1973 Constitution

Preamble
The Preamble of the 1935 Constitution began simply with: The Filipino people x x x.” On
the other hand, the preamble of the 1973 Constitution started off, thus: “We, the sovereign
Filipino people x x x.” The 1935 Constitution Preamble spoke of the “blessings of the
independence” under a regime of “justice, liberty and democracy” while the 1973 Preamble
referred to “blessings of democracy” under a regime not only of justice and liberty but also
of peace and equality. What significance, if any, would you attach to each of these changes?
(1978 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

By adopting the first person approach, the Preamble of the new Constitution emphasizes a more
direct and personal sense of participation, involvement and commitment of the Filipino people in
adopting the new charter. “Sovereign” describes the present political state of the Filipino people
which could not have been said when the 1935 Constitution was adopted. Then the immediate goal
of our people was political independence; now that it has been realized it is only proper that the
Filipino people seek the “blessings of independence.” A state may be politically independent and
sovereign, yet it is not democratic; its society may be unjust, its people not free. True justice and
liberty however, may not thrive where society is riven with crime, violence and lawlessness and
fractured with social and economic inequalities. Hence, in adopting the new Constitution, we
implore that the Divine Providence bestow upon us “the blessings of democracy under a regime
of justice, liberty, peace and equality”.

A. Concept: Form of Government; Ratification; De Facto Officer; Jure Imperii or Jure

Gestionis

What form of government do we have at present? Explain briefly its nature and and
characteristics? (1982 BAR EXAMS)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The government of the Philippines at the present time has been described as essentially presidential
in character. In De La Llana vs Alba G.R No. 57883, the Supreme Court describing the nature and
characteristics of the of the Government, stated: “the amended Constitution adheres even more
clearly to the long-established tradition of a strong executive that antedated the 1935 Charter…
The 1935 Constitution., stated, provided for and ‘Executive power, which subject to the
fiscalization of the Assembly and of the public opinion, will not only know how to govern, but
will actually govern, with a firm and steady hand, unembarrassed by vexatious interferences by
other departments or by unholy alliances with this and that social group.’ The above excerpt was
cited by Justice Laurel in Planas vs. Gil. 61 Phil. 62. The 1981 amendments embody the same
philosophy, this notwithstanding that once again the principles of separation of powers, to quote
from… Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139, ‘obtains not through express provision but
by actual division.’ The president under Article VII shall be ‘ the head of the State and the chief
executive of the Republic of the Philippines. Moreover, all the powers he possessed under the 1935
constitution are vested in him anew unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise.’

As originally framed, the 1973 Constitution created the position of President as the symbolic head
of the State (Article VII, Section 1, 1973 Constitution, original form). In addition there was a
provision for prime Minister as the heads of the government to exercise the executive power with
the assistance of the Cabinet. Clearly a modified Parliamentary system was established. In the light
of the 1981 amendments though, this court in Free telephone Workers Union vs. Minister of Labor
108 SCRA 757 could state: The adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the
amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential character. The retention, however,
of the provision for the Prime Minister with the Cabinet, a majority of the members of which shall
come from the regional representatives of the Batsang Pambansa and the creation of the Executive
Committee composed of the prime Minister as Chairman and not more than 14 other members at
least half of whom shall be members of the Batasang Pambansa, clearly indicate the evolving
system of government that is not operative. What is equally apparent is that the strongest ties bind
the executive and legislative departments. It is likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa
retains its full authority to enact whatever legislation may be necessary to carry out national policy
as usually formulated in a caucus of the majority party.

The Supreme Court ruled in Free Telephone Workers Union decision that from the
standpoint of the traditional Anglo-American concept, we have restored the presidential
system under the 1981 amendments. In the light of the third world constitutions, what we
have may be described either as a presidential system with parliamentary features or a
parliamentary system with presidential features.Whatever be your conclusion, cite the
constitutional provisions that support your view. (1984 BAR EXAMS)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The form of government we have has been described by the Supreme Court as “essentially
presidential” ( Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 108 SCRA
757 (1981) ; Tupas vs. Ople, G.R. no. 67573, June 19, 1985) or as a “ modified form of
parliamentary government.” The descriptions mean the same, that is, our form of government
embodies features of both presidential and parliamentary systems. Thus: (1) Members of the BP,
who are also members of the Cabinet, are officials of the executive department and as such are
subject to control by the President (Art. VII, sec. 10; Art. IX, sec. 1) ; (2) Although the Prime
Minister must be a member of the BP , he is primarily the choice of the President, who nominates
him and has the sole power to remove him. (Art. IX, secs. 1 and 3 ) ; (3) The President can dissolve
the BP whenever the need arises for a popular vote of confidence on fundamental issues (Art. VIII,
sec. 13(2) ; (4) The BP can withdraw its confidence in the Prime Minister by a majority vote of all
its members but only the President can terminate the Prime Minister’s incumbency (Art.VIII, sec.
13 (1) ; (5) Members of the Cabinet may be designated by the President to sit in the BP (Art. VIII,
sec. 1)

What is the legal justification for the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the Javellana petition
considering that six of the then eleven justices voted that there was no valid ratification in
accordance with the procedure laid in the 1935 Constitution? (1985 BAR EXAMS)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
While 6 Justices held that the 1973 Constitution had not been validly ratified , 6 Justices likewise
held that the petitioners were not entitled relief either because the Constitution had been acquiesced
in by the people or because the question of its effectivity was a political question. Also , on the
question whether it had come into force and effect , 4 Justices held that it had come into force and
effect ; 4 held they did not know ; while 2 others said it had not come into force and effect, “with
the result that there were not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.”
This means that the eight held that the Constitution had come into force, as the 4 who said they
did not know must be deemed to have legitimized it, together with the other four. Only 2 were of
the view that the Constitution had not come into force. (Mitra v. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 59
(1981).

As of the time of the dismissal of the Javellana petition, the Supreme Court could not rule
that there was acquiescence to the proposed 1973 Constitution. Was there such a ruling
thereafter? If your SUGGESTED ANSWER is in the affirmative, how was such acquiescence
shown? (1985 BAR EXAMS)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. In Occena v. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 1 (1981) the Court pointed out that the government has
been conducted in accordance with the Constitution since the decision in Javellana. The Supreme
Court itself had applied the Constitution in several cases. In Mitra v. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 59
(1981), it pointed out to other instances showing popular acquiescence in the Constitution, such
as the referenda leading to the ratification of the Constitution, those held on July 27-28, 1973,
February 27-28, 1976 and December 17, 1977, as well as the elections for the interim Batasang
Pambansa in 1978 and those for local governments in 1980.

C. De Facto Officer

a) To what extent are the official acts of a de facto officer valid?

b) Is a de facto officer entitled to compensation? (1982 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A) The acts of a de facto officer are valid only so far as their recognition is necessary for the
protection of the rights of third persons arising from such acts of the de facto officer. But the
de facto officer is not entitled such to any right enforceable in the Courts.
B) The generally accepted rule in American Law is that a de facto officer may lawfully be
compelled to return to the proper de jure officer any sum he might have received as salary
during the time he performed the functions of the office. But in Kare v. Locsin, 61 Phil 541
(1935) it was held that a person who is elected to the legislature becomes a de jure officer
from the time he is sworn in as a member of that body and is allowed to take part in the
exercise of its functions. If after an election contest he is unseated, the prevailing party may
not recover the amounts he received as salary during his incumbency. The order unseating
the member “does not, in the absence of express language, to that effect, retroactively convert
 his prior de jure status into the status of a userper or a de facto officer holding merely under
a colorable title.” In Rodriguez v. tan 91Phil. 724 (19520 it was like-wise held that a de facto
officer, in the absence of express statutory provision, may not be compelled to return to the
de jure officer the salary he had received during his incumbency.

Jure Imperii

The United States of America, through its naval authorities in Subic Zambales (one of the
bases under the Military Bases Agreement) invited submission of bids for the construction
of (1) repair fender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay, Philippines;
and (2) repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to shoreline
revetment; NAV-BASE Subic Bay; and repair to Leyte Wharf approach, NAV-BASE Subic
Bay, Philippines. Responding to the said invitation, CDCP submitted its bid. It was thereafter
asked to confirm its price proposal, which it did. A request to confirm a price proposal
operates as an acceptance of the bid according to US bidding practices. This notwithstanding,
CDCP WAS LATER ADVISED through a letter, that due to its previous unsatisfactory
performance rating on similar repair projects, its bid was rejected. In view thereof, CDCP
filed an action for specific performance plus damages against the US Navy and the naval
officials of the aforementioned base before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo.
Will the action prosper? Reasons. (1985 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. In United States of America v. Ruiz, G.R. No. L-35645, May 22, 1985, the Supreme Court
distinguished between the sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and the private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis) of a state. A state is liable for its commercial
transactions. It may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed
to have tacitly given its consent to be sued when it enters into business contracts. However, it is
not liable if its contract relates to the exercise to the exercise of sovereign functions. In this case,
the projects are an integral part of the naval base, which is devoted to the defense of both the
United States and the Philippines. Indisputably the contract relates to a governmental function of
the highest order.

Members of the Science Club of Gomez Elementary School are touring the Makban
Geothermal Plant, which supplies a substantial portion of the electricity needs of Metro
Manila. An ill-maintained steam pipe bursts and scalds some of the children. The angry
parents find evidence of gross negligence and sue the National Power Corporation for actual,
moral, nominal, and exemplary damages due to the serious burns suffered by their children.
Instead of filing an answer the NPC files a motion to dismiss invoking governmental
immunity from suit. Resolve the motion. (1985 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion to dismiss should be denied. In Rayo v. Court of First Instance, 110 SCRA 456 (1981),
the Supreme Court noted that under its charter (Rep. Act No. 6395, Sec. 3 (d)) the NPC is given
the capacity to sue and be sued. Accordingly, it held that the NPC had a personality separate and
distinct from that of the government. Since the grant to the NPC of capacity to sue or to be sued is
without qualification as to the cause of action, the Supreme Court ruled that the NPC can be sued
for tort or quasi delict. The action of the parents being for tort for injuries to the school children,
this ruling in Rayo is controlling.

Effects of Unconstitutional Statute

Discuss the effects of a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a statue. (1982 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the Judiciary to be contrary to the
Constitution, it is null and void. As the Civil Code provides in article 7: “when the courts declare
a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.”
This provision reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no
rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection. Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425 (1986).
As stated in Serrano de Agbayani vs. Philippine National Bank, 38 scra 429 (1971): “Such a view
has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It has to be qualified though. It does not
admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act
must have been in force and has to be complied with. This is so as, until after the judiciary, in an
appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have
acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a
subsequent litigation, regard be had to what had been done while such legislative or executive act
was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects… this is merely to reflect awareness that
precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or
not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can
exercise the power to judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive
the law of its quality of fairness and justice then if there be no recognition of what had transpired
prior to such adjudication.

C. Policies: Free Exercise Clause, Parens Patriae, Social Justice

Does the Philippine Constitution adhere to the principle of free enterprise? Discuss at least
three constitutional provisions that support your answer. (1985 BAR EXAMS)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. It is partial to the concept of welfare state. This is clear from the following constitutional
provisions: (1) Art. 11, sec. 6 provides that the “State shall promote social justice to ensure the
dignity, welfare, and security of all the people . Towards this end, the State shall regulate the
acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse
property ownership and profits. (2) Id., sec. 7 mandates to “establish, maintain, and ensure
adequate social services in the field of education, health, housing, employment, welfare, and social
security to guarantee the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living. (3) Id., sec. 9
provides that “The state shall afford protection of labor, promote full employment and equality in
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, just and humane conditions of work. The
State may provide for compulsory arbitration.’’ ( Alalayan v. National Power Corp., 24 SCRA 172
(1986)

The following provisions may also be mentioned: (1) Art. XIV, sec. 2: “The State shall regulate
or prohibit private monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combination in restraint of
trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.’’ (2) Id., sec. 3: “The Batasang Pambansa shall, upon
recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority, reserve to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations wholly owned by such citizens, certain traditional
areas of investments when the national interests so dictates.” (3) Id., sec. 6: “The State may, in the
interest of national welfare or defense, establish and operate industries and means of transportation
and communications, and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership
utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the Government.” (4) Id., sec. 7: “In times
of national emergency when the public interest so requires, the State may temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.”
(5) Art. XV, sec. 7: “(1) The ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to citizens
of the Philippines or to corporations or associations wholly owned and managed by such citizens.
(2) The governing body of every entity engaged in commercial telecommunications shall in all
cases be controlled by the citizens of the Philippines”.

The President issues an Executive Order requiring that, effective School Year 1987-1988, all
children below the age of twelve (12) years shall take their primary course, or Grades I to
IV, only in Public Schools. As legal counsel of the Philippine Association of Private Schools,
you are asked to prepare an opinion on the constitutional validity of the Executive Order.
How would you react? (1986 BAR EXAMS)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In the leading case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Court held that although
it would not question Oregon’s power to compel school attendance or require that the attendance
be at an institution meeting State-imposed requirements as to qualify and nature of curriculum,
Oregon had not shown that its interest in secular education required that all children attend publicly
operated schools. A premise of this holding was the view that the State’s interest in education
would be served sufficiently by reliance on the secular teaching that accompanied religious
training in the schools maintained by the Society Sisters. Since Pierce, a substantial body of a case
law has confirmed the power of the States to insist that attendance at private schools, if it is to
satisfy state compulsory-attendance laws, be at institutions which provide minimum hours of
instruction, employ teachers of specified training, and cover prescribed subjects of instruction.
These cases were a sensible corollary of Pierce v. Society of Sisters: if the State must satisfy its
interest in secular education through the instrument of private schools, it has a proper interest in
the manner in which those schools perform their secular educational function. (Board of Educ. V.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)).

On the basis of these case, I am of the opinion that the executive order in question violates the Free
Exercise Clause (Art. IV, Sec. 8) of the 1973 Constitution, as adopted by Art. I, Sec. 1 of the
Provisional Constitution.

In what capacity and on what basis can a state bring suits to protect the rights of the people,
enforce charities of a public nature, and defend the interest of the helpless infants and
lunatics? (1982 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The State acting as Parens Patriae, may bring suits to protect the rights of the its citizens,, to enforce
charities of public nature, and to defend the interests of those who because of age and mental
incapacity and physical incapacity are incapable of protecting their protecting their rights and
interests.

Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes as a “vagrant” any person “tramping or
wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support.”
X, who had been laid off from work because of redundancy, developed insomnia, thinking of
his financial problems. So, he walked on the streets at night. On one occasion, he fell asleep
at the park. He was arrested and charged with vagrancy under the above-quoted legal
provision.
As counsel, how would you attack the constitutionality of said provision? (1983 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code can be attacked on the ground that it denies due process for
being vague. Thus, in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), an ordinance
punishing as vagrant “persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any
lawful purpose or object” was declared void for vagueness. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that
many of these activities are “historically part of the amenities of life as we have known it,” and
that a “presumption that people who might walk, loaf or loiter or stroll or frequent houses where
liquor is sold,…or who look suspicious to the police are to become future criminals is too
precarious for a rule of law.” In Palmers v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971) the Court also
invalidated an ordinance which provided penalties for “any person who wanders about the streets
or other public ways or who is found abroad at late or unusual hours in the night without any
visible or lawful business and who does not give satisfactory account of himself.” The Court held
that the defendant could not reasonably understand his conduct to be proscribed.
Indeed, in the case at bar, it would be unjust to apply the vagrancy statute to X, who certainly
cannot be classed with vagabonds, ruffians, and pimps. It has been held that “a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law.” (Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939)
The Committee also suggested that an answer based on social justice (no one should be punished
for being poor or poverty cannot be made a crime) should also be considered correct in answering
this question.

National Patrimony
Malakas, a Filipino citizen, sold a titled parcel of land to the World Church of the
Reincarnation, a religious corporation sole duly registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission whose present head in the Philippines, called the Supreme Master Reincarnator
went to the Register of Deeds to secure a transfer certificate of title, the Register refused to
act favorably. A case to compel registration is filed by the Church, represented by its Head.
The Solicitor General, as a lawyer for the Government, resists the action. As presiding judge,
how would you decide the case? Explain your decision. (1986 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The petition of the World Church of Reincarnation should be dismissed. A corporation can acquire
private lands in the Philippines only if at least 60% of its capital is owned by citizens of the
Philippines. Since a corporation sole has no nationality it cannot acquire lands in the country. Art.
XIV, Sec. 14 of the 1973 Constitution provides that: “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain,” while Sec. 9 limits the “disposition,
exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources of the
Philippines… to citizens of the Philippines or corporations, or associations, at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens.” In Republic v. Villanueva, 11 SCRA
875 (1982), it was held that a religious corporation or corporation sole has no nationality and,
therefore, can neither acquire or hold by lease lands in the public domain.

D. Police Power

Is a municipal ordinance prohibiting cabarets and establishments serving beer, liquor and
other intoxication drinks within a radius of 200 meters fom schools, churches, mosques, and
synagouges valid? Briefly explain, citing the specific legal basis for your answer. (1984 BAR
EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, under the police power of a municipality which empowers it to enact ordinances to promote
health, and safety, improve morals, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of its inhabitants (Recreation and Amusement Assoc. vs. City of Manila 100 Phil.
950).

Section 10 of Ordinance No. 105 of Tagaytay City provides that at least 5% of the total area
of any memorial park established within its jurisdiction shall be set aside for charity burial
of its pauper residents and no permit to establish, operate and maintain a private memorial
park shall be granted without the applicant’s conformity or agreeing to such condition. The
City argues that it is within its power to pass said ordinance ; that said ordinance is a valid
exercise of police power and that the portion taken for public use, the same being intended
for paupers pursuant to its duty to provide for the health and safety of its inhabitants.
Discuss the constitutionality of the said ordinance. (1985 BAR EXAM)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The ordinance is unconstitutional. The requirement to set aside at least 5% of the total area of any
memorial park for charity burial cannot be justified as an exercise of the police power because
it has no relation to the promotion of public health , morals , good order, safety or the general
welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of private property
to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining
a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The ordinance
in question is different from laws requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for
streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell. These are clearly for
public safety, health and convenience, for which lot buyers, as beneficiaries are made to pay. (City
Government of Quezon City v. Ericta, 122 SCRA 795 (1983)

National Territory

Archipelagic doctrine
What is meant by the archipelagic doctrine advocated by the Philippines in the international
conferences on the law of the seas? Applying it to the Philippines, what would be considered
as our territorial waters? (1975 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The archipelago doctrine stresses the integration of a group of islands to the sea and their oneness,
so that together they constitute one unit, one country, and one state. A single base line is drawn
around the islands by joining appropriate points of the outermost islands of the baselines are
internal waters. As the Constitution provides, “the waters around, between, and connecting the
islands of the archipelago, irrespective of breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters
of the Philippines”. On the others hand the waters extending seaward within define limits constitute
our territorial waters.

Jurisdiction
A Filipino-owned construction company with principal offices in Manila lead an aircraft
registered in England to ferry construction workers to the Middle East. While on a flight to
Saudi Arabia with a Filipino crew provided by the lessee, the aircraft was hijacked by drug
traffickers. The hijackers were captured in Damascus and sent to the Philippines for trial.
Do Courts in Manila have jurisdiction over the case? Reasons. (1981 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to try the case. Hijacking is actually piracy, defined in
People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 (1922) as robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas without
lawful authority and done animo furandi and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. Piracy
is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. Accordingly, it may be punished
in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may
be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against
all so any it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the
jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, “for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral
to crimes.” (U.S. v. Furlong (1820)), 5 Wheat., 184)

Declaration of Principles and State Policies

Republican form of government

What are the manifestations or attributes of a Republican form of government? (1977 BAR
EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The manifestations of a republican state are:
(1) The existence of a bill of rights (Art. IV);
(2) The observance of the rule of the majority (supra) ;
(3) The observance of the principle that ours is a ' government of laws and' not of men
(supra) ;
(4) The presence of elections through popular will (Art. VI) .
(5) The Observance of the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances (See Art.VIII,Sec.1);
(6) The observance of the principle that the legislature cannot pass .irrepealable laws (see
Ibid.);
(7) The observance of the law on public officers (Art. XIII); and
(8) The observance of the principle that the state cannot be Sued Without its consent (Art.
XV,,. Sec. 16)

General Principles And State Policies

Art II of the New Constitution embodies the Declaration of Principles and State Policies.
State them. (1977 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Art II- Declaration of Principles and state Policies.

Section II.-The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.

Section 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of the government and the people, and
in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or
civil service.

Section 3. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
 Section 4. The state shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution. The natural
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth or civic efficiency and the development of
moral character shall receive the aid and support of the Government.

Section 5. The state recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall
promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being.

Section 6. The state shall promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security
of all the people. Towards this end, the state shall regulate the acquisition ownership, use,
enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and
profits.

Section 7. The state shall establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services in the
field of education, health, housing employment, welfare, and social security to guarantee the
enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living.

Section 8.Civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military.

Section 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment, and equality
in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex , race, or creed, and regulate
the relations between workers and employers. The state shall assure the rights of workers and
employers. The state shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The state may provide
for compulsory arbitration.

Section 10. The state shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units,
especially the barrio, to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant community.

Doctrine Of Incorporation
(a) The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals, which was ratified by the
Philippine Government under Presidential Decree No. 207, recommended the
enactment of local legislation for the installation of safety signs and devices.
Acting on that recommendation, Letter of Instruction No. 229 was issued requiring the
procurement by all motor vehicle owners of reflectorized triangular early warning
devices as a means of preventing nighttime vehicular accidents.
Discuss briefly the validity or invalidity of said LOI from the standpoint of (1)
international Law; (2) police power; and (3) due process.

(b) “J”, a foreign nation, is an official of a specialized agency of the United Nations assigned
to the Philippines. Almost a year after his arrival in Manila (where his office is located),
20 big crates all consigned to him arrived in port of Manila and were immediately
stored in a bonded warehouse. The Constabulary Anti-Smuggling unit, acting on a
reliable tip that the crates contained an assortment of highly dutiable goods and also
prohibited importations, apply to you, as a Judge of the Court of First Instance, to use
 a search warrant. The application, under oath, describes particularly the goods to be
searched as well as the place where they are located.
Would you, assuming you were a CFI Judge, issue the search warrant? Why?

(c) Assuming that you decide to issue the search warrant, and the solicitor General moves
to quash the same because the owner of the goods to be searched is entitled to
diplomatic privileges including immunity from search warrants, what will you do,
convinced as you are that the crates in question contain highly dutiable goods and
even prohibited items of importation? (1980 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The LOI was issued in fulfilment of the obligation assumed by the Philippines under the
1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals, for the installation of road safety
signs and devices. The Philippine Constitution declares the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land. The Vienna Convention is such a law
which must be carried out by the Philippines under the principles of pacta sunt servanda.
LOI 229 is a police power measure intended to promote public safety. The heavy burden
of providing its invalidity is on anyone challenging its constitutionality. In issuing the
decree the President had statistical data showing the high incidence of accidents caused by
stalled vehicles on the roads without proper lighting. As underlying questions of fact may
condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute.
Nor is the requirement oppressive. The adoption of universal signal can considerably
reduce the possibility of error of motorists at night. They will not have to figure out what
any other sign might indicate, whether the stalled vehicle might be a police car or an
ambulance. (Agustin v. Edu, 888 SCRA 195 [1979].)

(b) No. As held in World Health Organization v. Aquino, 49 SCRA 242 [1972]), “diplomatic
immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to go beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government it is. . .
the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the
principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer
acting under his direction.”
(c.) I will lift the search warrant because the UN official is entitled to diplomatic immunity.
At the same time since I believe he is guilty of abuse of diplomatic privilege, I will make my
recommendation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that it can take up the matter the UN
office concerned to insure that in the future no repetition of the incident will recur. This is the
proper action to take under the convention on the privileges and immunities of Specialized
Agencies of the United Nations. (WHO v. Aquino, supra)

General Welfare Clause

 A. Distinguish police power, taxation, and eminent domain.
B. Because of the construction of the Cubao overpass-underpass complex, traffic, both
pedestrian and vehicular, was blocked off around the affected intersection. As a result,
the business in a merchandising establishment of X fronting the site of the construction
ground stopped and X sustained losses in the form of unearned profits. May X
successfully demand compensation from the government for the losses aforesaid upon
the theory that there was virtual taking of his property for use under the
circumstances?
C. Pursuant to the power vested in the Rice and Corn Board by law, Resolution 10 was
promulgated providing that no person who is not a citizen of the Phils shall be
employed in any capacity in any Filipino-owned establishment engaged in any of the
lines whose employment may be authorized by the President upon the recommendation
of the Rice and Corn Board. X, an alien employee of the Universal Corn Product filed
a petition challenging the constitutionality of the resolution pursuant to which he was
dismissed from the service. Decide with reasons. (1976 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. Their similarities:
1. They all underlie the constitution and rest upon necessity because there can be no
effective government without them.
2. They exist independently of the constitution as a necessary attribute of sovereignty. They
are rights inherent in the state as a sovereign. While they may be regulated and limited by
the constitution, they exist independent of it.
3. They are as enduring and indestructible as the state itself. The state cannot surrender
them, because it cannot surrender a sovereign power. It cannot be a state without them.
4. They constitute the 3 methods by which the state interferes with private rights.
5. Each presupposes an equivalent compensation.
6. They are all legislative in nature and character.

Their dissimilarities:
1. In the nature of compensation – in police power, the compensation of the individual is not
immediate, possible or apparent and in the application of certain laws or regulations
enacted pursuant thereto, annoyance and financial loss may even be caused the citizens,
leaving the reward of the individual to be reaped thru his altruistic recognition that the
just restraint is for public good. In taxation, the compensation of the individual is
immediate and apparent in the form of protection and benefits received from the
government. In eminent domain, the individual receives just compensation for his
property taken by the government for public use.
2. In the nature of the property taken – in police power, the property taken is noxious or
harmful either as to its inherent nature or the use to which it is devoted. In taxation, the
taxes come in the form of money paid by the taxpayer as his proportionate share in the
support of the government. In eminent domain, the property taken is not noxious either in
its nature or the use to which it is applied.
3. As to transfer of ownership - in police power, there is no transfer of ownership to the
government. The taking of the property consists either in its destruction or the regulation
of its use. In taxation, the taxes paid become part of the public funds. In eminent domain,
 the ownership is transferred to the government.
4. In relation to the impairment clause – police power and power of eminent domain are
superior to the impairment clause of the constitution, the power of taxation is subordinate
to it.
5. As to who may exercise them – police power and taxation may be exercised only by the
government while the power of eminent domain may be vested by law in public service
companies.

B. No. the loss in revenue suffered by X in this case is part of incidental damages resulting from
a proper governmental activity, the construction of an overpass-underpass complex, in the
exercise of the police power of the state. Hence it is not compensable

C. Resolution no. 10 is constitutional. It was issued pursuant to the power vested in the Rice and
Corn Board by law. The law violates neither the due process nor the equal protection clauses
of the constitution. Nationalization of employment in nationalized activities does not run
counter to the constitution. The nationalization of an economic measure when founded on
grounds of public policy cannot be branded as unjust, arbitrary or oppressive or contrary to the
constitution because its aim is merely to further the material progress and welfare of the
citizens of a country. Indeed, nationalization of the rice and corn industry may be defeated, its
aims and purposes circumvented and thwarted, if employment is not nationalized. So the
purpose of the law is not to deprive alien of its employment but to enhance and to protect those
rights already accorded to the citizens in certain businesses or activities which affect the
national economy and security. And if indeed, there is a classification under the law based
upon citizenship or alienage, the classification is reasonable as the same is based upon
substantial distinctions which make real differences, germane to the purposes of the law, not
limited to existing conditions only and the law applies equally to all persons belonging to the
same class.

Separation of powers
With the adoption of the parliamentary system of government under the 1973 Constitution,
do the principle of separation of powers cease to be one of the principles underlying our
constitutional government? Explain your answer. (1978 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. There are actually three separately distributive clauses in the New Constitution: Sec. 1 of Art.
VIII which provide that “the legislative power shall be vested in a National Assembly”; Sec. 1 of
Art. IX which states that “the executive power shall be exercised by the Prime Minister with the
assistance of his cabinet”; and Sec. 1 of Art. X which provides that “the judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.” Moreover,
there are specific grants to the power of the National Assembly, the Prime Minister, and the
judiciary, as the case may be. No other department or organ of the government may encroach
upon the exercise of such powers. There is still, therefore, separation of powers, although the
separation of powers under the presidential system has been modified.
Social responsibility (1978)
Social responsibility in private ownership and in business has now been infused into our
constitutional system. So also an international economic order is a new concept developing
in International Law. What provisions in the New Constitution lend support to these ideas?
Explain. (1978 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(1) “The State shall promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security of all
the people. Towards the end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment,
and disposition, of private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits.” (Sec.
5, Art. II, New Constitution).
(2) “The State shall establish, maintain, and ensure adequate social services in the field of
education, health, housing, and employment, welfare, and social security to guarantee the
enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living.” (Sec. 7, Art. II, N.C.).
(3) “The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and human conditions of work. The
State may provide for compulsory arbitration.” (Sec. 9, Art. II, N.C.).
(4) “The State shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at
emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil and achieving the goals enunciated in this
constitution.” (Sec. 12, Art. II, N.C.).
(5) The National Assembly may authorize upon payment of just compensation, the
expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at the cost to deserving
citizens.” (Sec. 13, Art. II, New Constitution)

Separation Of Church And State

(a) What is the reason behind the principle of separation of Church and State?
(b) The Manila Synod, a gathering of religious and lay leaders, met with a mission related
to the religious and spiritual life of the residents of the Archdiocese. It discussed and
passed a Resolution urging the President to lift Martial Law, the Resolution becoming
official with the approval of the Archbishop of Manila. Is the Resolution justifiable
notwithstanding the principle of separation of Church and State? (1979 BAR EXAM)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The principle of separation of Church and State is based on the adage that “strong fences make
good neighbors” and is intended, through a delineation of their respective jurisdiction, to
prevent encroachment by one upon the other. It seeks as well to prevent a conspiracy between
the two or the purpose of imposing upon the religious freedom of the people. According to
the U.S. Supreme Court, it is likewise aimed against sponsorship and financial support of and
participation by the State and religious affairs.

(b) Two possible SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

1. The resolution is valid because the participants in the Manila Synod consisting of priest and
 lay leaders are citizen entitled to discuss public affairs in the exercise of their freedom of
expression. Ecclesiastics are not barred from this freedom because of their calling. Indeed,
even the Church itself as an institution may validly make suggestions to the state in connection
with public issues, including those affecting the welfare of the people, such as the lifting of
martial law.
2. The resolution is an unlawful interference by the Church in purely secular matters and,
therefore, violates the Establishment Clause. This is not a mere decision of citizens but
requires the imprimatur of the Archbishop of Manila in his capacity as an official of the
Catholic Church.

Separation Of Church And State

(a) An Aglipayan priest, “A” was overwhelmingly elected Mayor of the predominantly
Catholic town of “X”, despite the issue raised against him of his disqualification, for
being allegedly an ecclesiastic. As such priest, he has no fixed station, but is active in
community work unrelated to religion, and undertaken mostly by Catholic residents. In
running for the Mayoralty, his certificate of candidacy was not sworn to. He belongs to
no political party. Would he be legally entitled to assume the position of Mayor?

(b) An ordinance requires all aliens to secure an employment permit from the Mayor upon
the payment of certain fee before being employed in any kind of position or engage in
any business, with penalty for violation thereof. The ordinance is assailed on
Constitutional grounds. Decide. (1979 BAR EXAM)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) In the case of Pamil vs. Teleron, the Supreme Court upheld Section 2175 of the Revised
Administrative Code although supported only by 5 justices, as against the other 7 who opposed
it, for lack of the needed vote to declare it unconstitutional.

The fact that the certificate of candidacy was not sworn to could have been a valid ground
for its annulment before but not after the election, in deference to the verdict of the voters.

(b) A similar ordinance was annulled in the case of Villegas v. Hui Chiong on the grounds that if
offended due process in so far as it impaired the alien’s right to earn a livelihood, violated the
equal protection clause for failure to distinguish among the aliens, who were required to pay
a uniform fee regardless of the nature of their employment or the amount of their
compensation, and also for lack of a sufficient standard to delimit the discretion of the mayor
in granting or withholding the permit. Justice Teehankee in his concurring opinion, added that
the ordinance contravenes public policy as expressed in national laws limiting the ban on the
employment of aliens to certain fields.

Separation Of Church And State

 (a) Is the separation of Church and State a Constitutional myth or a reality? Reason out
your answer.
(b) A provision in the Election Code states as follows:
“Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting
to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a
candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan
political activity therein, provided, that a judgment of conviction for any of the
aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and that filing of charges
for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary
investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.”
Discuss the validity or invalidity of the above provision in so far as it affects a person who
seeks to run for an elective office provided for in the Election Code but who is charged
with subversion and rebellion before a military tribunal, after a preliminary investigation.
(c) Would your answer be the same if the person involved had been convicted by a civil
court of rebellion but the judgment of conviction is on appeal to the Supreme Court? (1980
BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Separation of Church and State in the Philippines is a reality:
1. Hiring policies with respect to private employment do not discriminate on the basis of
creed, pursuant to Art. II, Sec 9 of the Constitution.
2. Employment in the government is not based on any religious test. (Art. IV, Sec 8)
3. No public property or money is used for religious purposes, except to pay the salaries of
religious dignitaries assigned to the armed forces or employed in any penal institution or in
government orphanage or leprosarium. (Art. VIII, Sec 18 [2])
4. Buildings, lands and improvements owned by religious organizations and actually, directly,
and exclusively used for religious purposes are exempt from taxation. (Art. VIII, Sec 17 [3])
*Examinees may also answer that separation of Church and State is a myth in the following
cases:
1. The use of public buildings (and therefore of public property) for the enthronement of the
Sacred Heart Image and the holding of other religious ceremonies violates Art. VIII, Sec 18 (2)
of the Constitution.
2. The use of public funds to subsidize religious pilgrimages to Mecca likewise violates the
same constitutional provision.
3. Active involvement and participation of religious sects qua religious sects in elections
contravenes the Constitution. (Cf. Art. XII, C, Sec 8)

(b) The presumption of disloyalty arising from the filing in a court or military tribunal of charges
after preliminary investigation contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as
a candidate is disqualified from public office solely on the ground that charges have been
filed against him. Such person is virtually placed in the same category as a person already
convicted of a crime punishable by arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of
suspension to hold public office. Although the presumption is rebuttable, time constraints
may prevent one from offering contrary proof. Above all, it is best that evidence of disloyalty
be passed upon by the courts rather than by an administrative body like the COMELEC.
(Dumlao v. COM
 (c) The answer would be the same even if the candidate had been convicted but his conviction
is still pending appeal. Only a final judgment of conviction would suffice to disqualify him.
The opposite position is, however, arguable. After conviction the burden is now on the
defendant appellant to show that his conviction is erroneous. As in applications for bail, bail
cannot be granted as of right after conviction, even if the judgment of conviction is not yet
final but is pending appeal. In Dumlao v. COMELEC, L-52245, Jan. 22, 1980 this question
was raised but the Supreme Court avoided passing upon it on the ground that there was no
necessity to do so, neither petitioner having shown that he was injured by the operation of
law.

Separation of Church and State

Does the inclusion of religious organizations under the coverage of the Social Security Act
violate the constitutional prohibition against the application of public funds for the use and
support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution or system of religious, or
priest, preacher or minister, etc.? (1982 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The funds contributed to the Social Security System (SSS) are not public funds but funds
belonging to the members which are merely held in trust by the government. Even assuming such
funds are impressed with a public character, nevertheless their payment by way of retirement,
death or disability benefits would not violate the constitutional prohibition against the use of public
funds for the benefit of priests employed by religious organizations because their payment would
be made to the priests not as such but as any other employees. (Roman Catholic Archbishops of
Manila vs. Social Security Commission, 1 SCRA 10)

Bill of Rights

Requirements Of Due Process Of Judicial Proceedings

State the requirements of due process of judicial proceedings. (1977 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Procedural due process judicial proceedings. -Procedural due process in juudicial proceedings
requires:

(a) An impartial court clothed by law with power to hear and determine the matter before it ;

(b) Jurisdiction lawfully acquired over the .person of the defendant or property which is the
subject matter of the proceeding;

(c) Opportunity to be heard given the defendant; and

(d) Judgment to be rendered after lawful hearing.

Due Process Clause
The validity of nationalization of the rice and corn industry embodied in a statute
prohibiting an alien from being employed in any capacity in any establishment in any
industry except as a member of the technical personnel and only upon authority of the
President of the Philippines was assailed on grounds of lack of due process and equal
protection. How would you rule on such objection? May such nationalistic policy be
applied in certain areas of investments? Reason out your answer, citing constitutional
provisions. (1978 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1.The law nationalizing the rice and corn industry is itself not violative of the equal protection
of the laws. The purpose of the law is not to discriminate against aliens but merely to reserve
to citizens of the Philippines the rice and corn industry, industries which directly affect not only
the national economy but also national security. The classification made by the law into citizens
and aliens is reasonable and proper. Substantial distinction exist between them; such
classification is germane to the purpose of the law and is not limited to existing conditions only
and applies equally to all citizens and aliens, as the case may be. If the rice and corn industry
itself is nationalized, necessarily, employment therein must also be nationalized by prohibiting
alien employment therein, otherwise the purpose of the law may be circumvented. Again, for
purposes of employment, substantial distinctions exist between citizens and aliens in the
exercise and conduct of the industry regulated.

2.The law does not violate the due process clause. Its purpose is legitimate: to prevent economy
and security. The means employed by the law is reasonable, alien employment in a nationalized
industry may open the door to the use of dummies, thereby circumventing the law. Moreover,
alien employment is not absolutely barred. They may still be employed in technical positions
but as an added safeguard, such employment must be with the approval of the President.

3.Yes. Under Section 3 of Article XIV, “the National Assembly shall, upon the
recommendation of the National Economic Development Authority, reserve to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations wholly owned by such citizens, certain traditional
areas of investments when the national interest so dictates.”

