Social Scientist

Gunpowder and Empire: Indian Case

Author(s): Iqtidar Alam Khan
Source: Social Scientist, Vol. 33, No. 3/4 (Mar. - Apr., 2005), pp. 54-65
Published by: Social Scientist
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3518112
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Gunpowder and Empire: Indian Case

The increasinguse of firearmsfromthe middleof the fifteenthcenturyin

differentpartsof the world is often seen as a crucialfactorin the rise of
centralizedmonarchicalstates.In Europeit was a manifestationof the
overallweakeningof the position of gentry,as againstthe king. Thiswas
a directconsequenceof the increasingvulnerabilityof signioralcastlesto
the field artillerymaintainedby the king and of greatereffectivenessof
the musket-wielding infantrymen against mounted knights.' In the
Islamic East, where the mounted archers were the mainstay of the
imperialauthority,this phenomenonappearedto havemanifesteditself
in an alteredform. The highlycentralizedempiresof sixteenth century
like the Ottoman Empire,the SafavidEmpire,the Uzbek Khanateand
the MughalEmpirein Indiaare for examplecharacterizedby Marshall
G.S. Hodgson as the 'gunpowder empires'. According to him, the
changespromoted by the introductionof firearmsin these stateswere
not restricted to army organizations. The firearms also 'gave an
increasedadvantageover local militarygarrisons,to a well organized
central power which could afford artillery'.2In this paper*, such an
impact is examined in the context of state formation in India with a
specialfocus on the MughalEmpire.
A primitive type of gunpowder artillerywas alreadyin vogue in
different parts of the India during the second half of the fifteenth
century.Alreadyby the middleof the century,therewas known in North
India a firearmwith designationKashakanjirwhichthrewballs 'by the
extensiveforce of combustiblesubstances(darruha-iatishin)'.It was in
all probabilitya cannon. A weapon resemblingcannon is also reported
in Kashmir.Srivararecordsthat this weapon 'wascalled topain Muslim
language while in the Kashmiridialect it was called kanda'. He also
alludesat its being made of an alloy.3This is also supportedby allusions
in two other contemporarytexts, Ma'asir-iMahmud Shahiby Shihab
Hakim (1468) and Riyazu'linsha'by Mahmud Gawan (1470) to the
presencein Malwaand Deccanof ra'd/kaman-ira'd(literally,lightening
/lightening bow) which are identified by Firishtaas proper cannons.
According to one criptic descriptionby Shihab Hakim, it was 'made
from an alloy of copper'.4
* Paperpresentedat the MedievalHistorySectionof the IndianHistory
CongressSession,December2004.

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 Gunpowder and Empire: Indian Case

The destructive capacity of gunpowder artillery of fifteenth century, D-

nothwithstanding its primitive nature was vastly greater than that of the
mechanical devices of the earlierperiod. It is indicated by the contemporary
descriptionsof sieges of Mandalgarh(1457) and Machal(1470)5as well that of >-
Champanir(1485) recordedby Firishta(possiblycopying, as was his wont, an 3
earliertext).6This should explainwhy some of the fortsknown for theirstrength r
and soliditysometimeshad to be redesignedin the fifteenthcentury.As was the
case with Vijaymandirgarhfort of Bayana, this redesigning was aimed at
enlargingthe enclosed spacewhich could havebeen with the idea of making it
difficultfor a besiegingforce to aim its cannonsat the built-up areasof the fort.
Other similar examples from the Aravali tract are those of the forts of
Mandalgarhand Champanir.7
The artillery pieces in India during the fifteenth century being made
uniformly of brass or bronze were naturallyvery costly. These were generally
beyond the means of most of the zamindarsas well as the Rajputchieftains.The
rulerof Mewarwas perhapsone of the few exceptionsamong them.8These new
weapons were possessed in appreciablenumbers only by more prosperous
regionalkingdomslike those of Gujarat,Malwa,BahmanisandVijaynagara. Each
of them is creditedwith overpoweringlocalchiefsof theirregionsby reducingtheir
fortslocated in less accessibletracts.The reductionof these fortswas apparently
facilitatedby the use of newly introducedgunpowderartillerywhich was as yet
beyondthe reachof most of the localchiefs.
It is, therefore,understandablethat the appearanceof gunpowderartillery
synchronizedwith a distinctphaseof internalconsolidationleadingto a limited
territorialexpansion in the case of more prosperous regional kingdoms of
fifteenth century. Internal consolidation was always marked by the
strengtheningof king's control over the nobles and, more importantly,by the
suppression of the local chiefs some of whom hitherto enjoyed autonomous
statuson account of their largecaste or tribalfollowing and fortsheld by them
in peripheralzones. This is evident from the history of Gujaratand Bahmani
EmpireunderMahmudBegarha(1459-1511)9and MuhammadShah(1463-82)
respectively."'In the case of VijayanagaraEmpireagain the use of firearmsis
consideredto be the most importantfactorbehind its successesnot only against
the Bahmanis,but also 'againstthe enemies within', such as powerful chiefs of
Tamilregion."Thesedevelopmentsin a waytendedto conformto MarshallG.S.
Hodgson's view that the introduction of relativelyexpensive artillerywould
often, lead to the growthof'a well organizedcentralpower'.
The impact of Europeangunneryintroducedin Indiaon a largescale in the
beginningof the sixteenthcenturywas, however,a much more complex process
which I propose to examine here with referenceto the rise and decline of the
MughalEmpire. 55

