DE LEON VS ESGUERRA

GR NO 78059, AUGUST 31, 1987

FACTS:
In Barangay elections held on 05/17/1982, petitioner Alfredo De Leon was elected Brgy Captain
and other petitioners Angel Salamat Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa
and Jose M. Resurreccion, as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982.

02/09/1987, petitioner De Leon received a memorandum antedated 12/01/1986 but signed by

respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on 02/08/1987 designating respondent
FLorentino G. Magno as Brgy Captain. The designation by the OIC Governor was by authority of
the Minister of Loval Govt. Respondent designated Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta
Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S. Paz and Teresita L. Tolentino as members of the Barangay
Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.

Petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of 02/08/1987 be declared null and void and
respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions of Brgy Captain Councilmen.

Petitioners contention – Section 3 of BP Blg 222, their term of office shall be 6 years which
shall commence on June 7 1982, until their successors shall have elected and qualified/ up to
June 7, 1988. And with the ratification of 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no
longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.

Respondent contention – Section 2 Article III of the Provisional Constitution 03/25/1986, all
appointive and elective officials under 1973 Cons shall continue in office until otherwise
provided by proclamation or EO, if such appointmend is made within a period of one year from
February 25, 1986; that the provisions of Barangay Elections Act fixing term must be deemed
repealed for being inconsistent with the provisions of the Provisional Constitution.

ISSUE: whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly
made during the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987.

RULING: NO.

while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the aforequoted
provision in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27,
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading.

SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall
supersede all previous Constitutions.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore,
the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become
inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to
designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially considering that the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the
autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of
office of six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 5 should still govern.

Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6)
years for elective Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore,
be considered as still operative, pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution,
reading:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of

instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent, with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.

Dissenting (Sarmiento)

Provisional Constitution, with respect to the tenure of government functionaries was cut short
by the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. To his mind, 1987 Constitution took effect on
February 11, 1987, the date the same was proclaimed ratified pursuant to Proclamation 58 of
the President. Relied on Section 27. That the provision that the Constitution takes effect on the
date its ratification shall have been ascertained, not the time the people cast their votes to
approve or reject it.

That a Constitution or amendments thereto take effect upon proclamation of their

ratification and not at the time of the plebiscite is a view that is not peculiar to the
Marcos era.

Bakit hindi Feb 11 ang effectivity, and naviolate ba yung right to be informed?
- Social contract, the voluntary agreement among individuals by which, according to any
of various theories, as of Hobbes, Locke, or Rousseau, organized society is brought into
being and invested with the right to secure mutual protection and welfare or to regulate
the relations among its members.

- so pag gawa ng Constitution we sacrifice some of our rights. And if Feb 11 yung maging
effectivity, which is under the hands of the president, he can either delay the effectivity
or use it out of his own interest.
 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GSIS

GR NO. 122156, FEBRUARY 3, 1997

FACTS:

Filipino first policy is invoked by the petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of Manila
Hotel Corporation which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Respondent’s contention – provision
stated in the Constitution (in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos) is not self-
executing and requires implementing legislation for its enforcement.

Controversy arose when GSIS, under privatization program of the PH Govt Proc. 50 12/08/86,
decided to sell through public bidding 30-51% of issued and outstanding shares of respondent
MHC. Winning bidder will provide mngmt expertise, intl marketing/reservation system,
financial support to strengthen profitability.

09/18/95: only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhard (RB), a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator,
which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.

Pending declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner sent a letter 10/10/95,
sent a managers check issued by Philtrust bank P33M as bid security to match the bid of RB;
but GSIS disregarded the bid and consummated with RB. 10/18/95 – issued TRO enjoining
respondents from perfecting the sale to RB.

Petitioner invokes (1) Sec 10, Article XII, that Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino
nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of
Philippine heritage and culture. It has become part of national patrimony. (2) 51% shares of MHC
carries with it ownership of the business owned by GSIS, a GOCC, hotel business being part of
tourism industry, hence a part of national economy; part of national patrimony, hence should
be preferred after it has matched bid offer of RB.

Bidding rules: shares may be awarded to the other qualified bidders that have validly submitted
bids provided these qualified bidders are willing to match the highest bid.

Respondents invoke that: (1) Sec 10 Art XII is merely a statement of principles and policy since
it is not self-executing; that Manila Hotel does not fall under the term of national patrimony
which only refers to the lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, potential energy,
territorial sea and exclusive marine zone, Sec 2 Art XII; (2) the guests who have slept there and
the events happened do not make the hotel historic, do not fall under the patrimony of the
nation; (3) only 51% of the outstanding shares, not the hotel bldg nor the land, are being sold,
hence, cannot be considered part of national patrimony; (4) as to the bidding rules, RB can still
very well be awarded to the block of shares; (5) Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail
as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an
imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a
nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from
which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their
provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers
who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the
governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.

Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred
and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, and there is no language indicating
that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing.

A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.

A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions
manifest that they are only principles upon which legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec 10, second par, Art XII is mandatory, complete in itself and needs no
further guidelines or implementing rules. It means that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.

The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our
rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race.

In re: Manila Hotel – a living testimonial of PH heritage. It was the site of the festivities during
the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the
Philippine Government it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the
traditional Philippine hospitality. It was converted by Japanese Military Administration into a
military headquarters. For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to
the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed
with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood.

51% of the equity of MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it
comprises the majority and controlling stock, anyone who owns the stock will have actual
control and mangmt of the hotel. Accg to the Constitution, corporation at least 60% is owned by
Filipinos.

Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the Pro-Filipino bias in all economic concerns. It
is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy. This provision was never found in previous
Constitutions.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made
between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.

It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior
approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization.
 It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among
others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality
deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the
winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be
declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and
secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution
bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an
assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents
are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the
highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates
of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders
and other interested parties.
It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with
the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for
being.
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to
the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary
piece of property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted
many of the most important events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation.
 FRANCISCO VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

GR NO. 160261, NOVEMBER 10, 2003

FACTS:

June 22, 2002, HOR adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Rep Felix William Fuentebella directed
the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursement and expenditures by Chief Justice of SC of Judiciary Devt Fund.

06/02/03 – former President Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against CJ HIlario
Davide and seven associate Justices for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public
trust and high crimes.

The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and
Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution: “A verified complaint for
impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order
of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session
days thereafter.”