Due Process Clause

(a) “I” operates a beerhouse. Before opening the establishment, he obtained from the
appropriate authorities the necessary license to operate which means that he complied
with the requirements of the applicable City Ordinances and paid the license fee. The
license is renewable annually.

Even before the lapse of one year from the date of issuance of the license, the City
Mayor moved to cancel the license in view of police reports that the subject beer house
is frequent place of intoxication of students from a number of schools which are not
really distant from the beer house.
 “I”, the beer house operator, files a petition in Court seeking, in substance, to stop the
City Mayor from cancelling his license to operate the beer house.

If you were the Judge hearing the case, how would you decide it?

(b) Municipality “Z”, in preparation for the town fiesta contracted the services of “BB”
Construction Co. to erect a stage for the town fiesta program. During the town fiesta,
the stage collapsed when people climbed the stage to get a closer look at movie stars
who were special guests of the affair. A performing movie star died as a result of the
collapse of the stage.

It was later found that the stage was defectively constructed. The heirs of the deceased
movie star fatality now seek to recover damages against Municipality “Z”, which
disowns liability because the defective stage was erected not by the Municipality but
by “BB” Construction Co.

Is Municipality “Z” liable for damages to the heirs of the deceased movie star, or can
it successfully invoke as its defense the stage’s immunity from suit?

What is the liability, if any, of “BB” Construction Co? (1980 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER
(a) I would grant the petition of “I”. The operation of the beerhouse is properly protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. The cancellation of the license without a
hearing and solely on the basis of police reports is arbitrary. The Mayor’s office should
have conducted an investigation to determine the veracity of the report and only on proof
could it cancel the license granted to “I”.
(b) Municipality “Z” is liable. The rule is that if injury is caused in the curse of the performance
by a municipal corporation of its governmental function, no recovery can be had. The
reason is that the municipality is acting as agent of the State and, therefore, like the state,
the municipality is immune from suit. But when the municipality performs proprietary
function, it is liable to theird persons for its negligent acts. The holding of a town fiesta is
a proprietary function, because it is only for the special benefit of the community rather
than for the general welfare, performed in pursuance of a policy of the State. The mere fact
that the celebration was not held for profit or gain but only to provide entertainment for the
people is decisive. The establishment of a park does not provide income to a town, but
nevertheless, it is a private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public
schools, jails and the like, which are public. The municipality “Z” is responsible for the
acts of its agents under the doctrine of respondent superior. (Torio v. Fontanilla, 85 SCRA
599 [1978]).
“BB” Construction Co. is liable to the Municipality of “Z” under its contract, but has no
liability to third persons such as the family of the movie star who was killed in the accident.
Due Process
The collector of the Port of Cebu, acting on a trip, ordered the inspection of a truck about
to leave the customs zone. The customs police discovered untaxed goods being brought
out as personal effects. The Collector ordered seizure proceedings o be filed by customs
prosecutors assigned to his office. The owner of the seized articles questioned the
proceedings on the ground that the collector was the complainant, witness, prosecutor and
judge at the same time.

Does such a procedure deprive the owner of due process?

Reason out your answer. (1981BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The question here is whether the owner of the goods is deprived of a fair and impartial
proceeding. The port collector may have initiated the seizure proceedings, but he really does
not act as prosecutor and judge. The prosecution is undertaken by others, although assigned
to his office. The procedure no more deprives the owner of due process than it does an offender
who commits an offense in the presence of a judge acting as such whom the judge may order
arrested and thereupon prosecuted as if he had been brought before him on a warrant of arrest
under Rule 113, sec. 5 of the Rules of Court. The proceedings in the Bureau of Customs is
more administrative than judicial. It is similar to the proceedings in the Court of Industrial
Relations where prosecutors assigned to the CIR handled unfair labor practice cases.

Due Process

A, as Director of Forestry, decided a boundary dispute between two forest concessionaires,

X and Y, in favor of X. Y appealed to the Minister of Natural Resources.
When the Minister went abroad on an official mission, A was designated Acting Minister of
Natural Resources. A reviewed the appeal, after which he affirmed the disputed decision.
Is the decision of A as Acting Minister of Natural resources valid? Explain. (1983 BAR
EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. In Zambales Chronicle Mining Co.v. Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 261 (1979) it was held to
be a “palpable anomaly” and a “mockery of justice” for the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to review his own decision which he had rendered as Director of Mines. A sense of
proportion and consideration for the fitness of thing should have deterred the Director of Forestry
as acting minister of Natural Resources, from reviewing his own decision in the case. For his
decision as reviewing officer would be biased view. Inevitably it would be the same view, since
being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. As a result Y
was deprived of due process.

Section 2 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act 1379) provides that
whenever a public officer has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which
is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as public officer and his other lawful income, the
said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.
Under the law, forfeiture proceedings were instituted against X, a Customs Collector, to
confiscate his unexplained wealth. X questioned the constitutionality of said Section 2 as
being violative of due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence, he contended
that thereunder, the respondent has the burden of proving his innocence.
Resolve. (1983 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The contention has no merit and should be denied. The presumption that property acquired
manifestly out of proportion to the salary of the public officer, in this case of X, a Custom
Collector, is a natural and logical inference from facts proved. There is thus a rational connection
between the fact presumed and the fact proved, justifying shifting the burden of proof on the
accused, making the presumption reasonable. Thus, in People v. Mingoa, 92 Phil. 856 (1953), it
was held: “The validity of statutes establishing presumptions in criminal cases is now a settled
matter. Cooley, in his work in constitutional limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, pp. 639-641, says that ‘there
is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing that the presumption of innocence
may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and
enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence.’ ”
Moreover, the statute creates only a prima facie presumption which the accused can rebut. On this
ground the provision of article 217 of the Revised Penal Code that the failure of a public officer to
have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by
any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put much missing funds or
property to his personal use, has been upheld as constitutional (People v. Mingoa, supra)

Equal Protection

The constitutionality of the creation of the Sandiganbayan is assailed for being violative of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution. It is argued that a private individual accused
of a crime in the ordinary courts has, after conviction, the remedy of appeal to the Court of
Appeals, as a matter of right. On the other hand, a public officer who commits an offense
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan has no recourse to the Court of Appeals, but may only go
to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari which may or may not be given
due course. Rule on the above contention. (1982 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The contention is without merit. In Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan, L-50581 & L-50617, Jan 30, 1982,
a similar contention was dismissed by the Supreme Court in this wise: “Would the omission of the
Court of Appeals as an intermediate tribunal, deprive those, like the petitioner, who are charged in
the Sandiganbayan of a right that is vital to the protection of their liberty? Its SUGGESTED
ANSWER:: must be in the negative. The innocence or guilt of the accused is passed-upon by a
three-judge division of the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, unanimous vote is required, otherwise, the
Presiding Justice designates two other Justices from among the members of the Sandiganbayan to
sit temporarily in a division of five until a decision is rendered with the concurrence of three
Justices. If convicted, the accused can seek a review in the Supreme Court on a question of law or
the substantiality of the evidence. Petitioner makes much of the fact that there is no review by the
Supreme Court of the facts. What cannot be too strongly emphasized is that the Supreme Court, in
determining whether to give due course to a petition for review of a decision of the Sandiganbayan,
must be convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence has been overcome. Thus, it
cannot be said that there is no way of scrutinizing whether the quantum of evidence required for
conviction in criminal cases has been satisfied.”

In response to a protracted oil crisis, the President issued LOI 869 banning the use of private
motor vehicles with H and EH plates on weekends and holidays. Pursuant thereto, the LTC
issued a memorandum prescribing the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicles, and
cancellation of registration certificates of vehicle owners, found violating said LOI, Dante
Cruz now assails the same for being unconstitutional since it allegedly violates the due
process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution.
Discuss the Validity of the challenge against said LOI. (1985 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984), the Supreme Court sustained the validity of LOI 869
against objections that it violated the due process and equal protection guarantees of the
Constitution. The Court held that the LOI 869 is an oil conservation measure adopted in view of
oil crisis and is an appropriate response to such problem. It may not be the only alternative, but its
reasonableness is apparent. Nor does it violate equal protection clause. It operates equally and
uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances both in privileged conferred and in liabilities
imposed. However, the Court held that the Land Transportation Code did not authorize the
Ministry of Transportation and Communication to order the impounding of vehicles as a penalty
for the violation of its orders. To the extent, therefore, that impoundment of vehicles is provided,
such penalty was held to be ultra vires.

Bacolod City passes an ordinance that all bartenders in the city must pay an annual license
fee of P200.00 each but prohibiting the issuance of such a license to a woman owner of a duly
licensed liquor establishment. Maganda, who does not fall under any of the exceptions, and
who feels unjustly discriminated against, challenges the ordinance as an act which the city
council cannot validly promulgate. Will her challenge prosper? Explain. (1986 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. In Gossart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a challenge on
equal protection grounds to a Michigan statute which provided that no woman could obtain a
bartender’s license unless she was “the wife or daughter of the male owner” of a licensed liquor
establishment. In an opinion for the Court, Justice Frankfurter stated: “While Michigan may deny
to all women opportunities for bartending, Michigan cannot play favorites among women without
rhyme or reason. … Since bartending by women may, in the allowable legislative judgment, give
rise to moral and social problems against which it may devise preventive measures, the legislature
need not to go to the full length of the prohibition if it believes that as to a defined group of females
other factors are operating which either eliminate or reduce the moral and social problems
otherwise calling for prohibition. Michigan evidently believes that the oversight assured through
ownership of a bar by a barmaid’s husband or father minimizes hazards that may confront a
barmaid without such protecting oversight. This Court is certainty not in a position to gainsay such
belief by the Michigan legislature. If it is entertainment, as we think it is, Michigan has not violated
its duty to afford equal protection of its laws. We cannot cross-examine either actually or
argumentatively the mind of Michigan legislators nor question their motives. Since the line they
have drawn is not without a basis in reason, we cannot give ear to the suggestion that the real
impulse behind this legislation was an unchivalrous desire of male bartenders to try to monopolize
the calling.”

Unlawful Search and Seizure

On a Saturday night, the Metrocom decided to set up a check-point at the foot of the Quezon
Bridge in Manila. Motor vehicles passing through said check-point were stopped at random
and searched. “A”’s car was ordered to stop upon inspection, a plastic bag containing dried
marijuana leaves was discovered in the glove compartment. In the ensuing prosecution for
the offense of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, the marijuana leaves were presented in
evidence. The defense objected on the ground that it was taken under unlawful search.
Decide with reasons. (1982 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The following should be considered as alternative SUGGESTED ANSWER::s:

1. The seizure of marijuana leaves without a search warrant is valid and, therefore, the marijuana
leaves maybe presented in evidence. The search and seizure conducted in this case constitutes
an exception to the general requirement in art. IV, section 3 that before any search may be
conducted there must first be a search warrant issued by a judge or other responsible officer
authorized by law. As held in Papa vs. Mago, 22 scra 857 (1968), the guarantee of freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizure recognizes a necessary difference between a search
of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant readily be obtained
and a search of ship, motorboat, wagon or automobile for contraband goods where it is not
practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought out. The automobile is swift and powerful
vehicle. Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form in immense quantities and with a
capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they furnish for successful commission of crime a
disguising means of silent approval and swift escape. Moreover, since in the problem there
was no objection to the search conducted, the seizure of marijuana cannot later be objected to
in court.

2. There was no probable cause for establishment of check-points and therefore the search made
was illegal. Considering that the evidence was obtained through illegal search, the objection,
to its introduction should be sustained.

The Executive Judge of the Manila Regional Trial Court issued a search warrant for the
search and seizure of -
 "All narcotics and contraband, liquor, gambling paraphernalia and assorted
articles of all kinds of foreign manufacture smuggled into the country in
violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
Code, and the Revised Penal Code, stored at the main warehouse of the Metro
Manila Commercial Corporation at No. 2001 Claro M. Recto, Divisoria, Manila
and also at the corporation's outlets in the Quiapo, Sta. Cruz and Ermita areas."

The warrant was issued by the Executive judge convinced upon reading the supporting
affidavits of operatives from the Anti-Narcotics and Vice Squads of the Manila Police, all of
whom he personally knew as officers of the law. Of course the Executive Judge satisfied
himself that all signatures affixed to the affidavits were those of the affiants, after which the
warrant was issued forthwith.

After the search had been effected and various items seized, you were retained as counsel by
the owner of the premises searched. Evaluate the validity of the search warrant, citing
constitutional provisions and decisional doctrines. (1984 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The search warrant should be squashed because it violates Article IV, Sec. 3 of the Consitution
which provides as follows: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall not be violated and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by
law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."
The search warrant in question was not issued after actual "examination under oath or affirmation"
by the Judge of the affiants as to the truth of their affidavits, and the Constitution requires the
determination of probable cause through actual investigation proceedings. (Sayo vs. Chief of
Police, 80 Phil 859)
The search warrant is also unreasonable because it is very broad, thereby violating the
constitutional requirement of "particularly describing the things to be seized." (Stonehill vs.
Diokno 20 SCRA 383)
Finally, the search warrant is also defective because the specific provision of law violated is not
stated therein, and the search warrant states more than one offense supposedly violated. (Castro
vs. Pabalan, 70 SCRA 477)

In a suit for damages before the Manila Regional Trial Court, a motion for Production of all
“documents, papers, book, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible hinges, “ in
possession, custody of or control” of the defendant, is objected to as violative of the Bill of
Rights. Plaintiff , however, argues that the motion is in accord with the Rules of Court and
should be granted. Resolve said motion with reason. (1985 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The defendants claim that the order to produce documents is violative of the Bill of rights,
particularly the Search and Seizure Clause, is untenable . Such an order is not a search warrant.
(Material Distributors (Phil.) v. Natividad, 84 Phil. 127 (1949) However, the defendant’s objection
should be sustained. The motion fails to describe sufficiently the documents, books, accounts,
letters, photographs and tangible things desired and amounts to a fishing expedition . Rule 27, sec.
1 authorizes the production of such things only as are “not privilege, which constitute or contain
evidence material to any matter involved in the action.” Here the motions fail to show the
materiality of the things sought to be produced to any action brought by the plaintiff.

Requisites for a valid warrant

After having been investigated by the military authorities, “X”, a civilian, was charged with
kidnapping with murder in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the crime having been
committed in Cainta where the complaint was first filed in the Municipal Court. The case
was taken over by the military authorities which conducted the preliminary investigation,
on the suspicion that the killing was related to rebellion, and “X” was a member of the New
People’s Army (NPA) but was not found to be so. Upon the filing of the information therein,
the Court of First Instance issued the warrant of arrest, by virtue of which “X” was detained
without bail as none was recommended by the Fiscal who filed the information without
further investigation, in view of the crime being a capital offense. Forthwith, “X” filed a
petition in the Supreme Court for habeas corpus, alleging that the warrant of arrest was not
validly issued, and he was illegally denied bail. The Government opposed the petition
alleging: (1) That the proper remedy is to ask first the Court of First Instance to quash the
warrant of arrest to give the said Court a chance to correct its error, if any, and (2) that the
warrant was in all respects valid and legal.
Decide the two issues raised, stating on what ground the warrant of arrest may be assailed
as illegal, and your opinion whether the warrant is valid or not. Should the petition be
granted? (1979 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The warrant may be assailed on the ground that the preliminary investigation was not made by the
fiscal himself, but may be sustained under Sausi v. Querubin because the crime charged was the
same offense investigated by the military.
The validity of the detention without bail would have to depend on whether evidence of guilt of
the capital offense is strong, this to be proved by the prosecution.
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy as the motion to quash will not afford the speedy relief
required to restore individual liberty.

Warrant of Arrest

The Minister of Trade and Industry is empowered under an Executive Order to take all steps
and enforce all laws necessary to stop dollar smuggling, the highest form of economic
sabotage. There is an existing Presidential Decree enacted by the former President to the
same effect. On the basis of a preliminary investigation conducted by the Fiscal detailed to
his office, the Minister issues a warrant for the arrest of Mr. Fat Cat, long known in police
circles as the head of a big syndicate of smugglers. As Fat Cat’s counsel, what would you do
 to prevent his arrest and detention? Explain the basis of your action. (1986 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will question the validity of the warrant of arrest issued by the Minister of Trade and Industry on
the ground that he does not have the power to do so and that for that matter, PD 1936, which
authorizes prosecutors designated by the Anti-Dollar Smuggling Task Force, to issue warrants of
arrest, is unconstitutional. What Art. IV, Sec. 3 authorizes nonjudicial authorities to do is simply
to determine the existence of probable cause, but he issuance of a warrant if arrest can only be
done by a judge. Thus, in People v. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 467 (1981). Justice Aquino expressed
the view that a fiscal is a “responsible officer authorized by law” to determine the existence of
probable cause and that his finding is a sufficient basis for a judge to issue a warrant of arrest.
Although this view was concurred in by only two Justices, in the later case of Placer v. Villanueva,
126 SCRA 463 (1983), the Court held that while the judge may rely on the fiscal’s finding of
probable cause, the judge is not, however, bound to issue a warrant thus implying that only the
judge can issue a warrant if arrest. In fact in Lino v. Fugoso, 77 Phil. 933 (1947) it was held that
the City Fiscal of Manila “has no authority to issue warrants of arrest.”

Right To Privacy
(a) Would a law be constitutionally valid in providing that, before a marriage license may
be issued by the appropriate official of a city or municipality, the parties to the prospective
marriage should first submit to him a certification from a Family Planning Center that
they have undergone at least a week of instruction and/or information on family planning?
(b) “F,” a newspaperman, began the production of a movie portraying the life of an
unmarried mayoralty candidate who was killed during an election campaign. “F” was
basing the film on a book on the candidate’s life, the rights to which he had purchased.
Although the emphasis of the movie was on the candidate’s public life, it portrayed portions
dealing with his private and family life including scenes depicting his mother and his girl
friend. The family objected to the production as an invasion upon their privacy. “F”
contended, however, that since the candidate was a public figure, the movie production was
but in exercise of the constitutional right of freedom of speech of the press.
(c) Between the right to privacy on the one hand and the right to freedom of expression on the
other, which would you sustain? (1980 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Yes, the law is valid. The Constitution makes it the responsibility of the state to achieve
and maintain population levels conductive to the national welfare. (Art XV, Sec 10) In
fulfillment of this duty, the government may by law require prospective couples to undergo
instruction in family planning.

b) The right of privacy should prevail. As held in Lagunzad v. Soto Vda. De Gonzales, L-
32066, August 6, 1979 92 SCRA 476, “Being a public figure does not automatically
destroy in toto a person’s right to privacy. The right to invade a person’s privacy to
disseminated public information does not extend to a fictional or novelized representation
of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she may be. In the case at bar, while it is
true that petitioner exerted efforts to present the true-to-life story of Moises Padilla,
 petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film because without it, it would
be a drab story of torture and brutality. Freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred
position in the hierarchy of civil liberties. It is not, however, without limitations. In the
particular circumstances presented and considering the obligation assumed by petitioner
under the agreement, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly
because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon
matters of private concern.”

Freedom Of Speech And Peaceable Assembly

Petitioners, members of Jehovah’s Witnesses, applied for a permit to use the kiosk at the
public plaza of Sta. Cruz, Zambales. The kiosk is very near the Roman Catholic church. The
mayor denied the permit to use the kiosk but offered to grant the use of a part of the plaza.
The petitioners contended that the denial of the permit is an abridgement of the right to
freedom of speech and peaceable assembly. Is the contention meritorious? Why? (1975 BAR
EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Freedom of speech and assembly is subject to regulation to promote public order and
public safety. In this case, there was reasonable ground to believe that because of the proximity of
the Roman Catholic Church to the kiosk the use of the kiosk by religious sects could lead to a
disturbance of peace and order. Especially is this so in the case of Jehovah’s Witnesses whose
tenents are derogatory to those of the Roman Catholic Church. The offer of another place for the
meeting negated the claim of denial of the constitutional right of speech and assembly. (Ignacio v.
Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956) )

Freedom Of Speech Or Of The Press; Three Test

What are the three tests to be considered by the courts in determining whether or not a law
violates the freedom of speech or of the press? Explain each. (1977BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The three tests are:

(a) The dangerous tendency rule.--The rule which states that the State has the power to prescribe
and punish speech which “creates a dangerous tendency” Which the State has a right to prevent.

(b) The clear and present danger test.-The question in every case is whether the words are used
in such circumstances and are of such nature as to create a Clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive laws that Congress has a right to present.

(c) The balancing of interest test. -It requires a court to take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interest observable in a given situation or type of situation.

Clear And Present Danger

Can a person be punished for criticizing the decision of a court while the case is still pending?
Why? (1975 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER
Yes. Criticism of a decision which tends or which creates a clear and present danger of impending,
obstructing, embarrassing or influencing the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or
proceeding constitutes criminal contempt and may be punished. (People v. Alarcon, 69 Phil 265
(1930); People v. Castelo, L-11816, April 23, 1962, 4 SCRA 947) This is so because freedom of
speech and the press must, in this instance, yield in the interest of preserving the independence of
the judiciary and promoting the sound administration of justice. (Cabansag v. Fernandez. GR. No.
L-8974, October 18, 1957)

Freedom of Speech and Expression

A city ordinance prohibits the holding of any demonstration, assembly or precession,

whether in a public or private property, without a permit issued by the Mayor. A permit
must be applied for a t least 24 hours before the demonstration, assembly or procession. It is
expressly provided in the ordinance that it is mandatory for the Mayor to issue the permit
after taking into consideration the time, place and manner of holding the demonstration,
assembly or procession as related to public convenience and the preservation of peace and
order.
A group of students held a rally in a private compound to protest military abuses. The
organizers of the rally were arrested for violation of the ordinance because they did not have
any permit.
Evaluate the constitutional validity of the ordinance. (1983 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
So far the ordinance seeks to regulate the use of public parks and streets by giving the Mayor the
power to issue a permit, it is valid. As held in Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 (1948), citing Cox
v. New Hampshire 312 U.S. 569 (1941), “ ‘a statute requiring persons using the public streets for
a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an
unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where,
as the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing autgorities are strictly limited, in the
issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the time, place, and manner of the public convenience
and affording an opportunity to provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary
discretion to issue or refuse license.’ ”
However, so far as the ordinance purports to give the Mayor the power to regulate as well the
holding of assemblies on private property, it constitutes a temporary taking of such private property
without due process of law. As long as the property owner does not object to the use of his property,
it does not live within the power of the state or the city to require a permit because what is involved
here is not merely a group desiring to hold a party or revelry that might disturb the peace and quiet
of the neighborhood, but of a group desiring to exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of
expression and assembly. It would be a different matter if the owner forbids the use of his property
by others, for then anyone who enters it commits trespass. Thus, in Lloyd Corp v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 2219 (1972), it was held by the U.S. Supreme Court that “a trespasser or an uninvited guest
(cannot) exercise general rights of free speech on property privately owned and used
nondiscriminatorily for private use only.”

On August 30, 1984, students from Catholic schools in the Metro Manila area, together, with
priests and nuns of various religious orders of the Catholic Church, applied for a permit with
the City Mayor of Manila to hold a Prayer-Mass rally with the following specifics:
- at Mendiola Street in front of San beda;
- on September 21, 1984 from 1:30 to 5:30 P.M.;
- to invoke divine intercession and guidance for the purpose of affecting a genuine national
reconciliation between the leaders and citizens of this country.
The City Mayor rejected the application on two grounds:
(1) The legal opinion of his staff that a public street may not be used for religious services
and activities benefitting a particular religion.
(2) The PC-INP intelligence reports which unanimously indicate that in view of the
conflicting national significance of September 21, 1984, and the likelihood that communist
elements might exploit the situation, prudence and common sense dictate the denial of
the permit if probable loss and injury to life and property are to be avoided.
As a compromise, however, the City Mayor later granted the permit thru a memorandum to
the applicants in this tenor: " Prayer-Mass rally is approved, but the activities should be held
at the Manila Cathedral premises on September 23, 1984 (instead of September 21) from
1:30 to 5:30 P.M." The applicants received the Mayor's memorandum on September 20,
1984.
A mandamus suit, with prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, was filed
subsequently with the Manila Regional Trial Court. If you were the Presiding Judge, would
you give due course to the petition and grant the writ directing the City Mayor to issue permit
for September 21, 1984 at Mendiola Street? Support your SUGGESTED ANSWER::s with
citation of constitutional provisions and decisional doctrines. (1984 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The City Mayor's action in effect is a denial of the permit, and as RTC judge, I would compel the
City Mayor to issue the permit as applied for-
- the Constitution guarantees peaceful assembly and free speech as fundamental rights
comprehended by the due process protection of liberty (Sec. 9, Art. IV) - the clear and present
danger standard is not satisfied by a finding of communist infiltration; and llikelihood of
violence, because the standard requires causal relation between the exercise of right and
substantive evil to the extent that danger is immediate and imminent (Primicias vs. Fugoso 80
Phil. 71, American Bible Society vs. City of Manila 101 Phil. 886, Cabansag vs. Fernandez 102
Phil. 152, Vera vs, Arca 28 SCRA 351, Navarro vs. Villegas 31 SCRA 731, Imbong vs, Ferrer 35
SCRA 28, Badoy vs. COMELEC 35 SCRA 258, People vs. Ferrer 48 SCRA 382, Gonzalez
vs. Comeec 27 SCRA 835, Ruiz vs. Gordon 126 SCRA 233). Temporary use of public streets,
by tradition, for religious processions, does not offend against the prohibited-use-for-religious-
purpose clause of the Constitution particularly where the object of the exercise is political, not
ecclesiastical as is the situation here.
- the people have a right to use public property, like streets, parks, etc., for the exercise of their
constitutional rights.
- JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing (125 SCRA 553) said this much, also adding the requirement that the
application for a rally permit must promptly be acted upon

Freedom of Religion

The President issues an Executive Order stating that in addition to the qualifications
prescribed by Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 129, an appointee to a Regional Trial Court
must execute a declaration under oath that he believes in the existence of God or, in the case
of a Muslim, Allah. As aspirant is disturbed about this additional requirement and consults
you about the legal effect of an appointee’s disregarding said requirement after he has
complied with all steps needed to qualify for the position. Explain your SUGGESTED
ANSWER. (1986 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The requirement that an appointee to the Regional Trial Court must take an oath that he believes
in the existence of God or of Allah is a religious test forbidden by Art. IV, Sec. 8 of the 1973
Constitution. This provision is adopted by the Provisional Constitution in Art. I, Sec. 1 and,
therefore, constitutes a limitation on the legislative powers of the President under Art. II, Sec. 1.
Consequently, the amendment of B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 15 is void on its face and may be disregarded
as without any legal effect.

Right to Travel

Mayaman, a businessman charged with estafa involving P2,000,000.00 is allowed to post bail
for his provisional release. Pending trial, he files a motion seeking court permission to go to
the United States to attend to an important business transaction and to look for other
business opportunities for his corporation. The surety company manifests that it leaves the
matter to the discretion of the court. The fiscal opposes the motion citing reasons why
Mayaman will not return to face trial. Mayaman’s lawyer invokes the constitutional right to
travel under Section 5 of the Bill of Rights. You are the Judge. Resolve the motion and state
the reasons for your action. (1986 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion should be denied. If the accused goes abroad, he may not return anymore and therefore
he may place himself outside the jurisdiction of Philippine courts. The reason for rhe application
to travel is not a compelling reason to justify the granting of permission for the accused to travel.
He can simply transact business through a representative and does not have to personally go abroad
for that purpose.

Eminent Domain
“X” is the owner of a piece of land with an area of 5,000 square meters, located near a
factory. The land is so swampy it has been breeding place for mosquitoes and wallowing
place for carabaos. The Government wants to expropriate the land for a low-cost housing
project for the factory workers and laborers. “X” opposed the expropriation on the
 ground that the housing project is not for “public use” within the meaning of the power
of eminent domain.
(a) May the expropriation prosper?
(b) If not, may not the Government take the property just the same in the exercise of
police power for the protection of the health of all residents near the land, as by
abatement of nuisance? (1979 BAR EXAM)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(a) The expropriation will prosper under the expanded concept of “public use” which now
includes even indirect public benefit or advantage. The only possible flaw would be in the
area of the land, which is not enough to make it a landed estate under Art. XIV, Sec. 13.

(b) The property, being noxious, may be regulated under the police power for the purpose of
improving it in the interest of public health.

Non-Impairment Of Obligation Of Contract

“D,” is a resident of Davao, borrowed P9,666.00 from “E” his employer, a resident of Manila,
to defray the hospitalization expenses of “D’s” wife in Davao. “D” agreed in writing that he
would work as a helper in the house of “E”; that this account would be paid back by him to
“E” at the rate of P400.00 a month starting on a particular month, without interest, covering
a two (2) year period, the agreement further providing that in case “D” fails to pay in cash,
he would continue to render service, as a domestic help in “E’s” household with a salary of
P400.00 a month to be applied, however, to his indebtedness until fully paid. Since “D” could
not pay in cash on the third month of payment, he remained in “E’s” employ in accordance
with the agreement. On the sixth month, he requested to be allowed to be allowed to leave
“E’s” service because he had a better opportunity in Davao, salary-wise. “E” refused to
release “D” from his service and insisted on “D’s” compliance with his agreement even as
“D” promised to continue remitting from Davao the monthly amounts due until his debt was
fully paid.
Evaluate the rights of the parties based on the Constitution. Which of the conflicting rights
should prevail? (1980 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
“E,” the employer, has a right under the contract to the services of “D” in satisfaction of his
credit. It is a right arising from contract. The Constitution provides that the obligation of contracts
shall not be impaired. However, “D” has a right not to be kept in involuntary servitude under Art.
IV, Sec 14 of the Constitution which provides that no involuntary servitude shall exist in any
form except as punishment for a crime whereof, the party shall have been duly convicted. As held
in Caunca v. Salazar, L-2690, Jan. 1, 1949, an employment agency, regardless of the amount it
may have advanced to a prospective employee, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of
movement. If “D” is kept in “E’s” house whether by physical force or by external moral
compulsion, habeas corpus would lie to free her from her employer.

No. the constitutional right of “D” should, therefore, prevail.

Custodial investigation
Pablo Cruz kills his brother-in-law with a gun while the latter was unarmed. When the police
arrived at the scene of the crime, Pablo Cruz surrendered his gun to the police, saying, “I
killed him because I was fed up with him.” During the trial of the case for murder his defense
counsel objected to any question propounded to the policeman which would try to elicit the
statement the accused made while surrendering his gun on the ground that at that time he
was already in police custody and, therefore, as he had then the right to counsel, his
statement, without assistance of counsel, would be inadmissible is accordance with the
constitution. How would you rule on the objection? Reason. (1978 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The objection is not well-taken. The statements of Pablo Cruz are spontaneous declarations
constituting part of the res gestae, and therefore, admissible in evidence. The constitutional
prohibition invoked (Sec. 20 of Art. IV of the New Constitution) does not apply because the
statements of Pablo Cruz were voluntarily given by him in a precustodial proceeding. He was not
yet being investigated by the police for the commission of an offense. This is not the custodial
interrogation contemplated by the Constitution.

Custodial investigation
(a) Section 20, Article IV, of the 1973 Constitution granted for the first time to a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense the right to counsel and to be informed of such
right.
If, prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, a confession had been obtained from a
person under investigation who was not informed of such right, would it be admissible in
evidence against him?
(b) Five (5) persons were apprehended by the city police authorities in connection with a
robbery with homicide committed within the city limits. During the customary police
investigation, one of the suspects “A,” pointed to “B” and “C” as his companions in the
commission of the offense. When pointed to, “B” and “C” did not admit nor deny
participation in the offense. They merely remained silent.
c. During the trial of the criminal case against “A,” “B,” and “C,” such silence of “B” and
“C” during the custodial investigation conducted by the police (in the face of an accusation
implicating them) was used by the prosecution against “B” and “C” on the basis of the legal
principle that when accused, “one’s silence is admission.”
Is this position of the prosecution tenable? (1980 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Yes, the confession is admissible in evidence. In Magtoto v. Manguerra, 63 SCRA 4 (1975),
it was held that Art. IV, Sec 20 does not have a retroactive application. The result is that
confessions obtained before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution without informing the person
in custody of his right to counsel were held admissible even if presented in court after Jan. 17,
1973. The Court held that the validity of confessions must be determined as of their taking. Before
the 1973 Constitution, there was no requirement that the person in custody be informed of the right
to counsel. Moreover, to give retroactive effect of the provision might lead to the acquittal of guilty
individuals in many cases where confessions were obtained before the effectivity of 1973
Constitution in accordance with the rules then in force.
(b) Pursuant to Art. IV, Sec 20, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
has the right to remain silent and to counsel and may be informed of such right. Therefore, the
silence of “B” and “C” during the custodial investigation conducted by the police even in the face
of an accusation by “A,” can not be used against them and introduced in evidence against them
at the trial of the criminal case. (People v. Alegre, L-30423, Nov. 7, 1979, 94 SCRA 109). Rule
130, Sec. 23 of the Rules of Court, which provides that “any act or declaration made in the
presence and within the observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or
declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, may be given in evidence
against him,” does not apply to situations involving custodial investigation. The latter (custodial
investigation) is governed by Art. IV, Sec 20 of the Constitution which guarantees every person
under investigation the right to remain silent. Consequently, evidence of “B” and “C” silence’s
in that investigation cannot be introduced without violating their aforesaid constitutional right.

Presumption of Innocence

A, a taxpayer, a voter, and a member, of the Bar, filed a petition against the COMELEC to
enjoin the latter from enforcing Section 4, Batas Blg. 52 which provides for the
disqualification as candidate for any other person convicted of subversion insurrection,
rebellion, or other similar offenses. Said law further provides that the filing of charges for
such crimes before a civil or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima
facie evidence of such fact. A maintains that the above quoted provision is unconstitutional
because it contravenes the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Constitution. Is the
contention tenable? (1982 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A’s contention should be sustained. In Dumlao vs COMELEC, Igot vs COMELEC, 95 SCRA 39,
the Supreme Court invalidated the provision of BP Blg. 52 section 4 involved in this problem on
the ground that it contravenes the presumption of innocence in Art. IV, Sec. 19. The Supreme
Court held: “this proviso contravenes the presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified
for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or
military tribunals. Such person is virtually placed in the same category as a person already
convicted of a crime punishable by arresto which carries with it the accessory penalty of
suspension to hold public office. Although the presumption is rebuttable, time and constraints may
prevent one from offering contrary proof. Above all, it is best that evidence of disloyalty be passed
upon by courts rather than an administrative body like the COMELEC.

Writ of habeas corpus

(a) When the Bill of Right says that “the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, etc.,” the Constitution clearly established a restriction upon the State. During
Martial Law when the suspension of the writ is vested exclusively on the President as
Commander-in- Chief of the Armed Forces, is the exercise of such power by the
President subject to judicial inquiry? If so, to what extent. If not, why?
(b) What do you understand by “constitutional authoritarianism” as the President as the
President describes our present Government under the regime of Martial Law?
(c) Can you cite provisions of the Constitution reflective of this character of our
Government? (1979 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Two possible answers:
1. Even in normal times, the President has the exclusive power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, on the grounds authorized by the Constitution. However, such
suspension is subject to review by the Supreme Court under the doctrine laid down in Lansang
vs. Garcia, even under Martial law according to one faction of the Supreme Court in Aquino
vs. Enrile, where t was also held that the imposition of martial law automatically suspended
the privilege of habeas corpus.

Martial law itself, according to this group, is also subject to the Lansang test and may be
annulled if not based upon the grounds prescribed, viz., invasion, insurrection, rebellion, or
imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, as determined by the Supreme
Court after conducting its own factual investigation
2. According to another faction of the Supreme Court in the same case, the question is political
in nature and therefore cannot be decided by the judiciary.

(b) By “constitutional authoritarianism” is meant the ascendancy of state authority over individual
rights under certain emergency circumstances, within the framework of the Constitution.

(c) Illustrative of this concept are the provisions of the 1976 constitutional amendments in
general, particularly those concerning the extraordinary powers of the incumbent President,
including his power to legislate concurrently with, independently of, or even against the
legislature.

Another example is found in Art. XV, Sec. 7, which allows the State in times of national
emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operations of any privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest.

Witness Against Himself

A branch of a Bank was robbed. When the police arrived, they closed the branch and asked
all the persons inside to stay for interrogation and to inform the police investigators what
they saw, more particularly, the identity of the robbers.
When “X”, a teller, was being asked about the holdup, he gave a statement that tended to
implicate him. Prosecuted as an accomplice, he questioned at his trial the admissibility of his
statement given to the police investigator, claiming that he was denied his constitutional
rights to silence and to counsel.
Is X’s contention correct? Explain briefly. (1981 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
X’s contention is untenable. His statement, which tended to incriminate himself, was part of the
res gestae and is admissible in evidence. The right to remain silent and to counsel, guaranteed in
Art. IV, sec 20, applies only to the custodial stage of interrogation during which the police
interrogation focuses on the guilt of a particular suspect who is deprived of freedom in a significant
way. here the investigation is only what is known as the stage of general exploratory investigation,
during which statements made without the warnings of the right to remain silent and to counsel
are admissible in evidence.

In similar case (People v. Tampus, 96 SCRA 624 (1980)) the accused, who were inmates at the
Bilibid Prison, after killing another inmate inside a toilet, upon coming out surrendered to the
prison guard, saying “Surrender po kami. Gumanti lang po kami.” it was held that their statement
was part of the res gestae and at the same time a voluntary confession of guilt.

