G.R. No.
L-29755 January 31, 1969 tumbled down by the persons abovementioned within the communal forests of Barobo,
DOMINGO N. SARCOS, as Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RECAREDO CASTILLO, as Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur, and
THE HON. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF SURIGAO DEL SUR, respondents.
Sisenando Villaluz, Jr. for respondents.
Cristeto O. Cimagala for petitioner.
FERNANDO, J.:
Is the power of preventive suspension of a municipal mayor against whom charges
have been filed still vested in the provincial governor? That is the novel question
presented in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Such an authority he did possess
under the former law. 1 Then came the Decentralization Act of 1967, which took effect
on September 12 of that year. 2
What before could not be denied apparently no longer holds true. The statutory
provision now controlling yields a contrary impression. The question must thus be
answered in the negative. We hold that such a power has been withheld from the
provincial governor and may no longer be exercised by him.
Petitioner Domingo N. Sarcos, the duly elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur,
running as an independent candidate but winning, nonetheless, in the November 14,
1967 election, was charged with misconduct and dishonesty in office by respondent
Recaredo Castillo, the Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur. 3 The act constituting the
alleged dishonesty and misconduct in office consisted in petitioner allegedly
"[conniving] with certain private individuals to cut and fell [timber] and [selling] the
[timber] or logs so cut or felled for their own use and benefit, within the communal forest
reserve of the Municipality of Barobo, Province of Surigao del Sur, to the damage and
prejudice of the public and of the government; ...." 4
In the answer of respondent Castillo as well as the other respondent, the Provincial
Board of Surigao del Sur, there was an admission of the fact that as set forth in the
petition on October 4, 1968, such an administrative complaint for such an alleged
offense was indeed filed by respondent Governor with respondent Provincial Board.
What was sought to be stressed in the answer, however, was that as early as April 18,
1968, a charge under oath for abuse of official power in consenting to and authorizing
the violations of forestry laws was filed against petitioner by the Municipal Council of
Barobo, Surigao del Sur. He was then given the opportunity to answer and explain
within 72 hours, in an order of respondent Governor date May 21, 1968. The
explanation offered by petitioner contained the following: "These logs which I caused
to be hauled sometime within the month of January, 1968, were the same logs cut and
Surigao del Sur, and which were seized by the patrolmen of the undersigned. The said
logs were sold in order to raise funds for the purchase of the police uniforms and
arms." 5
It was on the basis of the above administrative complaint that respondent Governor,
according to the petition, ordered the "immediate suspension [ofpetitioner] from his
position as Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur; the same Administrative Order ...
[containing] the immediate designation of Vice-Mayor [Brigido L. Mercader] of the same
town as Acting [Mayor]." 6
Such administrative order for the preventive suspension of petitioner was admitted by
respondent Governor and sought to be justified thus: "[Considering] that the acts
charged against and admitted by the petitioner 'affects his official integrity,' as such
Municipal Mayor, by his having taken the law into his own hands; ..., there was an
urgent necessity to order the immediate 'preventive suspension' of the petitioner, in
accordance with the provisions of Section 5, of Republic Act No. 5185, otherwise known
as the 'Decentralization Act of 1967'." 7
The decisive issue therefore, as set forth at the outset of this opinion, is whether or
not respondent Provincial Governor is vested with power to order such preventive
suspension under the Decentralization Act of 1967, more specifically Section 5 thereof.
For if no such authority exists, then whatever be the alleged justification for preventive
suspension cannot validate the action taken by theGovernor. To assert otherwise would
be to negate the rule of law.
What does Section 5 provide? It opens with the categorical declaration: "Any provision
of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the suspension and removal of elective local
officials shall be governed exclusively by the provisions of this section."
After setting forth in the next paragraph the grounds for suspension and removal of
elective local officials, namely, disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, dishonesty,
oppression, and misconduct in office, it continues: "Written subscribed and sworn
charges against any elective provincial and city official shall be preferred before the
President of the Philippines; against any elective municipal official before the provincial
governor or the secretary of the provincial board concerned; and against any elective
barrio official before the municipal or city mayor or the municipal or city secretary
concerned."
Then comes the portion specifically dealing with preventive suspension. This
paragraph reads thus: "Within seven days after the charges are preferred, the
President, Governor, or Mayor, as the case may be, or his duly authorized
representative, as provided in the preceding paragraph, shall notify the respondent of
such charges. The President, Provincial Board and City or Municipal Council, as the
case may be, shall hear and investigate the truth or falsity of the charges within ten
days after receipt of such notice: Provided, That no investigation shall commence or
continue within ninety days immediately prior to an election. The preventive suspension
of the respondent officer shall not extend beyond sixty days after the date of his
suspension. At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended officer, shall be reinstated
in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until their
completion, unless the delay in the decision of the case is due to the fault, neglect or
request of the suspended officer, in which case, the time of delay shall not be counted
in computing the time of suspension: Provided, however, That if the suspended officer
shall have been found guilty as charged before the expiration of the thirty days, his
suspension, in the case of municipal and barrio officials, may continue until the case is
finally decided by the Provincial Board."
Considering that Section 5 leaves no doubt as to this particular paragraph governing
exclusively the suspension and removal of elective local officials, it must be apparent
why, as previously stated, respondent Provincial Governor lacks the authority to order
the preventive suspension of petitioner.
1. Under the former law then in force which stands repealed by virtue of the
Decentralization Act, 8 the provincial governor, if the charge against a
municipal official was one affecting his official integrity could order his
preventive suspension. 9 At present, the law is anything but that. A reading of
the pertinent paragraph above quoted makes manifest that it is the provincial
board to which such a power has been granted under conditions therein
specified. The statutory provision is worded differently. The principle, that the
deliberate selection of language other than that used in an earlier act is
indicative that a change in the law was intended, calls for application. 10
2. This conclusion has reinforcement from a fundamental postulate of
constitutional law. Public officials possess powers, not rights. There must be,
therefore, a grant of authority whether express or implied, to justify any action
taken by them. In the absence thereof, what they do as public officials lacks
validity and, if challenged, must be set aside. To paraphrase a leading
American decision, 11 law is the only supreme power under constitutional
government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its function
is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe
the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it
gives.
Here, clearly, no such authority is vested in the provincial governor. Instead, the
statutory scheme, complete on its face, would locate such power in the provincial
board. There would be no support for the view, then, that the action taken by the
provincial governor in issuing the order of preventive suspension in this case was in
accordance with law.
3. Moreover, any other view would be to betray lack of fidelity to the purpose
so manifest in the controlling legal provision. It is fundamental that once the
policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it
by the judiciary. From Ty Sue v. Hord, 12 decided in 1909, it has been our
constant holding that the choice between conflicting theories falls on that
which best accords with the letter of the law and with its purpose. The next
year, in an equally leading decision, United States v. Toribio, 13 there was a
caveat against a construction that would tend "to defeat the purpose and
object of the legislator." Then came the admonition in Riera v.
Palmaroli, 14 against an application so narrow "as to defeat the manifest
purpose of the legislator." This was repeated in the latest case, Commissioner
of Customs v. Caltex, 15 in almost identical language.1awphil.ñêt
So it is in the United States. 16 Thus, in an 1898 decision, the then Justice, later Chief
Justice, White minimized reliance on the subtle signification of words and the niceties
of verbal distinction stressing the fundamental rule of carrying out the purpose and
objective of legislation. 17 As succinctly put by the then Justice, later Chief Justice,
Stone: "All statutes must be construed in the light of their purpose." 18 The same thought
has been phrased differently. Thus: "The purpose of Congress is a dominant factor in
determining meaning." 19 For, to paraphrase Frankfurter, legislative words are not inert
but derive vitality from the obvious purposes at which they are aimed. 20The same jurist
likewise had occasion to state: "Regard for [its] purposes should infuse the construction
of the legislation if it is to be treated as a working instrument of government and not
merely as a collection of English words." 21 In the sixth annual Benjamin Nathan
Cardozo lecture delivered by him, entitled "Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes", he developed the theme further: "The generating consideration is that
legislation is more than composition. It is an active instrument of government which, for
purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to be achieved. It is in this
connection that Holmes said, 'words are flexible.' Again it was Holmes, the last judge
to give quarter to loose thinking or vague yearning, who said that "the general purpose
is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic
may lay down." And it was Holmes who chided courts for being 'apt to err by sticking
too closely to the words of a law where those words import a policy that goes beyond
them.' Note, however, that he found the policy in 'those words'." 22
It may be noted parenthetically that earlier, the United States Supreme Court was
partial more to the term "objective" or "policy" rather than "purpose." So it was in the
first decision where this fundamental principle of construction was relied upon, the
opinion coming from Chief Justice Marshall. Thus: "The two subjects were equally
within the province of the legislature, equally demanded their attention, and were
brought together to their view. If, then, the words making provision for each, fairly admit
of an equally extensive interpretation,and of one of which will effect the object that
seems to have been in contemplation, and which was certainly desirable, they ought to
receive that interpretation." 23
 So, too, with his successor, Chief Justice Taney. Thus: "This construction cannot be
maintained. In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or
member of a sentence, but look to the whole law, and to its object and policy." 24 It
should not escape attention that the above excerpt was quoted with approval by the
present Chief Justice Warren as late as 1957. 25
What is the purpose of the Decentralization Act of 1967? It is set forth in its declaration
of policy. 26 It is "to transform local governments gradually into effective instruments
through which the people can in a most genuine fashion, govern themselves and work
out their own destinies." 27 In consonance with such policy, its purpose is "to grant to
local governments greater freedom and ampler means to respond to the needs of their
people and promote their prosperity and happiness and to effect a more equitable and
systematic distribution of governmental powers and resources." 28
It is undeniable therefore that municipalities, as much as cities and provinces, are by
this act invested with "greater freedom and ampler means to respond to the needs of
their people and promote their prosperity and happiness." It is implicit in our
constitutional scheme that full autonomy be accorded the inhabitants of the local units
to govern themselves. Their choice as to who should be theirpublic officials must be
respected. Those elected must serve out their term. If they have to be removed at all it
should be for cause in accordance with the procedure prescribed and by the specific
officials of higher category entrusted with such responsibility.
It is easily understandable why as held in a leading case, Lacson v. Roque, 29 "strict
construction of law relating to suspension and removal is the universal rule." As was
further emphasized by Justice Tuason who penned the opinion: "When dealing with
elective posts, the necessity for restricted construction is greater." Deference to such a
doctrine possessed of intrinsic merit calls for due care lest by inadvertence the power
to suspend preventively is given to officials other than those specifically mentioned in
the act. For any other view would result in a dilution of the avowed purpose to vest as
great a degree of local autonomy as is possible to municipal corporations. That would
be to defeat and frustrate rather than to foster the policy of the act.1awphil.ñêt
4. Lastly, the construction here reached, as to the absence of power on the
part of provincial governors to suspend preventively a municipal mayor is
buttressed by the avoidance of undesirable consequences flowing from a
different doctrine. Time and time again, it has been stressed that while
democracy presupposes the right of the people to govern themselves in
elections that call for political parties contending for supremacy, once the
election is over the equally pressing and urgent concern for efficiency would
necessitate that purely partisan considerations be ignored, and if not entirely
possible, be restricted to a minimum.
The present litigation gives rise to the suspicion that politics did intrude itself. Petitioner
Municipal Mayor, an independent candidate, and thus of a different political persuasion,
appeared to have been placed at a disadvantage. It would be a realistic assumption
that there is the ever present temptation on the part of provincial governors, to utilize
every opportunity to favor those belonging to his party. At times, it may even prove
irresistible.
It is desirable therefore that such opportunity be limited. The statutory provision then
should be given such a construction that would be productive of such a result. That is
what we do in this case. To paraphrase Justice Tuason, we test a doctrine by its
consequences.
It could be said, of course, that to deny such a power to a provincial governor but at
the same time to affirm the existence thereof insofar as the provincial board is
concerned would not advance the cause of decentralization any. In answer, it suffices
to note that the Decentralization Act having so recognized such an authority in the
provincial board, the judiciary must perforce recognize its existence. Until after the
legislature decrees otherwise, the courts have no alternative but to accord deference
to such declared congressional policy. It may also be stated that the provincial board
being a collective body, the first, second and third class provinces being composed of
the provincial governor, the vice-governor and three other members elected at large by
the qualified electors of the province, and that in the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh class
provinces having in addition to the provincial governor and the vice-governor two other
members likewise elected at large, 30 there is a safeguard against the temptation to
utilize this power of preventive suspension for purely partisan ends. What one person
may feel free to do, fully conscious as he is that the authority belongs to him alone, may
not even be attempted when such an individual shares such power with others who
could possibly hold dissenting views. At any rate, there is a brake, which it is hoped
would suffice on most if not all occasions.
Such a restraining influence is indeed needed for the undeniable facts of the
contemporary political scene bear witness to efforts, at times disguised, at other times
quite blatant, on the part of local officials to make use of their positions to gain partisan
advantage. Harassment of those belonging to opposing factions or groups is not
unknown. Unfortunately, no stigma seems to attach to what really amounts to a misuse
of official power. The truism that a public office is a public trust, implicit in which is the
recognition that public advantage and not private benefit should be the test of one's
conduct, seems tohave been ignored all too often. The construction of any statute
therefore, even assuming that it is tainted by ambiguity, which would reduce the
opportunity of any public official to make use of his position for partisan ends, has much
to recommend it.
5. We hold, therefore, that under Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967, the
power of preventive suspension is not lodged in the provincial governor. To rule
otherwise would be at war with the plain purpose of the law and likewise fraught with
consequences far from desirable. We close with this appropriate excerpt from an
opinion of Justice Holmes rendered on circuit duty: "The Legislature has the power to
decide what the policy of the law shall be, and if it has intimated its will, however
indirectly, that should be recognized and obeyed. The major premise of the conclusion
expressed in a statute, the changeof policy that induces the enactment, may not be set
out in terms, but it is not an adequate discharge of duty for the courts to say: We see
what you are driving at but you have not said it, and therefore, we shall go on as
before." 31

WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for are granted, the preventive suspension of
petitioner by respondent Castillo annulled and set aside with the result that his
immediate reinstatement to his position as Municipal Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur,
is ordered, without prejudice to any further proceedings to be taken by respondent
Provincial Board in connection with the charge of misconduct and dishonesty in office
against petitioner, respondent Provincial Board being strictly enjoined in the disposition
of such administrative complaint to act strictly in accordance with the applicable law.
Without costs.

Concepcion. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,

Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 210551 June 30, 2015 after five (5) years of continue[d] payment. Further, the taxpayer availing this tax credit
must be a taxpayer in good standing as certified by the City Treasurer and City
JOSE J. FERRER, JR., Petitioner, Assessor.
vs.
CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, CITY The tax credit to be granted shall be equivalent to the total amount of the special
TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, and CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON assessment paid by the property owner, which shall be given as follows:
CITY, Respondents.
1. 6th year - 20%
DECISION
2. 7th year - 20%
PERALTA, J.:
3. 8th year - 20%
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) seeking to declare 4. 9th year - 20%
unconstitutional and illegal Ordinance Nos. SP-2095, S-2011 and SP-2235, S-2013 on
the Socialized Housing Tax and Garbage Fee, respectively, which are being imposed 5. 10th year - 20%
by the respondents.

The Case
On October 17, 2011,1 respondent Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-
2095, S-2011,2 or the Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City, Section 3 of which
provides:
SECTION 3. IMPOSITION. A special assessment equivalent to one-half percent (0.5%)
on the assessed value of land in excess of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Php100,000.00) shall be collected by the City Treasurer which shall accrue to the
Socialized Housing Programs of the Quezon City Government. The special
assessment shall accrue to the General Fund under a special account to be established
for the purpose.
Furthermore, only the registered owners may avail of the tax credit and may not be
continued by the subsequent property owners even if they are buyers in good faith,
heirs or possessor of a right in whatever legal capacity over the subject property. 4
On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-20135 was enacted on December 16,
2013 and took effect ten days after when it was approved by respondent City
Mayor.6 The proceeds collected from the garbage fees on residential properties shall
be deposited solely and exclusively in an earmarked special account under the general
fund to be utilized for garbage collections.7 Section 1 of the Ordinance se t forth the
schedule and manner for the collection of garbage fees:

Effective for five (5) years, the Socialized Housing Tax ( SHT ) shall be utilized by the
Quezon City Government for the following projects: (a) land purchase/land banking; (b)
SECTION 1. The City Government of Quezon City in conformity with and in relation to
improvement of current/existing socialized housing facilities; (c) land development; (d)
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991
construction of core houses, sanitary cores, medium-rise buildings and other similar
HEREBY IMPOSES THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE AND MANNER FOR THE
structures; and (e) financing of public-private partners hip agreement of the Quezon
ANNUAL COLLECTION OF GARBAGE FEES, AS FOLLOWS: On all domestic
City Government and National Housing Authority ( NHA ) with the private sector. 3
households in Quezon City;

Under certain conditions, a tax credit shall be enjoyed by taxpayers regularly paying
the special assessment: LAND AREA IMPOSABLE FEE

Less than 200 sq. m. PHP 100.00

SECTION 7. TAX CREDIT. Taxpayers dutifully paying the special assessment tax as
imposed by this ordinance shall enjoy a tax credit. The tax credit may be availed of only 201 sq. m. – 500 sq. m. PHP 200.00
 501 sq. m. – 1,000 sq. m. PHP 300.00 Php100.00.10

1,001 sq. m. – 1,500 sq. m. PHP 400.00 The instant petition was filed on January 17, 2014. We issued a TRO on February 5,
2014, which enjoined the enforcement of Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235 and
1,501 sq. m. – 2,000 sq. m. or more PHP 500.00
required respondents to comment on the petition without necessarily giving due course
thereto.11

Respondents filed their Comment12 with urgent motion to dissolve the TRO on February
On all condominium unit and socialized housing projects/units in Quezon City; 17, 2014. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Reply and a Memorandum on March 3, 2014
and September 8, 2014, respectively.
FLOOR AREA IMPOSABLE FEE
Procedural Matters
Less than 40 sq. m. PHP 25.00

41 sq. m. – 60 sq. m. PHP 50.00 A. Propriety of a Petition for Certiorari

61 sq. m. – 100 sq. m. PHP 75.00

101 sq. m. – 150 sq. m. PHP 100.00
151 sq. m. – 200 sq. [m.] or more PHP 200.00
On high-rise Condominium Units
a) High-rise Condominium – The Homeowners Association of high- rise
condominiums shall pay the annual garbage fee on the total size of the entire
condominium and socialized Housing Unit and an additional garbage fee shall
be collected based on area occupied for every unit already so ld or being
amortized.
Respondents are of the view that this petition for certiorari is improper since they are
not tribunals, boards or officers exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Petitioner,
however, counters that in enacting Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235, the Quezon
City Council exercised quasi-judicial function because the ordinances ruled against the
property owners who must pay the SHT and the garbage fee, exacting from them funds
for basic essential public services that they should not be held liable. Even if a Rule 65
petition is improper, petitioner still asserts that this Court, in a number of cases like in
Rosario v. Court of Appeals,13 has taken cognizance of an improper remedy in the
interest of justice.
We agree that respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor
arrogated unto themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial prerogatives.