10/13/03 – first impeach complaint was sufficient in form but voted to dismiss, also the 10/22
for being insufficient.

SECOND IMPEACHMENT CASE – filed with the Sec Gen by Rep Gilberto Teodoro, and Felix
William Fuentebella against Davide founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry.

Arose instant petition against HOR - petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI
of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the
eighteen which were filed before this Court, prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting
the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate.
Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the
November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on
October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No.
160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the
administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy
of the judiciary.
ISSUES:
WHETHER THE CONSTITUTION HAS EXCLUDED THE COVERAGE OF IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDING FROM JUDICIAL REVIEW

RULING:

The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational
way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an
act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.

This is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has
some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was
marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government,
which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
questions and got away with it.

Respondents Speaker De Vencia and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that
the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.

Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a
political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident
arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial
review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily,
the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to
it by the Constitution.

Judicial Review: (1) actual case or controversy (2) must have standing to challenge (3) must be
raised at an earliest possible opportunity (4) issue of constitutionality lis mota

It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In
his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in
deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the
provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the
initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of
one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment
proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section
3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."
ather Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no
second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action.
By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the
meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by
the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people
read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they
understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.

To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment
proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is
contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with
"impeachment proceeding."

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former
Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the
filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said
complaint.

Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not
be filed against the same official within a one year period.

Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with
the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is
barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
 GONZALES VS COMELEC

(Power to Amend the Constitution by the Legislature)

FACTS:

Senate and HOR passed the following resolutions: (1) RBH No 1 to amend Sec 5 Art VI of the
Constitution, to increase the membership of the HOR from 120-180, each province shall have at
least one member; (2) RBH No. 2 calling a convention to propose amendments to be composed
of two delegates from representative district, to be elected in the general elections on the
second Tuesday of Nov 1970; (3) RBH No. 3 proposing the Sec 16 Art VI to authorize Senators
and HOR to become delegates of the constitutional convention, without forfeiting their
respective seats in the Congress.

Congress subsequently passed a bill upon approval of the President , RA 4913, providing that
the amendments to the Constitution for approval by the people at the general elections.

Ramon Gonzales is admittedly a Filipino citizen, taxpayer and a voter.

SolGen maintains that this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter on the ground that
the same is merely political.

Senator Tolentino on the other hand – that the court had no jurisdiction; that if granted would,
in effect, render operational legislative department; that "the failure of Congress to enact a
valid reapportionment law . . . does not have the legal effect of rendering illegal the House of
Representatives elected thereafter, nor of rendering its acts null and void."

Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included
in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the
people.

the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a constituent assembly —

violates the Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial
review, and, to the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag
vs. Lopez Vito,16 the latter should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court
are unanimous on this point.

Pursuant to this provision (Sec 1 Art XV), amendments to the Constitution may be proposed,
either by Congress, or by a convention called by Congress for that purpose. In either case, the
vote of "three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
voting separately" is necessary. And, "such amendments shall be valid as part of" the
"Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification."

In the case at bar, RBH 1 and 3 have been approved by ¾ of all the member of the Senate and
HOR voting separately. It is urged that said resolution are null and void because:

(1) Members of the Congress which approved the proposed amendments are at best de
facto Congressmen; (2) Congress may not avail both propose amendment and call a
convention at the same time; (3)special election not a general election
It is urged that the last enumeration or census took place in 1960; that, no apportionment
having been made within three (3) years thereafter, the Congress of the Philippines and/or the
election of its Members became illegal; that Congress and its Members, likewise, became a de
facto Congress and/or de facto congressmen, respectively; and that, consequently, the
disputed Resolutions, proposing amendments to the Constitution, as well as Republic Act No.
4913, are null and void.

It is conceded that, since the adoption of the Constitution in 1935, Congress has not made a
valid apportionment as required in said fundamental law.

ISSUES:
(1) Is Republic Act No. 4913 constitutional?

(2) WON Congress can simultaneously propose amendments to the Constitution and call for the
holding of a constitutional convention?

RULING:

YES.

We — who constitute the minority — believe that Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies such
requirement and that said Act is, accordingly, constitutional.

The constituent power or the power to amend or revise the Constitution, is different from the
law-making power of Congress. Congress can directly propose amendments to the Constitution
and at the same time call for a Constitutional Convention to propose amendments.

Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included
in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the
people — as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours— to make, and,
hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the
Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising the
same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members
of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the
members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when
performing the same function, for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution —
they are the very source of all powers of government, including the Constitution itself.

Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the

members of Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily,
that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond
constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to
the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our
Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers upon
the Supreme Court, the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional, despite the eminently
political character of treaty-making power.
 IMBONG VS COMELEC

(The Congress acting as a constituent assembly, may propose amendments to the Constitution,
and exercising its general legislative power, provide for the details of the Constitutional
Convention.)

FACTS:

Two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant to Sec 19 of RA
6132 by petitioners Manuel Imbong, Raul Gonzales, members of the Bar interested in running
as candidates for delegates to Constitutional Convention. Impugned the constitutionality of RA
6132 that it prejudices their rights as candidates.

Congress, acting as Constituent Assembly, passed a Resolution no. 2 called for Constitutional
Convention to propose amendments to be composed of two delegates from each representative
district who shall have the same qualification as those of Congressmen.

06/17/1969, Congress passed a Resolution no 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution 2 stating

the convention must be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing
representative district accg to the number of their respective inhabitants. Each representative
district entitled of atleast 2 delegates, have the same qualifications as that of the HOR.

The validity of Sec 4 of RA 6132 which considers all public officers and employees whether
elective or appointive as resigned from the date of filing of their certificate of candidacy, later
on dismissed by the court on the ground that is it merely an application .

Sc sustains the constitutionality of RA 6132: (1) While the authority to call a constitutional
convention is vested by the present Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a
Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details, which are now contained in
Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132, does not exclusively pertain to Congress
acting as a Constituent Assembly. (2) when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits
to provide for such implementing details after calling a constitutional convention, Congress,
acting as a legislative body, can enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps,
which authority is expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of Res No. 2 as amended by Res. No. 4.

Petitioner contends: apportionment of delegates is not in accordance with the proportional

representation and therefore violates the Constitution.