Rights of the Accused; Self-Incrimination

While seated all by himself at Ugarte Filed one Friday evening at 6:0), Jose San Juan was
accosted by a Makati policeman. About five meters from where Jose was seated, the
policeman picked up a still lighted, half-smoked marijuana stick. Despite Jose's disclaimer
of ownership thereof, the policeman arrested him for illegal possession and use of marijuana
and brought him to the headquarters where he was locked up alone in a cell. At 4:00 the next
morning, he was roused from sleep and brought before a police investigator. The police
investigator started thus: "Since you said to the arresting officer that you are innocent, I
think it will be a simple matter for you to give a statement. Of course you have the right to
have a lawyer with you and you even have the right to give any statement. But if you tell me
now that you don't need a lawyer and you are willing to give your statement without your
lawyer around, then I'll start typing your statement and I'll see to it that you are treated with
all leniency. You see I am also a parent and I am very much concerned with my children."
Thus, Jose submitted himself to interrogation. Thereafter, he signed his statement confessing
to the offense of used prohibited drugs (Indian Hemp).
You have been appointed counsel de officio for Jose. The trial fiscal introduce in evidence
Jose's signed extrajudicial confession. Do you think you have grounds to oppose the
admission of the confession? Briefly explain whatever your stand is, citing constitutional
provision and decisional doctrines. (1984 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The extrajudicial confession should be opposed as inadmissible, because:
- taken in violation of the right against self-incrimination, articulated in the decisions as the
Miranda rule and finally, specifically incorporated in the Bill of Rights of the present Constitution
under Sec. 20, Art. IV which provides that "no person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain silent and to ocunsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."
- the accused was already under custody whent the confession was taken; and the rule of the
decision is to follow strictly the procedure of fully informing the accused of his right to have
acounsel of his choice, that if he can't afford one then a counsel will be given him at no expense
on his part, that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says may be used against
him, which procedure was not complied with in this case;
- the bottom line is that the recourds should exhibit clear and intelligent waiver by tha accused of
his rights after having fully understood the sitation, which was not the situation in this case;
- the facts even show inducement, if not actual entrapment, as causing the confession, which falls
squarely within the purview of the phrase "or any other means which vitiates free will..."

At the trial of a rape case, the prosecution submitted in evidence a pair of pants which the
victim, in her testimony, identified as the very pair of pants left by the accused when he
hurriedly jumped from the window to escape rescuers who heard her cries for help while
being raped. When it was the accused’s turn to testify on his defense, the fiscal, on cross-
examination asked the accused to put on the pair of pants. The defense, objected, invoking
the right of the accused against self-incrimination. As Judge, would you sustain or overrule
the objection? Explain. (1986 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I would overrule the objection on the ground that he privilege is limited to testimonial self-
incrimination. In People v. Ostadora, 86 Phil. 224 (1950), the Court rejected a similar contention
and held: “Furthermore, and this is conclusive, ‘measuring or photographing the party is not within
the privilege’ (against self-incrimination), ‘Nor is the removal or replacement of his garments or
shoes. Nor is the requirement that the party move his body to enable the foregoing things to be
done.’ (Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 4, p. 878, quoted in Beltran vs. Samson and Jose, 53 Phil., 57,
576).”

Right Against Involuntary Servitude

Mabagal, a court stenographer, transfers to the Far East Bank before she can finish
transcribing stenographic notes taken during the intestate proceedings in the Cebu Regional
Trial Court. The Court of Appeals, where the RTC decision was elevated, orders Mabagal’s
arrest and detention for ignoring the court’s repeated orders to submit the transcript of
stenographic notes. Mabagal files a habeas corpus petition with the Supreme Court stating
that her small children are deprived of their mother’s care and that she is being subjected to
involuntary servitude, never having been charged, tried, or convicted of any crime. How
would you resolve the petition? Explain. (1986 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed. In a similar case, the Supreme Court held:
“Aclaracion’s contention that to compel him to transcribe his stenographic notes would constitute
involuntary servitude is not tenable. Involuntary servitude denotes a condition of enforced,
compulsory service of one to another (Hodges vs. U.S., 203 U.S. 1; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of
Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) or the condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or
imprisonment, and against his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid or not (Black’s Law
Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 961). That situation does not obtain in this case. Also untenable is
Aclaracion’s argument that the imprisonment of a stenographer who had defied the court’s
resolution for the transcription if the notes constitute illegal detention. The incarceration of the
contemning stenographer is lawful because it is the direct consequence of his disobedience of a
court order.” (Aclaracion v. Gatmaitan, 64 SCRA 131, 134 (1975)).
Double Jeopardy
“X” was accused of Liber before the First Instance in 1975. After the arraignment, no further
proceedings were had because of the unavailability of prosecution witnesses. Finally, at the
trial on January 10, 1981, the complaining witness testified on direct examination. However,
on February 15, 1981, the day set for his cross-examination, the complainant failed to appear.
The Court sustained the defense’s objection to the postponement, dismissed the case, but
qualified the dismissal as “provisional”.
The next day, the Fiscal moved for reconsideration of the Order of dismissal on the ground
that the complainant was not able to attend the trail because he was delayed by the traffic.
The Court reconsidered Order and reset the case for trial.
Is the Order reinstating the case valid? Reasons. (1981 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The order reinstating the case is valid. In the first place, the reinstatement of the case would not
place the accuse in double jeopardy because the dismissal of the case was only provisional. In the
second place, the failure of the prosecution to proceed with the hearing on February 15, 1981 was
excusable, the complainant, who was testifying, having been held up by traffic. In People v.
Surtida, 43 SCRA 29 (1972) the failure of the prosecution to proceed with the hearing of a case
because the fiscal and the witnesses had to come from Angeles City, while trial was held in San
Fernando, Pampanga, and the traffic was heavy, was held by the Supreme Court to be excusable.
For this reason it ordered the reinstatement of the criminal case on the ground that the prosecution
was entitled to due process as much as the defense. It does not appear, however, that the time it
has taken to try the case was due to the failure of the prosecution. Nor does it appear that the accuse
objected to the delay if it was due to requests for postponement by the prosecution. The only time
he objected was to the motion for postponement on February 5, 1981 which, as already stated, is
due to an excusable reason.
An alternative answer is that provisional dismissal is a final disposition of the case and that the
reinstatement of the case would place the accused in double jeopardy. (Esmesa v. Pogoy, L-54110,
February 20, 1981)

Ex Post Facto Law

Explain and give an example of ex post facto law. (1977 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
An ex post facto law is “one which (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of
the law and which was innocent when done and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or
makes greater than it was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of
evidence, and authorizers conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in
effect imposes of penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful;
and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.”
An enactment which gives a criminal character to conduct which when performed was not
criminal, is an ex post facto law.

Bill Of Attainder.
Explain and give an example of bill of attainder. (1977 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Historically,
bills of attainder were used to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities. A statute which
convicts an individual or punishes him for a crime without a judicial trial is a bill of attainder.

Bill Of Attainder.
“A”, a public official, is charged with violation of Anti-Graft law committed before the
creation by a presidential decree of the Sandigan Bayan which the Constitution requires to
be created by the National Assembly, the Constitution giving it the power to hear and decide
criminal cases against public officials. As constituted, the Sandigan is composed three
justices, whose decision is appealable direct and only to the Supreme Court. “A” challenges
the jurisdiction and authority of the Sandigan over him. He contends that if applied to him,
the presidential decree creating the Sandigan, providing for its composition, and defining its
powers and jurisdiction in accordance with Constitution, would be in the nature of an ex post
facto law, the crime having been committed before the Sandigan was created but after the
1973 Constitution took effect. Accordingly, he contends that his case should be tried in Court
of First Instance which had jurisdiction of the crime at the time of its commission, and whose
decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals, and if necessary, to the Supreme Court,
thereby giving him more remedies and greater protection to his advantage. Decide on the
question raised. (1979 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It is generally held that a procedural rule cannot be considered an ex post facto law, which refers
only to penal matters. This was the view affirmed rather inconclusively in the case of People v.
Vilo. However, in the earlier case of U.S. vs. Gomez Coronel, an amendment of a procedural law
allowing the fiscal to file an information for adultery which before could be initiated only by the
offended spouse was held to be ex post facto.

Bill of Attainder
A municipal ordinance required every municipal employee, as a condition for continued
employment, to take an oath of loyalty which included an affirmation that during the period
of five (5) years immediately preceding the effectivity of the ordinance, he had not advocated
or taught the overthrow of the government by force and that he had not, during the said
period belonged to any organization advocating or teaching such doctrine. “X” who refused
to take oath, was dismissed. He challenges the constitutionality of the ordinance on the
ground that it is a bill of attainder. Is his contention tenable? Reason. (1982 BAR EXAM)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The municipal ordinance in question constitutes a bill of attainder because it condemns without
judicial trial those who in the past advocated or taught the overthrow of the government or
affiliated with groups advocating or teaching such doctrine. This case is to be distinguished from
Garner vs. Board of Public Works, 341 US 716 (1951) because there the ordinance did not punish
past conduct. While the ordinance also referred to the advocacy or teaching of government
overthrow during the past five (5) years prior to the effectivity of the ordinance in 1948, the
ordinance did no more than implement an earlier (1941) amendment to the City Charter of Los
Angeles which disqualified from public employment any person who advised, advocate or taught
the violent overthrow of the Government or became affiliated with any group doing so. As the US
Supreme Court said in upholding the ordinance.

“In our view of the validity of the oath turns upon the nature of the Charter amendment (1941) and
the relation of the ordinance (1948) to this amendment. Immaterial here is any opinion we might
have as to the Charter provision insofar as it purported to apply retrospectively for a five-year
period prior to its effective date. We assume that under the Federal Constitution the Charter
amendment is valid to the extent that it bars from the city’s public service persons who, subsequent
to its adoption in 1941, advise, advocate, or teach the violent overthrow of the Government or who
are or become affiliated with any group doing so.

The provisions operating thus prospectively were a reasonable regulation to protect the municipal
service by establishing an employment qualification of loyalty to the State and the United States.
C.f. Gerende vs. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 US 56. Likewise, as a regulation of
political activity of municipal employees, the amendment was reasonably designed to protect the
integrity and competence of the services… Petitioners rely heavily upon United States vs. Lovett
328 US 303, in which a legislative act effectively separating certain public servants from their
positions was held to be a bill of attainder. Unlike the provisions of the Charter and ordinance
under which petitioners removed, the statue in the Lovette case did not declare general and
prospectively operative standards of qualification and eligibility for public employment. Rather,
by its terms it prohibited any further payment of compensation to named individual employees.
Under these circumstances, viewed against the legislative background. The statue was held to have
imposed penalties without judicial trial.”
Rather the ordinance in the problem resembles more the provision in the Missouri Reconstruction
Constitution which required persons to take an oath of loyalty as prerequisite to the practice of a
profession. In Cummings vs. Missouri, 4 Wall 277, a Catholic priest was convicted for teaching
and preaching without taking an oath that he had not given aid or comfort to persons engaged in
hostility against the United States and had never been a member of any organization inimical to
the government. The provision was invalidated as a bill of attainder.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
We suggest that credit be given for an answer similar to the following: NO. The law does not single
out any specified or named person or group. It merely imposes qualifications and disqualifications
for the holding of an office or employment which are general and prospective. This is within the
competence of a local legislative body clothed with the authority to create an office to provide.
Trial in Absentia

Charged with the crime of murder, A entered a plea of not guilty. He was thereupon granted
bail. Due to his failure to appear at the trial, despite due notice, the court proceeded with the
reception of the prosecution’s evidence and thereafter rendered a judgement of conviction.
On appeal, A sought to set aside the judgement of conviction on the ground, among others,
that while the crime charged was a capital offense, the trial was conducted and terminated
by the court in his absence. Is A’s contention tenable? Reason. (1982 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A’s contention is untenable. The Constitution specifically states in Art. IV, Sec 19 that “after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified.” In the case at bar, A was arraigned and duly
notified of the trial but without any justifiable reason, he failed to appear. He thereby waived the
right to be present, and the court was justified in conducting a trial in absentia. Indeed, the
constitutional provision makes no distinction whether the offense charged is capital or otherwise.
While the rule before was that a person in custody or charged with a capital offense must be present
as a matter of duty during trial, it was modified in Aquino vs Military Commission 63 SCRA 546
except where this is required for purposes of enabling witnesses to identify him.

Citizenship

Filipino citizens
Who are citizens of the Philippines under the New Constitution? (1977 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1.) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the constitution.
2.) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizen of the Philippines.
3.) Those who elect Philippine Citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
4.) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

The Duties and Obligations of Citizens

What ate the duties and obligations of citizens under the New Constitution? (1977 BAR
EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The following are duties and obligations of citizens under the New Constitution:

1. It shall be the duty of the citizen to be loyal to the Republic and to honor the Philippine flag,
to defend State and contribute to its development and welfare, to uphold the constitution and
obey the laws, and to cooperate with the duly constituted authorities in the attainment and
 preservation of a just and orderly society.
2. The rights of the individual impose upon him the correlative duty to exercise them responsibly
and with due regard for the rights of others.
3. It shall be the duty of every citizen to engage in gainful work to assure himself and his family
a life worthy of human dignity.

Natural-Born Citizen
Who is a natural born citizen? (1977 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippine from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Loss and re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship

In what ways may Philippine citizenship be lost? (1977 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the following ways and/or events; 1.) By
naturalization in a foreign country, 2.) By express renunciation of citizenship; 3.) By subscribing
to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining
twenty-one years of age or more ;Provided how-ever , That a Filipino may not divest himself of
Philippine citizenship in any manner while the Republic of the Philippines is at war with any
country;4.) By rendering service to or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the republic
of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present :a)The Republic of
the Philippines has a defensive and/or b.) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on
Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines;5.) By cancellation of the
certificate of naturalization; 6.)By having been declared by competent authority a deserter of the
Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been
granted , and 7.) in case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner and by her act or omission
she is deemed under the law to have renounced her citizenship.

Natural-Born
(a) “H” was employed as assistant cashier in a government-owned corporation. Because of
irregularities in the performance of his duties, he was charged administratively with
gross negligence and misconduct prejudicial to the interests of his employer. During the
hearings in the administrative case “H” was suspended from office. At the conclusion of
the hearings, a decision was reached to dismiss him from the service. He was, in fact,
dismissed.
While the hearings in the administrative case were on-going, he was also charged in
Court for Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents in relation to the same conduct
then under investigation administratively. After his dismissal case acquitting him of the
offense charged based on reasonable doubt.
“H” then filed a ase in Court against his former employer for reinstatement alleging as
 a basis thereof his acquittal in the criminal case.
Will his complaint for reinstatement prosper?
(b) Would a law requiring that only natural-born Filipino citizens may be eligible for
membership in the Board of Directors of domestic commercial banks be constitutionally
valid? (1980 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) “H’s” complaint for reinstatement cannot prosper. While the evidence against him may not
be sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt his guilt, it may be adequate to prove his
liability for purposes of the administrative case. It is noteworthy that his acquittal in the
criminal case is based not on a finding of innocence but on reasonable doubt.
(b) The law is unconstitutional as a denial of the equal protection. As held in Chan Tek Law v.
Republic, 55 SCRA 1 (1974), “a naturalized citizen is entitled to similar treatment as a
native-born citizen ecept where the Charter itself provides otherwise.” In Baumgartner v.
United States, 322 US 66 (1944), Justice Frankfurter wrote for the Court that “under the
American constitution a naturalized citizen stands on equal footing with a native citizen in
all respects save that of eligibility to the Presidency.” In that case of the Philippines
Constitution, natural born citizenship is required only for members of the National Assembly
(and therefore the President and prime Minister since they are elected from among the
members of the Assembly), the members of the judiciary, and those of the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. Consequently,
no law may require natural born citizenship with respect to other positions, much less with
respect to private offices or business.
However, examinees may also answer that there is no basis for the classification in the law
between natural born and naturalized citizen for purposes of directorship in domestic
commercial banks. Such a classification is violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.

Modes of Acquiring Citizenship

How may an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen acquire citizenship? (1975 BAR
EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
She must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among
other things, that she is not disqualified from acquiring citizenship pursuant to Sec. 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. The petition must be accompanied by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and
her husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to the group of disqualified persons,
and must be filed with the Bureau of Immigration. (Moi Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of
Immigration, L-21289, Oct. 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 292)

Loss and re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship

(a) “B”, a natural born citizen lost his Filipino citizenship when he enlisted with the Russian
 Navy. He reacquired it by administrative naturalization proceedings. May he be elected
to the National Assembly?
(b) “A”, Justice of the Court of Appeals, requested and was allowed by the President to take
an oath of office under the new Constitution but without the need of a new appointment,
just to strengthen his sense of security in office. A new President comes to office, may he
appoint another in place of “A” under the provision of the Constitution that an
incumbent judge or justice may continue in office until his successor is appointed by the
President?
(c) If the President does not exercise his power under this provision within 3 years, may he
not be deemed to have voluntarily renounced said power in the interest of the
independence of the judiciary? (1979 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) He may not be elected to the National Assembly where natural born citizenship is required.
As defined in Art. II, Sec. 4, of the Constitution, a natural-born is one who is a citizen of the
Philippines at birth without having to perform any to acquire or perfect his citizenship. In this
case, he had to perform an affirmative act to become a Filipino again.

One view is that the citizenship acquired is the old natural-born status. It is submitted,
however, that he is now a citizen not by virtue of his birth but as a result of a positive act of
repatriation.

(b) Two possible answers:

1. No, because the new President is not the “incumbent President” referred to in Art. XVII of the
Constitution. As held in Aquino vs. COMELEC, the phrase refers exclusively to Ferdinand E.
Marcos, who was the incumbent President of the Philippines when the Constitution became
effective in January 17, 1973.
2. No, because the new President will not assume the powers of the President-Prime Minister
and will only exercise the functions enumerated in Art. VII, Sec. 6, of the Constitution.
3. No, because non-user will not result in forfeiture of the power nor does the Constitution
prescribe a time for its exercise. He may choose not to exercise his power but may not
renounce it.

In 1974, “A”, a Filipina, and “B”, an Australian, were married in Manila. Immediately
thereafter the took up resident in Australia where “A” found employment as secretary to the
president of the Bank of Australia. During her residence in Australia, “A” never paid income
taxes to the Philippine government. In 1975, a son, “C”, was born to “A” and “B”. In October
1980, “X”, “C”’s uncle in the Philippines, donated to “C” a parcel of land located in Bulacan.
The deed of donation and the certificate of title were presented for registration to the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan, but the latter refused registration and the issuance of a transfer
certificate of title in the name of “C” on the ground that the latter is not a Filipino citizen. Is
such refusal by the Register of Deeds tenable? Reason. (1982 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the refusal of the Register of Deeds is untenable. C is a Filipino citizen, being the son of A
who is a Filipina. Article III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution provides “that a female citizen of the
Philippines who marries an alien shall retain her citizenship unless by her act or omission she is
deemed under the law, to have renounced her citizenship.” There is nothing in the question to
indicate that A, the mother of C, in any way renounced her Philippines citizenship. Her marriage
to an Australian citizen, without more, did not result in the loss of her Philippine citizenship.
Commonwealth Act No. 63, Sec (17), providing for the loss of citizenship of a Filipina woman
who marries a foreigner if by the laws of her husband’s country she is deemed to have acquired
his nationality, must be deemed modified by the new Constitution.

In connection with the reorganization of the judiciary, the President receives information
that Dayuhan should not be appointed Regional Trial Court Judge because he is not a
natural born citizen. Dayuhan was born out of wedlock in 1940 to a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother, both of whom were single at that time. In 1946, the parents were legally
married thus legitimating him and giving him, under Civil Code, all rights of legitimate
children effective from the time of his birth. On the advise of well-meaning friends, Dayuhan
elects Philippine citizenship upon reaching majority age. Is Dayuhan a natural born citizen?
Explain. (1986 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Dayuhan is a natural born citizen of the Philippines within the contemplation of Art. III, Sec. 4 of
the 1973 Constitution, considering that he was born out of wedlock of a Filipino mother and does
not have to do any act in order to acquire or prefect Philippine citizenship. Thus, in In re Mallare,
59 SCRA 45 (1974) it was held: “Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is
therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would necessary to confer on him all the rights and
privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 322; Santos Co vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy
Quimsan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954).
Neither could any act taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the
citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled.”
The subsequent marriage of his parents while he is still a minor, while conferring on him all the
rights of legitimate children effective from birth, did not in any way change his Philippine
citizenship at birth, since citizenship is a political and not a civil status.

Election of Citizenship

X was born in 1961 of an English father and a Filipino mother. Upon reaching the age of 21
years in 1982, he went to the Phil. Embassy in London and asked for a Philippine passport,
claiming that he automatically had become a Filipino citizen under the new Philippine
constitution.
Is the position of X valid? Explain. (1983 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Pursuant to article IV, section 1 (3), X must elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority. In accordance with Com. Act No. 625, he must sign and swear to a statement
expressing his election of Philippine citizenship and send such statement, together with an oath of
allegiance, to the Civil Registrar of Manila. Since X is in London, he may make the statement
before any officer of the Philippine Embassy there authorized to administer oath. The provision of
Article IV, sec. 1 (1) that those whose fathers or mothers are themselves citizens of the Philippines
does not apply to X. This provision applies only to those born of such parents after January 17,
1973 when the new Constitution came into force and effect.

Suffrage

Consitutional Provisions
What are the constitutional provisions on suffrage? (1977 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Suffrage shall be exercised by citizens of Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are
eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year
and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six month preceding the election. No
literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
The National Assembly shall provide a system for the purpose of securing the secrecy of the vote.

C. Legislative Department

Legislative Power
A. Distinguish:
1.Constituent power from legislative power
2Political question from justiciable question

B. The President proposes amendments to the Constitution providing in substance, for the
reversion from the Parliamentary to the Presidential system of government and calls a
referendum, appropriating funds therefor, in which to submit said proposals to the people
for ratification. X, a citizen and a taxpayer, challenges before the Supreme Court the
presidential acts aforesaid claiming that the propsed amendments will only resurrect the
evils of the Old Society and that a referendum plebiscite is not the proper method for
ratification. In turn, the SolGen contends that X has not standing to bring the action, that
the issue is political and not justiciable, and that the President does not have any power to
prepare amendment to the Constitution. Decide with reasons.

C. What is meant by constitutional authoritarianism? Is it compatible with the

constitutionally declared principle that the Phils is a Republican State? (1976 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. 1. Constituent power is the power to make or amend the Fundamental Law. Legislative
power, on the other hand, is essentially lawmaking power. It is the power to make laws and
to alter and to repeal them. A general grant of legislative power to the legislature under the
Constitution does not include the grant of constituent power.
 2.The term political question connotes a question of policy. It refers to those questions
which, under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislature or
executive branch of the government. Hence, political questions are beyond judicial
cognizance. Judicial authority over a case involving political question extends no further
than to dismiss it for want of jurisdiction. A justiciable question, on the other hand, refers
to one which calls for the full exercise of judicial power. Courts decide such questions on
the merits. The question of validity or legality of the assumption and exercise of powers, as
well as the allocation of power, that calls for the application or interpretation and
construction of the provisions of the constitution is a legal or justiciable question.

B. X has locus standi to bring this action. The action question the validity of a decree which
appropriate funds. Its purpose is to prohibit the disbursement of such funds. If the decree is
unconditional there will a misapplication of funds. A taxpayer like X has therefore a
substantial interest in prohibiting an illegal expenditure of public funds.
The issue raised is legal and justiciable. Since the constitution provides how it may be
amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that constitution, can declare whether the
procedure followed or the authority assumed in proposing amendment thereto is valid or
not.

C. constitutional authoritarianism is a form of government wherein all the political powers of

the government are by constitution vested in and to be exercised by a single official or ruler.
Since a republican state is one where sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanate from them and since it is the people themselves – in adopting their
constitution – who provided for a constitutional authoritarian government therein, there is
then no incompatibility between constitutional authoritarianism and the principle of
republicanism.

Budgetary Power
In the past, members of our old Congress, used to allocate to themselves so-called
congressional allowances which met with popular disfavor due to their scandalous
proportions. What precautionary measures are now provided for in the New Constitution
in order to prevent such pernicious practice? Explain. (1978 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Although the New Constitution (Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII), unlike the 1935 Constitution, does not
prohibit the grant of allowances, per diems and travelling expenses to its members, the following
provisions are made to safeguard against abuses in the grant therefore:
1. The records and books of accounts of the National Assembly shall be open to the public in
accordance with law;
2. Such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually the
itemied expenditures for each member. ( Sec. 8 (2), Art. VIII).

Moreover, under Sec. 16(3) of the Art VIII, the procedure in approving appropriations for the
National Assembly shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other
departments and agencies. A discussion on the floor of appropriations for such allowances is
 itself a safeguard against abuse in the grant thereof.
One who has intruded upon the office and assumes to exercise its functions without either the
lawful title ( like a de jure officer ) or the color or right to it ( like a de facto officer) is an intruder
or usurper. His acts are void unlike

Party-list system; turncoatism

(a) It has been said that the “virus of turncoatism” was remedied in the 1973 Constitution.
Cite and explain the novel and innovative provision in that Constitution by which this was
effected.
(b) Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, in calling for the election of provincial officials in each province
classified the chartered cities based on the annual regular income of each city, and provided
that the “registered voter of a component city may be entitled to vote in the election of the
officials of the province of which tat city is a component, if its charter provides,” but that
“voters registered in a highly urbanized city, shall not participate nor vote in the election of
the officials of the province in which the highly urbanized city is geographically located.”
Taxpayers and voters of a “highly urbanized” city assailed the constitutionality of such
provision for being a denial of the equal protection clause, and an infringement on the right
of suffrage.
Is their contention tenable? (1980 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Art. XII, C, Sec 10 provides that “No elective public officer may change his political party
affiliation during the term of office, and no candidate for any elective public office may change
his political party affiliation within six months immediately preceding or following an election.”
The 1973 Constitution thus puts a stop to the rather common practice of candidates of changing
parties for political convenience or advantage and seeks to preserve the two-party system.
(b) The classification of cities is based on substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show
whether it is capable of independent existence. Cities with smaller incomes need the continued
support of the provincial government. It is true that there are cities which are classified as
component cities whose charters do not allow their voters to participate in provincial elections,
while other component cities have charters which allow their voters to do so, but this difference in
treatment is a matter of legislative discretion. Highly urbanized cities are independent of the
province in the administration of their affairs. Such being the case, it is just and proper to limit the
selection and election of provincial officials to the voters of the province whose interest are
affected and exclude the voters of highly urbanized cities.
As for the contention that the classification in the statute is an infringement on the right of suffrage,
it has been held that the prohibition against the imposition of burden on the right of suffrage refers
to such irrelevant requirements as the poll tax or the requirement that one must be a parent to be
eligible to vote in a school district election. It has no application to a case like this where the
disfranchisement of voters is the result of the incorporation of their municipality into a city.
(Ceniza v. COMELEC, No. 52304, Jan. 30, 1980, 95 SCRA 763).

Batasang Pambansa
May the Batasang Pambansa repeal the decrees issued by the incumbent President pursuant
to his law-making power under amendment No. 6? Explain fully. (1982 BAR EXAMS)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It is unclear from the problem whether the reference is truly to the “incumbent President” as this
phrase is used in the Transitory Clause (Art. XVII, Sec. 3 (2) or to the “President (Prime Minister)”
mentioned in Amendment No. 6.

If the reference is to the Transitory Clause, then the regular Batasang Pambansa can repeal the
decree. Art. XVII, Sec. 3 (2) expressly provides that ‘the proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the
law of the land and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective even after the lifting of martial
law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent President or unless
expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly [Batasang
Pambansa].” As held in Aquino v. COMELEC, 62 SCRA 275 (1975), the phrase “incumbent
President” has reference to President Marcos alone and to the decreed, orders, etc. referred to
which he issued under martial law.

On the other hand, if what is meant by the problem is the “President (Prime Minister)” in
Amendment No. 6, which was construed recently in Legaspi v. Minister of Finance, No. 58289,
July 24, 1982 as referring to whoever is the President and not solely to President Marcos, as the
phrase “incumbent President”, then it is submitted that the Batasang Pambansa may also repeal
any decree issued by the President notwithstanding the absence of an express provisions, in the
same way that under Art. VIII, sec. 15, Batasang Pambansa may withdraw the grant of emergency
power to the President. To hold that the BP has no power to repeal the decrees issued by the
President would be to overlook the fact that the grant of legislative power to him under Amendment
No. 6 is premised on the existence of an emergency preventing the BP from acing immediately
upon the matter of legislation. Consequently, if the BP has since been able to act on the matter, I
should be allowed to exercise the legislative power which after all is primarily vested in it by the
Constitution and the grant of the power to the President is only exceptional. Moreover, to contend
that the BP cannot repeal such decrees is to disregard the principle against the passage of
irrepealable laws, not to mention the fact that if for any reason the President who issued the decree
is unable to act (because of death, permanent disability, etc.) there may be no authority to amend,
modify or repeal the decrees which he has issued, should this become immediately necessary.

Legislature power over Property of Municipal Corporation

Does the legislature have control over property belonging to municipal corporations?
Explain. (1982 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The legislature has control of all properties of Municipal Corporation insofar as the regulation of
their use is concerned. Thus, the legislature may define what property of a municipal corporation
is for public use and what may be considered as its patrimonial property and then subject these
two kinds of properties to different regulations. But the legislature cannot authorize the taking of
patrimonial properties of municipal corporations without due process of law. For instance, it was
held that the National Waterworks and Sewerage Administration could not take over the
waterworks system of the City of Baguio without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and
without the payment of just compensation. (City of Baguio v. NAWASA, 106 Phil. 144) (1959)

Assemblyman cannot appear as Counsel

On May 10, 1981, P filed in the City Court an action for damages against D. After trial, the
court rendered judgement in favor of P and against D. on appeal to the Court of First
Instance, Assemblyman X ( a member of the Btasang Pambansa) entered his appearance as
counsel for D. P challenges X’s appearance on the ground that under the Constitution he is
barred from appearing before Courts Of First Instance Resolve P’s challenge. (1982 BAR
EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
P’s challenge should be dismissed. Assemblyman X is not disqualified from appearing as counsel
for D in the Court of First Instance considering that the case is there pending in exercise of the
Court’s appellate jurisdiction. In Villegas v. Legaspi, L-53869 & L-51982, it was held that the
disqualification of the Assemblymen in Art. VIII, Sec. 11 of the Constitution (1973) is intended to
remove any possibility of undue influence upon the administration of justice, to eliminate the
possible use of office for personal gain, to ensure impartiality in trials and thus preserve the
independence of the Judiciary. The possible influence of an Assemblyman on a single judge of the
Court of First Instance is definitely diminished where the courts acts in the exercise of its appellate,
instead of original jurisdiction. The upper hand that the party represented by an Assemblyman by
virtue of his office possesses is more felt and could be more feared in original cases because the
decision appealed from in the latter situation has already a presumption not only of regularity but
also of correctness in its favor.

One Bill, One Subject

By law passed by the Batasang Pambansa, the Courts are directed to fix as the just
compensation for property expropriated by the Government either the assessed value of the
land by the owner, or the market value whichever is the lesser amount. The law is entitled:
“Assessment Law of 1979”. “A”, owner of a property expropriated by the Government
contests the legality of the provision referred to, alleging that the same is not expressed in
the title of the law, nor is it germane to the subject matter thereof. He contends further that
fixing just compensation is a matter of judicial power, not legislative. Decide on the merit of
the contentions.
(b) Spouses “A” and “B” donated a piece of land to a Government bureau with a condition
attached to the deed of donation that said bureau “shall install lighting and water facilities
and construct a building and parking lot therein”. The bureau having failed to comply with
the condition, the spouses filed a suit for revocation. The court dismissed the suit because the
State cannot be sued without its consent. This decision of the Court was appealed to the
Supreme Court. Decide. (1979 BAR EXAM)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Yes, under Art. VIII, Sec 19, par. 1, of the Constitution since the title of the bill is not supposed
to be a catalogue or index of all the contents of the measure. The title in the problem is not
enough to alert the people to the possible scope thereof, which could reasonably include rues
on the proper valuation of expropriated lands.
This measure is valid insofar as it prevents the owner from disowning his own sworn
declaration or allow actual value of the property to be determined by the court on the basis
of relevant factors, conformably to the formula devised by the legislature.
(b) This is the case of Santiago vs. Republic of the Philippines, where it was held that violation
of the conditional donation imported a presumed waiver of the immunity of the State from
suit. Moreover, the claim could have been filed with Commission on Audit under C.A. No.
327 as it was not a money claim.

Limitations on revenue, appropriations, and tariff measures

The Social Security Act specifically covers religious organizations. Such inclusion is
assailed on the ground that it violates the constitutional prohibition against appropriation
of public funds for the benefit of priest who may be employed by the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, since such priest or their beneficiaries will be the recipients of
retirement, disability, or death benefit from the system. Is the argument meritorious?
Why? (1975 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The funds contributed to the Social Security System are not public funds but are funds
belonging to the members which are merely held in trust by the Government. Even assuming such
funds are impressed with a public character, nevertheless, their payment by the way of retirement,
death or disability benefits would not violate the constitutional prohibition against the use of public
funds for the benefit of priest employed by religious organizations because their payment would
be made to the priests not as such but as any other employees . (Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila v. Social Security Commission, L-15045, Jan. 20, 1961, 1 SCRA 10)

Limitations on revenue, appropriations, and tariff measures

A. Does the declaration of martial law necessarily suspend the constitutional right of a
person to bail?

B. Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 provides: In no case shall there
be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service,
persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or
contractors for public works of the municipality. On the other hand, both the 1973 and
1935 provides: no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed.
No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. Is the above
quoted provision of the Revised Administrative Code inconsistent with the above quoted
provisions of the 1935 and 1973 constitution? If so, how will you reconcile the provisions?
(1976 BAR EXAM )
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. Yes. Martial law includes the right to detain persons even without charges for act related to
the situation which justifies proclamation of the martial law. Moreover, implicit in a state of
martial law is the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus with respect to
persons arrested. The individual rights must yield to the more paramount right of the state to
defend and preserve itself.
B. No. neither the establishment of religion nor the free exercise clause of the constitution forbid
the legislature from prescribing general and prospectively operative standards for
qualifications and eligibility for basis. Therefore, the law implements separation of church and
state, which by constitutional mandate, must be inviolable.

Limitations on revenue, appropriations, and tariff measures

In the past, members of our old Congress, used to allocate to themselves so-called
congressional allowances which met with popular disfavor due to their scandalous
proportions. What precautionary measures are now provided for in the New Constitution in
order to prevent such pernicious practice? Explain. (1978 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Although the New Constitution (Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII), unlike the 1935 Constitution, does not
prohibit the grant of allowances, per diems and travelling expenses to its members, the following
provisions are made to safeguard against abuses in the grant therefore:
1. The records and books of accounts of the National Assembly shall be open to the public in
accordance with law;
2. Such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually the
itemied expenditures for each member. ( Sec. 8 (2), Art. VIII).

Moreover, under Sec. 16(3) of the Art VIII, the procedure in approving appropriations for the
National Assembly shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other
departments and agencies. A discussion on the floor of appropriations for such allowances is itself
a safeguard against abuse in the grant thereof.

Record Keeping
A bill was presented to the Batasang Pambansa providing for a uniform franchise tax of
3% of the gross earnings of electric and telephone utilities. The journal showed that the
Batasang Pambansa approved a tax of 5% of gross earnings, but the bill authenticated by
the Speaker and signed by the President showed that the tax was only 3%. The stenographic
notes of the proceedings indicated that the motion increase the tax to 5% was voted down.

As the Bureau of Internal Revenue was collecting a tax at 5%, the franchise holders
questioned the assessment. The Speaker and the President declined to comment and issued
statements that they were leaving the matter to the Courts.

Decide the case giving reasons. (1981 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The franchise holders cannot be made to pay more than 3% of their gross earning as provided by
law, and as shown by the enrolled copy of the bill which the President signed into law. The
enrolled copy of the bill imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. In Casco Phil.
Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 117 Phil 363 (1963), the statute fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on
foreign exchange transactions except with respect to the importation of urea formaldehyde. But
a resolution of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank granted exemption from the payment of
the fee in case of separate importation of urea and formaldehyde. The auditor general refused to
approve the exemptions pursuant to this resolution, prompting the petitioner to raise the question
to the Supreme Court.Petitioner contended that the bill approved in Congress granted exemption
to “urea and formaldehyde” as separate elements. It argued that the intention of congress was to
exempt these essential elements, rather than the finished product. The Supreme Court that the
enrolled copy of the bill, which used the term “urea formaldehyde” was conclusive. If there was
a mistake in the printing, it was pointed out, the remedy was by amendment or curative legislation,
not by judicial decree.

It is true that in Astoraga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974), the journal was relied upon in
determining whether the bill which the President had signed into law was approved by Congress,
and as the journal showed that the bill did not embody did not embody the amendments of the
Senate, the Court held the statute never to have become a law. It is to be noted, however, that in
that case, the President of the Senate, upon discovering that the enrolled copy of the bill did not
contain the Senate amendments, invalidated his signature and, when the Presidnet of the
Philippines was informed, he in turn withdrew his signature. There was, therefore, no enrolled
bill to consider in that case. Thus, the question in the Astoraga case is different, namely whether
the bill became a law. On the other hand, the question here is which of the two conflicting versions
is correct. Necessarily, the one certified by the presiding officer of the Batasang Pambansa must
control.

However, credit may be given to an answer that the journal entries should prevail over the
enrolled copy of the bill on the basis of the statement in Astoraga v. Villegas that the journal is a
document required by the Constitution to be kept by the legislature.

Taxing Power
Some years ago, the B.I.R. has started to disallow the benefits of tax deduction enjoyed by
the head of the family, beginning with a fourth dependent and up, in line with the
government’s family planning program. Furthermore, contraceptives for the prevention of
birth are being encouraged by the government and distributed for free by public hospitals
and clinics. Catholic families strongly protest against this state policy and practice on the
grounds that it is not only discriminatory but also offensive to religious beliefs and violative
of the natural law which prohibit birth control of the human specie. How would you resolve
this controversy? Reason out you answer. (1975 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Such disallowance of a tax deduction by the B.I.R. to a head of family beginning with a fourth
dependent and up is invalid. There is nothing in the problem which says that the B.I.R. has acted
pursuant to law. On the contrary, the existing law (The Income Law Tax) allows such deduction.
If indeed it is in line with the government’s family planning program, such must be embodied in a
statute and the B.I.R. cannot, without any authority of law or in derogation of it, disallow such
deduction as a means to carry out that program.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER
On the assumption that there is such a law, the said statute is valid not only as a reasonable measure
to control population explosion which, in turn, may bring about serious economic and social
problems under the police power of the state and more specifically in compliance with Section 10
of Article XV of the New Constitution which provides: “It shall be the responsibility of the State
to achieve and maintain population levels most conducive to national welfare.” The right to
religious freedom and of beliefs is not absolute. Its exercise is subject to the dominant police power
of the State.