b) High-rise apartment units – Owners of high-rise apartment units shall pay
the annual garbage fee on the total lot size of the entire apartment and an
additional garbage fee based on the schedule prescribed herein for every unit
occupied.
The collection of the garbage fee shall accrue on the first day of January and shall be
paid simultaneously with the payment of the real property tax, but not later than the first
quarter installment.8 In case a household owner refuses to pay, a penalty of 25% of the
garbage fee due, plus an interest of 2% per month or a fraction thereof, shall be
charged.9
Petitioner alleges that he is a registered co-owner of a 371-square-meter residential
property in Quezon City which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT ) No.
216288, and that, on January 7, 2014, he paid his realty tax which already included the
garbage fee in the sum of
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to
determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then
undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.
Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which applies to the actions,
discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies … required to investigate
facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them
as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is
necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of person s or
property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy en
suing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and
authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending
parties.14
For a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be
directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. The enactment by the Quezon City Council of the assailed ordinances
was done in the exercise of its legislative, not judicial or quasi-judicial, function. Under
Republic Act (R.A.) No.7160, or the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), local
legislative power shall be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlungsod for the city.15Said
law likewise is specific in providing that the power to impose a tax, fee, or charge , or
to generate revenue shall be exercised by the sanggunian of the local government unit
concerned through an appropriate ordinance.16
Also, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, it essentially seeks
to declare the unconstitutionality and illegality of the questioned ordinances. It, thus,
partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief, over which this Court has only
appellate, not original, jurisdiction.17
Despite these, a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for prohibition or
mandamus, over which we exercise original jurisdiction, in cases with far-reaching
implications or one which raises transcendental issues or questions that need to be
resolved for the public good.18The judicial policy is that this Court will entertain direct
resort to it when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts or when
exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and
calling for the exercise of Our primary jurisdiction.19
Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lay down under what circumstances a petition
for prohibition may be filed:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist
from further proceeding in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person – whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions – who has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner prays that
judgment be rendered, commanding the respondents to desist from further proceeding
in the action or matter specified in the petition. In this case, petitioner's primary intention
is to prevent respondents from implementing Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235.
Obviously, the writ being sought is in the nature of a prohibition, commanding
desistance.
We consider that respondents City Mayor, City Treasurer, and City Assessor are
performing ministerial functions. A ministerial function is one that an officer or tribunal
performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without
regard for the exercise of his or its own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of
the act done.20 Respondent Mayor, as chief executive of the city government, exercises
such powers and performs such duties and functions as provided for by the LGC and
other laws.21 Particularly, he has the duty to ensure that all taxes and other revenues
of the city are collected, and that city funds are applied to the payment of expenses and
settlement of obligations of the city, in accordance with law or ordinance. 22 On the other
hand, under the LGC, all local taxes, fees, and charges shall be collected by the
provincial, city, municipal, or barangay treasurer, or their duly-authorized deputies,
while the assessor shall take charge, among others, of ensuring that all laws and
policies governing the appraisal and assessment of real properties for taxation
purposes are properly executed.23 Anent the SHT, the Department of Finance (DOF)
Local Finance Circular No. 1-97, dated April 16, 1997, is more specific:
6.3 The Assessor’s office of the Identified LGU shall:
a. immediately undertake an inventory of lands within its
jurisdiction which shall be subject to the levy of the Social
Housing Tax (SHT) by the local sanggunian concerned;
b. inform the affected registered owners of the effectivity of
the SHT; a list of the lands and registered owners shall also
be posted in 3 conspicuous places in the city/municipality;
c. furnish the Treasurer’s office and the local sanggunian
concerned of the list of lands affected;
6.4 The Treasurer’s office shall:
a. collect the Social Housing Tax on top of the Real Property
Tax, SEF Tax and other special assessments;
b. report to the DOF, thru the Bureau of Local Government
Finance, and the Mayor’s office the monthly collections on
Social Housing Tax (SHT). An annual report should likewise
be submitted to the HUDCC on the total revenues raised
during the year pursuant to Sec. 43, R.A. 7279 and the
manner in which the same was disbursed.
Petitioner has adduced special and important reasons as to why direct recourse to us
should be allowed. Aside from presenting a novel question of law, this case calls for
immediate resolution since the challenged ordinances adversely affect the property
interests of all paying constituents of Quezon City. As well, this petition serves as a test
case for the guidance of other local government units (LGUs).Indeed, the petition at
bar is of transcendental importance warranting a relaxation of the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts. In Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers, et al. v. Lim , 24the Court cited the
case of Senator Jaworski v. Phil. Amusement & Gaming Corp., 25 where We
ratiocinated:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for
prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants
that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at
bar . x x x This is in accordance with the well entrenched principle that rules of
procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice,
must always be eschewed.26
B. Locus Standi of Petitioner
Respondents challenge petitioner’s legal standing to file this case on the ground that,
in relation to Section 3 of Ordinance No. SP-2095, petitioner failed to allege his
ownership of a property that has an assessed value of more than Php100,000.00 and,
with respect to Ordinance No. SP-2335, by what standing or personality he filed the
case to nullify the same. According to respondents, the petition is not a class suit, and
that, for not having specifically alleged that petitioner filed the case as a taxpayer, it
could only be surmised whether he is a party-in-interest who stands to be directly
benefited or injured by the judgment in this case.
It is a general rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest, who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or
a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest." "To qualify a person to be a real party-in-interest in whose
name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of
the right sought to be enforced."27
"Legal standing" or locus standi calls for more than just a generalized grievance.28 The
concept has been define d as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government al act
that is being challenged.29 The gist of the question of standing is whether a party
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 30
A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show "not only
that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely
that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way." It must be shown that he has been, or
is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he
is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute
complained of.31
Tested by the foregoing, petitioner in this case clearly has legal standing to file the
petition. He is a real party-in-interest to assail the constitutionality and legality of
Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235 because respondents did not dispute that he is
a registered co-owner of a residential property in Quezon City an d that he paid property
tax which already included the SHT and the garbage fee. He has substantial right to
seek a refund of the payments he made and to stop future imposition. While he is a
lone petitioner, his cause of action to declare the validity of the subject ordinances is
substantial and of paramount interest to similarly situated property owners in Quezon
City.
C. Litis Pendentia
Respondents move for the dismissal of this petition on the ground of litis pendentia.
They claim that, as early as February 22, 2012, a case entitled Alliance of Quezon City
Homeowners, Inc., et al., v. Hon. Herbert Bautista, et al. , docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-12- 7-820, has been pending in the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 104,
which assails the legality of Ordinance No. SP-2095. Relying on City of Makati, et al. v.
Municipality (now City) of Taguig, et al.,32 respondents assert that there is substantial
identity of parties between the two cases because petitioner herein and plaintiffs in the
civil case filed their respective cases as taxpayers of Quezon City.
For petitioner, however, respondents’ contention is untenable since he is not a party in
Alliance and does not even have the remotest identity or association with the plaintiffs
in said civil case. Moreover, respondents’ arguments would deprive this Court of its
jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of laws under Section 5, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution.33
Litis pendentia is a Latin term which literally means "a pending suit" and is variously
referred to in some decisions as lis pendens and auter action pendant.34 While it is
normally connected with the control which the court has on a property involved in a suit
during the continuance proceedings, it is more interposed as a ground for the dismissal
of a civil action pending in court.35 In Film Development Council of the Philippines v.
SM Prime Holdings, Inc.,36 We elucidated:
Litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to a situation where
two actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so
that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy against
multiplicity of suit and authorizes a court to dismiss a case motu proprio.
xxxx
The requisites in order that an action may be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia
are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in both
actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex
another more than once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of
action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the same subject matter should
not be the subject of controversy in courts more than once, in order that possible
conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and status
of persons, and also to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits.
Among the several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits relate to a single
or common cause of action are: (1) whether the same evidence would support and
sustain both the first and second causes of action; and (2) whether the defenses in one
case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other.
The determination of whether there is an identity of causes of action for purposes of
litis pendentia is inextricably linked with that of res judicata , each constituting an
element of the other. In either case, both relate to the sound practice of including, in a
single litigation, the disposition of all issues relating to a cause of action that is before
a court.37
There is substantial identity of the parties when there is a community of interest
between a party in the first case and a party in the second case albeit the latter was
not impleaded in the first case.38Moreover, the fact that the positions of the parties are
reversed, i.e., the plaintiffs in the first case are the defendants in the second case or
vice-versa, does not negate the identity of parties for purposes of determining whether
the case is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia . 39
In this case, it is notable that respondents failed to attach any pleading connected with
the alleged civil case pending before the Quezon City trial court.1âwphi1 Granting that
there is substantial identity of parties between said case and this petition, dismissal on
the ground of litis pendentia still cannot be had in view of the absence of the second
and third requisites. There is no way for us to determine whether both cases are based
on the same set of facts that require the presentation of the same evidence. Even if
founded on the same set of facts, the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for could be
different. Moreover, there is no basis to rule that the two cases are intimately related
and/or intertwined with one another such that the judgment that may be rendered in
one, regardless of which party would be successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other.
D. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Respondents contend that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies for his
non-compliance with Section 187 of the LGC, which mandates:
Section 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue
Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. – The procedure for approval of local tax
ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this
Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the
enactment thereof: Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or
legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty
(30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a
decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however,
That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance
and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally,
That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day
period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may
file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
The provision, the constitutionality of which was sustained in Drilon v. Lim ,40 has been
construed as mandatory41 considering that –
A municipal tax ordinance empowers a local government unit to impose taxes. The
power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance and
support the myriad activities of local government units for the delivery of basic services
essential to the promotion of the general welfare and enhancement of peace, progress,
and prosperity of the people. Consequently, any delay in implementing tax measures
would be to the detriment of the public. It is for this reason that protests over tax
ordinances are required to be done within certain time frames. x x x. 42
The obligatory nature of Section 187 was underscored in Hagonoy Market Vendor
Asso. v. Municipality of Hagonoy:43
x x x [T]he timeframe fixed by law fo r parties to avail of their legal remedies before
competent courts is not a "mere technicality" that can be easily brushed aside. The
periods stated in Section 187 of the Local Government Code are mandatory. x x x Being
its lifeblood, collection of revenues by the government is of paramount importance. The
funds for the operation of its agencies and provision of basic services to its inhabitants
are largely derived from its revenues and collections. Thus, it is essential that the
validity of revenue measures is not left uncertain for a considerable length of time.
Hence, the law provided a time limit for an aggrieved party to assail the legality of
revenue measures and tax ordinances."44
Despite these cases, the Court, in Ongsuco, et al. v. Hon. Malones,45held that there
was no need for petitioners therein to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting
to the courts, considering that there was only a pure question of law, the parties did not
dispute any factual matter on which they had to present evidence. Likewise, in Cagayan
Electric Power and Light Co., Inc. v. City of Cagayan de Oro, 46 We relaxed the
application of the rules in view of the more substantive matters. For the same reasons,
this petition is an exception to the general rule.
Substantive Issues
Petitioner asserts that the protection of real properties from informal settlers and the
collection of garbage are basic and essential duties and functions of the Quezon City
Government. By imposing the SHT and the garbage fee, the latter has shown a
penchant and pattern to collect taxes to pay for public services that could be covered
by its revenues from taxes imposed on property, idle land, business, transfer,
amusement, etc., as well as the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA ) from the National
Government. For petitioner, it is noteworthy that respondents did not raise the issue
that the Quezon City Government is in dire financial state and desperately needs
money to fund housing for informal settlers and to pay for garbage collection. In fact, it
has not denied that its revenue collection in 2012 is in the sum of ₱13.69 billion.
Moreover, the imposition of the SHT and the garbage fee cannot be justified by the
Quezon City Government as an exercise of its power to create sources of income under
Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.47 According to petitioner, the constitutional
provision is not a carte blanche for the LGU to tax everything under its territorial and
political jurisdiction as the provision itself admits of guidelines and limitations.
Petitioner further claims that the annual property tax is an ad valorem tax, a percentage
of the assessed value of the property, which is subject to revision every three (3) years
in order to reflect an increase in the market value of the property. The SHT and the
garbage fee are actually increases in the property tax which are not based on the
assessed value of the property or its reassessment every three years; hence, in
violation of Sections 232 and 233 of the LGC.48
For their part, respondents relied on the presumption in favor of the constitutionality of
Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235, invoking Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v.
Municipality of Victorias, etc.,49 People v. Siton, et al.,50 and Hon. Ermita v. Hon.
Aldecoa-Delorino .51 They argue that the burden of establishing the invalidity of an
ordinance rests heavily upon the party challenging its constitutionality. They insist that
the questioned ordinances are proper exercises of police power similar to Telecom. &
Broadcast Attys. of the Phils., Inc. v. COMELEC52 and Social Justice Society (SJS),
et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.53 and that their enactment finds basis in the social justice
principle enshrined in Section 9,54 Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
As to the issue of publication, respondents argue that where the law provides for its
own effectivity, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary so long as it is not
punitive in character, citing Balbuna, et al. v. Hon. Secretary of Education, et al. 55 and
Askay v. Cosalan .[56]] Thus, Ordinance No. SP-2095 took effect after its publication,
while Ordinance No. SP-2235 became effective after its approval on December 26,
2013.
Additionally, the parties articulate the following positions:
On the Socialized Housing Tax
Respondents emphasize that the SHT is pursuant to the social justice principle found
in Sections 1 and 2, Article XIII57 of the 1987 Constitution and Sections 2 (a)58 and
4359 of R.A. No. 7279, or the "Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 ( UDHA ).
Relying on Manila Race Horse Trainers Assn., Inc. v. De La Fuente,60and Victorias
Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, etc., 61respondents assert that Ordinance
No. SP-2095 applies equally to all real property owners without discrimination. There
is no way that the ordinance could violate the equal protection clause because real
property owners and informal settlers do not belong to the same class.
Ordinance No. SP-2095 is also not oppressive since the tax rate being imposed is
consistent with the UDHA. While the law authorizes LGUs to collect SHT on properties
with an assessed value of more than ₱50,000.00, the questioned ordinance only covers
properties with an assessed value exceeding ₱100,000.00. As well, the ordinance
provides for a tax credit equivalent to the total amount of the special assessment paid
by the property owner beginning in the sixth (6th) year of the effectivity of the ordinance.
On the contrary, petitioner claims that the collection of the SHT is tantamount to a
penalty imposed on real property owners due to the failure of respondent Quezon City
Mayor and Council to perform their duty to secure and protect real property owners
from informal settlers, thereby burdening them with the expenses to provide funds for
housing. For petitioner, the SHT cannot be viewed as a "charity" from real property
owners since it is forced, not voluntary.
Also, petitioner argues that the collection of the SHT is a kind of class legislation that
violates the right of property owners to equal protection of the laws since it favors
informal settlers who occupy property not their own and pay no taxes over law-abiding
real property owners w ho pay income and realty taxes.
Petitioner further contends that respondents’ characterization of the SHT as "nothing
more than an advance payment on the real property tax" has no statutory basis.
Allegedly, property tax cannot be collected before it is due because, under the LGC,
chartered cities are authorized to impose property tax based on the assessed value
and the general revision of assessment that is made every three (3) years.
As to the rationale of SHT stated in Ordinance No. SP-2095, which, in turn, was based
on Section 43 of the UDHA, petitioner asserts that there is no specific provision in the
1987 Constitution stating that the ownership and enjoyment of property bear a social
function. And even if there is, it is seriously doubtful and far-fetched that the principle
means that property owners should provide funds for the housing of informal settlers
and for home site development. Social justice and police power, petitioner believes,
does not mean imposing a tax on one, or that one has to give up something, for the
benefit of another. At best, the principle that property ownership and enjoyment bear a
social function is but a reiteration of the Civil Law principle that property should not be
enjoyed and abused to the injury of other properties and the community, and that the
use of the property may be restricted by police power, the exercise of which is not
involved in this case.
Finally, petitioner alleges that 6 Bistekvilles will be constructed out of the SHT collected.
Bistek is the monicker of respondent City Mayor. The Bistekvilles makes it clear,
therefore, that politicians will take the credit for the tax imposed on real property owners.
On the Garbage Fee
Respondents claim that Ordinance No. S-2235, which is an exercise of police power,
collects on the average from every household a garbage fee in the meager amount of
thirty-three (33) centavos per day compared with the sum of ₱1,659.83 that the Quezon
City Government annually spends for every household for garbage collection and waste
management.62
In addition, there is no double taxation because the ordinance involves a fee. Even
assuming that the garbage fee is a tax, the same cannot be a direct duplicate tax as it
is imposed on a different subject matter and is of a different kind or character. Based
on Villanueva, et al. v. City of Iloilo63 and Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of
Victorias, etc.,64 there is no "taxing twice" because the real property tax is imposed on
ownership based on its assessed value, while the garbage fee is required on the
domestic household. The only reference to the property is the determination of the
applicable rate and the facility of collection.
Petitioner argues, however, that Ordinance No. S-2235 cannot be justified as an
exercise of police power. The cases of Calalang v. Williams,65 Patalinghug v. Court of
Appeals,66 and Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., 67 which were
cited by respondents, are inapplicable since the assailed ordinance is a revenue
measure and does not regulate the disposal or other aspect of garbage.
The subject ordinance, for petitioner, is discriminatory as it collects garbage fee only
from domestic households and not from restaurants, food courts, fast food chains, and
other commercial dining places that spew garbage much more than residential property
owners.
Petitioner likewise contends that the imposition of garbage fee is tantamount to double
taxation because garbage collection is a basic and essential public service that should
be paid out from property tax, business tax, transfer tax, amusement tax, community
tax certificate, other taxes, and the IRA of the Quezon City Government. To bolster the
claim, he states that the revenue collection of the Quezon City Government reached
Php13.69 billion in 2012. A small portion of said amount could be spent for garbage
collection and other essential services.
It is further noted that the Quezon City Government already collects garbage fee under
Section 4768 of R.A. No. 9003, or the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000,
which authorizes LGUs to impose fees in amounts sufficient to pay the costs of
preparing, adopting, and implementing a solid waste management plan, and that LGUs
have access to the Solid Waste Management (SWM) Fund created under Section
4669 of the same law. Also, according to petitioner, it is evident that Ordinance No.
S2235 is inconsistent with R.A. No. 9003 for whil e the law encourages segregation,
composting, and recycling of waste, the ordinance only emphasizes the collection and
payment of garbage fee; while the law calls for an active involvement of the barangay
in the collection, segregation, and recycling of garbage, the ordinance skips such
mandate. Lastly, in challenging the ordinance, petitioner avers that the garbage fee
was collected even if the required publication of its approval had not yet elapsed. He
notes that on January 7, 2014, he paid his realty tax which already included the garbage
fee.
The Court's Ruling
Respondents correctly argued that an ordinance, as in every law, is presumed valid.
An ordinance carries with it the presumption of validity. The question of reasonableness
though is open to judicial inquiry. Much should be left thus to the discretion of municipal
authorities. Courts will go slow in writing off an ordinance as unreasonable unless the
amount is so excessive as to be prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or
confiscatory. A rule which has gained acceptance is that factors relevant to such an
inquiry are the municipal conditions as a whole and the nature of the business made
subject to imposition.70
For an ordinance to be valid though, it must not only be within the corporate powers of
the LGU to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
should also conform to the following requirements: (1) not contrary to the Constitution
or any statute; (2) not unfair or oppressive; (3) not partial or discriminatory; (4) not
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) general and consistent with public policy; and (6)
not unreasonable.71 As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal
(i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU and
whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the
substantive ( i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the
limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of
fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy). 72
An ordinance must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of
consistency with the prevailing laws.73 If not, it is void.74
Ordinance should uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution.75 As to
conformity with existing statutes,
Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals76 has this to say:
It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and
subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general
character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid. The principle is
frequently expressed in the declaration that municipal authorities, under a general grant
of power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant
to the general policy of the state. In every power to pass ordinances given to a
municipality, there is an implied restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with
the general law. In the language of Justice Isagani Cruz (ret.), this Court, in Magtajas
vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., ruled that:
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is
obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local
councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as
the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local
government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their
power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly
from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot
exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control.
Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a
single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong,
sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation
could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation
themselves are concerned. They are so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the
legislature.
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units
has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the
policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm
that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly
reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still
includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold
or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct
conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be
withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the
principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate
it.77
LGUs must be reminded that they merely form part of the whole; that the policy of
ensuring the autonomy of local governments was never intended by the drafters of the
1987 Constitution to create an imperium in imperio and install an intra-sovereign
political subdivision independent of a single sovereign state.78
"[M]unicipal corporations are bodies politic and corporate, created not only as local
units of local self-government, but as governmental agencies of the state. The
legislature, by establishing a municipal corporation, does not divest the State of any of
its sovereignty; absolve itself from its right and duty to administer the public affairs of
the entire state; or divest itself of any power over the inhabitants of the district which it
possesses before the charter was granted."79
LGUs are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from
the national legislature; they are mere agents vested with what is called the power of
subordinate legislation.80 "Congress enacted the LGC as the implementing law for the
delegation to the various LGUs of the State’s great powers, namely: the police power,
the power of eminent domain, and the power of taxation. The LGC was fashioned to
delineate the specific parameters and limitations to be complied with by each LGU in
the exercise of these delegated powers with the view of making each LGU a fully
functioning subdivision of the State subject to the constitutional and statutory
limitations."81
Specifically, with regard to the power of taxation, it is indubitably the most effective
instrument to raise needed revenues in financing and supporting myriad activities of
the LGUs for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general
welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. 82 As
this Court opined in National Power Corp. v. City of Cabanatuan: 83
In recent years, the increasing social challenges of the times expanded the scope of
state activity, and taxation has become a tool to realize social justice and the equitable
distribution of wealth, economic progress and the protection of local industries as well
as public welfare and similar objectives. Taxation assume s even greater significance
with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Thenceforth, the power to tax is no longer
vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority
to levy taxes, fees and other charges pursuant to Article X, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution, viz: "Section 5. Each Local Government unit shall have the power to
create its own sources of revenue, to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy
of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
governments."
This paradigm shift results from the realization that genuine development can be
achieved only by strengthening local autonomy and promoting decentralization of
governance. For a long time, the country’s highly centralized government structure has
bred a culture of dependence among local government leaders upon the national
leadership. It has also "dampened the spirit of initiative, innovation and imaginative
resilience in matters of local development on the part of local government leaders." The
only way to shatter this culture of dependence is to give the LGUs a wider role in the
delivery of basic services, and confer them sufficient powers to generate their own
sources for the purpose. To achieve this goal, Section 3 of Article X of the 1987
Constitution mandates Congress to enact a local government code that will, consistent
with the basic policy of local autonomy , set the guidelines and limitations to this grant
of taxing powers x x x84
Fairly recently, We also stated in Pelizloy Realty Corporation v. Province of
Benguet85 that:
The rule governing the taxing power of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
is summarized in Icard v. City Council of Baguio :
It is settled that a municipal corporation unlike a sovereign state is clothed with no
inherent power of taxation. The charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer
that power or the municipality, cannot assume it. And the power when granted is to be
construed in strictissimi juris . Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the term used in
granting that power must be resolved against the municipality. Inferences, implications,
deductions – all these – have no place in the interpretation of the taxing power of a
municipal corporation. [Underscoring supplied]
xxxx
Per Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, "the power to tax is no longer vested
exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to levy
taxes, fees and other charges." Nevertheless, such authority is "subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide."
In conformity with Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. Book
II of the LGC governs local taxation and fiscal matters. 86
Indeed, LGUs have no inherent power to tax except to the extent that such power might
be delegated to them either by the basic law or by the statute. 87 "Under the now
prevailing Constitution , where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute , the
tax power must be deemed to exist although Congress may provide statutory limitations
and guidelines. The basic rationale for the current rule is to safeguard the viability and
self-sufficiency of local government units by directly granting them general and broad
tax powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be
absolute and unconditional; the constitutional objective obviously is to ensure that,
while the local government units are being strengthened and made more autonomous
, the legislature must still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not be over-burdened or
saddled with multiple and unreasonable impositions; (b) each local government unit will
have its fair share of available resources; (c) the resources of the national government
will not be unduly disturbed; and (d) local taxation will be fair, uniform, and just." 88
Subject to the provisions of the LGC and consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy, every LGU is now empowered and authorized to create its own sources of
revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges which shall accrue exclusively to the local
government unit as well as to apply its resources and assets for productive,
developmental, or welfare purposes, in the exercise or furtherance of their
governmental or proprietary powers and functions. 89 The relevant provisions of the
LGC which establish the parameters of the taxing power of the LGUs are as follows:
SECTION 130. Fundamental Principles. – The following fundamental principles shall
govern th e exercise of the taxing and other revenue-raising powers of local
government units:
(a) Taxation shall be uniform in each local government unit;
(b) Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:
(1) be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer’s
ability to pay;
(2) be levied and collected only for public purposes;
 (3) not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory;
(4) not be contrary to law, public policy, national economic policy, or
in restraint of trade;
(c) The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall in
no case be left to any private person;
(d) The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall inure
solely to the benefit of, and be subject to the disposition by, the local
government unit levying the tax, fee, charge or other imposition unless
otherwise specifically provided herein; and,
(e) Each local government unit shall, as far as practicable, evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
SECTION 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units.
– Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:
(a) Income tax, except when levied on banks and other financial institutions;
(b) Documentary stamp tax;
(c) Taxes on estates, inheritance, gifts, legacies and other acquisitions mortis
causa, except as otherwise provided herein;
(d) Customs duties, registration fees of vessel and wharage on wharves,
tonnage dues, and all other kinds of customs fees, charges and dues except
wharfage on wharves constructed and maintained by the local government
unit concerned;
(e) Taxes, fees, and charges and other impositions upon goods carried into or
out of, or passing through, the territorial jurisdictions of local government units
in the guise of charges for wharfage, tolls for bridges or otherwise, or other
taxes, fees, or charges in any form whatsoever upon such goods or
merchandise;
(f) Taxes, fees or charges on agricultural and aquatic products when sold by
marginal farmers or fishermen;
(g) Taxes on business enterprises certified to by the Board of Investments as
pioneer or non-pioneer for a period of six (6) and four (4) years, respectively
from the date of registration;
(h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal Revenue
Code, as amended, and taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products;
(i) Percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or
similar transactions on goods or services except as otherwise provided herein;
(j) Taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons
engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by hire and common
carriers by air, land or water, except as provided in this Code;
(k) Taxes on premiums paid by way of reinsurance or retrocession;
(l) Taxes, fees or charges for the registration of motor vehicles and for the
issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving thereof, except
tricycles;
(m) Taxes, fees, or other charges on Philippine products actually exported,
except as otherwise provided herein;
(n) Taxes, fees, or charges, on Countryside and Barangay Business
Enterprises and cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6810 and
Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred thirty-eight (R.A. No. 6938)
otherwise known as the "Cooperative Code of the Philippines" respectively;
and
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its
agencies and instrumentalities, and local government units.
SECTION 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. – Except as otherwise provided in this Code,
the city, may levy the taxes, fees, and charges which the province or municipality may
impose: Provided, however, That the taxes, fees and charges levied and collected by
highly urbanized and independent component cities shall accrue to them and
distributed in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
The rates of taxes that the city may levy may exceed the maximum rates allowed for
the province or municipality by not more than fifty percent (50%) except the rates of
professional and amusement taxes.
SECTION 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. – Local government units
may exercise the power to levy taxes, fees or charges on any base or subject not
otherwise specifically enumerated herein or taxed under the provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended, or other applicable laws: Provided, That the
taxes, fees, or charges shall not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or
contrary to declared national policy: Provided, further, That the ordinance levying such
taxes, fees or charges shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted
for the purpose.
On the Socialized Housing Tax
Contrary to petitioner’s submission, the 1987 Constitution explicitly espouses the view
that the use of property bears a social function and that all economic agents shall
contribute to the common good.90 The Court already recognized this in Social Justice
Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.:91
Property has not only an individual function, insofar as it has to provide for the needs
of the owner, but also a social function insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the
other members of society. The principle is this:
Police power proceeds from the principle that every holder of property, however
absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use
of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property, no r injurious to the right of the community. Rights of
property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to reasonable
limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such
reasonable restraints and regulations established by law as the legislature, under the
governing an d controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think
necessary and expedient.92
Police power, which flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex (the
welfare of the people is the supreme law), is the plenary power vested in the legislature
to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety and general welfare of the people.93 Property rights of individuals may
be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government
in the exercise of police power. 94 In this jurisdiction, it is well-entrenched that taxation
may be made the implement of the state’s police power. 95
Ordinance No. SP-2095 imposes a Socialized Housing Tax equivalent to 0.5% on the
assessed value of land in excess of Php100,000.00. This special assessment is the
same tax referred to in R.A. No. 7279 or the UDHA.96 The SHT is one of the sources
of funds for urban development and housing program.97 Section 43 of the law provides:
Sec. 43. Socialized Housing Tax . – Consistent with the constitutional principle that the
ownership and enjoyment of property bear a social function and to raise funds for the
Program, all local government units are hereby authorized to impose an additional one-
half percent (0.5%) tax on the assessed value of all lands in urban areas in excess of
Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00).
The rationale of the SHT is found in the preambular clauses of the subject ordinance,
to wit:
WHEREAS, the imposition of additional tax is intended to provide the City Government
with sufficient funds to initiate, implement and undertake Socialized Housing Projects
and other related preliminary activities;
WHEREAS, the imposition of 0.5% tax will benefit the Socialized Housing Programs
and Projects of the City Government, specifically the marginalized sector through the
acquisition of properties for human settlements;
WHEREAS, the removal of the urban blight will definitely increase fair market value of
properties in the city[.]
The above-quoted are consistent with the UDHA, which the LGUs are charged to
implement in their respective localities in coordination with the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council, the national housing agencies, the Presidential
Commission for the Urban Poor, the private sector, and other non-government
organizations.98 It is the declared policy of the State to undertake a comprehensive and
continuing urban development and housing program that shall, among others, uplift the
conditions of the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban areas and in
resettlement areas, and provide for the rational use and development of urban land in
order to bring a bout, among others, reduction in urban dysfunctions, particularly those
that adversely affect public health, safety and ecology, and access to land and housing
by the underprivileged and homeless citizens.99 Urban renewal and resettlement shall
include the rehabilitation and development of blighted and slum areas 100 and the
resettlement of program beneficiaries in accordance with the provisions of the
UDHA.101 Under the UDHA, socialized housing102 shall be the primary strategy in
providing shelter for the underprivileged and homeless.103 The LGU or the NHA, in
cooperation with the private developers and concerned agencies, shall provide
socialized housing or re settlement areas with basic services and facilities such as
potable water, power and electricity, and an adequate power distribution system,
sewerage facilities, and an efficient and adequate solid waste disposal system; and
access to primary roads and transportation facilities.104 The provisions for health,
education, communications, security, recreation, relief and welfare shall also be
planned and be given priority for implementation by the LGU and concerned agencies
in cooperation with the private sector and the beneficiaries themselves.105
Moreover, within two years from the effectivity of the UDHA, the LGUs, in coordination
with the NHA, are directed to implement the relocation and resettlement of persons
living in danger areas such as esteros , railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks,
shorelines, waterways, and other public places like sidewalks, roads, parks, and
playgrounds.106 In coordination with the NHA, the LG Us shall provide relocation or
resettlement sites with basic services and facilities and access to employment and
livelihood opportunities sufficient to meet the basic needs of the affected families. 107
Clearly, the SHT charged by the Quezon City Government is a tax which is within its
power to impose. Aside from the specific authority vested by Section 43 of the UDHA,
cities are allowed to exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions
and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective
provision of the basic services and facilities which include, among others, programs
and projects for low-cost housing and other mass dwellings.108 The collections made
accrue to its socialized housing programs and projects.
The tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it is levied
with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power for
the general welfare of the entire city. It is greatly imbued with public interest. Removing
slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to the underprivileged and homeless
constituents but advantageous to the real property owners as well. The situation will
improve the value of the their property investments, fully enjoying the same in view of
an orderly, secure, and safe community, and will enhance the quality of life of the poor,
making them law-abiding constituents and better consumers of business products.
Though broad and far-reaching, police power is subordinate to constitutional limitations
and is subject to the requirement that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public
good.109 In the words of City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.: 110
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with
utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of
the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its
exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect
and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming
part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected
only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest
or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with
the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
xxxx
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment
of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only
must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable
relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public
interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to
be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down
as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights – a violation of the due process clause.111
As with the State, LGUs may be considered as having properly exercised their police
power only if there is a lawful subject and a lawful method or, to be precise, if the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the mean s employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.112
In this case, petitioner argues that the SHT is a penalty imposed on real property
owners because it burdens them with expenses to provide funds for the housing of
informal settlers, and that it is a class legislation since it favors the latter who occupy
properties which is not their own and pay no taxes.
We disagree.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.113 The guarantee means
that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which
is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances. 114 Similar subjects
should not be treated differently so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others.115 The law may, therefore, treat and regulate one class
differently from another class provided there are real and substantial differences to
distinguish one class from another.116
An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional
guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable
classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it
must apply equally to all members of the same class.117For the purpose of undertaking
a comprehensive and continuing urban development and housing program, the
disparities between a real property owner and an informal settler as two distinct classes
are too obvious and need not be discussed at length. The differentiation conforms to
the practical dictates of justice and equity and is not discriminatory within the meaning
of the Constitution. Notably, the public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the
motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one over
another.118 It is inherent in the power to tax that a State is free to select the subjects of
taxation.119Inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation
or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.120
Further, the reasonableness of Ordinance No. SP-2095 cannot be disputed. It is not
confiscatory or oppressive since the tax being imposed therein is below what the UDHA
actually allows. As pointed out by respondents, while the law authorizes LGUs to collect
SHT on lands with an assessed value of more than ₱50,000.00, the questioned
ordinance only covers lands with an assessed value exceeding ₱100,000.00. Even
better, on certain conditions, the ordinance grants a tax credit equivalent to the total
amount of the special assessment paid beginning in the sixth (6th) year of its effectivity.
Far from being obnoxious, the provisions of the subject ordinance are fair and just.
On the Garbage Fee
In the United States of America, it has been held that the authority of a municipality to
regulate garbage falls within its police power to protect public health, safety, and
welfare.121 As opined, the purposes and policy underpinnings of the police power to
regulate the collection and disposal of solid waste are: (1) to preserve and protect the
public health and welfare as well as the environment by minimizing or eliminating a
source of disease and preventing and abating nuisances; and (2) to defray costs and
ensure financial stability of the system for the benefit of the entire community, with the
sum of all charges marshalled and designed to pay for the expense of a systemic refuse
disposal scheme.122
Ordinances regulating waste removal carry a strong presumption of
validity.123 Not surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of U.S. cases addressing a city's
authority to impose mandatory garbage service and fees have upheld the ordinances
against constitutional and statutory challenges.124
A municipality has an affirmative duty to supervise and control the collection of garbage
within its corporate limits.125The LGC specifically assigns the responsibility of regulation
and oversight of solid waste to local governing bodies because the Legislature
determined that such bodies were in the best position to develop efficient waste
management programs.126 To impose on local governments the responsibility to
regulate solid waste but not grant them the authority necessary to fulfill the same would
lead to an absurd result."127 As held in one U.S. case:
x x x When a municipality has general authority to regulate a particular subject matter,
the manner and means of exercising those powers, where not specifically prescribed
by the legislature, are left to the discretion of the municipal authorities. x x x Leaving
the manner of exercising municipal powers to the discretion of municipal authorities
"implies a range of reasonableness within which a municipality's exercise of discretion
will not be interfered with or upset by the judiciary."128
In this jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 16 of the LGC and in the proper exercise of its
corporate powers under Section 22 of the same, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Quezon City, like other local legislative bodies, is empowered to enact ordinances,
approve resolutions, and appropriate funds for the genera l welfare of the city and its
inhabitants.129Section 16 of the LGC provides:
SECTION 16. General Welfare . – Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support
the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the
State to LGUs.130 The provisions related thereto are liberally interpreted to give more
powers to LGUs in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of
life for the people in the community.131 Wide discretion is vested on the legislative
authority to determine not only what the interests of the public require but also what
measures are necessary for the protection of such interests since the Sanggunian is in
the best position to determine the needs of its constituents.132
One of the operative principles of decentralization is that, subject to the provisions of
the LGC and national policies, the LGUs shall share with the national government the
responsibility in the management and maintenance of ecological balance within their
territorial jurisdiction.133 In this regard, cities are allowed to exercise such other powers
and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate,
or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities which
include, among others, solid waste disposal system or environmental management
system and services or facilities related to general hygiene and sanitation. 134R.A. No.
9003, or the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, 135 affirms this authority
as it expresses that the LGUs shall be primarily responsible for the implementation and
enforcement of its provisions within their respective jurisdictions while establishing a
cooperative effort among the national government, other local government units, non-
government organizations, and the private sector.136
Necessarily, LGUs are statutorily sanctioned to impose and collect such reasonable
fees and charges for services rendered.137 "Charges" refer to pecuniary liability, as
rents or fees against persons or property, while "Fee" means a charge fixed by law or
ordinance for the regulation or inspection of a business or activity. 138
The fee imposed for garbage collections under Ordinance No. SP-2235 is a charge
fixed for the regulation of an activity. The basis for this could be discerned from the
foreword of said Ordinance, to wit:
WHEREAS, Quezon City being the largest and premiere city in the Philippines in terms
of population and urban geographical areas, apart from being competent and efficient
in the delivery of public service, apparently requires a big budgetary allocation in order
to address the problems relative and connected to the prompt and efficient delivery of
basic services such as the effective system of waste management, public information
programs on proper garb age and proper waste disposal, including the imposition of
waste regulatory measures;
WHEREAS, to help augment the funds to be spent for the city’s waste management
system, the City Government through the Sangguniang Panlungsod deems it
necessary to impose a schedule of reasonable fees or charges for the garbage
collection services for residential (domestic household) that it renders to the public.
Certainly, as opposed to petitioner’s opinion, the garbage fee is not a tax. In Smart
Communications, Inc. v. Municipality of Malvar, Batangas , 139the Court had the
occasion to distinguish these two concepts:
In Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City, the Court declared that "if the
generating of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the
imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that incidentally
revenue is also obtained does not make the imposition a tax."
In Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, the Court reiterated that the
purpose and effect of the imposition determine whether it is a tax or a fee, and that the
lack of any standards for such imposition gives the presumption that the same is a tax.
We accordingly say that the designation given by the municipal authorities does not
decide whether the imposition is properly a license tax or a license fee.1awp++i1 The
determining factors are the purpose and effect of the imposition as may be apparent
from the provisions of the ordinance. Thus, "[w]hen no police inspection, supervision,
or regulation is provided, nor any standard set for the applicant to establish, or that he
agrees to attain or maintain, but any and all persons engaged in the business
designated, without qualification or hindrance, may come, and a license on payment of
the stipulated sum will issue, to do business, subject to no prescribed rule of conduct
and under no guardian eye, but according to the unrestrained judgment or fancy of the
applicant and licensee, the presumption is strong that the power of taxation, and not
the police power, is being exercised."
In Georgia, U.S.A., assessments for garbage collection services have been
consistently treated as a fee and not a tax.140
In another U.S. case,141 the garbage fee was considered as a "service charge" rather
than a tax as it was actually a fee for a service given by the city which had previously
been provided at no cost to its citizens.
Hence, not being a tax, the contention that the garbage fee under Ordinance No. SP-
2235 violates the rule on double taxation142 must necessarily fail.
Nonetheless, although a special charge, tax, or assessment may be imposed by a
municipal corporation, it must be reasonably commensurate to the cost of providing the
garbage service.143 To pass judicial scrutiny, a regulatory fee must not produce
revenue in excess of the cost of the regulation because such fee will be construed as
an illegal tax when the revenue generated by the regulation exceeds the cost of the
regulation.144
Petitioner argues that the Quezon City Government already collects garbage fee under
Section 47 of R.A. No. 9003, which authorizes LGUs to impose fees in amounts
sufficient to pay the costs of preparing, adopting, and implementing a solid waste
management plan, and that it has access to the SWM Fund under Section 46 of the
same law. Moreover, Ordinance No. S-2235 is inconsistent with R.A. No. 9003,
because the ordinance emphasizes the collection and payment of garbage fee with no
concern for segregation, composting and recycling of wastes. It also skips the mandate
of the law calling for the active involvement of the barangay in the collection,
segregation, and recycling of garbage.
We now turn to the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9003.
Under R.A. No. 9003, it is the declared policy of the State to adopt a systematic,
comprehensive and ecological solid waste management program which shall, among
others, ensure the proper segregation, collection, transport, storage, treatment and
disposal of solid waste through the formulation and adoption of the best environmental
practices in ecological waste management.145 The law provides that segregation and
collection of solid waste shall be conducted at the barangay level, specifically for
biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes, while the collection of non-
recyclable materials and special wastes shall be the responsibility of the municipality
or city.146Mandatory segregation of solid wastes shall primarily be conducted at the
source, to include household, institutional, industrial, commercial and agricultural
sources.147 Segregation at source refers to a solid waste management practice of
separating, at the point of origin, different materials found in soli d waste in order to
promote recycling and re-use of resources and to reduce the volume of waste for
collection and disposal.148 Based on Rule XVII of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 2001-34, Series of 2001,149which
is the Implementing Rules and Regulations ( IRR ) of R.A. No. 9003, barangays shall
be responsible for the collection, segregation, and recycling of biodegradable,
recyclable , compostable and reusable wastes.150
For the purpose, a Materials Recovery Facility (MRF), which shall receive
biodegradable wastes for composting and mixed non-biodegradable wastes for final
segregation, re-use and recycling, is to be established in every barangay or cluster of
barangays.151
According to R.A. 9003, an LGU, through its local solid waste management board, is
mandated by law to prepare a 10-year solid waste management plan consistent with
the National Solid Waste Management Framework.152 The plan shall be for the re-use,
recycling and composting of wastes generated in its jurisdiction; ensure the efficient
management of solid waste generated within its jurisdiction; and place primary
emphasis on implementation of all feasible re-use, recycling, and composting programs
while identifying the amount of landfill and transformation capacity that will be needed
for solid waste which cannot be re-used, recycled, or composted.153 One of the
components of the so lid waste management plan is source reduction:
(e) Source reduction – The source reduction component shall include a program and
implementation schedule which shows the methods by which the LGU will, in
combination with the recycling and composting components, reduce a sufficient amount
of solid waste disposed of in accordance with the diversion requirements of Section 20.
The source reduction component shall describe the following:
(1) strategies in reducing the volume of solid waste generated at source;
(2) measures for implementing such strategies and the resources necessary
to carry out such activities;
(3) other appropriate waste reduction technologies that may also be
considered, provide d that such technologies conform with the standards set
pursuant to this Act;
(4) the types of wastes to be reduced pursuant to Section 15 of this Act;
(5) the methods that the LGU will use to determine the categories of solid
wastes to be diverted from disposal at a disposal facility through re-use ,
recycling and composting; and
(6) new facilities and of expansion of existing facilities which will be needed to
implement re-use, recycling and composting.
The LGU source reduction component shall include the evaluation and identification of
rate structures and fees for the purpose of reducing the amount of waste generated,
and other source reduction strategies, including but not limited to, program s and
economic incentives provided under Sec. 45 of this Act to reduce the use of non-
recyclable materials, replace disposable materials and products with reusable
materials and products, reduce packaging, and increase the efficiency of the use of
paper, cardboard, glass, metal, and other materials. The waste reduction activities of
the community shall al so take into account, among others, local capability, economic
viability, technical requirements, social concerns, disposition of residual waste and
environmental impact: Provided , That, projection of future facilities needed and
estimated cost shall be incorporated in the plan. x x x154
The solid waste management pl an shall also include an implementation schedule for
solid waste diversion:
SEC. 20. Establishing Mandatory Solid Waste Diversion. – Each LGU plan shall include
an implementation schedule which shows that within five (5) years after the effectivity
of this Act, the LGU shall divert at least 25% of all solid waste from waste disposal
facilities through re-use, recycling, and composting activities and other resource
recovery activities: Provided , That the waste diversion goals shall be increased every
three (3) years thereafter: Provided , further, That nothing in this Section prohibits a
local government unit from implementing re-use, recycling, and composting activities
designed to exceed the goal.
The baseline for the twenty-five percent (25%) shall be derived from the waste
characterization result155 that each LGU is mandated to undertake.156In accordance
with Section 46 of R.A. No. 9003, the LGUs are entitled to avail of the SWM Fund on
the basis of their approved solid waste management plan. Aside from this, they may
also impose SWM Fees under Section 47 of the law, which states:
SEC. 47. Authority to Collect Solid Waste Management Fees – The local government
unit shall impose fees in amounts sufficient to pay the costs of preparing, adopting, and
implementing a solid waste management plan prepared pursuant to this Act. The fees
shall be based on the following minimum factors:
(a) types of solid waste;
(b) amount/volume of waste; and
(c) distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility.
The fees shall be used to pay the actual costs incurred by the LGU in collecting the
local fees. In determining the amounts of the fees, an LGU shall include only those
costs directly related to the adoption and implementation of the plan and the setting
and collection of the local fees.
Rule XVII of the IRR of R.A. No. 9003 sets forth the details:
Section 1. Power to Collect Solid Waste Management Fees . – The Local SWM
Board/Local SWM Cluster Board shall impose fees on the SWM services provided for
by the LGU and/or any authorized organization or unit. In determining the amounts of
the fees, a Local SWM Board/Local SWM Cluster Board shall include only those costs
directly related to the adoption and implementation of the SWM Plan and the setting
and collection of the local fees. This power to impose fees may be ceded to the private
sector and civil society groups which have been duly accredited by the Local SWM
Boar d/Local SWM Cluster Board; provided, the SWM fees shall be covered by a
Contract or Memorandum of Agreement between the respective boa rd and the private
sector or civil society group.
The fees shall pay for the costs of preparing, adopting and implementing a SWM Plan
prepared pursuant to the Act. Further, the fees shall also be used to pay the actual
costs incurred in collecting the local fees and for project sustainability.
Section 2. Basis of SWM Service Fees
Reasonable SWM service fees shall be computed based on but not limited to the
following minimum factors:
a) Types of solid waste to include special waste
b) amount/volume of waste
c) distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility
d) capacity or type of LGU constituency
e) cost of construction
f) cost of management
g) type of technology
Section 3. Collection of Fees. – Fees may be collected corresponding to the following
levels:
a) Barangay – The Barangay may impose fees for collection and segregation
of biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes from households,
commerce, other sources of domestic wastes, and for the use of Barangay
MRFs. The computation of the fees shall be established by the respective
SWM boards. The manner of collection of the fees shall be dependent on the
style of administration of respective Barangay Councils. However, all
transactions shall follow the Commission on Audit rules on collection of fees.
b) Municipality – The municipal and city councils may impose fees on the
barangay MRFs for the collection and transport of non-recyclable and special
wastes and for the disposal of these into the sanitary landfill. The level and
procedure for exacting fees shall be defined by the Local SWM Board/Local
SWM Cluster Board and supported by LGU ordinances; however, payments
shall be consistent with the accounting system of government.
c) Private Sector/Civil Society Group – On the basis of the stipulations of
contract or Memorandum of Agreement, the private sector or civil society
group shall impose fees for collection, transport and tipping in their SLFs.
Receipts and invoices shall be issued to the paying public or to the
government.
From the afore-quoted provisions, it is clear that the authority of a municipality or city
to impose fees is limited to the collection and transport of non-recyclable and special
wastes and for the disposal of these into the sanitary landfill. Barangays, on the other
hand, have the authority to impose fees for the collection and segregation of
biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes from households, commerce, other
sources of domestic wastes, and for the use of barangay MRFs. This is but consistent
with
Section 10 of R.A. No. 9003 directing that segregation and collection of biodegradable,
compostable and reusable wastes shall be conducted at the barangay level, while the
collection of non-recyclable materials and special wastes shall be the responsibility of
the municipality or city.
In this case, the alleged bases of Ordinance No. S-2235 in imposing the garbage fee
is the volume of waste currently generated by each person in Quezon City, which
purportedly stands at 0.66 kilogram per day, and the increasing trend of waste
generation for the past three years.157 Respondents did not elaborate any further. The
figure presented does not reflect the specific types of wastes generated – whether
residential, market, commercial, industrial, construction/demolition, street waste,
agricultural, agro-industrial, institutional, etc. It is reasonable, therefore, for the Court to
presume that such amount pertains to the totality of wastes, without any distinction,
generated by Quezon City constituents. To reiterate, however, the authority of a
municipality or city to impose fees extends only to those related to the collection and condominium and socialized Housing Unit and an additional garbage fee shall
transport of non-recyclable and special wastes. be collected based on area occupied for every unit already so ld or being
amortized.
Granting, for the sake of argument, that the 0.66 kilogram of solid waste per day refers
only to non-recyclable and special wastes, still, We cannot sustain the validity of b) High-rise apartment units – Owners of high-rise apartment units shall pay
Ordinance No. S-2235. It violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution and the annual garbage fee on the total lot size of the entire apartment and an
the provisions of the LGC that an ordinance must be equitable and based as far as additional garbage fee based on the schedule prescribed herein for every unit
practicable on the taxpayer’s ability to pay, and not unjust, excessive, oppressive, occupied.
confiscatory.158
For the purpose of garbage collection, there is, in fact, no substantial distinction
In the subject ordinance, the rates of the imposable fee depend on land or floor area between an occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a unit in a condominium,
and whether the payee is an occupant of a lot, condominium, social housing project or socialized housing project or apartment, on the other hand. Most likely, garbage output
apartment. For easy reference, the relevant provision is again quoted below: produced by these types of occupants is uniform and does not vary to a large degree;
thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just and equitable.159
On all domestic households in Quezon City;
The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable: a resident of a
200 sq. m. unit in a condominium or socialized housing project has to pay twice the
LAND AREA IMPOSABLE FEE
amount than a resident of a lot similar in size; unlike unit occupants, all occupants of a
Less than 200 sq. m. PHP 100.00 lot with an area of 200 sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed rate of Php100.00; and the
same amount of garbage fee is imposed regardless of whether the resident is from a
201 sq. m. – 500 sq. m. PHP 200.00 condominium or from a socialized housing project.
501 sq. m. – 1,000 sq. m. PHP 300.00
Indeed, the classifications under Ordinance No. S-2235 are not germane to its declared
1,001 sq. m. – 1,500 sq. m. PHP 400.00 purpose of "promoting shared responsibility with the residents to attack their common
mindless attitude in over-consuming the present resources and in generating
1,501 sq. m. – 2,000 sq. m. or more PHP 500.00
waste."160 Instead of simplistically categorizing the payee into land or floor occupant of
a lot or unit of a condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, respondent City
On all condominium unit and socialized housing projects/units in Quezon City; Council should have considered factors that could truly measure the amount of wastes
generated and the appropriate fee for its collection. Factors include, among others,
household age and size, accessibility to waste collection, population density of the
FLOOR AREA IMPOSABLE FEE
barangay or district, capacity to pay, and actual occupancy of the property. R.A. No.
Less than 40 sq. m. PHP 25.00 9003 may also be looked into for guidance. Under said law, WM service fees may be
computed based on minimum factors such as type s of solid waste to include special
41 sq. m. – 60 sq. m. PHP 50.00 waste, amount/volume of waste, distance of the transfer station to the waste
61 sq. m. – 100 sq. m. PHP 75.00 management facility, capacity or type of LGU constituency, cost of construction, cost
of management, and type of technology. With respect to utility rates set by
101 sq. m. – 150 sq. m. PH₱100.00 municipalities, a municipality has the right to classify consumers under reasonable
classifications based upon factors such as the cost of service, the purpose for which
151 sq. m. – 200 sq. [m.] or more PHP 200.00
the service or the product is received, the quantity or the amount received, the different
character of the service furnished, the time of its use or any other matter which presents
On high-rise Condominium Units a substantial difference as a ground of distinction.161[A] lack of uniformity in the rate
charged is not necessarily unlawful discrimination. The establishment of classifications
a) High-rise Condominium – The Homeowners Association of high rise and the charging of different rates for the several classes is not unreasonable and does
condominiums shall pay the annual garbage fee on the total size of the entire not violate the requirements of equality and uniformity. Discrimination to be unlawful
must draw an unfair line or strike an unfair balance between those in like circumstances
having equal rights and privileges. Discrimination with respect to rates charged does
not vitiate unless it is arbitrary and without a reasonable fact basis or justification. 162
On top of an unreasonable classification, the penalty clause of Ordinance No. SP-2235,
which states:
SECTION 3. Penalty Clause – A penalty of 25% of the garbage fee due plus an interest
of 2% per month or a fraction thereof (interest) shall be charged against a household
owner who refuses to pay the garbage fee herein imposed. lacks the limitation required
by Section 168 of the LGC, which provides:
SECTION 168. Surcharges and Penalties on Unpaid Taxes, Fees, or Charges. – The
sanggunian may impose a surcharge not exceeding twenty-five (25%) of the amount
of taxes, fees or charges not paid on time and an interest at the rate not exceeding two
percent (2%) per month of the unpaid taxes, fees or charges including surcharges, until
such amount is fully paid but in no case shall the total interest on the unpaid amount or
portion thereof exceed thirty-six (36) months. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, on the issue of publication of the two challenged ordinances.
Petitioner argues that the garbage fee was collected even if the required publication of
its approval had not yet elapsed. He notes that he paid his realty tax on January 7,
2014 which already included the garbage fee. Respondents counter that if the law
provides for its own effectivity, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary so
long as it is not penal in nature. Allegedly, Ordinance No. SP-2095 took effect after its
publication while Ordinance No. SP-2235 became effective after its approval on
December 26, 2013.
The pertinent provisions of the LGC state:
SECTION 59. Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions. – (a) Unless otherwise stated
in the ordinance or the resolution approving the local development plan and public
investment program, the same shall take effect after ten (10) days from the date a copy
thereof is posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capital or city,
municipal, or barangay hall, as the case may be, and in at least two (2) other
conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned.
(b) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause the posting of an
ordinance or resolution in the bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial
capital and the city, municipal, or barangay hall in at least two
(2) conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned not later than
five (5) days after approval thereof.
The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in
Filipino or English and in the language or dialect understood by the majority
of the people in the local government unit concerned, and the secretary to the
sanggunian shall record such fact in a book kept for the purpose, stating the
dates of approval and posting.
(c) The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation within the province where the local legislative
body concerned belongs. In the absence of any newspaper of general
circulation within the province, posting of such ordinances shall be made in all
municipalities and cities of the province where the sanggunian of origin is
situated.
(d) In the case of highly urbanized and independent component cities, the
main features of the ordinance or resolution duly enacted or adopted shall, in
addition to being posted, be published once in a local newspaper of general
circulation within the city: Provided, That in the absence thereof the ordinance
or resolution shall be published in any newspaper of general circulation.
SECTION 188. Publication of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures. – Within ten
(10) days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city, and municipal
tax ordinances or revenue measures shall be published in full for three (3) consecutive
days in a newspaper of local circulation: Provided, however, That in provinces, cities
and municipalities where there are no newspapers of local circulation, the same may
be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly accessible places. (Emphasis
supplied)
On October 17, 2011, respondent Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-
2095, which provides that it would take effect after its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation.163 On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, which was passed
by the City Council on December 16, 2013, provides that it would be effective upon its
approval.164
Ten (10) days after its enactment, or on December 26, 2013, respondent City Mayor
approved the same.165
The case records are bereft of any evidence to prove petitioner’s negative allegation
that respondents did not comply with the posting and publication requirements of the
law. Thus, We are constrained not to give credit to his unsupported claim.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The constitutionality and legality
of Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011, or the "Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City,"
is· SUSTAINED for being consistent ·with Section·43 of Republic Act No. ·7279. On
the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which collects an annual garbage fee
on all domestic households in Quezon City, is hereby declared as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL. Respondents are DIRECTED to REFUND with
reasonable dispatch the sums of money collected relative to its enforcement. The
temporary restraining order issued by the Court on February 5, 2014 is LIFTED with
respect to Ordinance No. SP-2095. In contrast, respondents are PERMANENTLY
ENJOINED from taking any further action to enforce Ordinance No. SP. 2235.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182604, September 27, 2016
DR. ROLANDO B. MANGUNE, DR. RENE A. ARCE AND EMMA E.
TA�AFRANCA, IN THEIR RESPECTIVE PERSONAL CAPACITIES AND AS
ATTORNEYS-IN-FACT FOR AND IN BEHALF OF DR. VIRGINIA M. AGUILAS,
ROLANDO R. ANATALIO, DR. LEA M. DE LEON-ASI, CATALINO N. ATANACIO,
JR., JULIANA M. BATALLER, MA. LUISA B. CA�EZA, LILIAN C. CANILAO,
RANIEL S. CAPADA, FLORENDO A. DAYUS, JENNIFER D. PAGULAYAN,
BIENVENIDO C. DE VILLA, JOSE A. DELOS REYES, CYNTHIA A. DIAZ, ANNA
LEAH D. DIPATUAN, MADELAINE M. ESTOCAPIO, DR. MARIA SONIA YEE-
FESTIN, MARIO E. FLORENDO, RUEL E. FORTUNADO, NATIVIDAD A. GAMIAO,
IRMA Q. ANDAL, CHARITO C. LAZAM, AGNES R. LOVINDINO, EVELYN M.
MABAG, RECHILDA B. MACAFE, ZENAIDA M. MADIANGKIT, ANGELICA T.
MALAZARTE, DOMINGO P. MANAY, DR. EDGAR ORVEN M. MORTEL,
SATURNINO E. QUIBAN, MARITES J. RAMOS, DR. MELINDA S.L. A. RAZALAN,
BAITONGGAL L. SAUDAGAL, DR. JOHN ALBERT V. TABLIZO, JULIETA T.
TERANIA, ANNIE B. TRINIDAD, JUDY T. AVNER, DR. ROMEO F. UY, AVELONA
A. VEA, MINVILUZ G. VERA CRUZ, PE�AFLOR M. VILLAFLOR, JR., AND DR.
LEOPOLDO P. SISON, JR., ALL OF TAGUIG-PATEROS DISTRICT
HOSPITAL, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HONORABLE SECRETARY
FRANCISCO DUQUE III, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGUIG AS
REPRESENTED BY ITS MAYOR, HONORABLE SIGFRIDO R. TINGA, AND THE
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF PATEROS, AS REPRESENTED BY ITS MAYOR,
HONORABLE ROSENDO CAPCO, Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review1 assailing the Decision2 dated January 2, 2008
(assailed Decision) and Order3 dated April 14, 2008 (assailed Order) of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 20 in Civil Case No. 07-116531, upholding the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 5674 (E.O. No. 567), issued by then President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) on September 8, 2006.
Facts of the Case
On July 25, 1994, Republic Act No. 78425 (R.A. No. 7842) was enacted establishing,
under the administration and supervision of the Department of Health (DOH), the
Taguig-Pateros District Hospital (TPDH).
On September 8, 2006, President Arroyo issued E.O. No. 567 devolving the
administration and supervision of TPDH from the DOH to the City of Taguig.6 E.O.
No. 567 provided that it was issued pursuant to Republic Act No. 7160 (R.A. No.
7160), otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (Local Government
Code) and the President's continuing authority to reorganize the offices under the
executive department.
Thus, the City of Taguig, through its then Mayor and respondent Hon. Sigfrido R.
Tinga (Mayor Tinga), issued Executive Order No. 053 7 (E.O. No. 053) dated October
18, 2006 formalizing the plan for the City of Taguig's take-over of the operations of
TPDH. The City of Taguig and the DOH subsequently entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement8 (MOA) dated October 23, 2006 providing the details of the transition and
turn-over of the hospital's operations from the DOH to the City of Taguig.
In the meantime, petitioners, who were employees of the DOH assigned to the TPDH,
submitted a position paper to the then Secretary of Health, respondent Hon.
Francisco Duque III (Secretary Duque), expressing their objections to E.O. No.
567.9 The position paper was received by the Office of the Secretary on November 6,
2006.10 However, the DOH did not act on the Position Paper.11 Petitioners also wrote
a letter12 to the Office of the President requesting the deferment of the implementation
of E.O. No. 567, which also took no action.13chanrobleslaw
Thereafter, on January 3, 2007, Mayor Tinga issued Executive Order No. 001 14 (E.O.
No. 001) creating the TPDH Management Team which will implement the MOA and
directing the creation of an audit team which will conduct an inventory of all the
medical supplies, materials, equipment and other documents to be turned-over from
the DOH to the City of Taguig.
On January 15, 2007, petitioners filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief 15 against
respondents in the RTC of Manila. On January 26, 2007, petitioners filed an amended
Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer
for Ex-Parte Issuance of 72-hour Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), 20-day TRO
and Writ of Preliminary Injunction.16 The petition prayed that E.O. No. 567 be
declared unconstitutional, illegal and null and void for having been issued in violation
of the constitutional principle of separation of powers and with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.17chanrobleslaw
The RTC denied petitioners' prayer for a 72-hour TRO and 20-day TRO.18 As for the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the RTC, in its Order19 dated February 9, 2007,
deemed the prayer for the same withdrawn in light of petitioners' manifestation that
they are no longer pursuing their prayer for the writ.
On motion20 of petitioners and due to the Municipal Government of Pateros' failure to
file its Answer to the amended petition despite notice, the RTC declared it in
default.21chanrobleslaw
After the parties filed their respective pleadings, marked their exhibits and identified
the issues, the RTC, on July 26, 2007, issued the Pre-Trial Order.22 As only legal
issues are involved, the RTC directed the parties to file their respective position
papers after which, the petition will be submitted for decision.23chanrobleslaw
Respondents City of Taguig, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and DOH
Secretary Francisco Duque III, and petitioners filed their respective position
papers.24chanrobleslaw
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC dismissed the petition and held E.O. No. 567 valid and constitutional.
The RTC held that the issuance of E.O. No. 567 is in accordance with the President's
power of supervision over government entities in the executive
department.25cralawred The RTC also ruled that R.A. No. 7842, which established the
TPDH, did not prohibit the devolution of the TPDH's administration and supervision
from the DOH to the City of Taguig because the constitutional provision on local
autonomy and provisions of the Local Government Code on devolution are impliedly
written in R.A. No. 7842.26 Further, the Local Government Code provides that any
doubt must be resolved in favor of devolution.27chanrobleslaw
The RTC further opined that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies
when they did not seek the intervention of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) with
respect to their transfer or reassignment28and when they failed to bring action against
the DOH and the Office of the President for their inaction on their objections to E.O.
No. 567.29chanrobleslaw
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration30 which the RTC denied through the
assailed Order.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
I. Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies;
and cralawlawlibrary
II. Whether E.O. No. 567 is constitutional.
Ruling
We deny the petition.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that a party must first
avail himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or
her before he or she is allowed to seek the intervention of the court. 31 If resort to a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the
court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of
the court is fatal to one's cause of action.32 However, the doctrine admits of
exceptions, one of which is when the issue involved is purely a legal question. 33 As
the issue in this case involves the legality of E.O. No. 567, a purely legal question, the
filing of the petition without exhausting administrative remedies is justified.
E.O. No. 567 is constitutional.
E.O. No. 567 reads in full:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Executive Order No. 567
DEVOLVING THE TAGUIG-PATEROS DISTRICT HOSPITAL FROM THE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH TO THE CITY OF TAGUIG
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7842 approved on 16 December 1994 established the
Taguig-Pateros District Hospital under the administration and supervision of the
Department of Health (DOH);
WHEREAS, under Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, local government units (LGUs) shall exercise such powers and
discharge such functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate or
incidental to efficient and effective provision of basic services and facilities which
cover, among others, health services including secondary and tertiary hospitals;
WHEREAS, the President has the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under
the executive department;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySection 1. The administration and supervision of Taguig-
Pateros District Hospital is hereby devolved from the Department of Health to the City
of Taguig.
Section 2. All laws, issuances, rules and regulations which are inconsistent with this
Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 3. This Executive Order shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication
in a national newspaper of general circulation.

