full of
the benefits thereunder from said date.

In 1973, Gasilao filed an action against the Board to recover the pension,
which he claims he is entitled to, from July 1955, when he first filed his
application for pension, up to 1968 when his pension was finally approved.
The Board contends, however, based on Section 15 of Republic Act 65, that
since the section impliedly requires that the application filed should first be
approved by the Board of Administrators before the claimant could receive
his pension, therefore, an award of pension benefits should commence from
the date of approval of the application.

Issue: Whether Gasilao is entitled to the pension from 1955 instead of from
1968.

Held: As it is generally known, the purpose of Congress in granting veteran

pensions is to compensate a class of men who suffered in the service for the
hardships they endured and the dangers they encountered, and more
particularly, those who have become incapacitated for work owing to
sickness, disease or injuries sustained while in line of duty. A veteran
pension law is, therefore, a governmental expression of gratitude to and
recognition of those who rendered service for the country, especially during
times of war or revolution, by extending to them regular monetary aid. For
this reason, it is the general rule that a liberal construction is given to
pension statutes in favor of those entitled to pension. Courts tend to favor
the pensioner, but such constructional preference is to be considered with
other guides to interpretation, and a construction of pension laws must
depend on its own particular language. In the present case, Republic Act 65
is a veteran pension law which must be accorded a liberal construction and
interpretation in order to favor those entitled to rights, privileges, and
benefits granted thereunder, among which are the right to resume old
positions in government, educational benefits, the privilege to take
promotion examinations, a life pension for the incapacited, pension for
widow and children, and hospitalization and medical benefits. Upholding the
Board that the pension awards are made effective only upon approval of the
application, this would be dependent upon the discretion of the Board which
had been abused in this case through inaction extending for 12 years. Such
stand, therefore does not appear to be, or simply is not, in consonance with
the spirit and intent of the law. Gasilao’s claim was sustained.

The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the court a quo, ordering the
Board of Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration (now the
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) to make Gasilao’s pension effective 18
December 1955 at the rate of P50.00 per month plus P10.00 per month for
each of his then unmarried minor children below 18, and the former amount
increased to P100.00 from 22 June 1957 to 7 August 1968; and declaring
the differentials in pension to which said Gasilao, his wife and his
unmarried minor children below 18 are entitled for the period from 22 June
1969 to 14 January 1972 by virtue of Republic Act 5753 subject to the
availability of Government funds appropriated for the purpose.
 Sarmiento v. Mison [GR L-79974, 17 December 1987]
En Banc, Padilla (p): 8 concur

Facts: Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and
professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin Salvador Mison from
performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs and Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget,
from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison’s salaries and
emoluments, on the ground that Mison’s appointment as Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the
other hand, maintain the constitutionality of Mison’s appointment without
the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
The Supreme Court held that the President has the authority to appoint
Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without submitting his
nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, and thus,
the latter is entitled the full authority and functions of the office and receive
all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto. Thus, the Supreme
Court dismissed the petition and the petition in intervention, without costs.

1. Standing to file suit / Prohibition as proper remedy: Procedural

questions set aside due to demands of public interest
Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in
the public service, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and
decide, setting aside the finer procedural questions of whether prohibition is
the proper remedy to test Mison’s right to the office of Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs and of whether the petitioners have a standing to bring
this suit.

2. Constitutional Construction
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to
the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it.
The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and
expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. (Gold Creek Mining v.
Rodriguez) The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional
provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative
department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they
say and provide.

3. President’s power to appoint

Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution empowers the President to
appoint 4 groups of officers: (1) the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; (2) all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
(3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and (4)
officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone. The first group is clearly appointed with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are
initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. The second and third
groups of officers can be made by the President without the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments, as can be determined
through the recorded proceedings of Constitutional Commission.

4. Express enumeration excludes others not enumerated

It is an accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an
express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated. In the
case at bar, it would follow that only those appointments to positions
expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.

5. Constitutional provision presumed to have been framed and

adopted in light of prior laws
A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and
adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with
reference to them. Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a
constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the
subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their
judgment and opinion in its adoption. In the 1935 Constitution, almost all
presidential appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments. Under the 1935 Constitution, the
commission was frequently transformed into a venue of “horse-trading” and
similar malpractices. On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent
with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by
successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the
President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature. Given the
above two in extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the
1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of
the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a “middle ground”
by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments
for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President, without
such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the
second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of
lower rank. The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support
this conclusion.

6. Construction of “also” in second sentence; consideration of

different language of proximate sentences to determine meaning
The word “also” could mean “in addition; as well; besides, too” besides “in
like manner” which meanings could stress that the word “also” in said
second sentence means that the President, in addition to nominating and,
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the
officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint (without such
consent or confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence,
contrary to the interpretation that the President shall appoint the officers
mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as he appoints
officers mentioned in the first sentence. Rather than limit the area of
consideration to the possible meanings of the word “also” as used in the
context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive significance
from the fact that the first sentence speaks of nomination by the President
and appointment by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of appointment by
the President. And, this use of different language in 2 sentences proximate
to each other underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions
established. Thus, words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition.

7. Power to appoint fundamentally executive in character;

Limitations construed strictly
The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in
character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly
construed. Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order
to be recognized. In the case at bar, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII
clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein
enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.

8. The use of word “alone” after “President” in third sentence is a

lapse in draftsmanship, a literal import deemed redundant
After a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, the Court found the use of the word “alone” after the word
“President” in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than
anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. In the 1987 Constitution,
the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential
appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence.
Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence the word
“alone” after the word “President” in providing that Congress may by law
vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in
the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint
officers whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint is already
vested in him, without need of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, in the second sentence. The word “alone” in the third
sentence, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article
VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the
second sentence. This redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive
intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential
appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence, are not subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

9. President authorized Commissioner of Bureau of Customs;

Commissioner not included with the first group of appointment
The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is
not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of
the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution
deliberately excluded the position of “heads of bureaus” from appointments
that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (RA 1937, Tarifff and Customs
Code of the Philippines, Section 601, as amended by PD34 on 27 October
1972).

10. Laws approved during the effectivity of previous constitution

must be read in harmony with the new one
RA 1937 and PD 34 were approved during the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus,
like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution, however, RA 1937 and PD 34 have to be read in
harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment
of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the
President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, such
appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission
on Appointments.
 Perfecto v. Meer
GR L-2348, 27 February 1950 (85 Phil 552)
First Division, Bengzon (p): 8 concur.

Facts: The 1935 Constitution provides in its Article VIII, Section 9, that the
members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts “shall
receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office”. It also provides that “until
Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each
Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos”. When Justice Perfecto assumed
office, Congress had not “provided otherwise”, by fixing a different salary for
associate justices. He received salary at the rate provided by the
Constitution, i.e., fifteen thousand pesos a year.

The Collector of Internal Revenue required Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay

income tax upon his salary as member of the judiciary. The latter paid the
amount under protest. He contended that the assessment was illegal, his
salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon
would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether the imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a

member of the Judiciary amount to a diminution thereof., and thus violate
the Constitution.

Held: The imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the
judiciary amounts to a diminution thereof. If said imposition would not be
considered as a diminution, it would appear that, in the matter of
compensation and power and need of security, the judiciary is on a par with
the Executive. Such assumption certainly ignores the prevailing state of
affairs. Further, the Constitution provides that judges shall hold their
offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times receive for their
services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office. Thus, next to permanency in office, nothing can
contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for
their support. In the general course of human nature, a power over a man’s
subsistence amounts to a power over his will. The independence of the
judges as of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from
taxing their salaries.

Exemption of the judicial salary from reduction by taxation is not really a

gratuity or privilege. It is essentially and primarily compensation based
upon valuable consideration. The covenant on the part of the government is
a guaranty whose fulfillment is as much as part of the consideration agreed
as is the money salary. The undertaking has its own particular value to the
citizens in securing the independence of the judiciary in crises; and in the
establishment of the compensation upon a permanent foundation whereby
judicial preferment may be prudently accepted by those who are qualified by
talent, knowledge, integrity and capacity, but are not possessed of such a
private fortune as to make an assured salary an object of personal concern.
On the other hand, the members of the judiciary relinquish their position at
the bar, with all its professional emoluments, sever their connection with
their clients, and dedicate themselves exclusively to the discharge of the
onerous duties of their high office. So, it is irrefutable that the guaranty
against a reduction of salary by the imposition of a tax is not an exemption
from taxation in the sense of freedom from a burden or service to which
others are liable. The exemption for a public purpose or a valid
consideration is merely a nominal exemption, since the valid and full
consideration or the public purpose promoted is received in the place of the
tax.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.

 Endencia v. David
GR L-6355-56, 31 August 1953 (93 Phil 696)
En Banc, Montemayor (p): 6 concur

Facts: Saturnino David, as a Collector of Internal Revenue collected income

taxes from Justices Endencia and Jugo, as Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court respectively. The lower
court held that under the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer,
85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo
and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore
was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the
refund of said taxes. Respondent, through the Solicitor General contended
that the collection was done pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act 590
which Congress enacted to authorize and legalize the collection of income
tax on the salaries of judicial officers, if not to counteract the ruling on the
Perfecto Case.

Issue: Whether the Legislature may lawfully declare the collection of income
tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a
decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided
otherwise.

Held: The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax on
the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his
salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise. The
interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within
the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that
in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be
interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional
prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later
interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and
provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already
given in a case by the highest court of the land. In the case at bar, Section
13 of Republic Act 590 interpreted or ascertained the meaning of the phrase
“which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office,” found in
section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial
officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the
Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and
jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The Legislature under our form of government
is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to
interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the
basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative
department. Allowing the legislature to interpret the law would bring
confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions.

Further, under the Philippine system of constitutional government, the

Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The
Executive department is charged with the execution or carrying out of the
provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws
belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret
and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can
determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and
ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion
of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the
two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be
declared invalid and unconstitutional. Therefore, the doctrine laid down in
the case of Perfecto vs. Meer to the effect that the collection of income tax on
the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the
Constitution, is reiterated.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, affirming the ruling in Perferto v.
Meer and holding the interpretation and application of laws belong to the
Judiciary.
 Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Resolution)
GR L-78780, 23 July 1987
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 12 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal
Management and Budget Office to continue the deduction of withholding
taxes from salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and other members
of the judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc on 4
December 1987.

Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over
Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the RTC, National Capital Judicial
Region, all with stations in Manila. They seek to prohibit and/or perpetually
enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the
Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their
salaries. With the filing of the petition, the Court deemed it best to settle the
issue through judicial pronouncement, even if it had dealt with the matter
administratively.

Issue: Whether the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to

exempt justices and judges from taxes as it was in the 1935 Constitution.

Held: The ascertainment of the intent is but in keeping with the

fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given
effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed
that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers. In the present case, Section 10, Article
VIII is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing
another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be
higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if
lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It
would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption
from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional
Commission. Thus, the debates, interpolations and opinions expressed
regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally
approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members
of the Judiciary taxable.

The Supreme Court