Taxing Power
An American citizen, at one time a civilian employee of an American corporation providing
technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines, was assessed by the
BIR and had to pay the income tax due for the proceeds of the sale of his automobile to a
member of the U.S Marine Corp., the transaction having taken place in Clark Airbase in
Pampanga. It was his claim both with the CTA and thereafter, the Supreme Court, that he
was not liable for the tax as in legal contemplation, the sale was made out of the Philippine
territory. How would you decide the case. (1978 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
He is liable to pay income tax due from the proceeds of the sale of his automobile made inside
Clark Airbase in Pampanga. The Clark Airbase is not a foreign soil or territory for purposes of
income tax legislation. It is an integral part of the Philippine territory and subject to its sovereignty
and jurisdiction. True, under the military Bases Agreement, the Philippines has consented that
the United States exercise certain rights necessary for the use, operation and defense of the bases.
But the Philippines jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not excluding the power to tax have
been preserved. The “exemption clause” under the Military Bases Agreement does not apply in
this case because the income from the sale of the car is clearly derived in the Philippines.

Taxing Power
A law prohibiting the making and use of fake internal revenue stamps imposes as penalty a
“fine of not less than P10,000.00 or imprisonment of not less than one year” for violation
thereof.
“A” who was accused of violating the law, questioned the constitutionality thereof, claiming
that it imposes an excessive penalty. He contended that under said law, a Court can impose
a fine of as much as P1 Million pesos or imprisonment of twenty years because there is no
maximum penalty.
Decide the case, giving reasons. (1981 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The statute is unconstitutional not because the penalty it imposes is excessive but because it
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The prohibition against excessive fines must
take into account the nature of the offense. Here the making and use of fake internal revenue stamps
deprives the government of substantial revenue from taxation, and thus affects vital public
functions. On the other hand the ban on cruel or unusual punishment does not have reference to
the severity of the punishment but to its form. Even in those cases where the prohibition is held to
apply to the severity of the punishment, it has been held that the disparity between the offense and
the penalty must be such as to shock the moral sense of reasonable men before the penalty may be
considered cruel or unusual (People v. De la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906 (1953)). An imprisonment of one
year certainly cannot be said to be disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. Since a court may
impose the minimum penalty of fine of P10,000 or imprisonment of one year, the statute cannot
be said to impose an excessive penalty.
However, to the extent that the statute does not fix the maximum penalty for its violation there is
undue delegation of legislative power to the courts. In People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937), it was
held that “it is clearly within the province of the legislature to denominate and define all classes of
crime, and to prescribe for each a minimum and maximum punishment. . . . The legislative power
to set punishment for crime is very broad, and in the exercise of this power the general discretion
may confer on trial judges, if it see fit, the largest discretion as to the sentence to be imposed, as
to beginning and end of the punishment and whether it should be certain or indeterminate or
conditional.” a statute that does not fic the maximum penalty would, therefore, give unfettered
discretion to the judges and would constitute an abdication of the legislative power to prescribe
the penalty.

Non-Appropriation
A Barangay Counsil in Tawi- Tawi raised funds through donations for the construction of a
chapel and the purchase of religious paraphernalia. The exclusive use of the chapel was given
to a Catholic priest who said mass therein for the benefit of residents, most of whom are
dependents of military personnel assigned to a military camp in the barrio.
A Muslim questioned the expenditure as violative of the Constitution. Decide the case, giving
your reasons. (1981 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In Grace v. Estenzo, G.R No. 53487, May 25, 1981, the Supreme Court held that the purchase of
a religious image by the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City with the use of funds, raised
by means of solicitations and cash donations, did not violate either art. VIII, sec. 18 (2) which
prohibits the use of public money for the use, benefit or support of any church, nor art. IV, sec. 8
which prohibits the enactment of a law respecting an establishment of religion. The court held that
the image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. It further held that if there is
nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then
any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint cannot be illegal.
However, the construction of a chapel, even if the money used was raised not by taxation but only
solicitation, is a religious activity which cannot be undertaken by the barangay council. It has been
held that the Non- Establishment Clause prohibits “sponsorship, financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity” and that any statute (including a barangay
counsil resolution), to be valid, must pass three tests: (1) it must have a secular legislative purpose;
(2) Its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion and (3)
the statute must not foster excessive government entanglement with religion. (Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S 602 (1971)).
Tested by these criteria, the barangay council resolution constitutes a law respecting an
establishment of religion. By means of it the barangay council of Tawi-Tawi sponsors a religious
activity contrary to art. IV, sec. 8 and the principle of separation of church and state as expressed
in art. XV, sec. 15

Executive Department

Executive and administrative powers in general

Has the President (now Prime Minister) the authority to suspend the operation of any statue
or law? Why? (1975BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, because it is his duty to execute the law. However, he may be authorized by the Legislature
upon the occurrence of certain contingencies to suspend the operation of the law. Moreover, in a
martial law situation, the President exercises not only the executive power but also legislative
power and therefore may also suspend the operation of statutes.

Power of appointment
In 1958 Villaluz was appointed by the President of the Philippines as administrator of the Motor
Vehicles Office. In 1960 administrative charges were filed against him for mismanagement,
gross inefficiency, and negligence of the performance of his duties. After an investigation and
hearing, the President removed Villaluz and appointed Ponyo to take his place. Villaluz filed
an original petition in the Supreme Court seeking reinstatement of the ground that Civil
Service Commisioner and not the President of the Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate
and remove him. Is the contention meritorious? Why? (1975 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Petitioner, being a presidential appointee, belongs to the non-competitive or
unclassified service of the government and as such he can only be investigated and
removed from office after due hearing by the President, under the principle that “The power
to remove is inherent to the power to appoint” as can be clearly implied from Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 2260. The Civil Service Commissioner is without jurisdiction to hear
and decide the administrative charges against petitioner because the authority of the
commissioner to pass upon question of suspension, separation, or removal can only be
exercise with reference to permanent officials and employees in the classified service.
(Villaluz v. Saldivar, L-22754, Dec. 31, 1965, 15 SCRA 710)

Power of appointment
(a) “B”, a natural born citizen lost his Filipino citizenship when he enlisted with the Russian
Navy. He reacquired it by administrative naturalization proceedings. May he be elected
 to the National Assembly?
(b) “A”, Justice of the Court of Appeals, requested and was allowed by the President to take
an oath of office under the new Constitution but without the need of a new appointment,
just to strengthen his sense of security in office. A new President comes to office, may he
appoint another in place of “A” under the provision of the Constitution that an
incumbent judge or justice may continue in office until his successor is appointed by the
President?
(c) If the President does not exercise his power under this provision within 3 years, may he
not be deemed to have voluntarily renounced said power in the interest of the
independence of the judiciary? (1979 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) He may not be elected to the National Assembly where natural born citizenship is required.
As defined in Art. II, Sec. 4, of the Constitution, a natural-born is one who is a citizen of the
Philippines at birth without having to perform any to acquire or perfect his citizenship. In
this case, he had to perform an affirmative act to become a Filipino again.

One view is that the citizenship acquired is the old natural-born status. It is submitted,
however, that he is now a citizen not by virtue of his birth but as a result of a positive act
of repatriation.

(b) Two possible answers:

1. No, because the new President is not the “incumbent President” referred to in Art. XVII of
the Constitution. As held in Aquino vs. COMELEC, the phrase refers exclusively to
Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was the incumbent President of the Philippines when the
Constitution became effective in January 17, 1973.
2. No, because the new President will not assume the powers of the President-Prime Minister
and will only exercise the functions enumerated in Art. VII, Sec. 6, of the Constitution.
3. No, because non-user will not result in forfeiture of the power nor does the Constitution
prescribe a time for its exercise. He may choose not to exercise his power but may not
renounce it.

Power of Supervision
The Minister of Natural Resources affirmed the decision of the Director of Mines in a case
for specific performance of a mining contract filed by “A” against “B”. Instead of appealing
to the President, “B” the losing party, appealed to the Prime Minister, who reversed the
decision of the Minister of Natural Resources. Is the Prime Minister authorized under the
1981 amendments to the Constitution to review the decision of the Minister of Natural
Resources? Explain your answer. (1981 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Prime Minister has no authority under the constitution to reverse a decision of a head
of a cabinet, his authority being limited to supervision. (Const., art IX, sec. 10). There is a
distinction between supervision and control. Supervision means overseeing or to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer
to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter, (Mondano v. Silvosa,
97 Phil. 143 (1995)). Since a review of the decision of the Minister of natural Resources may call
for the substitution of his judgment, it is clear that such review can be exercised only by the
President who under article VII, sec. 8 is vested with the control of ministries.

Pardoning Power
In furtherance of the government’s policy of attraction to win over rebels in Mindanao, the
President extended executive clemency to several rebels being tried for violation of the anti-
subversion act and thereafter authorized their induction in the armed forces to help in the
pacification drive. Is this grant of clemency justifiable either as a pardon or an amnesty?

X, a practicing lawyer in the Phils received from his client the amount of 500 of a judgment
of ejectment against said client. X failed to deposit the amount in court. As a result the
judgment was executed and the client evicted from the apartment he was renting. The client
prosecuted X for estafa for failure to return the amount of 500 in spite of several demands
and was convicted. Later, the client filed disbarment proceedings against X based on his
criminal conviction of estafa. X asks for the dismissal of the disbarment proceedings against
him on the ground that he has already been pardoned by the Pres from the crime committed
against the client. Is X’s contention tenable?

X, Y, and Z were among those who participated in the raids against the authorities in the
South. In their raids, the rebels attacked even civilians along the way, burned their houses
and other valuable properties in order to restore normalcy in the area. Subsequently, the
Pres granted absolute amnesty to the rebels, among them X, Y, Z. May these civilians who
suffered losses because of the acts of the rebels go to court and sue those rebels responsible
for the loss and destruction of their property for damages? (1976 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1. This act of executive clemency may be justified as an amnesty because it was granted to a
group of offenders, for political offenses and before final conviction. As to the requirement of
concurrence of the national assembly, it may be stated that at this stage of the transition period
the President exercises not only executive and administrative powers but legislative power as
well. In fine, the power of the interim Batasang Pambansa to concur in the grant of amnesty
by the Pres must be deemed vested in the latter in this stage when the interim Batasang
Pambansa has not yet been convened and is not yet functioning.

2. It depends on the kind of a pardon extended to him. If the pardon is absolute X’s contention is
tenable. An absolute pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the
guilt of the offender, releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the
eyes of the law the offender is an innocent as if he had never committed the offense. An
absolute pardon wipes out the conviction, hence the ground for which his disbarment is sought
ceases to exist. On the other hand, if the pardon is conditional, only the punishment and the
resultant disabilities are affected subject to the conditions of the pardon. The conviction
 remains. Since the ground for disbarment is his conviction, X’s contention will not be tenable.

3. Yes. Amnesty does not extinguish the right of the offended party to enforce the civil liability
of the person benefited by the amnesty. The idea that amnesty wipes out the crime cannot be
carried to the extent of saying, for the purpose of depriving a person of a legal civil right to
which he was entitled that the criminal act never existed. The state, through a grant of amnesty,
cannot condone civil liability legally due to a private individual. It cannot give away what does
not legally belong to it.

Pardoning Power

a) May a person convicted by the trial court, and whose conviction is pending appeal, be
extended Presidential pardon? Explain.\
b) May a person, who has already served his sentence, be extended pardon? Explain. (1983
BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A) The following should be considered alternative SUGGESTED ANSWER::s:
a. Yes, considering that after the amendment of Art. VII, sec 11, conviction by final judgment is
no longer required for the exercise of the President’s pardoning power.
b. Although sec. 11 of Art VII deleted the original requirement for final conviction before pardon
can be extended, it is believed that the deletion was made because of the opinion held by some
that there was no necessity therefor since the assumption is that unless there is final conviction
there is no offense to be pardoned.

B) Yes, because the purpose of the pardon in such case is necessary to restore the convict to the
enjoyment of the right to hold public office or the right to suffrage which he may not otherwise
enjoy as a result of his conviction. As the Court held in Cristobal v. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34
(1940), “An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all
disabilities resulting from the conviction. . . . Imprisonment is not only punishment which the
law imposes upon those who violate its command, there are accessory and resultant
disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon
removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction.” This was reiterated in Pelobello v.
Palatino, 72 Phil 411 (1941)

Reprieve
The Court of First Instance of Rizal found “X” guilty of murder and imposed upon him the
death penalty. The sentence was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Upon the remand of the
case for execution on June 10, the trial court set the execution on June 10, 1980. On June 9,
1980, the President granted a reprieve ending on July 10, 1980.
On July 8, 1980, the trial court granted another reprieve of three months from July 10, 1980
in order to give the accused the opportunity to present evidence that the real murdered had
confessed and that his conviction was a case of mistaken identity.
Is the order of the trial court valid? Why? (1981 BAR EXAM)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It is submitted that the order granting reprieve is void. In People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 65
(1937)the court distinguished between reprieve and suspension of sentence. Reprieve is the
postponement of the execution of sentence to a day certain, while suspension is for an indefinite
time. The power to grant reprieve is conferred by the Constitution on the President (Art. VII, sec
11). It, therefore, cannot be exercised by the courts. What the latter may be authorized by statute
to exercise would be the power to suspend sentence by probation or otherwise. Furthermore, the
Court of First Instance of Rizal cannot suspend the sentence here since decision has become final
and executory and, therefore, it is beyond the power of the court to reopen the case.

Veto Power

The President of the Philippines went on a state visit to Malaysia. while there, he was
informed that five bills passed by the Batasang Pambansa had to be acted upon by him as
they had been submitted to him 29 days before. So, on the 30th day, he went to the Philippine
Embassy in Kuala Lumpur and vetoed one of the bills and approved three of the bills. The
fifth bill was neither vetoed nor signed into law.
(a) Was the veto by the President valid?
(b) Was the approval of the three bills valid?
(c) Did the fifth bill become a law?
Reason out each of your answer. (1981 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The veto is valid and effective. While art VIII, sec 20 (1) requires that the vetoed bill
should be returned to the Batasang Pambansa together with the President’s objections, so that if
the legislature wishes, it may reconsider the bill and repass it over the President’s veto by the vote
of two-thirds of all its members, this requirement may be complied with later, outside the thirty
day period provided in the Constitution.
(b) The approval of the three bills is valid. The Philippine Embassy in Malaysia is an
extension of Philippne Territory and certainly the President can sign the bills passed by the
Batasang Pambansa in that office.
(c) Yes, the fifth bill became a law pursuant to art VIII, sec. 20 (1) which provides that if
the President does not act on a bill passed by the Batasang Pambansa within thirty days after it is
presented to him, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.

Foreign Relations

[a] Cite the principal provisions of the Constitution which indicate and/or account for the
primacy of the President in foreign affairs.
[b] Does the President, acting solely on his authority, have the power to conclude a treaty
with Malaysia to drop the Philippine claim to Sabah as part of the Philippine territory?
Explain. (1983 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
[a] The primacy of President in foreign affairs is shown by the provisions of the Constitution
saying:
1. That he has the power to make treaties, even without concurrence of the Batasan (Sec.
10, Art XIV)
2. That he may contrast and guarantee loans, foreign and domestic, subject to limitations
provided for by law (Sec. 14, Art VII)
3. That he is the Chief Executive and Head of State (Sec. 1, Art. VII)
4. That he has the power to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, as
well as receive duly accredited ambassadors and other public ministers from other
countries (Art. VII, Sec. 1-, 1935 Constitution, in rel. Art. VII, Sec. 18, 1973
Constitution)
5. That he is the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces (Sec. 11, Art. VII)

[b] There seems to be two conflicting provisions on the matter whether or not the President alone
may conclude treaties. One provision of the Constitution says "no treaty shall be valid and
effective unless concurred by a majority of all the members of the Batasang Pambans" (Art.
VIII, Sec. 14 on powers of the Batasan). But then in another article on national economy
and patrimony of the nation, the contrary is expressly provided that the President alone "may
enter into international treaties or agreements as the national welfare and interest may require"
(Art. XIV, Sec. 16).
The dropping of Sabah as part of the Philippine territory is not a simple treaty matter, because it
would affect the constitutional definition of Philippine territory which expressly embraces "all
other territories belonging to the Philippines by historic right or legal title" (Art. I, Sec. 1).
On the other hand, the dropping of the claim may be in the "national welfare and interest" which
the President as the primary spokesman in foreign affairs may in his discretion uilaterally decide.
But it is more in consoncance with democratic tradition that frowns upon over concentration of
governmental powers, particularly on a matter as essential as the national territory, the Sabah claim
be subject to joint presidential-congressional action, at least. For there may even be the
constitutional need to submit the matter to a nature of a constitutional amendment to the national
territory clause.

President as Commander- in- Chief

What constitutional powers may be exercised or resorted to by the President to meet

emergency situations? Explain. (1985 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The President my exercise the following constitutional powers to meet and emergency: (1) As
Commander-in-Chief he may call out the armed forces to suppress lawless violence, invasion,
insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines under martial law. (Art.
VII, sec. 11) (2) Pursuant to Amendment 6, whenever in his judgment there exists a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the Batasang Pambansa fails or is unable
to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he
may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders , or letters of instructions,
which shall form part of the law of the land. (3) Pursuant to Art. VIII, sec. 15, “ In times of war or
other national emergency, the Batasang Pambansa my by law authorize the President for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, exercise powers necessary and proper
to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by the resolution of the Batasang
Pambansa, such powers shall cease upon its next adjournment. (See Legaspi v. Minister of
Finance, 115 SCRA 418 1982)

Immunity from Suit

[a] What is the scope of the President's immunity from suit?

[b] Does the said immunity cover within its protective mantle culpable violations of the
Constitution? Explain. (1984 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
[a] The President's immunity protects him from all suits " for official acts done by him or by others
pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure." (Sec. 17, Art. VII)
[b] No, the Constitution itself provides under the chapter on accountability of public officers that
the President and other important officials "shall be removed by impeachment for and conviction
of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery and other high crimes, or graft and
corruption" (Sec. 2, Art. XIII). The impeachment clause necessarily is an exception to the
presidential immunity clause.

Control Power

As stated in the Constitution, what power does the President have over the executive
departments/ministries as distinguished from his power over provincial, city and municipal
governments? Compare and contrast these two powers. (1984 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under the 1973 Constitution " The President shall have control of the ministries." The 1935
Constitution, in relation to and as made applicable by the 1973 Constitution (Art. VII, Sec. 18)
provides: "The President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus or offices...' (Art.
VII, Sec. 10-1)In respect to local governments, the 1935 Constitution, again in relation to and as
made applicable by the 1973 Constitution, provides: "the President shall . . . exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law . . ."

In administrative law, "supervision" means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to

see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties"
(Mondano vs. Silvosa 97 Phil. 143)

In administrative law, "control" on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter, modify,
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."
Judicial Department

Powers of Supreme Court

(a) “G”, a Filipino citizen resident of and property owner in Davao City, believing that the
President of the Philippines may not propose amendments to the Constitution – since
this is a legislative function under the Constitution to be performed only by the regular
National Assembly or by a Constitutional Convention called by it or by the interim
National Assembly – files a suit to stop the Commission on Elections and the National
Treasurer, the first from conducting a plebiscite and the second, from releasing public
funds to finance the same plebiscite where the people were called upon to ratify (or
reject) a specific proposal of the President to amend the constitution.

Des “G” have a standing in Court vis-à-vis the action he has filed? The respondents
contend that “G” has no interest, direct or remote, to protect in the suit since he stands
to suffer no injury or damage from the holding of the plebiscite in question.

What will be your position on this issue?

(b) Before the 1973 Constitution, administrative supervision over inferior courts was vested
in the Department of Justice. The 1973 Constitution transferred said supervision to the
Supreme Court. Of late, the view has been advanced that administrative supervision
over inferior courts should be returned to the Ministry of Justice.
Would you endorse this view? Give the constitutional basis for your answer. (1980 BAR
EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) “G” has standing to bring the action to stop the expenditure of funds which he believes is for
an unconstitutional purpose. For if the President of the Philippines as no power to propose
amendments to the Constitution, the expenditure of funds for the holding of a plebiscite for
the ratification of such proposed amendments would constitute a misapplication of public
funds. As citizen and taxpayer “G” has an interest in theproper expenditure of public funds.
(Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333[1976])

(b) The supervision of the inferior courts was vested the Supreme Court to secure the
independence of the judiciary. While a distinction can be drawn between the performance of
judicial functions and administration, the supervision of inferior courts by the Ministry of
Justice may trench upon the discretion of the judges which should be exercised by them
according to their influence which the Minister of Justice has over Judges. It is unavoidable
that judges will court his goodwill, as their promotion may at times depend on it. (Garcia v.
Macaraig, 39 SCRA 106 [1971] [Fernando, J., concurring]).
 The examinee may, however, answer as follows: I am endorsing this proposal. The
Constitution should be amended so as to transfer the supervision of the lower courts to the
Ministry of Justice. Administrative supervision unnecessarily burden the Supreme Court and
detracts from the time and attention that it needs to give to its essential function of developing
the law in its most profound aspects.

Powers of Supreme Court

Section 291 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 provides:

“No court shall have authority to grant an injunction to restrain the collection of any internal
revenue tax, fee or charge imposed by this Code.”
Is this provision unconstitutional for being an undue encroachment by the legislative branch
on judicial powers and prerogatives? Explain briefly. (1981 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The power to enjoin the collection of taxes is not given to the courts; therefore the statute in this
case cannot be said to be an impairment of the powers and prerogatives of courts. No government
could exist that permitted its collection to be delayed by a very litigous man or very embarassed
man, to whom delay was more important than the payment of costs. (Sarasola v. Trinidad, 40 Phil.
252 (1919)). Where a taxpayer is permitted to pay the amount demanded under protest and then
maintain an action at law to recover the amount paid or so much of it as was illegally exacted, this
is ordinarily regarded as adequate remedy. In Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580 (1915), it was
therefore held that a law denying the power to enjoin the collection of taxes was valid (a) because
jurisdiction was never conferred on courts to enjoin the colection of taxes and (b) because the
taxpayer has an adequate remedy under the law. (See also David v. Ramos 90 Phil. 351 (1951)).

Powers of Supreme Court

a. “G”, a Filipino citizen resident of and property owner in Davao City, believing that the
President of the Philippines may not propose amendments to the Constitution – since this
is a legislative function under the Constitution to be performed only by the regular
National Assembly or by a Constitutional Convention called by it or by the interim
National Assembly – files a suit to stop the Commission on Elections and the National
Treasurer, the first from conducting a plebiscite and the second, from releasing public
funds to finance the same plebiscite where the people were called upon to ratify (or reject)
a specific proposal of the President to amend the constitution.

Des “G” have a standing in Court vis-à-vis the action he has filed? The respondents
contend that “G” has no interest, direct or remote, to protect in the suit since he stands
to suffer no injury or damage from the holding of the plebiscite in question.

What will be your position on this issue?

b. Before the 1973 Constitution, administrative supervision over inferior courts was vested
in the Department of Justice. The 1973 Constitution transferred said supervision to the
Supreme Court. Of late, the view has been advanced that administrative supervision over
inferior courts should be returned to the Ministry of Justice.
Would you endorse this view? Give the constitutional basis for your answer(1980 BAR
EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) “G” has standing to bring the action to stop the expenditure of funds which he believes is
for an unconstitutional purpose. For if the President of the Philippines as no power to propose
amendments to the Constitution, the expenditure of funds for the holding of a plebiscite for
the ratification of such proposed amendments would constitute a misapplication of public
funds. As citizen and taxpayer “G” has an interest in theproper expenditure of public funds.
(Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333[1976])

(b) The supervision of the inferior courts was vested the Supreme Court to secure the
independence of the judiciary. While a distinction can be drawn between the performance of
judicial functions and administration, the supervision of inferior courts by the Ministry of
Justice may trench upon the discretion of the judges which should be exercised by them
according to their influence which the Minister of Justice has over Judges. It is unavoidable
that judges will court his goodwill, as their promotion may at times depend on it. (Garcia v.
Macaraig, 39 SCRA 106 [1971] [Fernando, J., concurring]).

The examinee may, however, answer as follows: I am endorsing this proposal. The
Constitution should be amended so as to transfer the supervision of the lower courts to the
Ministry of Justice. Administrative supervision unnecessarily burden the Supreme Court
and detracts from the time and attention that it needs to give to its essential function of
developing the law in its most profound aspects.

Powers of Supreme Court

“X”, a civilian, was tried before and convicted by a military commission of the crime of
kidnapping. He was sentenced to die by firing squad. The President affirmed the decision.
Is the death sentence subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court? Explain your
answer. (1981 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In Gumawa v. Espino, 96 SCRA 402 (1980), Chief Justice Fernando said in a concurring and
dissenting opinion: “Thus for me the question of whether or not this court is empowered to pass
on a death sentence by military tribunals where as in this case petitioner Gumaua is a civilian, calls
for determination. More specifically, the crucial issue to me is whether the procedure for automatic
review of a death sentence must be followed. My answer is in the affirmative. So I would conclude
in the light of what my opinion is the plain and explicit command of the constitution. I must admit
that Ruffy v. Chief of Staff yields a different conclusion.
Thus, Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities “ for the
ordering of courts martial has been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the
President as Commander in Chief, independently of legislation.” (Winthrops's Military Law and
Precedents, 2nd Edition, p.49). Unlike courts of law, they are not portion of the judiciary.”...Not
belonging to the Judicial branch of Government, it follows that the courts-martial must pertain to
the executive department; and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power,
provided by Congress for the President as Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly
commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or
those of his authorized military representatives.”

Such a ruling continues with unabated force where an accused belongs to the armed forces. I
cannot subscribe to the view that it calls for the application where a civilian is involved. After the
holding of this court in the third Aquino decision, referred to earlier, that military tribunals have
jurisdiction over civilians in certain specified offenses, it would follow, to my way of thinking,
that thereby judicial rather that executive power is being exercised and, therefore, the law on
automatic review calls respect and deference.”

What are the powers of the Supreme Court under the new Constitution? Considering all
these powers, is the Supreme Court truly the weakest department or is the weaknesses self-
imposed for policy reasons? Reason out your answer. (1985 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Supreme Court has the following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

2. Review and revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari final judgments and decrees
of inferior courts in –
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, executive agreement,
law or ordinance or executive order or regulation is in question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
impost in relation thereto.
c. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

3. Assign temporarily judges of inferior courts to other stations as public interest may require, not
longer than six months without the consent of the judge.

4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

5. Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Bar, subject to the power of the Batasang Pambansa to
repeal, alter, or supplement such rules.

6. Appoint its officials and employees in accordance with the Civil Service Law. (Art. X, sec 5)
7. Exercise administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel. (Id., sec. 6)

8. Discipline judges of Inferior courts and, by the vote of at least eight members, order their
dismissal. (Id., sec. 7)

With all these powers, especially the power of judicial review, the Supreme Court cannot be said
to be the weakest department of government. What Hamilton said is that it is the “least dangerous
to the political rights of the constitution.” (7th Federalist) On the contrary, it is sometimes charged
that the exercise of the power of review results in “judicial supremacy,” a charge which Justice
Laurel denied and said it is nothing but the performance of a duty entrusted to the judiciary by the
Constitution. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1996))

In Rescue, Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549 (1947) the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the reasons for its policy of self-limitation are to be found “in the delicacy of the function
of judicial review, particularly in view of possible consequences for others stemming also from
constitutional roots; the comparative finality of those consequences; the consideration due to the
judgment of other repositories of constitutional power concerning the scope of their authority; the
necessity, if government is to function constitutionally for each to keep within its power, including
the courts; the inherent limitations of the judicial process arising especially from its largely
negative character and limited resources of enforcement; withal, in the paramount importance of
constitutional adjudication in our system.

Appointments to the Judiciary

“A” was already a Justice of the Court of Appeals when the 1973 Constitution took effect.
Thereafter, he was appointed Presiding Justice. When he reached the age of 65 years, he
continued in the same office exercising the functions and prerogatives thereof. The validity
of his decision was raised by a defeated litigant in the Supreme Court, majority of whose
members are similarly situated as “A”.
(a) May all the members of the Supreme Court sit to pass on the question raised?
(b) May “A” continue in office until he reaches the age of 70 years?
If not, may he be considered de facto officer when he rendered the questioned decision(1979
BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) It is submitted that the validity of the decision cannot be questioned collaterally and that A’
title should be raised in a direct proceeding in quo warranto. In any case, the question of
disqualification is addressed to the discretion only of the Justices involved.
(b) There is yet no settled rule on this matter. One view is that the judge appointed under the new
Constitution should retire at the age of 65 years even if he might originally have been covered
by Art. XVII, Sec. 10.

Another view is that he does not forfeit the benefits of this rule, since all it requires is that he
was incumbent in the Judiciary and not in any particular judgeship on January 17, 1973.
The cases of Chief Justice Makalintal and Justices Martin and Palma, originally covered by
 the said provision, who retired voluntarily upon reaching the age of 65, have only one
persuasive value
(c) Yes, as there was an office de jure, color of title derived from his reputation as a judge, and
actual possession of the office.

Exclusive Power of Supreme Court: Admission to Bar

By virtue of its powers under PD 902-A, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
propose to issue rules requiring lawyers who wish to practice before the SEC , to take and
pass a qualifying examination administered by SEC. The SEC pointed out the delay was very
often caused by lawyers who do not understand Corporation Law, much less many facets of
mercantile law. The rules would be temporary in character and was merely a response to
current economic depression, where enterprise could not afford delays settling issues.
As a new lawyer who just passed the bar, comment on the proposed rules, giving
administrative and constitutional law basis. (1985 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The rule is beyond the power of the SEC to promulgate. In Philippines Lawyer’s Ass’n. v. Agrava,
105 Phil. 173 (1959), It was held that the Supreme Court has the exclusive power with respect to
the admission to the practice of law and that any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing
may practice law anywhere and before any entity , whether judicial or quasi judicial or
administrative in the Philippines. Consequently, it was held, the Patents Office was without power
to require members of the Bar to pass a qualifying examination before they can be allowed to
practice before it. In the problem at bar, since the function of the SEC involves the application and
interpretation and application of law, the appearance of the members of the Bar before it involves
the practice of law. In the absence of least of statutory authority , the SEC cannot limit such practice
to those who have passed the special examination required by its rule.

Exclusive Power of Supreme Court: Admission to Bar

Atty. Beata Makalugod, handles, among others, cases before the provost courts of the U.S.
Air Force at Clark Field. She was charged with incompetence and unethical conduct in the
handling of cases before the provost courts, for which reason Col. Jake Smith of the U.S. Air
Force Judge Advocate General Corps created a Board of Investigation to ascertain whether
or not Atty. Makalugod may be banned from appearing before the provost courts. She
questions the Board’s authority on the ground that Clark Field is a Philippine base, that the
United States is only allowed to maintain “facilities” on Philippine territory, and only the
Supreme Court has the power to discipline a member of the Philippine bar. Resolve the issue
of the Board’s jurisdiction. (1987 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Board of Investigation created by the Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Air Force has
jurisdiction. Under Rule 139 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Art. X, Sec. 5 (5) of the 1973
Constitution, the Supreme Court has the power to admit and on lawful grounds to suspend or even
disbar those admitted to practice law in the courts of the Philippines. Here the respondents do not
seek to bar Atty. Makalugod from practicing in accordance with her license from the Supreme
Court. She is being investigated in connection with her practice of law before U.S. Navy Courts
Martial. These Courts Martial are constituted under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government. They are not extensions of Philippine Courts. Under the Military Bases Agreement,
The Philippine Government allows the United States to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over certain
criminal and disciplinary cases. In these cases, the United States Government possesses ample
powers to determine and adjudicate upon the merits to the exclusion of Philippine courts. By
appearing before U.S. military courts, the petitioner submits to their jurisdiction. (Vargas v.
Kilcline, G.R. No. L-45319, June 6, 1986)

Exclusive Power of Supreme Court: Reorganization

In De la Llana v. Alb, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Judiciary reorganization Act, was
challenged on the ground that the abolition of the then existing inferior courts, except
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, was violative of the security of tenure
guarantee to members of the judiciary.
How did the Court rule? What was the ratio decidenti? Was there any qualification? (1985
BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Supreme Court held that the abolition of the inferior courts was made in good faith to improve
the performance of the courts in view of the growth or population in the face of rising expectations
and the need to pursue the developmental programs of the government. Security of tenure
presupposes the continued existence of an office. Consequently, where the public office is
abolished , there can be no security of tenure of its incumbent. However, with respect to incumbent
members of the judiciary who were not appointed to the new judicial posts, the Supreme Court
should be consulted and its view should be accorded the fullest consideration because the effect of
reorganization was similar to their removal , a matter over which the Court has exclusive
jurisdiction under Art. X, sec. 7.

Judicial Review
What do you understand by power of judicial review? When may it be exercised? What are
the guides or standards for its exercise? (1975 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) the Court, through Justice Laurel, defined
the power of judicial review as the power of courts “to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the right which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them”.
It may be exercised if the following conditions are present:
(a) an appropriate case;
(b) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question;
(c) invocation of the power at the earliest opportunity;
 (d) necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon to decide the case. (People v.
Vera, 64 Phil. 56 (1937))

Judicial Review
S is the registered lessee of a 393 sq. meter lot forming a part of the Tambsoong Estate,
paying the rentals thereof to the Roman Catholic church, then the owner thereof. S subleased
to L, B, and K portions of the said lot on which they built their houses, paying rentals to S.
In 1947, the government acquired this estate pursuant to Commonwealth Act 539 for resale
to bonafide tenants or occupants therein. S applied to purchase the entire lot leased to him,
while L, B, and K also applied to buy the portions thereof respectively subleased to them.
The bureau of Lands approved the application of S and denied those of the sublessees.
However, the Land Tenure Administration set aside the decision of the Bureau of Lands and
gave due course to the application of the sublessees, which action was affirmed by the
Executive Secretary, S went to court on certiorari. The lower court as well as the Court of
Appeals upheld him. In the appeal, the following issues were raised:
(a) Are the sublessees “tenants” or “occupants” under the law who may be allowed to
purchase the respective portions of the lot of S leased to them?
(b) Can the court review the administrative action of the Bureau of lands?
Please decide. (1975 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Commonwealth Act No. 539, Section 1 provided that lands acquired under it should be
subdivided and resold at reasonable prices to “their bona fide tenants or occupants or private
individuals who will work the lands themselves and who are qualified to acquire and own lands in
the Philippines.” Thus, the order of preference is, first, bona fide tenants, second, occupants, and
third, private individuals.

In Leongson v. Court of Appeals, L3255, January 30, 1973, 49 SCRA 212, the Court considered
the sublessees, L, B, and K, to be bona fide tenants with respect to the portion of the lands occupied
by them. The Court held that “justice and equity command that [they] be given preferencial right
to purchase in order to carry out the avowed policy of the law to give land to the landless” and that
“if the claim of a sublease actually in possession would be ignored or disregarded, the result would
be to heighten social tension and aggravate further the unrest that has its roots in so many of our
countrymen being denied the opportunity of owning even a small piece of land on which their
houses are built and wherein they reside.”

(b) Yes, because the question involved is a question of law. As held in the same case of Leongson
v. Court of Appealse, “the moment a question of law arises, . . . it is inescapable on the judiciary
to pass upon and decide the issue.” A decision of the Director of Lands on a question of law is in
no sense conclusive upon the courts, but is subject to review.

Judicial Power And Judicial Review

Define and distinguish judicial power and judicial review. (1977 BAR EXAM)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Judicial power is the power to apply the laws to contest or disputes concerning legally recognized
rights or duties between the State and private persons, or between individual litigants in cases
properly brought before the judicial tribunals.

Judicial review is the power of the courts, ultimately of the Supreme Court, to interpret the
constitution and declare any legislative or executive act invalid because it is in conflict with the
fundamental law. This authority is derived by clear implication from the provision of sections 2(2)
and 5 (2a) Article X of the Constitution. Through such power, the Supreme Court particularly,
enforces and upholds the supremacy of the Constitution.

Judicial Review
(a) To what extent is the Constitution a grant of, and yet a limitation on, power?
(b) What, if any, is the difference in the power of review of the Supreme Court over decisions,
rulings and orders of the Commission on Elections under the 1935 Constitution and 1973
Constitution? (1980 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) A Constitution is an organic instrument under which governmental powers are both conferred
and circumscribed. “The office and purpose of the Constitution is to shape and fix the limits of
governmental activity (Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines 21 [2d ed. 1977]). When the
Constitution allocates powers to the different branches of the government, the effect is to confer,
and at the same time place, limitations on power.
(b) Under the 1935 Constitution the decisions, orders, and rulings of the Commission on Elections
“shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court.” (Art. X, Sec. 2). This means a review of
questions of law. On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution provides somewhat differently that the
decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission “may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari.” (Art. XII, C, Sec. 11), even as it ordains that the Commission shall be “the sole judge
of all contests relating to the elections returns and qualifications of all the members of the National
Assembly and elective provincial officials.” (Art. XII, C, sec. 2 [2]). It is evident from the change
in the Constitutional language and the limited scope of certiorari compared to review that the intent
is to limit judicial review to questions of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. This
construction is consistent with the decision of the Constitutional Convention to strengthen the
independence of the Commission. (Aratuc v. Commission on Elections, L-49705-02, Feb. 8, 1978,
88 SCRA 251).

Judicial review
What is your understanding of this sentence that the function of Judicial review has both a
positive and a negative aspect, and that its exercise is an awesome and delicate power? (1981
BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Judicial review has both a positive and negative aspect because it can be used as a means of
validating governmental action against constitutional doubts, as well as to nullify legislative or
executive acts. The first is known as the legitiating work of judicial review, while the second is
known as the checking work. (Black, The People and the Court 87 (1960):ana v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 56350, April 2, 1981).

The power of judicial review is a delicate one because, as Justice Frankfurt ha pointed out, the
authority of the Supreme Court, which is possessed neither of the purse nor the sword, ultimately
rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished at the
Court's complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political entanglements and by
absentation from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political settlements. (Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S 186 (1962) (dissent); see also Fernando, The Supremacy of the Constitution:
Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 113 (1981)). The power is at the same time an awesome
one because, as Professor alexander M. Biclkel has well observed, judicial review can be a counter
majoritarian force in a democratic system. ( The Least Dangerous Branch 16 (1962)). It is a veto
on the act of the people's representatives in the legislature.

Power of Judicial Review

a. What is the power of judicial review? Cite its constitutional basis.

b. In general, what factors or circumstances should exist in order that the power of judicial
review may be exercised? (1984 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. Judicial review is the power of the courts, in appropriate cases, to annul executive or legislative
action, whether from the national or local government level, when such act violates any provision
of the Constitution. The power is based on the constitutional provision which says that the "judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law"
(Article X, Sec. 1); also the express grant of power in the Supreme Court to review cases involving
constitutionality of executive acts.
b. Judicial review may be exercised when the following circumstances are present:
- There must be an appropriate case;
- The party impugning the validity of an act must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result of its
enforcement;
- The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
- The constitutional question must be the very lis mota for decision (People vs. Vera, 65
Phil 56)

Explain the difference between the Supreme Court’s power to review the Comelec’s
decisions, orders, or rulings under the 1935 Constitution (as amended) and the 1973
Constitution (as amended). (1985 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under Art, X, sec. 2 of the 1935 Constitution, the Supreme Court could review the decisions,
orders and rulings of the COMELEC on questions, of law. It could not pass upon findings of fact
of the COMELEC unless there was arbitrariness. (Sotto v. COMELEC, 76 Phil. 516 (1936); Sidro
v. COMELEC, 123 SCRA 759 (1983)) On the other hand, in Aratuc v. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251
(1979), it was held that under the 1973 Constitution, its power to review is limited to questions of
jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. The reason for this is that the present Constitution
specifies certiorari as the only mode of review (Art. XII, C, sec. 11), even as it provides that the
COMELEC shall be the “sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.”
(Art. XII, C, sec. 2(2))

Operative Fact Doctrine

When an assailed legislative or executive act is found by the courts to be contrary to the
Constitution, it is null and void. Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that administrative
or executives acts, orders, and regulations shall be valid only when they are contrary to the
laws or the constitution. What is the nature of acts done under such our constitutional or
invalid law, order or regulation before the court has declared the same null and void? Why?
(1975 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Strictly speaking, acts done under an unconstitutional statute or executive act are null and void
since such law or executive act confers no rights, imposes no duty and affords no protection. This
is especially so where the statue or executive act is void on its face. However, this rule is subject
to qualifications. It has been held that the actual existence of a statute or executive act prior to a
determination that it is unconstitutional is an operative fact and many have consequences which
cannot be justly ignored. The effect of a subsequent ruling of invalidity may have to be considered
in various aspects - with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular
conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determination deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of
the nature both of the statute or act and of its previous application, demand examination. A
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot thus be justified. Municipality of Malabang v.
Benito, L28113, March 28, 1969; Serrano de Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank, L-23127,
April 29, 1971

Power of removal
(a) The President writes a member of his cabinet that his registration has been accepted
although the latter has not filed his resignation. Is this a valid termination of official
relation?
(b) What do you understand by the principle that a “public office is a public trust”?
(c) When is it considered as property? (1979 BAR EXAM)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) In Article IX, Sec 4, the members of the Cabinet may be removed by the Prime Minister at
his discretion. Strictly speaking, however, Cabinet members serve at the pleasure of the
Prime Minister, their term continuing as long as they enjoy his confidence. The moment
such confidence is lost, they cease to be entitled to their position, not by virtue of a removal
but of a different method of terminating official relations, to wit, expiration of the term. No
 resignation is even necessary to separate them from the cabinet.
(c) It means that public office is held by the functionary not for purposes of self-
aggrandizement but as a steward who must discharge the duties thereof for the benefit of
the people.
(d) Generally, public office is not considered property. However, in Segovia vs. Noel, it was
held that it could come under the protection of due process of law in the sense that one
cannot be deprived thereof except upon a clear showing of the legislative intention.

Determination of Fair Value

A certain law provides that the Supreme Court shall determine the fair valuation of the assets
of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company in case the said assets are to be acquired
by the Republic of the Philippines.
Is this provision vulnerable to constitutional objection? (1983 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The determination of the fair value of the assets of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company in the event the Government decides to acquire such assets is the performance of a
judicial function in the same way that the determination of just compensation for the taking of any
other private property is within the power of courts to make. In this case the Government would
be exercising its power under article XIV, section 6 which provides that “The State may, in the
interest of national welfare or defense, establish and operate industries and means of transportation
and communications, and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership
utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the Government.”
This case is to be distinguished from Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co., 57 Phil. 600
(1932), in which it was held that the Supreme Court cannot sit as a board of arbitrators in order to
determine the terms on which other parties may use the right way of granting to a franchise holder
and the compensation to be paid for such use. Here the Supreme Court is no going to act as a board
of arbitrators but as a court exercising original jurisdiction conferred on it by the legislature
pursuant to its power under Article X, section 1 to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction
of the various courts, including the Supreme Court as in the MERALCO case, is constituted a
board of arbitrators, then it would either be exercising an administrative or quasi-judicial function,
which it could not d, or it would exercise a judicial function, which would be subject to review by
sitting as a Court.

Regional Trial Court in Determination of Constitutionality

A case for violation of Batas Pambansa No. 22, which penalizes the issuance of bouncing
checks, was recently filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The RTC Judge
dismissed the case on the ground that the law is unconstitutional and, therefore, null and
void. Explain whether or not it is correct and proper for a Regional Trial Court to declare
a statute, in this case B.P. No. 22m unconstitutional. (1986 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It is improper for the Regional Trial Court to declare the statute unconstitutional without evidence
to overcome the presumption of constitutionality. As the Supreme Court stated Vera v. Arca, 28
SCRA 351 (1969) in setting aside an injunction issued by the trial court on the basis solely of legal
arguments on the constitutionality of a law: “while a court should not relax its vigilance in assuring
that no undue curtailment of liberty exists, still it is to be admitted that except in cases where the
specific freedoms of belief whether religious or secular, of expression, of assembly and of
association are concerned, a domain where Congress is forbidden to trespass except under the clear
and present danger doctrine, the need for introducing evidence to counteract the assumption that a
statute is valid may be unavoidable.” Here, no claim is made that BP Blg 22 infringes on freedoms
of the mind, and, therefore, the presumption is that the statute is valid unless otherwise shown after
hearing.
As an alternative and as the question may also be construed as asking whether the Regional Trial
Court can pass upon the constitutionality of BP Blg 22, we suggest that the SUGGESTED
ANSWER:: be as follows: Although the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court the power to pass
upon the constitutionality, among other things, that grant of power refers to appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court, implying thereby that lower courts have the power to determine the same
question of constitutionality. [J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Court of Appeals, 113 Phil. 673 (1961)].

Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (1984)

Judge Rosa dela Rosa had occupied the position of Presiding Judge of Branch IV, Manila
Court of First Instance, for 10 years. Then the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 was
enacted providing, among others, as follows:

Section 2. Scope - The reorganization herein provided shall include the Court of
Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts, the Court of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the
Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts."

Section 13. Creation of Regional Trial Courts. - There are hereby created thirteen
(13) Regional Trial Courts, one for each of the following judicial regions...

Section 44. Transitory provisions. - The provisions of this Act shall be immediately
carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The
... (courts enumerated in Section 2 above) shall continue to function as presently
constituted and organized, until the completion of the reorganization provided in this
Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be
deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office.
The cases pending in the old courts shall be transferred to the appropriate courts
constituted pursuant to this Act..."

Judge dela Rosa was not among those appointed by the President tot the newly constituted
Regional Trial Courts or any other court. The net result is that Judge dela Rosa was left
jobless with the implementation of the Reorganization Law.
 (a) As legal counsel of Judge dela Rosa, what arguments would you raise so that she could
regain her judgeship? Cite constitutional provisions and doctrines.

(b) Now as Judge, how would you decide Judge dela Rosa's case? Cite constitutional
provisions and doctrines. (1984 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. As legal counsel of Judge dela Rosa, I will question the constitutionality of the reorganizational
act on these grounds:
- the wholesale separation of all members of the judiciary below the rank of Justice of the
Supreme Court is an arbitrary exercise of legislative power violative of the independence of
the judiciary, because if such power of wholesale removal exists then all judges and justices
would function in their offices in fear that when the lawmaking body is minded it may just
remove all of them;
- specifically for Judge dela Rosa, since the facts do not show any cause for her removal,
her separation from the office therefore violates her security of tenure guaranteed by the
Constitution.
B. As judge, I will uphold the constitutionality of the reorganization act, because:
- the constitution specifically empowers the lawmaking body to create "inferior courts",
which under the Constitution embrace all courts below the Supreme Court (Art. X, Sec. 1), and
the power to create implies the power to abolish;
- the arguments of arbitrariness and ciolation fo judicial independence should therefore be
untenable since the law-making body in enacting the reorganization act was merely exercising a
specifically constitutional power, political in nature, which appears to have been a sound exercise
of legislative discretion and wisdom free from the taint of arbitrariness and bad faith;
- there is likewise no violation of the security of tenure clause since Judge dela Rosa was
not removed, but simply that her office, along with others, was abolished, and the cases say
abolition is an entirely different thing from removal, because the latter connotes the continued
existence of the office which is not so in the case of the former (De La Llana vs. Alba 112 SCRA
294).

Power of COMELEC

Features
Is the COMELEC, under the New Constitution, a more independent and effective vehicle for
clean, orderly and honest elections than its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution? In what
respects is this true or false, as the case may be? (1978 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The COMELEC, under the New Constitution, is a more independent and effective vehicle for
clean, orderly and honest elections than its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution because of its
broader powers, such as:

1. It shall appoint its officials and employees in accordance with the Civil Service
Law (Sec. 4, Art. XII-A, New Constitution);
 2. It has the power to fix in special cases the election period (Sec. 6, Art. XII-B, New
Constitution);
3. It has the power to register and accredit political parties (Sec.8, Art. XII-B, New
Constitution);
4. It shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Members of the National Assembly and elective provincial or city
officials. (Sec. 2(2), Art. XII-C, New Constitution)
5. It has the duty to recommend to the National Assembly effective measures to
minimize election expenses and prohibit all forms of election frauds and malpractices,
political opportunism, guest or nuisance candidacy, or other similar acts (Sec. 2(6), Art.
XII-C, New Constitution);
6. It may regulate or supervise the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits
for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media, or communication or
information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the government, or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, inlcuding any government owned or
controlled corporation during the election period for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly,
and honest elections (Sec 5, Art. XII-C, N.C.);
7. It may recommend to the Prime Minister the removal of, or any other disciplinary
action against any officer or employee it has deputized, for violation or disregard of, or
disobedience to its decision, order or directive (Sec 4, Art. XII-C, N.C.);
8. It can decide administrative questions affecting elections, including the registration
of voters ( Sec 2 (3), Art. XII, N.C.)

On the other hand, under Sec 2 of Art X of the 1935 Constitution the Commission
may deputize all law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the government for the
purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections without the consent of the President.
Now, it needs the consent of the Prime Minister for that purpose (Sec. 2 (4), Art. XIII-C,
N.C.). The latter provision has weakened the position of the Commission on this particular
matter.

Powers
In an election protest filed before the Court of First Instance, the protestees were dissatisfied
with an order that said court had issued. To assail it, the protestees filed with the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction seeking to restrain the trial Court from enforcing said order. Acting on the
petition, the COMELEC issued a Resolution requiring the protestants to file an Answer
within ten days from notice, and in the meantime, restrained the Court of First Instance from
enforcing its questioned order.
Does the COMELEC, which now exercises judicial functions, have jurisdiction to take
cognizance of petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus involving election cases
cognizable by courts of First Instance and appealable to said Commission? Explain your
answer briefly. (1981BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. While the COMELEC, uhder Article 196 in relation to Art. 190 of the 1978 Election Code, is
given an appellate jurisdiction over decisions of courts of first instance in election contests
involving municipal and municipal district officers it has no original jurisdiction to issue writ of
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under the constitution or the election laws.
It is basic that jurisdiction can only be conferred by law. The conferment of appellate jurisdiction
in the COMELEC does not include a grant of original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs
even if it be in aid of the appellate jurisdiction granted. The only original jurisdiction conferred on
the COMELEC is that over contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
“Members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials,” of which it is
made the “sole judge” (Const., art. XII, C, sec. 2 (2); 1978 Election Code, art. 188)

Special Election

When, if at all, may the COMELEC call for special elections? Explain. Will your
SUGGESTED ANSWER: be the same for municipal officials as well as for members of the
Batasang Pambansa. Briefly discuss. (1985 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In Sanches v. COMELEC, 114 SCRA 454 (1982) it was held that pursuant to BP 52, sec. 5, the
COMELEC can call a special election where because of violence, terrorism, force majeure, and
the like, the election for local offices fails to take place on the date set by law or is suspended, or
it results in a failure to elect, as well as where after the voting, irregularities are committed in the
preparation of the election returns.
Art. VIII, sec. 5 (2) provides: “In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months
or more before a regular election, the Commission on Elections shall call a special elections to be
held within sixty days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.”
However, in Lozada v. Comelec, 120 SCRA 337 (1983), it was held, in respect of the election of
the members of the Batasan, that the Comelec cannot call a special election to fill any vacancy in
the Batasan unless the Batasang Pambansa has appropriated the money needed for such purposes.

Annul Election

In the local election of January 30 1980, A, the official candidate for the KBL for the position
of mayor of X municipality, was proclaimed the winner of the municipal board of canvassers.
Three days later, B, the Nacionalista Party candidate for the same office filed a petition with
the COMELEC to declare null and void the elections due to alleged large scale terrorism.
After due hearing, After due hearing, the COMELEC finding that the teachers-members of
the Citizens Election Committee had been threatened and coerced in making false election
returns and that the ballot boxes had been forced open and the contents thereof substituted
with pre-prepared ballots, issued a resolution with he dispositive portion which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby orders the following: 1) the annulment of the
election last January 30, 1980 of the local government officials in X municipality,
consequently, the annulment and setting aside of the proclamation of respondent A and other
municipal officials thereat; and 2) to certify to the President/Prime Minister and the
Batasang Pambansa the failure of election in X municipality so that remedial legislation may
be enacted and that pending such enactment, the President/prime Minister may appoint the
municipal officials of X municipality.
B moved for the reconsideration of that portion of the resolution which certified to the
president/prime Minister and the Batasang Pambansa the election in said municipality and
prayed instead that special elections be held. A ikewise filed a motion for reconsideration,
praying that he be proclaimed the winner on the basis of the undisputed returns. A
contended that the COMELEC has no authority to annul the entire municipal election
because the Constitution grants it only the power to enforce and administer all the laws
relative to the conduct of elections.
Based in the foregoing facts: 1) does the COMELEC have the power to annul an entire
municipal election based on the ground of post-election terrorism?; 2) Does the COMELEC
have the power to call for special election? Explain your answer. (1982 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The SUGGESTED ANSWER:: to both questions should be in the affirmative in accordance with
the ruling in Sanchez vs COMELEC L-55513 & L-55642, 1) the COMELEC has the power to
annul the election. Under Article XII, C, Sec. 2 (1) of the Constitution it is charged with the
function to “enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election.” The rejection of
returns and annulment of elections were in exercise of this function. Under the 1935 Constitution
it was held in Abes vs COMELEC 21 SCRA 1252 , that the power to enforce election laws did not
include the power to annul an election, but it was also held that this was a power which pertained
to the Senate and the House Electoral Tribunals and the Courts, because the powers of the
COMELEC were preventive rather thatn remedial. But under Art. XII, C, Sec 2(2) of the present
Constitution the COMELEC now has the power of the Electoral Tribunals and the courts of
deciding contests related to elections, disqualification, and return of members of the BP and of
elective provincial and city officials so that the power to set aside elections must now be deemed
a power of the COMELEC.

2) the COMELEC can also call for a a special election. It is true that in Ututtalum vs COMELEC,
15 SCRA 465, it was held that the calling of a special election is a legislative function, unless it is
delegated to some agency of government, as in the case of Section 21(2) of the former Election
Code which authorized the President to call special election in the event election for the for local
elective office is not held on the said date fixed by law. It is likewise true that, at present, pursuant
to section 5 of BP 52, the COMELEC is authorized to call a special election only where because
of violence, terrorism, force majeure, and the like, the election for local office fails to take place
on the date set by law, or is suspended, or results in a failure to elect. While in the case at bar, there
was free, orderly, and honest election in January 30, 1980, the terrorism took place after and not
during the voting. However, in practical effect, there is no difference between the failure to elect
because of terrorism committed during the voting and the failure to ascertain the result of an
election because of fraud and terrorism after the voting, in the preparation of election returns. Since
under Section 8 of the 1978 Election Code the COMELEC has the power to call special election
in the event of failure to elect due to terrorism, etc., committed during voting, it must also have the
same power, when if the voting was regular, the process of counting is irregular.

Pre- Proclamation

The case of Lagumbay vs. Comelec condemnded as evil the politician's practice of "grabbing
the proclamation and prolonging the election protest" - a phyrric victory for both eventual
winner and the electorate. Taking the cure from Lagumbay, the Batasan enacted Batas
Pambansa Blg. 697 for the Batasan elections of May 14, 1984, and therein provided for a
procedural remedy to concretize and give vitality to the Lagumbay pronouncement. What
remedy was prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 and in what instance it may be invoked?
(1984 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The remedy is known as "pre-proclamation" action as distinguished from an "election protest."
A pre-proclamation action may be filed when the issues involved refers to:
(a) Illegal composition of proceedings of the Board of Canvassers;
(b) Canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be
tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or other authentic copies
thereof;
(c) When the election returns were prepared under duress, threat, coercion, or intimidation,
or are obviously manufactured, or not authentic;
(d) When substitute, fictitious or illegal voters, constituting a majority of the registered
voters in the voting center were able to vote; or
(e) Other matters related to or in connection with the canvass of election returns or
proclamation or any candidate. (Sec. 51, Art. XIII, B.P. 697)

Criminal Case: Condonation by Reelection

Mayor Lopez of Calauag, Quezon stands charged before the Sandiganbayan for falsification
of public documents, malversation, and violation of a certain special law. He is likewise facing
investigation in three administrative cases involving the said offenses. During the pendency
of the said cases, he ran for reelection and garnered more than 90% of the total votes cast
and which is more than the total combined votes of his four opponents. He now moved to
dismiss all the aforementioned administrative and criminal cases.
Rule on his aforesaid motion with reasons. (1985 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In accordance with the ruling in People v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 372 (1985), only the
mayor’s administrative, but not his criminal, guilt is deemed condoned by his reelection.
Accordingly, only the administrative charge against him may be dismissed. As held in Ingco v.
Sanchez, 21 SCRA 1292 (1967), which involved a falsification of public documents against a
mayor allegedly committed during his prior term. “The ruling,… that – ‘when the people have
elected a man to office it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and
character and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct if he had been guilty of
any’ – refers only to an action for removal from office and does not apply to a criminal case because
a crime is a public wring more atrocious in character than mere misfeasance or malfeasance
committed by a public officer in the discharge of his duties, and is injurious not only to a person
or group or persons but to the State as a whole. This must be the reason why Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code, which enumerates the grounds for extinction of criminal liability, does not
include reelection to office as one of them, at least insofar as a public officer is concerned.”
Civil Service Commission

Removal; just cause

(c) “H” was employed as assistant cashier in a government-owned corporation. Because of
irregularities in the performance of his duties, he was charged administratively with
gross negligence and misconduct prejudicial to the interests of his employer. During the
hearings in the administrative case “H” was suspended from office. At the conclusion of
the hearings, a decision was reached to dismiss him from the service. He was, in fact,
dismissed.
While the hearings in the administrative case were on-going, he was also charged in
Court for Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents in relation to the same conduct
then under investigation administratively. After his dismissal case acquitting him of the
offense charged based on reasonable doubt.
“H” then filed a ase in Court against his former employer for reinstatement alleging as
a basis thereof his acquittal in the criminal case.
Will his complaint for reinstatement prosper?
(d) Would a law requiring that only natural-born Filipino citizens may be eligible for
membership in the Board of Directors of domestic commercial banks be constitutionally
valid? (1980 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(c) “H’s” complaint for reinstatement cannot prosper. While the evidence against him may not
be sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt his guilt, it may be adequate to prove his
liability for purposes of the administrative case. It is noteworthy that his acquittal in the
criminal case is based not on a finding of innocence but on reasonable doubt.
(d) The law is unconstitutional as a denial of the equal protection. As held in Chan Tek Law v.
Republic, 55 SCRA 1 (1974), “a naturalized citizen is entitled to similar treatment as a native-
born citizen ecept where the Charter itself provides otherwise.” In Baumgartner v. United
States, 322 US 66 (1944), Justice Frankfurter wrote for the Court that “under the American
constitution a naturalized citizen stands on equal footing with a native citizen in all respects
save that of eligibility to the Presidency.” In that case of the Philippines Constitution, natural
born citizenship is required only for members of the National Assembly (and therefore the
President and prime Minister since they are elected from among the members of the
Assembly), the members of the judiciary, and those of the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. Consequently, no law may require
natural born citizenship with respect to other positions, much less with respect to private
offices or business.
However, examinees may also answer that there is no basis for the classification in the law
between natural born and naturalized citizen for purposes of directorship in domestic
commercial banks. Such a classification is violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.
Removal of Eligible Civil Service Officer

“A”, a civil service eligible, was appointed Director for Security of the Bureau of Customs.
He was detailed to the Arrastre Service and, in his stead, “B”, was designated Acting Director
of Security. However, “A” continued receiving salary as Director for Security. Subsequently,
the President extended a permanent appointment to “A” as Arrastre Superintendent, and
another appointment to “B” as Director for Security. Refusing to accept the position, “A”
insisted quo warranto proceeding before the Court of First Instance of Manila, claiming that
he had been removed without just cause. “B”, on the other hand, argued that “A” can be
ousted from the position of Director for Security even without just cause, because the same
is confidential in character. (1982 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In Hernandez v. Villegas, 14 SCRA 544 (1965) based on the same facts, the Supreme Court held:
“For Our purposes, we do not need to consider whether the position involved in this case is
primarily confidential, because, even assuming the position to be, it is nevertheless subject to the
Constitutional provision that “no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause.” (Phil. Const. art. XII, sec. 4, now art. XII, B, sec. 4 of the 1973
Constitution) Villegas’ removal is, therefore, concededly without cause…. The statement in De
Los Santos v. Mallare, supra, to the effect that appointment to any of the three classes of positions
is terminable at the will of the appointing power, must be deemed a mere obiter. It has been
correctly criticized as misleading. For if these three special positions do not really belong to the
Civil Service, the Constitution would not have specifically named them as an exception to the
general rule that all appointments must be made on the basis of merit and fitness to be determined
by competitive examinations. (Sinco, Philippine Political Law 411 ( 11th ed. 1962). Indeed, in
(Corpuz v. Cuaderno, 114 Phil. 683 (1962), this statement was held as not controlling, the ruling
in the De Los Santos case, where the statement appears, being that a city engineer who belongs
to the unclassified service is protected by the security of tenure provisions of the Constitution.”

Effect of Acquittal

X, a cashier of the Bureau of Customs, was prosecuted for malversation of public funds. At
the same time, he was charged administratively for dishonesty based on the same evidence
as that presented in the criminal case against him.
X was acquitted in the criminal case for failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. However, X was found guilty in the administrative case and ordered
dismissed from the service.
In his appeal, X invoked his acquittal in the criminal case as basis for the reversal of the
administrative decision.
Decide. (1983 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
To acquittal of X in the criminal case for malversation of public funds is a ground for the dismissal
of the administrative case for the same offense against him. In Tabora v. Montelibano, 98 Phil 800
(1956) it was held that the acquittal of a person of the charge of malversation entitles him to
reinstatement and payment of back unpaid salaries. While in private employment it has been held
that because evidence which would be enough to warrant suspension or dismissal may not suffice
to bring about conviction in a criminal case, because of the requirement that the guilt of an accused
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, the cases distinguish employees who are civil service
eligible. In the case of the latter the Civil Service guarantee that they cannot be removed except
for cause has been held to justify the administrative exoneration of an employee who has been
acquitted in criminal case. (See Gatmaitan v. Manila Railroad Co., 21 SCRA 191, NARIC v.
NARIC Workers’ Union, 98 Phil 563, 1956); Fabella v. PNB (CA) 56 OG 536 (1960).

National Economy And Patrimony

Use of Property
The Municipality of Pasig , Metro Manila, received a donation of a two-hectare lot which it
converted into a public park. The cost of costruction of the park was partially met through
public contribution. As the Municipality could not pay the balance of the construction cost,
the contractors sued and secured a judgment against the Municipality.
Can the contractor have the park attached as security for the satisfaction of the judgement?
Explain. (1981 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The public park cannot be attached. In Viuda de Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of iloilo, 49 Phil.
52 (1962), It was held that “the movable and immovable property of a municipality, necessary for
government purposes, may not be attached and sold for the payment of a judgment against the
municipality. The Supreme reason for this rule is the character of the public use to which such
kind of property is devoted. The necessity for government service justifies that the property of
public use of the municipality be exempt certain property of private individuals in accordance with
section 452 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”

Hereditary Succession
“A”, a Filipino citizen, bought a farm of ten hectares in Tanay, Rizal, in 1937. In 1950, he
emigrated to Canada with his wife and his only child “B”. In 1973, “A”, his wife and son
became naturalized as Canadian citizens. :A” and his wife died in a vehicular accident in
1980.
Who is entitled to own the farm left by “A”, the Philippine Government, or “B'? Reasons.
(1981 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The farm passed to B by hereditary succession upon the death of A. The fact that A and his family,
including B, became Canadian citizens and under Commonwealth Act No. 63, sec. 1 (1) they lost
their Philippine citizenship is of no moment. Article XIV, sec 14 of the Constitution provides that
save in cases of hereditary succession no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Education, Science And Technology, Arts, Culture And Sports

Academic Freedom
(a) What do you understand by “academic freedom”, and what is the limitation of its
exercise”?
(b) The constitution provides that the “ownership and management of the mass media shall
be limited to citizens of the Philippines or corporation wholly owned and managed by
such citizen.” Is this not repugnant to the press freedom and freedom of speech provision
of the Constitution? If so, which provision would prevail? (1979 BAR EXAM)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Academic freedom is the freedom of the teacher or researcher to investigate and discuss the
problems of his science and to publish his conclusions thereon without interference from the
political or ecclesiastical authorities. As applied to institution of learning, according to Garcia
v. Faculty of Admissions, it includes the right to determine what to teach, how to teach it,
when to teach it, and to whom to teach it.
(b) Art. XV, Sec. 7, par 1, does not militate against freedom of speech, which is subject to the
police power. The purpose of the rule is to prevent aliens from dominating the mass media,
whose pervasive and strong influence in the crystallization of public opinion may be used by
these foreigners for their ulterior purposes to the prejudice of the national interest.

The Family

Marriage
(a) Would a law be constitutionally valid in providing that, before a marriage license may be
issued by the appropriate official of a city or municipality, the parties to the prospective
marriage should first submit to him a certification from a Family Planning Center that they
have undergone at least a week of instruction and/or information on family planning?
(b) “F,” a newspaperman, began the production of a movie portraying the life of an
unmarried mayoralty candidate who was killed during an election campaign. “F” was basing
the film on a book on the candidate’s life, the rights to which he had purchased. Although
the emphasis of the movie was on the candidate’s public life, it portrayed portions dealing
with his private and family life including scenes depicting his mother and his girl friend. The
family objected to the production as an invasion upon their privacy. “F” contended, however,
that since the candidate was a public figure, the movie production was but in exercise of the
constitutional right of freedom of speech of the press.
Between the right to privacy on the one hand and the right to freedom of expression on the
other, which would you sustain? (1980 BAR EXAMS)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Yes, the law is valid. The Constitution makes it the responsibility of the state to achieve and
maintain population levels conductive to the national welfare. (Art XV, Sec 10) In fulfillment of
this duty, the government may by law require prospective couples to undergo instruction in family
planning.
(b) The right of privacy should prevail. As held in Lagunzad v. Soto Vda. De Gonzales, L-32066,
August 6, 1979 92 SCRA 476, “Being a public figure does not automatically destroy in toto a
person’s right to privacy. The right to invade a person’s privacy to disseminated public information
does not extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure
he or she may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present the
true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film
because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality. Freedom of expression, indeed,
occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties. It is not, however, without
limitations. In the particular circumstances presented and considering the obligation assumed by
petitioner under the agreement, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly
because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of
private concern.”

General Provisions

State immunity
A. Upon what is based the principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent?
B. May an office, agency or instrumentality of the republic which is unincorporated and
possessing no juridical personality be sued without the consent of the government?
C. X was the owner of a parcel of land evidenced by a certificate of title issued to her in
1924. No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property
appeared at the back of the title. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the
government used a portion of X’s land for the construction of 2 avenues. X asked for
payment of the use of the land but the then auditor general disallowed the claim of X
fronting the site of the construction ground stopped the republic for the recovery of the
land with damages. The CFI before which the complaint was filed dismissed the same
for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the complaint is actually a suit against the
state without its consent. Was the action taken by the court tenable? (1976 BAR
EXAMS)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. The principle rests upon a two-fold basis: first, upon grounds of public policy, and second,
upon sovereignty. Public policy because public service will be hindered and the public
safety endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to suit at the instance of
every citizen and controlled in the use and disposition of means required for the proper
administration of government. Sovereignty because there can be no legal right against the
authority which makes the law on which the right depends. Some authorities add another
basis: the theory of social contract. Under this theory, the people had agreed to surrender
some of their rights in favor of the higher rights of the state. One of such rights surrendered
is the right to sue the government without its consent.
B. It depends on the nature of its functions. If it exercises sovereign or governmental function,
it may not be sued without the consent of the government. Contrariwise, if it exercises
business or proprietary function, it may be sued. However, if the business function is
merely accidental to the governmental function of the office, then it may not be sued
without the government’s consent.
C. No. the doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
 injustice to a citizen. When the government takes a private property for public use without
instituting proper condemnation proceedings, it makes manifest that it submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit
could still be appropriately invoked in an action brought by the property owner against the
government for the payment of just compensation

State immunity
A. On November 1, 1976, A,B,C and D, self-styled Moro rebels long wanted by the
authorities for the fatal ambuscade of a bus-load of innocent civilians, hijacked a PAL
plane on its Manila-Davao flight which they forcibly diverted to, and landed in
Djarkarta, Indonesia. In that country , A, B, C and D sought political asylum, invoking
the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights. Reacting, the Philippines
Government, thru proper diplomatic channels, sought after their extradition. May
Indonesia grant Asylum or should it extradite A, B, C and D to the Philippines? Reason.

B. While about to leave his place of work inside U.S Naval Base in Subic, E, a Filipino
civilian employee therein, was unceremoniously stopped and undignifiedly search by
U.S. Marines, acting upon orders of the Base Provost Marshall on suspicion of pilfering
navy property, but only to be released after several hours of detention when nothing was
found in his person. Charging excess of jurisdiction and abuse of authority, E filed a suit
before the CFI of Olongapo City against the Provost Marshall and other base officers
for damages for violation of his Constitutional rights under Art. 32 of the Civil Code.
Moving the dismiss, defendant Base officials contend: (1) that the civil code does not
apply inside the U.S. Naval Base; and (2) that having acted in their official capacities,
the suit which has not given its consent thereto. Decide with reasons.

C. R and S are both U. S. military servicemen subject to the military law of the United
States and regularly assigned to the Philippines. While in Clark Air Force Base, R
sladered a 19-year old daughter of S by calling her a professional “call girl”. Assume
that slander is also punishable under U. S. laws and an appropriate prosecution is
initiated against R. Under the US-PI Military Bases Agreement, which country would
have primary jurisdiction to try the case? Reason. (1976 BAR EXAMS)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. Inasmuch as the offenders are merely “self-styled” Moro rebels, I take it that they are not
actual rebels and there is no political color to their acts. Indonesia must therefore extradite
them to the Philippines in view of our recently concluded treaty of extradition with Indonesia
relative to such crimes as murder or homicide obviously committed in the “fatal ambuscade”.
It additionally extradite is requested for the hijacking , the same should likewise be granted.

B. The motion to Dismiss should be DENIED firstly, because Philippines laws such as the Civil
Code operate even inside the Bases, our Government not having relinquished territorial
jurisdiction and sovereignty over the Bases and secondly, while they may have acted in their
official capacities, certainly the Provost Marshall and other base officers are not supposed to
exercise unlawful and illegal acts, which are prohibited even under United States Law.
 Obedience to lawful orders may exempt but obedience to unlawful commands cannot
exempt. Said act therefore cannot be presumed to have been done by a foreign government
as an Act of State. Verily therefore, this is not a suit against the United States. Or the position
of the Base officials that the Civil Code does not apply inside the U. S. Naval Base is not
meritorious. The U.S. Naval Base in Subic is part of Philippines territory, and Philippine law
apply therein as in other parts of the Philippines. However, the second contention is well
taken. Having acted in their official capacities and in obedience to the direct orders of their
superiors, the Base officers may not be held personally liable for damages in the absence of
proof showing that the United States consented to be sued before the Philippine courts. This
is one of the limitations on Philippine jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss should be granted
on this ground.

C. Under the US-PI Military Bases Agreement, the general rule( if the act is punishable both
by Philippines and US laws) is that the Philippines has primary jurisdiction and it will not
matter whether the Crime is an exception, and this occurs when the accused is a person
subject to US Military Law and the Crime he committed is one of the following:

1. Against the property or security of the U.S.

2. Against theproperty or person of:
a) a member of the U.S. Armed Forces; or
b) a member of the Civilian Component; or
c) a dependent of either.
3. In connection with official duty.

In the present problem, the accused is a Member of the U.S. Armed Forces, AND the crime
has been committed against the person of the dependent member of the U.S. Armed Forces.
Thus, the U.S. has primary jurisdiction. Be it noted that the Agreement speaks of a crime
against "property" or "person", and the crime in the problem is one of "slander" ( one that
under the Revised Penal Code is not a crime against "property" or "person"),
NONETHELESS there is no indication in the Agreement that the offense against "property"
or "person" are those referred to as such in the Philippine Revised Penal Code, whose
classification of crimes may not tally with that under U.S. laws.

State Immunity
The validity of nationalization of the rice and corn industry embodied in a statute prohibiting
an alien from being employed in any capacity in any establishment in any industry except as
a member of the technical personnel and only upon authority of the President of the
Philippines was assailed on grounds of lack of due process and equal protection. How would
you rule on such objection? May such nationalistic policy be applied in certain areas of
investments? Reason out your answer, citing constitutional provisions. (1978 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. The law nationalizing the rice and corn industry is itself not violative of the equal protection of
the laws. The purpose of the law is not to discriminate against aliens but merely to reserve to
 citizens of the Philippines the rice and corn industry, industries which directly affect not only
the national economy but also national security. The classification made by the law into citizens
and aliens is reasonable and proper. Substantial distinction exist between them; such
classification is germane to the purpose of the law and is not limited to existing conditions only
and applies equally to all citizens and aliens, as the case may be. If the rice and corn industry
itself is nationalized, necessarily, employment therein must also be nationalized by prohibiting
alien employment therein, otherwise the purpose of the law may be circumvented. Again, for
purposes of employment, substantial distinctions exist between citizens and aliens in the
exercise and conduct of the industry regulated.

2.The law does not violate the due process clause. Its purpose is legitimate: to prevent aliens
control and dominance of the rice and corn industry, an industry which affects national economy
and security. The means employed by the law is reasonable, alien employment in a nationalized
industry may open the door to the use of dummies, thereby circumventing the law. Moreover,
alien employment is not absolutely barred. They may still be employed in technical positions
but as an added safeguard, such employment must be with the approval of the President.

3.Yes. Under Section 3 of Article XIV, “the National Assembly shall, upon the
recommendation of the National Economic Development Authority, reserve to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations wholly owned by such citizens, certain traditional
areas of investments when the national interest so dictates.”

State Immunity
Plaintiffs filed a complaint with the CFI seeking payment for their parcel of land from the
national government, alleging from 1947, it took possession of their private property for the
purpose of widening a national road. The defense of the government was the absence of its
consent to be sued. This was upheld by the lower court which dismissed the case. Plaintiffs
appealed to the SC. How would you decide the case? Reasons. (1978 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Decisions of the lower court should be reversed. The doctrine of immunity of the state from suit
cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to citizens. When the government takes
any private property for public use without instituting proper condemnation proceedings, it makes
manifest that it submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court. There is no thought then that the
doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked in action brought by the
property owner against the government for the payment of just compensation.

State Immunity
By law passed by the Batasang Pambansa, the Courts are directed to fix as the just
compensation for property expropriated by the Government either the assessed value of the
land by the owner, or the market value whichever is the lesser amount. The law is entitled:
“Assessment Law of 1979”. “A”, owner of a property expropriated by the Government
contests the legality of the provision referred to, alleging that the same is not expressed in
the title of the law, nor is it germane to the subject matter thereof. He contends further that
fixing just compensation is a matter of judicial power, not legislative. Decide on the merit of
the contentions.
(b) Spouses “A” and “B” donated a piece of land to a Government bureau with a condition
attached to the deed of donation that said bureau “shall install lighting and water facilities
and construct a building and parking lot therein”. The bureau having failed to comply with
the condition, the spouses filed a suit for revocation. The court dismissed the suit because the
State cannot be sued without its consent. This decision of the Court was appealed to the
Supreme Court. Decide. (1979 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Yes, under Art. VIII, Sec 19, par. 1, of the Constitution since the title of the bill is not supposed
to be a catalogue or index of all the contents of the measure. The title in the problem is not
enough to alert the people to the possible scope thereof, which could reasonably include rues
on the proper valuation of expropriated lands.
This measure is valid insofar as it prevents the owner from disowning his own sworn
declaration or allow actual value of the property to be determined by the court on the basis
of relevant factors, conformably to the formula devised by the legislature.
(b) This is the case of Santiago vs. Republic of the Philippines, where it was held that violation
of the conditional donation imported a presumed waiver of the immunity of the State from
suit. Moreover, the claim could have been filed with Commission on Audit under C.A. No.
327 as it was not a money claim.

Amendments or Revisions

Amendments
A. Distinguish:
1. Constituent power from legislative power
2. Political question from justiciable question

B. The President proposes amendments to the Constitution providing in substance, for

the reversion from the Parliamentary to the Presidential system of government and
calls a referendum, appropriating funds therefor, in which to submit said proposals
to the people for ratification. X, a citizen and a taxpayer, challenges before the
Supreme Court the presidential acts aforesaid claiming that the propsed amendments
will only resurrect the evils of the Old Society and that a referendum plebiscite is not
the proper method for ratification. In turn, the SolGen contends that X has not
standing to bring the action, that the issue is political and not justiciable, and that the
President does not have any power to prepare amendment to the Constitution. Decide
with reasons.
C. What is meant by constitutional authoritarianism? Is it compatible with the
constitutionally declared principle that the Phils is a Republican State? (1976 BAR
EXAMS)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
 1. Constituent power is the power to make or amend the Fundamental Law. Legislative
power, on the other hand, is essentially lawmaking power. It is the power to make laws and
to alter and to repeal them. A general grant of legislative power to the legislature under the
Constitution does not include the grant of constituent power.
2. The term political question connotes a question of policy. It refers to those questions which,
under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislature or
executive branch of the government. Hence, political questions are beyond judicial
cognizance. Judicial authority over a case involving political question extends no further
than to dismiss it for want of jurisdiction. A justiciable question, on the other hand, refers
to one which calls for the full exercise of judicial power. Courts decide such questions on
the merits. The question of validity or legality of the assumption and exercise of powers,
as well as the allocation of power, that calls for the application or interpretation and
construction of the provisions of the constitution is a legal or justiciable question.

B. X has locus standi to bring this action. The action question the validity of a decree which
appropriate funds. Its purpose is to prohibit the disbursement of such funds. If the decree
is unconditional there will a misapplication of funds. A taxpayer like X has therefore a
substantial interest in prohibiting an illegal expenditure of public funds.
The issue raised is legal and justiciable. Since the constitution provides how it may be
amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that constitution, can declare whether the
procedure followed or the authority assumed in proposing amendment thereto is valid or
not.

C. Constitutional authoritarianism is a form of government wherein all the political powers of

the government are by constitution vested in and to be exercised by a single official or
ruler. Since a republican state is one where sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanate from them and since it is the people themselves – in
adopting their constitution – who provided for a constitutional authoritarian government
therein, there is then no incompatibility between constitutional authoritarianism and the
principle of republicanism.

Amendment
Under Section 10 of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is mandated that “the
state shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the
barrio to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.” Under the 1976
amendments, however, which were proposed by President Marcos, the barangays and
sanggunians were given constitutional recognition. Does this amendment have the effect of
abolishing the barrio, considering that the barangay now exercise political and public
functions originally exercised by barrio units? Reason out your answers. (1978 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The concept of barrios remain as one the political and territorial subdivisions into which the
Philippines is divided (Sec. 10, Art. II; Sec. 1, Art. XI, New Constitution). What happened is that
under Presidential Decree No. 557 issued on September 21, 1974 “all existing barrios or barrios
that may be created were (are hereby) declared as barangays and all references to the barrio in any
existing laws shall henceforth be understood as referring to the barangay.” In short, only the name
has been changed from barrio to barangay. But the entity remains the same.

Amendments to the Constitution

In Sanidad v. COMELEC, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the
President, in the absence of the Interim National Assembly, could propose amendments to
the Constitution. Petitioner argued that the exercise of legislative powers by the President
under Martial Law did not convert him into a constituent assembly for constitutional
amendments. What is the majority opinion? The dissenting? Discuss briefly. (1978 BAR
EXAMS)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The majority opinion holds that in a crisis government such as which existed during the first phase
of the transition period, there is concentration of powers in the President. Although an interim
National Assembly legally exist, it has not yet been convened and therefore not in a position to
exercise and discharge its powers. The President, during the said period, could exercise the
legislative power not only because of the absence of an interim National Assembly but as the
administrator of martial law. There is no reason why he could not also exercise the constituent
power to propose amendments which is but an adjunct to legislative power. Otherwise, there will
be a vacuum in the Constitution. The President and the judiciary are the only existing constitutional
organs and since the judiciary cannot propose amendments to the constitution, only the President
can exercise that power to prevent that vacuum.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The dissenting opinion, in turn, holds that the power to propose amendments to the Constitution is
a constituent power. It is separate from and not a part of nor an adjunct to legislative power. The
Constitution specifically vests the power in the interim National Assembly during the transition
period; (Sec. 15, Art. XII, N.C) by no other organ or official can that power be exercised. The
Constitution is not only a grant but a limitation of power. To avoid the so-called vacuum, it is
incumbent upon the incumbent President to convene the interim National Assembly for the specific
purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution and not use his refusal; to convene it to
justify his assumption of its power. The true will of the sovereign people is embodied in the
amendatory procedure provided in the Constitution; hence, to propose amendments in any other
way is a derogation to that will.

Amendments

The President wants the Constitution amended on its judiciary provisions, to restore the
retirement age of judges and justices to 70 years, and to return the supervision of courts
to the Ministry of Justice from the Supreme Court.
(a) May the President propose the amendment himself and call a plebiscite to ratify them as
he did with the last October, 1976 amendments to the 1973 Constitution, an act sustained
as a valid procedure by the Supreme Court in the referendum-plebiscite cases?
(b) May the Interim National Assembly or Batasang Pambansa (IBP) propose the
constitutional amendments without being called by the President/ Prime Minister as a
constituent body?
(c) Is an amendment to the Constitution valid even without a proclamation of the
President/Prime Minister to the effect that the votes required to ratify the amendment
has been met? (1979 BAR EXAMS)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The President may no longer propose amendments to the Constitution because the IBP
is now functioning. Sanidad v. Commisssion on Elections was decided principally on
the basis of the non-convening of the interim National Assembly and the resultant
vacuum that had to be filled, logically by the President, who was then already
exercising legislative authority. The Supreme Court said that the power to propose
constitutional amendments was an adjunct of the legislative power.
(b) Under Art. XVII , Sec. 15, of the Constitution, the IBP may propose constitutional
amendments by a majority vote of all its members only upon special call by the interim
Prime Minister.
(c) This was required only with respect to the 1976 constitutional amendments. Sec. 16 of
Art. XVII provides that proposed amendments shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast at a plebiscite called for the purpose, subject presumably to
certification of the results thereof not by the President but by the Commission on
Elections.

Amendments
(a) Considering the specific and paramount purpose for which the Interim National
Assembly was created by the Constitution itself, may it propose an amendment thereto
to revert the form of government form parliamentary to the Presidential type as we had
under the 1935 Constitution?
(b) May the members of the National Assembly who are lawyers practice their profession?
A member of the Interim National Assembly is served with a warrant of arrest while the
assembly is in session. May the warrant be enforced, and may the Interim National
Assembly be obliged to surrender the erring member? (1979 BAR EXAMS)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Three possible answers:
1. Art. XVII, Sec. 5, of the Constitution provides that the IBP shall give preference to the
enactment of, among others, measures for the orderly transition from the presidential to the
parliamentary system of government. Hence, it cannot propose a change of government.
2. Its power to propose amendments under Art. XVII, Sec. 15, which, incidentally, is later in
point of location, is plenary and, therefore, includes proposals to change the form of
government.
3. The problem speaks of the “Interim National Assembly” which has already been abolished.
Hence, it can no longer make any proposal or, for that matter, function at all.
(b) Art. XVII, Sec. 10, of the Constitution provides that a member of the National Assembly
may not appear as counsel before any court inferior to a court of appellate jurisdiction, before
any court in any civil case wherein the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof is an adverse party, or before any administrative body. If he is also a
 member of the Cabinet, he may also not practice his profession or appear before any judicial
or administrative body under Art. IX, Sec. 8.
(c) Under Art. VIII, Sec. 9, of the Constitution, a member of the National Assembly is immune
from arrest while attending the legislative session, and while going to and returning from the
same, for any offense punishable by not more than six years imprisonment.
To the provision also states that within 24 hours after its adjournment for a recess or for its
next regular session, the National Assembly should surrender the wanted member to the
authorities.

Ratification
When, how, and by whom was the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines ratified? (1975 BAR
EXAMS)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
By Proclamation No. 1102 the President certified and proclaimed that the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was ratified by the overwhelming majority of
all the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the
Philippines and that it had thereby come into effect. While the Supreme Court, by the vote of 6
Justices, held in Javellana v. Executive Secretary 69 O.G. 7975 (1973) that the proposed
Constitution was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution, nevertheless, the Court failed to rule “that the new Constitution is not in force”.
Accordingly the petitions challenging the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 and seeking to
enjoin enforcement of the new Constitution by executive officials were dismissed, with the
consequence that “there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered
in force and effect”. The effect of this ruling is to uphold the validity of Proclamation No. 1102.
Its date, January 17, 1973, is regarded as the date of effectivity of the new Constitution.

Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court, especially in the Martial Law cases and the
Referendum cases, held that the effectivity of the new Constitution was laid to reset by the
acceptance or acquiescence of the Filipino people.

Ratification cases; Referendum-plebiscite

In the following historic cases, discuss fully the principal issue raised by the petitioners and
petitioners and the ruling promulgated by the Supreme Court:
1. Martial law cases (Aquino vs. Enrile)
2. Ratification cases (Jovellana vs. Exec. Sec.)
3. Referendum cases (Aquino vs. COMELEC)
Referendum-plebiscite cases (Sanidad vs. COMELEC) (1977 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
There were several principle issues presented in many of these case.
1. Martial law cases (Aquino vs. Enrile)
Petitioners were arrested of the Philippines, following the proclamation of martial law on
September 21, 1972. They applied to the Supreme Court for writs of habeas corpus,
contending that the declaration of martial law was unconstitutional. The writs were issued
requiring respondent Secretary of National Defense and military official to make a return
contending that the declaration of martial law was justified by a rebellion and the consequent
danger to public safety. It was claimed that petitioners were involved in a conspiracy to seize
political and state power and to take over the government by force.”

Shortly after, some of the petitioners withdrew their petitions and were subsequently released.
Others, without doing so, were likewise released with the result that only two of the petitioners
(Jose W. Diokno and Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.) remained in custody.

On August 11, 1973, petitioner Aquino was charged with murder, subversion and illegal
possession of firearms before a military commission. On December 28, of the same year,
Diokno filed a motion to withdraw the petition filed on his behalf on the ground that, because
of the decision on his behalf on the ground that, because of the decision in the ratification
cases in the decision of the members of the Court to take an oath of allegiance to the new
Constitution he could not “reasonably expect to get justice” in this case.

On September 11, 1974, Diokno was released from military custody on order of the President
so that only petitioner Aquino remained in detention. On September 17, the Supreme Court
dismissed the remaining petitions. The court in a resolution prepared by Chief Justice
MAKALINTAL, said (1) that seven Justices (Makalintal, C.J, Zaldivar, Ferndo, Teehankee,
Barredo, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ.) had voted to grant Diokno’s motion to withdraw,
while five (Castro, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra and Fernandez, JJ) had voted to deny it but
that in view of Diokno’s subsequent release from custody, all members of the Court, with the
exception of Castro, J., agreed to dismiss the petition on the ground of mootness; (2) that six
Justices (Barredo , Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Antonio, JJ.) held that
whether the proclamation of martial law was justified by the condition in the country at the
time was political question; while five (Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, and
Muñoz Palma,JJ.) held that the Court could determine the constitutional sufficiency of the
proclamation of martial law under the test laid down in Lansang vs. Garcia, L-33964,
December 11, 1971; (3) that the power to detain persons even without charges for acts related
to the situation which justified the proclamation of martial law necessary implied the power
to impose conditions or restrictions which were germane to, or necessary to carry out the
purposes of, the proclamation of martial law. Fernando, J. dissented, contending that the
restrictions placed on petitioner Rodrigo’s right to travel should be removed; (4) that implicit
in a state of martial law is the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

CASTRO,J. filed a separate opinion stating: (1) that Diokno’s motion to withdraw the petition
in his behalf should be denied; (2) that there was no doubt as to existence of rebellion; (3) that
while court could inquire into, or take judicial notice of the existence of conditions claimed
to justify the declaration of the martial law the determination of the necessity for the exercise
of such power was within the constitutional domain of the President and as long as the
measures taken were reasonably related to the occasion involved, interference by the courts
would be officious; (4) that given the validity of the proclamation of martial law the arrest and
detention of those believed to be engaged in the disorder or in fomenting it was beyond
question; (5) that the suspension of the writ was subsumed in a declaration of martial law.
FERNANDO, J., filed a concurring and dissenting opinion, stating (1) that Aquino’s petition
should be dismissed solely on the ground that charges had been filed against him and therefore
the question of legality of his detention had become moot; that the conditions imposed on
petitioner Rodrigo’s release should be removed on the principle that freedom of travel should
be unrestricted; and that the petition filed in behalf of Diokno should be considered
withdrawn; (2) that the vadility of proclamation No. 1081 could no longer be questioned in
view of the provision of Article XVII, Section 3(2) of New Constitution making all
proclamations, orders and decrees issued by the incumbent President to be valid and binding
as part of the land; (3) that independently of the New Constitution, Proclamation No. 1081
was valid, the President not having been shown to have acted arbitrarily in issuing it; (4) that
is was doubtful whether the writ of habeas corpus and, therefore, it was desirable that if the
intention was to suspend the privilege of the wri, a specific to this effect should be issued: (5)
that nevertheless, preventive detention, where necessary to enable the state to defend itself,
was allowable: (6) that wheter an individual fell within the coverage of the proclamation
was a judicial question.

TEEHANKEE, J., filed a separate opinion stating that ( 1) Diokno’s motion to withdraw
petition should be granted because a simple majority of seven to tweleve members of the Court
is legally sufficient to grant the motion, since it does not involve a decision on the merits: (2)
That court should not rule on constitutional issues except when necessary in an appropriate
case, and as urged by respondent” at the very least, this Court should postpone consideration
***until the present emergency is over”;(3) a party’s subjective evaluation of the Court’s
action is actually of no moment, for it has always been recognized that this Court, possessed
of neither the sword nor the purse, must ultimately and objectively rest its authority on
sustained public on sustained public confidence in the truth, justice integrity and moral force
of its judgements (4) petitioner is in error in his assumption that this court is a “ new court
functioning under a News Constitution different from the Court and the Constitution under
which (he) applied for (his) release. “The same Supreme Court has continued saved that it
now operates under Article X of the 1973 Constitution: ( 5) during the period of ninety days
that the Ratification cases were pending before the days that the Ratification cases were
pending before the Court until their dismissal became final on April 17, 1973.the Executive
Department was operating under the 1973 Constitution in accordance with the Proclamation
No. 1102 ON January 17, 1973 while this court as the only other governmental department
continued to operate under the 1935 Constitution pending its final resolution on the said cases
challenging the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 and enforcement of the New
Constitution;(6) petitioner Aquino’s petition should be dismissed on the ground that charges
had been filed against him and had filed another petition questioning his trial by a military
commission which has superseded his present petition and where the same constitutional
issues may properly be resolved (see the Military Tribunal case), and (7) Petitioner Rodrigo’s
petition should be dismissed having been rendered moot and academic by his release from
physical confinement and detention.

BARREDO, J., concurred, stating (1) that the judicial power of the Supreme Court is
complete and plenary and covers all cases of whatever nature, including those traditionally
termed as political: and it’s up to the court in the light of the attendant circumstances and the
imperativeness and inadvisability of the intervention, as the national interest may dictate, to
take the cognizance of the same or not; that, in any event, G.O. No. 3 and G. O. No. 3-A
Removing from the jurisdiction of the courts cases involving the constitutionality of martial
law proclamations orders and decrees had become inoperative: (2) that the court should
abstain from determining the constitutional sufficiency of Proclamation No. 1081: (3) that the
Constitution definitely commits the Excutive the determination of the factual bases for the
proclamation of martial law; (4) that the judiciary was not powerless to check the abuse of
the power to proclaim martial law; (5) that under Constitution the President has authority to
determine when condition justified the restoration of the regular constitutional process;(6) that
the proclamation of martial law carried with it the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus; (7) that under Article XVII, section 3 (2) of the Constitution the proclamations,
orders and decrees of the incumbent President , whether issued before or after the ratification
of the New Constitution, are valid and cannot be questioned in court; (8) that this interpretation
of Article XVII , Section 3 (2) is confirmed by the results of the referendum held in January
and July of 1973.

ANTONIO, J., joined by makasiar, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., filed a separate opinion
stating (1) that the 1935 Constitution expressly conferred the power to proclaim martial
exclusively on the President ; (2) that in times of emergency there was a need for prompt and
unhesitating obedience to the orders of the President as every delay or obstacle to its
immediate implementation may jeopardize the safety of the nation; (3) that there was danger
to public safety arising from the Communist rebellion, justifying the proclamation of martial
law;(4) that the arrest and detention of petitioner were made pursuant to the proclamation of
martial law; (5) that the proclamation of martial law in effect suspended the privilege of the
writ of habeas with respect to those involved in the rebellion and subversion; (6) that petitioner
Aquino had been charged with subversion and therefore his detention was related to the
proclamation of martial law; (7) that the restrictions on the freedom to travel of certain
petitioners were justified by the requirement of national security.

ESGUERRA,J,. filed a separate opinion stating (1) the Proclamation No. 1081; (2) that the
veracity or sufficiency of the factual bases of the Proclamation could not be inquired into by
the courts; (3) that the question presented by the petitions in these cases were political and not
justiciable.

FERNANDEZ, J., joined by Makasiar, Antonio, and Aquino, JJ., filed a separate opinion
stating (1) that Diokno’s motion to withdraw for the reasons given by him should be denied
but in view of his subsequent release, his motion should now be allowed, the petition for
habeas corpus having become moot and academic; (2) that the power to proclaim martial law
is exclusively vested in the President and the proclamation of martial law raises a political
question; (3) that even under the test of Lansang vs. Garcia, Proclamation No. 1081 could not
be said to have been issued in an arbitrary manner; (4) that the validity of Proclamation 1081
was confirmed in Article XVII, Section 3(2) of the New Constitution; (5) that there was no
longer any question that the Constitution was in force and effect; (6) that the power to
determine whether the proclamation of martial law should be lifted is also vested in the
President alone; (7) that the proclamation of martial law automatically suspended the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.
MUŇOZ PALMA, J., filed a separate Opinion stating (I) that Diokno’s motion to withdraw
should be granted; (2) that petitioner. Aquino’s case should be dismissed; (3) that Court should
inquire into the sufhciency of the proclamation of martial law under the test of Lansang vs.
Garcia, 11-33964, December 11, 1971; (4) that the proclamation of ‘martial law was necessary
and the President’s action was neither capricious nor whimsical; (5) that the fact that courts
were open did not negate the need for the proclamation of martial law ; (6) that the
proclamation of martial law does not carry 'with it the automatic suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, except possibly when there is a total collapse of civil authorities;.
(7) that) proclamations, orders and decrees issued by the incumbent President had the force of
law but not of a constitutional mandate “and, therefore, were subject to judicial review like
statutes: (8) that the arrest of those suspected of complicity in the rebellion .was valid; (S!)
that the conditions imposed on those who had been released was a reasonable precautionary
measure in the face of danger and was not arbitrary.

2. Ratification cases (Javellana vs. Exec. Sec.)

Following the decision in the Plebiscite cases, these actions were filed in the Supreme Court
to restrain respondent executive officials from enforcing the New Constitution on the ground
that it was not” validly ratified. In b36155 (Roms vs. Exec. Sec.) the additional allegation was
made that petitioner were duly elected members of Congress who were unlawfully prevented
from meeting by the authorities who had taken physical possession of the Legislative
Building. Petitioners asked the Court to declare Proclamation No. 1102 declaring the New
Constitution in force, to be null and void. Respondents controverted petitioners’ allegations
and contended that the questions raised were political in character; that there was, substantial
compliance with the 1935 Constitution in the ratification of the New Constitution; that the
New Constitution had been ‘properly submitted to the people; and that Proclamation No. 1102
was conclusive on the courts.

The Court dismissed the petition in a resolution stating that, (1) On the question whethei the
validity of Procla‘mation No 1102 was justiciable or political, six Justices (Concepcion, C. J.,
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, ' ' .and Teehankee, JJ.) held that the issue was
justiciable and non-political. Barredo, J., qualified his vote and held that} ‘ the Court should
determine whether the New Constitution had actually been approved and, if so, the Court
should keep its hands off out of respect to the people’s will, but, in the negative, the Court
should determine Whether Article XV of the 1935 Constitution had been complied with. Three
Justices (Makasiar, Antonio, and. Esguerra, JJ.) held that the'issue was‘political and “beyond
the ambit of judicial inquiry;’.’ (2) On the question of'validity of the ratification, six Justices
(Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee, JJ.) held that the
proposed Constitution was not validily ratified in accordance With Article XV, Section 1 of
the 1935 Constitution, Which ' provided only one way for ratification, i.e., “in an election or
plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered
voters;” Justice: ' Barredo held that, while the ratification of the 1973 Constitution fell short
of the requirements of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, as he had “no means of refusing
to recognize as a judge that factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes Were
for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of
plebiscite followed in past ratifications,” in its political aspect, which was decisive, there had
been substantial compliance with Article XV 0f the 1935 Constitution and that the 1973
Constitution had been constitutionally ratified. Two justices (Makasiar and Esgueri'a, JJ.) held
that there had been substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid
ratification. Justice Antonio advanced the view that Article XV 0f the 1935 Constitution
applied only to amendments but not M a revision thereof. In the case of revision, where the
existing Constitution is to' be replaced by an entirely New Constitution, the procedure of
adoption is “reserved to the people.” In overwhelmingly approving the 1973 Constitution
through the Citizens’ Assembly, the people exercised such power reserved to them under the
1935 Charter. (3) On the question of acquiescense by the people in the proposed Constitution,
no majority ‘vote was reached by the Court. Four Justices (Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra, JJ.) held that the people had accepted the 1973 Constitution, two others (Concepcion
C.J., and Zaldivar, JJ.) held that under martial law the people qualified to vote all over the
Philippines could not express themselves freely on the proposed Constitution; four J ustices
(Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, and Teehankee, JJ.). expressed lack of knowledge or
competence to rule on the question on the ground that they could not ascertain whether the
people had accepted the Constitution; (4) On the question of relief, six Justices (Makalintal,
Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, and Esguerra, JJ.) voted to dismiss the petitions.
Makalintal and 'Castro, JJ., explained that “(T)hat effectivity of the said Constitution, in the
final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which
considerations other than judicial, and therefore beyond 'the competence of this Court are
relevant and unavoidable.” Four J ustices (Concepcion, C.J.,; Zaldivar, Fernando and
Teehankee, JJ.) voted to give due course to the petitions; (5) On the question whether the New
Constitution was in force, four Justices (Barredo, Makasiar: Antonio, and» Esguerra, JJ.) held
that it was in force by virtue of popular acquiescence; four (Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and
Teehankee, JJ.) abstained on the ground that they could not ascertain whether the people had
accepted the Constitution; and two (Concepcion, C.J., and Zaldivar, J.) voted that the proposed
Constitution was not in force, with the result that there were enough votes to declare that the
New Constitution was not in force; (6) by virtue of the majority of six votes of Makalintal
Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ.) with the four dissenting votes of the
Chief Justice and Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, JJ. the cases were dismissed with the
result that there was “no further judicial obstacle to the New Constitution being considered in
force and effect.”

3. Referendum Cases (Aquino vs. COMELE’C)

Petitioners brought his action for prohibition to stop the holding of a referendum on February
27, 1975. They contended that President Marcos did not have law-making powers and that at
all events he was no longer President of the Philippines. In addition it was‘ contended that
under martial law, there was no freedom of speech and that therefore there could be no true
expression of the Will of the people The Court through MAKASIAR, J., dis. missed the
petition

MAKASIAR, J. joined by Makalintal, C..,J and Aquino, . J ., in the result, held: ( 1) that
President Marcos was the “incumbent President”. Within the meaning of Article XVII Section
3(1-) of the Constitution and as such is authorized to “continue to exercise the powers and
prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the powers vested
in.the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution until he calls upon the interim
National Assembly to elect the interim President and the interim Prime Minister who shall
then exercise the legislative powers vested by this Constitution;” (2) that as Commander-in-
Chief and enforcer and administrator of martial law the President has authority to issue such
orders and decrees having the .force of law, as may be necessarily for the security and
preservation of the Republic, the defense of political and social liberties of the People and the
institution of reforms to prevent the re8urg-ence of rebellion or insurrection ; and (3) that
martial law is not incompatible with the holding of a referendum.

CASTRO, J., joined by Makalintal, Barredo, Antonio, Esguerra, and Fernandez, concurred on
the ground (1) that President Ferdinand E. Marcos was the constitutional and lawful President
of the Philippines; and (2) Article XVII, Section 3 of' the Constitution constitutes an
unmistakable constitutional warrant for the incumbent President, meaning President Marcos,
to legislate until at the Very earliest the interim National Assembly shall have been convoked.

FERNANDO, J ., concurred stating ( 1) that the question raised was not political; (2) that
petitioners as tax payers had standing; (3) that to grant the petition would be to declare illegal
a procedure that under the present regime is the only viable one for ascertaining the will of
the people; (4) that petitioners’ objection to the decrees on referendum are not weighty enough
to warrant granting their petition; (5) that to make the referendum meaningful, the people
should be allowed freedom of expression and assembly, no limitation being permissible unless
otherwise required by a clear and present danger.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurred in the view that President Marcos is the incumbent President
referred in Article XVII of the Constitution but dissented on the grounds that (1) the powers
vested in the President by Article XVII, Section 3(1) are executive, not. legislative powers ;
(2) the legislative powers which the President has under martial law are limited to those which
are necessary for the preservation of the state and the operation of the government; (3) the
immediate convening of the interim National Assembly, in which legislative power is vested,
is clearly required by the Constitution where the single most important change is the change
from the presidential to the parliamentary system of government; (4) from the very nature of
the transitory provisions which created it, its existence must likewise be interim, i.e.
temporary, Provisional, of passing and temporary duration (as opposed to permanent and the
regular institutions provided for in the first 15 articles of the Constitution) until after it shall
have reapportioned the Assembly seats and called for the election of the members of the
regular National Assembly; (5) the concept of martial law may not be expanded, as the main
opinion does, to cover the lesser threats of “worldwide recession, inflation or economic crisis
which presently threatens all nations” in derogation of the Constitution; (6) those legislative
powers granted in the cited Section 3(2) known‘ as the’ validating provision which validated
the President’s acts and decrees after the proclamation of martial law up to the ratification of
the Constitution are limited to modifying, revoking or superseding such validated acts and
degrees done or issued prior to the proclaimed ratification, since Section 7 of the Transitory
Provisions expressly reserves to the National Assembly the legislative power to amend,
modify or repeal “all existing laws not inconsistent with the. Constitution”; and (7) Referenda
(where 15-year olds participate) are admittedly consultative and cannot amend the
Constitution or any provision or mandate thereof.

BARREDO, J., joined by Makalintal, C.J., Antonio, Esguerra, and Fernandez, J.J., concurred
stating ( 1) that ' by virtue of ‘Article XVII, Section 3(1), President Marcos continued
exercising the powers of President under the 1935 Constitution and to exercise those of the
President and Prime Minister under the 1973 Constitution; (2) that . by virtue of Article XVII,
Section .3(2)/ he was given the power to make laws not inconsistent With existing laws -which
pursuant to Section 7 may only be amended, modified, or repealed by the regular National
Assembly; (3) that while nothing is said in the Constitution regarding referenda there is
nothing in it that prohibits their holding; on the contrary, the holding of referendums is the
best assurance against fears of dictatorship; (4) whether in the referendum the people will be
allowed freedom, of expression was a question that could not be determined beforehand; (5)
there was no evidence that the Commission on Elections was not independent and impartial.

ANTONIO, J., concurred, stating (1) that the President under martial law has legislative
powers which are affirmed in Article XVII, Section 3(1) of the Constitution; (2) that the
convening Of the interim National Assembly was left to the President to determine in view of
the emergency for which martial law was proclaimed; (3) that the exercise of authoritarian
powers to realize the ethical purposes of society is not inconsistent with profession of
democracy, since such powers are expressly conferred by the Constitution; (4) that the
referendum was a means of ascertaining the wishes of the people; (5) that there was no basis
for petitioner’s fear that the people would not be able to express their will in the referendum.

FERNANDEZ, J ., concurred, stating (1) that President Marcos had authority to exercise the
powers of the President of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and those of the
President and Prime Minister under the 1973 Constitution; (2) that the convening of the
interim National Assembly was left to the judgment of the President; (3) that it would be
unthinkable for the Constitutional Convention to leave it to the President when to convene the
"interim National Assembly Without providing for the exercise of legislative powers in the
meantime; (4) that the power to declare martial law includes the power to make needful rules
and regulations with the force and effect of law tintil the termination of martial rule.

MUNOZ PALMA, J ., concurred stating: (1) that by virtue of Article XVII, Section 3(1) of
the 1973 Constitution, President Marcos continued to exercise the powers of the President
under the 1935 Constitution during the transition period contemplated in said article, that is,
until the interim National Assembly shall have been called and the interim President and
interim Prime Minister shall have been elected after which the office of the incumbent
President ceases; (2) to fill up the vacuum during the transition period when the interim
National Assembly is not yet convened and functioning, the incumbent President necessarily
exercises legislative powers to carry out the. objectives of the proclamation of Martial Law
and for the orderly functioning of the government, and because this grant of vast executive
and legislative powers to the incumbent President Will result in a one-man rule, it cannot be
reasonably construed that the absence in the Constitution of a specific period of time for the
President to initially convene the interim assembly places the matter at his sole pleasure and
convenience otherwise, the incumbent President can keep the interim National Assembly,
which automatically came into existence upon the ratification of the 1973 Constitution, in
suspended animation as long as he pleases, hence, the President is called upon to use his sound.
discretion and judgment on the matter; (3): the holding bf a referendum is nothing more than
a device for consulting the people on national issues and as such is not prohibited 'by the
Constitution and is authorized as an exercise of 'executive power; (.4) a referendum‘ held
under a regime of Martial Law can be of no far reaching significance because it is being
accomplished under an atmosphere or climate of fear; (5) under the Constitution, Article XI,
Section 2, changes in the form of local governments can only be effected by the National
Assembly and approved by the people in a plebiscite.

4. Referendum Plebiscite cases (Sanidad vs. 7 COMELEC) ‘ ‘ '

Petitioners questioned the validity of Presidential Decree N0. 991 and 'No. 1033, dated
September. 2,. 1976 "and September 22, 1976 respectively, calling for the holding of a
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16, 1976 and for mulating the questions and the
amendments to be submitted to the people for their consideration.

The petitioners raised their issues, namely:

(1) Is the question of the constitutionality of P1esidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033
political or justiciable?
(2) During the present stage of the transition period, and under the environmental
circumstances now obtaining, does the President possess power to propose amendments to the
Constitution as 'well as set up the required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the
ratification of his proposals by the people?

(3) Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed
therefor a sufficient and proper submission?

The Supreme Court, by a vote of 8 to 2, dismissed the petitions.

On the first question, the Court voted 7 to 3 that the issue xx as justiciable.

On the second question, 7 voted to sustain the President’s exercise of constituent powers, 2
voted in the negative. One (Justice Fernando) concurred in the result but dismissed in part.

On the third question, 6 stated there was a sufficient and proper submission while 2 voted
there was none. Two Justices Fernando and Antonio, joined Justice Makasiar who was also
one of the 6 were of the view that this .2 question is political.

Justice Martin, writing for the Court, held that the amending process, both as to proposal and
ratification raises a justiciable question and that under the peculiar circumstances brought
about by the refusal of the people to convene the interim National Assembly, the President, of
necessity, had authority to exercise constituent powers.

Chief Justice Castro, concurring, held that ‘(1) the issue of the validity of the Presidential
Decrees was a justiciable question; '(2) without going into whether or not the President is
vested with constituent power, under the present transition period of our political
development, no provision exists in the Constitution as to the agency or agent by whom and
the procedure by which amendments thereto may be proposed and ratified; consequently,
constituent power at present remains with the people to be exercised by them in the manner
or through the agency of their choice, and (3) there was proper submission of the proposed
amendments within the allowed time frame.

Justice Fernando concurring: in the result, held that (1) the issue presented is justiciable; (2)
he dissents from the majority opinion that there is a concentration of governmental power in
the Executive in times of crisis; and therefore, (3) he expresses serious doubts rather than a
dissent as to the President’s authority to exercise constituent powers.

Justice Teehankee, dissenting, held that (1) the issue was justifiable; (2) the President’s act 'of
proposing amendments to the constitution had no constitutional and ' legal basis; and (3) there
was no proper submission considering the complex and -complicated proposed amendments,
their vagueness and ambiguity, and the limitations on free debate and discussion under martial
law.

Justice Barredo, concurring, held that (1) the issue was justiciable; (2). the President’s exercise
of constituent .power under the 'prevailing circumstances is not inconsistent with
constitutionalism but conforms admirably with the underlying, tenet of Government-the
sovereignty and plenary power of the people; and (3) while admitting that the majority may
be right in holding that the period given to the people is adequate, he) himself, prefers that the
referendum-plebiscite day be postponed; still the matter was for the President to decide.

Justice Makasiar, concurring, held that the matter at hand is political and therefore outside the
scope of judicial inquiry, the ultimate decision, being with the people.

Justice Antonio, ,concurring‘, held that (1) the issue involved is political and (2) the power to
propose amendments or to amend the Constitution is part of the inherent power of the people
as the depository of sovereignty; ' absent an interim National Assembly upon whom, through
the Constitution, the people have delegated authority to exercise constituent powers, it follows
from necessity that either the people should exercise that power themselves through any,other
instrumentality they may choose-in this case, the President.

Justice Munoz Palma while concurring fully in the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee
wrote a separate dissenting opinion ‘stressing the need to strictly observe the processes
embodied in the Constitution itself.

Justice Aquino concurred in the opinion of J . Antonio.

Justice Concepcion, Jr. concurring, held that (1) the issue is justiciable involving as it does a
determination of conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and (2) the authority
to amend the Constitution was transferred from the interim National Assembly to the seat of
sovereignty itself when the people voted against the convening of the interim National
Assembly.
Referendum
President Marcos has” issued Presidential Decree No. 1229 calling for a national referendum
on December 17, 1977 wherein the people will be asked this question: “Do you vote that
President Ferdinand E. Marcos continue in office as incumbent President and be Prime
Minister aftetthe organization of the interim Batas-ang Pambansa as provided for in
Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 amendments to the Constitution?”

The decree appropriated P10 million for implementing the provisions thereof and directed
the COMELEC to supervise the conduct of the referendum.

Assuming that Juan de la Cruz, a citizen of the Republic and a taxpayer, files in the Supreme
Court the proper petition against the COMELEC and the National Treasurer questioning
the legality of the referendum and the use and expenditure of public funds for said
referendum, contending that (1) the expenditure is unnecessary because the people had
already voted overwhelmingly in support of the leadership of President Marcos in previous
referenda; (2) that the so-called referendum is in reality a presidential election which is not
legally feasible under the present Constitution as amended; and (3) that the Muslim
seccessionist problem must first be solved before holding this political exercise. Will this
petition prosper? Why? Decide with reasons. (1977 BAR EXAMS)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(1) As first held in the Emergency Powers Cases and recently affirmed in Samidad v. Commission
on Elections, an ordinary citizen and taxpayer may question the validity of an appropriation
measure. In any event, according to the Supreme Court, the question of proper party is subject to
its discretion. ,

(2) The issue of the necessity of the expenditure is political in nature, addressed to the exclusive
discretion of the lawmaking power. Not even the Supreme Court can review this question under
the doctrine of separation of powers. . ’

(3) The objection based on the Muslim problem is also political, involving as it does the matter of
legislative priorities and the wisdom of the challenged measure. It is also not subject to judicial
review for the reasons stated in (2).

(4) An election, like a plebiscite, produces legal and binding effect. A referendum, according to
the Sanidad Case, is merely consultative or advisory and may be participated in by those not
qualified to vote, including ex-convicts and the feeble-minded, They may advise the government.
But a “yes” vote in-the projected referendum cannot by itself legally extend the President’s term;
on. the other hand, a “no"vote may be legally disregarded or rejected by him.

Citizens Assemblies
What compose the citizens assemblies and the purpose of their creation? (1977 BAR EXAM)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Citizens Assemblies are composed of all persons who are residents of the barrio, district ward
for at least six month, fifteen years of the age or over, citizens of the Philippines and who are
registered in the list of Citizens Assembly members kept by the barrio district or ward secretary.

The citizens assemblies shall constitute the base for citizen participation in government affairs and
their collective views shall be considered in the formulation of national policies of programs and,
whenever practicable, shall be translated into concrete and specific decision.
They shall consider vital national issues confronting the country.

Amendment
The people have approved the October 1976 amendment to the constitutional. Cite five (5)
of them. (1977 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The following amendments to the Constitutional were approved by the people:
1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa.
Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa which shall not be more than 120, unless
otherwise provided by law, shall include the incumbent President of the Philippines,
representatives elected from the different regions of the nation, those who shall not be less
than eighteen years of the age elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the
incumbent President from the Members of the Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be
apportioned among the regions in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ration, while the sectors shall be determined by
law. The number of representatives from each region or sector and the manner of their election
shall be prescribed and regulated by law.
2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the
same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim
National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof. However, it
shall not exercise the powers provided in Article VII, Section 14(1) of the Constitution.
3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the election and
selection of the Members, convene the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its
sessions until the Speaker shall have been elected. The incumbent President of the Philippines
shall be the Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even after the
interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions, and likewise he
shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the 1935 Constitution and the
powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution.
4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and function, and
discharge the responsibilities of the regular President (Prime Minister) and his cabinet, and
shall be subject only to such disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe.
The President (Prime Minister), if he so desires, may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as
many Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime Minister as he may deem necessary.
5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall
have been lifted.
Transitory Provisions

Transitory Provisions
How tenable is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not in force and effect and is not
the fundamental law of the land, but that, the 1935 Constitution was suspended by the
establishment of an authoritarian regime by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
after the proclamation of martial law and was once more operative with the lifting of martial
law on January 17, 1981?
Explain briefly. (1981 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The assertion is untenable. In Occena v. COMELEC, G.R. 56350, April 2, 1981, the Supreme
COurt adverted to its decision in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 (1973), in which,
after dismissing the several petition to enjoin enforcement of the 1973 Constitution on the ground
that it had not been validly ratified it was held: “This being the vote of the majority, there is no
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect”. Such a
statement served a useful purpose to clear the atmosphere by making it manifest that the
Constitution came into force and effect on January 17, 1973. Since then, there has been popular
acquiescence and the Supreme Court itself has invariably applied the present Constitution.

Nor is there any basis for the claim that the 1935 Constitution was suspended upon the
proclamation of martial law and, therefore, became once more effective upon the lifting of martial
law on January 17, 1981. As held in Mitra v COMELEC, G.R. No. L-56503, April 4 1981, even
during the period of martial law the judiciary performed its functions and discharged its
responsibility. The court passed upon the transcendental issues arising from the proclamation of
martial law and in one case, Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), even nullified a portion
of a statute making the filing of charges of subversion, insurrection or rebellion before civil courts
or military tribunals prima facie evidence of such facts. There can be no justification then for the
reckless assertion that upon the proclamation of martial law and while it was in force,
constitutionalism, in terms of the exercise of the power of judicial review and respect for individual
rights, no longer hel sway in the Philippines.

Law on Public Officers

General principles
(a) Who are public officers, and what are their classifications?
(b) Can a public officer who has already resigned still withdraw his resignation? (1975
BAR EXAM)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) An individual holding a right authority, and duty created or conferred by law, whereby for
a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the appointing power he is
invested with some sovereign functions of government to be exercised by him for the
benefit of the public.
 Public officers may be classified as follows:
(1) Executive, legislative, and judicial
(2) Constitutional and statutory
(3) National, provincial, city, and municipal
(4) Military, naval, and civil
(5) Discretionary, ministerial, and administrative
(6) De jure and De facto
(7) Appointive and elective
(8) Special agents

(b) Yes, provided his resignation has not yet been accepted because then it is still incomplete.
Acceptance of resignation is necessary and any public officer who before acceptance is
given abandons his office to the detriment of public service is liable under article 238 of
the Revised Penal Code. And even after the acceptance of the resignation he may still be
allowed to make the withdrawal by the consent of the authority accepting, so long as no
new rights in favor of third parties have arisen. (Gonzales, op. cit. citing Mechem, Public
Officer and Offices 265)

General principles
(d) The President writes a member of his cabinet that his registration has been accepted
although the latter has not filed his resignation. Is this a valid termination of official
relation?
(e) What do you understand by the principle that a “public office is a public trust”?
(f) When is it considered as property? (1979 BAR EXAM)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(e) In Article IX, Sec 4, the members of the Cabinet may be removed by the Prime Minister at
his discretion. Strictly speaking, however, Cabinet members serve at the pleasure of the
Prime Minister, their term continuing as long as they enjoy his confidence. The moment
such confidence is lost, they cease to be entitled to their position, not by virtue of a removal
but of a different method of terminating official relations, to wit, expiration of the term. No
resignation is even necessary to separate them from the cabinet.
(f) It means that public office is held by the functionary not for purposes of self-
aggrandizement but as a steward who must discharge the duties thereof for the benefit of
the people.
(g) Generally, public office is not considered property. However, in Segovia vs. Noel, it was
held that it could come under the protection of due process of law in the sense that one
cannot be deprived thereof except upon a clear showing of the legislative intention.

Accountability of public officers, De facto officers

 A. One of the salient characteristics of a public office is that it is a public trust and not a
property. Is there any instances when a public office may be considered a property of
the office-holder within the protection of the due process clause of the Constitution?
Explain your answer. How should a public officer or employee serve his office?

B. Distinguish the power of recall from the power of removal. Is the power of recall
authorized in the Philippines?

C. A was appointed Director of a certain bureau. He took his oath of office, and assumed
the duties thereof. Few months later, the bureau to which he was appointed was
declared not legally existing because the law creating it is unconstitutional. What
would be the legal effect of the acts performed by A before the law creating the office
was declared unconstitutional? Reason. (1976 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. In cases where the controversy relates to the question as to which of two persons is entitled
thereto, a public office may be considered property within the protection of the due process
clause, in that before any may be deprived of his title to the office, the same should be
properly litigated before the courts. A public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency and shall remain accountable to the people. (Sec.1, Art.XIII, New Constitution).

B. Removal is the ouster of a public officer exercised by the official who has been vested by
law of the power to remove; recall is removal of such officer by the people themselves,
through the process of a recall election. Section 2 of Article XI of the New Constitution
mandates the National Assembly to enact a local government code defining a more
responsive an accountable local government structure with “an effective system of recall”.
Recall is therefore authorized under the New Constitution.

C. Technically, A would be a plain usurper or intruder because the law creating his office
(bureau) is unconstitutional. Therefore, there is no de jure office and if there is no office de
jure there cannot be an officer de jure or de facto. ( The facts of the problem given itself says
that “ the bureau to which he was appointed was declared not legally existing because the
law creating it is unconstitutional). Accordingly, under the general rules, the acts of A would
be void. However, the harshness of this rule should not deprived the law of its quality of
fairness and justice especially insofar as the public and third persons, acting without notice,
who dealt with A thinking that A is the officer he purports himself to be. The existence of
the law creating the bureau to which A had been appointed is an operative fact which cannot
justly be ignored. Therefore, it is submitted that insofar as the public and third parties are
concerned, the facts of A must be considered good and valid like those of a de jure officer.

De facto officers
Is a public office the property of the incumbent thereof? Explain briefly.
What is a usurper in public office as distinguished from a de facto officer and de jure officer?
(1978 BAR EXAM)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A public office is not property of the incumbent within the meaning of the due process clause. It
exists only for the good of the public. If public interests is no longer served by a public office, it
is not only the right but the duty of the legislature to abolish it, otherwise its continued existence
is a waste of public funds. In such case the office holder cannot claim deprivation of property
without due process of law. But where there is a controversy as to which of two persons is entitled
thereto, a public office may be considered property within the protection of the due process clause
in that before one may be deprived of his right to the said office the same should be properly
litigated before the court.

Term of office and tenure of office

Define and distinguish term of office and tenure of office. (1978 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as offright, and
fixed the interval after which the several represents the term during which the incumbent actually
holds the office.

Sandiganbayan And Tanodbayan

Define and sandiganbayan and tanodbayan. (1978 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The sandiganbayan is a special court which shall have special jurisdiction over civil and criminal
cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers
and employees in relation to their committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
office as may be determine by law.

The Tanodbayan shall receive and investigate complaints relative to public office, including those
in government-owned or controlled corporations, make appropriate recommendations, and in case
of failure of justice as defined by law, file and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil, or
administrative case before the proper court or body.

Termination of official relation

Former Senator X is, charged of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions,
subversions, and murder before a military tribunal. He files a petition for habeas corpus
before the Court claiming unlawful detention and a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
He contends that unlike in his case, Muslim rebels who have taken up arms against the
government and have inflicted how losses and casualties on men and material of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines are entitled to complete amnesty and release and are not prosecuted
for illegal possession of firearms; subversion or rebellion; that civilian guards and
bodyguards of warloads from whom unlicensed firearms and ammunition had been
confiscated were also released and not prosecuted; and that the publicly announced policy
of the government which transfers authority to try civilians under indictment before military
courts to civil courts in thousands of detainees has not been equally applied to him. Petitioner
claims he alone was singled out, detained and prosecuted. Is the petitioner entitled to the writ
prayed £01. 9 Decide with reasons. (1977 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In Yick Wo v. Hopkim, affirmed by our own Supreme Court in People v. Vera, it was held that a
law fair and impartial on its face would still violate the equal protection clause if it were
administered with an evil eye and an uneven hand. This guaranty calls for equal treatment of those
similarly situated, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. It has been denied Senator X
as there is no substantial distinction between him and the Muslim rebels who are being coddled by
the government,

Liable In Personal Capacity

“D”, the Mayor of Norzagaray, Bulacan, dismissed without cause, notice and hearing , “X”,
a municipal employee, in violation of the law on tenure of office. “X” sued “D” in his personal
capacity, praying for reinstatement and payment of back salary and damages. “D” put up
the defense that the action should be filed against the Municipality of Nirzagaray as the latter
would be the one to pay the back salaries.
Is the defense of the Mayor meritorious? State your reasons. (1981 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
So far as the payment of back salary and damages is concerned D cannot claim that the
municipality of Norzaragay is liable. It is evident that D acted in bad faith is dismissing X without
cause and without even giving the latter notice and affording him a hearing before dismissing him.
The principle is well established that public officers are personally liable in their private capacity
if they act maliciously and in bad faith and outside the scope of their official capacity. (Mindanao
Realty Corp. v. Kintanar, 6 SCRA 814 (1962); Abellera v. City of Baguio, 19 SCRA 600 (1967).

Administrative Law

Principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, Doctrine of finality of administrative action

A. Discuss briefly the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, giving its basis,
its purpose and its exception.

B. A standing circular in the U.P provides that not more than one member of any student
organization may be appointed or elected for any particular term in the University
Student Council, Senior Council Women’s Club and other student organization. Some
U.P students filed their grievances with the U.P student organizations. But , the U.P
president refused. After their petition was denied, they went to court assailing the
validity of the circular. Can the court take action on their petition for prohibition and
mandamus? Reason.
C. In the homestead application case, the Director of Lands, after appropriate proceedings,
found in favour of the applicant and ordered the issuance of the corresponding patent
in his favour. Upon appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture, however the factual findings
of the Director of Lands were modified by the Secretary of Agriculture, who instead
found for the oppositor and ordered the issuance of a patent to him. Should an appeal
be taken to the court in a proper case, what would be the effect of the findings of fact of
the Secretary of Agriculture upon the court, if any? Reason. (1976 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that when an administrative
remedy is provided by law, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before the
courts will act. No resource for judicial review can be had until all such remedies have been
exhausted. This is founded not only on practical considerations but also on comity existing
between the different departments of the government, which comity requires that the courts
stay their hands until the administrative processes have been completed. Its purposes may
be found in the following:

If relief is first sought from a higher or superior administrative agency, resort to the courts
may prove unnecessary, saving the delay and expense of litigation and preventing the
courts from being swamped by resort to them in the first instance;

If a mistake is committed in the initial steps of administrative activity or by an

administrative agency, it should be given the chance to correct such error, and if such
mistake is not corrected therein relief may be obtained from higher administrative
authorities;

The principle of comity and convenience requires the courts to stay their hands until the
administrative processes have been completed.

Finally, since judicial review of administrative actions is usually had through special civil
actions, such proceedings cannot ordinarily lie if there is an appeal, or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinarily course of law.

Among the recognized exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

are:
1. Where it plainly appears that the administrative remedy would be of no value and
fruitless, the party seeking judicial relief does not have to complete administrative
procedure before resorting to the courts.
2. When there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency claiming the benefit
of the doctrine.
3. When no administrative action is possible because the question involved is purely
a legal question.
4. When the administrative actions for which relief is sought is potenty illegal
amounting to a lack of jurisdiction.
5. Where there is unreasonable delay or official in action.
 6. Where there is an irreparable damage or injury or threat thereof unless resort to the
court is immediately made.
7. When the doctrine of qualified political agency applies.
8. In extreme cases, where there is no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
9. In land cases, the doctrine applies only to lands of public domain in pursuance of
the Public Land Act. The rule is inapplicable when private lands are involved even
where they had been acquired by the government by purchase for resale to
individuals.
10. When there are special reasons or circumstances demanding immediate court
action.
(NOTE: however, a general and substantial answer should suffice considering the
length of the correct answer)

B. No. Petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Considering that the presidency
of the University is subject to the direction of the Board of Regents and that board has the
power to annul or modify the circular in question, it was the legal obligation of the
petitioners to appeal to the board before resorting to the courts.

C. The findings of facts of the Secretary of Agriculture shall be conclusive upon the courts
unless there is fraud, imposition or mistake other than error of judgment in estimating the
value or effect of the evidence.

Discuss the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedy (1977 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedy is provided by law, relief must be sought by
exhausting this remedy before the courts will act. No recourse can be had until all such remedies
have been exhausted and special civil actions against administrative officers could grant relief.

Doctrine of Finality of administrative decisions

An ordinance of a city in the South made it unlawful for any proprietor, lessee or operator
of an amusement place to admit two or more persons with only one admission ticket. This
was assailed by the theater owners for being ultra vires and for being contrary to the due
process clause as this was an unlawful deprivation of property because of a limitation on
their right “to manage their theaters in the manner they wish.” How would you decide the
case? Reason out your answer. (1978 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The ordinance is valid. Regulation of places of amusement is within the legal powers of the city.
One who operates an amusement place does so subject to reasonable regulations for the safety and
convenience of the public patronizing the same and the collection of revenue due to the city
government. Admitting two or more persons with only one admission ticket certainly may result
in inconvenience to the patrons due to overcrowding and loss of revenue to the city. His ownership
thereof and right to manage the same are not absolute.

Doctrine of Finality of administrative decisions

The Preamble of the 1935 Constitution began simply with: The Filipino people x x x.”
On the other hand, the preamble of the 1973 Constitution started off, thus: “We, the
sovereign Filipino people x x x.” The 1935 Constitution Preamble spoke of the
“blessings of the independence” under a regime of “justice, liberty and democracy”
while the 1973 Preamble referred to “blessings of democracy” under a regime not only
of justice and liberty but also of peace and equality. What significance, if any, would
you attach to each of these changes? (1978 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
By adopting the first person approach, the Preamble of the new Constitution emphasizes a
more direct and personal sense of participation, involvement and commitment of the Filipino
people in adopting the new charter. “Sovereign” describes the present political state of the
Filipino people which could not have been said when the 1935 Constitution was adopted.
Then the immediate goal of our people was political independence; now that it has been
realized it is only proper that the Filipino people seek the “blessings of independence.” A
state may be politically independent and sovereign, yet it is not democratic; its society may
be unjust, its people not free. True justice and liberty however, may not thrive where society
is riven with crime, violence and lawlessness and fractured with social and economic
inequalities. Hence, in adopting the new Constitution, we implore that the Divine Providence
bestow upon us “the blessings of democracy under a regime of justice, liberty, peace and
equality”.

Exception To The Application Of The Doctrine Of Exhaustion Of Administrative Remedies.

The losing party in a case before the Board of Transportation operating air conditioned auto-
truck service in the City of Cebu filed certiorari proceedings in the SC during the pendency
of a motion for reconsideration. Private respondent alleged that the suit was premature as
the administrative agency had not ruled yet on his motion for reconsideration, invoking the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies before resorting to action. How would you
decide the case? Reason out you answer. (1978 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Considering that the auto-truck service is a public utility, an early disposition of the case may
warrant the filing of a petition for certiorari with the SC without waiting for the resolution by the
lower court of the motion for reconsideration. It is to the public interest and convenience that a
procedural technicality be overlooked. In this sense, this is an exception to the application of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
1. Considering that a petition for certiorari was filed. The issue that must have been raised is:
that the Board of Transportation Acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction or
committed a grave abuse of discretion. The question raised being strictly a legal one, exhaustion
of administrative remedies is not necessary.

2. Petition for certiorari is premature and will be dismissed. There is still a plain, adequate
and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law. Comity and convenience require that the Board
of Transportation be given the opportunity to rule on the motion for reconsideration. It may grant
the relief prayed for and thereby render unnecessary resort to judicial review. There is nothing in
the problem which give factual circumstance showing any urgency dictated by public interest to
warrant disregard for the exhaustion doctrine. Neither is there any intimation in the problem that
the question raised is a jurisdictional one or a pure question law.

Finality of administrative decisions

What are the exceptions to the finality of administrative decisions? (1977 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(1) Where it plainly appears that the administrative remedy would be of no value and fruitless,
the party seeking judicial relief does not have to complete administrative procedures before
resorting the courts.
(2) When there is estoppel on the part of administrative agency claiming the benefit of the
doctrine.
(3) When no administrative action is possible because the question involved is purely a legal
question.
(4) When the administrative action for which relief is sought is patently illegal amounting to a
lack of jurisdiction.
(5) When there is unreasonable delay or official in- action.
(6) When there is an irreparable damage or injury or threat thereof unless resort to the court
immediately made.
(7) When the doctrine of qualified political agency applies.
(8) In extreme cases where there is no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary
courts of law.

Election Laws

Jurisdiction of the COMELEC over political parties

John Doe and Richard Roe were opposing candidates for municipal mayor. After Richard
Roe was proclaimed as the winning candidate, John Doe filed with the Commission on
Elections a petition to cancel the canvass of the election returns of a certain precinct. Richard
Roe contends that the Commission on Elections has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
petition. Is the contention meritorious? Why? (1975 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Commission on Elections has no authority to annul any canvass made after the proclamation
of a winning candidate. The remedy of the party aggrieved is to file an election protest. However,
where the proclamation is illegal it cannot serve as a bar to an action to annul the canvass, otherwise
the pernicious practice of “grabbing-the-proclamation-and –prolonging- the protest” would be
encouraged. (Aguam v. Commission on Elections, L-28995, May 28, 1968. 23 SCRA 883)
 Powers of COMELEC
(a) The registered voters of distant barrios of Municipality “A” complained against the
transfer of their voting places from their barrios to the poblacion as ordered by the
COMELEC because of the presence of terrorists in areas far from the poblacion. May
they file a petition to the Supreme Court to order the COMELEC to return their
voting places to their barrios for their convenience invoking the power of the
Supreme Court over acts, orders etc. of the COMELEC as granted by the
Constitution?
(b) Compare the powers of the COMELEC as granted by the 1973 Constitution and those
granted by the 193 Constitution but only with references to changes introduced in
the New Constitution. (1979 BAR EXAM)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Under Art. VII, (B), Sec 11 of the new Constitution, the decisions, orders or rulings of the
Commission on Election may be brought to the Supreme Court only in a petition for
certiorari which according to Aratuc vs. COMELEC, is limited to question of law or grave
abuse of discretion.
On the merits, the action of the COMELEC can be upheld in the interest of the
constitutional ideal of “free, orderly and honest election”
(b) The COMELEC is now the “sole judge” of election contest involving members of the
National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials may register and accredit
political parties, decide administrative questions concerning the registration of voters,
and regulate or supervise the operation of entities over to government franchise, like
communication and transportation, companies during the election period. It can now
still deputize, but only with the consent or at the instance of Prime Minister.

Election protest
A. Distinguish referendum from plebiscite. Can referendum and plebiscite be held at the
same time? Reason.

B. One of the objection to the 1976 National referendum-plebiscite, submitting to the people
for their ratification the proposed amendments to the 1976 Constitution, was that the
allowing of the 15-year olds to vote in the said referendum- plebiscite would amount to
an amendment of the 1973 Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those
citizen of the Philippines, 18 years of age and over. How would you meet the objection?

C. X who obtained second highest number of votes in the election of November 8, 1971, field
a protest against the election of Y as mayor of Pintungan, Southern Leyte, on the ground
of fraud, illegal counting of votes and massive vote buying. Y, the protestee, moved to
dismiss the protest on the ground that , after the proclamation of martial law the position
of mayor became of doubtful existence and, after the ratification of the New Constitution
, the mayoralty position became a newly- created position and he (Y) is only a hold-over
 occupant , no longer subject to an electoral protest. The trial judge sustained the motion
and dismissed the protest. Was the dismissal of the protest correct? Reason. (1976 BAR
EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. A referendum, in the concept of referenda being held in the Philippines since the imposition
of martial law, is merely a form of consultation with the people. Its purpose is to determine
how the people feels about an issue or question of national importance so that the government
may act, or formulate policies in accordance with their wishes. Under P.C. No.86-A
constituting the barangays as the base of citizen participation in the governmental affairs, it
is provided that the collective views of the members of the barangay as expressed in the
referendum or other forms of constitutions with its members are to be considered in the
formulation of polices and whenever practicable translated into concrete and specific actions
and decisions. They only serve as basis for governmental action.

On the other hand, a plebiscite refers to a vote of the enfranchised citizens on a question
submitted for their determination. The result of a plebiscite are legally efficacious and
binding, ex propio vigore without the need for further governmental action. There is nothing
in the Constitution which prohibits the simultaneous holding of a referendum and plebiscite.
For example, in a ratification plebiscite the constitution does not qualify, qualification is
not justified. It may perhaps be better if they are separately held but that is a policy matter
addressed to the political department which the courts cannot review. On the other hand,
the issue raised in the referendum and plebiscite may be interrelated. Moreover, the need
to economize in the expenditure of funds which will be entailed in holding them separately
cannot just be ignored.

B. Presidential Decree No. 229 which was extended by Presidential Decree No. 1031 in the
conduct of the referendum-plebiscite held on October 16-17, 1976 , provides that the
barangay referendum committees shall prepare two sets of referendum results, one of those
between the ages of 15-18 years and another 18 years and above. In short, there will be
separate returns for those authorized to exercise the right of suffrage under the Constitution.
With respect to the votes of the group of barangay voters from 15 to 18 years, it will only be
a means of determining the feeling of a substantial segment of the body politic on the vital
questions of national importance.

C. No. Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution provides; “ All officials and
employees in the existing government of the Republic of the Philippines shall continue in
office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President…”. Said
provision does not the existing offices. In fact, it recognizes the continued existence of said
offices and allows the office holders to continue in office until otherwise decreed by the
incumbent President. It does not even terminate their terms of office upon the ratification of
the New Constitution nor create a new term for them. Insofar as elective local officials ,they
are serving the same term only that the duration thereof has been changed from one which
is definite ( four years and until their successors are duly elected and qualified) to one which
is uncertain an indefinite ( to last until otherwise decreed by the incumbent President.) On
the other hand, only the “duly” elected officials are the ones given the privilege to continue
 in office. And an election contest has for its purpose the determination of whether or not Y
is a duly elected official.

Local Government

I. Powers of local government units

Police power
Petitioners built their houses without government authority inside a public street of
Manila. The City Engineer of Manila threatened to demolish the houses summarily.
Petitioners sought to enjoin the City Engineer on the ground that their houses cannot be
demolished without a court order. Is the contention meritorious? Why? (1975 BAR
EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Houses constructed without governmental authority, on public streets and waterways,
obstruct at all times the free use by the public of the streets and waterways, and, accordingly,
constitute nuisances per se, as well as public nuisances. As such, their summary removal,
without judicial process or proceeding may be authorized by statute or municipal ordinance,
despite the due process clause. Both the Civil Code (Arts. 694, 700 & 702) and the Revised
Ordinance of the City Manila (Sec. 1122) authorized summary proceedings for the abatement
of public nuisances. (Stichon v. Aquino, 98 PHIL. 458, (1956))

Police power
The accused are owners of lumber yards located within a residential zone of the
municipality. They were prosecuted for failure to remove their lumber yards from the
residential area upon being required to do so by the municipal authorities. They attacked
the validity of the municipal ordinance as an invasion of the property rights of lumber
yard owners without due process of law. Is their contention meritorious? Why? (1975
BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. the power of municipal corporations to divide their territory into industrial, commercial,
and residential zones and to abate nuisances is recognized in almost all jurisdictions in as much
as it is derived from the police power and is exercised for the benefit and protection of their
inhabitants. On this ground, and ordinance of the then municipality of Iloilo, prohibiting lumber
stores and lumber yard in certain streets classified as residential and commercial zones, was
upheld. Taking into consideration the nature of plaintiff’s business necessarily disturbed
passers-by, the Supreme Court held that such business was a nuisance per accidence or per se.
The Court rejected the contention that the ordinance in question was confiscatory and did not
provide adequate compensation, for the reason that the municipality did not take over the
ownership of the business but simply prohibited the conduct of the business. The ordinance was
intended to safeguard the health, safety and welfare of the inhabitants, in accordance with the
maxim salus populi supreme lex. (Tan Chat v. Municipality of Iloilo, 60 Phil. 465)
 Taxing power
The municipal council of Roxas, Palawan enacted Ordinance No. 12 on October 15, 1960
imposing an inspection and verification fee of PHP0.10 per ton of silence sand excavated
with Roxas. Plaintiff filed an action to annul the said ordinance and to ask for refund of
whatever amount it has paid under the same. Plaintiff contended as a police measure
because it applies to a business which is not inherently subject to police regulation. Is the
contention meritorious? Why? (1975 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. the fee in question is in the nature of a license tax and is authorized under section 2 of the
Republic Act No. 2264 giving local governments the power to impose not only taxes but also
license taxes and service fees. The ordinance in question is justified by public interest, which
requires inspection by municipal authorities to insure that a party has a permit from the Bureau
of Mines and that the excavation does not encroach upon the claims of other parties. (Nin Bay
Mining Co. v. Municipality of Roxas, Palawan, L-20125, July 20, 1965, 14 SCRA 660)

Liability of LGU
A. X is the wife of the mayor of the municipality of Malabon. She wants to know if she can
legally lease a stall in the public market operated by the municipality. Can she do so?
reasons.

B. As a result of a fire that razed a row of private buildings along Recto Avenue, a burned-
out wall fronting said street remained standing. Despite the owner’s non-compliance
with an order for the demolition of said wall, the city Engineer inexcusably neglected
to enforce said order until, under its own weight , the aforesaid wall collapsed and
crushed onto a pedestrian who sustained serious injuries. Is the city of Manila liable in
damages to said pedestrian for the injuries he sustained? Reasons.

C. Under the so-called general welfare, the Municipal Council of Las Pinas, passed an
ordinance authorizing the establishment of a Red Light District within the limits of the
municipality. Is the ordinance valid? Reason. (1976 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. No. Section 2176 of the Revised Administrative Code makes it unlawful for any municipal
officer to possess a pecuniary interest, either direct or indirect , in any municipal contract,
contract work, or any other municipal business or to hold such interest in any cockpit or
other game licensed by municipal authority. Considering the unity of interest of the mayor
and his wife in their conjugal partnership, a lease of public market will amount to a pecuniary
interest of the mayor in a contract with the municipality.

B. No. in the first place, under Section 24 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, the city
is not liable or held for damages or injuries to person or property arising from the failure of
any city official to enforce the provisions of the Charter, or any other law or ordinance or
 from negligence of said officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions. In
the second place, a municipal corporation, like City of Manila, is not liable in damages for
the torts committed by its officers or employees in the performance of public or
governmental function, unless the law specifically makes it liable.

C. No, Prostitution is a crime under the Revised Penal Coe and the regulation establishing “Red
Light District” seems to allow prostitution. In other words, the ordinance is contrary to law
and on that basis it may be invalidated. Moreover, it is not contrary to law, but also lower
morals and public policy. One of the mandatory powers of municipal councils is to “prohibit
and penalize prostitution”. Therefore, the Municipal ordinance of Las Pinas establishing a
“Red Light District” is invalid because it regulates prostitution. It is therefore, ultra vires.

Recall
A. One of the salient characteristics of a public office is that it is a public trust and not a
property. Is there any instances when a public office may be considered a property of
the office-holder within the protection of the due process clause of the Constitution?
Explain your answer. How should a public officer or employee serve his office?

B. Distinguish the power of recall from the power of removal. Is the power of recall
authorized in the Philippines?

C. A was appointed Director of a certain bureau. He took his oath of office, and assumed
the duties thereof. Few months later, the bureau to which he was appointed was
declared not legally existing because the law creating it is unconstitutional. What
would be the legal effect of the acts performed by A before the law creating the office
was declared unconstitutional? Reason. (1976 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. In cases where the controversy relates to the question as to which of two persons is entitled
thereto, a public office may be considered property within the protection of the due process
clause, in that before any may be deprived of his title to the office, the same should be
properly litigated before the courts. A public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency and shall remain accountable to the people. (Sec.1, Art.XIII, New Constitution).

B. Removal is the ouster of a public officer exercised by the official who has been vested by
law of the power to remove; recall is removal of such officer by the people themselves,
through the process of a recall election. Section 2 of Article XI of the New Constitution
mandates the National Assembly to enact a local government code defining a more
responsive an accountable local government structure with “an effective system of recall”.
Recall is therefore authorized under the New Constitution.

C. Technically, A would be a plain usurper or intruder because the law creating his office
(bureau) is unconstitutional. Therefore, there is no de jure office and if there is no office de
jure there cannot be an officer de jure or de facto. ( The facts of the problem given itself says
 that “ the bureau to which he was appointed was declared not legally existing because the
law creating it is unconstitutional). Accordingly, under the general rules, the acts of A would
be void. However, the harshness of this rule should not deprived the law of its quality of
fairness and justice especially insofar as the public and third persons, acting without notice,
who dealt with A thinking that A is the officer he purports himself to be. The existence of
the law creating the bureau to which A had been appointed is an operative fact which cannot
justly be ignored. Therefore, it is submitted that insofar as the public and third parties are
concerned, the facts of A must be considered good and valid like those of a de jure officer.

Referendum
A.Distinguish referendum from plebiscite. Can referendum and plebiscite be held at the
same time? Reason.

A. One of the objection to the 1976 National referendum-plebiscite, submitting to the

people for their ratification the proposed amendments to the 1976 Constitution, was
that the allowing of the 15-year olds to vote in the said referendum- plebiscite would
amount to an amendment of the 1973 Constitution, which confines the right of
suffrage to those citizen of the Philippines, 18 years of age and over. How would you
meet the objection?

B. X who obtained second highest number of votes in the election of November 8, 1971,
field a protest against the election of Y as mayor of Pintungan, Southern Leyte, on the
ground of fraud, illegal counting of votes and massive vote buying. Y, the protestee,
moved to dismiss the protest on the ground that , after the proclamation of martial
law the position of mayor became of doubtful existence and, after the ratification of
the New Constitution , the mayoralty position became a newly- created position and
he (Y) is only a hold-over occupant , no longer subject to an electoral protest. The
trial judge sustained the motion and dismissed the protest. Was the dismissal of the
protest correct? Reason. (1976 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. A referendum, in the concept of referenda being held in the Philippines since the imposition
of martial law, is merely a form of consultation with the people. Its purpose is to determine
how the people feels about an issue or question of national importance so that the
government may act, or formulate policies in accordance with their wishes. Under P.C.
No.86-A constituting the barangays as the base of citizen participation in the governmental
affairs, it is provided that the collective views of the members of the barangay as expressed
in the referendum or other forms of constitutions with its members are to be considered in
the formulation of polices and whenever practicable translated into concrete and specific
actions and decisions. They only serve as basis for governmental action.

On the other hand, a plebiscite refers to a vote of the enfranchised citizens on a

question submitted for their determination. The result of a plebiscite are legally
efficacious and binding, ex propio vigore without the need for further governmental
action. There is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits the simultaneous holding
 of a referendum and plebiscite. For example, in a ratification plebiscite the
constitution does not qualify, qualification is not justified. It may perhaps be better if
they are separately held but that is a policy matter addressed to the political department
which the courts cannot review. On the other hand, the issue raised in the referendum
and plebiscite may be interrelated. Moreover, the need to economize in the
expenditure of funds which will be entailed in holding them separately cannot just be
ignored.

B. Presidential Decree No. 229 which was extended by Presidential Decree No. 1031 in the
conduct of the referendum-plebiscite held on October 16-17, 1976 , provides that the
barangay referendum committees shall prepare two sets of referendum results, one of those
between the ages of 15-18 years and another 18 years and above. In short, there will be
separate returns for those authorized to exercise the right of suffrage under the Constitution.
With respect to the votes of the group of barangay voters from 15 to 18 years, it will only
be a means of determining the feeling of a substantial segment of the body politic on the
vital questions of national importance.

C. No. Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution provides; “ All officials and
employees in the existing government of the Republic of the Philippines shall continue in
office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President…”. Said
provision does not the existing offices. In fact, it recognizes the continued existence of said
offices and allows the office holders to continue in office until otherwise decreed by the
incumbent President. It does not even terminate their terms of office upon the ratification
of the New Constitution nor create a new term for them. Insofar as elective local officials
,they are serving the same term only that the duration thereof has been changed from one
which is definite ( four years and until their successors are duly elected and qualified) to
one which is uncertain an indefinite ( to last until otherwise decreed by the incumbent
President.) On the other hand, only the “duly” elected officials are the ones given the
privilege to continue in office. And an election contest has for its purpose the determination
of whether or not Y is a duly elected official.

Municipal Corporations
(a) Discuss the dual character of municipal corporation.
(b) Can a municipality impose a tax even if it is not authorized by a statute?
(c) The stage constructed during the town fiesta collapsed and caused the death of a
person. If sued for damages, may the Sanggunian Bayan members plead that they are
not liable because they constructed the stage in the exercise of a public function
intended for the general welfare, the town fiesta being for the enrichment and
happiness of the whole populace? 1979 BAR EXAM
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Municipal corporations act in a public capacity as an agent of the State in the discharge of
governmental functions such as the collection of taxes, the protection of health, the
apprehension of criminals, and in a private capacity as an agent of their inhabitants for the
promotion of their interests, as where they engage in the operation of a market, cemetery,
 or a ferry service.
(b) Municipalities can now impose taxes independently of statutory grant on the strength of a
self-executing constitutional authorization in Article XI, Sec 5, which provides that they
can create their own sources of revenue and levy taxes, subject only to limitations
prescribed by the Legislature.
(c) This is the case of Torrio vs. Fontanilla, where the Supreme Court described the
celebration of a town fiesta as a proprietary activity, which can be the basis of a tort action
for damages under the principle of respondeat superior.
II. Local Autonomy
Local Autonomy Under Section 10 of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is
mandated that “the state shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government
units, especially the barrio to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.”
Under the 1976 amendments, however, which were proposed by President Marcos, the
barangays and sanggunians were given constitutional recognition. Does this amendment
have the effect of abolishing the barrio, considering that the barangay now exercise political
and public functions originally exercised by barrio units? Reason out your answers. (1978
BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The concept of barrios remain as one the political and territorial subdivisions into which the
Philippines is divided (Sec. 10, Art. II; Sec. 1, Art. XI, New Constitution). What happened is that
under Presidential Decree No. 557 issued on September 21, 1974 “all existing barrios or barrios
that may be created were (are hereby) declared as barangays and all references to the barrio in any
existing laws shall henceforth be understood as referring to the barangay.” In short, only the name
has been changed from barrio to barangay. But the entity remains the same.

III. Creation
A public corporation, known as Metro Manila, vested with powers and attributes of a
corporation including the power to make contracts, sue and be sued, etc., was created under
Presidential Decree No. 824, issued on November 7, 1975, following the referendum held on
February 27, 1975 wherein the residents of Metro Manila authorized the President, to
restructure the local government of 4 cities and 13 municipalities into an integrated unit. Its
creation is now assailed on the following grounds: (1) that it violates Batas Pambansa Blg.
337 otherwise known as the Local Government Code approved on February 10, 1983 which
provides:
“No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebescite in the unit or units affected.” and (2) that it contravenes the equal protection clause
of the Constitution in that the residents thereof are denied the right to elect members of the
Sangguniang Bayan now enjoyed by other cities and municipalities.
As counsel representing Metro Manila, how will you meet such challenge? State your
reasons. (1985 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
PD 824 was promulgated on November 7, 1975 before the enactment of the Local Government
Code of 1983. Accordingly, PD 824 could not have complied with the criteria in the Code for the
creation of local government units. The facts that PD824 was approved in a referendum was
sufficient. At all events, any doubts as to its validity and the creation of Metro Manila was removed
with the amendment of the constitution in 1984, giving representation to Metro Manila in the
Batasang Pambansa. Nor is the fact that the composition of Sangguniang Panglungsod and
Sangguniang Pambansa for Metro Manila different from that of other local governments a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. It is sufficient that PD 824 operates equally and uniformly
on all persons under similar circumstances and that persons are treated under it in the same manner,
both in the previleges conffered and the liabilities imposed. There is ample justification for such a
distinction because of the growth of population. It is not a condition for the validity of the
Sangguniang Bayans of the four cities and thirteen municipalities the membership be identical
with those of other cities or municipalities. (Lopez v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 56022 &56124, May
31, 1985)

Public International Law

I. State

Right of Asylum
(a) Distinguish recognition of state from recognition of government.
(b) Explain the right of asylum in international law. (1975 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(1) Recognition of state carries with it the recognition of government since the former
implies that a state recognized has all the essential requisites of a state at the time the
recognition is extended.
(2) Once recognition of state is accorded, it is generally irrevocable. Recognition of
government, on the other hand, may be withheld from a succeeding government brought
about by violent or unconstitutional means.
(b) The right of asylum is the competence of every state inferred from its territorial
supremacy to allow a prosecuted alien to enter and to remain on its territory, under its
protection and thereby to grant asylum to him. (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law,
295 (3rd ed. 1966))

Archipelagic Doctrine
Explain the Philippine claim or position on the archipelagic concept presented to the
United Nations conferences on the Law of the Sea. (1977 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Philippine position was stated by Solicitor General Mendoza in an international
conference on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, thus: “All of (the
definitions of archipelago) uniformly suggest that integration of a group of islands to the
sea to a group of islands, and the oneness and existence of this group of islands and the sea
where they are found as one unit, one country, one state. 'The Philippines, known in history
as the Philippine Archipelago, or the Philippine Islands, one such state.”

The reason for such archipelago theory in $0 far as the Philippines is concerned is clearly
set forth, thus: “More than seven thousand islands comprise the Philippines, rules by one
unitary government, bound by a common heritage, beholden to the same traditions,
pursuing the same ideals, interdependent and united politically, economically and. socially
as one nation. To suggest that each island has its own territorial sea and the baselines must
be drawn around each island is to splinter into 7,000 pieces What is a single nation and a
united state.” There should be “single baseline around the islands that constitute it by
joining appropriate points of the outermost islands of the archipelago with straight lines.”
'

Archipelagic doctrine
(a) What is the “archipelagic theory” as proposed by the Philippines in the U. N
Conference on “The Law of the Sea” and give its justification, legal or practical from
the standpoint of the Philippine Position?
(b) How can the observance of our law on national theory be enforced upon
individuals, and upon States?
(c) May the USA lay exclusive claim over the moon having explored it and having
planted her flag thereon to the exclusion of other States? Explain. (1979 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Under the archipelago theory as constitutionalized in Article I, Sect., 1 of the new
charter the waters around, between and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
irrespective of their breath and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines.

It is our position that the 7,100 islands comprising our terrestrial domain should be
considered one integrated whole instead of as a separate component to be each provided
with its own territorial sea, as this would make the intervening waters open seas and,
therefore, available to the uses of other states to the prejudice of our country.

(b) All persons within our national territory are subject to the jurisdiction of the
Philippines, with certain exceptions like heads and diplomatic agents of foreign states.
States are required under international law, specifically under Art. II, par. 4, of the U.N.
Charter, to respect the territorial integrity of other states. Any encroachment upon our
territory, for example by a foreign vessel, may be punished under our own laws, or by
sanctions allowed under the generally accepted principle of international law.

(c) The United States cannot lay exclusive claim to the moon because other space and
all celestial bodies found therein, including the moon, are not susceptible to national
appropriation but are legally regarded as res communes.

Stateless
Victor Korchnoi, a stateless resident of Switzerland, was the challenger to the world
chess title held by Russian Anatolyv Karpov. After 32 grueling games were played in
Baguio City, Karpov finally retained his title on a close 6 to 5 win. Korchnoi protested
non-payment of his prize money and alleged unfair treatment he received form the
tournament organizers in the Philippines, particularly in the 32nd crucial game which
he attributes as the main cause of his defeat. May he press for his right to the prize
money against the Philippine government through the Swiss government? Reason out
your answer. (1978 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Switzerland, even if she so decides, cannot espouse a diplomatic claim against the
Philippines in behalf of Viktor Korchnoi. Nationality is the basis of the right of a state to
espouse such claim. In this case Korchnoi is not a Swiss national, but a stateless person.

Right of Equality
(a) A crime was committed in a private vessel registered in Japan by a Filipino
against an Englishman while the vessel is anchored in a port of a State “A”. where
can he be tried? If both are members of the crew, where will the trial be?
(b) The United States Ambassador to the Philippines and the American Consul
General also in the Philippines quarreled in the Manila Hotel and shot at each other.
May the Philippines Court take jurisdiction over them for trial and punishment for
the crime they may have committed? (1979 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Under both the English and French rules, the crime will be triable by the local state
“A”, if serious enough as to compromise the peace of its port; otherwise, by the flag state,
Japan, if it involves only the members of the crew and is of such petty nature as not to
disturb the peace of the local state.
(b) The ambassador is immune from prosecution for all crimes committed by him,
whether officially or in a private capacity. The consul is immune from criminal prosecution
only for acts committed by him in connection with his official functions.

State immunity
(a) May the United Nations be sued for unpaid rentals of buildings used by it for
its session in the Philippines?
(b) It was after the 1973 Constitution has become effective that the Philippines
had opened diplomatic relations with Russia, China and other socialist countries.
What provision in said Constitution, not found in the 1935 Constitution, can you cite
that may have paved the way to the aforementioned diplomatic moves?
(c) What is the “ASEA”, and what are its primary objectives? (1979 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Two possible answers:
1. Article 105 of the U.N. Charter provides that the U.N shall enjoy in the territory of
its members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its
 purposes. Hence, it cannot be sued for the rentals of premises used for its official sessions
in the Philippines.
2. Having entered into the contract of lease, the U.N is deemed to have waived its
immunities and may, therefore, be sued for unpaid rentals.
(b) Article II, Sec. 3, to the effect that the Philippine “adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.”
(c) The ASEAN is a regional organization composed of the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Singapore and Thailand, and organized to promote friendship, cooperation, peace and
prosperity in Southeast Asia.

II. Extradition
A. On November 1, 1976, A,B,C and D, self-styled Moro rebels long wanted by the
authorities for the fatal ambuscade of a bus-load of innocent civilians, hijacked a PAL
plane on its Manila-Davao flight which they forcibly diverted to, and landed in Djarkarta,
Indonesia. In that country , A, B, C and D sought political asylum, invoking the United
Nations Declaration on Human Rights. Reacting, the Philippines Government, thru
proper diplomatic channels, sought after their extradition. May Indonesia grant Asylum
or should it extradite A, B, C and D to the Philippines? Reason. (1976 BAR EXAM)

B. While about to leave his place of work inside U.S Naval Base in Subic, E, a Filipino
civilian employee therein, was unceremoniously stopped and undignifiedly search by U.S.
Marines, acting upon orders of the Base Provost Marshall on suspicion of pilfering navy
property, but only to be released after several hours of detention when nothing was found
in his person. Charging excess of jurisdiction and abuse of authority, E filed a suit before
the CFI of Olongapo City against the Provost Marshall and other base officers for
damages for violation of his Constitutional rights under Art. 32 of the Civil Code. Moving
the dismiss, defendant Base officials contend: (1) that the civil code does not apply inside
the U.S. Naval Base; and (2) that having acted in their official capacities, the suit which
has not given its consent thereto. Decide with reasons. (1976 BAR EXAM)

C. R and S are both U. S. military servicemen subject to the military law of the United
States and regularly assigned to the Philippines. While in Clark Air Force Base, R
sladered a 19-year old daughter of S by calling her a professional “call girl”. Assume that
slander is also punishable under U. S. laws and an appropriate prosecution is initiated
against R. Under the US-PI Military Bases Agreement, which country would have
primary jurisdiction to try the case? Reason. (1976 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. Inasmuch as the offenders are merely “self-styled” Moro rebels, I take it that they
are not actual rebels and there is no political color to their acts. Indonesia must therefore
extradite them to the Philippines in view of our recently concluded treaty of extradition
with Indonesia relative to such crimes as murder or homicide obviously committed in the
“fatal ambuscade”. It additionally extradite is requested for the hijacking , the same should
likewise be granted.
B. The motion to Dismiss should be DENIED firstly, because Philippines laws such
as the Civil Code operate even inside the Bases, our Government not having relinquished
territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty over the Bases and secondly, while they may have
acted in their official capacities, certainly the Provost Marshall and other base officers are
not supposed to exercise unlawful and illegal acts, which are prohibited even under United
States Law. Obedience to lawful orders may exempt but obedience to unlawful commands
cannot exempt. Said act therefore cannot be presumed to have been done by a foreign
government as an Act of State. Verily therefore, this is not a suit against the United States.
Or the position of the Base officials that the Civil Code does not apply inside the U. S.
Naval Base is not meritorious. The U.S. Naval Base in Subic is part of Philippines territory,
and Philippine law apply therein as in other parts of the Philippines. However, the second
contention is well taken. Having acted in their official capacities and in obedience to the
direct orders of their superiors, the Base officers may not be held personally liable for
damages in the absence of proof showing that the United States consented to be sued before
the Philippine courts. This is one of the limitations on Philippine jurisdiction. The motion
to dismiss should be granted on this ground.

C. Under the US-PI Military Bases Agreement, the general rule( if the act is punishable
both by Philippines and US laws) is that the Philippines has primary jurisdiction and it will
not matter whether the Crime is an exception, and this occurs when the accused is a person
subject to US Military Law and the Crime he committed is one of the following:
1. Against the property or security of the U.S.
2. Against theproperty or person of:
a) a member of the U.S. Armed Forces; or
b) a member of the Civilian Component; or
c) a dependent of either.
3. In connection with official duty.

In the present problem, the accused is a Member of the U.S. Armed Forces, AND the crime
has been committed against the person of the dependent member of the U.S. Armed Forces.
Thus, the U.S. has primary jurisdiction. Be it noted that the Agreement speaks of a crime
against "property" or "person", and the crime in the problem is one of "slander" ( one that
under the Revised Penal Code is not a crime against "property" or "person"),
NONETHELESS there is no indication in the Agreement that the offense against
"property" or "person" are those referred to as such in the Philippine Revised Penal Code,
whose classification of crimes may not tally with that under U.S. laws.

Extradition

Sergio Osmena III and Eugenio Lopez, Jr., both charged with attempted
assassination of President Marcos before the military tribunal, escaped from military
custody, flew to Hongkong and then to California, U.S.A. where they are reportedly
seeking political asylum. There is no extradition treaty, however, between the
Philippines and the United States.
Assuming that the Philippine government desires the surrender of the above named
fugitives to the Philippines to face trial before military tribunal, how can this be
 legally done under international law? (1977 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Philippines may only request and cannot demand the surrender of the two fugitives.
As territorial sovereign of the United States is not oblige to return them but may decide to
do so for reasons of comity. This is not likely however, beacause the escapees are sought
for political offences and can claim the right to asylum under the Universal declaration of
Human Rights.

III. International organizations

(a) What event of great international significance took place recently in the United
Nations which enhanced the prestige and importance of the Philippines as a member
of the International community? Why?
(b) May the United States be sued in our courts for the value of private properties
requisitioned by its Army during the last World War, as well as Japan for the
“Mickey Mouse” money in payment for private properties which have not been
redeemed until now? May the suit be brought to the International Court of Justice?
(c) When is the principle of Postliminium applied? (1979 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Philippines was recently elected one of the ten non-permanent members of the Security
Council, in the first balloting and after endorsement by the whole Asian bloc. This is
considered a recognition of our active role in the promotion of international peace.
(a) No, even foreign states are entitled to the doctrine of state immunity in the local
state. The suit may not be brought before the International Court of Justice without consent
of the United States as jurisdiction of this Court in contentious cases is based upon the
consent of the parties.
(b) Where the territory of one belligerent state is occupied by the enemy during war,
the legitimate government is ousted form authority. When the belligerent occupation ceases
to be effective, the authority of the legitimate government is automatically restored,
together with all its laws, by virtue of the jus postliminium.

What is the meaning or concept of:

1. Right of extraterritoriality
2. Uti possidetis
3. Most favored nation treatment
4. Act of state, doctrine 1979 BAR EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The term “extraterritoriality” has been used to denote the status of a person or thing physically
present on a State’s territory, but wholly or partly withdrawn from the State’s jurisdiction by a rule
of international law

SUGGESTED ANSWER
 The problem concerning ownership of property which have changed hands during the
course of the war are generally settled by the application of the rule of uti possidetis, by which
each belligerent is regarded as legally entitled to such property as are actually in its possession at
the time hostilities caused.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The most-favored nation treatment is that granted by one country to another not less
favorable than that which has been or may be granted to the “most favored” among other countries.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The act of state doctrine states that every sovereign state is bound to respect the
independence off every other state and the courts Of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another, done within its territory. Redress of grievances by reason of
such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as
between themselves.

IV.International Court of Justice

A, a citizen of State X was arrested and detained for several years without charges or trial.
He brings his case to the courts of State X, but to no avail. He desires to seek redress from
any international forum. He goes to you as counsel to file his case to file his case with the
International Court of Justice. Will you action prosper? Reason out your answer. (1978 BAR
EXAM)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Only States may be parties in contentious cases before the International Court of Justice; in
fact, only States which are parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice and other
States on conditions to be laid down by the Security Council may be such parties. Therefore, a
private individual like A, cannot bring an action before it.

1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES .....................................................................

Phil Con 87; New Features (1991) ...........................................................................................
Phil Con 87; People Power (2000)............................................................................................
ARTICLE I National Territory .............................................................................................
Archipelagic Doctrine (1989)...................................................................................................
Exclusive Economic Zone; Rights of the Coastal State (1994) ...............................................
Territory & Government (1996) ...............................................................................................
ARTICLE II Declaration of Principles and State Policies ...................................................
Doctrine of Incorporation; Constitutional Law (1997) ............................................................
Doctrine of Incorporation; Pacta Sunt Servanda (2000) ..........................................................
State Immunity from Suit (1991) .............................................................................................
State Immunity from Suit (1996) .............................................................................................
State Immunity from Suit (1989) ............................................................................................
State Immunity from Suit (1994) .............................................................................................
State Immunity from Suit (1992) .............................................................................................
State Immunity from Suit (1999) .............................................................................................
State Immunity from Suit (1999) .............................................................................................
State Immunity vs. Waiver of Immunity (1997) ......................................................................
State Immunity from Suit (1993) .............................................................................................
State Principles & Policies (1994) ...........................................................................................
Transparency; Matters of Public Interest (1989)......................................................................
Transparency; Matters of Public Interest (2000)......................................................................
ARTICLE III Bill of Rights ......................................................................................................
Bill of Attainder (1990) ............................................................................................................
Custodial Investigation; Extrajudicial Confession (2001) .......................................................
Custodial Investigation; Extrajudicial Confession; Police Line-Up (1994) .............................
Custodial Investigation; Police Line-Up (1997) ......................................................................
Custodial Investigation; Right to Counsel (1988) ....................................................................
Custodial Investigation; Right to Counsel (1993) ....................................................................
Custodial Investigation; Right to Counsel (2000) ....................................................................
Custodial Investigation; Rights (1990) ....................................................................................
Custodial Investigation; Rights (1993) ....................................................................................
Custodial Investigation; Rights (1996) ....................................................................................
Custodial Investigation: Waiver of Rights (1988) ...................................................................
Double Jeopardy (1988) ...........................................................................................................
Double Jeopardy (1993) ...........................................................................................................
Double Jeopardy (1997) ...........................................................................................................
Double Jeopardy (1999) ...........................................................................................................
Double Jeopardy (1999) ...........................................................................................................
Double Jeopardy (2000) ...........................................................................................................
Double Jeopardy (2001) ...........................................................................................................
Double Jeopardy; Requisites (1999) ........................................................................................
Due Process; Functions of LTFRB (1988) ...............................................................................
Due Process; Absence of Denial (1999) ..................................................................................
Due Process; Deportation (1994) .............................................................................................
Due Process; Forfeiture Proceedings (1993) ............................................................................
Due Process; Media Coverage during Hearing (1996) ............................................................
Due Process; Meeting vs. Hearing (1999) ...............................................................................
Due Process; PPA-Pilots (2001) ..............................................................................................
Due Process; Procedural vs. Substantive (1999)......................................................................
Due Process; Provisional Order (1991)....................................................................................
Due Process; Suspension of Driver's License (1992) ..............................................................
Eminent Domain; Garnishment (1994) ....................................................................................
Eminent Domain; Garnishment (1998) ....................................................................................
Eminent Domain; immunity from suit (2001)..........................................................................
Eminent Domain; Indirect Public Benefit (1990) ....................................................................
Eminent Domain; Just Compensation (1988) ..........................................................................
Eminent Domain; Just Compensation (1989) ..........................................................................
Eminent Domain; Just Compensation (1998) ..........................................................................
Eminent Domain; Legal Interest (1993) ..................................................................................
Eminent Domain; Non-observance of the policy of "all or none" (2000) ................................
Eminent Domain; Socialized Housing (1996) .........................................................................
Eminent Domain; Writ of Possession (1993)...........................................................................
Equal Protection; Alien Employment (1989) ...........................................................................
Equal Protection; Police Power (2000) ....................................................................................
Equal Protection; Right to Education (1994) ...........................................................................
Equal Protection; Subsidiary Imprisonment (1989) .................................................................
Freedom of Religion; Convicted Prisoners (1989) ..................................................................
Freedom of Religion; Flag Salute (1997) .................................................................................
Freedom of Religion; Non-Establishment Clause (1992) ........................................................
Freedom of Religion; Non-Establishment Clause (1997) .......................................................
Freedom of Expression; Prior Restraint (1988) ......................................................................
Freedom of Speech; Ban on Tobacco AD (1992) ...................................................................
Impairment Clause; Basic Human Rights (1992) ....................................................................
Involuntary Servitude (1993) ..................................................................................................
Liberty of Abode; Limitations (1998) .....................................................................................
Liberty of Abode; Temporary (1996) ......................................................................................
Non-Imprisonment for Non-Payment of Debt (1993) .............................................................
Police Power; Ban on Tobacco AD (1992) .............................................................................
Police Power; Zoning Ordinance vs. Non-Impairment of Contracts (1989) ...........................
Police Power; Zoning Ordinance vs. Non-Impairment of Contracts (2001) ...........................
Privacy of Communication (2001) ..........................................................................................
Privacy of Correspondence (1998) ..........................................................................................
Privacy of Correspondence; Jail (1989) ..................................................................................
Right to Assembly; Permit Requirements (1992) ..................................................................
Right to Assembly; Public Teachers (2000) ............................................................................
Right to Strike (1988)..............................................................................................................
Right to join a Labor Organization; Amnesty (1988) .............................................................
Right to Travel; Order of Arrest (1991) ..................................................................................
Rights of the Accused; Right to Bail (1993) ...........................................................................
Rights of the Accused; Right to Bail; Deportation Case (1989)..............................................
Rights of the Accused; Right to Speedy Trial (2000)..............................................................
Rights of the Accused; Self-Incrimination (1988) ..................................................................
Rights of the Accused; Self-Incrimination (1990)...................................................................
Rights of the Accused; Self-Incrimination (1992)...................................................................
 Rights of the Accused; Self-Incrimination (2000)...................................................................
Searches and Seizures; Breathalyzer Test (1992) ...................................................................
Searches and Seizures; Incidental to Valid Search (1990) ......................................................
Searches and Seizures; Place of Search (2001) .......................................................................
Searches and Seizures; search made by a private citizen (1993) .............................................
Searches and Seizures; Valid Warrantless Search (2000) .......................................................
Searches and Seizures; Visual Search (1992)..........................................................................
Searches and Seizures; Waiver of Consent (1989) ..................................................................
Searches and Seizures; Warrantless Arrests (1993) ................................................................
Searches and Seizures; Warrants of Arrest (1991) ..................................................................
ARTICLE IV Citizenship .......................................................................................................
Action for Cancellation; Prescription & Effect of Death (1994) ............................................
Citizenship (1988) ...................................................................................................................
Citizenship Who are Filipinos
(2001)…………………………………………………………
Citizenship Who are Filipinos (2003)
………………………………………………………...
Citizenship Who are Filipinos (2006) ………………………………………………………..
Citizenship Who are Filipinos (2006) ………………………………………………………..
Citizenship Who are Filipinos (2011) ……………………………………………………….
Citizenship Who are Filipinos (2013)………………………………………………………..
Citizenship Who are Filipinos (2014) ……………………………………………………….
Citizenship Who are Filipinos (2015)……………………………………………………….
Citizenship; Elected Official (1993) ........................................................................................
Citizenship, Modes of Acquiring (2011) …………………………………………………….
Citizenship, Modes of Acquiring (2011) …………………………………………………….
Citizenship, Modes of Acquiring (2012) ……………………………………………………
Dual Citizenship (1994) ...........................................................................................................
Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance (2009) ………………………………………………
Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance (2012) ………………………………………………
Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance (2012) ………………………………………………
Effect of Marriage; Filipino (1989) ........................................................................................
Effect of Repatriation (1999)...................................................................................................
Effects of Marriages (1999) ....................................................................................................
Effects of Philippine Bill of 1902 (2001) ................................................................................
Elected Official (1992) ............................................................................................................
Loss and re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship (2000) ……………………………………
Loss and re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship (2009) ……………………………………
Natural-born citizens and public office (2002)
………………………………………………
Natural-born citizens and public office (2003)
………………………………………………
Natural-born citizens and public office (2004)
………………………………………………
Natural Born Filipino (1989) ...................................................................................................
Natural Born Filipino (1998) ...................................................................................................
 Natural-Born Filipino(1993) ...................................................................................................
Naturalization; Cancellation of Citizenship (1998) .................................................................
Status; Illegitimate Child (1990) .............................................................................................
Status; Illegitimate Child; Dual Citizenship (1996) ................................................................
Ways of Reacquiring Citizenship (2000) ................................................................................
ARTICLE VI Legislative Department ..................................................................................
Appropriation of Public Funds; Debt Servicing (1992) ..........................................................
Discipline; Modes of Removal (1993) ...................................................................................
Electoral Tribunal; Senate; Jurisdiction (1990) .......................................................................
Foreign Affairs; Role of House of Rep (1996) ........................................................................
Foreign Affairs; Role of Senate (1994) ...................................................................................
Investigations in Aid of Legislation (1992) .............................................................................
Law Making; Process & Publication (1993) ...........................................................................
Law-Making; Appropriation Bill (1996) .................................................................................
Law-Making; Appropriation Law; Automatic Renewal & Power of Augmentation (1998) ..
Law-Making; Appropriation Law; Rider Provision (2001).....................................................
Law-Making; Appropriation Law (1988) ...............................................................................
Law-Making; Appropriation Law (1988) ...............................................................................
Law-Making; Foreign Affairs; Treaties (1996) ......................................................................
Law-Making; Overriding the Presidential Veto (1991)...........................................................
Legislative Power; Pres. Aquino’s Time (1990) .....................................................................
Legislative Powers (1989) .......................................................................................................
Legislative Powers (1988).......................................................................................................
Legislative Powers: Enactment of Law (1988) .......................................................................
Loans Extended to Members of Congress (1991) ...................................................................
Multi-Party System (1999) ......................................................................................................
Non-Legislative Powers; Emergency Powers; Requisites (1997) ...........................................
Qualifications; Congressmen; (1993) ......................................................................................
Qualifications; Congressmen; (1999) ......................................................................................
Three-Term Limit: Congressmen (1996) ................................................................................
Three-Term Limit; Congressmen (2001) ................................................................................
Treaty; Ratfication (1988) .......................................................................................................
ARTICLE VII Executive Department ....................................................................................
Appointing Power; ad interim appointments (1991) ...............................................................
Appointing Power; Ad Interim Appointments (1994) .............................................................
Appointing Power; Categories of Officials (1999)..................................................................
Appointing Power; Kinds of Appointments (1994) ................................................................
Appointing Power; Kinds of Appointments (2003)………………………………………….
Appointing Power; Kinds of Appointments (2011)………………………………………….
Appointing Power; Limitations on Presidential Appointments (1997) ...................................
Appointing Power; Limitations on Presidential Appointments (2002)………………………
Appointing Power; Limitations on Presidential Appointments (2010)………………………
Cabinet Members; limitation on accepting additional duties (1996) .......................................
Enter into Contract or Guarantee Foreign Loans (1994) .........................................................
Enter into Contract or Guarantee Foreign Loans (1999) .........................................................
Impose Tariff Rates, Import and Export Quotas (1999)..........................................................
 Martial Law; Limitations (2000) ............................................................................................
Pardoning Power; Amnesty (1993) .........................................................................................
Pardoning Power; Amnesty (1995) .........................................................................................
Pardoning Power; Exec Clemency (1988) ..............................................................................
Pardoning Power; Exec Clemency; Pardon (1995) .................................................................
Pardoning Power; Executive Clemency (1997).......................................................................
Pardoning Power; Executive Clemency (1999).......................................................................
Pardoning Power; Pardon, Conditional (1997) .......................................................................
President; Participation; Legislative Process (1996) ...............................................................
Presidential Immunity from Suit (1997) .................................................................................
Suspension of Writ of Habeas Corpus (1997) .........................................................................
ARTICLE VIII Judicial Department .....................................................................................
Cases to be Heard En Banc; Supreme Court (1999) ...............................................................
Contempt Powers (1996) .........................................................................................................
Finality of Void Judgments (1993)..........................................................................................
Fiscal Autonomy (1999) ........................................................................................................
Function; Continuing Constitutional Convention (2000) ......................................................
Issuance of Restraining Orders and Injunctions (1992) ........................................................
Judicial & Bar Council (1988) ..............................................................................................
Judicial & Bar Council (1999) ..............................................................................................
Judicial Department; Writ of Amparo (1991) ..........................................................................
Judicial Independence; Safeguard (2000) ................................................................................
Judicial Power (1989) ..............................................................................................................
Judicial Power (1992) ..............................................................................................................
Judicial Power (1998) ..............................................................................................................
Judicial Power; Scope (1994)...................................................................................................
Judicial Review; Presumption of Regularity (1988) ................................................................
Judicial Review; Separation of Powers (1988) ........................................................................
Judicial Review; Locus Standi (1992) .....................................................................................
Judicial Review; Requisites (1994) ..........................................................................................
Judicial Review; Constitutionality Ordinance (1988) ..............................................................
Jurisdiction of HLURB (1993).................................................................................................
Mandatory Period For Deciding Cases (1989) .........................................................................
Political Question (1995) .........................................................................................................
Political Question Doctrine (1997) ..........................................................................................
Pro Hac Vice Cases (1999) ......................................................................................................
Removal of Lower Court Judges (1993) ..................................................................................
Review Executive Acts (1996).................................................................................................
Taxpayer's Suit; Locus Standi (1995) ......................................................................................
Term of Office; Justices (1996) ...............................................................................................
Votes required for declaring a law unconstitutional (1996) .....................................................
ARTICLE IX Constitutional Commissions ...........................................................................
Rotational Scheme (1999) ........................................................................................................
ARTICLE IX Civil Service Commission ...............................................................................
Career Service; Characteristics (1999).....................................................................................
Function of CSC (1994) ...........................................................................................................
 GOCCs Without Original Charter vs. GOCCs With Original Charter (1998).........................
Jurisdiction over the GOCCs (1999) ........................................................................................
Modes of Removal from Office (1993)....................................................................................
Receiving of Indirect Compensation (1997) ............................................................................
Security of Tenure; Meaning (1999) ........................................................................................
Dismissal of Public Officers (1988) .........................................................................................
ARTICLE IX COMELEC ......................................................................................................
Fair Election; Equal Space & Time in Media (1989)...............................................................
Grant of Pardon in Election Offenses (1991) ...........................................................................
Judicial Review of Decisions (2001) .......................................................................................
Removal from Office; Commissioners (1998) .........................................................................
Right to Vote; Jurisdiction (2001)............................................................................................
Election Laws ..............................................................................................................................
Effect of Criminal Case (1983) ................................................................................................
Pre-proclamation Controversy (1988)......................................................................................
Proclamation (1986) .................................................................................................................
Violation (1986) .......................................................................................................................
2nd Placer Rule (1990) .............................................................................................................
2nd Placer Rule; in Quo Warranto Cases (1992) .....................................................................
2nd Placer Rule; Rule of Succession (1996) ...........................................................................
Appreciation of Ballots (1994).................................................................................................
Disqualification; Grounds (1991) ............................................................................................
Disualifications (1999) ..........................................................................................................
Election Offenses; Conspiracy to Bribe Voters (1991) .........................................................
Election Protest (1990) ..........................................................................................................
Election Protest vs. Quo Warranto (2001) ............................................................................
Election Protest; Jurisdiction (1996) .....................................................................................
Expiration of term bars service thereof (2000) ......................................................................
Petition to Declare Failure of Elections; Requisites & Effects (1995) ..................................
Pre-Proclamation Contest vs. Election Contests (1997) ........................................................
Pre-Proclamation Contest; Proper Issues (1996) ...................................................................
Process; Principle of Idem Sonans (1994) .............................................................................
Process; Stray Ballot (1994) ..................................................................................................
Three-Term Limit Rule (2001)..............................................................................................
Vacancy; Rule of Succession (1995) .....................................................................................
ARTICLE IX Commission on Audit ...................................................................................
COA; Jurisdiction (2001) ......................................................................................................
COA; Money Claims (1998) .................................................................................................
ARTICLE X Local Government ........................................................................................
Appointment of Budget Officer; control vs supervision (1999) ...........................................
Boundary Dispute Settlement; Authority; Jurisdiction (1999) ..............................................
Devolution of Power (1999) ..................................................................................................
Ordinance; Use & Lease of Properties; Public Use (1997) ...................................................
Ordinance; Validity; Compensation; Tortuous Act of an Employee (1994) .........................
Ordinance; Validity; Utilization & Development; National Wealth (1991) .........................
Ordinances; Validity; Gambling Prohibition (1995) .............................................................
 Ordinances; Validity; Limitation of Penalties (1991) ...........................................................
Ordinances; Veto Power (1996) ............................................................................................
Police Power; LLDA (1995) .................................................................................................
Power to Issue Subpoena & Cite For Contempt (1993) ........................................................
Requisites; Contracts Involving LGU (1991) ..........................................................................
Requisites; Contracts involving LGU (1995)...........................................................................
Taxation; GOCC Liability For Real Estate Tax (1999) ...........................................................
Taxation; Sources of Revenue (1999) ......................................................................................
Withdrawal of Public Property from Public Use (1990) ..........................................................
ARTICLE XI Accountability of Public Officers ...................................................................
Abandonment of Office (2000) ................................................................................................
Discretionary Duty; Delegability
(2009)……………………………………………………….
Discipline; Clemency; Doctrine of Condonation (2000) .........................................................
Discipline; Effect of Pardon Granted in Favor of Public Officers
(1999) .......................................................................................................................................
Discipline; Preventive Suspension (1990) ...............................................................................
Discipline; Preventive Suspension (2010) ...............................................................................
Elective Public Officer; De Facto Officer (2000) ....................................................................
Elective Public Officer; De Facto Officer (2004) ....................................................................
Elective Public Officer; De Facto Officer (2009) ....................................................................
Elective Public Officer; De Facto Officer (2011) ....................................................................
Elective Public Officer; De Facto Officer (2013) ....................................................................
Impeachment; Cronyism (2000) ..............................................................................................
Impeachment; Grounds (1999).................................................................................................
Impeachment (1988)
Law of Public Officers; Next-in-Rank Rule (1994) .................................................................
Liability For Damages in Performance of Official Functions (1990) ......................................
Liability For Damages in Performance of Official Functions
(2011)………………………….
Local Elective Officials; Limitations On Additional Duties (1995) ........................................
Ombudsman; Power to Suspend; Preventive Suspension (1996) ............................................
Power to Issue Subpoena; validity of delegation (1989)..........................................................
Public Officer; Definition
(2011)……………………………………………………………….
Public Office; Public Trust (1998) ...........................................................................................
Retirement Benefits (1996) ......................................................................................................
SALN; Definition
(2012)……………………………………………………………………….
Term; Appointment
(2002)……………………………………………………………………..
Vacancy; Hold-Over Principle
(2009)………………………………………………………….
ARTICLE XII National Economy and Patrimony .................................................................
Acquisition and Lease of Public Lands (1998) ........................................................................
Acquisition of Lands (2000) ....................................................................................................
 Acquisition of Lands; Citizenship issue (1989) .......................................................................
Acquisition of Lands; Citizenship issue (1994) .......................................................................
Acquisition of Lands; Citizenship issue (1995) .......................................................................
Acquisition of Lands; Prohibition; acquisition of private lands by aliens (1994) ....................
Citizenship Requirement in Management of Advertising Industry (1989) ..............................
Exploration and Development of Minerals (1994) ..................................................................
Expropriation of Public Utilities (1992) ..................................................................................
Lease of Private Agricultural Lands (2001) .............................................................................
National Patrimony; definition (1999) .....................................................................................
Nationalized Activities (1994) .................................................................................................
Ownership Requirement of Mass Media (1989) ......................................................................
ARTICLE XIII Social Justice and Human Rights.................................................................
Agrarian Reform Law; Coverage (1992) .................................................................................
Commission on Human Rights; Power to investigate (1992) ..................................................
Commission on Human Rights; Power to issue TRO (1997) ..................................................
Commission on Human Rights; Power to issue TRO (2001) ..................................................
Labor; Right to Strike (1993) ...................................................................................................
Social Justice under the Present Constitution (1995) ...............................................................
Women (2000) .........................................................................................................................
ARTICLE XIV Education, Science and Technology, Arts ...................................................
Education; Academic Freedom (1989) ....................................................................................
Education; Academic Freedom (1993) ....................................................................................
Education; Academic Freedom; Extent (1999) ........................................................................
Education; Alien Enrollees & Donors (1999) ..........................................................................
Education; Duties of State in Re Education (1999) .................................................................
Education; Right to Choose Profession (2000) ........................................................................
Education; Teaching of Religion (1999) ..................................................................................
Education; Validity of Academic Requirements (1994) ..........................................................
ARTICLE XVI General Provisions .........................................................................................
AFP; limitation on accepting additional duties (1996) ............................................................
ARTICLE XVII Amendments or Revisions ...........................................................................
Amendments and Revisions; Modes (1997) ............................................................................
ARTICLE XVIII Transitory Provisions ..................................................................................
Transitory Provisions; Foreign Military Bases (1996) .............................................................
Military Bases Agreement (1988) ............................................................................................
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW .........................................................................................
Revolutionary Government (1985) ..........................................................................................
1949 Geneva Convention (1982) .............................................................................................
Status of Individual (1982).......................................................................................................
Jurisdiction (1986) ...................................................................................................................
U.N. Charter (1984) .................................................................................................................
U.N. Charter (1984) .................................................................................................................
U.N. Charter (1985) .................................................................................................................
U.N. Charter (1988) .................................................................................................................
Basic Principles in Public Int’l Law (1991) .............................................................................
Basic Principles; Reparation (2007).........................................................................................
Concept of Association (2010) ................................................................................................
Constitutive Theory vs. Declaratory Theory (2004)
..................................................................
Contiguous Zone vs. Exclusive Economic Zone (2004)
............................................................
Diplomatic Immunity (2000) ...................................................................................................
Diplomatic Immunity (2001) ...................................................................................................
Diplomatic Immunity (2003) ...................................................................................................
Diplomatic Immunity (2004) ...................................................................................................
Diplomatic Immunity; Ambassador (Q3-2005)
.........................................................................
Diplomatic Immunity; Ambassador (2014) ............................................................................
Diplomatic Immunity; Ambassadors (1990) ............................................................................
Diplomatic Immunity; Coverage (Q3-2005)
...............................................................................
Diplomatic Immunity; Diplomatic Envoy and Consular Officers (1995) ................................
Diplomatic Immunity; Diplomatic Envoy and Consular Officers (1997) ................................
Exclusive Economic Zone (2000) ............................................................................................
Executive Agreements; Binding Effect (2003)
...........................................................................
Extradition vs. Deportation (1993)...........................................................................................
Extradition; Doctrine of Specialty (1993) ................................................................................
Extradition; Double Criminality (2007) ..................................................................................
Extradition; Effectivity of treaty (1996)...................................................................................
Extradition; Grounds (2002)
....................................................................................................
Extradition; Retroactive Application (Q2-2005)
..................................................................................................................................................
Flag State vs. Flag of Convenience (2004)
..................................................................................................................................................
Genocide (1988)
..................................................................................................................................................
Genocide (2010)
..................................................................................................................................................
Hard Law vs. Soft Law (2008)
..................................................................................................................................................
Human Rights
(1999)
..................................................................................................................................................
Human Rights; Civil and Political Rights
(1992)
..................................................................................................................................................
Human Rights; Civil and Political Rights
(1996)
..................................................................................................................................................
Human Rights; Civil and Political Rights (2007)
..................................................................................................................................................
Human Rights; Civil and Political Rights; Freedom from Torture (2010)
..................................................................................................................................................
Int’l Court of Justice; Jurisdiction Over
States
..................................................................................................................................................
Int’l Court of Justice; Jurisdiction Over States
(1994)
..................................................................................................................................................
Int’l Court of Justice; Limitations On Jurisdiction
(1999)
..................................................................................................................................................
Int’l Court of Justice; Parties; Pleadings and Oral Argument
(1994)
..................................................................................................................................................
International Convention; Law of the Sea (2004)
..................................................................................................................................................
International Court of Justice (Q9-2006)
..................................................................................................................................................
Int’l Court of Justice vs. Int’l Criminal Court (2010)
..................................................................................................................................................
International Law vs. Municipal Law; Territorial Principle; International Crimes (Q2-
2005)
..................................................................................................................................................
International Law Violation; Treaty (2008)
..................................................................................................................................................
Mandates and Trust Territories (2003)
..................................................................................................................................................
Municipal Law vs. International Law (2003)
..................................................................................................................................................
Neutrality of States (1988)
..................................................................................................................................................
Opinio Juris (2012)
..................................................................................................................................................
Opinio Juris (2008)
..................................................................................................................................................
Outer Space; Jurisdiction (2003)
..................................................................................................................................................
Principle of Attribution or Imputation (2010)
..................................................................................................................................................
Principle of Auto-Limitation (Q10-2006)
..................................................................................................................................................
Principle of Auto-Limitation (2009)
..................................................................................................................................................
Reciprocity v. Principle of Auto-Limitation (Q10-2006)
..................................................................................................................................................
Recognition of States; De Facto vs. De Jure Recognition
(1998)
..................................................................................................................................................
Reparations Agreement; Validity
(1992)
..................................................................................................................................................
Retorsion (2010)
..................................................................................................................................................
Right to Innocent Passage
(1999)
..................................................................................................................................................
Right to Transit and Innocent Passage (2004)
..................................................................................................................................................
Rights and Obligation under UN Charter
(1991)
..................................................................................................................................................
Sources of International Law; Primary & Subsidiary Sources (2003)
..................................................................................................................................................
Sovereign Immunity of States; Absolute vs. Restrictive
(1998)
..................................................................................................................................................
Sovereignty of States; Natural Use of Territory
(1989)
..................................................................................................................................................
Sovereignty; Definition; Nature (Q10-2006)
..................................................................................................................................................
State Liabilities
(1995)
..................................................................................................................................................
State Sovereignty; Effective Occupation; Terra Nullius
(2000)
..................................................................................................................................................
Stateless Persons; Effects; Status; Rights
(1995)
..................................................................................................................................................
Territorial Sea vs. Internal Waters (2004)
..................................................................................................................................................
Use of Force; Exceptions (2003)
..................................................................................................................................................
Use of Force; Principle of Non-Intervention
(1994)
..................................................................................................................................................
Use of Force; Right of Self-defense (2002)
..................................................................................................................................................
Use of Force; Self-Defense (2009)
..................................................................................................................................................
 Use of Force; Self-Defense; Waging War
(1998)
..................................................................................................................................................
Use of Force; When allowed (1988)
..................................................................................................................................................
Verbal Agreement; Source of Int’l Law
(2012)
..................................................................................................................................................
War; Combatants/ Prisoners of War vs. Mercenaries
(1993)
..................................................................................................................................................
Wilson doctrine vs. Estrada doctrine (2004)
..................................................................................................................................................
ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW
......................................................................................................................................................
Alter Ego Principle
(1986)
......................................................................................................................................................
Primary Jurisdiction
(1985)
..................................................................................................................................................
Admin Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
(1982)
..................................................................................................................................................
Admin Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
(1983)
......................................................................................................................................................
Admin Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
(1984)
......................................................................................................................................................
Admin Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
(1991)
..................................................................................................................................................
Admin Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
(2000)
..................................................................................................................................................
Admin Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies vs Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
(1996)
................................................................................................................................................
Admin Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Exceptions
(1991)
..................................................................................................................................................
Admin Law; Judicial Review of Administrative Action
(2001)
..................................................................................................................................................
 Admin Law; Meaning of “Government of the Philippines” (1997)
..................................................................................................................................................
Admin Law; Rules and Regulations; Due Process (2000) .......................................................
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
Legislative Power of Local Government (1983) ......................................................................
Taxing Power (1986) ................................................................................................................