Done in the City of Manila, this 8th day of September, in the year of Our Lord, Two
Thousand and Six.
Petitioners aver that E.O. No. 567 contradicts the constitutional principle of separation
of powers as: (1) it amends the Local Government Code, particularly its Section
17(e), which limits devolution of basic services and facilities to local government units
(LGUs) to only six (6) months after the effectivity of the law; 34 and (2) it violates the
DOH-issued Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the Local Government
Code which provides that district health offices in the National Capital Region (NCR),
including its district hospitals, are exempt from devolution. 35 Petitioners also argue
that E.O. No. 567 violates Republic Act No. 730536 (R.A. No. 7305) because the
former did not include provisions for the expenses relative to petitioners' transfer and
reassignment.37chanrobleslaw
Respondents counter that the issuance of E.O. No. 567 is within the President's
constitutional power of control over government entities in the executive department,
her continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President and her constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Consequently, the MOA between the City of Taguig and DOH as well as the
subsequent executive orders of then Mayor Tinga are valid.38chanrobleslaw
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they
are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.39 Thus, to be valid, an administrative
issuance, such as an executive order,40 must comply with the following
requisites:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and
(4) It must be reasonable.41
E.O. No. 567 satisfies all of the above requisites.
First, E.O. No. 567 itself identifies its statutory and constitutional basis.
E.O. No. 567 was issued pursuant to Section 17 of the Local Government Code
expressly devolving to the local government units the delivery of basic services and
facilities, including health services, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 17. Basic Services and Facilities. -
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue
exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon
them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national
agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government
units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other
functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to
efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and facilities enumerated
herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxx
(2) For a Municipality:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxx
(iii) Subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of this Code, health services which
include the implementation of programs and projects on primary health care, maternal
and child care, and communicable and non-communicable disease control services,
access to secondary and tertiary health services; purchase of medicines, medical
supplies, and equipment needed to carry out the services herein enumerated;
xxx
(4) For a City:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryAll the services and facilities of the municipality and
province. x x x
xxx
(e) National agencies or offices concerned shall devolve to local government
units the responsibility for the provision of basic services and
facilities enumerated in this Section within six (6) months after the effectivity of this
Code.
As used in this Code, the term "devolution" refers to the act by which the national
government confers power and authority upon the various local government
units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is the policy of the Local Government Code to provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization. 43 Thus,
E.O. No. 567 merely implements and puts into operation the policy and directive set
forth in the Local Government Code.
Similarly, E.O. No. 567 is within the constitutional power of the President to issue.
The President may, by executive or administrative order, direct the reorganization of
government entities under the executive department. This is sanctioned under the
Constitution, as well as other statutes.44chanrobleslaw In assailing E.O. No. 567, petitioners argue that it violates Section 17(e) of the Local
Government Code. Section 17(e) partly reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of Appeals,45 petitioners (e) National agencies or offices concerned shall devolve to local government units the
questioned the validity of Executive Order No. 10246 (E.O. No. 10246 issued by then responsibility for the provision of basic services and facilities enumerated in this
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada which, also pursuant to Section 17 of the Local Section within six (6) months after the effectivity of this Code.
Government Code, provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and
organizational processes of the DOH. Petitioners alleged that E.O. No. 102 was void xxx
on the ground that it was issued in excess of the President's authority, as the
For petitioners, the provision limits the devolution of services to a period of only six (6)
structural and functional reorganization of the DOH is a legislative function. 47 In
months from the effectivity of the Local Government Code. Any devolution after the
rejecting petitioners' argument, we held that the issuance of E.O. No. 102 is an
expiration of such period can only be done through a statutory act. Thus, the issuance
exercise of the President's constitutional power of control over the executive
of E.O. No. 567, which was well-beyond such period, is a clear usurpation of
department, supported by the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by
legislative functions.
other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court.48 Similarly, in Malaria
Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Romulo,49 where the
In order to ascertain whether the six-month period bars devolution after its expiration,
issue is also the validity of E.O. No. 102, we reiterated that the President has the
we bear in mind that we must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit
authority to carry out a reorganization of the DOH under the Constitution and other
that giveth life.54 Thus, we revisit the Declaration of Policy of the Local Government
statutory laws.
Code, which provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. -
Our ruling in the above cases applies squarely in this case. The transfer of the
administration and supervision of TPDH from the DOH to the City of Taguig is a result
(a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political
of the President's exercise of her power of control over the executive department,
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to
including the DOH.
enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the
The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure the autonomy of local
State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
governments while Section 17 of the Local Government Code secures to the local
structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government
governments the genuine and meaningful autonomy that would develop them into
units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The
self-reliant communities and effective partners in the attainment of national
process of decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the local
goals.50 Therefore, in issuing E.O. No. 567, the President was actually carrying out
government units.
the provisions of the Constitution and the Local Government Code. She was
performing her duty to ensure the faithful execution of the laws. 51chanrobleslaw
(b) It is also the policy of the State to ensure the accountability of local government
units through the institution of effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and
As regards the second requisite, that the order must be issued or promulgated in
referendum.
accordance with the prescribed procedure, petitioners do not question the procedure
by which E.O. No. 567 was issued. In the absence of strong evidence to the contrary,
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to
acts of the other branches of the government are presumed to be valid, and there
conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, non�
being no objection from the respondents as to the procedure in the promulgation of
governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the
E.O. No. 567, the presumption is that the executive issuance duly complied with the
community before any project or program is implemented in their respective
procedures and limitations imposed by law.52chanrobleslaw
jurisdictions.55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The third requisite provides that an administrative issuance must not be ultra vires or The foregoing provision echoes Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which
beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It must not supplant or modify the reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Constitution, its enabling statute and other existing laws, for such is the sole function Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a
of the legislature which the other branches of the government cannot more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
usurp.53chanrobleslaw system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, and
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
units.56chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Decentralization is the devolution of national administration, not power, to local
governments.57 One form of decentralization is devolution,58 which involves the
transfer of powers, responsibilities, and resources for the performance of certain
functions from the central government to the LGUs.59 It has been said that devolution
is indispensable to decentralization.60chanrobleslaw
health offices and hospitals in the NCR, including TPDLI, from devolution.
We emphasize that under the Local Government Code, it is the Oversight Committee,
composed of representatives from both the executive and the legislative branches of
government, which was tasked to formulate the implementing rules and regulations of
the law.62 The Local Government Code did not delegate to any other entity the
formulation of its implementing rules and regulations. Thus, on February 21, 1992,
President CorazoniC. Aquino approved the Oversight Committee's draft of the
implementing rules and regulations and issued Administrative Order No. 270 63 (A.O.
No. 270).