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 Social Scientist

C) During the sixteenth century, the heavy mortars produced in India

?C4 registereda strikingadvance.This was a direct result of improved designs and
casting methods learnt from the west through contact with the Portugueseas
also throughexpertisebroughtwith him by Babur.'2However,the problemslike
co lack of mobility, proneness to accidents, slow rate of firing and large
consumption of gunpowder persisted causing a decline in their over all
~m popularity.Alreadyby the middleof the sixteenthcenturythese had come to be
o treatedas impressiveexhibitsprobablymeant to overawethe common people
Z-- with the militaryprowess of the Empirethan for actualuse in warfare.'3
mn It is of interestto rememberthat in Babur'sown descriptionsof the battles
o of Panipat (1526) and Kanwah (1527) where he experimented with the
deployment of firearmsin the battlefieldwith some success, heavy mortars,
(kazans)arenot mentioned.ThoughHumayunhad deployed21 mortarsin the
Battle of Kanauj(1540) these did not prove to be of much help.'4Similarly,in
1553, Islam Shah found it difficultto carryhis mortarsto Punjabfor checking
Humayun'santicipatedadvancethither.'5In 1556,the entire parkof Adil Shah
Sur'sslow moving mortarswas capturedby the Mughalsbefore these could be
deployed againstthem at Panipat.16
Under Akbar,heavy mortarsdid not figureprominently in the process of
territorialexpansion.Apartfromthe siegesof Chittor(1568) and Ranthambhor
(1570), militaryoperationsleadingto territorialacquisitionsin the earlydecades
of Akbar'sreign did not involve prolongedsieges requiringthe use of mortars.
MughalEmpire'sexpansion duringthis phasewas achievedprimarilywith the
use of mounted archerssupportedmarginallyby light artilleryand musketeers.
In the second phase of territorialexpansion under Akbar,during 1585-1601,
againartillerywas used sparselywhichwasseeminglyon accountof the difficulty
of transportation.'7This eclips in the popularity of mortars in the Mughal
Empiretemporarilyended duringthe decadesAurangzebwas frequentlyfaced
with the task of attackingnumeroushill fortsin Deccan.'8Acquisitionof a large
number of siege mortars in the Deccan towards the end of the seventeenth
century, however, did not prove to be of much strategic advantagefor the
Mughals.Theycontinued to be vulnerableto Marathalight cavalryresortingto
hit and run tactics.
From the above it is quite evident that the siege artilleryof the Mughal
Empiredid not command 'the fatefulsignificancepolitically'that is ascribedto
the same category of firearms in a gunpowder empire of Hodgeson's
conception.Abu'lFazl,no doubt,goes out of his way in characterizingartilleryas
an instrument of empire building'9 in words remnicent of the theory of
gunpowderempiresbut the historyof Akbar'smilitarycampaignsrecordedby
him does not bear out this characterization.
56 Two other firearmsintroducedfrom Europein the sixteenthcenturywere:

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 Gunpowder and Empire: Indian Case

(a) light cannons mounted on carriagesand (b) matchlockmuskets.These, no __

doubt,wereeasilyintegratedin the prevelantformof warfarebasedon the use of n

mounted archeryby adoptingvariablepatternsof the battle-planof 'the Ghazis D
of Rum' introduced in Indiaby Babur(1526). In this battle plan, light artillery ~
and musketrywere protectedby a barricadecarryinggapesto facilitatethe free 3
movement of cavalry.2) Both of these firearmsappearto havecontributedto the r
growth of Mughal Empire as a centralized state. The matchlock musket
particularlyseemsto haveemergedas an instrumentof centralizationin so faras
its use cameto acquirespecialrelevanceto centre'scontrolof internalresources.2:
During the seventeenth century,on the other hand, disseminationof muskets
among peasantcommunities alsobecamea factorcontributingto the militancy
of disaffectedruralpopulation.22 It would, perhaps,be usefulto dilateseparately
on the status of each one of them in the Mughalsystem.
There was a distinct improvement in the basic design and general
performanceof the light artilleryduring the firsthalf of the sixteenth century
which facilitatedtheirdeploymentandeffectiveuse in the siegeoperationsaswell
as open battles.The earliestspecimensof theselightcannons (zarb-zan)used by
Babur(1526-30) were, in all probability,miniaturereplicasof his heavymortars
(kazans).Subsequentlyin 1540s,the size of an averagelight cannonwas reduced
considerably.Thiswas possiblyaimedat improvingthe qualityof castingwithin
the constrantsimposed by the use of manualbellows.It also economised on the
quantityof gunpowderconsumed.23
The introductionfrom Europeof the artof makingless costlywroughtiron
barrelsnaturallycontributedto makinglight cannons much cheaper.Besidesa
considerable increase in the total number of light cannons possessed by the
Mughalsand theirAfghanadversariesin North India,manyof the local chiefsall
overthe countrybeganto possessthem in limitednumbers.Theselight cannons
when combinedwith musketryweregenerallypercievedas effectivein defending
fortified positions. The enhanced military clout of the Rajput chieftains,
controllingstrongholdson the outer peripheryof the Gangeticplain duringthe
firsthalf of the sixteenth century,may perhapsbe linked to this development.24
The exceptionallyfavourabletermsofferedby Akbarto the Rajputchieftainsto
induce them to join his servicemaybe viewed from this perspectiveas well.
The Mughalresponseto the increasedeffectivenessof the light cannonswas
represented by their attempt from the very beginning, to enforce imperial
monopoly on the production and use of everykind of firearms.25 It also led to a
drive on their part to increasemanifold the number of light cannons in their
arsenal.UnderAkbartherewas a concertedattemptto furtherimproveand also
to add to their variety.These improvementsseems to haveled to the division of
light cannons cast in bronze/brassas well as those forged from wrought iron
into two broad categories: (a) zamburakscarriedwith king in the so-called 57

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 Social Scientist

o 'artilleryof stirrup';and (b) stilllighterpieceslike narnalsandgajnalsdistributed

?r'4 for deployment on the rampartsof the fortslocated in differentprovinces.26
Perhaps,the most importantinnovationrelatingto militaryuse of firearms
I in the Mughal Empire during seventeenth century was the placing of light
E
- cannonson some kind of swivelsmountedon camels.27 It is likelythat the notion
~- of a light cannon fitted to a swivel on the back of a camel, the shaturnal(camel
~m barrel), came to India from West Asia some time in the beginning of the
o seventeenthcentury.This cannon is describedby Bernieras a 'smallfield piece'.
-
Being better tuned to the requirementsof battles fought with fast moving
rn cavalry,shaturnalsoften played a far more important role in action than the
o 'artilleryof strirrup'representedby a comparativelysmall number of medium
size cannons mounted on horse drawncarriages.The shaturnalswereseemingly
Indian and West Asian substitutesfor the latest cast-iron field guns of Europe
with the significant difference that these, instead of rendering obsolete the
dominant form of mounted cambate,tended to give it added support. Despite
the constraintsimposedby the necessityof camelto kneelon the groundto open
fire,the shaturnalsoften provedto be more effectivethanthe cannonscarriedon
slow moving carriages.The speed with which severalhundred pieces of light
cannon, capableof keeping up fairlyrapidfire,could be moved from one point
to another during the battle would, on many an occasion, be crucial to the
outcome of a sharplycontestedaction.28 This is for exampleborne out by Mirza
Nathan'saccount of the Battleof Daulabapur(1612)29and those of the Battleof
Samugar(1658) by Bernierand Manucci.-'
The shaturnalswereof coursenot out of the reachfor manyof the rebellious
Rajputchiefs and Marhattasardarsdefyingthe Mughalsduringthe second half
of the seventeenth century. But the rebels were certainlynot in a position to
deploy them in a matchingstrength.To this limitedextent, it would appear,the
increasingpresence of the shaturnalsin the field artillery,contributed to the
MughalEmpire'sholding on its own in the faceof mounting rebellionsdown to
the end of Aurangzeb'sreign.
Matchlock maskets present in India from the early phase of Mughal
conquest (1526-56)3' came to be regarded as effective weapons of general
combat. As was the case at Panipatin 1526, these came to be used from behind
barricadesformed by bullock-cartstied together in pairs for harassingthe on
rushingcavalry.The musketeerswould some time also providecover duringthe
battle to artillerycarts on the move which appearsto have been their role at
Knwah (1527).32This had a parallelin muskets' singular contribution to the
Ottoman victories over Shah Ismailat Chaldiran(1514) and over Mamluksin
1517.33Fromthe historyof MughalEmpirein Indiamanymore instancescanbe
cited to illustratethat sometimes a skilful use of muskets could prove to be of
58

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 Gunpowder and Empire: Indian Case

criticalsignificancein decidingthe outcome of a battle.This role of musketeers _n

would often tend to get enhancedin localisedsmallscaleconflicts." c

In this contextWilliamIrvin'sviewthatdownto the middleof the eighteenth D
century, the bow and arrow was considered in India a much more effective >,
instrument of combate than the musket35meeds to be viewed in its proper 3
perspective.Thisview seems to be mainlybasedon a statementof Bernierwhere z
he is comparing the 'astonishingquickness'with which the mounted archers 3
dischargedtheir arrowswith the slowness of horsemen carryingmuskets who
were obliged to dismount for firing a volley. There is no denying the fact that
much more time would pass between each matchlock shot than between the
shooting of successive arrows.But the simple point is that the matchlock fire
could hit much harderwith a pelet andbe effectiveupto a much longerdistance;
andthus frequencyalone could not be the decisivefactor.The musketfittedwith
matchlockwhen used from the ground in a skilfulmannercould prove to be a
devastatinginstrumentof war.Evena smallnumberof matchlockmenfighting
from the ground, if deployed innovatively,could contributeto breakingup the
onslaught of a much largerbody of horsemen.3
The recognition of musketsas an increasinglyeffectivefactorin warfareis
reflectedin the anxietyof the Mughalimperialauthorityto retaina largebody of
musketeers.The strengthof foot-musketeersin the serviceof Mughalking rose
from roughly 1200 in 1526 to 35,000 around 1595.37Abu'l Fazl accordingly
classifiesmusketeers(banduqchis)as partof the royalhousehold (manzilabadi)
and not as part of the army (sipahabadi)."It is understandablethat along with
artillery (involving heavy expenditure) comparatively affordable muskets
shouldhavebeen controlledexclusivelyby the Emperor.Thiswould suggestthat
the musketstoo were considereda majorinstrumentof power.Leavingmuskets
entirelyto the careof the nobles was evidentlynot consideredsafe.
Under Akbar'smansabsystem, from the very beginning, the officerswere
allowedto have in theircontingentsamong dakhilifoot-soldiersa partlyof foot-
musketeers whose strength would be 121/2per cent of the total number of
horsemen in the contingent. In other words, there would be present in each
contingent one musketeer for eight horsemen. But, on paper, these dakhili
musketeersalso were treatedas personnelin the directemploy of the Emperor
and were paid their stipends not by the officersconcerned but by the central
treasury.39This systemappearsto havecontinuedin the seventeenthcenturyin a
modified form. The term dakhilifell in disuse, but the officers often came to
maintaina largernumberof musketeersthan prescribedunderthe rulesframed
duringAkbar'sreign.An inventory(siyaha)of the detachmentcommandedby
BahramandKhan in 1689 shows a ratio of one musketeerto five horsemen.4"
SometimesunderAurangzeb,selectnobleswerealsoallowedthe rareprivilegeof
59

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 Social Scientist

O recruiting foot-musketeers directly in their contingents who would again be

r-4 treatedas being in the centralgovernment'sservice(naukar-isarkar-iwala).4
Thereis some evidence indicatingthat fromthe latterpartofAkbar'sreign
the foot-musketeerscame to partlyreplaceordinarycavalryas the instruments
of localcontrol.The use of musketeersin villageleveloperationscould havebeen
a much less costly affairthan the cavalrytroops of anyvarietyas is suggestedby
the salariesof the two type of troopers.The deferencebetween the salariesof
o centrally maintained yakaspa sawars and foot-musketeers (sair piyada
Z banduqchi)rangedfrom 41/2:25 to 6:25.42Moreover,the total cost of equipping
a cavalrytrooper, even of the meanestorder,inclusive cost of a horse (with its
apparel),weaponsand armour,would be quiteconsiderable.This cost would be
much higherthan the cost of a musketand ammunitionneededfor equippinga
musketeer.43 UnderTodarMal'sregulationsof 27th R.Y./1582-3, thejagirdarsas
well as the officials of the territoryyielding revenues for imperial treasury
(khalisa)could takethe help of the imperialmusketeersstationedin everylocality
under the command of an amir-ichakla(commandantof a chakla,a territorial
unit within a province). Forthis assistancethey were made 'responsiblefor the
collection of one dam per bigha of cultivated land for the maintenance
(nigahdasht)of the musketeers.That this systemwas actuallyenforced in some
of the provinces is borne out by the extant text of one of Akbar's orders
appointinga faujdarin the provinceof Lahore.44
Many instancescan be cited to illustratethe effectiveuse of musketsby the
Mughals against defiant ruralpopulace as well as rebellious chiefs during the
seventeenth century.45These go to clearly indicate that down to the end of
Aurangzeb'sreignthe matchlockmusketplayeda conspicuouslysignificantrole
as an instrumentof local control.
Rapiddisseminationof musketsin the countrysideduring the firsthalf of
the seventeenthcenturymadethe taskof exercisinglocalcontrol and of ensuring
the smooth flow of land revenuemore onerous. Evena marginalimprovement
in the fighting efficiency of the disaffected peasants and zamindars as a
consequence of their access to muskets of even most primitive type would
become a matter of graveconcern to the Mughalauthorities.One response of
the Mughal imperial system to this new situation was the creation under
Jahangir(1605-1627) of a corps of mounted musketeers called barqandaz
among the centrallymaintainedahdihorsemen.46A few decadeslater,some of
the senior nobles, for exampleMirzaRajaJaiSingh also came to enrol, possibly
with the tacit approvalof the imperialauthority,in their contingents musket
carryinghorsemen.47 Down to 1658,one knows on Bernier'stestimony,most of
these barqandaztroopswereyakaspahorsemenridingyabuor still more inferior
moutns.48
60 This attempt at combining horsemanshipwith the use of musket was

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 Gunpowder and Empire: Indian Case

obviously aimed at enhancingthe strikingpower of the musketeersagainstthe _-

rural rebels for whose suppression they are known to have been frequently
employedin localizedmilitaryoperationssince Akbar'stime. The performance
of mounted musketeersin a large scale action like Battle of Samugar(1658) p-
would no doubt appearto be rathernot very impressiveas comparedto that of 3
mounted archers forming the bulk of opposing armies. This should not, r
however,blur one's view of the effectiverole that the barqandaztroops often a

playedin scatteredoperations.Theycameto be frequentlyused in the Deccanas

well as in other regions against dispersed resistance of the local authorities
particularly that of the Marhatta sardars.The effectiveness of mounted
musketeersin dispersedfightingis borne out by a numberof episodes recorded
in waqa'i'sarkarAjmerwa Ranthambhorand Mazhar-iShahjahani.49
Though the number of mounted musketeersin the contingents of select
nobles (the Kachchwahachief of Amberbeing one of them) mayhave increased
appreciablyduringAurangzeb'sreign,but the musketsused by them as also by
most of the barqandazahdiscontinuedto be unwieldymatchlockswhich could
be fired only after dismounting. On the other hand, during the same period,
some of the ruralinsurgentsin North India,like Jatsof Mathuraregion started
using matchlocks5'which werein-any-casemoreefficientthanthe crudelymade
arquebusesavailableto them till then. It could have been partlyin responseto
this situation that there was created in the Mughal army a body of mounted
musketeerspossessing the skill of firing their muskets without dismounting.
IslamKhanRumi's barqandazretainerswere perhapsone such group. They are
reportedto have been the expertsof Ottomanstyle of fightingbased on the use
of musket(madar-ijang-iRumibarbanduqbud).' It is likelythatthese new type
of musketeer horsemen were armed with the Turkish versions of European
flintlocks.Specimendiscriptionof a flintlockreproducedby AnandRamKayath
in Siyaq-nama(1696)52 indicates that this musket was known in the Mughal
military establishment during Aurangzeb's reign. But, as is evident from
Bhimsen's description of Islam Khan Rumi's clumsy method of supplying
gunpowderto his horsemen during an skirmishwith Marathas,the rigidityof
the Mughal militaryorganizationbased on a contractsystem did not suit this
new form of warfare.Apparently,the new system requireda more centralized
organization of production, distribution and supply of firearmsof different
typeswhichwas practicallyruledout in the mansabsystemof the Mughals.5It is,
therefore,understandablethat, despitetherebeing strongreasonsfor shiftingto
this new form of musketeering,the flintlockmusketand the skillof using it from
horsebackdid not find wide acceptancein the MughalEmpire.
While concluding this discussionone may reiteratethat of all the different
type of firearms introduced by Babur in India, the wide use of matchlock
musket, perhaps, had particular relevance to centre's control of internal 61

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 Social Scientist

O resources in the Mughal Empire. That is why muskets were considered

'honourable'not only when carriedby cavalrybut also in the hands of ordinary
Ca musketeersfiringfrom the ground.54 The high statusof musketwas reflectedin
< Humayun's establishing in 1535 a rule that his leaving the Diwan would be
announced by firingof a musket.55Significantly,Abu'l Fazlmakes it a point to
~- mention his hero Akbar'sinterestin this weapon and his being unsurpassedin
nm making and handling it. In A'in-i Akbari one of the three military skills
o3 prescribedfor a commandantadministeringa provinceis that of shooting with
Z musket. It is put at par with horsemanshipand archery.56 It is, therefore, not
mo surprisingthat the foot-musketeers,though poorlypaid as comparedto cavalry
o troopers,were allowedcertainconcessionslike,forexample,paymentin advance
a part of salarieswhich was not deducted during campaigns.57Their average
stipends were always higher than those of ordinary foot-soldiers of other
categories.58
A similarsituationobtainedwith regardto mounted musketeers.As earlyas
1636 sih aspa (3 horse) and chaharaspa (4 horse) ahdi barqandazstaioned in
Deccan were allowedto maintainone horse less than the number indicatedby
their ranks (du aspa).Till then this privilegewas not allowed to ordinaryahdi
horsemen.59Again additional payment to some of the horsemen in the
contingentof the Kachchwahachiefof AmberduringAurangzeb'sreign,on their
equipping themselveswith muskets (azafa ba-shart-ibanduq)also appearsto
point to musket's special status as a weapon of war in the Mughal Empire.6"
Although, as IrfanHabib stresses,the main strengthof the Mughalslay in their
mounted archery,6'the matchlockmusketappearsto havecontributedfrom the
verybeginning significantlyto the exerciseof imperialcontrol over disaffected
localitiesor tracts.

of HistoryattheAligarhMuslimUniversity,
IqtidarAlamKhanwasformerlyProfessor
Aligarh.

Notes
1 Cf. Carlo M. Cipola, Guns and Sails in the EarlyPhase of EuropeanExpansion,
1400-1700, London, 1965, p.28; Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution:Mili-
tary Innovationand Rise of the West, 1500-1800,Cambridge, 1988, p.8.
2 Marshall, G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: The GunpowderEmpires and
Modern Times, Vol.III, pp.17-18, 26.

3 Ibrahim-i Qawam Faruqi,Sharafnama-iAhmadMunnairi(1457-75), MS entitled

62 Farhang-i Ibrahimi, AMU, Aligarh, Habib Ganj Collection 53/22, under

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 Gunpowder and Empire: Indian Case

Kashakanjir.See also Jonaraja,Rajatarangini(1459) tr. by T.C. Dutt, Kings of n0

Kashmir,Delhi, 1968, pp.105-6 and Srivara,Jaina Rajatarangini,(1486), tr. by Q'
Kashi Nath Dhar, New Delhi,1996, p.39. -

4 ShihabHakim, Ma'asir-iMahmudShahi(1467-8), ed. Nurul Hasan Ansari,Delhi, >

1968, pp.56, 87; Mahmud Gawan, Rayazu'lInsha (1470), ed. M. Shafi, Lahore, 3
1941-9, p.72. See also Iqtidar A. Khan, Gunpowderand Firearms: Warfarein 7\
MedievalIndia, New Delhi, 2004, p.42. p
5 Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi, pp.85-9 and Rayazu'lInsha, pp.72-4.
6 Muhammad Qasim Hindu Shah Firishta,Tarikh-iFirishta(1607), Vol.II, Kanpur,
1884, pp.202, 251.
7 Cf. Gunpowderand Firearms,pp.48-9.
8 Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi, p.56. The chief of Mewar is reported to have supplied
two kaman-ira'dsmade of an alloy of copper (haft-josh)to the rulerof Gagaraunin
1442-3.
9 See Gunpowderand Firearms,pp.50-2.
10 Haroon Khan Sherwani, The Bahmanisof Deccan,Hyderabad, 1953, pp.296, 323-
4. BahamaniKingdomis describedas attaining'a height unequalledin the whole of
its history' during the 'premiership'of Mahmud Gawanunder Muhammad Shah
Bahmani. Cf. Rayazu'l Insha, p.72. Mahmud Gawan is reported to have used
kaman-i ra'd.
11 Burton Stein in The Cambridge Economic History of India, eds., Tapan
Raychaudhuriand Irfan Habib, Vol.1, c.1200-1750, Cambridge, 1982, p.119.
12 See Iqtidar A. Khan in Journalof RoyalAsiaticSociety,April 1999, pp.27-34.
13 Gunpowderand Firearms,pp.94-5.
14 MirzaHaidarDoghlat, Tarikh-iRashidi,MS, AMU, Aligarh,UniversityCollection,
No.34, f.351a.
15 'Abdul Qadir Badauni, Muntakhab-ut-tawarikh,(1596), ed. Ahmad 'Ali and
others, Vol.I, Calcutta, 1869, p.412.
16 Abu'l Fazl,Akbar-nama,ed. AghaAhmad'Ali and 'Abdal-Rahim,Vol.11,Calcutta,
1873-87, p.36; Nizam al-Din Ahmad, Tabaqat-i Akbari, ed. B. De, Vol.11,
Calcutta, 1913, p.131.
17 Cf. W.H. McNeill, ThePursuitof Power,Technology,ArmedForceand Societysince
A.D. 1000, Chicago, 1982, pp.95, 98. Attributesthe 'precarious'nature of Mughal
control in the Deccan to the difficultyof moving siege guns long distanceoverland'.
18 Gunpowderand Firearms,pp.97-7.
19 A'in-i Akbari,(1598), Vol.1, 1893, p.82. See also Journalof RoyalAsiatic Society,
April 1999, p.27.
20 Cf. A.S. Beveridge, Babur-namain English,reprint, London, 1969, pp.550, 568-9.
21 Gunpowderand Firearms,pp.85 f.n. 46, 150.
22 Op.cit., pp. 164-5. 63

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 Social Scientist

Ln
23 Op.cit., pp.74-9.
0
N 24 Op.cit., pp.103, 120-21 f.ns. 43 & 44.
L.
25 Op.cit., pp.91-2. Compare A'in-i Akbari,Vol.I, p.82 and Babur-namain English,
L _ I p.117.
2 - 26 A'in-i Akbari,Vol.1, p.82.
27 Francois Bernier, Travelsin the Mogul Empire,1656-58, tr. A. Constable, revised
0 by V.A. Smith, London, 1916, p.254.
Z 28 Compare, Gunpowderand Firearms,pp.107-10.
29 J.N. Sarkar,MilitaryHistoryof India, reprint, Delhi, 1970, p.89.
o
> 30 Bernier, p.49; Nicolao Manucci, Storia do Mogor, 1656-1712, tr. William Irvine,
Vol.I (London, 1907-8), reprint Calcutta, 1965, p.254.
31 For an arguement that muskets brought to India by Babur were matchlocks of
Ottoman origin see Gunpowderand Firearms,p. 143.
32 Babur-namain English,pp.468-9, 473-4, 557-8, 568-9.
33 Devid Ayalon, Gunpowderand Firearmsin the MamlukKingdom,London, 1962,
pp.60, 88-9.
34 Yusuf Mirak, Mazhar-i Shahjahani(1634), ed. Pir Hasamuddin Rashidi, Part 2,
Karachi,1961, pp. 139-40. There is describeda skirmishbetween a partyof Mughal
horsemen using muskets and a large band of Nahmardi tribesmen of pargana
Sehwan (Sind).
35 William Irvine, TheArmyof the Indian Moghuls,reprint New Delhi, 1962, p.103.
36 Cf. Sidi Ali Reis, Travelsand Adventuresof the TurkishAdmiralSidi Ali Reis,tr. A.
Vamberey,London, 1899,pp.37. A band of 30 foot-musketeersforced a largebody
of Rajputhorsemen to retire.
37 Gunpowderand Firearms,p. 150.
38 Ain-i Akbari,Vol.I, pp.84-5.
39 Op.Cit.,Vol.I, pp.121, 134. CompareShireenMoosvi, TheEconomyofthe Mughal
Empire,c.1595: A StatisticalStudy,O.U.P., 1987, p.223. She interpretes the text
here differently.
40 SelectedDocuments of Aurangzeb'sReign, ed. Yusuf Husain Khan, Hyderabad,
1958, pp.200-1.
41 ForMaha SinghBhadoria'srequestto be allowedsuch a privilegesee Waqa'i'Sarkar
Ajmerwa Ranthambhor,(1678-80), MS, AsafiaLibrary,Hyderabad,Fan-i Tarikh,
Aligarhtranscript,pp.417-18.
42 Irvin, The Army of the Indian Moghuls,p.173. Compare R.A. Alvi, Studiesin the
History of MedievalDeccan,Delhi, 1977, p.30.
43 The lowest cost of the musket as given by Abu'l Fazl is /2a rupee while the price of
a horse is set at Rs.2 Again an ordinaryhandguncould be obtained for half the cost
64 of an ordinary sword. Cf. A'in-i Akbari,Vol.1,p.82.

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 Gunpowder and Empire: Indian Case

44 Abu'l Fazl, Akbar-nama, Vol.III, ed. Agha Ahmad 'Ali and 'Abd al-Rahim, _D
Calcutta, 1887, p.382. Cf. Abu'l Qasim Namakin, Munshat-i Namakin, MS, m+
AMU, University Collection 26, f.675b. -

45 Cf. Gunpowderand Firearms,pp. 153-4. >

46 For a reference to barqandazsawars see Tuzuk-i Jahangiri,ed. Saiyid Ahmad, 3

Ghazipurand Aligarh, 1863-4, p.238. 7

47 For a referenceto a barqandazsawarservingin the contingent of a Rajputnoble in

subaDeccan in the year 1636, see SelectDocumentsof Shahjahan'sReign,ed. Yusuf
Husain Khan, Hyderabad, 1950, p.25. Compare, Gunpowderand Firearms,p. 152.
48 Bernier, p.217. For musketeers participatingin the Battle of Samugar (1658) he
mentions three rates of payment: Rs.20/- Rs.15/- and Rs.10/- per month. These
obviously are not the scales of foot-musketeers who were never paid more than
Rs.6/- per month. Cf. Shireen Moosvi, TheEconomyof theMughalEmpire,c.1595,
p.227. yak aspa ahdis were paid Rs.20/- per month.
49 This is borne out by a perusal of JaipurRecord No.3833: 'ulufa sipahian, in the
RajasthanState Archives,Bikaner.
50 Manucci, Storia do Mogor, 1656-1712, tr. W. Irvine, Vol.11, (London, 1907-8),
reprint, Calcutta, 1965, p.131.
51 Bhimsen, Nuskha-i Dilkusha,MS., Br. Library,Or. 23, f.66a.
52 Nand Ram Khayasth,Siyaq-nama,Lucknow, 1879, p.154.
53 Athar Ali, The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb,revised edition, Delhi, 1997,
p.xx) was first to make this point.
54 For a contraryview see StewartGordon, 'The limited Adoption of EuropeanStyle
Military Forces by the Eighteenth-centuryRulers in India', The Indian Economic
and Social History Review,Vol.xxxv, No.3 and Jos Gommans, Mughal Warfare,
London, 2002, p.161.
55 KhawarShah bin Qibad al-Husaini (d.1565), Tarikh-iIlchi-i Nizam Shah, MS,
British Library,Add. 23513, ff. 228b-229a.
56 A'in-i Akbari,VOl.I, p.83, 196; See also, 'Ali Ahmad Khan, Mirat-i Ahmadi, ed.
Nawab Ali, Vol.I, Baroda, 1928, p.167.
57 Cf. Ruqq'a-i Hakim Abu'l Fath Gilani, ed. Muhammad Bashir Husain, Lahore,
1968, p.128.
58 A'in-i Akbari, Vol.1, pp.82, 134; Shireen Moosvi, The Economyof the Mughal
Empire,pp.229-30. Compare, Irvine, The Army of the Indian Moghuls, pp. 167,
173.
59 SelectDocumentsof Shah Jahan'sReign,ed. Yusuf Husain Khan, pp.24-25.
60 Severalsuch orders are to be found in the bundle, Siyahaziayadti wa kami daftar-
i bakhshi,farsi, 1129H/ 1774 Sambat:in RajasthanState Archives, Bikaner.
61 Irfan Habib, The AgrarianSystemof Mughal Empire,1556-1707, second, revised
edition, New Delhi, 1999, p.364. 65

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