Records of the proceeding of RA 6132 show that it based its apportionment of the delegates on
the 1970 official preliminary population census in 1976 and the Congress adopted a reasonable
formula

As to disqualifying public officers or employees - The obvious reason for the questioned
inhibition, is to immunize the delegates from the perverting influence of self-interest, party
interest or vested interest and to insure that he dedicates all his time to performing solely in
the interest of the nation his high and well nigh sacred function of formulating the supreme
law of the land, which may endure for generations and which cannot easily be changed like an
ordinary statute.
Thus the challenged disqualification prescribed in Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 6132 is a valid
limitation on the right to public office pursuant to state police power as it is reasonable and
not arbitrary.

The discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates to the Constitutional Convention is likewise
constitutional; for it is based on a substantial distinction which makes for real differences, is
germane to the purposes of the law, and applies to all members of the same class.

According to Senate Majority Floor Leader Senator Arturo Tolentino, the sponsor of the Puyat-
Tolentino amendment embodied in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, is to assure the
candidates equal protection of the laws by according them equality of chances.

Public welfare demands that the delegates should speak for the entire nation, and their voices
be not those of a particular segment of the citizenry, or of a particular class or group of people,
be they religious, political, civic or professional in character.

As emphasized by Senators Tolentino and Salonga, this ban is to assure equal chances to a
candidate with talent and imbued with patriotism as well as nobility of purpose, so that the
country can utilize their services if elected.
 OCCENA VS COMELEC

G.R. NO. L-56350, APRIL 2, 1981

FACTS:

Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A Gonzales, members of the PH bar and former
delegates of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, are suing as taxpayers. The unorthodox
aspect of the petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law.

It is the ruling of the Court, as set forth at the outset, that the petitions must be dismissed; that
is it too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. As of
January 17, 1973, the present Constitution came into effect and force.

RULING:

(1) The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare
invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then
concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to
the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." what the Supreme Court
says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was
removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution
is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that.
(2) The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The
applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it
reads thus: "The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its
Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and
disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly
and the Members thereof." One of such powers is precisely that of proposing
amendments.
(3) As to the period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter should be resolved.
There is no ambiguity to the applicable provision: "Any amendment to, or revision of,
this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such
amendment or revision."
(4) Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the
new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced
with a new one ... is no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment'
includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether
the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become
immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people."
 TOLENTINO VS COMELEC

FACTS:

Petition for prohibition to restrain the respondent COMELEC to hold a plebiscite on

11/08/1971 at which the proposed constitutional amendment reducing the voting age in
Sec 1 Art V to 18 years old, shall be submitted for ratification by the people pursuant to
Organic Resolution no. 1; declaring the acts of COMELEC be done by it in obedience to the
aforesaid Convention resolutions to be null and void.

The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the
Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for
the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution.

Resolution 2: called a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the PH,

composed of two delegates from each representative district; considered part of the
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election.

Resolution 4: modified the number of delegates to represent the diff cities and
provinces.

11/10/1970 election of delegates, convention held its inaugural session on 06/01/1971.

09/28/1971, the Convention approved the Organic Resolution No. 1 to lower the voting
age to 18.

President Diosdado Macapagal called upon the respondent COMELEC to help implement
the resolution.

COMELEC informed that it will hold plebiscite on the condition that: (1) ConCon will
undertake the printing of separate ballots election returns and tally sheets, adopt its
own security measures for printing and shipment of said ballots.

the main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing
resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the Convention have no force and effect as
laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the elections of
eight senators and all city, provincial and municipal officials to be held on November 8,
1971, hence all of Comelec's acts in obedience thereof and tending to carry out the holding
of the plebiscite directed by said resolutions are null and void, on the ground that the
calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in
Congress, as a legislative body, and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that,
under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the proposed amendment in question
cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all of the other
amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention.

ISSUE: Is the Resolution approved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention constitutional?

As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139, 157), this Court — speaking
through one of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention and a respected
professor of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel — declared that "the judicial department
is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation
of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof."
 Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not
included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress (Section 1, Art. VI,
Constitution of the Philippines). It is part of the inherent powers of the people.

The Constitutional Convention of 1971, as any other convention of the same nature, owes
its existence and derives all its authority and power from the existing Constitution of the
Philippines. This Convention has not been called by the people directly as in the case of a
revolutionary convention which drafts the first Constitution of an entirely new government
born of either a war of liberation from a mother country or of a revolution against an
existing government or of a bloodless seizure of power a la coup d'etat.

The ultimate question, therefore boils down to this: Is there any limitation or condition in
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which is violated by the act of the Convention of
calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1? The
Court holds that there is, and it is the condition and limitation that all the amendments to be
proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or
plebiscite. It being indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be submitted to a
plebiscite is only the first amendment the Convention propose We hold that the plebiscite
being called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on
November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all
acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void.

At the very least, they can examine it before casting their vote and determine for themselves
from a study of the whole document the merits and demerits of all or any of its parts and of
the document as a whole. And so also, when an amendment is submitted to them that is to
form part of the existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the
proposed amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and or any of its parts and
thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability.

But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what changes in the
fundamental principles of the constitution the Convention will be minded to approve. To be
more specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of
any significant value at all.

The root of the difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on the verge of
introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect of the
existing social and political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a voter in the
proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon
the different institutions which the Convention may establish and of which presently he is not
given any idea?

It must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of
the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution
with which it has to form a harmonious whole.

We are not denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed amendment; We are only
holding that under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the same should be submitted to
them not separately from but together with all the other amendments to be proposed by this
present Convention.
Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts
and resolutions of the Convention are hereby declared null and void.
SANIDAD VS COMELEC

(power of the President to propose amendment

The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary injunction relates to the
power of the incumbent President of the Philippines to propose amendments to the present
Constitution in the absence of the interim National Assembly which has not been convened.

September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for
a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve,
among other things, the issues of martial law.

20 days after, PD 1031 amending PD 991 by declaring the provisions of presidential Decree No.
229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens
Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite. PD 1033 recites in its "whereas"
clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the National Assembly
evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment,
providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite of October 16.

Questions are:

(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?

(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following
amendments to the Constitution?

Pablo Sanidad and Pablito Sanidad seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding referendum
plebiscite, to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as
they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031.

Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the
incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional
or legal basis.

The Solicitor General principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue
raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the
transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power;
the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
Petitioner argues - the submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time
for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity

RULING:

1. Justiciability of question raised.

The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question. This is
especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the of normally exercised
by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to
propose amendments o the constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the period
of transition.