Petitioners' position that Article 25 of the IRR of the Local Government Code further
Based on the foregoing, there is no question that the law favors devolution. In fact, as
delegated to the DOH the task of formulating another set of implementing rules and
mentioned earlier, Section 5(a) of the Local Government Code explicitly states that in
regulations is without any basis.
case of doubt, any question on any provision on a power of a local government shall
be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the LGU.
The Local Government Code and its IRR do not contain any provision directing the
DOH to promulgate implementing rules and regulations on the devolution of health
Considering the same, petitioners' restrictive interpretation of Section 17(e) is
services. The pertinent portion of Article 25 of the IRR of the Local Government Code
inconsistent with the Constitution and the Local Government Code. It limits the
actually states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
devolution intended by both the Constitution and the Local Government Code to an
Art. 25. Responsibility for Delivery of Basic Services and Facilities. - The LGUs shall,
unduly short period of time.
in addition to their existing functions and responsibilities, provide basic services and
facilities devolved to them covering, but not limited to, the following:
The more reasonable understanding of the six-month period is that the framers of the
law provided for the period to prompt the national government to speedily devolve the
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
existing services to the LGUs. However, it was not intended as a prescriptive period,
xxx
as to absolutely prohibit the national government from devolving services beyond the
period. Most especially so in this case because the TPDH was created long after the
Municipality
lapse of the six-month period, thus making its devolution within such period
impossible.
xxx
Notably, there is nothing in Section 17(e) or in the Local Government Code which
provides for what would happen after the six-month period. Therefore, it cannot be (c) Subject to the provisions of Rule XXIII on local health boards and in
said that the law clearly and unequivocally prohibits devolution after the six-month accordance with the standards and criteria of the Department of Health
period. (DOH), provision of health services through:

In support of their position that devolution can only be done within said period,
petitioners quote a portion of the Transcript of the Session Proceedings for the Local
Government Code.61 However, a reading of the quoted transcript indicates that what (1) Implementation of programs and projects on primary health care,
the legislators considered was when the law and devolution will commence and not maternal and child care, and communicable and non-communicable
their intent to prohibit devolution after the end of the six-month period. Notably, disease control services;
in Tondo Medical Center Employees Association, we upheld the validity of E.O. No.
102 which also sought to implement the devolution of services under the Local (2) Access to secondary and tertiary health services; and
Government Code, even if it was issued long after the lapse of the six-month period.
(3) Purchase of medicines, medical supplies, and equipment needed to
Petitioners also posit that E.O. No. 567 violates the IRR promulgated by the DOH carry out the devolved health services.
pursuant to Article 25 of the IRR of the Local Government Code as it excludes district

xxx
Based from the above, Article 25 mandates that the health services to be provided by
the LGUs must comply with the standards and criteria given by the DOH. It does not
direct the DOH to create rules on how devolution of health services must be
implemented.
Indeed, petitioners' failure to explain why there would be two (2) implementing rules
and regulations for a single law and its basis proves that their position is without any
merit. More, their failure to provide important details regarding the supposed DOH
IRR such as its title and number, date of issuance and series number signifies the
falsity of petitioners' claim.
Even assuming that the DOH was directed to promulgate a subsequent IRR, and that
the DOH issued the IRR, said IRR does not exempt district health offices, including
hospitals in the NCR from devolution. The quoted sections of the alleged DOH IRR
read:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 17. General Provisions. -
(a) The DOH shall devolve to LGUs concerned public health programs and
projects and such health and medical packages as currently in place at the
Integrated Provincial Health Offices, District Health Offices, City Health
Offices, and Municipal Health Offices, including the barangay health stations
as follows:
xxx
(3) Secondary health services are medical health services provided by
some rural health units, infirmaries, district hospitals and out-patient
departments of provincial hospitals. x x x
Sec. 18. Specific Provisions. - The devolution prescribed in the preceding section
shall include the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Province
(1) The Integrated Provincial Health Office including the provincial
hospital, district health offices including district hospitals, Medicare and
municipal hospitals. However, the district health offices in the National
Capital Region including its district hospitals are not included in the
devolution as prescribed herein. x x x64
Section 18 (a)(l) merely excludes district hospitals in the NCR from the process of
devolution as prescribed in Section 17. The former does not entirely prohibit
devolution of health services in district hospitals in the NCR.
At any rate, we emphasize that the DOH is subject to the power of control of the
President. Therefore, E.O. No. 567 issued by the President shall prevail over any
issuance made by the DOH and not the other way around.
The fourth requisite pertains to the reasonableness of an administrative issuance. It
is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act
arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such
rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in
view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were
authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.65 Specific to a
reorganization, it is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. As a
general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.66chanrobleslaw
E.O. No. 567 meets the test of reasonableness. The transfer of the administration and
supervision of TPDH from the DOH to the City of Taguig aims to provide the City of
Taguig the genuine and meaningful autonomy which would make it an effective and
efficient partner in the attainment of national goals and providing basic health services
and facilities to the community. It implements and breathes life to the provisions of the
Constitution and the Local Government Code on creating a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization.
Petitioners complain that E.O. No. 567 violated their rights because they were
transferred to other public health facilities without being afforded with the necessary
provisions for expenses relative to their transfer and re�assignment, as required by
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7305.
Similar to our ruling in Tondo Medical Center Employees Association, we hold that
petitioners' allegations are too general and unsubstantiated by the records for us to
pass upon. The persons affected are not specified; details of their appointments and
transfers�such as position, salary grade, and the date they were appointed�are not
given; and the circumstances which attended the alleged violations are not
identified.67 Further, while we recognize the inconvenience which may be suffered by
petitioners as a result of E.O. No. 567, the need to make the delivery of health
services more efficient and more compelling is far from being unreasonable or
arbitrary.

Be that as it may, we stress that E.O. No. 567 only lays down the directive to transfer
the administration and supervision of TPDH from the DOH to the City of Taguig. The
details and particulars of its implementation are set forth in the subsequent issuances
of the City of Taguig, i.e., E.O. No. 053 and E.O. No. 001, as well as the MOA dated
October 23, 2006 between the DOH and the City of Taguig.

Considering the validity of E.O. No. 567, the subsequent Executive Orders issued by
Mayor Tinga, as well as the MOA between the DOH and the City of Taguig,
implementing E.O. No. 567 are likewise valid.

In sum, we find that the petition failed to show any constitutional infirmity or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in President Arroyo's
issuance of E.O. No. 567.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The January 2, 2008

Decision and April 14, 2008 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 20 in
Civil Case No. 07-116531 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. BEL-AIR
VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts to solve urgent
problems of the people. But even when government is armed with the best of
intention, we cannot allow it to run roughshod over the rule of law. Again, we let the
hammer fall and fall hard on the illegal attempt of the MMDA to open for public use a
private road in a private subdivision. While we hold that the general welfare should be
promoted, we stress that it should not be achieved at the expense of the rule of law. h
Y Court, Branch 136, Makati City, Civil Case No. 96-001 for injunction. Respondent
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in
Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock,
non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private
subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune
Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a
notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to
public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. The notice reads: Court
"SUBJECT: NOTICE of the Opening of Neptune Street to Traffic
"Dear President Lindo,
"Please be informed that pursuant to the mandate of the MMDA law
or Republic Act No. 7924 which requires the Authority to rationalize
the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient
movement of persons, Neptune Street shall be opened to vehicular
traffic effective January 2, 1996.
"In view whereof, the undersigned requests you to voluntarily open
the points of entry and exit on said street.
"Thank you for your cooperation and whatever assistance that may
be extended by your association to the MMDA personnel who will
be directing traffic in the area.
"Finally, we are furnishing you with a copy of the handwritten
instruction of the President on the matter.
"Very truly yours,
PROSPERO I. ORETA
Chairman"[1]
On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the
subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. Sppedsc
On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the Regional Trial
prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the
perimeter wall. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order the following day.
On January 23, 1996, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a
preliminary injunction.[2] Respondent questioned the denial before the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549. The appellate court conducted an ocular
inspection of Neptune Street[3] and on February 13, 1996, it issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the MMDAs proposed action. [4]
On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits of the
case finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street,
a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that
the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance. The decision
disposed of as follows: Jurissc
"WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the challenged Order
dated January 23, 1995, in Civil Case No. 96-001, is SET ASIDE
and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on February 13, 1996
is hereby made permanent.
"For want of sustainable substantiation, the Motion to Cite Roberto
L. del Rosario in contempt is denied.[5]
"No pronouncement as to costs.
"SO ORDERED."[6]
The Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was denied on September 28, 1998.
Hence, this recourse. Jksm
Petitioner MMDA raises the following questions:
"I
HAS THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY (MMDA) THE MANDATE TO OPEN NEPTUNE
STREET TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC PURSUANT TO ITS
REGULATORY AND POLICE POWERS?
II
IS THE PASSAGE OF AN ORDINANCE A CONDITION
PRECEDENT BEFORE THE MMDA MAY ORDER THE OPENING
OF SUBDIVISION ROADS TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC?
III
IS RESPONDENT BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.
ESTOPPED FROM DENYING OR ASSAILING THE AUTHORITY
OF THE MMDA TO OPEN THE SUBJECT STREET? Jlexj
V
WAS RESPONDENT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS DESPITE
THE SEVERAL MEETINGS HELD BETWEEN MMDA AND THE
AFFECTED BEL-AIR RESIDENTS AND BAVA OFFICERS?
V are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.[19] They are also the territorial
HAS RESPONDENT COME TO COURT WITH UNCLEAN
HANDS?"[7]
Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside Bel-Air
Village, a private residential subdivision in the heart of the financial and commercial
district of Makati City. It runs parallel to Kalayaan Avenue, a national road open to the
general public. Dividing the two (2) streets is a concrete perimeter wall approximately
fifteen (15) feet high. The western end of Neptune Street intersects Nicanor Garcia,
formerly Reposo Street, a subdivision road open to public vehicular traffic, while its
eastern end intersects Makati Avenue, a national road. Both ends of Neptune Street
are guarded by iron gates. Edp mis
Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public
traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of
basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic management
which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety,
convenience and welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the police power of
MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v.
Intermediate Appellate Court.[8] From the premise that it has police power, it is now
urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening
Neptune street to the public.[9]
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power
vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner
of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.[10] The power is
plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for
public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.[11]
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. [12] It
cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative
power.[13] The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the
President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal
corporations or local government units.[14]Once delegated, the agents can exercise
only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking
body.[15]
A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted
by law and has substantial control of local affairs." [16] The Local Government Code of
1991 defines a local government unit as a "body politic and corporate" [17]-- one
endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a
corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory. [18] Local government units
and political subdivisions of the state.[20]
Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the
Local Government Code of 1991. This delegation is found in Section 16 of the same
Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz: Chief
"Sec. 16. General Welfare.Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall
 ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right
of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants."[21]
Local government units exercise police power through their respective
legislative bodies. The legislative body of the provincial government is
the sangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city government is the sangguniang
panlungsod, that of the municipal government is the sangguniang bayan, and that
of the barangay is the sangguniang barangay. The Local Government Code of 1991
empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and
sangguniang bayan to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds
for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality, as the case may be], and
its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the [province, city municipality] provided under the Code x x
x."[22] The same Code gives the sangguniang barangay the power to "enact
ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by
law or ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants thereon." [23]
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government
units - i.e., twelve (12) cities and five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of
Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las
Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the municipalities of Malabon, ,
Navotas, , Pateros, San Juan and Taguig. With the passage of Republic Act (R. A.)
No. 7924[24] in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special
development and administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-
wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development
authority" referred to as the MMDA.[25]
"Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact and
transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not
be viable for said services to be provided by the individual local government units
comprising Metro Manila."[26] There are seven (7) basic metro-wide services and the
scope of these services cover the following: (1) development planning; (2) transport
and traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and management; (4) flood control
and sewerage management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and
shelter services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and
(7) public safety. The basic service of transport and traffic management includes the
following: Lexjuris
"(b) Transport and traffic management which include the
formulation, coordination, and monitoring of policies,
standards, programs and projects to rationalize the existing
transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of
thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and convenient
movement of persons and goods; provision for the mass
transport system and the institution of a system to regulate
road users; administration and implementation of all traffic
enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and
traffic education programs, including the institution of a single
ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila;"[27]
In the delivery of the seven (7) basic services, the MMDA has the following
powers and functions: Esm
"Sec. 5. Functions and powers of the Metro Manila Development
Authority.The MMDA shall:
(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of
medium and long-term plans and programs for the delivery of
metro-wide services, land use and physical development within
Metropolitan Manila, consistent with national development
objectives and priorities;
(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of
medium-term investment programs for metro-wide services which
shall indicate sources and uses of funds for priority programs and
projects, and which shall include the packaging of projects and
presentation to funding institutions; Esmsc
(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and
projects for the delivery of specific services under its jurisdiction,
subject to the approval of the Council. For this purpose, MMDA can
create appropriate project management offices;
(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans,
programs and projects in Metro Manila; identify bottlenecks and
adopt solutions to problems of implementation;
(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in Metro
Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the implementation
of all programs and projects concerning traffic management,
specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering and
education. Upon request, it shall be extended assistance and
 cooperation, including but not limited to, assignment of
personnel, by all other government agencies and offices
concerned;
(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose
and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of
traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in
nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses
in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the
provisions of RA 4136 and PD 1605 to the contrary
notwithstanding. For this purpose, the Authority shall impose
all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its
traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the
PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed
security guards, or members of non-governmental
organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority,
subject to such conditions and requirements as the Authority
may impose; and
(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the
objectives of the MMDA, including the undertaking of delivery of
basic services to the local government units, when deemed
necessary subject to prior coordination with and consent of the
local government unit concerned." Jurismis
The implementation of the MMDAs plans, programs and projects is undertaken by
the local government units, national government agencies, accredited peoples
organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector as well as by
the MMDA itself. For this purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into contracts,
memoranda of agreement and other cooperative arrangements with these bodies for
the delivery of the required services within Metro Manila. [28]
The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The Council is
composed of the mayors of the component 12 cities and 5 municipalities, the
president of the Metro Manila Vice-Mayors League and the president of the Metro
Manila Councilors League.[29] The Council is headed by a Chairman who is appointed
by the President and vested with the rank of cabinet member. As the policy-making
body of the MMDA, the Metro Manila Council approves metro-wide plans, programs
and projects, and issues the necessary rules and regulations for the implementation
of said plans; it approves the annual budget of the MMDA and promulgates the rules
and regulations for the delivery of basic services, collection of service and regulatory
fees, fines and penalties. These functions are particularly enumerated as follows: LEX
"Sec. 6. Functions of the Metro Manila Council. -
(a) The Council shall be the policy-making body of the MMDA;
(b) It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and
issue rules and regulations deemed necessary by the MMDA to
carry out the purposes of this Act;
(c) It may increase the rate of allowances and per diems of the
members of the Council to be effective during the term of the
succeeding Council. It shall fix the compensation of the officers and
personnel of the MMDA, and approve the annual budget thereof for
submission to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM);
(d) It shall promulgate rules and regulations and set policies and
standards for metro-wide application governing the delivery of basic
services, prescribe and collect service and regulatory fees, and
impose and collect fines and penalties." Jj sc
Clearly, the scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7)
basic services. One of these is transport and traffic management which includes the
formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to rationalize the
existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares
and promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass
transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the administration
of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education
programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for
traffic violations. Under this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the
policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of all
traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install and administer a
single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic
violations. Ca-lrsc
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no
syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any
legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is
no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the
inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a
"development authority."[30] It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient
and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its
functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the
charter itself, viz:
"Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority.
-- x x x.
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative
functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and
supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services
within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local
government units concerning purely local matters." [31]
Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate
Court[32] where we upheld a zoning ordinance issued by the Metro Manila
Commission (MMC), the predecessor of the MMDA, as an exercise of police power.
The first Sangalang decision was on the merits of the petition,[33] while the second
decision denied reconsideration of the first case and in addition discussed the case
of Yabut v. Court of Appeals.[34]
Sangalang v. IAC involved five (5) consolidated petitions filed by respondent BAVA
and three residents of Bel-Air Village against other residents of the Village and the
Ayala Corporation, formerly the Makati Development Corporation, as the developer of
the subdivision. The petitioners sought to enforce certain restrictive easements in the
deeds of sale over their respective lots in the subdivision. These were the prohibition
on the setting up of commercial and advertising signs on the lots, and the condition
that the lots be used only for residential purposes. Petitioners alleged that
respondents, who were residents along Jupiter Street of the subdivision, converted
their residences into commercial establishments in violation of the "deed restrictions,"
and that respondent Ayala Corporation ushered in the full commercialization" of
Jupiter Street by tearing down the perimeter wall that separated the commercial from
the residential section of the village.[35]
The petitions were dismissed based on Ordinance No. 81 of the Municipal Council of
Makati and Ordinance No. 81-01 of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC). Municipal
Ordinance No. 81 classified Bel-Air Village as a Class A Residential Zone, with its
boundary in the south extending to the center line of Jupiter Street. The Municipal
Ordinance was adopted by the MMC under the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for
the National Capital Region and promulgated as MMC Ordinance No. 81-01. Bel-Air
Village was indicated therein as bounded by Jupiter Street and the block adjacent
thereto was classified as a High Intensity Commercial Zone. [36]
We ruled that since both Ordinances recognized Jupiter Street as the boundary
between Bel-Air Village and the commercial district, Jupiter Street was not for the
exclusive benefit of Bel-Air residents. We also held that the perimeter wall on said
street was constructed not to separate the residential from the commercial blocks but
simply for security reasons, hence, in tearing down said wall, Ayala Corporation did
not violate the "deed restrictions" in the deeds of sale. Scc-alr
We upheld the ordinances, specifically MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, as a legitimate
exercise of police power.[37] The power of the MMC and the Makati Municipal Council
to enact zoning ordinances for the general welfare prevailed over the "deed
restrictions".
In the second Sangalang/Yabut decision, we held that the opening of Jupiter Street
was warranted by the demands of the common good in terms of "traffic decongestion
and public convenience." Jupiter was opened by the Municipal Mayor to alleviate
traffic congestion along the public streets adjacent to the Village. [38] The same reason
was given for the opening to public vehicular traffic of Orbit Street, a road inside the
same village. The destruction of the gate in Orbit Street was also made under the
police power of the municipal government. The gate, like the perimeter wall along
Jupiter, was a public nuisance because it hindered and impaired the use of property,
hence, its summary abatement by the mayor was proper and legal. [39]
Contrary to petitioners claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case
at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of
Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for the proposed opening of
Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to
respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any ordinance or
law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the
legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply
relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads and/or
thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons." Rationalizing the
use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the scope of
transport and traffic management. By no stretch of the imagination, however, can this
be interpreted as an express or implied grant of ordinance-making power, much less
police power. Misjuris
Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although
the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential
Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed
greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA. Jjlex
Metropolitan Manila was first created in 1975 by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 824. It
comprised the Greater Manila Area composed of the contiguous four (4) cities of
Manila, Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan, and the thirteen (13) municipalities of Makati,
Mandaluyong, San Juan, Las Pinas, Malabon, Navotas, Pasig, Pateros, Paranaque,
Marikina, Muntinlupa and Taguig in the province of Rizal, and Valenzuela in the
province of Bulacan.[40] Metropolitan Manila was created as a response to the finding
that the rapid growth of population and the increase of social and economic
requirements in these areas demand a call for simultaneous and unified development;
that the public services rendered by the respective local governments could be
administered more efficiently and economically if integrated under a system of central
planning; and this coordination, "especially in the maintenance of peace and order
and the eradication of social and economic ills that fanned the flames of rebellion and
discontent [were] part of reform measures under Martial Law essential to the safety
and security of the State."[41]
Metropolitan Manila was established as a "public corporation" with the following
powers: Calrs-pped
"Section 1. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila.There is hereby
created a public corporation, to be known as the Metropolitan
Manila, vested with powers and attributes of a corporation
including the power to make contracts, sue and be sued,
acquire, purchase, expropriate, hold, transfer and dispose of
property and such other powers as are necessary to carry out
its purposes. The Corporation shall be administered by a
Commission created under this Decree."[42]
The administration of Metropolitan Manila was placed under the Metro Manila
Commission (MMC) vested with the following powers:
"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions of the Commission. - The
Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
1. To act as a central government to establish and administer
programs and provide services common to the area;
2. To levy and collect taxes and special assessments, borrow and
expend money and issue bonds, revenue certificates, and other
obligations of indebtedness. Existing tax measures should,
however, continue to be operative until otherwise modified or
repealed by the Commission;
3. To charge and collect fees for the use of public service facilities;
4. To appropriate money for the operation of the metropolitan
government and review appropriations for the city and municipal
units within its jurisdiction with authority to disapprove the same if
found to be not in accordance with the established policies of the
Commission, without prejudice to any contractual obligation of the
local government units involved existing at the time of approval of
this Decree;
5. To review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances,
resolutions and acts of cities and municipalities within
Metropolitan Manila;
6. To enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and to fix
penalties for any violation thereof which shall not exceed a
fine of P10,000.00 or imprisonment of six years or both such
fine and imprisonment for a single offense;
7. To perform general administrative, executive and policy-making
functions;
8. To establish a fire control operation center, which shall direct the
fire services of the city and municipal governments in the
metropolitan area;
9. To establish a garbage disposal operation center, which shall
direct garbage collection and disposal in the metropolitan area;
10. To establish and operate a transport and traffic center, which
shall direct traffic activities; Jjjuris
11. To coordinate and monitor governmental and private activities
pertaining to essential services such as transportation, flood control
and drainage, water supply and sewerage, social, health and
environmental services, housing, park development, and others;
12. To insure and monitor the undertaking of a comprehensive
social, economic and physical planning and development of the
area;
13. To study the feasibility of increasing barangay participation in
the affairs of their respective local governments and to propose to
the President of the Philippines definite programs and policies for
implementation;
14. To submit within thirty (30) days after the close of each fiscal
year an annual report to the President of the Philippines and to
submit a periodic report whenever deemed necessary; and
 15. To perform such other tasks as may be assigned or directed by
the President of the Philippines." Sc jj
The MMC was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the purpose of
establishing and administering programs providing services common to the area. As a
"central government" it had the power to levy and collect taxes and special
assessments, the power to charge and collect fees; the power to appropriate money
for its operation, and at the same time, review appropriations for the city and
municipal units within its jurisdiction. It was bestowed the power to enact or approve
ordinances, resolutions and fix penalties for violation of such ordinances and
resolutions. It also had the power to review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances,
resolutions and acts of any of the four (4) cities and thirteen (13) municipalities
comprising Metro Manila.
P. D. No. 824 further provided:
"Sec. 9. Until otherwise provided, the governments of the four cities
and thirteen municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila shall continue
to exist in their present form except as may be inconsistent with this
Decree. The members of the existing city and municipal
councils in Metropolitan Manila shall, upon promulgation of
this Decree, and until December 31, 1975, become members of
the Sangguniang Bayan which is hereby created for every city
and municipality of Metropolitan Manila.
In addition, the Sangguniang Bayan shall be composed of as many
barangay captains as may be determined and chosen by the
Commission, and such number of representatives from other
sectors of the society as may be appointed by the President upon
recommendation of the Commission.
x x x.
The Sangguniang Bayan may recommend to the Commission
ordinances, resolutions or such measures as it may adopt;
Provided, that no such ordinance, resolution or measure shall
become effective, until after its approval by the Commission;
and Provided further, that the power to impose taxes and other
levies, the power to appropriate money and the power to pass
ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions shall be vested
exclusively in the Commission."
The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of the Sangguniang
Bayan. This was composed of the members of the component city and municipal
councils, barangay captains chosen by the MMC and sectoral representatives
appointed by the President. The Sangguniang Bayan had the power to recommend
to the MMC the adoption of ordinances, resolutions or measures. It was the MMC
itself, however, that possessed legislative powers. All ordinances, resolutions and
measures recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan were subject to the MMCs
approval. Moreover, the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to
appropriate money, and the power to pass ordinances or resolutions with penal
sanctions were vested exclusively in the MMC. Sce-dp
Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a "central government," i.e., the MMC which fully
possessed legislative and police powers. Whatever legislative powers the
component cities and municipalities had were all subject to review and
approval by the MMC.
After President Corazon Aquino assumed power, there was a clamor to restore
the autonomy of the local government units in Metro Manila. Hence, Sections 1 and 2
of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provided: Sj cj
"Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic
of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras as herein provided.
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy."
The Constitution, however, recognized the necessity of creating metropolitan regions
not only in the existing National Capital Region but also in potential equivalents in the
Visayas and Mindanao.[43] Section 11 of the same Article X thus provided:
"Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan
political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section
10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their
basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives
and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan
authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic
services requiring coordination."
The Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law, create "special
metropolitan political subdivisions" which shall be subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected; the jurisdiction of
this subdivision shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination; and the cities
and municipalities comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic autonomy and
their own local executive and legislative assemblies.[44] Pending enactment of this
law, the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution gave the President of the Philippines
the power to constitute the Metropolitan Authority, viz:
"Section 8. Until otherwise provided by Congress, the President
may constitute the Metropolitan Authority to be composed of the
heads of all local government units comprising the Metropolitan
Manila area."[45]
In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and
constituted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). The powers and functions
of the MMC were devolved to the MMA.[46] It ought to be stressed, however, that
not all powers and functions of the MMC were passed to the MMA. The MMAs
power was limited to the "delivery of basic urban services requiring
coordination in Metropolitan Manila."[47] The MMAs governing body, the
Metropolitan Manila Council, although composed of the mayors of the
component cities and municipalities, was merely given the power of: (1)
formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination
and consolidation; and (2) promulgation of resolutions and other issuances,
approval of a code of basic services and the exercise of its rule-making
power.[48]
Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily
responsible for the governance of their respective political subdivisions. The MMAs
jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving basic services
that transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative power. Its power was
merely to provide the local government units technical assistance in the preparation
of local development plans. Any semblance of legislative power it had was confined to
a "review [of] legislation proposed by the local legislative assemblies to ensure
consistency among local governments and with the comprehensive development plan
of Metro Manila," and to "advise the local governments accordingly." [49]
When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special
development and administrative region" and the MMDA a "special development
authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the autonomy of the
affected local government units." The character of the MMDA was clearly
defined in the legislative debates enacting its charter.
R. A. No. 7924 originated as House Bill No. 14170/ 11116 and was introduced by
several legislators led by Dante Tinga, Roilo Golez and Feliciano Belmonte. It was
presented to the House of Representatives by the Committee on Local Governments
chaired by Congressman Ciriaco R. Alfelor. The bill was a product of Committee
consultations with the local government units in the National Capital Region (NCR),
with former Chairmen of the MMC and MMA,[50] and career officials of said agencies.
When the bill was first taken up by the Committee on Local Governments, the
following debate took place:
"THE CHAIRMAN [Hon. Ciriaco Alfelor]: Okay, Let me explain. This
has been debated a long time ago, you know. Its a special we can
create a special metropolitan political subdivision. Supreme
Actually, there are only six (6) political subdivisions provided for in
the Constitution: barangay, municipality, city, province, and we
have the Autonomous Region of Mindanao and we have the
Cordillera. So we have 6. Now.
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman. In the case of
the Autonomous Region, that is also specifically mandated by the
Constitution.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thats correct. But it is considered to be a political
subdivision. What is the meaning of a political subdivision?
Meaning to say, that it has its own government, it has its own
political personality, it has the power to tax, and all
governmental powers: police power and everything. All right.
Authority is different; because it does not have its own
government. It is only a council, it is an organization of
political subdivision, powers, no, which is not imbued with any
political power. Esmmis
If you go over Section 6, where the powers and functions of
the Metro Manila Development Authority, it is purely
coordinative. And it provides here that the council is policy-
making. All right.
Under the Constitution is a Metropolitan Authority with coordinative
power. Meaning to say, it coordinates all of the different basic
services which have to be delivered to the constituency. All right.
There is now a problem. Each local government unit is given its respective as a
political subdivision. Kalookan has its powers, as provided for and protected and
guaranteed by the Constitution. All right, the exercise. However, in the exercise of
that power, it might be deleterious and disadvantageous to other local government
units. So, we are forming an authority where all of these will be members and then set
up a policy in order that the basic services can be effectively coordinated. All
right. justice
 Of course, we cannot deny that the MMDA has to survive. We
have to provide some funds, resources. But it does not
possess any political power. We do not elect the Governor. We
do not have the power to tax. As a matter of fact, I was trying to
intimate to the author that it must have the power to sue and be
sued because it coordinates. All right. It coordinates practically all
these basic services so that the flow and the distribution of the
basic services will be continuous. Like traffic, we cannot deny that.
Its before our eyes. Sewerage, flood control, water system, peace
and order, we cannot deny these. Its right on our face. We have to
look for a solution. What would be the right solution? All right, we
envision that there should be a coordinating agency and it is called
an authority. All right, if you do not want to call it an authority, its
alright. We may call it a council or maybe a management agency.
x x x."[51]
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to
the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative
rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions. There is no
grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of
the inhabitants of the metropolis. This was explicitly stated in the last Committee
deliberations prior to the bills presentation to Congress. Thus: Ed-p
"THE CHAIRMAN: Yeah, but we have to go over the suggested
revision. I think this was already approved before, but it was
reconsidered in view of the proposals, set-up, to make the MMDA
stronger. Okay, so if there is no objection to paragraph "f" And then
next is paragraph "b," under Section 6. "It shall approve metro-
wide plans, programs and projects and issue ordinances or
resolutions deemed necessary by the MMDA to carry out the
purposes of this Act." Do you have the powers? Does the
MMDA because that takes the form of a local government unit,
a political subdivision.
HON. [Feliciano] BELMONTE: Yes, I believe so, your Honor. When
we say that it has the policies, its very clear that those policies must
be followed. Otherwise, whats the use of empowering it to come out
with policies. Now, the policies may be in the form of a resolution or
it may be in the form of a ordinance. The term "ordinance" in this
case really gives it more teeth, your honor. Otherwise, we are going
to see a situation where you have the power to adopt the policy but
you cannot really make it stick as in the case now, and I think here
is Chairman Bunye. I think he will agree that that is the case now.
Youve got the power to set a policy, the body wants to follow your
policy, then we say lets call it an ordinance and see if they will not
follow it.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thats very nice. I like that. However, there is a
constitutional impediment. You are making this MMDA a
political subdivision. The creation of the MMDA would be
subject to a plebiscite. That is what Im trying to avoid. Ive been
trying to avoid this kind of predicament. Under the
Constitution it states: if it is a political subdivision, once it is
created it has to be subject to a plebiscite. Im trying to make
this as administrative. Thats why we place the Chairman as a
cabinet rank.
HON. BELMONTE: All right, Mr. Chairman, okay, what you are
saying there is .
THE CHAIRMAN: In setting up ordinances, it is a political
exercise. Believe me.
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: Mr. Chairman, it can be changed into
issuances of rules and regulations. That would be it shall also
be enforced. Jksm
HON. BELMONTE: Okay, I will .
HON. LOPEZ: And you can also say that violation of such rule,
you impose a sanction. But you know, ordinance has a
different legal connotation.
HON. BELMONTE: All right. I defer to that opinion, your
Honor. sc
THE CHAIRMAN: So instead of ordinances, say rules and
regulations.
HON. BELMONTE: Or resolutions. Actually, they are actually
considering resolutions now.
THE CHAIRMAN: Rules and resolutions.
HON. BELMONTE: Rules, regulations and resolutions."[52]
The draft of H. B. No. 14170/ 11116 was presented by the Committee to the House of
Representatives. The explanatory note to the bill stated that the proposed MMDA is a
"development authority" which is a "national agency, not a political government
unit."[53] The explanatory note was adopted as the sponsorship speech of the
Committee on Local Governments. No interpellations or debates were made on the
floor and no amendments introduced. The bill was approved on second reading on
the same day it was presented.[54]
warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of
the rule of law. Sdjad
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549 are affirmed. Sppedsc
SO ORDERED.