The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to
have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of
said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon.

2. The amending process as laid out in the new Constitution.

In times of normally, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular
National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional
Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However
the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election
voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of
transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the National
Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister.

ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of
constitutional conferment amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In
political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character
and that of a legislative character'. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law.17 Such
being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer 18 The
prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of
legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the
Constitution.

3.Concentration of powers

In short, while conventional constitutional law just confines the President's power as
Commander-in-Chief to the direction of the operation of the national forces, yet the facts of our
political, social, and economic disturbances had convincingly shown that in meeting the same,
indefinite power should be attributed to tile President to take emergency measures
4. Authority of the incumbent President to propose amendments to the Constitution.

1. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim
National Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that
Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the
exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that body in utter
recognition of the people's preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to
propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special
call by the President

Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to assume
that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's
legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the
legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly
discharge the function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution.

The Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan
ng mga Barangay, and the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, representing 42,000
barangays, about the same number of Kabataang Barangay organizations, Sanggunians in 1,458
municipalities, 72 provinces, 3 sub-provinces, and 60 cities had informed the President that the
prevailing sentiment of the people is for the abolition of the interim National Assembly.

Similarly, the "barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to the President the submission of
the proposed amendments to the people on October 16. All the foregoing led the President to
initiate the proposal of amendments to the Constitution and the subsequent issuance of
Presidential Decree No, 1033 on September 22, 1976 submitting the questions (proposed
amendments) to the people in the National Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.

5. People is sovereign

In the Philippines, a republican and unitary state, sovereignty "resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them .30 In its fourth meaning, Savigny would treat
people as "that particular organized assembly of individuals in which, according to the
Constitution, the highest power exists."

In consequence, the people may thus write into the Constitution their convictions on any
subject they choose in the absence of express constitutional prohibition.

A "referendum" is merely consultative in character. It is simply a means of assessing public

reaction to the given issues submitted to the people foe their consideration, the calling of which
is derived from or within the totality of the executive power of the President.39 It is
participated in by all citizens from the age of fifteen, regardless of whether or not they are
illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex- convicts .40 A "plebiscite," on the other hand, involves the
constituent act of those "citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, It is
generally associated with the amending process of the Constitution, more particularly, the
ratification aspect.

6. Time for deliberation

The constituent body or in the instant cases, the President, may fix the time within which the
people may act. This is because proposal and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts, but
as succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference being that they are not to be
widely separated in time; second, it is only when there is deemed to be a necessity therefor that
amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable implication being that when proposed, they are
to be considered and disposed of presently, and third, ratification is but the expression of the
approbation of the people, hence, it must be done contemporaneously.

ISSUE:

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PD 1031, 991, 1033 – 7 JUSTICIABLE; 3 POLITICAL

DOES THE PRESIDENT POSSESS POWER TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE

CONSTITUTION – justiciable question

The congress, acting as a constituent assembly, may propose and amendment of the
Constitution, and as legislative assembly, may also implement rules and regulations by virtue of
necessary implication, o fill in the gaps which as a Constitutional assembly omitted, and as long
as it does not clash with the constitutional provision, implementing rules and regulations is
valid.

1. Fix qualifications
2. Apportionment
3. Compensation of the delegates
 PROVINCE OF COTABATO VS GOVT OF THE REPBULIC OF THE PH (GRP)

FACTS

Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President
in pursuing the peace process

08/25/08, GRP and MILF scheduled to sign a MOA-AD. MILF rebel group
established in March 1984, under leadership of the late Salamat Hashim,
splintered from MNLF.

SOLGEN – summarizes the MOA AD the commitment of the parties to pursue

peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in
the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of
threat while peace negotiations on going.

But it was evident that there was not going to be any smooth sailing peace
process. 1999-2000, MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central
Mindanao. In response, then President Joseph Estrada declared and carried out
an all-out-war against the MILF.

PGMA - military offensive against the MILF was suspended and the government
sought a resumption of the peace talks. But when she asked the Govt of Malaysia
to convince MILF, the MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously discuss
the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the GRP.

Peace talks outcome was the GRP-MILF TRIPOLI AGREEMENT ON PEACE, contains
basic principles and agenda: Security, Rehabilitation, Ancestral Domain.

Petitioners Province of Cotabato, V Governor Emmanuel Piol file a petitions

invoking the right to information on matters of public concern. Seeks to compel
the respondents to disclose complete and official copies of the MOA-AD; and to
declare MOA unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on
public consultation and right to information 2) Whether or not the MOA-AD
violates the Constitution and the laws.

RULING

The present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and PAPP Esperon
drafted the terms of the MOA-AD without consulting the local government units
or communities affected, nor informing them of the proceedings.

Furthermore, the petitions allege that the provisions of the MOA-AD violate the
Constitution. The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring
amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the
signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to
the legal framework, implying an amendment of the Constitution to
accommodate the MOA-AD.

When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed

the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute.

There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount public
interest, involving a significant part of the countrys territory and the wide-ranging
political modifications of affected LGUs. The assertion that the MOA-AD is
subject to further legal enactments including possible Constitutional
amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case,
the government and its negotiating entity.

ON THE FIRST ISSUE: The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both
the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has been recognized as a self-
executory constitutional right.
In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their time, access to information of general interest aids the people
in democratic decision-making by giving them a better perspective of the vital
issues confronting the nation so that they may be able to criticize and participate
in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective
manner. That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a
matter of public concern faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit
that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern.

Indeed, ours is an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to
public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if the
country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all
government authority emanating from them.

SECOND ISSUE:

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our
laws as having an associative relationship with the national government.Indeed,
the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the
Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of
the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate
any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it
provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory
for independence.

As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But
even assuming that it is covered by the term autonomous region in the
constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with
it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present
geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del
Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebisciteBaloi,
Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal are automatically part of the
BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories
A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the
ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in
2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the
Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their
inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.

CONCLUSION

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not
only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the
associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the
BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is
a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof
inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that
framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of
provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the
BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of
Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government
peace panel.Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the
necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in
place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make
such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation
of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or
the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the
Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue
influence or interference with that process.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or

unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international law,
respondents act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional
violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective.
SANTIAGO VS COMELEC

FACTS:
The heart of the controversy brought us by way of petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through system
of initiative.

12/02/1996 – private respondent Atty Jesus Delfin filed with the private respondent COMELEC,
petition to amend the Cons, lift term limits of elective officials, by Peoples Initiative; Delfin
asking the COMELEC to fix time and dates for signature gathering all over the country. Delfin
alleged that he is a founding member of the Movement for Peoples Initiative; that he and other
members of the Movement intend to exercise power to directly propose amendments granted
under Sec 2 Art XVII; that as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall
be established all over the country, and it is necessary that the time and dates for the purpose
be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC.

Delfin alleged the provisions sought to be amended Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI7] Section 4 of
Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution.

Petitioners Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago and Alex Padilla and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a
special civil action on the following arguments:

(a) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. Senate Bill No. 1290 of Senator Santiago is still
pending

(b) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically
provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III.

© RA 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This
indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter
take effect only upon ratification and not after publication.

(4) COMELEC Resolution 2300 is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the
implementing law.

(5) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof.

(6) Congress has not yet appropriated funds for peoples initiative; neither the COMELEC nor
any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.

RESPONDENT CONTENTION – it would not entail expenses to the national treasury for general
registration of voters; not a single centavo would be spent by the national government if the
comelec grants petition of the respondent, all signature gathering are all expenses for the
account of respondent Delfin; lifting of the limitation on the term of office of elective official is
not a revision of the Constitution but only an amendment.

According the Fr Joaquin Bernas, “it would involve a change from a political philosophy that
rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might
appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions”

ISSUES:

1. Whether R.A. No. 6735 was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific
provisions on the conduct of such initiative.

3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials would constitute a
revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.

RULING:

1. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This provision is not self-executory. In his book, Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, stated:

Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of
amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in
the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action. The people cannot exercise it if
Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.

It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to
proposals to AMEND -- not to REVISE -- the Constitution.

But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to provide for
the implementation of the exercise of the right?
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer. Contrary to the assertion of public
respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned.
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest.
2. It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No.
6735. Reliance on the COMELECs power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is
misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the
COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate
legislation is authorized and which satisfies the completeness and the sufficient standard tests.
3. The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the
term limits of the elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of,
the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
SANTIAGO VS COMELEC

FACTS:
The heart of the controversy brought us by way of petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through system
of initiative.

12/02/1996 – private respondent Atty Jesus Delfin filed with the private respondent COMELEC,
petition to amend the Cons, lift term limits of elective officials, by Peoples Initiative; Delfin
asking the COMELEC to fix time and dates for signature gathering all over the country. Delfin
alleged that he is a founding member of the Movement for Peoples Initiative; that he and other
members of the Movement intend to exercise power to directly propose amendments granted
under Sec 2 Art XVII; that as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall
be established all over the country, and it is necessary that the time and dates for the purpose
be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC.

Delfin alleged the provisions sought to be amended Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, [7] Section 4 of
Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution.

Petitioners Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago and Alex Padilla and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a
special civil action on the following arguments:

(a) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. Senate Bill No. 1290 of Senator Santiago is still
pending

(b) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically
provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III.

© RA 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This
indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter
take effect only upon ratification and not after publication.

(4) COMELEC Resolution 2300 is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the
implementing law.

(5) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof.

(6) Congress has not yet appropriated funds for peoples initiative; neither the COMELEC nor
any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.
RESPONDENT CONTENTION – it would not entail expenses to the national treasury for general
registration of voters; not a single centavo would be spent by the national government if the
comelec grants petition of the respondent, all signature gathering are all expenses for the
account of respondent Delfin; lifting of the limitation on the term of office of elective official is
not a revision of the Constitution but only an amendment.

According the Fr Joaquin Bernas, “it would involve a change from a political philosophy that
rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might
appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions”

ISSUES:

1. Whether R.A. No. 6735 was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific
provisions on the conduct of such initiative.

3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials would constitute a
revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.

RULING:

1. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This provision is not self-executory. In his book, Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, stated:

Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of
amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in
the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action. The people cannot exercise it if
Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.

It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to
proposals to AMEND -- not to REVISE -- the Constitution.

But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to provide for
the implementation of the exercise of the right?
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer. Contrary to the assertion of public
respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned.
 The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest.
2. It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No.
6735. Reliance on the COMELECs power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is
misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the
COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate
legislation is authorized and which satisfies the completeness and the sufficient standard tests.
3. The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the
term limits of the elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of,
the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
LAMBINO VS COMELEC

FACTS

02/15/06 Petitioners Raul Lamino and Erico Aumentado with other groups and individuals
commenced gathering signatures for initiative petition to change the 1987 Cons. 08/25/06 –
Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative. Petitioners alleged that their petition had the support of 6, 327, 952 constituting the
12% of all registered voters, and 3% per legislative disctrict. The Lambino Group also claimed
that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

LG initiative petition changes modifying Sections 1-7 of Legislative Dept, Section 1-4 Exec Detp
and adding Transitory Provisions. Proposed changes will shift from Bicameral-Presidential to
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of Govt.

COMELEC denied the petition invoking the Court’s ruling on Santiago. BUT, LG contends that
Santiago is not a binding precedent; that Santiago case only binds that parties to the case, while
the petition is an expression of the will of the sovereign people.

ISSUE: WHETHER the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative.

RULING:

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a
people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition.

Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The
framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The
framers also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the
proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature."

he essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a

petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two
essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a
petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before
they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition"
that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25
August 2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 "support(s) the porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission
on Charter Change through people's initiative and referendum as a mode of amending the
1987 Constitution." The proposals of the Consultative Commission are vastly different from
the proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30 August 2006
amended petition filed with the COMELEC.

hey could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes, among which are:

1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of
Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;

2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who
are almost all the present members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary
elections. Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will determine the expiration
of their own term of office;

3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament
shall convene to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.28

These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's
signature sheets.

There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear
distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and
wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the
Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only
amendments to the Constitution.

This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the
Constitution but only for amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of
the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through a people's initiative will only result in
gross absurdities in the Constitution.

In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not
an amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative
to "[A]mendments to this Constitution."

This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The
Constitution, which embodies the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court
exists to defend and protect the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative,
propelled by deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to
allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and desecration is to lose this
Court's raison d'etre.
 ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ

The enactment poses question of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It
also poses an important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the law purports to
remedy really or actually exist.

Through and within the field of economy it regulates, congress attempts to translate national
aspirations for economic independence and national security, rooted in the drive and urge for
national survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free the
national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation
may be free from the supposed economic dependence and bondage.

RA 1180 is entitled an act to regulate the retail business. It nationalizes the retail trade
business. (1) prohibition against persons, not citizens of the PH, and assoc, partn, or corp the
capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the PH, from engaging directly and
indirectly in the retail trade, (2) except from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually
engaged in said business on 5/15/1954, (3)exception in favor of citizens and juridical entities
of US (4) forfeiture of license for violation of laws on nationalization, control weights and
measures, and labor, (5) prohibition against establishment or opening by aliens

Petitioner – adversely affected, filed this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said act
unconstitutional, contend:

- Denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives their liberty
- Subject of the act is not expressed in the title
- Act violates the intl and treaty obligations
- Provisions of the act against the transmission of aliens of their retail business thru
hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation
or entity to entitle to engage in the retail business

Solicitor General and CFI contended:

- Act was passed in the valid exercised of the police power

- Act has only one subject
- No intl law infringed
- Hereditary succession – only form is affected but the value of the property is not
impaired

POLICE POWER – it derives its existence from the very existence of the state itself, need not to
be expressed or defines in its scope; co-extensive with self-protection and survival; essential,
insistent and illimitable. **limitation: due process

If the disputed legislation was merely a regulation, there would be no question that it falls
within the legitimate scope of legislative power. But it goes further and prohibits a group of
residents, aliens, from engaging therein.
**Retail dealers perform functions of capillaries in the human body, thru which all the needed
food and supplies are administered to members of the communities comprising the nation.

**It is undeniable fact that in many communities the alien has replaced the native retailers.

Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath
it is said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined. That the law is merely the result
of radicalism and pure and abashed nationalism.

It is the domination and control, which we believe he has been sufficiently shown to exist, that
is the legislature’s target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization would have never
been adopted.

(Dean Sinco of UP COL)

- But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the
country is not desirable and that if such a situation should remain, political
independence alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino private
capital is not big enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the national economy.

that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient
grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation
regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and
recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects
their privilege;
 ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC VS SEC OF AGRARIAN
REFORM

GR NO. 78742, JULY 14, 1989

(Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.)

FACTS: Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code,
had already been enacted by the Congress of the Philippines in line with the principle that “The
State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and
regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in
the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof.”

The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized the thrust for
agrarian reform. Thus, on July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the
valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their
payment. This was followed by PD 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program.

Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and
R.A. No. 6657.

The subjects of this petition are 9-hectare Riceland worked by 4 tenants and owned by
petitioner Nicolas Manaay and 5-hectare Riceland owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano.

Petitioners contend that promulgation of EO 228 by Pres. Aquino is invalid for violation of Art
XIII Sec 4, for failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners.

The petitioners also maintain that in declaring beneficiaries to be the owners of the lands
ignored judicial prerogatives and violated due process.

The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of
due process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the
coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to
the private respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him.

Power of eminent domain- Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to
forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to
the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under
terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed
upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or
other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play
to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner.

The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation".

Contention of the petitioners – that the state should first distribute public agricultural lands in
the pursuit of agrarian reform instead of immediately disturbing property rights by forcibly
acquiring private agricultural lands.
SC Decision – the legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in
the CARP the redistribution of private landholdings. The requirements for public use have
already been settled for us by the Constitution, which is the reason why private agricultural
lands are to be taken from the owners. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and
R.A. No. 6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the State adopt the
necessary measures "to encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands
to enable farmers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till." That
public use, as pronounced by the fundamental law itself, must be binding on us.
 PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC vs DRILON

GR NO 81958, JUNE 30, 1988

(Section 18 – The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare. Section 20 – the State recognizes the indispensable
role of the private sector, encourage private enterprise, and provide incentives to needed
investment.)

FACTS: PASEI is a firm engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and
female, for overseas placement, challenged the constitutionality of D.O. No. 1 of 1988, in the
character of guidelines governing the temporary suspension of deployment of Filipino domestic
and household workers. The measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;
that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with
similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel.

PASEI invokes Section 3 Article XIII of the Constitution providing for worker participation in
policy and decision making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law. It contended that D.O. No. 1 was passed in the absence of prior consultations; that it is in
violation of the Charter’s non-impairment clause, in addition to the great and irreparable injury
that PASEI members face.

It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure. The
concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare."

"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not
inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity."

ISSUE: whether or not the D.O. No. 1 is constitutional

HELD: The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers —
rests on substantial distinctions.

As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen
our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working
conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The tales of
maltreatment by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture are
compelling motives for urgent Government action.

What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence. and not upon some fanciful
or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is evidence capable indeed of
unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say
the same thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no evidence to justify such an
inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is
content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified.

Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the

protection for Filipino female overseas workers" this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of
the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be
for their own good and welfare.

The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic
overseas workers. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or
group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or
resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons.

Furthermore, total ban on overseas deployment has not been contemplated. Authorized
deployment and are exempted from the suspension: hiring by immediate members of the
family of Heads of State and Govt, ministers, deputy ministers and other senior govt official,
senior officials of the diplomatic corps, employers in countries with whom the PH have bilateral
labor agreement. Lifting of suspension in countries where there are bilateral agreements or
understanding with the PH and existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to
ensure the welfare and protection for Filipino workers.

As to the worker participation in policy and decision making processes affecting rights and
benefits – not taken. The right granted by this provision must submit to the demand and
necessities of the State’s power of regulation.

"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the
Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and
humane. The Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate
protection, personally and economically, while away from home.
 RESTITUTO YNOT VS INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

GR NO. 74457, MARCH 20, 1987

FACTS: the petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order 626-A prohibiting the
interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the
EO 626 with respect to age. EO 626 is amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of
age, sex or physical condition and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another. Transportation would be in violation of the EO and shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture, to be distributed to the charitable institutions.

Petitioner had transported 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo and they were
confiscated. The petitioner sued for recovery.

The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes
outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial
boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the
owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process.
There is also an improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE EXECUTIVE ORDER IS A VALID POLICE POWER.

HELD:

We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute
ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement

Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any
more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there.

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander,
were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given
a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of
the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished.

The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers
to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A
unconstitutional.

We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated
the petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance
with its mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a
member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere
subordinate of the President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own
responsibility alone, refuse to execute it.

The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people
to invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if,
like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a
promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in
the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert
them.

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional.

 DECS VS SAN DIEGO

G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989

(Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution.)

FACTS: PR Roberto San Diego is a graduate of the UE degree of BS Zoology. He took NMAT three
times and flunked it as many times. When he applied, DECS rejected his application on the
basis of the aforesaid rule. He went to RTC of Valenzuela to compel his admission to the test.
He first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education and
questioned the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12 series of 1972.

ISSUE: whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is
entitled to take it again.

HELD: No. In Tablarin vs Gutierrez, this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a
measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially
proved their competence and preparation for a medical education. Thus, legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass
medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental
power.

The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional
schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current state of our social and
economic development, are widely known.

Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b)
the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The
Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of
study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.

The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for
another calling that has not excited his interest.

It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of
education by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by
initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of
Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of
misfits.
 LUTZ VS ARANETA

FACTS:

Law in question opens with a declaration of emergency, due to the threat to our industry by
imminent imposition of export taxes upon sugar provided in the Tydings-McDuffie Actand
eventual loss of preferential position in the US market, “to obtain readjustment of the benefits
derived from sugar industry and to stabilize sugar industry to prepare to for the eventuality of
the loss of its preferential position and imposition of the export taxes.

Sec 2 CW 567 provides for an increase of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar, on a
graduated basis, Section 3 levies on the owners or persons in control of lands devoted to the
cultivation of sugar cane; Section 6 all collections made under this act shall accrue to a special
fund in the PH Treasury known as Sugar Adjustment and Stabilization Fund, shall be paid out
only for :

(1) Maintenance of sugar industry, despite the gradual loss of preferential position of PH
sugar in the US market, (2) readjust the benefits derived from the sugar industry by all
of the component elements thereof — the mill, the landowner, the planter of the sugar
cane, and the laborers in the factory and in the field — so that all might continue
profitably to engage therein; , to afford labor employed in the industry a living wage and
to improve their living and working conditions; to make necessary disbursements from
the fund.

Plaintiff Walter Lutz, seeks to recover from the Collector of Internal Revenue P14, 666 paid by
the estate as taxes under section 3 of the act, saying that it is unconstitutional and void, which
in plaintiff's opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied.

Basic defect of the plaintiff – that CW 567 is pure exercise of the taxing power. But
analyzing the act will show that the tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means
for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act
is primarily an exercise of the police power.

This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that sugar production is one of the great
industries of our nation, sugar occupying a leading position among its export products; that it
gives employment to thousands of laborers in fields and factories; that it is a great source of
the state's wealth, is one of the important sources of foreign exchange needed by our
government, and is thus pivotal in the plans of a regime committed to a policy of currency
stability.

Hence it was competent for the legislature to find that the general welfare demanded that the
sugar industry should be stabilized in turn; and in the wide field of its police power, the
lawmaking body could provide that the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among
its components to enable it to resist the added strain of the increase in taxes that it had to
sustain.

The protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a matter of public concern, it follows
that the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its
protection and expedient for its promotion.

The funds raised under the Sugar Stabilization Act, now in question, should be exclusively
spent in aid of the sugar industry, since it is that very enterprise that is being protected.
 LOZANO VS MARTINEZ

FACTS:

Constitutionality of Batas Pambansa 22/ BP Blg 22 / Bouncing Checks Law , is the sole issue
presented by these petitions.

Defendant moved seasonably to quash the information on the ground that the acts did not
constitute an offense, statue being unconstitutional. Motions were denied by the respondent
trial court, except case GR no 75789, declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case.

In view of the importance of the issue involved here, there is no doubt in our mind that the
instant petitions should be entertained and the constitutional challenge to BP 22 resolved
promptly, one way or the other, in order to put to rest the doubts and uncertainty that exist in
legal and judicial circles and the general public which have unnecessarily caused a delay in the
disposition of cases involving the enforcement of the statute.

The language of BP 22 is broad enough to cover all kinds of checks, whether present dated or
postdated, or whether issued in payment of pre-existing obligations or given in mutual or
simultaneous exchange for something of value.

BP 22 punished a person who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank
to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than 30
days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor more than
double said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment
at the discretion of the court.

Also punishes any person who having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank, fails
to keep sufficient funds of maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check. Essential
element “knowledge”. Prima facie presumption of such knowledge. Mitigate: if within five
banking days from the receipt of the notice, make or drawer make arrangements for payment
of the check.

BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are
worthless.the focus of the penal provision is on the damage on the property rights of the
victim.

Art 315 - The scope of paragraph 2 (d), however, was deemed to exclude checks issued in
payment of pre-existing obligations. The rationale of this interpretation is that in estafa, the
deceit causing the defraudation must be prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the
fraud. In issuing a check as payment for a pre-existing debt, the drawer does not derive any
material benefit in return or as consideration for its issuance.

Article 315, as amended by Republic Act 4885, does not cover checks issued in payment of pre-
existing obligations, again relying on the concept underlying the crime of estafa through false
pretenses or deceit—which is, that the deceit or false pretense must be prior to or simultaneous
with the commission of the fraud.
Since statistically it had been shown that the greater bulk of dishonored checks consisted of
those issued in payment of pre-existing debts, 13 the amended provision evidently failed to cope
with the real problem and to deal effectively with the evil that it was intended to eliminate or
minimize. (malum prohibitum)

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT BATAS PAMBANSA BLG 22 IS VALID

RULING:

Those who question constitutionality of BP 22 insists that: (1) violates constitutional provision
forbidding imprisonment for debt ; (2) impairs freedom of contract (3) equal protection clause.
BP 22 is consummated only upon the dishonor or non-payment of the check when it is
presented to the drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad debt law" rather than a "bad check
law."

The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-
payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce
a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.

The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and
illimitable of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety
and welfare of society. 24 It is a power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution,
but inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in
the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual
citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare."

The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the
making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the
imposition of penal sanctions.

Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is
an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on
deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to
the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the instrument wig be
paid upon presentation.

In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not
repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

As stated elsewhere, police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the
exigencies of changing times. There are occasions when the police power of the state may even
override a constitutional guaranty.

We hold that BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment
for debt.

"the clause in question was ... an authorized amendment of the bill and the printed copy
thereof reflects accurately the provision in question as approved on Second Reading. 37 We
therefore, find no merit in the petitioners' claim that in the enactment of BP 22 the provisions
of Section 9 (2) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution were violated.

CITY OF GOVT OF QUEZON CITY VS ERICTA

FACTS:

Ordinance 6118 S64 entitled “ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE

AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF”,
Section 9: 6% of the total area of the memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial of
deceased personwh o are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years.

For several years, aforecited section of the ordinance was not enforced, 7 years later another
resolution was passed, requesting City Engineed to stop selling of memorial parks whre the
owner failed to donate required 6% of intended space for paupers.

Respondent Himlayang Pilipino seeks to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance, that it is contrary to
the Constitution, charter, local autonomy act and Revised Administrative Code.

Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable
exercise of police power, as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and
safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and
convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."

Respondent Himlayang Pilipino contends questioned ordinance permamnently restricts the use
of the property, it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose, deprives owner of all beneficial
use of his property; it refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property."

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police
power.

RULING:

No. The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. The ordinance in question
not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because
under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine
and/or imprisonment.

Police power does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few
cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the
purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance,
the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.

Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation
but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of
law, nay, even without compensation.
 MANILA MEMORIAL PARK VS SECRETARY OF DSWD

FACTS:

04/23/1992, RA 7432 was passed into law, granting senior citizens the ff privileges: (1) 20%
discount on all establishments, admission fees by theaters, cinema houses; (2) exemptions from
payment of individual income taxes provided it does not exceed property level determined by
NEDA; (3) exemption from training fees for socioeconomic programs; (4) free medical and
dental services in govt establishment; (5) to the extent feasible and practicable, the continuance
of the same benefits and privileges.

Their interpretation has muddled x x x the intent of Congress in granting a mere discount
privilege, not a sales discount. The administrative agency issuing these regulations may not
enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the law it administers; it cannot engraft additional
requirements not contemplated by the legislature. Sections 2.i and 4 of Revenue Regulations
No. (RR) 2-94 define tax credit as the 20 percent discount deductible from gross income for
income tax purposes, or from gross sales for VAT or other percentage tax purposes.

February 26, 2004, RA 9257 amended certain provisions: The establishment may claim the
discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods
sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction
from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted. Provided, further,
That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be
included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper
documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.

Secretary of Finance issued RR No. 4-2006: (1) Only that portion of the gross sales EXCLUSIVELY
USED, CONSUMED OR ENJOYED BY THE SENIOR CITIZEN shall be eligible for the deductible
sales discount.

Feeling aggrieved by the tax deduction scheme, petitioners filed the present recourse, praying
that Section 4 of RA 7432, as amended by RA 9257, and the implementing rules and regulations
issued by the DSWD and the DOF be declared unconstitutional insofar as these allow business
establishments to claim the 20% discount given to senior citizens as a tax deduction; that the
DSWD and the DOF be prohibited from enforcing the same; and that the tax credit treatment of
the 20% discount under the former Section 4 (a) of RA 7432 be reinstated.

ISSUE: WHETHER SECTION 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9257 AND X X X ITS IMPLEMENTING
RULES AND REGULATIONS, INSOFAR AS THEY PROVIDE THAT THE TWENTY PERCENT
(20%) DISCOUNT TO SENIOR CITIZENS MAY BE CLAIMED AS A TAX DEDUCTION BY THE
PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, ARE INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Petitioners’ contention – they are only assailing the constitutionality of the tax deduction
scheme under RA 9257 and IRR issued by the DSWD and DOF; contravenes Article III, Section 9
of the Constitution, which provides that: "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation."; They assert that "[a]lthough both police power and the power of
eminent domain have the general welfare for their object, there are still traditional distinctions
between the two" and that "eminent domain cannot be made less supreme than police power."

Petitioners also contend that the tax deduction scheme violates Article XV, Section 4 and Article
XIII, Section 11 of the Constitution
RULING:

If it is police power, no just compensation is warranted. But if it is eminent domain, the tax
deduction scheme is unconstitutional because it is not a peso for peso reimbursement of the
20% discount given to senior citizens. Thus, it constitutes taking of private property without
payment of just compensation.

The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens
to nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-
being as the State considers them an integral part of our society. The priority given to senior
citizens finds its basis in the Constitution as set forth in the law itself.

The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain,
has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has
been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all
exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits.

While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of
business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a
business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process.

We, thus, found that the 20% discount as well as the tax deduction scheme is a valid exercise of
the police power of the State

To be a valid exercise of police power, it must have a lawful subject or objective and a lawful
method of accomplishing the goal.

Under the police power of the State, "property rights of individuals may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government."

Eminent domain, on the other hand, is the inherent power of the State to take or appropriate
private property for public use.

The Constitution, however, requires that private property shall not be taken without due
process of law and the payment of just compensation. The exercise of the power of eminent
domain, property interests are appropriated and applied to some public purpose which
necessitates the payment of just compensation therefore.

Senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power - The 20% discount is intended to improve
the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are less likely to be gainfully employed, more
prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing basic
commodities.

As a result, the discounts resulting from sales to senior citizens will not be confiscatory or
unduly oppressive. In sum, we sustain our ruling in Carlos Superdrug Corporation that the 20%
senior citizen discount and tax deduction scheme are valid exercises of police power of the
State absent a clear showing that it is arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory.

In conclusion, we maintain that the correct rule in determining whether the subject regulatory
measure has amounted to a "taking" under the power of eminent domain is the one laid down
in Alalayan v. National Power Corporation and followed in Carlos Superdurg
Corporation127 consistent with long standing principles in police power and eminent domain
analysis. Thus, the deprivation or reduction of profits or income. Gross sales must be clearly
shown to be unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory. Under the specific circumstances of this
case, such determination can only be made upon the presentation of competent proof which
petitioners failed to do. A law, which has been in operation for many years and promotes the
welfare of a group accorded special concern by the Constitution, cannot and should not be
summarily invalidated on a mere allegation that it reduces the profits or income/gross sales of
business establishments.

The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens to
nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as
the State considers them an integral part of our society. The priority given to senior citizens finds its
basis in the Constitution as set forth in the law itself. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides
that business establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the
discount as a tax deduction. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the
power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. While the Constitution protects