When the bill was forwarded to the Senate, several amendments were made. These
amendments, however, did not affect the nature of the MMDA as originally conceived
in the House of Representatives.[55]

It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a
public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a "special
metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the
Constitution. The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.[56] R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a
plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but
appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact,
part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the
President,[57] whereas in local government units, the President merely exercises
supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the
MMDA. Newmiso

Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA
under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact
ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units,
acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and
police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not
pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its
proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals
did not err in so ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues as they are
unnecessary. Esmso

We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDAs noble efforts to solve
the chaotic traffic condition in Metro Manila. Everyday, traffic jams and traffic
bottlenecks plague the metropolis. Even our once sprawling boulevards and avenues
are now crammed with cars while city streets are clogged with motorists and
pedestrians. Traffic has become a social malaise affecting our peoples productivity
and the efficient delivery of goods and services in the country. The MMDA was
created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately
the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the
opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision without any legal
[G.R. No. 130230. April 15, 2005]
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. DANTE
O. GARIN, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
At issue in this case is the validity of Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924 creating
the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), which authorizes it to
confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws
and regulations.
The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a
lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his drivers license
confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on 05 August
1995. The following statements were printed on the TVR:
YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO REPORT TO THE MMDA TRAFFIC
OPERATIONS CENTER PORT AREA MANILA AFTER 48 HOURS FROM DATE OF
APPREHENSION FOR DISPOSITION/APPROPRIATE ACTION THEREON.
CRIMINAL CASE SHALL BE FILED FOR FAILURE TO REDEEM LICENSE AFTER
30 DAYS.
VALID AS TEMPORARY DRIVERS LICENSE FOR SEVEN DAYS FROM DATE OF
APPREHENSION.[1]
Shortly before the expiration of the TVRs validity, the respondent addressed a
letter[2] to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his drivers
license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint [3] with application
for preliminary injunction in Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque,
on 12 September 1995, contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and
regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to
deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the
validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution.
The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional
prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the
MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and therefore unlimited - fines and other penalties
on erring motorists.
In support of his application for a writ of preliminary injunction, Garin alleged that
he suffered and continues to suffer great and irreparable damage because of the
deprivation of his license and that, absent any implementing rules from the Metro
Manila Council, the TVR and the confiscation of his license have no legal basis.
For its part, the MMDA, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, pointed
out that the powers granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the
fixing, collection and imposition of fines and penalties for traffic violations, which powers
are legislative and executive in nature; the judiciary retains the right to determine the
validity of the penalty imposed. It further argued that the doctrine of separation of
powers does not preclude admixture of the three powers of government in
administrative agencies.[4]
The MMDA also refuted Garins allegation that the Metro Manila Council, the
governing board and policy making body of the petitioner, has as yet to formulate the
implementing rules for Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 and directed the courts attention
to MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 dated 15 April 1995. Respondent
Garin, however, questioned the validity of MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-
001, as he claims that it was passed by the Metro Manila Council in the absence of a
quorum.
Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort issued a temporary restraining order on 26
September 1995, extending the validity of the TVR as a temporary drivers license for
twenty more days. A preliminary mandatory injunction was granted on 23 October
1995, and the MMDA was directed to return the respondents drivers license.
On 14 August 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision [5] in favor of the
herein respondent and held that:
a. There was indeed no quorum in that First Regular Meeting of the MMDA Council
held on March 23, 1995, hence MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001,
authorizing confiscation of drivers licenses upon issuance of a TVR, is void ab initio.
b. The summary confiscation of a drivers license without first giving the driver an
opportunity to be heard; depriving him of a property right (drivers license) without
DUE PROCESS; not filling (sic) in Court the complaint of supposed traffic infraction,
cannot be justified by any legislation (and is) hence unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the temporary writ of preliminary injunction is hereby made
permanent; th(e) MMDA is directed to return to plaintiff his drivers license; th(e)
MMDA is likewise ordered to desist from confiscating drivers license without first
giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding.
In filing this petition,[6] the MMDA reiterates and reinforces its argument in the
court below and contends that a license to operate a motor vehicle is neither a contract
nor a property right, but is a privilege subject to reasonable regulation under the police
power in the interest of the public safety and welfare. The petitioner further argues that
revocation or suspension of this privilege does not constitute a taking without due
process as long as the licensee is given the right to appeal the revocation.
To buttress its argument that a licensee may indeed appeal the taking and the
judiciary retains the power to determine the validity of the confiscation, suspension or
revocation of the license, the petitioner points out that under the terms of the
confiscation, the licensee has three options:
1. To voluntarily pay the imposable fine,
2. To protest the apprehension by filing a protest with the MMDA
Adjudication Committee, or
3. To request the referral of the TVR to the Public Prosecutors Office.
The MMDA likewise argues that Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 was validly
passed in the presence of a quorum, and that the lower courts finding that it had not
was based on a misapprehension of facts, which the petitioner would have us review.
Moreover, it asserts that though the circular is the basis for the issuance of TVRs, the
basis for the summary confiscation of licenses is Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 itself,
and that such power is self-executory and does not require the issuance of any
implementing regulation or circular.
Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through its Chairman Bayani
Fernando, implemented Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the
procedures for the use of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under the
circular, erring motorists are issued an MTT, which can be paid at any Metrobank
branch. Traffic enforcers may no longer confiscate drivers licenses as a matter of
course in cases of traffic violations. All motorists with unredeemed TVRs were given
seven days from the date of implementation of the new system to pay their fines and
redeem their license or vehicle plates.[7]
It would seem, therefore, that insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to
enjoin the petitioner from confiscating drivers licenses is concerned, recent events have
overtaken the Courts need to decide this case, which has been rendered moot and
academic by the implementation of Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004.
The petitioner, however, is not precluded from re-implementing Memorandum
Circular No. TT-95-001, or any other scheme, for that matter, that would entail
confiscating drivers licenses. For the proper implementation, therefore, of the
petitioners future programs, this Court deems it appropriate to make the following
observations:
1. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in the
exercise of its police power.
The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a motor vehicle is not
a property right, but a privilege granted by the state, which may be suspended or
revoked by the state in the exercise of its police power, in the interest of the public
safety and welfare, subject to the procedural due process requirements. This is
consistent with our rulings in Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal[8] on the license to
operate a cockpit, Tan v. Director of Forestry[9] and Oposa v. Factoran[10] on timber
licensing agreements, and Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Surigao [11] on a
legislative franchise to operate an electric plant.
Petitioner cites a long list of American cases to prove this point, such as State ex.
Rel. Sullivan,[12] which states in part that, the legislative power to regulate travel over
the highways and thoroughfares of the state for the general welfare is extensive. It may
be exercised in any reasonable manner to conserve the safety of travelers and
pedestrians. Since motor vehicles are instruments of potential danger, their registration
and the licensing of their operators have been required almost from their first
appearance. The right to operate them in public places is not a natural and unrestrained
right, but a privilege subject to reasonable regulation, under the police power, in the
interest of the public safety and welfare. The power to license imports further power to
withhold or to revoke such license upon noncompliance with prescribed conditions.
Likewise, the petitioner quotes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Commonwealth v. Funk,[13] to the effect that: Automobiles are vehicles of great speed
and power. The use of them constitutes an element of danger to persons and property
upon the highways. Carefully operated, an automobile is still a dangerous
instrumentality, but, when operated by careless or incompetent persons, it becomes an
engine of destruction. The Legislature, in the exercise of the police power of the
commonwealth, not only may, but must, prescribe how and by whom motor vehicles
shall be operated on the highways. One of the primary purposes of a system of general
regulation of the subject matter, as here by the Vehicle Code, is to insure the
competency of the operator of motor vehicles. Such a general law is manifestly directed
to the promotion of public safety and is well within the police power.
The common thread running through the cited cases is that it is the legislature, in
the exercise of police power, which has the power and responsibility to regulate how
and by whom motor vehicles may be operated on the state highways.
2. The MMDA is not vested with police power.
In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,[14] we
categorically stated that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power,
let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature.
The said case also involved the herein petitioner MMDA which claimed that it had
the authority to open a subdivision street owned by the Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.
to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the
delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. From this premise, the MMDA argued that
there was no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune Street
to the public.
Tracing the legislative history of Rep. Act No. 7924 creating the MMDA, we
concluded that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation
endowed with legislative power, and, unlike its predecessor, the Metro Manila
Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community.
Thus, in the absence of an ordinance from the City of Makati, its own order to open the
street was invalid.
We restate here the doctrine in the said decision as it applies to the case at bar:
police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the
Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome
and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.
Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised
by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National
Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and administrative
boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government
units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as
are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code
of 1991.[15] A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. [16] Local government units
are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police power
through their respective legislative bodies.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government
units. With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared
as a "special development and administrative region" and the administration of "metro-
wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority"
referred to as the MMDA. Thus:
. . . [T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring,
setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in
R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative
power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no
provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare"
of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a
"development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies,
people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector
for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are
actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:
Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. -- -x x x.
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative
functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory
authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila,
without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units
concerning purely local matters.
.
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the
MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules
and regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions. There is no grant of
authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of the metropolis. [17] (footnotes omitted, emphasis supplied)
Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower
court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or
revoke drivers licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, such is an
unauthorized exercise of police power.
3. Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and
regulations.
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the Functions and Powers of the
Metro Manila Development Authority. The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the
petitioner shall install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect
fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether
moving or nonmoving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers
licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of Rep.
Act No. 4136[18] and P.D. No. 1605[19] to the contrary notwithstanding, and that (f)or this
purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila,
through its traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic
enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-
governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to
such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose.
Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature
or those agencies to whom legislative powers have been delegated (the City of Manila
in this case), the petitioner is not precluded and in fact is duty-bound to confiscate and
suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic
management, as well as the administration and implementation of all traffic
enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs. [20]
This is consistent with our ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is a development
authority created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the
various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector, which may enforce, but not enact, ordinances.

This is also consistent with the fundamental rule of statutory construction that a
statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat
it,[21] and is supported by the criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.[22]

A last word. The MMDA was intended to coordinate services with metro-wide
impact that transcend local political boundaries or would entail huge expenditures if
provided by the individual LGUs, especially with regard to transport and traffic
management,[23] and we are aware of the valiant efforts of the petitioner to untangle the
increasingly traffic-snarled roads of Metro Manila. But these laudable intentions are
limited by the MMDAs enabling law, which we can but interpret, and petitioner must be
reminded that its efforts in this respect must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance,
or regulation arising from a legitimate source.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
METROPOLITAN MANILA G.R. No. 179554
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
Petitioner, Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
-versus- CARPIO MORALES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
TRACKWORKS RAIL TRANSIT
ADVERTISING, VENDING Promulgated:
AND PROMOTIONS, INC.,
Respondent. December 16, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This case concerns whether the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA)
could unilaterally dismantle the billboards, signages and other advertizing media in the
structures of the Metro Rail Transit 3 (MRT3) installed by respondent advertising
company by virtue of its existing contract with the owner of the MRT3.
The trial and appellate courts ruled that MMDA did not have the authority to dismantle.
MMDA is now before the Court to assail such adverse ruling.
Antecedents
In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation and
Communications, entered into a build-lease-transfer agreement (BLT agreement) with
Metro Rail Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957
(Build, Operate and Transfer Law), under which MRTC undertook to build MRT3
subject to the condition that MRTC would own MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration
of which the ownership would transfer to the Government.
The BLT agreement stipulated, among others, that MRTC could build and
develop commercial premises in the MRT3 structures, or obtain advertising income
therefrom, viz:
16.1. Details of Development Rights. DOTC hereby
confirms and awards to Metro Rail the rights to (a) develop
commercial premises in the Depot and the air space above the
Stations, which shall be allowed to such height as is legally and
technically feasible, (b) lease or sub-lease interests or assign such
interests in the Depot and such air space and (c) obtain any
advertising income from the Depot and such air space and LRTS
Phase I.
LRTS Phase I means the rail transport system comprising
about 16.9 line kilometers extending from Taft Avenue, Pasay City,
to North Avenue, Quezon City, occupying a strip in the center of
EDSA approximately 10.5 meters wide (approximately 12 meters
wide at or around the Boni Avenue, Santolan and Buendia Stations),
plus about 0.1 to 0.2 line kilometers extending from the North Avenue
Station to the Depot, together with the Stations, 73 Light Rail
Vehicles and all ancillary plant, equipment and facilities, as more
particularly detailed in the Specifications.
16.2. Assignment of Rights. During the Development Rights
Period, Metro Rail shall be entitled to assign all or any of its rights,
titles and interests in the Development Rights to bona fide real estate
developers. In this connection, Metro Rail may enter into such
development, lease, sub-lease or other agreements or contracts
relating to the Depot and the air space above the Stations (the space
not needed for all or any portion of the operation of the LRTS) for all
or any portion of the Development Rights Period.
In 1998, respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc.
(Trackworks) entered into a contract for advertising services with MRTC. Trackworks
thereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and other advertizing media in the
different parts of the MRT3. In 2001, however, MMDA requested Trackworks to
dismantle the billboards, signages and other advertizing media pursuant to MMDA
Regulation No. 96-009, whereby MMDA prohibited the posting, installation and display
of any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in any part of the road,
sidewalk, center island, posts, trees, parks and open space. After Trackworks refused
the request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded to dismantle the formers billboards and similar
forms of advertisement.
On March 1, 2002, Trackworks filed against MMDA in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Pasig City an injunction suit (with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order [TRO] and preliminary injunction), docketed as Civil Case No. 68864.
On March 6, 2002, the RTC (Branch 155) issued a TRO, enjoining MMDA
from dismantling or destroying Trackworks billboards, signages and other advertizing
media. On March 25, 2002, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction for the same
purpose.
 Without filing a motion for reconsideration to challenge the RTCs issuances,
MMDA brought a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals (CA),
docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 70932, but the CA denied the petition and affirmed the
RTC on August 31, 2004. The CA ultimately denied MMDAs motion for
reconsiderationthrough its resolution issued on March 14, 2005.
Thence, MMDA appealed to this Court (G.R. No. 167514), which denied
MMDAs petition for review on October 25, 2005.[1]
Ruling of the RTC
In the meanwhile, on October 10, 2005, the RTC (Branch 155) rendered its
decision permanently enjoining MMDA from dismantling, removing or destroying the
billboards, signages and other advertizing media installed by Trackworks on the interior
and exterior structures of the MRT3.[2]
Ruling of the CA
MMDA appealed the RTCs decision to the CA.
On April 30, 2007, the CA denied the MMDAs appeal, [3] holding that
Trackworks right to install billboards, signages and other advertizing media on the
interior and exterior structures of the MRT3 must be protected by a writ of permanent
injunction; and that MMDA had no power to dismantle, remove or destroy Trackworks
billboards, signages and other advertizing media.[4]
MMDA moved for reconsideration, but the CA resolution denied the motion for
reconsideration on September 3, 2007.[5]
Hence, this appeal by petition for review.
Issues
MMDA claims that its mandate under its charter[6] of formulating, coordinating
and monitoring of policies, standards, progress and projects for the use of
thoroughfares and the promotion of safe and convenient movement of persons and
goods prompted its issuance of MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, which reads in part:
h. ) It is unlawful for any person/s, private or public
corporations, advertising and promotions companies, movie
producers, professionals and service contractors to post, install,
display any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers,
professional service advertisements and other visual clutters in any
part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts, trees parks and open
space.
MMDA avers that the conversion of the center island of Epifanio Delos Santos
Avenue (EDSA) into the carriageway of the MRT3 line did not exempt the EDSA center
island from the coverage of the MMDA regulation;[7] that the Governments grant of
development rights to MRTC was not an abdication of its right to regulate, and,
therefore, the development of the MRT3 remained subject to all existing and applicable
national and local laws, ordinances, rules and regulations; [8] that MMDA was merely
implementing existing and applicable laws; [9] that Trackworks advertising materials
were placed indiscriminately and without due regard to safety, and as such might be
classified as obstructions and distractions to the motorists traversing EDSA;[10] and that
the interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the
community whose safety and general welfare MMDA was mandated to protect.[11]
Trackworks maintains, on the other hand, that MMDAs petition was defective for its
failure to raise any genuine question of law; and that the CAs decision dated April 30,
2007was valid and correct.[12]
Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
That Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards, signages and other advertizing
media in the MRT3 from MRTCs authority under the BLT agreement to develop
commercial premises in the MRT3 structure or to obtain advertising income therefrom
is no longer debatable. Under the BLT agreement, indeed, MRTC owned the MRT3 for
25 years, upon the expiration of which MRTC would transfer ownership of the MRT3 to
the Government.
Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time
material to this case, and until this date, MRTCs entering into the contract for
advertising services with Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership by the former.
In fact, in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Trackworks Rail Transit
Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc.,[13] this Court expressly recognized
Trackworks right to install the billboards, signages and other advertising media
pursuant to said contract. The latters right should, therefore, be respected.
It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of
Trackworks billboards, signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no
power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other
advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,[14] Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc.,[15] and Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority v. Garin,[16] the Court had the occasion to rule that
MMDAs powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a
system, and administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police thereof is hereby vested in the Secretary of Public Works,
power, let alone legislative power.[17] Transportation and Communications, hereinafter referred to as the
Secretary.
Clarifying the real nature of MMDA, the Court held:

xxx The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a development There is also no evidence showing that MMDA had been delegated by DPWH to
authority. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down implement the Building Code.
policies and coordinating with the various national government
agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review, and affirm the decision dated April 30,
and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of 2007 and the resolution dated September 3, 2007.
basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are
administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the
Costs against the petitioner.
charter itself, viz:

Sec.2. Creation of the SO ORDERED.

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority.- xxx.
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and
coordinative functions, and in the process exercise
regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of
metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution
of the autonomy of local government units
concerning purely local matters.[18]

The Court also agrees with the CAs ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009
and MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks billboards,
signages and other advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation and
display of billboards, signages and other advertising media applied only to public areas,
but MRT3, being private property pursuant to the BLT agreement between the
Government and MRTC, was not one of the areas as to which the prohibition
applied. Moreover, MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks
billboards, signages and other advertising media in MRT3, because it did not
specifically cover MRT3, and because it was issued a year prior to the construction of
MRT3 on the center island of EDSA. Clearly, MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09
could not have included MRT3 in its prohibition.

MMDAs insistence that it was only implementing Presidential Decree No. 1096
(Building Code) and its implementing rules and regulations is not persuasive. The
power to enforce the provisions of the Building Code was lodged in the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), not in MMDA, considering the laws following
provision, thus:

Sec. 201. Responsibility for Administration and Enforcement.

The administration and enforcement of the provisions of this Code
including the imposition of penalties for administrative violations
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS,[1]DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE,DEPARTMENT OF PUBLICWORKS AND
HIGHWAYS,DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET ANDMANAGEMENT,
PHILIPPINECOAST GUARD, PHILIPPINENATIONAL POLICE MARITIMEGROUP,
and DEPARTMENT OFTHE INTERIOR AND LOCALGOVERNMENT,
Petitioners,
- versus -
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OFMANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA
V. ILAS,
SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH
DELA PEA, PAUL DENNIS
QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA
LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE
SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA,
SARAH JOELLE LINTAG,
HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS,
FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and
JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA,
Respondents.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
On December 18, 2008, this Court rendered a Decision in G.R. Nos. 171947-48
ordering petitioners to clean up, rehabilitate and preserve Manila Bay in their different
capacities. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005
Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and
the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-
99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent
developments or supervening events in the case. The fallo of the
RTC Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up,
rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its
waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification
Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make
them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact
recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as
the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development, and proper use of the countrys environment and
natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR
as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement
and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement its
Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the
rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the
earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination
meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to
ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action
in accordance with its indicated completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the
Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government
Code of 1991, the DILG, in exercising the Presidents power of
general supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in
establishing waste management programs under Sec. 43 of the
Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in
Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and
Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial establishments, and
private homes along the banks of the major river systems in their
respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-
Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias)
Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the
Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan)
River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor
rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila
Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have
wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed
by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be
found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying
establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks
within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water,
and human wastes from flowing into these rivers, waterways,
esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of
fines and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the MWSS is
directed to provide, install, operate, and maintain the necessary
adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and
Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275, the LWUA, through the local water
districts and in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide,
install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and
the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage
in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan
where needed at the earliest possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, the DA, through the
BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore the marine life of
the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila,
Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in
developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic
resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the
PNP Maritime Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in
coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979,
RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to
prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 and the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,
the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent
the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-
generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at
ports and apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of
programs and projects for flood control projects and drainage
services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG,
affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other agencies,
shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other
applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR
(Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-
Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros
in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of
programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the
country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite,
and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP
Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government
agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures, constructions,
and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other
applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan)
Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the
Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros
that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and
maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period
of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its
territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties
on the maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is
also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the appropriate
criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of
RA 9003, Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other
existing laws on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and
Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision,
determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the
proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and
sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the
companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within
which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of
its environmental sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, Sec. 118 of RA 8550,
and Sec. 56 of RA 9003, the DepEd shall integrate lessons on
pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection,
and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in
the minds and hearts of students and, through them, their parents
and friends, the importance of their duty toward achieving and
maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay
and the entire Philippine archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate
budget in the General Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding
years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and
preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the
countrys development objective to attain economic growth in a
manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of
our marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR,
DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG,
 and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of
continuing mandamus, shall, from finality of this Decision, each
submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities
undertaken in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
The government agencies did not file any motion for reconsideration and the
Decision became final in January 2009.
The case is now in the execution phase of the final and executory December
18, 2008 Decision. The Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive and
evaluate the quarterly progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the agencies
in accordance with said decision and to monitor the execution phase.
In the absence of specific completion periods, the Committee recommended
that time frames be set for the agencies to perform their assigned tasks. This may be
viewed as an encroachment over the powers and functions of the Executive Branch
headed by the President of the Philippines.
This view is misplaced.
The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of
judicial power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision
is but an integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court. None of the agencies
ever questioned the power of the Court to implement the December 18, 2008 Decision
nor has any of them raised the alleged encroachment by the Court over executive
functions.
While additional activities are required of the agencies like submission of plans
of action, data or status reports, these directives are but part and parcel of the execution
stage of a final decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Section 47 of Rule 39
reads:
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.The effect of
a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be
as follows:
xxxx
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties of their
successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged
in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face
to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is clear that the final judgment includes not only what appears upon its face to have
been so adjudged but also those matters actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto. Certainly, any activity that is needed to fully implement a final
judgment is necessarily encompassed by said judgment.
Moreover, the submission of periodic reports is sanctioned by Secs. 7 and 8,
Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases:
Sec. 7. Judgment.If warranted, the court shall grant the
privilege of the writ of continuing mandamus requiring respondent to
perform an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied
and to grant such other reliefs as may be warranted resulting from
the wrongful or illegal acts of the respondent. The court shall
require the respondent to submit periodic reports detailing the
progress and execution of the judgment, and the court may, by
itself or through a commissioner or the appropriate government
agency, evaluate and monitor compliance. The petitioner may
submit its comments or observations on the execution of the
judgment.
Sec. 8. Return of the writ.The periodic reports submitted by the
respondent detailing compliance with the judgment shall be
contained in partial returns of the writ. Upon full satisfaction of the
judgment, a final return of the writ shall be made to the court by the
respondent. If the court finds that the judgment has been fully
implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the
court docket. (Emphasis supplied.)
With the final and executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of continuing mandamus
issued in MMDA means that until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with
the Courts orders, the Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full
execution of the judgment.
There being no encroachment over executive functions to speak of, We shall now
proceed to the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee.
Several problems were encountered by the Manila Bay Advisory Committee. [2] An
evaluation of the quarterly progressive reports has shown that (1) there are voluminous
quarterly progressive reports that are being submitted; (2) petitioner-agencies do not
have a uniform manner of reporting their cleanup, rehabilitation and preservation
activities; (3) as yet no definite deadlines have been set by petitioner DENR as to
petitioner-agencies timeframe for their respective duties; (4) as of June 2010 there has
been a change in leadership in both the national and local levels; and (5) some
agencies have encountered difficulties in complying with the Courts directives.
In order to implement the afore-quoted Decision, certain directives have to be issued
by the Court to address the said concerns.
Acting on the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee, the
Court hereby resolves to ORDER the following:
(1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), as lead
agency in the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004, shall submit to the Court on or before
June 30, 2011 the updated Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy.
The DENR is ordered to submit summarized data on the overall quality
of Manila Bay waters for all four quarters of 2010 on or before June 30, 2011.
The DENR is further ordered to submit the names and addresses of persons
and companies in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga
and Bataan that generate toxic and hazardous waste on or before September 30, 2011.
(2) On or before June 30, 2011, the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) shall order the Mayors of all cities in Metro Manila; the Governors
of Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan; and the Mayors of all the
cities and towns in said provinces to inspect all factories, commercial establishments
and private homes along the banks of the major river systemssuch as but not limited to
the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (Paranaque-Zapote,
Las Pinas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-
Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River,
and the Laguna De Bayand other minor rivers and waterways within their jurisdiction
that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay and the lands abutting it, to
determine if they have wastewater treatment facilities and/or hygienic septic tanks, as
prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, rules and regulations. Said local government
unit (LGU) officials are given up to September 30, 2011 to finish the inspection of said
establishments and houses.
In case of non-compliance, the LGU officials shall take appropriate action to
ensure compliance by non-complying factories, commercial establishments and private
homes with said law, rules and regulations requiring the construction or installment of
wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks.
The aforementioned governors and mayors shall submit to the DILG on or
before December 31, 2011 their respective compliance reports which will contain the
names and addresses or offices of the owners of all the non-complying factories,
commercial establishments and private homes, copy furnished the concerned
environmental agency, be it the local DENR office or the Laguna Lake Development
Authority.
The DILG is required to submit a five-year plan of action that will contain
measures intended to ensure compliance of all non-complying factories, commercial
establishments, and private homes.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DILG and the mayors of all cities in Metro
Manila shall consider providing land for the wastewater facilities of the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) or its concessionaires (Maynilad and
Manila Water, Inc.) within their respective jurisdictions.
(3) The MWSS shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the list of
areas in Metro Manila, Rizal and Cavite that do not have the necessary wastewater
treatment facilities. Within the same period, the concessionaires of the MWSS shall
submit their plans and projects for the construction of wastewater treatment facilities in
all the aforesaid areas and the completion period for said facilities, which shall not go
beyond 2037.
On or before June 30, 2011, the MWSS is further required to have its two
concessionaires submit a report on the amount collected as sewerage fees in their
respective areas of operation as of December 31, 2010.
(4) The Local Water Utilities Administration is ordered to submit on or before
September 30, 2011 its plan to provide, install, operate and maintain sewerage and
sanitation facilities in said cities and towns and the completion period for said works,
which shall be fully implemented by December 31, 2020.
(5) The Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources, shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 a report on
areas in Manila Bay where marine life has to be restored or improved and the
assistance it has extended to the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna,
Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan in developing the fisheries and aquatic resources
in Manila Bay. The report shall contain monitoring data on the marine life in said areas.
Within the same period, it shall submit its five-year plan to restore and improve the
marine life in Manila Bay, its future activities to assist the aforementioned LGUs for that
purpose, and the completion period for said undertakings.
The DA shall submit to the Court on or before September 30, 2011 the
baseline data as of September 30, 2010 on the pollution loading into
the Manila Bay system from agricultural and livestock sources.
(6) The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) shall incorporate in its quarterly
reports the list of violators it has apprehended and the status of their cases. The PPA
is further ordered to include in its report the names, make and capacity of the ships that
dock in PPA ports. The PPA shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the
measures it intends to undertake to implement its compliance with paragraph 7 of the
dispositive portion of the MMDA Decision and the completion dates of such measures.
The PPA should include in its report the activities of its concessionaire that
collects and disposes of the solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes,
which shall state the names, make and capacity of the ships serviced by it since August
2003 up to the present date, the dates the ships docked at PPA ports, the number of
days the ship was at sea with the corresponding number of passengers and crew per
trip, the volume of solid, liquid and other wastes collected from said ships, the treatment
undertaken and the disposal site for said wastes.
(7) The Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group shall submit on or
before June 30, 2011 its five-year plan of action on the measures and activities it
intends to undertake to apprehend the violators of Republic Act No. (RA) 8550 or
the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 and other pertinent laws, ordinances and
regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the successful
prosecution of violators.
The Philippine Coast Guard shall likewise submit on or before June 30, 2011
its five-year plan of action on the measures and activities they intend to undertake to
apprehend the violators of Presidential Decree No. 979 or the Marine Pollution Decree
of 1976 and RA 9993 or the Philippine Coast Guard Law of 2009 and other pertinent
laws and regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the
successful prosecution of violators.
(8) The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) shall submit to
the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the names and addresses of the informal settlers
in Metro Manila who, as of December 31, 2010, own and occupy houses, structures,
constructions and other encroachments established or built along the Pasig-Marikina-
San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-
Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros, in violation of RA
7279 and other applicable laws. On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit
its plan for the removal of said informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid
houses, structures, constructions and encroachments, as well as the completion dates
for said activities, which shall be fully implemented not later than December 31, 2015.
The MMDA is ordered to submit a status report, within thirty (30) days from
receipt of this Resolution, on the establishment of a sanitary landfill facility for Metro
Manila in compliance with the standards under RA 9003 or the Ecological Solid Waste
Management Act.
On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit a report of the location
of open and controlled dumps in Metro Manila whose operations are illegal after
February 21, 2006,[3] pursuant to Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003, and its plan for the
closure of these open and controlled dumps to be accomplished not later than
December 31, 2012. Also, on or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, as
Chairperson of the National Solid Waste Management Commission (NSWMC), shall
submit a report on the location of all open and controlled dumps in Rizal, Cavite,
Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, in his capacity as NSWMC
Chairperson, shall submit a report on whether or not the following landfills strictly
comply with Secs. 41 and 42 of RA 9003 on the establishment and operation of sanitary
landfills, to wit:
National Capital Region
1. Navotas SLF (PhilEco), Brgy. Tanza (New Site), Navotas City
2. Payatas Controlled Dumpsite, Barangay Payatas, Quezon City
Region III
3. Sitio Coral, Brgy. Matictic, Norzagaray, Bulacan
4. Sitio Tiakad, Brgy. San Mateo, Norzagaray, Bulacan
5. Brgy. Minuyan, San Jose del Monte City, Bulacan
6. Brgy. Mapalad, Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija
7. Sub-zone Kalangitan, Clark Capas, Tarlac Special
Economic Zone
Region IV-A
8. Kalayaan (Longos), Laguna
9. Brgy. Sto. Nino, San Pablo City, Laguna
10. Brgy. San Antonio (Pilotage SLF), San Pedro, Laguna
11. Morong, Rizal
12. Sitio Lukutan, Brgy. San Isidro, Rodriguez (Montalban), Rizal
(ISWIMS)
13. Brgy. Pintong Bukawe, San Mateo, Rizal (SMSLFDC)
On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA and the seventeen (17) LGUs in Metro
Manila are ordered to jointly submit a report on the average amount of garbage
collected monthly per district in all the cities in Metro Manila from January 2009 up to
December 31, 2010 vis--vis the average amount of garbage disposed monthly in
landfills and dumpsites. In its quarterly report for the last quarter of 2010 and thereafter,
MMDA shall report on the apprehensions for violations of the penal provisions of RA
9003, RA 9275 and other laws on pollution for the said period.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH and the LGUs in Rizal, Laguna,
Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan shall submit the names and addresses of the
informal settlers in their respective areas who, as of September 30, 2010, own or
occupy houses, structures, constructions, and other encroachments built along the
Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus
(Cavite) River, the Laguna de Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways
and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay, in breach of RA 7279 and
other applicable laws. On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH and the aforesaid LGUs
shall jointly submit their plan for the removal of said informal settlers and the demolition
of the aforesaid structures, constructions and encroachments, as well as the
completion dates for such activities which shall be implemented not later than
December 31, 2012.
(9) The Department of Health (DOH) shall submit to the Court on or before
June 30, 2011 the names and addresses of the owners of septic and sludge companies
including those that do not have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of
fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.

The DOH shall implement rules and regulations on Environmental Sanitation

Clearances and shall require companies to procure a license to operate from the DOH.

The DOH and DENR-Environmental Management Bureau shall develop a

toxic and hazardous waste management system by June 30, 2011 which will implement
segregation of hospital/toxic/hazardous wastes and prevent mixing with municipal solid
waste.

On or before June 30, 2011, the DOH shall submit a plan of action to ensure
that the said companies have proper disposal facilities and the completion dates of
compliance.
(10) The Department of Education (DepEd) shall submit to the Court on or
before May 31, 2011 a report on the specific subjects on pollution prevention, waste
management, environmental protection, environmental laws and the like that it has
integrated into the school curricula in all levels for the school year 2011-2012.

On or before June 30, 2011, the DepEd shall also submit its plan of action to
ensure compliance of all the schools under its supervision with respect to the
integration of the aforementioned subjects in the school curricula which shall be fully
implemented by June 30, 2012.
(11) All the agencies are required to submit their quarterly reports
electronically using the forms below. The agencies may add other key performance
indicators that they have identified.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007
THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI
FERNANDO as Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority, petitioners,
vs.
VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., respondent.
x --------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 170657 August 15, 2007
HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary, the METROPOLITAN
MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI FERNANDO as Chairman of
the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority,petitioners,
vs.
MENCORP TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, INC., respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The following conditions in 1969, as observed by this Court:
Vehicles have increased in number. Traffic congestion has moved from bad
to worse, from tolerable to critical. The number of people who use the
thoroughfares has multiplied x x x,1
have remained unchecked and have reverberated to this day. Traffic jams continue to
clog the streets of Metro Manila, bringing vehicles to a standstill at main road arteries
during rush hour traffic and sapping people’s energies and patience in the process.
The present petition for review on certiorari, rooted in the traffic congestion problem,
questions the authority of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to
order the closure of provincial bus terminals along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue
(EDSA) and major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.
Specifically challenged are two Orders issued by Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 26 in Civil Case Nos. 03-105850 and
03-106224.
The first assailed Order of September 8, 2005,2 which resolved a motion for
reconsideration filed by herein respondents, declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179,
hereafter referred to as the E.O., "unconstitutional as it constitutes an unreasonable
exercise of police power." The second assailed Order of November 23, 2005 3 denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The following facts are not disputed:
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued the E.O. on February 10, 2003, "Providing
for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transport System," the pertinent
portions of which read:
WHEREAS, Metro Manila continues to be the center of
employment opportunities, trade and commerce of the Greater
Metro Manila area;
WHEREAS, the traffic situation in Metro Manila has affected the
adjacent provinces of Bulacan, Cavite, Laguna, and Rizal, owing to
the continued movement of residents and industries to more
affordable and economically viable locations in these provinces;
WHEREAS, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA) is tasked to undertake measures to ease traffic congestion
in Metro Manila and ensure the convenient and efficient travel of
commuters within its jurisdiction;
WHEREAS, a primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila
has been the numerous buses plying the streets that impedes [sic]
the flow of vehicles and commuters due to the inefficient
connectivity of the different transport modes;
WHEREAS, the MMDA has recommended a plan to decongest
traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major
Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access
to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the
provision of mass transport terminal facilities that would integrate
the existing transport modes, namely the buses, the rail-based
systems of the LRT, MRT and PNR and to facilitate and ensure
efficient travel through the improved connectivity of the different
transport modes;
WHEREAS, the national government must provide the necessary
funding requirements to immediately implement and render
operational these projects; and extent to MMDA such other
assistance as may be warranted to ensure their expeditious
prosecution.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by law, do hereby order:
Section 1. THE PROJECT. – The project shall be identified as
GREATER MANILA TRANSPORT SYSTEM Project.
Section 2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES. – In accordance with the plan
proposed by MMDA, the project aims to develop four (4) interim
intermodal mass transport terminals to integrate the different
transport modes, as well as those that shall hereafter be
developed, to serve the commuting public in the northwest, north,
east, south, and southwest of Metro Manila. Initially, the project
shall concentrate on immediately establishing the mass transport
terminals for the north and south Metro Manila commuters as
hereinafter described.
Section 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTING AGENCY. –
The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), is
hereby designated as the implementing Agency for the project. For
this purpose, MMDA is directed to undertake such infrastructure
development work as may be necessary and, thereafter, manage
the project until it may be turned-over to more appropriate
agencies, if found suitable and convenient. Specifically, MMDA
shall have the following functions and responsibilities:
a) Cause the preparation of the Master Plan for
the projects, including the designs and costing;
b) Coordinate the use of the land and/or
properties needed for the project with the
respective agencies and/or entities owning them;
c) Supervise and manage the construction of the
necessary structures and facilities;
d) Execute such contracts or agreements as may
be necessary, with the appropriate government
agencies, entities, and/or private persons, in
accordance with existing laws and pertinent
regulations, to facilitate the implementation of the
project;
e) Accept, manage and disburse such funds as
may be necessary for the construction and/or
implementation of the projects, in accordance
with prevailing accounting and audit polices and
practice in government.
f) Enlist the assistance of any national
government agency, office or department,
including local government units, government-
owned or controlled corporations, as may be
necessary;
g) Assign or hire the necessary personnel for the
above purposes; and
h) Perform such other related functions as may
be necessary to enable it to accomplish the
objectives and purposes of this Executive
Order.4 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied)
As the above-quoted portions of the E.O. noted, the primary cause of traffic
congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets and the
inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes;5 and the MMDA had
"recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now
located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient
access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of
mass transport terminal facilities"6 which plan is referred to under the E.O. as
the Greater Manila Mass Transport System Project (the Project).
The E.O. thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project.
Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board and
policymaking body of the MMDA, issued Resolution No. 03-07 series of
20037 expressing full support of the Project. Recognizing the imperative to integrate
the different transport modes via the establishment of common bus parking terminal
areas, the MMC cited the need to remove the bus terminals located along major
thoroughfares of Metro Manila.8
On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of public transportation with a provincial bus operation, 9 filed
a petition for declaratory relief10 before the RTC11 of Manila.
In its petition which was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-105850, Viron alleged that the
MMDA, through Chairman Fernando, was "poised to issue a Circular, Memorandum
or Order closing, or tantamount to closing, all provincial bus terminals along EDSA
and in the whole of the Metropolis under the pretext of traffic regulation." 12 This
impending move, it stressed, would mean the closure of its bus terminal in Sampaloc,
Manila and two others in Quezon City.
Alleging that the MMDA’s authority does not include the power to direct provincial bus
operators to abandon their existing bus terminals to thus deprive them of the use of
their property, Viron asked the court to construe the scope, extent and limitation of the
power of the MMDA to regulate traffic under R.A. No. 7924, "An Act Creating the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, Defining its Powers and Functions,
Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes."
Viron also asked for a ruling on whether the planned closure of provincial bus
terminals would contravene the Public Service Act and related laws which mandate
public utilities to provide and maintain their own terminals as a requisite for the
privilege of operating as common carriers.13
Mencorp Transportation System, Inc. (Mencorp), another provincial bus operator,
later filed a similar petition for declaratory relief14 against Executive Secretary Alberto
G. Romulo and MMDA Chairman Fernando.
Mencorp asked the court to declare the E.O. unconstitutional and illegal for
transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of public land
transportation units over their respective terminals.
Averring that MMDA Chairman Fernando had begun to implement a plan to close and
eliminate all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in the whole of the metropolis
and to transfer their operations to common bus terminals,15 Mencorp prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction
to restrain the impending closure of its bus terminals which it was leasing at the
corner of EDSA and New York Street in Cubao and at the intersection of Blumentritt,
Laon Laan and Halcon Streets in Quezon City. The petition was docketed as Civil
Case No. 03-106224 and was raffled to Branch 47 of the RTC of Manila.
Mencorp’s petition was consolidated on June 19, 2003 with Viron’s petition which was
raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, Manila.
Mencorp’s prayer for a TRO and/or writ of injunction was denied as was its
application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. 16
In the Pre-Trial Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed down to
whether 1) the MMDA’s power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included the power
to direct provincial bus operators to abandon and close their duly established and
existing bus terminals in order to conduct business in a common terminal; (2) the E.O.
is consistent with the Public Service Act and the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus
operators would be deprived of their real properties without due process of law should
they be required to use the common bus terminals.
Upon the agreement of the parties, they filed their respective position papers in lieu of
hearings.
By Decision18 of January 24, 2005, the trial court sustained the constitutionality and
legality of the E.O. pursuant to R.A. No. 7924, which empowered the MMDA to
administer Metro Manila’s basic services including those of transport and traffic
management.
The trial court held that the E.O. was a valid exercise of the police power of the State
as it satisfied the two tests of lawful subject matter and lawful means, hence, Viron’s
and Mencorp’s property rights must yield to police power.
On the separate motions for reconsideration of Viron and Mencorp, the trial court, by
Order of September 8, 2005, reversed its Decision, this time holding that the E.O.
was "an unreasonable exercise of police power"; that the authority of the MMDA
under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the power to order the closure
of Viron’s and Mencorp’s existing bus terminals; and that the E.O. is inconsistent with
the provisions of the Public Service Act.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution of November 23,
2005.
Hence, this petition, which faults the trial court for failing to rule that: (1) the requisites
of declaratory relief are not present, there being no justiciable controversy in Civil
Case Nos. 03-105850 and 03-106224; and (2) the President has the authority to
undertake or cause the implementation of the Project. 19
Petitioners contend that there is no justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory
relief as nothing in the body of the E.O. mentions or orders the closure and
elimination of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. Viron and
Mencorp, they argue, failed to produce any letter or communication from the
Executive Department apprising them of an immediate plan to close down their bus
terminals.
And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to
government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use
government property along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that the
only relation created by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the
implementing officials, but not between third persons.
The petition fails.
It is true, as respondents have pointed out, that the alleged deficiency of the
consolidated petitions to meet the requirement of justiciability was not among the
issues defined for resolution in the Pre-Trial Order of January 12, 2004. It is equally
true, however, that the question was repeatedly raised by petitioners in their Answer
to Viron’s petition,20 their Comment of April 29, 2003 opposing Mencorp’s prayer for
the issuance of a TRO,21 and their Position Paper of August 23, 2004.22
In bringing their petitions before the trial court, both respondents pleaded the
existence of the essential requisites for their respective petitions for declaratory
relief,23 and refuted petitioners’ contention that a justiciable controversy was
lacking.24 There can be no denying, therefore, that the issue was raised and
discussed by the parties before the trial court.
The following are the essential requisites for a declaratory relief petition: (a) there
must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons
whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal
interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial
determination.25
The requirement of the presence of a justiciable controversy is satisfied when an
actual controversy or the ripening seeds thereof exist between the parties, all of
whom are sui juris and before the court, and the declaration sought will help in ending
the controversy.26 A question becomes justiciable when it is translated into a claim of
right which is actually contested.27
In the present cases, respondents’ resort to court was prompted by the issuance of
the E.O. The 4th Whereas clause of the E.O. sets out in clear strokes the MMDA’s
plan to "decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major
Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass
transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport
terminal facilities x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 2 of the E.O. thereafter lays down the immediate establishment of common
bus terminals for north- and south-bound commuters. For this purpose, Section 8
directs the Department of Budget and Management to allocate funds of not more than
one hundred million pesos (P100,000,000) to cover the cost of the construction of the
north and south terminals. And the E.O. was made effective immediately.
The MMDA’s resolve to immediately implement the Project, its denials to the contrary
notwithstanding, is also evident from telltale circumstances, foremost of which was
the passage by the MMC of Resolution No. 03-07, Series of 2003 expressing its full
support of the immediate implementation of the Project.
Notable from the 5th Whereas clause of the MMC Resolution is the plan to "remove
the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila and an urgent
need to integrate the different transport modes." The 7th Whereas clause proceeds to
mention the establishment of the North and South terminals.
As alleged in Viron’s petition, a diagram of the GMA-MTS North Bus/Rail Terminal
had been drawn up, and construction of the terminal is already in progress. The
MMDA, in its Answer28 and Position Paper,29 in fact affirmed that the government had
begun to implement the Project.
It thus appears that the issue has already transcended the boundaries of what is
merely conjectural or anticipatory.lawphil
Under the circumstances, for respondents to wait for the actual issuance by the
MMDA of an order for the closure of respondents’ bus terminals would be foolhardy
for, by then, the proper action to bring would no longer be for declaratory relief which,
under Section 1, Rule 6330 of the Rules of Court, must be brought before there is a
breach or violation of rights.
As for petitioners’ contention that the E.O. is a mere administrative issuance which
creates no relation with third persons, it does not persuade. Suffice it to stress that to
ensure the success of the Project for which the concerned government agencies are
directed to coordinate their activities and resources, the existing bus terminals owned,
operated or leased by third persons like respondents would have to be eliminated;
and respondents would be forced to operate from the common bus terminals.
It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on respondents. The
closure of their bus terminals would mean, among other things, the loss of income
from the operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely, respondents claim a
deprivation of their constitutional right to property without due process of law.
Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal and substantial interest in
the case such that [they have] sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
[the E.O.’s] enforcement."31 Consequently, the established rule that the
constitutionality of a law or administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will
sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement has been satisfied by
respondents.
On to the merits of the case.
Respondents posit that the MMDA is devoid of authority to order the elimination of
their bus terminals under the E.O. which, they argue, is unconstitutional because it
violates both the Constitution and the Public Service Act; and that neither is the
MMDA clothed with such authority under R.A. No. 7924.
Petitioners submit, however, that the real issue concerns the President’s authority to
undertake or to cause the implementation of the Project. They assert that the
authority of the President is derived from E.O. No. 125, "Reorganizing the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications Defining its Powers and Functions and for Other
Purposes," her residual power and/or E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987. They add that the E.O. is also a valid exercise of the
police power.
E.O. No. 125,32 which former President Corazon Aquino issued in the exercise of
legislative powers, reorganized the then Ministry (now Department) of Transportation
and Communications. Sections 4, 5, 6 and 22 of E.O. 125, as amended by E.O. 125-
A,33 read:
SECTION 4. Mandate. — The Ministry shall be the primary policy,
planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating
and administrative entity of the Executive Branch of the government in
the promotion, development and regulation of dependable and
coordinated networks of transportationand communication systems as
well as in the fast, safe, efficient and reliable postal, transportation and
communications services.
To accomplish such mandate, the Ministry shall have the following
objectives:
(a) Promote the development of dependable and
coordinated networks of transportation and
communications systems;
(b) Guide government and private investment in
the development of the country’s intermodal
transportation and communications systems in a most
practical, expeditious, and orderly fashion for maximum
safety, service, and cost effectiveness; (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
xxxx
SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. — To accomplish its mandate, the
Ministry shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) Formulate and recommend national policies and
guidelines for the preparation and implementation of
integrated and comprehensive transportation and
communications systems at the national, regional and
local levels;
(b) Establish and administer comprehensive and
integrated programs for transportation and
communications, and for this purpose, may call on any
agency, corporation, or organization, whether public or
private, whose development programs include
transportation and communications as an integral part
thereof, to participate and assist in the preparation and
implementation of such program;
(c) Assess, review and provide direction to transportation
and communications research and development programs
of the government in coordination with other institutions
concerned;
(d) Administer all laws, rules and regulations in the
field of transportation and communications; (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
xxxx
SECTION 6. Authority and Responsibility. — The authority and
responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the Ministry and for
the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the
Minister of Transportation and Communications, hereinafter referred to
as the Minister, who shall have supervision and control over the Ministry and
shall be appointed by the President. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
SECTION 22. Implementing Authority of Minister. — The Minister shall
issue such orders, rules, regulations and other issuances as may be
necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of
this Executive Order. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is readily apparent from the abovequoted provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended,
that the President, then possessed of and exercising legislative powers,
mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating,
implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate
networks of transportation and communications. The grant of authority to the DOTC
includes the power to establishand administer comprehensive and integrated
programs for transportation and communications.
As may be seen further, the Minister (now Secretary) of the DOTC is vested with the
authority and responsibility to exercise the mandate given to the
department. Accordingly, the DOTC Secretary is authorized to issue such orders,
rules, regulations and other issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective
implementation of the law.
Since, under the law, the DOTC is authorized to establish and administer programs
and projects for transportation, it follows that the President may exercise the same
power and authority to order the implementation of the Project, which admittedly is
one for transportation.
Such authority springs from the President’s power of control over all executive
departments as well as the obligation for the faithful execution of the laws under
Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution which provides:
SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.
This constitutional provision is echoed in Section 1, Book III of the Administrative
Code of 1987. Notably, Section 38, Chapter 37, Book IV of the same Code defines
the President’s power of supervision and control over the executive departments, viz:
SECTION 38. Definition of Administrative Relationships. — Unless otherwise
expressly stated in the Code or in other laws defining the special
relationships of particular agencies, administrative relationships shall be
categorized and defined as follows:
(1) Supervision and Control. — Supervision and control shall include
authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by
law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain
the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and
decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the
execution of plans and programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly
provided in the specific law governing the relationship of particular agencies
the word "control" shall encompass supervision and control as defined in this
paragraph. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate,
the President may act directly or merely direct the performance of a duty. 34
Respecting the President’s authority to order the implementation of the Project in the
exercise of the police power of the State, suffice it to stress that the powers vested in
the DOTC Secretary to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated
programs for transportation and communications and to issue orders, rules and
regulations to implement such mandate (which, as previously discussed, may also be
exercised by the President) have been so delegated for the good and welfare of the
people. Hence, these powers partake of the nature of police power.
Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to
the Constitution, for the good and welfare of the people. 35 This power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order or safety, and
general welfare of the people flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema
lex ─ the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated,
as it is in fact increasingly being delegated.36 By virtue of a valid delegation, the
power may be exercised by the President and administrative boards 37 as well as by
the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local governments under an
express delegation by the Local Government Code of 1991. 38
The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project
notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA as the implementing agency for the
Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no legal basis therefor.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the
DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project
such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized
to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority
through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing
and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of
transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such
as the Project in question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President
clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No.
179 ultra vires.
In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the absence of a
specific grant of authority to it under R.A. No. 7924.
To recall, R.A. No. 7924 declared the Metropolitan Manila area 39 as a "special
development and administrative region" and placed the administration of "metro-wide"
basic services affecting the region under the MMDA.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7924 specifically authorizes the MMDA to perform "planning,
monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and
supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services," including transport
and traffic management.40 Section 5 of the same law enumerates the powers and
functions of the MMDA as follows:
(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of
medium and long-term plans and programs for the delivery of
metro-wide services, land use and physical development within
Metropolitan Manila, consistent with national development
objectives and priorities;
(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of
medium-term investment programs for metro-wide services which
shall indicate sources and uses of funds for priority programs and
projects, and which shall include the packaging of projects and
presentation to funding institutions;
(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and
projects for the delivery of specific services under its jurisdiction,
subject to the approval of the Council. For this purpose, MMDA can
create appropriate project management offices;
(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans,
programs and projects in Metro Manila; identify bottlenecks and
adopt solutions to problems of implementation;
(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in Metro
Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the implementation
of all programs and projects concerning traffic management,
specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering and
education. Upon request, it shall be extended assistance and
cooperation, including but not limited to, assignment of personnel,
by all other government agencies and offices concerned;
(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose
and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of
traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in
nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses in
the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions
of RA 4136 and PD 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding. For this
purpose, the Authority shall impose all traffic laws and regulations
in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may
deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government
units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-
governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain
authority, subject to such conditions and requirements as the
Authority may impose; and
(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the
objectives of the MMDA, including the undertaking of delivery of
basic services to the local government units, when deemed
necessary subject to prior coordination with and consent of the
local government unit concerned." (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The scope of the function of MMDA as an administrative, coordinating and policy-
setting body has been settled in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA)
v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.41 In that case, the Court stressed:
Clearly, the scope of the MMDA’s function is limited to the delivery of the
seven (7) basic services. One of these is transport and traffic
management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies,
standards and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations,
infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the
safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass transport
system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the administration
of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic
education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in
Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under this service, the MMDA is expressly
authorized to "to set the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and
regulate the implementation of all traffic management programs." In addition,
the MMDA may install and administer a single ticketing system," fix, impose
and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations.
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA
police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has
not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of
the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that
empowers the MMDA or its Council to ‘enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare’ of the
inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter
itself, a ‘development authority.’ It is an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various
national government agencies, people’s organizations, non-
 governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All
its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually
summed up in the charter itself, viz:
‘SECTION 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. —
...
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and
coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory
and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide
services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy
of the local government units concerning purely local
matters.’42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid
of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not
have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that
the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents’ terminals.
Even the MMDA’s claimed authority under the police power must necessarily fail in
consonance with the above-quoted ruling in MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.
and this Court’s subsequent ruling in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Garin43 that the MMDA is not vested with police power.
Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise
of such power does not satisfy the two tests of a valid police power measure, viz: (1)
the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class,
requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 44 Stated
differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means.
As early as Calalang v. Williams,45 this Court recognized that traffic congestion is a
public, not merely a private, concern. The Court therein held that public welfare
underlies the contested statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate
rules and regulations to regulate and control traffic on national roads.
Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at the
bottom of any regulatory measure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic, which is,
to say the least, a menace to public safety."47 As such, measures calculated to
promote the safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the
regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of police power.
Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that
needs to be addressed immediately. Indeed, the E.O. was issued due to the felt need
to address the worsening traffic congestion in Metro Manila which, the MMDA so
determined, is caused by the increasing volume of buses plying the major
thoroughfares and the inefficient connectivity of existing transport systems. It is thus
beyond cavil that the motivating force behind the issuance of the E.O. is the interest
of the public in general.
Are the means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly oppressive?
With the avowed objective of decongesting traffic in Metro Manila, the E.O. seeks to
"eliminate[e] the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares
and provid[e] more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting
public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities x x x." 48 Common
carriers with terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila would thus be
compelled to close down their existing bus terminals and use the MMDA-designated
common parking areas.
In Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc.,49 two city ordinances were
passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena, directing public utility vehicles to
unload and load passengers at the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, which was given
the exclusive franchise to operate a single common terminal. Declaring that no other
terminals shall be situated, constructed, maintained or established inside or within the
city of Lucena, the sanggunian declared as inoperable all temporary terminals therein.
The ordinances were challenged before this Court for being unconstitutional on the
ground that, inter alia, the measures constituted an invalid exercise of police power,
an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition
against monopolies.
Citing De la Cruz v. Paras50 and Lupangco v. Court of Appeals,51 this Court held that
the assailed ordinances were characterized by overbreadth, as they went beyond
what was reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem in the city. And it found
that the compulsory use of the Lucena Grand Terminal was unduly oppressive
because it would subject its users to fees, rentals and charges.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between
authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the
law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.
A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful
formulation of solutions to societal problems.
 From the memorandum filed before this Court by petitioner, it is gathered
that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic
congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by
buses on the streets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the
terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the
city streets.
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of
traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all
terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered
as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has
not been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus
drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead
of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of
terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those
which are unable to meet the specifications.
In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription
against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities
which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised
terminal are barred from operating at all. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As in Lucena, this Court fails to see how the prohibition against the existence of
respondents’ terminals can be considered a reasonable necessity to ease traffic
congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary, the elimination of respondents’ bus
terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and the equally harrowing reality of traffic
congestion in the common parking areas, a case of transference from one site to
another.
Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of "colorum" buses, vans
and taxis entering Metro Manila and using the streets for parking and passenger pick-
up points, as respondents suggest, might even be more effective in easing the traffic
situation. So would the strict enforcement of traffic rules and the removal of
obstructions from major thoroughfares.
As to the alleged confiscatory character of the E.O., it need only to be stated that
respondents’ certificates of public convenience confer no property right, and are mere
licenses or privileges.52 As such, these must yield to legislation safeguarding the
interest of the people.
Even then, for reasons which bear reiteration, the MMDA cannot order the closure of
respondents’ terminals not only because no authority to implement the Project has
been granted nor legislative or police power been delegated to it, but also because
the elimination of the terminals does not satisfy the standards of a valid police power
measure.
Finally, an order for the closure of respondents’ terminals is not in line with the
provisions of the Public Service Act.
Paragraph (a), Section 13 of Chapter II of the Public Service Act (now Section 5 of
Executive Order No. 202, creating the Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board or LFTRB) vested the Public Service Commission (PSC, now the
LTFRB) with "x x x jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services and
their franchises, equipment and other properties x x x."
Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC was empowered to "impose such
conditions as to construction, equipment, maintenance, service, or operation as
the public interests and convenience may reasonably require"53 in approving any
franchise or privilege.
Further, Section 16 (g) and (h) of the Public Service Act54 provided that the
Commission shall have the power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with
the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions
mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:
(g) To compel any public service to furnish safe, adequate, and proper
service as regards the manner of furnishing the same as well as the
maintenance of the necessary material and equipment.
(h) To require any public service to establish, construct, maintain, and
operate any reasonable extension of its existing facilities, where in the
judgment of said Commission, such extension is reasonable and practicable
and will furnish sufficient business to justify the construction and
maintenance of the same and when the financial condition of the said public
service reasonably warrants the original expenditure required in making and
operating such extension.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle parking areas or passenger
terminals, is generally considered a necessary service to be provided by provincial
bus operators like respondents, hence, the investments they have poured into the
acquisition or lease of suitable terminal sites. Eliminating the terminals would thus run
counter to the provisions of the Public Service Act.
This Court commiserates with the MMDA for the roadblocks thrown in the way of its
efforts at solving the pestering problem of traffic congestion in Metro Manila. These
efforts are commendable, to say the least, in the face of the abominable traffic
situation of our roads day in and day out. This Court can only interpret, not change,
the law, however. It needs only to be reiterated that it is the DOTC ─ as the primary
policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and
administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and
communications ─ which has the power to establish and administer a
transportation project like the Project subject of the case at bar.

No matter how noble the intentions of the MMDA may be then, any plan, strategy or
project which it is not authorized to implement cannot pass muster.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is, in light of the foregoing disquisition, DENIED. E.O. No.
179 is declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires.

SO ORDERED.
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., G.R. No. 166501
Petitioner,
- versus -
HON. BAYANI F. FERNANDO,in his capacity as Chairman of the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, and METROPOLITAN
MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
Promulgated:
Respondents. November 16, 2006
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (petitioner), as member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and taxpayer, filed this original action for the issuance of the writs of
Prohibition and Mandamus. Petitioner prays for the Prohibition writ to enjoin
respondents Bayani F. Fernando, Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA) and the MMDA (respondents) from further implementing its wet flag
scheme (Flag Scheme).[1] The Mandamus writ is to compel respondents to respect and
uphold the x x x rights of pedestrians to due process x x x and equal protection of the
laws x x x.
Petitioner contends that the Flag Scheme: (1) has no legal basis because the
MMDAs governing body, the Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it; (2) violates the
Due Process Clause because it is a summary punishment for jaywalking; (3) disregards
the Constitutional protection against cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment; and
(4) violates pedestrian rights as it exposes pedestrians to various potential hazards. [2]
In their Comment, respondents sought the dismissal of the petition for petitioners lack
of standing to litigate and for violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Alternatively, respondents contended that the Flag Scheme is a valid preventive
measure against jaywalking.
Petitioner filed a Reply, claiming that the Court should take cognizance of the case as
it raises issues of paramount and transcendental importance. Petitioner also contended
that he filed this petition directly with the Court because the issues raised in the petition
deserve the direct x x x intervention of the x x x [C]ourt x x x.
We dismiss the petition.
A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
and (3) a favorable action will likely redress the injury. [3] On the other hand, a party
suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury
as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute. [4] Petitioner meets none of the
requirements under either category.
Nor is there merit to petitioners claim that the Court should relax the standing
requirement because of the transcendental importance of the issues the petition
raises. As an exception to the standing requirement, the transcendental importance of
the issues raised relates to the merits of the petition.[5] Thus, the party invoking it must
show, among others, the presence of a clear disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition.[6] Petitioner has not shown such clear constitutional or statutory violation.
On the Flag Schemes alleged lack of legal basis, we note that all the cities and
municipalities within the MMDAs jurisdiction,[7] except Valenzuela City, have each
enacted anti-jaywalking ordinances or traffic management codes with provisions for
pedestrian regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for respondents
implementation of schemes, or ways and means, to enforce the anti-jaywalking
ordinances and similar regulations. After all, the MMDA is an administrative agency
tasked with the implementation of rules and regulations enacted by proper
authorities.[8] The absence of an anti-jaywalking ordinance in Valenzuela City does not
detract from this conclusion absent any proof that respondents implemented the Flag
Scheme in that city.
Further, the petition ultimately calls for a factual determination of whether the Flag
Scheme is a reasonable enforcement of anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar
enactments.This Court is not a trier of facts.[9] The petition proffers mere surmises and
speculations on the potential hazards of the Flag Scheme. This Court cannot determine
the reasonableness of the Flag Scheme based on mere surmises and speculations.
Lastly, petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when he filed this petition
directly with us. This Courts jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with the Regional Trial
Courts and the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice
of forum from which to seek such relief.[10] We relax this rule only in exceptional and
compelling circumstances.[11] This is not the case here.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED