Design of A Manned Vehicle Technical Report

Technical Report
Lucas DE MENDOCA FONSECA

Vincent DOMINGIE Sudeh KAMALI
Carolina GALLARDO PATINO Petar KOS
Luis GANUZA LOPEZ Florian PONTIER
Robert GUILANYA JANE Julie RICHARD
Mireia JOYA VILLANUA Bruno VICTORINO SARLI
Technical tutors:
Rémi DELAGE Stéphanie LIZY-DESTREZ
ITP – Design of a manned re-entry vehicle

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TAS & EuMAS Astro – 2009/2010
Technical Report
ABSTRACT
The goal of the reports (management and technical ones) are to give some tools and
results on a project done by the student in Master course in Astronautics and space
engineering at Suapero University.
The management report presents you the key element of the beginning of a project from
phase ―0‖ up to phase ―A‖. All the aspect of a project, on a management point f view, is
given. All the tool, methodology and results for this project, are explained.
The technical report is the final report on the project, which aims to give the result of our
6 month study on the design of a manned space vehicle to carry 3 astronauts to the ISS and
to bring back them to Earth safely. For all the studies perform, a methodology is given in
order to have an idea of how to begin a phase ―0‖ space project on a technical point of
view; some key elements are written to do a budget (mass and power), to find the good
shape of a re-entry capsule…

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CONTENTS
Abstract ...................................................................................................... 2
Contents ..................................................................................................... 3
Acronyms................................................................................................ 11
1 Introduction ................................................................................. 13
1.1 Background........................................................................................ 13
1.2 Mission objectives ........................................................................... 13
1.3 Project requirements ..................................................................... 13
1.4 Mission overview ............................................................................. 14
1.5 Report structure .............................................................................. 14
2 System Engineering ................................................................... 15
2.1 Concept of Operations (ConOps) ................................................ 15
2.1.1 Inputs ..................................................................................................................... 16
2.1.2 Constraints ........................................................................................................... 16
2.1.3 Enablers ................................................................................................................ 16
2.1.4 Outputs .................................................................................................................. 16
2.1.5 Process activities ............................................................................................... 17
2.1.6 Scope ...................................................................................................................... 17
2.1.7 Referenced documents .................................................................................... 18
2.1.8 Existing system – ATV “Jules Verne” ............................................................ 19
2.1.8.3 System description & operational environment..................................... 20
2.1.8.4 Modes of operation .......................................................................................... 21
2.1.8.5 Users & stakeholders ....................................................................................... 21
2.1.8.6 Support Environment ...................................................................................... 22
2.1.9 Justifications & description of changes...................................................... 22
2.1.9.1 Justification of changes .................................................................................. 22
2.1.9.2 Description of desired changes .................................................................... 22
2.1.9.3 Priorities among changes .............................................................................. 23
2.1.10 Proposed system – “manned re-entry ATV” ......................................... 24
2.1.10.1 Background, objectives & scope ................................................................ 24

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2.1.10.2 Operational policies & constraints ........................................................... 24
General constraints ....................................................................................................... 24
Operational constraints ............................................................................................... 25

2.1.10.3 System description & Operational Environment ................................. 25
2.1.10.4 Crew Health Concept of Operations ......................................................... 27
2.1.10.5 Modes of operations ...................................................................................... 28
2.1.10.6 Users & stakeholders .................................................................................... 28
2.1.10.7 Support environment.................................................................................... 28
2.2 Functional analysis ......................................................................... 29

2.2.1 Global approach ................................................................................................. 29
2.2.2 Rules to establish an Octopus diagram ...................................................... 30
2.2.3 Application to our functional analysis ....................................................... 31
2.3 Driving factors .................................................................................. 38
2.4 Selection of alternatives ................................................................ 39
2.4.1 Shape configuration .......................................................................................... 39
2.4.2 Main drag enhancement system................................................................... 41
2.4.3 Control method................................................................................................... 42
2.4.4 Crew Escape System.......................................................................................... 44
2.4.5 Crew escape system while the vehicle stands in the launch pad ...... 45
2.4.6 Landing site.......................................................................................................... 47
2.4.7 Future inclusion of a module capable to land on the Moon ................ 47
2.5 Winning idea ..................................................................................... 47
2.5.1 Trade-off table .................................................................................................... 47
2.5.2 Trade-off Results ............................................................................................... 49
3 Operations .................................................................................... 50
3.1 Mission phases .................................................................................. 50
3.2 Functional Chains ............................................................................ 52
3.3 Interfaces ............................................................................................ 53
3.4 Criticality Analysis .......................................................................... 54
4 Product Assurance ..................................................................... 58
4.1 PA definition ...................................................................................... 58

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4.2 Expected results and methodology for a Phase 0 project .. 58

4.2.1 Expected results ................................................................................................. 58
4.2.2 Methodology ........................................................................................................ 58
4.2.3 PA introduction to the manned re-entry vehicle.................................... 59
4.2.4 Safety difference between the actual ATV and the manned re-entry
vehicle .................................................................................................................................. 60
4.2.5 Preliminary Hazard Analysis......................................................................... 60
4.2.6 Means to avoid hazard to identify in the PHA.......................................... 61
4.2.6.1 Space debris avoidance .................................................................................. 61
4.2.6.2 Launcher destruction avoidance ................................................................. 61
4.2.6.3 Thermal shield problem avoidance ............................................................ 62
4.2.6.4 Fire inside the vehicle avoidance ................................................................ 62
4.2.7 Reliability of the manned re-entry vehicle ............................................... 62
4.2.8 Safe Mode & FO/FO/FS aspects ..................................................................... 62
5 Mission analysis.......................................................................... 63
5.1 Scenarios for the Trajectories ..................................................... 63
5.1.1 First scenario - nominal mode ...................................................................... 63
5.1.2 Second scenario - safe mode .......................................................................... 63
5.1.3 Third scenario - contingency situation ...................................................... 64
5.2 Landing Sites ..................................................................................... 64
5.2.1 Landing Sites Selection .................................................................................... 64
5.2.2 Nominal and Emergency Landing sites geographical location .......... 67
5.2.2.1 Nominal Scenario ............................................................................................. 67
5.2.2.2 Emergency Scenario ........................................................................................ 68
5.2.2.3 Additional Constraints .................................................................................... 71
5.3 Introduction to Trajectory Design ............................................. 72

5.4 Description of the phases.............................................................. 72
5.4.1 Dynamic and aerothermal models .............................................................. 72
5.4.2 Landing sites analysis ...................................................................................... 73
5.4.3 Re-entry corridor and ATV body trajectory ............................................. 73
5.5 Road Map ............................................................................................ 74
5.5.1 Information and iterations with other work packages ........................ 74
5.5.2 Work flow ............................................................................................................. 75

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5.6 Earth’s Physical Characteristics.................................................. 76

5.6.1 Earth’s sphere of influence ............................................................................. 76
5.6.2 Earth’s gravitational field ............................................................................... 77
5.6.3 Earth’s density profiles .................................................................................... 77
5.7 Modeling the Atmospheric Entry ............................................... 77
5.7.1 The atmospheric re-entry model ................................................................. 77
5.7.2 Flight mechanics ................................................................................................ 79
5.7.3 Vehicle and environment equations ........................................................... 81
5.7.3.1 Equations of Motion ......................................................................................... 81
5.7.3.2 Drag ...................................................................................................................... 81
5.7.3.3 Lift ......................................................................................................................... 82
5.7.3.4 Density ................................................................................................................. 82
5.7.3.5 Stagnation Point ............................................................................................... 82
5.7.3.6 Kinematics .......................................................................................................... 84
5.8 Entry Corridor................................................................................... 85

5.8.1 Study of initial parameters............................................................................. 85
5.8.1.1 Flight-path angle .............................................................................................. 85
5.8.1.2 Heading angle.................................................................................................... 86
5.8.1.3 Altitude ................................................................................................................ 86
5.8.1.4 Mass ...................................................................................................................... 89
5.8.1.5 Reference area and nose radius .................................................................. 90
5.8.1.6 Velocity ................................................................................................................ 90
5.8.1.7 Latitude ............................................................................................................... 91
5.8.1.8 Longitude ............................................................................................................ 91
5.8.1.9 Lift coefficient and Drag coefficient............................................................ 92
5.8.1.10 Bank angle ....................................................................................................... 92
5.8.1.11 Required landing sites.................................................................................. 93
5.8.1.12 First landing site coordinates .................................................................... 93
5.8.1.13 Second landing site coordinates ............................................................... 93
5.8.1.14 Third landing site coordinates .................................................................. 93
5.8.1.15 Maximum temperature allowed ............................................................... 94
5.8.2 Maximum acceleration allowed ................................................................... 95
5.8.3 Method used in the Simulations ................................................................... 95
5.9 Nominal Scenario ............................................................................. 96

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5.9.1 First landing site ................................................................................................ 96

5.9.2 Bank angle variation ........................................................................................ 98
5.9.3 Second landing site .........................................................................................100
5.9.4 Bank angle variation ......................................................................................101
5.9.5 Third landing site ............................................................................................103
5.9.6 Bank angle variation ......................................................................................104
5.10 Emergency Scenario .....................................................................105
5.10.1 First landing site ..........................................................................................105
5.10.2 Second landing site .....................................................................................106
5.10.3 Third landing site ........................................................................................107
5.11 Catastrophic Scenario ..................................................................108
5.12 ATV body Re-Entry ........................................................................108
5.13 Future Lunar Missions .................................................................110
6 Landing System ......................................................................... 114
6.1 Main requirements .......................................................................115
6.1.1 Requirements for nominal operations ....................................................115
6.2 Parachute system...........................................................................116
6.2.1 Aerodynamic study for the parachute .....................................................117
6.2.2 Parachute options ...........................................................................................119
6.2.3 Parachute design .............................................................................................122
6.2.3.1 Mass of the parachute system .................................................................... 122
6.2.3.2 Main parachute ............................................................................................... 124
6.2.3.3 Size and number of parachutes ................................................................. 124
6.2.3.4 Pilot parachute................................................................................................ 128
6.2.4 Drogue parachute ............................................................................................130
6.2.5 Deployment altitude, Mach and dynamic pressure: Nominal case 132
6.2.6 Deployment altitude, Mach and dynamic pressure: Emergency case ..
................................................................................................................................134
6.2.6.1 Required Drogue chute diameter .............................................................. 136
6.2.7 Parachute system summary ........................................................................136
6.3 Secondary landing system ..........................................................137
6.3.1 Human tolerance to impact..........................................................................137

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6.3.2 Airbag landing system ...................................................................................138

6.3.3 Retrorocket landing system.........................................................................139
6.3.4 Airbag / spare tire design .............................................................................142
6.3.5 Additional systems ..........................................................................................142
7 Structures ................................................................................... 143

7.1 Capsule Shape definition .............................................................143
7.1.1 Benchmarking analysis .................................................................................143
7.1.2 Atmospheric Re-entry Demonstrator (ARD) .........................................143
 DASA 40 kgf hydrazine attitude control thrusters ...... 144

7.1.3 Shape selection .................................................................................................144
7.2 Vehicle configuration ...................................................................145
7.2.1 Vehicle-ATV integration ................................................................................145
7.2.2 Vehicle’s definition constrains ...................................................................146
7.2.3 Vehicle’s plans ..................................................................................................147
7.3 Structure Materials .......................................................................149
7.4 Vehicle dimensions .......................................................................149
8 Thermal analysis ...................................................................... 150
8.1 Thermal Protection System........................................................150
8.1.1 Main description ..............................................................................................150
8.1.2 Types of thermal protection systems .......................................................150
8.2 Benchmarking analysis ...............................................................155
8.3 TPS selection ...................................................................................156
8.3.1 TPS technology .................................................................................................156
8.3.2 TPS shape definition .......................................................................................156
8.3.3 TPS material ......................................................................................................157
8.3.4 TPS thickness ....................................................................................................157
8.3.5 TPS mass fraction and total mass ..............................................................157
9 Power ........................................................................................... 159

9.1 Actual ATV power ..........................................................................159
9.2 Data to do the power budget......................................................160
9.3 Power budget ..................................................................................161

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9.4 New solar array dimension estimation ..................................163

9.5 New NiCd battery dimension estimation ...............................165
9.6 Mass budget of the power subsystem .....................................166
10 Propulsion .................................................................................. 167
10.1 Overview of the propulsion system .........................................167
10.2 Propulsion budget .........................................................................168
10.3 The Equipped Propulsion bay ...................................................169
11 Communication strategy ....................................................... 171
11.1 Actual ATV communication ........................................................171
11.2 The Artemis issue ..........................................................................172
11.3 The EDRS solution .........................................................................172
11.4 The Galileo option .........................................................................173
12 GNC ................................................................................................ 174
12.1 Docking GNC ....................................................................................174
12.2 Orbital GNC ......................................................................................175
12.3 Re-entry GNC ...................................................................................175
13 OBDH & Mission Management ............................................. 176
14 Environmental Control and Life Support System .......... 178
14.1 Scenarios and Astronauts Needs ..............................................180
14.2 Atmospheric Control and Supply (ACS) .................................180
14.2.1 O2/N2 Supply and Control........................................................................181
14.2.2 CO2 Removal System ..................................................................................182
14.2.3 Trace Contaminants Removal .................................................................182
14.2.4 Pressure Control System ...........................................................................183
14.3 Temperature and Humidity Control (THC) ..........................183
14.3.1 Air Circulation System ...............................................................................183
14.3.2 Temperature Control .................................................................................184
14.3.3 Humidity Control .........................................................................................184
14.4 Water Supply and Management ................................................184

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14.5 Fire Detection and Suppression System ................................184

14.6 Waste Management .......................................................................186
14.7 Food Storage and Preparation ..................................................187
14.8 Crew Health Care ...........................................................................187
14.9 Crew Systems ..................................................................................188
14.10 Redundancy level and type ........................................................188
14.11 ECLSS Configuration......................................................................190
15 Budgets ........................................................................................ 191
15.1 Power budget ..................................................................................191
15.2 Mass budget .....................................................................................192
16 Testing ......................................................................................... 197
16.1 Introduction ....................................................................................197
16.2 Environmental tests ......................................................................198
16.3 Electrical tests .................................................................................198
16.4 Functional tests ..............................................................................198
Conclusion ............................................................................................ 199
Bibliography ........................................................................................ 200
Appendix .............................................................................................. 203
Appendix 1 – Risk assessment table ..........................................................204
Appendix 2 – Catia plans ................................................................................212
Appendix 3 – Thermal Protection Comparison .....................................213

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ACRONYMS
Acronym Meaning
ACS Atmosphere Control & Supply
ACWRS Atmospheric Condensate Water Regeneration System
ARD Atmospheric Re-entry Demonstrator
AREM Atmospheric re-entry model
ARS Atmosphere Revitalization and Sampling
ARTES Advanced Research in Telecommunications Systems
ARV Advanced Reentry Vehicle
ATV Automated Transfer Vehicle
CAM Collision Avoidance Maneuver
CBS Cost Breakdown Structure
CC Control Center
CHeC Crew Health Care
CRM Continuous Risk Management
CS Crew Systems
CSTS Crew Space Transportation System
CTV Crew Transport Vehicle
CV Crew Vehicle
DMU Data Management Unit
ECLS Environmental Control and Life Support
ECLSS Environment Control and Life Support Systems
ECSS European Cooperation for Space Standardization
EDRS European Data Relay Satellite
EDS Earth Departure Stage
ESA European Space Agency
FDS Fire Detection & Suppression
FO Fail Operational
FS Fail Safe
FSP Food Storage & Preparation
GEOS Geostationary Earth Orbit Satellite
GNC Guidance Navigation and Control
GPS Global Positioning System
HS Hazardous Situation
ISAE Institut Supérieur de l‘Aéronautique et de l‘Espace
ISS International Space Station
ITP Integrated Team Project

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LDS Lunar Departure Stage

LEO Low Earth Orbit
LM Lunar Module
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
OBDH On-board Data Handling
PA Product Assurance
PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis
PM Project Management
PMBOK Project Management Body Of Knowledge
PMI Project Management Institute
SSA Space Science Agencies
TBD To Be Defined
TDRSS Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
THC Temperature & Humidity Control
TPS Thermal Protection System
WBS Work Breakdown Structure
WM Waste Management
WP Work Package
WSM Water Supply & Management

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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
After the success of the first ATV mission, Europe is willing to develop its own
manned re-entry capsule. Now that the capability of bringing back cargo from space has
been demonstrated such a spacecraft could undertake the next logical steps to become the
European crew transportation system. Of course this would require complex modifications
and additional technologies.
A crew-capable vehicle should be available after end of the shuttles exploitation (in
2010). As the ISS usage is extended until 2020 and the US Orion spacecraft should be ready
for 2014, the European vessel could be an interesting back-up solution for the ISS.
Currently, the ATV is unable to return to Earth without burning into the atmosphere.
The idea that ESA is following is to re-use the ATV Jules Verne design, but to put a crew
compartment in place of the current cargo section.
Based on the interest of the space community on a manned re-entry vehicle as

mentioned above, it was decided that it would be quite relevant for a project to be done
regarding this as part of the Master course in Astronautics and Space Systems Engineering
in ISAE – Supaéro.
1.2 Mission objectives

The main objectives defined at the beginning of the project were as follows:
 To carry three astronauts

 To transport the astronauts from Kourou to ISS and return on Earth.
 To insure a rescue system in case of launch failure
 To dock to any port of the ISS
1.3 Project requirements

In addition to the objectives mentioned above a set of requirements were also defined at
the beginning of the project. These were:
Performances Re-entry specifications

 First flight expected for 2017  After undocking, the re-entry capsule
 Lifetime : greater than 15 years shall provide to three cosmonauts the
 Frequency: 2 flights per year (TBC) capability to survive during 24h00.
 The capsule shall be able to land on the
Earth, on the sea or on the Moon.

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1.4 Mission overview

Based on the requirements given the vehicle should be ready for launch by 2017. It
would be launched on an adapted version of the Arian 5 launcher from the Kourou in
French Guiana. It would have the capability to carry 3 astronauts to the ISS and back.
Below an overview of the whole mission as designed can be viewed.
Figure 1 - Overview of the different phases of the mission
1.5 Report structure

The report is organized in a subsystem point of view, meaning that each chapter is
dedicated to a specific subsystem. However a general overview is given on the project in
the system engineering chapter.
During the project work has been done in the following subsystems and a chapter is
dedicated to each:
1. System engineering 6. Propulsion
2. Mission analysis 7. Communication
3. Structures 8. GNC
4. Thermal 9. OBDH
5. Power 10. ECLS

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2 SYSTEM ENGINEERING
In this chapter it would be explained how with the use of the system engineering tools
used in the industry this project was handled.
A concept of operations study was performed in order to define the objectives, scope and
constraints of the project. Within the concept of operations study, a functional chain
analysis is performed to identify the requirements of the project as needed by the
customer. Finally using these data, the mission driving factors become clear. In the final
phase a trade-off analysis is performed between the available solutions.
2.1 Concept of Operations (ConOps)

The Concept of Operations results from a stakeholder view of the operations of the
system being developed. The ConOps is made so that it can easily be reviewed by the
stakeholders to get their agreement on the system description. It also provides the basis
for user requirements.
The main objectives here are

therefore to:
 Document the total

environment and use
of the system to be
developed in a non-
technical and easy way
to understand
 Present this
information from
different viewpoints
 Provide a bridge from
the problem space and
stakeholder needs to
the system level
requirements
Figure 2 - ConOps process

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2.1.1 Inputs
Project goals and objectives determine how the system will be used. Starting from the
preliminary customer requirements the project scope has been elaborated in order to
guide the trade-off and identify the project drivers.
Recommended system concept describes the envisaged concepts, from which the final
concept is obtained through preliminary analysis. For instance the lunar landing has been
imagined but not considered.
Needs Assessment include the list of collected needs, their sources, and documentation of
the rationale for the selection of the key needs and any constraints that exist that may
limit possible solutions to the needs.
Feasibility assessment defines and analyzes the conceptual system and, in the process,
provides operational information.
2.1.2 Constraints
The constraints are actually the control tools of the process. The Project Plan describes
the project and the SEMP (Systems Engineering Management Plan) describes the systems
engineering effort needed for development. They both guide what may be developed.
2.1.3 Enablers
The stakeholders played a key role, as their involvement is essential to ensure that the
system is useful to them. Especially technical reviews support continuing communications
with the stakeholders, which are essential to developing a concept that reflects their
needs.
2.1.4 Outputs
Concept of operations describes the operation of the system being developed from the
various stakeholder viewpoints. It documents the user‘s requirements for ultimate system
operations. The users and other stakeholders can review the document and provide
feedback and validate these key going-in assumptions.

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2.1.5 Process activities

Define project vision, goals, and objectives. From that point of view a loop is made over
the project scope and the objectives, in order to improve those and to ensure their right
direction.
Explore project concepts through several scenarios and trade-off.
Develop operational scenarios. Those describe how the system will be operated under
various conditions. These scenarios will describe the activities from the viewpoint of each
of the participants. Flow diagrams are a useful technique for describing the scenarios.
Figure 3 - ConOps contents
2.1.6 Scope
This chapter is devoted to the Concept of Operations, which describes the capabilities of a
new European manned space vehicle. It records system characteristics and includes such
information such as vision, goals and objectives, operational philosophies, operational
environment, support environment, operational scenarios, operational system
characteristics, system constraints & limitations, institutional issues, external interfaces,
stakeholder functions, roles & responsibilities, and capabilities.
The ConOps is firstly proposed on the ATV Jules Verne, to reach from specific
modifications the space manned re-entry vehicle ConOps. Indeed as the new vehicle is
made from the actual ATV, it is logical to start this study from the existed and known ATV.

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2.1.7 Referenced documents

The listed documents are linked to the ConOps process according different views such as
input, enabler, control, or activities. Mainly of those documents are included into the
Management Report, except for the ones provided by the customer.
Documents produced ConOps use

Preliminary “customer” requirements Input
System concept Input
Scope Input
Assumptions Input
Motivations Enabler
Stakeholders Enabler
Management Plan (“SEMP”) Control
Control Monitoring Control
Phase Description Input
WBS Control
OBS Control
CBS Control
Functional Chain Analysis Activities
Driving Factors Activities
Trade-off study (with results) Activities
Risk Management Enabler
Figure 4 - Referenced documents (cf. Fig.3)

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2.1.8 Existing system – ATV “Jules Verne”

2.1.8.1 Background, objectives & scope
The Automated Transfer Vehicle is an unmanned expendable space transport vehicle
designed for logistic servicing of the International Space Station. It provides the
capabilities of delivering pressurized and unpressurized cargoes to the Space Station and
serves for ISS refueling. Moreover, the ATV system is capable of raising the Space Station
orbit (ISS re-boost) in order to counteract a decrease in its orbital altitude due to
atmospheric drag and contributes to space station attitude control.
The ATV is launched atop an Ariane 5 vehicle into a viable quasi-circular orbit. Once on
orbit, the ATV becomes fully autonomous and performs all the operations until direct
docking to the Space Station under the control of the ATV Control Centre (located in
Toulouse) and in coordination with the ISS Control Centers (located in Moscow and
Houston). It docks to the station precisely and safely and becomes a manned spaceship for
a period up to 6 months. After its mission completion, the ATV will de-dock from the
station carrying away tons of waste to be disposed. The ATV ends its mission by burning
into the atmosphere.
2.1.8.2 Operational policies & constraints
General constraints
As the ATV is a European project led by ESA, all the vehicle development and conception is
ruled by the geo-return policy, which limits possibilities. For the ATV program only ten of
the ESA Member States have decided to participate, therefore the geo-return is only
relevant among those countries.
The vehicle must use the Russian docking port and therefore the ATV has to be equipped
with the Russian docking system.
The ATV has to be launched into orbit using the European Ariane 5 launch vehicle. Some
accommodations are possible on the launcher but remain limited. This involves mass and
volume constraints.

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Operational constraints
Although the Control Center of Toulouse operates the ATV during all mission phases, the
Moscow and Houston Control Centers receive, follow and have their word on everything.
The ATV telecommunication system has therefore to be designed in accordance. And the
Operation Control Center has to be in constant interaction with Moscow and Houston. It is
an important constraint.
The ATV interacts closely with the manned Space Station; indeed it will dock to it.
Consequently for safety concerns about the ISS, the crew in the Station must keep the
possibility to stop the vehicle mission at any time. The vehicle has a specific mode to fulfill
this requirement.
The ATV Jules Verne has not the priority in the vicinity of the ISS. If the American or the
Russian decide to have a specific mission with its own vehicle, the ATV mission should wait
for the green light and be therefore able to stand its mission on a waiting orbit or within a
specific configuration mainly dictated by the Russians or the Americans.
2.1.8.3 System description & operational environment
Figure 5 - ATC operational environment

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The ATV Control Centre in Toulouse (ATV-CC) is designed to be operational during the
entire ATV life cycle (up to 15 years). During all flight phases (free flight and attached) the
link with the ground (ATV-CC) is established via the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
System (TDRSS) and ARTEMIS. During attached phases, when ATV is in dormant mode, the
link via TDRS/ARTEMIS is activated during a typical 10mn slot per orbit. During proximity
operations, the ISS provides data to ATV and also can send some High Level Tele-
Commands (HLTC) via the proximity link in case of contingencies.
All the ground commands are issued by the ATV-CC. The CAM (Collision Avoidance
Maneuver), Resume, and Hold related commands could either be initiated by the ATV-CC
or by the ISS crew. During the attached operations (re-boost, refueling, etc.), the ATV is
commanded by the ISS after preparation by ATV-CC and under ATV-CC control. The GPS
system is used for ATV navigation. During phasing and de-orbiting, the absolute navigation
is performed on the ground by ATV-CC.
During rendezvous, the ATV GPS receivers perform the relative navigation on-board. The
ISS GPS measurements are transmitted to the ATV via proximity link so that ATV can
compute the relative state vector (Relative GPS, hereafter referred to as RGPS).
2.1.8.4 Modes of operation
The ATV has been designed to be ready to face many situations, which implies several
modes of operation such as normal, degraded, exception handling, maintenance, safe,
stand-by.
The normal mode of operation includes all safety concern and always allows a quick and
safe cancellation of the current mission phase. The normal mode of operation performs all
the mission phases, from the launch to the docking and de-docking, until the destruction of
the vehicle.
2.1.8.5 Users & stakeholders
For the project stakeholders, their listing is below displayed by a kind of decreasing level
of importance. Only the ―high stakeholders‖ are presented, size of country or companies.
ESA as the Space Agency that ignited this program is the main Stakeholder. Especially it is
the first space vehicle ever made by ESA, so the impact of this mission is huge.
The ATV is part of the European participation in the ISS which remains an optional ESA
program. France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden,
Denmark and Germany have decided to participate in this project. All those countries are
involved in this project and therefore are stakeholders.
The ATV is made to serve the ISS which is like under the ownership of the US and Russia.
Those two countries are consequently the most powerful stakeholders, in the sense that
they can dictate their rules over the ATV mission.

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The ATV project involves dozens of companies from ten European countries under the
prime contractor ship of EADS Astrium. Also implies the cooperation of Russian companies
for the docking system and some US companies. All those companies are stakeholders.
The TDRS and Artemis systems being used in operations by the ATV are also included within
the stakeholders, as they both can strongly impact the mission.
2.1.8.6 Support Environment
During all the operations the Houston and Moscow Control Centers are in steady support of
the Toulouse Control Center.
2.1.9 Justifications & description of changes

2.1.9.1 Justification of changes
The aim of this project is the design of a manned vehicle, whose purpose is to transport a
crew to/from the ISS from/to Earth. Particularly, the space vehicle shall be capable of
bringing back a crew of three people from the ISS to the Earth. As an important fact the
designed spacecraft shall maintain the ATV Jules Verne design but replacing the current
cargo section by a new crew compartment. The first flight of the ATV re-entry vehicle shall
be ready for 2017.
To perform such a mission the current ATV requires lots changes, but another point justify
changes: the telecommunication system which is based on Artemis and TDRS will not
remain working for longer. Therefore another solution for this system must be elaborated.
Above all the vehicle has to remain safe for the crew on-board and its environment. This
point involves certain changes in the design and over the launcher accommodation (the
launcher accommodation is however not considered in this study which is limited to the
vehicle itself).
2.1.9.2 Description of desired changes
The description of desired changes is ordered following the mission phase needs, starting
from the launch.
During the launch, the vehicle should provide a rescue system (such as a rescue tower) in
case of launcher failure.
To allow a crew of three people on-board the vehicle, a crew compartment ensuring
people safety substitutes the cargo part of the ATV. It therefore also required an ECLS
(Environmental Control and Life Support), which will maintain a viable environment during
all the mission phases. Note for the Jules Verne ATV, an ECLS system was efficiently
working, but only during the docked phase (the one mission phase where the vehicle was
actually manned). It is surely possible to take advantage of this point.

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During the docking phase the crew inside the vehicle should also be able to abort the
mission in case of danger. In the previous version the ISS and the Control Centers were the
only capable of stopping the mission. A specific human interface has so to be implemented
to monitor on-board the vehicle behavior and to allow communication with the different
actors.
The docked phase does not require changes, just that periodic ATV maintenance will need
to be re-defined according to prior changes.
In term of needs the undocking phase requires the same things as the docking phase. Note
that, as it has proven its performances, the same set (of the ATV) of actuators and sensors
are used for all the guidance and navigation. But…
Many changes are involved because of the re-entry phase, which is moreover manned. A
thermal shield needs to be designed in order to prevent the vehicle destruction and
jeopardizing the crew.
For the atmospheric flight, a specific set of actuators/sensors ensuring the guidance and
navigation of the vehicle has to be established. Finally a recovery system has to be
designed, from the parachute deployment to the landing.
Besides all subsystems levels of criticality and availability like their fail/safe/operating
status have to be reviewed to ensure that the crew will not be jeopardized. And as the
mass and the power consumption might change from the ATV to the new vehicle
adjustments are required.
2.1.9.3 Priorities among changes
In the frame of our study, we focus our work on the re-entry part. The most critical
changes are therefore the ECLS and the thermal shield. In addition of that, an atmospheric
guidance and navigation needs to be established.
The telecommunication limits are also considered but in a lower part.
Talking about the complete mission of this manned re-entry vehicle, none of the desired
changes presented above can be ignored, because those are actually all compulsory for the
success of the mission.

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2.1.10 Proposed system – “manned re-entry ATV”

2.1.10.1 Background, objectives & scope
The manned re-entry ATV is devoted to become the first European crew transportation
vehicle. It will provide the capability of bringing three astronauts to the ISS and bringing
back on Earth a three people crew. This vehicle will take advantages of all the ATV know-
how, especially the confident capability of reaching and docking/de-docking to the ISS,
and all its features. The philosophy of the new vehicle is to be designed from the actual
ATV, with all the required improvements and changes detailed in the previous paragraphs.
The manned re-entry ATV will be launched atop a suitably modified Ariane 5 vehicle into a
viable quasi-circular orbit. The use of Ariane 5 will require important changes such as a
crew escape system for the launch phase, which might consist of solid rocket motors able
to pull the crew capsule away from the launcher. Once on orbit, the vehicle could directly
dock to the Space Station under the monitoring of the Control Center. It will dock to the
station precisely and safely, as the ATV is able to do, and will become a ―manned station
module‖ as it happened with the Jules Verne mission for all the docked period.
After its mission completion, the vehicle with its three-member crew will de-dock from the
station and enter in a safe quasi-circular orbit. Waiting for the appropriate re-entry
window, the Control Center will ignite the re-entry phase. Only the capsule, with the crew
on-board, protected by the thermal shield will survive to the atmospheric re-entry.
Parachutes will ensure the final part of the atmospheric flight to eventually ditch on the
ocean, where international rescue aid will recover the astronauts.
2.1.10.2 Operational policies & constraints
General constraints
As for the ATV Jules Verne, the program is an ESA program which will be propose to the
State Members. The geo-return will therefore be applied between the participating States
and according to their level of participation.
Like the ATV the vehicle will use the Russian docking port and therefore the vehicle has to
be equipped with the Russian docking system.
The ATV has to be launched into orbit using the European Ariane 5 launch vehicle. Some
accommodations are possible on the launcher but remain limited. This involves mass and
volume constraints.
The launching port is located in Kourou, French Guiana, the vehicle has to be safely
transported and prevented from the local environment.

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Operational constraints
A Control Center will be devoted in Europe to operate this new vehicle, it will probably be
the skilled Toulouse Control Center which operates the ATV. As long as the vehicle is
aimed to the ISS, Houston and Moscow Control Centers will keep monitoring all the
operations, and will have the possibility to impose directives at any time.
The vehicle directly interacts with the manned Space Station. For safety concerns about
the ISS, the crew in the Station must keep the possibility to stop the vehicle mission at any
time. The vehicle has a specific mode to fulfill this requirement.
Within the same point of view, it is a manned vehicle therefore the on-board crew must
have the capability of aborting the mission if they analyze this need.
In any scenarios the vehicle crew must remain safe.
The assumption is made that such a manned mission will not be postponed once ignited for
vicinity traffic (US or Russian vehicles). However a safety mode must allow the vehicle to
wait on a safe orbit for the mission re-start (or for specific procedures).
As a crew is involved in the mission, a medical concern is required and especially a ready
Medical Operations team is mandatory. All Medical Operations personnel staffing the
Mission Control Center are required to complete the training and certification
requirements outlined in the Program, Medical Operations Flight Support Training and
Certification Plan. All medical operations MCC personnel shall be trained so.
Note that Europe has never carried out operations for manned spacecraft, thus this last
constraint might need US or Russian assistance, as they are used to that kind of operations
support. Presumably the Houston or Moscow CC could ensure Medical Operations as they
are already in charge of the ISS crew. But as Europe aims to make a certain step into
manned spaceflights, it is more relevant to develop their own means.
2.1.10.3 System description & Operational Environment
The vehicle will function within the operational network that includes the ATV system
(upgrade for the re-entry manned vehicle), the ISS space and ground segment, Ariane 5
and its related launch site facilities as well as their relevant control centers (Toulouse,
Moscow and Houston) and communication systems.
Expecting the same success, the operational environment is designed a way to remain very
close to the ATV‘s one, but will be upgrade thanks to European know-how. In the case of
the ATV, Artemis and TDRS played a key role in the communications between space
segment and ground segment. But from 2012 Artemis will reach the end of its mission and
shall be replaced by EDRS (European Data Relay Satellite), moreover in 2014 the European
positioning system, Galileo, shall also be operating. The re-entry manned vehicle is
expected for later, therefore those new systems will substitute the former ones for
ensuring similar functions. Note that TDRS and GPS will remain used in the frame of the
vehicle mission by the American CC.

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Figure 6: Operational environment
The Toulouse Vehicle-CC will be designed to be operational during all the mission steps.
During all flight phases (free flight and attached) the link with the ground is established via
EDRS and TDRS (if mandatory or dictated by the US). During attached phases, when ATV is
in dormant mode, the link via EDRS is intermittently activated. During proximity
operations, the ISS provides data to the vehicle and also can send some High Level Tele-
Commands via the proximity link in case of contingencies.
All the ground commands are issued by the Vehicle-CC. The CAM (Collision Avoidance
Maneuver), Resume, and Hold related commands could either be initiated by the Vehicle-
CC or by the ISS crew or by the vehicle crew. During the attached operations the vehicle
becomes a module, which is commanded by the ISS (under Vehicle-CC monitoring and
control). The Galileo system is used for the navigation. During phasing and de-orbiting, the
absolute navigation is performed on the ground by Vehicle-CC. During rendezvous, the
Galileo/GPS receivers perform the relative navigation on-board. The ISS position
measurements are transmitted to the vehicle via proximity link so that the relative state
vector can be computed.
For the departure of the Station the same procedures are carried out. For the atmospheric
re-entry the operational strategy still needs to be established.

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Figure 7: Overall flow block diagram
The overall Functional Flow Block Diagram (where CRV stands for the vehicle) depicts the
main task sequences and interactions as mentioned in the above paragraph. The launch,
the docking phase, the de-docking, and the re-entry are the most critical phases of this
mission.
2.1.10.4 Crew Health Concept of Operations
Standards are established to optimize crew health and performance, thus contributing to
overall mission success, and to prevent negative long-term health consequences due to
space flight. The re-entry manned vehicle will be designed with respect to those
standards.
To discuss and scale care, the ―Level of Care‖ is used as a system guideline. It refers to the
amount and type of care rendered based on perceived need and the ability of the provider.

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The Level of Care that can be provided during any particular space mission is dependent on
the level of training of the medical provider, the technology and advances in medicine that
allow such care to be rendered in austere environments, the distance from the platform to
more definitive care, the duration of the mission, the health and performance of the crew
upon embarking on the mission, the type of mission, time required to return to Earth or
other fallback location for more definitive medical treatment. The Level of Care Zero
foresees no medical support to mitigate any risks; there are currently no space vehicles or
missions in human space flight with this level of care. Level of Care Zero does not require
any special medical support. There are up to five levels.
The re-entry manned vehicle is established on the Level of Care One. Little perceived
threat to health or life exists where medical intervention would be allowed, and the
relatively short time and distance to definitive care allows for first-aid implementation
without more advanced care. Level of Care One requires a minimum of (basic life support)
first-aid capability and implementation plans for follow-on medical support. Level of Care
One is actually provided for transfer missions to vehicles in LEO (e.g., Shuttle or Crew
Exploration Vehicle to ISS) or for sub-orbital flights.
2.1.10.5 Modes of operations
The nominal operation mode satisfies the mission timeline described earlier and also
include a Collision Avoidance Maneuver procedure, which can be enabled either by the
MCC, the vehicle crew or the ISS crew.
The operations must be ensured for all the mission phases, and be ready to face many
situations, which implies several modes of operation such as normal, degraded, exception
handling, maintenance, safe, stand-by.
2.1.10.6 Users & stakeholders
The project stakeholders are the same as the ATV ones, except that the stake is much
higher as it is a manned mission. In fact, the combination of the re-entry manned vehicle
and Ariane launcher will provide Europe with the independent capability to transport crew
to the ISS, and more globally to LEO. This will have very important political and
operational implications.
Here are recalled those stakeholders, ESA, the Member States participating, Russia, the
US, the companies working on the project.
Besides those, the EDRS and Galileo systems would have an important impact on the
project operational environment.
2.1.10.7 Support environment
During all the operations the Houston and Moscow Control Centers are in steady support of
the Toulouse Control Center.

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2.2 Functional analysis

The main objective is to have a global comprehension of the system and the elements
interacting with it in order to have a good definition of the system. To implement that, we
need to list the different functions coming from these interactions. This preliminary work
will lead to the functional requirements.
2.2.1 Global approach

The functional analysis is:
 Functional ⇒ allowing a practical analysis of the functions of the system

 Methodical ⇒ application of predefined methods
 Multidisciplinary ⇒ requiring participation of all stakeholders concerned in the
system
 Participative ⇒ provoking exchanges among stakeholders
 Modular ⇒ applied only if judged necessary
One approach consists in seeking, ordering, characterizing the functions in a diagram with
an explicative table. Several methods and tools exist and we will use here the Octopus
diagram. The Octopus diagram or APTE method comes from Larry Miles and was formalized
in 2000. The aim is to ameliorate the quality and decrease the costs of the studied system.
The first step of this method is to:
 define the study (goal and limits) and validate the interest of the study;
 control the validity compare to the objectives of the firm (or the responsible in our
case) which allows to obtain the unanimity on the objectives;
 Establish an action structure to give ourselves the means to carry through this
study.
Figure 8 - Methodological tool

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2.2.2 Rules to establish an Octopus diagram

As we said, the system is in contact with a certain number of elements in its environment
which constituted the external milieu. There are two types of functions:
 The principal functions (FP) which are the connections created between the system
and, at least, two elements of its external milieu;
 The constraint functions (FC) which are the demands of a constraining element of
the external milieu.
To express these functions, we have some basics rules which are:
 To use a active and positive verb at the infinitive form

 Not to prejudge a solution or a technical principle
 To include the names of the concerned external elements but never include the
name of the system
Here are the cases we can have, or not:
⇒ 2 different principal functions

FP1
FP2 (FP) may be identified from a same
couple of external elements
FP1  FP2
FP1
FP2 ⇒ an external element may be

linked to more than on other
element by a FP
⇒ a FC can be generated only by

FP1 one element of the external
FC1
element which is not concerned by
a FP
Figure 9 - Octopus rules

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2.2.3 Application to our functional analysis

If we do a general study, we found the following external elements which will influence
our system, the re-entry vehicle:
 Astronauts  People & Environement

 ISS  Space agencies
 Launcher  Rescue efforts
 Launch site  Ground segment
 Landing sites  Earth & Moon
 Pollution  Space Environment & weather
But as these elements do not influence at the same level the system, we have to develop
the octopus diagram for each phase of the mission. All the phases are defined and
explained in the chapter 3.
NB: All the functions and the associated requirements are given in two tables at the end of
this current chapter. These tables are necessary to well define the interactions between
the different parts and to quantify them.
Pre-launch
Figure 10 - Octopus diagram of the pre-launch phase

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Launch
Figure 11 –Octopus diagram of the pre-launch phase
Transfer orbit
Figure 12–Octopus diagram of the pre-launch phase

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Approach, docking, attached, de-docking & departure phase
Figure 13 – Octopus diagram of the phase around the ISS
De-orbitation
Figure 14 - Octopus diagram of the de-orbitation phase

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Re-entry
Figure 15 - Octopus diagram of the re-entry phase
Landing
Figure 16 - Octopus diagram of the landing phase

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Figure 17 - Principle function table

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Figure 18 –Constraint function table

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This functional analysis is our basis to work and develop more in details the system. In the
next step after defining the requirements and the functional chains is to check whether or
not with the available subsystems all these requirements would be met. This is done
through the table shown in the next page. And as can be observed from the table with the
available subsystems and work packages in the group all the requirements would be taken
in to account and hopefully met.
Subsystems
Functions Requirements Mission Life Structures & System
Power Thermal GNC Communication
analysis support mechanics engineering
RE1_1 X X X X X X X
RE1_2 X X X
RE1_3 X X X
FP1
RE1_4 X X X
RE1_5 X X X
RE1_6 X X X
RE2_1 X X X
FP2 RE2_2 X X X
RE2_3 X X X
RE3_1 X X X X X
FP3
RE3_2 X X
RE4_1 X X
FP4
RE4_2 X
RE5_1 X X X
RE5_2 X X X X X
FP5
RE5_3 X X X X X
RE5_4 X X X X X
RE6_1 X X X
FP6 RE6_2 X X X
RE6_3 X X X
RE7_1 X X X X
RE7_2 X X X
FP7 RE7_3 X X X X
RE7_4 X X
RE7_5 X
FP8 RE8_1 X X X
RE9_1 X X
RE9_2 X X
FP9
RE9_3 X X
RE9_4 X X
RE10_1
FP10 RE10_2
RE10_3 X X X X X X X X
Figure 19 – Cross checking the requirements and functions against the subsystem availability

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2.3 Driving factors

In the next step based on the results of the functional chain analysis the main driving
factors of the mission was selected. By going through the requirements table and the
user‘s need it was evident that the following are the system level drivers:
 Financial Cost
 Mass/Dimension
 Power
 Technology readiness level
 Safety of the crew
 Precision and accuracy
 Flexibility and robustness
Also based on the results of the functional chain analysis a weight can be assigned to each
of these drivers in order to make sure that the importance of each of them are taken into
account in the results of the trade-off. Since based on the customer‘s requirements some
are more important than the others. For example from the results of the previous section
it is obvious that the safety of the crew is the most importance driver in this mission. On
the other hand since not much limitation is given regarding the budget of the mission it is
not considered as one of the leading driving factors. It was decided by the team to choose
the weights in the range of 1-5 with 1 being the lowest and 5 the highest. So the following
weights were chosen:
 Financial Cost 1
 Mass/Dimension 4
 Power 2
 Technology readiness level 3
 Safety of the crew 5
 Precision and accuracy 3
 Flexibility and robustness 4
In the later steps these drivers will be used to analyze the available alternative and to
perform a trade-off in order to choose the winning idea.

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2.4 Selection of alternatives

In order to perform a trade-off the different alternatives available for each of the
important criterion‘s of the mission was selected.
It was decided based on the review of other similar space missions and also the results of
the functional chain analysis that the following are the main criterions to be studied:
 Shape configuration
 Main drag enhancement system
 Control method
 Crew escape system
 Landing site
The different alternatives identified for each of these criterions and the process that was
taken to choose the winning idea in each case will be further discussed in the coming
section.
2.4.1 Shape configuration

In this section, the main shape of the ATV re-entry vehicle that satisfies best the needs of
the customer will be selected. The different types of manned spacecraft existing nowadays
were considered:
1. Capsules
 Spherically blunted cone

 Spherical
 Conical
 Bi-conic
2. Gliders
Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable. depicts the criteria that have been used to select
the shape of the ATV re-entry vehicle and its method of calculation.

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Criteria Method of calculation

Mass and main dimensions of each system. Volumetric efficiency in
Mass /dimensions
the crew compartment
Technology Readiness Level Experience, ‘flight proven’ in successful manned missions
Advantages in terms of structural properties, fully related to crew
Flexibility & Robustness
safety
Control methods Attitude control software needed for atmospheric flight
Capabilities to be maneuvered outside and inside the atmosphere as
Precision and accuracy
to obtain an optimal precision and accuracy
Cost Estimated cost of each system
Figure 20 - Criteria of selection for the shape configuration
The type of shape which satisfies better the specifications has been determined by means
of an evaluation of each criterion (with different weights) in each system. The process of
selection is detailed in Table(6). The best alternative is a capsule because of the following
reasons,
Reduced size
 Less complex and already demonstrated design

 Control of the capsule is less restrictive during the re-entry phase (no need for
elaborate attitude control software for atmospheric flight)
 Heat shield less difficult to design and implement
 Same maneuvering capabilities outside the atmosphere as any other solution
 Both volumetrically efficient and structurally strong
 Possibility to construct a capsule of performance comparable in all but lift-to-
drag ratio to a lifting body or delta wing form for less cost
Among the available capsule designs the spherically blunted cone has been selected due
to,
 Reduced mass and dimensions

 Widely used before for space exploration missions or for return from space (High
TRL)
 Not expensive
 Important amount of test data
 Good thermal behavior
 The lift, drag and pitching moment can be optimized varying the semiapex
angles or its symmetry

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2.4.2 Main drag enhancement system

The purpose of this section is to select the most suitable drag enhancement in this manned
mission. The selection of the optimal drag enhancement depends mostly on its ‗flight
proven‘, the experience using it.
The different alternatives that have been evaluated in this preliminary study are the
followings:
 Parachute
 Balloons
 Ballutes
 Thrusters
Other systems have been considered as possible secondary drag enhancement systems.
Special attention has been given to:
 Trailing skirt
 Airbags
 Hyper-cone system
 Samara-wind decelerator
Nonetheless these systems will be evaluated in depth after the definition and study of the
main drag enhancement system.

Mass and main dimensions of each system.
Drag to weight ratio
Capabilities in terms of drag
Reliability Probability of failure for each drag enhancement system
Volume Volume required
State of development, ‘flight proved’ in successful missions.

Technology Readiness Level
Predictable performance
Capabilities to be maneuvered inside the atmosphere as to obtain

an optimal precision and accuracy in the landing site
Figure 21 - Criteria of selection for the drag enhancement system

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According to the analyzed parameters, a parachute is the best choice for the ATV reentry
vehicle mainly because of the following features,
 Wide knowledge and experience

 Predictable drag and inflation performance
 High drag to weight ratio
 Sufficient gliding capability (L/D) to allow pinpoint landing
 Withstand high dynamic pressure
 Perform both at supersonic and subsonic speeds
 New designs available with innovative capabilities
Despite these advantages, the parachute will be used in combination with at least one of
the systems presented above. For instance the use of an inflatable system would result in
an increment of the ratio L/D and therefore a better gliding performance. This decision
will be made once the performance of the parachute and the number of parachutes
needed had been obtained.
Impact attenuation possibly using thrusters must also be provided to prevent damage at
touchdown.
2.4.3 Control method

The purpose of this section is to establish the general control method of the vehicle. The
control during descent is essential to permit selection of a landing site and to avoid ground
obstructions, excessive ground slopes or high winds. This implies active crew participation
for the nominal recovery case. In the event the crew is disabled, the recovery system must
be designed to function automatically.
Some options for the control method are presented here,
1. A ballistic reentry body: is the simplest option. The only intended loads acting on
it are gravity and aerodynamic (along the negative of the velocity vector).
Transverse or lifting forces are regarded as unintended and appear especially due
to an asymmetry of the ablative material configuration. This method does not need
extra equipment, power or space but as drawbacks there is a lack of back-up mode
and poor precision.
2. A rotating or spin stabilized aero-ballistic control: Presents a gain in stability

which is reverted in a more accurate landing. Its implementation requires a relative
low level of complexity but does not affect the safety that much. One of the main
disadvantages is that it lacks a back-up mode.

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3. A maneuvering reentry vehicle: uses maneuvering to offset the effects of

positional or velocity errors acquired at boost termination. It has a means of
detecting position (at atmospheric entry). Two methods have been considered,
 Reaction control system: it makes use of reaction control wheels.

Advantages are the great precision that it can reach by correctly pointing
the entry angle. Disadvantages are the extra mass, equipment and space.
This system is less reliable than the controlled ballistic one.
 Controlled ballistic: makes use of thrusters firing them once during the
descent phase for trajectory correction. This allows a better L/D control,
increasing the accuracy for a smaller cost in equipment and mass with
respect to the reaction control system.
4. A Lifting body re-entry as used on Gemini, Apollo and Russian Soyuz spacecrafts. In
this case the aerodynamic lift allows a gentler reentry but have a ballistic re-entry
mode.
Finally the nose system uses non-axisymmetric shapes without lift. It has never been used
for manned entry vehicles. Even though, it may present a considerable gain in the lift drag
relation.

Mass /dimensions Increasing in mass and outer skin changes for implementation
Safety Most important aspect for the mission; mostly in the re-entry phase
Technology Readiness Level Experience, ‘flight proven’ in successful manned missions
Advantages in terms of accuracy and back-up system, fully related to
Flexibility and Robustness
crew safety
Power Minimum usage of power for each control method
Capabilities to be maneuvered outside and inside the atmosphere as
to obtain an optimal precision and accuracy
Figure 22 - Criteria of selection for the control method

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After the tradeoff being performed the winning control method was the controlled
ballistic. This method scored better in most of the criteria due to the following reasoning:
 Mass and dimension: the addition of mass is simply one thruster, as for the change
in the shape it presents a very small modification.
 Safety: the system is largely used for manned missions, therefore, due to this large
use the system is the most reliable for this kind of mission.
 Technology readiness level: as mentioned above as the system has been used
already in many missions; moreover, so far it presents the best compromise
between flexibility and robustness.
 Flexibility and Robustness: Even if the system goes to emergency mode this control
method still have the possibilities of performing a pure ballistic, which is an
increase in safety due to this back-up mode.
 Power: Usage of power to fire the thrusters once is minimum; barely noticed by the
system.
 Precision and accuracy: Even thought the system is not the most precise is one of
the most precise.
 Cost: Due to low changes in mass, no major changes in dimension, an already

proven technology and low power consumption the system is one of the cheapest in
terms of implementation and certification.
2.4.4 Crew Escape System
The purpose of this section is to define the equipment needed in order to provide the
required safety to the crew. The safety system must provide a robust/reliable escape
route just in case something goes wrong.
Two main problems related to safety has been studied here,
 Crew escape system while the vehicle stands in the launching pad
 Crew escape system during the ascent phase

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2.4.5 Crew escape system while the vehicle stands in the launch
pad
Due to the fact that a failure of the rocket could happen before reaching the altitude
where a parachute can be used the alternative used here as a launch escape system is as
follows; a launch escape system as depicted in the next figure will be implemented. This
system consists of an escape rocket that will be installed in the top section of the launcher
and a support tower. In case of a failure the escape rocket will pull away the top section
of the vehicle (ATV crew compartment with the reentry capsule) from the rest of the
rocket. The differential thrust provided by the escape rocket will accelerate up to 50 – 150
meters per second, and will lift the capsule to an altitude of 1-1.5 kilometers which would
be enough for normal landing under a parachute.
Figure 23 - Escape tower
Although this is the only design used up to now as a crew escape system while the vehicle
stands in the launching pad there are some choices to be made, for example the method of
control:
 Automatic control: whenever trouble hits during the launch phase, it is liable to hit
fast. There might not be time for the astronauts to consult their display panels and
make a decision.
 Manual control: the various indications of potential launch-vehicle failure must be

displayed to the flight crew.
Another choice to be made is whether to have the:
 Capsule descends on parachute with the astronauts inside.

 Astronauts descend on parachute using ejection seats.
 Both possibilities according to urgency.

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Ejections seats have been considered as a simpler way to assure the safety of the crew in
case of a failure during the ascent phase or the descent phase. These man-seat separating
apparatus remove the astronaut from danger if the propelling escape rocket malfunctions
(ascent phase) or if the gliding parachute recovery system fails during the reentry.

State of development, ‘flight proven’ in successful missions.
Technology Readiness level
Predictable performance
Capability of an endangered crew to activate the crew safety
Simplicity
system in a way as simple as possible
Reliability Risk analysis, redundancy
Capability of being implemented in an automatic or manual control
Automatic or manual control
according to urgency
Figure 24 -Criteria of selection for a crew safety system
Crew safety systems must be as simple as possible. Simplicity enhances assurance that the
system will work.
The option selected has the following features,
 The astronauts, at altitudes from zero to 4 km can use manual-controlled

ejection seats to abandon the capsule and descend on individual chutes
 At altitudes higher up the astronauts will stay inside the capsule and it will
swing down on its own chute.
 The escape rocket will hurl the whole capsule away from the trouble-stricken
booster and to a safe distance, lest the booster explode.
 The system will be designed to be fully automatic for fast-developing
emergencies or in the case of an incapacitated crew but will adopt manual
control by astronauts for use in other emergencies.
 Conditions that will trigger the automatic abort will be defined related to the
shutdown of one or more engines after lift-off, a rotation rate of the vehicle too
high in pitch or yaw plane or a rolling movement above some specific value.

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2.4.6 Landing site

The vehicle will be capable of landing both in the sea and in the land. Although the vehicle
will be designed for both a water landing and an earth landing the first one will be
preferable since the spacecraft tumbling after ground impact would result in greater loads
on the crew and the spacecraft.
Some restrictions related to water landing,
 Water landing is restricted to maximum sea state of 5 under emergency

conditions
 Some restrictions related to earth landing,
 Ground slopes of less than 40 degrees
 Altitudes below 1700 m
 Winds not bigger than 70 m/s
The avoidance of these conditions and of ground obstacles will be possible with the
recovery parachutes because they will have gliding or steering capabilities. A landing
impact attenuation system will be used. This system will consist of thrusters and a crew
couch shock absorbing system at the touchdown area to prevent damage at touchdown.
For water landing a flotation bag system will maintain correct stable attitude until crew
egress.
2.4.7 Future inclusion of a module capable to land on the Moon

A preliminary study about the needed equipment and functions that had to be added to
the design so as to land on the Moon will be done. The main idea is to attach a module to
the spacecraft with this required equipment and to be capable of getting rid of the useless
elements in the actual vehicle.
2.5 Winning idea

The results obtained and the conclusions reached at the end of the trade-off analysis will
be presented in this section.
2.5.1 Trade-off table

A summary of the above mentioned analysis can be seen in the following table:

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Scores (from 1 to 5)
Trade off parameters Technology Safety of the Precision & Flexibility &
Mass Power Financial cost
Readiness Level crew accuracy robustness TOTAL
Weightings (1 to 5) 4 2 3 1 5 3 4
Criterion Possible options More details
Spherically 5 0 5 5 5 2 2 79
blunted cone
Capsule
Shape Spherical 4 0 5 5 4 1 1 63
Conical 3 0 1 5 2 1 1 37
Bi-conical 3 0 1 5 3 2 2 49
Glider 1 0 3 1 4 5 5 69
Parachute 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 104
Drag
Balloons 3 3 2 3 3 3 4 67
enhancement
Ballutes 3 4 1 1 2 3 3 55
single
Thrusters 3 2 2 3 4 5 3 72
Drag Parachutes + Balloons
enhancement Parachutes + Thrusters
multiple Parachutes + Airbags
Reaction Control System (RCS) 2 1 3 2 4 5 5 76
Ballistic 5 5 5 5 4 1 2 81
Control
Controlled ballistic 4 4 5 4 5 3 4 93
method
Spin stabilized aerobalistic 3 3 4 4 4 2 3 72
Nose 3 5 1 1 1 2 2 45
Crew scape "Scape pod" (Soyuz)
methods Ejection seats + scape pod
Earth 3 0 5 5 3 0 3 59
Landing site
Sea 4 0 5 4 5 0 5 80
Figure 25 - Trade-off table

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2.5.2 Trade-off Results

Here the conclusions gained from the trade off table are presented.
Basic specifications
The designed spacecraft will maintain the ATV Jules Verne design but replacing the current
cargo section by a new crew compartment. The basic specifications of the new ATV re-
entry compartment, decided during the preliminary study, are the following ones.
Shape
The ATV re-entry vehicle design will be based on a capsule design with a spherically
blunted cone.
Drag enhancement system

A parachute or a combination of them will be used as the main drag enhancement system.
The possibility of using multiple drag enhancement systems (balloons, airbags...) will be
considered once the performance of the main system will be determined. Impact
attenuation using thrusters will be provided to prevent damage at touchdown
Control method
The ATV re-entry vehicle will use a controlled ballistic method.
Crews escape method

The system will be fully automatic for fast-developing emergencies but will allow the
astronauts to adopt manual control for use in other emergencies.
An escape tower will hurl the whole capsule away to a safe distance in case of launch
failure. The capsule will swing down on its own chute while the astronauts stay inside.
Ejection seats will be used as well in the spacecraft at altitudes from zero to 6 km to
abandon the capsule and descend on individual chutes.
Landing site
The vehicle will be capable of landing both in the sea and in the land.
A landing impact attenuation system will be used. In the case of a sea landing a flotation
bag system will be designed whereas for an earth landing a crew couch shock absorbing
system will be implemented.
The design will allow the future inclusion of a module capable to land on the Moon.

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3 OPERATIONS
In order to see how the system would be operating during its life time, first the mission
phases have to be defined clearly. Next the important functional chain in each phase has
to be identified in order to put importance and if necessary redundancy on it, which will
be explained in this chapter.
3.1 Mission phases

In order to carry out a detailed analysis of each step of the mission, we have subdivided it
in 9 phases:
1. PRE-LAUNCH 2. LAUNCH Q 3. TRANSFER ORBIT

It comprises the time between the From the lift-off until the beginning Here, the phasing with
delivery of the spacecraft and the launch. of the phasing with ISS. Although it the ISS in order to place
In this phase all the preparation and the is a critical phase due to the risk of the ATV in a correct
integration of the ATV in the launcher are a launch failure, in terms of position to start the
done. Depending on the launcher used, requirements for the ATV rendezvous is done. It can
this phase can last up to 12 months. performances, is the less critical last up to 2 days.
4. APPROACH & DOCKING 5. ATTACHED PHASE Q 6. DEDOCKING & DEPARTURE

A very critical phase in which the During this phase, ATV and ISS
coupling between ATV and ISS is will be coupled. Astronauts will
If an emergency occur, a fast de-
done. It is imperative that the be able to enter normally in the
docking must be done. The vehicle
rendezvous does not jeopardize ATV as an additional ISS
must be directed out of the safety
the ISS crew or the ATV Crew. module. ATV will also be used
zone of the ISS. Since the crew may
After the satisfactory results during this phase to correct the
have the necessity of reaching the
achieved, the automated docking ISS orbital position as it has
Earth as soon as possible, we
systems of the non crewed ATV already been performed with
consider a maximum duration of this
will be used for the new ATV the non crewed vehicle. We
phase of 1 hour.
version. We consider a foreseen consider that the ATV can stay
duration of 3 hours. in this phase up to 1 year.
7. DE-ORBITATION 8. RE-ENTRY Q 9. LANDING

After the service module with Finally, the ATV will perform an automated
After the de-docking is
the de-orbit engine and the landing. Since it was designed with medical
carried out, the de-orbit
solar panels is jettisoned, the emergencies in mind, it makes sense that the
engine module is used
ATV will start its descent vehicle could find its way home automatically in
to put the ATV into the
through the atmospheric the event that crew members were
insertion orbit. This
layers at around 120 km of incapacitated or injured. If there was a need,
phase can take up to 6
altitude. It can take 30 the crew would have the capability to operate
hours.
minutes. the vehicle by switching to the backup systems.

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The following figure is a representation of the different phases of the ATV mission, along
with the approximate altitude for each phase. The time scale is not representative.
Figure 26 - Crewed ATV mission phases

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3.2 Functional Chains

In order to perform a proper design of the S/C that is able to fulfil the mission specified,
several functional chains must be identified and implemented. The functional chains were
chosen to reflect the mission requirements, and are shown below:
 Onboard Data Handling & Mission Management: It comprises the performance of

the Management, Vehicle Monitoring and Control and Failure Detection, Isolation
and Recovery (FDIR)
 Orbital GNC: Guidance, Navigation and Control of the spacecraft during the phasing
and deorbitation orbits.
 Docking GNC: Guidance, Navigation and Control of the spacecraft during the
approach and rendezvous to the ISS.
 Atmospheric GNC: Guidance, Navigation and Control of the spacecraft during the
Re-entry and Landing phases.
 Communication: In charge of performing the communication with ISS and Ground

Segment.
 Thermal Control: In charge of maintaining the appropriate temperature for all the
equipment. Especially important in the re-entry phase.
 Environmental Control and Life Support: It comprises the equipment necessary for
the survival of the crew by performing a control of the cabin temperature, pressure
and composition of the atmosphere, fire detectors and fluids and wastes treatment.
 Power Supply: It will collect, store and distribute the energy to the different
equipments.

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3.3 Interfaces
The general interfaces of the functional chains are represented by the following figure:
Guidance , Navigation and Control (GNC)
Atmospheric
Orbital GNC Docking GNC
GNC
Power
Supply
OBDH
Communication
Environmental
Thermal
Control and
Control
Life Support
Data
Power
Figure 27 - Functional chain interface
All the avionics that make up these functional chains are coupled with the external
environment through the different interfaces. We have identified the following needed
interfaces:
 Umbilical cord coupling the ATV with the launcher and then with the ISS. This cord
will be able to transmit different data and power.
 Detector of the union/separation of the ATV with launcher and ISS
 Crew interface. Although the docking and landing would be automatic, if there was
a need, the crew would have the capability to operate the vehicle by switching to
the backup systems.
Figure 28 - ATV external interfaces

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3.4 Criticality Analysis

In order to define the type of redundancy implemented for each functional chain it is
necessary to carry out an analysis of the criticality of each chain at each mission phase.
For this purpose we will use a scale from 1 to 5. Thereby, 5 corresponds to the highest
level of criticality and we will use it when the mission has a maximum bearable outage for
a specific functional chain of around 100 ms. We will give the level 4 when the maximum
outage time is around 1 second, and the level 3 for around 1 minute. Level 2 corresponds
to the functional chains that have no constrain in the outage duration because the function
can be performed by different equipment. Finally, level 1 is applied when a function is
useless in a given phase. A 5 level will entail a hot redundancy, a 4 level a tepid one and a
3 level involves cold redundancy.
Functional
Criticality Justification
Chain
OBDH 2
Orbital GNC 2
Phase 1: Pre-launch
Docking GNC 2
In this phase all the functions and equipment are tested. Thereby,
Atmospheric GNC 2 they have to perform properly their functions but if there is an
Communication 2 eventual failure, the equipment can be replaced without a stringent
outage constraint
Thermal Control 2
ECLS 2
Power Supply 2
All the equipments supporting atmospheric composition, pressure,

ECLS 4 cabin temperature and fire detection must work properly. An
outage of a few seconds is acceptable
Power Supply 4 ECLS must be continuously provided of energy

Phase 2: Launch
OBDH 3 It is foreseen that Telemetry monitoring the state of the vehicle

Communication 3 and the crew is sent to the Ground Station
A slight passive thermal Control in order to preserve the
Thermal Control 3 appropriate temperature for all the equipments has to be
performed in this phase
Dcoking GNC 1
Orbital GNC 1 These functional chains are not used in this phase
Atmospheric GNC 1

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Orbital GNC 4 A typical GNC system for orbital flights has a 8 Hz control loop. If
we assume we can loose the spacecraft after 3 or four loops, we
need to activate the redundant equipment in some seconds. As in
Phase 3: Transfer Orbit
Power Supply 4
the previous phase, an outage of the ECLS system of few seconds is
accepted. The power system must have the same reaction time in
ECLS 4 case of failure
Thermal Control 3
During the transfer orbit the ATV is far from the ISS and thereby, an
Communication 3 eventual problem with communications, OBDH or thermal system
can be corrected after some minutes
OBDH 3
Atmospheric GNC 1
These functional chains are used in other phases
Docking GNC 1
OBDH 5
This is a very critical phase due to the risk of collision between ATV
and ISS. A typical docking system has a 20 Hz control loop.
Phase 4: Approach & Docking
Communication 5 Therefore all the equipments involved have to work with a hot
redundancy. GNC must be very accurate in order to perform an
appropriate docking, Communication has to be always available to
Docking GNC 5 receive a possible Collision Avoidance Manoeuvre triggering, OBDH
has to be fast enough to monitor every possible failure and the
power supply must continuously feed all these equipments
Power Supply 5
ECLS 4 As in previous phases
All the equipments have to work under their temperature operative

Thermal Control 3
range
Orbital GNC 1
Atmospheric GNC 1
OBDH 3
Phase 5: Attached Phase
Orbital GNC 3
Docking GNC 3
In this phase all the equipments are permanently active and being
Atmospheric GNC 3 monitored in order to be ready in case an emergency occurs.
Communication 3 However, if something fails, there is the possibility of using the
redundant equipments after some minutes
Thermal Control 3
ECLS 3
Power Supply 3

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OBDH 5
As for the docking, the de-docking and departure has to be very
Phase 6: De-docking & Departure
Power Supply 5
accurate in order not to jeopardize the ISS and the crew. As for the
docking phase, a possible outage in this functional chains has to be
Docking GNC 5
solved in some tenths of second
Communication 5
The life conditions have to be preserved. A problem in pressure,

ECLS 4 temperature or atmospheric composition can be solved within the
firsts seconds

Thermal Control 3
range. This can be achieved even with an outage of some minutes.
Atmospheric GNC 1
Orbital GNC 1
Orbital GNC 4 A typical GNC system for orbital flights has a 8 Hz control loop. If
we assume we can lose the spacecraft after 3 or four loops, we need
ECLS 4 to activate the redundant equipment in some seconds. As in the
Phase 7: Deorbitation
previous phase, ECLS is a level 4. The power system must have the
Power Supply 4 same reaction time in case of failure
OBDH 3
During the deorbitation the ATV is far from the ISS and thereby, an
Thermal Control 3 eventual problem with communications, OBDH or thermal system
can be corrected after some minutes
Communication 3
Atmospheric GNC 1
Docking GNC 1

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OBDH 5 A typical atmospheric GNC system has a 50 Hz control loop. This is

because reentry is a very critical phase where a minimum deviation
Power Supply 5 on the trajectory can destroy the spacecraft. OBDH must detect
immediately a possible failure and power supply must feed
Atmospheric GNC 5 continuously the equipments.
ECLS 4 As in the previous phases

Phase 8: Reentry

Thermal Control 3
It is interesting to have continuous communications with the

spacecraft. However, since the reentry and landing are performed
Communication 2
automatically, a failure in communications would not put in danger
the mission
Docking GNC 1
Orbital GNC 1
Onboard Data
Handling & Mission 5
Management As for the reentry, this is a very critical phase were a failure can
Power Supply 5 jeopardize the crew lives.
Atmospheric GNC 5
Phase 9: Landing
Enviromental
Control & Life 4 As in the previous phases
Support
Thermal Control 3
Communication between ground segment and ATV must be
Communication 4 established in order to know in every moment were the spacecraft
is
Docking GNC 1
Orbital GNC 1

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4 PRODUCT ASSURANCE
4.1 PA definition
ECSS definition: discipline devoted to the study, planning and implementation of activities
intended to assure that the design, controls, methods and techniques in a project result in
a satisfactory degree of quality in a product.
The PA takes into account 4 main disciplines, which is the Reliability, the Availability, the
Maintainability & the Safety.
4.2 Expected results and methodology for a Phase 0

project
The following 2 parts will explain to us the results which are expected as outputs and the
methodology used to get these results.
4.2.1 Expected results

The Manned Re-entry vehicle is a project study in phase 0. For a Product Assurance point
of view, the expected results are next one:
 Safety results
o A Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
o A Safety Program Plan
 Reliability results
o A preliminary reliability estimation
4.2.2 Methodology
In order to get the results and to perform some analysis, the ECSS standard will be used,
especially for the PHA. The methodology to perform a Preliminary Hazard Analysis is
recalled below:
Hazard analysis comprises the identification, classification and reduction of hazards.

Hazard analysis can be implemented at each level of the customer‐supplier network.
Hazard analysis activities at lower level can contribute to system level safety analysis.
System level safety analysis can determine lower level hazard analysis activities.
The purpose of the PHA is to identify and evaluate hazards, to identify their causes and to
identify design and operations requirements needed in the program concept phase.

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The results of this analysis can be given in the following table:

System Phase Hazards Events Hazardous Events Potential Effects Severity Preventive
sources causing a situation causing accident action
hazardous an
situation potential
accident
Figure 29 - PHA table
The severity of the hazard is classified as below:
Figure 30 - Hazard classification
4.2.3 PA introduction to the manned re-entry vehicle

The purpose of this part is to give an introduction on a PA point of view for the Manned Re-entry
Vehicle. This Manned Re-entry Vehicle is an improvement of the actual ATV.
The ATV is an unmanned transfer vehicle, which carries cargo to the ISS (manned space station). So,
the safety and reliability issue have already being solved because the actual ATV has to have a high
safety level in order to dock to the ISS. Then, we will reuse the same safety and reliability
requirements for the vehicle.
The results, which should be given especially from the PHA, will be the result in a safety point of view
for the upgrade of the new vehicle towards the actual ATV.
Here are recalled the main safety and reliability aspects of the actual ATV:
 95% probability of successful mission completion starting from vehicle activation at launch
count down, and continuing through to atmospheric re-entry
 99.2% of launch availability over a period of 4 days (target availability)
 capability to command and execute a Collision Avoidance Maneuver (CAM) as an ultimate
protective measure

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4.2.4 Safety difference between the actual ATV and the manned
re-entry vehicle
There are 2 main differences between the actual ATV and the Manned Re-entry Vehicle.
The first one is the re-entry phase. Indeed, the actual ATV re-enters in the atmosphere
and it is destroyed during this phase. An upgrade has to perform on the ATV in order to
have the possibility to recover the crew safely.
The second one is all the phase (docking phase excluded) because during these phases,
there will be a crew inside the vehicle, especially during launching phase, which is a
critical phase.
So, some safety requirement, hazardous events has to be detected and has to be added to
the actual safety plan of the ATV.
N.B: The docking phase is not considered because during this phase, the ATV is docked to
the ISS and become a module of the ISS. The entire safety requirement will be the same
for the new vehicle.
4.2.5 Preliminary Hazard Analysis

The PHA, which will be done just after, aims to identify, rank, and prevent from a hazard.
This preliminary analysis is bounded by the necessary improvement required from the
actual ATV to the new vehicle. So, the identify hazard will be for the improvement part of
the ATV. The analysis will be perform at system and higher level and will have to be
updated at system and subsystem in the next project phase (Phase A, B, C …).
Furthermore, this PHA identifies the hazard at a ―Catastrophic‖ severity level as define in
the methodology part. So, the analysis identifies the hazard where the effect is: ―Death of
the astronauts‖ or ―Death of the crew‖.
Events
Hazard Hazardous Potential
Syst. Phase due to Effects Severity
sources situation (HS) accident
HS
All the phase - Space Manned - Collision with - Depressurization - No air
except vehicle the vehicle - Fire C
Debris inside the
Manned Reentry Vehicle
launch and passes - Short Circuit, - Etc … A

re-entry - Battery, through explosion vehicle T
phase propellant debris - Etc … - Death of A
- Etc … field astronauts S
Re-entry Thermal - Bad study - Crack on the - Loss of the T
shield - Bad thermal shield
manufacturing -…
capsule R
- Death of O
of the thermal
astronauts
shield P
-… H
Launch Launcher - SW/HW failure - Destruction of - Death of I
of the launcher the launcher
astronauts C
-… -…
Figure 31 - PHA table

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4.2.6 Means to avoid hazard to identify in the PHA

From the previous analysis, we find 4 different catastrophic hazards for the safety of the
crew:
 Space debris
 Battery, propellant, …
 Thermal shield
 Launcher
These 4 hazards can jeopardize the crew with the possible death of the astronauts. In
order to avoid these hazards, some procedures, devices or even analysis and study can be
performed.
4.2.6.1 Space debris avoidance

Two possible solutions can be done in order to avoid a depressurization of the vehicle
caused by the collision with space debris:
 Having a suit
 Change the position of the vehicle.
If astronauts wear a suit during all the critical phase, the crew will be protected in case of
depressurization of the vehicle whatever the cause is.
Another solution will be to redirect the vehicle in order that the back side of the vehicle
was the face where the collision should appear (as with the shuttle).
4.2.6.2 Launcher destruction avoidance

As before, two solutions can implemented in order to rescue the crew to launcher
destruction:
 Add an escape tower at the top of Ariane 5 launcher
 Add individual ejection seat
The fact to add an escape tower at the top of the launcher increases the reliability and the
safety of the crew during the launch phase because of the high reliability of such system.
Besides, the system has already worked successfully in September 26th 1983 on Soyuz
launcher vehicle.
Figure 32 - Escape tower ESA ®

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4.2.6.3 Thermal shield problem avoidance

In order not to lose the capsule (and the astronauts) because of the thermal shield during
the re-entry phase, a high level of study based on several demonstrators will be
performed. A validation process will be implemented during the design and manufacturing
phase of the thermal shield.
4.2.6.4 Fire inside the vehicle avoidance

The fire inside the vehicle is a critical point for a safety point of view because it burns the
oxygen. The same safety requirement and validation process will be performed as for the
Columbus module, which is part of the ISS.
4.2.7 Reliability of the manned re-entry vehicle

For a reliability point of view, we will require the same level of reliability for the Manned
Re-entry Vehicle as for the actual ATV. Indeed, because the ATV has to dock with the ISS,
and become for a few time a part of the ISS where the astronauts can go, the reliability of
the ATV is the same reliability of a manned spacecraft vehicle.
So the reliability prediction of our Manned Re-entry vehicle should be higher than 95% from
the launch phase up to the re-entry and landing phase.
To fulfill this requirement, the reliability estimation of each sub-system of the Manned Re-
entry Vehicle has to be higher than 99%.
Figure 33 - Escape tower
4.2.8 Safe Mode & FO/FO/FS aspects

The Manned Re-entry Vehicle has to FO/FO/FS (Fail Operational/Fail Operational/Fail
Safe), which means the vehicle has to continue its mission after 2 failures and after a third
failure, the vehicle hast to be put in a safe mode.
The safe mode of the Manned Re-entry Vehicle is quite similar to the ATV safe mode. The
new vehicle has to find the sun and recover power when the Manned Re-entry vehicle is
still power by the solar array. But when there is just the capsule (during the last phases of
the Manned Re-entry vehicle), the safe mode is to bring back rapidly and safety the crew
on Earth.

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5 MISSION ANALYSIS
5.1 Scenarios for the Trajectories

ESA and CNES safety principles request that, in a system with potential hazards, no
combination of two failures, whatever they are (hardware, software or human failure),
may lead to catastrophic consequences where loss of human lives takes place. This
statement defines the Fail Operational/ Fail Safe criterion. As it is logic the
implementation of this criterion entails the consideration of different trajectory scenarios.
5.1.1 First scenario - nominal mode

In this mode all the systems are working under specifications. The re-entry is a controlled
ballistic type (lift different from zero) and the spacecraft will land within the desired area.
In this scenario both the trajectory and landing will be inside the lower acceleration cases
providing a relatively comfortable mission to the astronauts. The redundancy type and
level will be implemented in such a way that the spacecraft can cope with any possible
failure, being able to work in this mode with any degradation of the mission requirements.
5.1.2 Second scenario - safe mode

If two failures arise during the mission, the safe mode will be activated, either manually or
automatically. In this backup mode the only aim is to preserve the crew and Earth
inhabitant‘s lives. Thereby, the requirements of landing area and comfort of the mission
will be deteriorated. The control system performed will be the purely ballistic re-entry
(lift equal to zero) for the re-entry from ISS case. In this scenario the trajectory and
landing will be inside the higher acceleration cases. In order to assure human lives and
reliability of the safe mode, a high degree of segregation will be implemented. That means
different sensor and actuator types than in the nominal mode, different Software
principles and different developers. We will then assure that a single failure type will not
be propagated and will not jeopardize the whole mission.

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5.1.3 Third scenario - contingency situation

If the safe mode fails, it is likely that the capsule blew up and the astronauts either
ejected, if possible, or died. Once the lives of the astronauts are lost, the main aim is to
preserve the Earth inhabitant‘s lives. In this scenario the trajectory will be such that the
wreckage will not fall over populated areas.
5.2 Landing Sites

The landing system for a manned spacecraft is one of the major systems of the design and
it is critical from the standpoint of crew‘s safety and mission success.
The project‘s requirements include the ability of the capsule to land in water (e.g. ocean)
as well as in terrestrial landing sites. However, ballistic re-entry at Earth return was
selected with water landing as the primary mode.
The requirements also include the feasibility for International Space Station (ISS) and Lunar
mission return, population and crew safety, landing operation and rescue infrastructure,
and the environmental conditions to select a landing site.
At this phase, we will not cover the analysis of environmental conditions, landing
operations and rescue infrastructure. We will provide only tentative landing sites (due to
technical data available to public and time constraints). However, further research and
trade-off analysis has to be performed in order to select the final and decisive nominal and
emergency landing sites.
5.2.1 Landing Sites Selection

One of the principal requirements to select the landing sites for ballistic re-entry is:
 Landing Sites should be under the orbital path of the ISS (International Space
Station) orbit to facilitate the re-entry conditions.
As the altitude of the ISS varies, the time it takes to orbit the Earth also changes passing
over different locations.
At an altitude of 400km the ISS orbit is about 94 minutes long. At an altitude of 345km, the
ISS takes about 92 minutes to circle the Earth. Even a small change of a few minutes in the
orbital time will alter the orbital path the ISS takes over the Earth.

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The ISS orbits the Earth at 51.6° to the Equator, following the direction of the Earth‘s
rotation from west to east. The ISS goes over a specific area on Earth approximately twice
a day. Once in an ascending track from south to north, the second is in a descending track
from north to south. ISS is not over the same place exactly in each 90-minute pass.
The ISS completes around 15½ orbits per 24 hours at a varying height of 350-400 km. It
does not orbit over the same spot every 24 hours. After one orbit, the Earth has rotated
approximately 15° of longitude (at the Equator). The ISS‘s ground track will thus be further
behind on a map projection by 15°.
From Star-Crossed Orbits by James Oberg:
It takes about 90 minutes for the satellite to complete one full circuit. When it gets back
to its starting point, Earth’s surface has moved eastward. It moves 360 degrees in 24
hours, or 15 degrees per hour. So after each satellite circuit of 1.5 hours, the Earth’s
surface has moved about 1.5 times 15 degrees, or 22.5 degrees, further to the east.
Below is a screenshot from appISSOrbit ISS orbital tracking page showing the ISS‘s current
position (February 28, 2010, 13:00 GMT).
Figure 34 - appISSOrbit web page ISS orbital tracking for February 28, 2010, 13:00 GMT. Orbital display
rows: 2, each row is shifted by 2 Earth circumferences. For screening the whole Orbital, please refer to
the appISSOrbit web page

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Based on the whole ISS orbital display, we can follow the ISS orbit path and reduce the
landing site options. We will select three lading sites in sequence (one per orbital period –
approximately 90min), a nominal one and two for emergency situations. If the capsule is
not able to re-entry in the first window, it will remain orbiting around the Earth. As the
second orbit will not pass over the same point, a new entry window will be related with a
different landing site for the new location over the Earth. If the capsules fail to re-entry
again, a third landing site will be used.
Moreover, potential impacts from catastrophic incidents involving re-entry have to be

assessed as part of the overall Range Safety evaluation. The potential hazard during the
Earth re-entry of the capsule will be the falling debris.
During capsule re-entry, the Service Module as well as the Docking mechanism will be
jettisoned. These objects will break into small debris pieces some of which are going to
survive passing through the atmosphere. Those pieces are intended to have an ocean
impact. Prior atmospheric entry, the report of the estimation of where and when those
debris will occur, as well as risk estimation based on air and mariner traffic, will be
release such the air and marine routes be free during re-entry. Debris are expected to land
within designated unpopulated areas.
Based on available information to public of ―NASA‘s Exploration System Architecture Study

Final Report‖ (2005), we propose that the landing sites for our mission follow below
specifications:
NASA‘s Crew Exploration Vehicle Final Report focus in where acceptable landing sites can
be located with respect to the disposal debris area, analyzing two cases:
 A landing site location analysis conceptual design for a 0.35 L/D

(100 nmi cross-range) vehicle.
 A landing site location analysis conceptual design for a 0.40 L/D
(110 nmi cross-range) vehicle.
A conceptual design for 0.35 L/D was selected (Chapter 6) with a 100nmi (185.20Km)
cross-range capsule. Furthermore,
 The debris ellipse, which encompasses a track approximately 900nmi (1666.8Km)

long from toe-to-heel, must not infringe on landing areas.
 Landing area size requirement of 5–6nmi (9.26 – 11.112Km) diameter.
 Safety Margin for all land coast lines of 25nmi (46.30Km)
With the Maximum Landing Site Boundary and the Disposal Footprint based on NASA‘s
analysis, we selected our provisional Landing Sites.

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5.2.2 Nominal and Emergency Landing sites geographical

location
The following figures correspond to the analysis made, which represent the 0.35 L/D case.
They show that the debris limits certain landing sites location to no further than 350nmi
(648.20Km) west of the Pacific Ocean (including a 25nmi (46.30Km) safety margin for all
French coast lines). This boundary line is based on the entry aerodynamic flight
characteristics for this vehicle design analysis made by NASA Assured Crew Return Vehicle.
5.2.2.1 Nominal Scenario
The first window was selected for a landing site situated at S16°08‘45.9‘‘, W149°38‘1.6‘‘
(-16.146092,-149.633789). This landing site is located at the north of the French Polynesia
and Bora-Bora. The landing site is approximately 80nmi (148.16Km) north from French
Polynesia and 54nmi (100.008Km) north from Bora-Bora island.
Figure 35 - First Window Landing Site: Upper image –appISSOrbit ISS orbital track and selection of the
first window for the landing site. Lower image - Maximum Landing Site Boundary for a 0.35 L/D returning
from a 51.3deg ISS Orbit

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5.2.2.2 Emergency Scenario
As mentioned before, in the case that the capsule is not able to re-entry in the first
window because of emergency situations, it will remain orbiting around the Earth. A
second window is selected based on one opportunity per orbit. The second orbit will not
pass over the same point and the new entry window will be related with a different
landing site for the new location over the Earth.
After 90min approximately of the ISS tracking orbit, a new landing location is selected. The
location coordinates of the second landing site (in case of emergency contingency) are
S13°59‘14.5‘‘, W179°23‘5.1‘‘ (-13.987376, -179.384766). This location is situated
approximately 70nmi (129.64Km) of the north-east of Wallis and Fortuna islands (French
Territory).
Figure 36 - Second Window Landing Site: Upper image – appISSOrbit ISS orbital track showing the second
window for the Landing Site after 90 minutes approximately (one opportunity per orbit). Lower image -
Maximum Landing Site Boundary for a 0.35 L/D returning from a 51.3deg ISS Orbit.

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If the capsule fails to re-entry again, a third landing site will be used. This new window is
selected after 95min approximately of the ISS tracking orbit following one opportunity per
orbit. This new landing site location is at S18°40‘1.42‘‘, E162°39‘48.8‘‘ (-18.667063,
162.663574) coordinates. It is approximately 97nmi (179.644Km) north-west from New
Caledonia coast (French territory).
Figure 37 - Third Window Landing Site: Upper image – appISSOrbit ISS orbital track showing the third
window for the Landing Site after 95 minutes approximately (one opportunity per orbit). Lower image -
Maximum Landing Site Boundary for a 0.35 L/D returning from a 51.3deg ISS Orbit.
The three landing sites meet the specification of having a debris ellipse of 900nmi
(1666.8Km) long from toe-to-heel which does not infringe the landing area neither the
populated areas. The three landing sites also have a landing area size of 5 to 6nmi (9.26 to
11.112Km) of diameter and a safety margin of 25nmi (46.30Km) away from all coast lines.

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Nominal and Emergency Landing Sites for a re-entry vehicle
Name of Location Geographical coordinates
Emergency
Wallis and Fortuna S13°59‘14.5‘‘, W179°23‘5.1‘‘
New Caledonia S18°40‘1.42‘‘, E162°39‘48.8‘‘
Nominal
French Polynesia S16°08‘45.9‘‘, W149°38‘1.6‘‘
Figure 38 - Nominal and Emergency Landing Sites Location
In the event that major situations are presented during re-entry, landing sites may be
decided on State coast or a place not under the jurisdiction of any State. This is based on
the "Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of
Objects Launched into Outer Space", signed on 22 April 1968 by the United States, Russia,
and many other countries, "If, owing to accident, distress, emergency or unintended
landing, the personnel of a spacecraft land in territory under the jurisdiction of a
Contracting Party or have been found on the high seas or in any other place not under the
jurisdiction of any State, they shall be safely and promptly returned to representatives of
the launching authority."
As such, some sort of contingency plans would be required in case such a contingency
presented itself.
There exist bilateral and multilateral agreements—including the Convention on Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects; the Agreement on the Rescue and Return of Astronauts;
the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space; the
Agreement Among the Government of Canada, Governments of the Member States of the
European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, The Government of the Russian
Federation, and the Government of the United States of America concerning cooperation
on the civil International Space Station —as sufficient to define cooperation and liability
associated with the landing and return of the Re-entry vehicle.

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5.2.2.3 Additional Constraints
Additionally, safety constraints state that a landing has to be on relatively flat terrain
which would provide a broad expanse of smooth surface to allow a margin of error for
overshoot when descending to the target site. It is preferable that the landing time be at
day-time to facilitate rescue operations.
After splashdown, the crew can be retrieved by helicopter and taken to the primary
recovery ship, which must be equipped with medical facilities. As an additional
requirement, the crew has to be in a hospital or medical facilities within 24 hrs after being
in LEO. Hospital facilities are suggested to be within maximum distance around 200Km
away from the landing site. The landing sites locations are actually in a distance less or
equal to 107.99nmi(200Km) of French territories which have hospital facilities in case the
recovery ship cannot reach the capsule and the crew possibly should be recover by
helicopter.
For a future and deeper study of landing sites viability, the Meteorological constraints have
to be taken into account.
 Visibility conditions
 Speed of the wind (along or cross the runway): Horizontal wind velocities are
suggested to be < 70 m/s
 Keraunic level (to define the risk of storms)
Pacific Ocean weather is typically a lot calmer than the Atlantic in the areas used for
recovery. Most areas in the Atlantic experience 3-5' waves regularly, usually higher.
Though the Caribbean is calmer, it is also a lot shallower (Carriers need deep water). Some
other factors are important to be included, such as:
 Political constraints and Country Trades

 Seasonal fishing
 Airspace Prohibition
 Rescue infrastructure (Cargo, recovery ships, helicopters)
 Landing surface slope angle < 10º
The landing sites also must have the State Department approval. It is important to mention
that the future work and research must include abort mission as well as a detailed
investigation of the landing sites proposed to assess their viability.

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5.3 Introduction to Trajectory Design

In order to safely return the crew, the whole payload needs to be placed back on Earth in
a way that the astronauts and the instruments will not be damaged and at the correct
landing site for rescue. The first step is the deployment of the payload at the desired
location. The second step is to make sure that the maximum temperature and maximum
acceleration achieved during the re-entry will be within certain acceptable levels. Not only
the adequate temperature and acceleration levels of the capsule are concerned but also
the payload inside it, been this last the crew and the instruments necessary for their
survival. Third and final step is to analyze how the selected trajectories can be driven by
the bank angle and also inside these trajectories design a trajectory for the ATV body in
order to make it burn during re-entry without any risk to the population on ground
On the next lines the method used for achieving the aim of each part, as described above,
will be explained in more details.
As a final realization in this study, it could be expressed as: a parametric analysis of the
trajectory for landing site, maximum achieved temperature and acceleration.
5.4 Description of the phases

5.4.1 Dynamic and aerothermal models
The study will be divided into three cases: the nominal case - controlled ballistic re-entry,
as selected in the trade-off study; the emergency scenario - a ballistic re-entry without
incidence; and the catastrophic scenario – a wreckage re-entry, this scenario is assuming
that the capsule exploded and the crew did not survive and the pieces must not fall over
populated areas. The initial conditions will be assigned for speeds typical for cases of re-
entry after de-orbiting from low Earth orbit (LEO) according the data obtained from
literature and the data available from the International Space Station (ISS). However in
these conditions a realistic aerothermodynamic simulation would also demand models for
the evaluation of the radiation thermal flow on the wall and the effect of the ablation in
the thermal protection system which is not currently available. Therefore, simpler
aerothermal dynamical models and assumptions for simulation in the ablation were made
in use. More specific analyses like using Direct Simulation Monte Carlo (DSMC) in the
hypersonic flow and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) for the continuum flow were not
applied due to the lack of time. Typical conditions for the definition of a single mesh will
be identified in which the aerodynamic coefficients of interest will be estimated.

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5.4.2 Landing sites analysis

The first results will come for the landing sites. There are three desired landing sites
reason for the choice of three different landing sites is if the capsule is not able to re-
entry in the first window for some reason it will remain orbiting around Earth. Due to the
precession of the line of nodes in the second orbit the capsule will not pass over the same
point (it would take a long time for this to happen). Therefore, a second re-entry window
is needed. The new entry window will be related to a different landing site because of the
new location over the planet. If this window is missed again same reason makes the need
for a third landing site (refer to chapter 5.2 for more information):
 First landing site: centre at 16°08‘45.6‘‘ South and 149°38‘2.4‘‘ West. This site is close to
French Polynesia and Bora Bora (less than 200Km away from land coast, French Territory).
Giving around -16.146092° latitude and -149.633789° longitude;
 Second landing site: centre at 13°59‘14.5‘‘ South and 179°23‘5.1‘‘ West. This site is close
to Wallis and Fortune (less than 200Km away from land coast, French Territory). Giving
around -13.987376° latitude and -179.384766° longitude; and
 Third landing site: centre at 18°40‘1.42‘‘ South and 162°39‘48.8‘‘ East. This site is close to
New Caledonia (less than 200Km away from land coast, French Territory). Giving around -
18.667063° latitude and 162.663574° longitude.
The initial conditions of the three lading sites will be basically the same, which are the
final conditions after de-docking from the ISS. The fluctuation of these parameters due to
uncertainties will be analysed in the sensitivity analysis section.
Starting from those assumptions a study of the equations of motion will be made in order
to place the payload at the required landing site taking in account the temperature and
acceleration constraints. There will be a range of possible conditions for each scenario due
to the allowed landing area (defined based on the location and the rescue time
expectation) and the variation of the altitude of the ISS (the ISS altitude varies roughly
around 10 Km). The results compiled will form the re-entry corridors for each capsule.
5.4.3 Re-entry corridor and ATV body trajectory

A parametric study of the effects of variation in the mission parameters will be carried out
(i.e. initial conditions after de-orbiting) or the parameters that represent the vehicle
(dimension, weight, etc.). In particular peaks of acceleration, thermal flow and the total
thermal cargo under the various conditions considered will be determined. As a result a
flight envelope for the re-entry window will be obtained for each capsule scenario and ATV
body. This envelope will be taking in account the maximum allowed temperature and
acceleration during the re-entry.

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5.5 Road Map

5.5.1 Information and iterations with other work packages
Represented in the next diagram is the work exchange perform with other work packages
during the entire project. The double arrows represent iterations made, which means that
information and analyses were exchanged continually and traded in order to achieve a
desired condition or a level. The single arrows represent information that was provided for
this analysis only without the need of iterations or information exchange.
Arrival Velocity
(ISS database)
Shape and Geometry Capsules’ Mass

Vehicle’s Dynamic
(Mission Analysis) Model (System Engineering)
Maximum
Maximum Acceleration Entry Constrains
Temperature
(Structures)
(Thermal)
Landing Sites
Corridor
(Mission Analysis, System Engineering)
Figure 39 – Work exchanges

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5.5.2 Work flow

Below the work flow and the chapters related are described was a way of facilitating the
understanding of this document as well as a way to provided a graphical explanation of the
steps how they were used in order to obtain the results described at the end of this work.
Environment Model Vehicle’s Corridor

Chapters 0 Dynamic Model Parameters
Chapter 5.2
Chapter 5.7
and 0
Chapter 5.8.3
Parametric Study Trajectory Entry Constrains

Chapter 5.8.1 Analysis
Chapters 0,
5.8.1.15 and 0
Final Possible
Trajectories
Chapter 0, 5.10
and 5.12
Figure 40 –Wrok flow

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5.6 Earth’s Physical Characteristics

In this part some aspects of Earth‘s physical characteristics will be presented. These
characteristics are going to be used further in this study in modeling the vehicle‘s
equations of motion. As described in the working flow diagram this chapter and part of the
next chapter will form the Earth‘s environmental model.
5.6.1 Earth’s sphere of influence

In astrodynamics sphere of influence of a certain body is the region, in the shape of a
sphere, where the gravitational field of this body is the dominant force. This means that
other bodies‘ effects are ether negligible or simply are not affecting significantly the area
inside the sphere.
As the analyses in this report is only with respect to re-entry decent and land it will start
where the atmosphere start, for clear reasons. However, Moon‘s gravity field can influence
the trajectory. Therefore, Earth‘s sphere of influence will be here evaluate in order to
proper know if is reasonable to assume that Moon‘s influence in the trajectory can be
neglected. If this assumption proves in fact to be reasonable it will result in the use of a
much simpler dynamic model.
The radius of the sphere of influence can be evaluated as, according to ―Bate, 1970‖ and
―Sellers, 2004‖:
Where, a is the semi major axis of Earth with respect to Sun, mT and mS are the masses of
Earth and Sun respectively.
Carrying out the calculation r is obtained as approximately 925×103 Kilometers. The radius is
measured for the Earth‘s centre of mass.
Earth‘s atmosphere can be supposed to start at 1000 kilometers, refer to ―U.S. Standard
Atmosphere, 1976‖. To evaluate with respect to the sphere of influence it has to be
summed with Earth‘s mean radius (6378.1 km), giving in this way:
The result (0.7976%) is, in fact, a small percentage, for that reason, is possible to assume
that neglecting other gravitational influences is not going to make any significant change in
the results.

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5.6.2 Earth’s gravitational field

An Earth‘s gravity evaluation during the entire radius of re-entry as needed for the
modeling the environment. The model used to describe the effects of Earth‘s gravity was
the same used in classic mechanics, which can be describe using ―Newton‘s law of
universal gravitation‖ the formulas applied can be seen as follows:
Where, g is the acceleration of gravity measured in meters over seconds square (ms-2), G is
the gravitational constant equals to 6.67428x10-11 m3kg-1s-2, M is Earth‘s mass equals to
5.9742x1024 and r is the measured point distance from Earth‘s centre of mass.
The effects of gravity perturbations because a non-spherical Earth can be neglected since
there is no orbiting phase and typically those effects are only significant throughout
several orbits.
5.6.3 Earth’s density profiles

The U.S. Standard Atmosphere, US76 extended model, is a series of models that defines
values for atmospheric temperature, density, pressure and other properties over a wide
range of altitudes. With all values plotted, a table had been built where the density value
was taken at each altitude. The values in the altitude table vary every ten meters from -
5000 until 1000000 meters high, for those simulated altitudes that were in between two
table values an interpolation was made in order to find the number at the desired point.
Reference: ―U.S. Standard Atmosphere, 1976‖. For densities at altitudes higher than 1000
kilometers it will be considered as always 0 kg/m3.
5.7 Modeling the Atmospheric Entry

For the entry corridor and sensitivity analysis phases the execution of a MATLAB program
and MATLAB/ Simulink model was developed, the complete tool was named Atmospheric
Re-Entry Model (AREM).
5.7.1 The atmospheric re-entry model

The complete model consists of two different programs that working together are able to
model an planet re-entry of a point mass vehicle; first part is a MATLAB script (called
initial_data.m) and second part is a MATLAB/ Simulink (named equations.mdl). The
gathering of those two programs forms the Atmospheric Re-Entry Model (AREM). All the
variables and constants used were set in the international metric system of units (SI).

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The script contains physical constants like body characteristics, vehicle‘s initial conditions
and one operation:
The length of position vector, r0 (starting point at the main body‘s centre of mass):
Where R is the main body‘s mean radius (Earth‘s equals to 6378.1 Km) and h0 is the initial
altitude with respect to the Earth surface.
The Simulink program is executed by a command in the script. It reproduces all the
calculation process and hypothesis further presented, in this way, calculating the vehicle‘s
behavior at each time step. The Simulink was assembled, mainly, in six subsystems:
 Constrains;
 Environment;
 Equations of motion;
 Post-processing;
 Kinematics; and
 Thermodynamics.
The next picture represents the blocks scheme as it is in the program. There it is possible
to distinguish the subsystems‘ calculated variables and, also, which variable re-feeds
which subsystem. The clock block is not preview described, since, its only function is
measure the time; therefore, is not a subsystem.

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theta
phi
Kinematics
0 time
Clock
phi phi
phi dot phi dot
theta theta
g g
theta dot theta dot
gamma gamma
ro
gamma dot gamma dot
Environment
psi psi
psi dot psi dot
r r
ro
r dot r dot
v v
v dot v dot
Equations of Motion
r
altitude altitude
temp
Constrains
temp.
v temp
ro q dot q dot
Thermodynamics
pos-processing
Figure 41 - Representation of AREM's Simulink block system
In the next parts the model‘s assumptions and the applied equations used in the
construction are described.
5.7.2 Flight mechanics

For the model construction some statements were made:
 The equations derived are evaluating a flight over a spherical rotating main body;
 The re-entry body is represented as a point mass;
 The re-entry body‘s total angular moment is zero;
 There isn‘t any kind of force produced by thrusters or propulsion system;

 The main body rotates with constant angular velocity  ;
 The atmosphere is fixed with respect to the main body and is be represented by the gravity
and density models stated in chapter 5.6
 The atmospheric density was taken from the US76 Standard Atmosphere extended model;
 The gravity acceleration varies according to the description made at chapter 5.6.2; this is
due to the assumption of a perfect spherically symmetric mass distribution of the planet;
 Other bodies‘ gravity perturbations are not been taking in account, refer to chapter 5.6.1;
 No wind is present.

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With the initial assumptions selected, the coordinate system will be present with the
respective angles, as it is describe at ―Vinh, 1993‖:
“The inertial reference frame OX1Y1Z1 is taken such that O is at the centre of the gravitational
field of the spherical earth and the OX 1Y1 plane is the equatorial plane. The OXYZ reference frame

is fixed with respect to the earth with OZ coinciding with OZ 1. The rotation  takes place along

the Z-axis. With respect to the earth-fixed system OXYZ, the position vector r is define by its
magnitude r, longitude  (measured from the X-axis, in the equatorial plane, positively eastward)
and its latitude  (measured from the equatorial plane, along a meridian, positively northward).
The different vectors are evaluate by their components in a rotating coordinate system Oxyz such
that the x-axis is along the position vector, the y-axis is in the equatorial plane, orthogonal to the
x-axis and from it toward the eastward direction, and the z-axis completing a right-handed system.
Let  be the angle between the local horizontal plane; that is the plane passing through the
vehicle located at the point M and orthogonal to the position vector r, and the velocity vector V.
The angle  is termed the flight-path angle and is positive when V is above the horizontal plane.
Let  be the angle between the local parallel of the latitude and the projection of V on the
horizontal plane.”
Figure 42 - Coordinate system - Planetocentric fix frame (from "Vinh - 1993")

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5.7.3 Vehicle and environment equations

The deduction of all the equations of motion and the other parameters that will be
presented as follows can be found in the references stated at each sublevel. The program
evaluation of other variables used (such as: drag force, D, lift force, L, density, ρ, and
heat flux & temperature at the stagnation point) will be describe right after the equations
of motion. Those variables are also changing continuously during the vehicle‘s motion.
The program also contains a matrix change for the coordinate system, originally Spherical
coordinates shifting to Cartesian coordinates. Allowing the program to make an Earth plot
of the trajectory and obtain the vehicle‘s velocity in Cartesian axis.
5.7.3.1 Equations of Motion
For the rotating coordinate system Oxyz the following equations were deducted starting
from the kinematics relations and Newton‘s second law; reference ―Vinh, 1993‖.
5.7.3.2 Drag
The drag force is expressed as:
Where  is the density of the free stream, S is the reference area, CD is the drag
coefficient and V is the vehicle velocity; all them can be found in the reference
―Houghton & Carpenter, 2003‖.

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5.7.3.3 Lift
The lift force is expressed as:
Where  is the density of the free stream, S is the reference area, CL is the lift
coefficient and V is the vehicle velocity; all them can be found in the reference
―Houghton & Carpenter, 2003‖.
5.7.3.4 Density
Earth‘s density profiles were extracted from ―U.S. Standard Atmosphere, 1976‖, refer to
chapter 5.6.3.
5.7.3.5 Stagnation Point
The model used for the wall was insulating adiabatic with emissivity, a zero heat transfer
to an insulate surface (adiabatic surface). The model calculates the surface temperature
that leads to zero heat transfer. Thermal radiation also is taken into account, therefore:
Having this in mind, it is possible to evaluate the maximum temperature by setting q total as
the value measured at the stagnation point and q radiate , according to Stefan-Boltzmann law
(as the velocities involved will be in the range that only the body will be emitting radiation
towards the shock wave), as:
Where  is Stefan-Boltzmann constant (equal to 5.670400×10−8 Wm-2K-4),  is emissivity

correction factor and T is the temperature.
Consequently, the total heating rate calculated at the stagnation point can be equalized to
the radiated heat flux and, according to this the maximum temperature achievable can be
obtained at every simulation step.

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In general, when flow is laminar (usually it is or can be assumed to be), the correlation
between nose cap parameters, flight conditions and heating rate is described by the
following formula:
The coefficients K1, m & n describe the correlation of the equation and its parameters
with real heating rate (as experienced in experiments),  C describe the catalytic
coefficient, v0 is the initial velocity, RN is the nose radius and  0 is the density at surface
level. The coefficients vary depending on the study and their experience of finding the
correlation relationship, conditions of tests and units chosen as K1 is a dimensional
coefficient.
According to Detra-Kemp Riddell:
 K1 = 113.5x106 for q expressed in units [W/m2];

 n = 0.5;
 m = 3.15; and
  C = 1.0 (fully catalytic wall, conservative assumption).
Finally, the temperature can be evaluated as:
Where all the parameters and passages are better describes in the references ―Griffin &
French, 1991‖ and ―Hankey, 1988‖.

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5.7.3.6 Kinematics
The kinematics performs a series of mathematical operations in order to change the

reference coordinate system from the Spherical to Cartesian system.
The axis transformation is the conversion from the Spherical coordinate system described
above to the Cartesian coordinate system.
The chosen Cartesian system is the rotating planetocentric frame, FR := {O; xR, yR, zR},
which has a constant Eastward rotation of  with respect to the fixed planetocentric
coordinates Fp := {O; x, y, z}, centered in the centre of mass of the planet, O, and with a
fixed orientation iˆ , ĵ and k̂ with respect to the fixed stars, which is called
Planetocentric Fix Frame. Unit vectors iˆ and ĵ lie on the equatorial plane, perpendicular
to the planet spin axis, k̂ according to the spherical coordinate system figure. As it
follows the equations of the transformation from Spherical to Cartesian coordinates will be
presented, further information in the references ―Avanzini, 2006‖ and ―Vinh, 1993‖
x  r cos  cos 
y  r sin   cos 
z  r sin  
Figure 43 - Spherical Coordinate system angles

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5.8 Entry Corridor

5.8.1 Study of initial parameters
The capsule and ATV body will come detached from International Space Station for
performing a re-entry in Earth‘s atmosphere. At the correct the re-entry window the ATV
body will place the capsule at the correct position and release it for performing the re-
entry. Little time after this the ATV body will also re-entry. This means that the initial
conditions will come directly from the ISS orbit parameters. Furthermore, the re-entry
phase will be analyzed in the beginning of Entry window, in this way, not taking in account
other body‘s gravity perturbations, refer to chapter 5.6.1.
The study of the initial parameters has been made in order to obtain an envelope for each
scenario where if the capsule is initially inside will land at the correct site taking in
account of an ideal case without variations. Which respect to the ATV body an analysis will
be made based on the selected initial conditions for the capsule for each scenario the only
difference between the two initial conditions will be the initial flight-path angle which for
the ATV body will be more shallow in order to make it burn during the re-entry.
5.8.1.1 Flight-path angle
The initial flight-path angle for tripulated capsules is typically in between 0 to -20 degrees
due to the acceleration and thermal constraints. For obtaining the initial flight-path angle
for each capsule (with respect the Earth‘s referential frame) the desired landing site must
be achieved. As a way of obtaining the possible values the flight-path angle will be varied
to scan all the possible re-entry trajectories. From these trajectories will be selected the
ones that achieved the correct landing site within the allowed error.
As can be understood from real missions preformed over the history it is possible to obtain
a range of the flight-path angle that varies from 0° until negative 20°, for the reasons
presented above. For angle‘s reference check chapter 5.7.2.
The initial flight-path angle for the ATV body need to be chose in a way that the
temperature achieved during the trajectory is sufficient higher to burn it. The temperature
will be defined further in the study.

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5.8.1.2 Heading angle
The heading angle in an orbit defines the orbit inclination, typically denoted by the letter
i. As the capsule and the ATV body are de-attached from the ISS, its orbit will follow the
same as the space station with some slightly differences with respect to the station, this
small difference does not produce a significant change in the re-entry trajectory.
Therefore, the angle of the capsules orbit (heading angle) can be assumed similar to the
ISS orbit‘s inclination. From reference ―Wikipedia, 2010‖ the orbit inclination of the ISS is
51.6419 degrees.
5.8.1.3 Altitude
The initial altitude will be, again, the same as the ISS orbit for the same reasons presented
above. From reference ―Wikipedia, 2010‖ the orbit altitude of the ISS varies between 336
and 346 Kilometers from the perigee to the apogee respectively. In the next lines two
simulations will be performed in order to evaluate if this difference of 10 Km is significant
in the re-entry trajectory.
For analysis proposes the comparisons will be made between the six trajectory parameters
being them the flight-path angle, the heading angle, latitude, longitude, velocity and
altitude. The two trajectories will have the same initial conditions differing only by the
fact that one is starting at an altitude of 336 Km and another starting at 346 Km high.
Initial parameters:
→initial flight-path angle
→initial heading angle
→initial altitude min and max
→initial mass
→reference area
→nose radius
→initial velocity
→Lift coefficient
→Drag coefficient
→initial longitude
→initial latitude
→ablative temperature
→mass variation due to ablation

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Acceleration Difference
20
336 Km
346 Km
0
-20
Acceleration [m/s 2]
-40
-60
-80
-100
-120
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Time [s]
Figure 44 - Acceleration profile for initial altitudes 336 Km and 346 Km
Temperature Difference at the Stagnation Point

3000
336 Km
346 Km
2500
2000
Temperature [K]
1500
1000
500
0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Time [s]
Figure 45 - Temperature profile for initial altitudes 336 Km and 346 Km

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geoghrapical lines
Coast line
336 Km
346 Km
Figure 46 - Re-entry trajectory for initial altitudes 336 Km and 346 Km
The landing points can be better seen when zoomed. Next figure presents a zoom of the
landing area of both trajectories.
-2
6
x 10 0
4
2
4 6
geoghrapical
6 lines
Coast line
336 Km
346 Km
Figure 47 - Zoomed Re-entry trajectory for initial altitudes 336 Km and 346 Km

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As it can be seen from the pictures above the difference between both trajectories are in
fact small. Moreover, the peak of acceleration and temperature at stagnation point are the
same, but happening at different times. The values of the points are very close happening
at close altitudes but at different times due to the difference on the starting point. The
landing point as the other values are also very close laying within the acceptable level
defined but the landing precision requirements. Therefore, due to the lack of time and
base on the results presented is possible to assume with a certain degree of confidence
that the change of 10 Km in altitude will not change significantly the trajectory. Based on
that, the simulations will be carried out in an average altitude of 341 kilometers.
5.8.1.4 Mass
The initial mass for the capsule will be changed during the re-entry phase due to ablation,
vaporization of the heat shield‘s resin. The vaporization occurs on the resin which bounds
the heat shield; this phenomenon will cause the lost of the heat shield during the entry.
Ablation will start when a certain temperature is achieved and stopped when all the resin
is vaporized. The temperature value for the capsule is related with the material selected
for the heat shield, calculated by the thermal subsystem.
The mass of the heat shield will be lost during the trajectory due to this effect. In the
AREM program this effect was simulated as an instant loss of mass (equivalent to the heat
shield) when the ablation temperature is achieved. This rather simplistic model had to be
used since models for the evaluation of the radiation thermal flow on the wall and the
effect of the ablation of the thermal protection system are not currently available.
In the table below the values for the capsule and the ATV body masses are found;
evaluated by the budget work package. The calculation of the heat shield mass and the
total mass (before ablation) of the capsule was obtained by iterations with the work
packages: mission analysis responsible for entry descent and land and system engineering
responsible for the budgets (as shown in the work flow diagram). The process is carefully
described at chapter 14.
Re-entry capsule ATV body
Total (kg) 6000 7000
Heat shield (kg) 859.33 0.0
Figure 48 - Bodies' masses evaluated by the budgets work package

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5.8.1.5 Reference area and nose radius
The reference area and the nose radius for the capsule and ATV body will be constant
during the re-entry; small loses can be assumed to be negligible without changing the
trajectory. Based on the two bodies‘ diameter the reference area, it can be calculated as
follows:
Below are the values as they were calculated, for the diameters‘ values refer to
corresponding chapter.
Re-entry capsule ATV body
Diameter (m) 4.590 4.480
Reference area 15.7633

16.619
(m2) (without solar arrays)
-4.6864
Nose radius (m) 5.52
(concave surface)
Figure 49 - Bodies' reference areas and nose radius
5.8.1.6 Velocity
As already mentioned the initial velocity will come derived from the velocity of the
International Space Station, reason to that in that when the capsule was attached to the
ISS it had the same speed; after de-attaching this speed does have some small variation
but it can be consider negligible when compared to the order of magnitude of the LEO
orbital velocities.
The orbit velocity of the ISS is 7706.6 m/s.

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5.8.1.7 Latitude
The capsule has a particular desired final latitude, which comes from the landing site‘s
location. As can be seen in the table below the final latitude of the selected landing sites
are presented (for the landing sites definition refers to chapter 5.2).
First landing site Second landing site Third landing site
-16°08‘45.9‘‘ -13°59‘14.5‘‘ -18°40‘1.42‘‘

Final latitude
(South) (South) (South)
Figure 50 -Capsule's latitudes landing sites
The AREM program requires as a input the initial latitude with respect the Earth‘s
referential frame; a way of obtaining the initial latitude value for each capsule is by
achieving the desired landing site within the allowed error; therefore, the initial latitude
will be varied in order to scan all the possible re-entry scenarios selecting the ones that
satisfy the above requirement.
As the orbit inclination of the capsule will be 51.6419 degrees (heading angle), due to this
the maximum and minimum latitude that can be achieved by the capsule in its orbit are
51.6419° and -51.6419° respectively. Consequently, this will be the range of the initial
latitudes.
5.8.1.8 Longitude
As it can be noticed from the vehicle‘s equations of motion, (chapter 5.7.2) the longitude
and the longitude variation are not affecting the motion. Therefore, the vehicle‘s
trajectory is indifferent to the initial longitude or its variation during re-entry.
Taking in account the information presented above, for simulations purposes, the initial
longitude will be set as zero, as its value will not interfere with the trajectory.
As a result of this assumption, the initial longitudes for the capsule‘s different scenarios
and the ATV body could be calculated once the initial flight-path angle and latitude are
founded by varying just the initial longitude.

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5.8.1.9 Lift coefficient and Drag coefficient
Due to the lack of time to perform most accurate analysis the lift and drag coefficients will
come evaluated as a Newtonian flow. A more accurate analyze would demand a continuous
and rarefied flow simulations based on the flow characteristics and body geometry before
and after ablation. In addition, these types of analyses demand o lot of time and
computational power and time.
The Mach number described by velocity over speed of sound. In dealing with Mach numbers
above 10, typically, as it is for a direct entry type, a reasonable approximation is to keep
the lift and drag coefficient constant during the entire entry; since the variation is very
low at these high Mach numbers and would not affect significantly the trajectory.
According to the analysis presented in the chapter 7 for the used geometry the CL and CD
could be used as 0.483 and 1.38, respectively, for the capsule; and 0.0 for the CL (ballistic
re-entry) and 1.6 for the CD for the ATV body.
5.8.1.10 Bank angle
The bank angle or the velocity roll angle. It is the angle between the vehicle's normal axis
and the Earth's vertical plane containing its longitudinal axis. The bank angle will be
initially set as zero for simulating the envelopes. After the envelopes are defined a new set
of simulations will be performed varying the bank angle in order to obtain the extension of
the area that is possible to be achieved by varying the bank angle.
In order to obtain the maximum range described above the angle needs to be varied in
such a way that provides the greatest lateral displacement. According to the equations
presented in the vehicle‘s equation of motion, the angle varies from a range of -90° until
90° in this configuration the lift force is parallel to the local horizontal; this means that
the force will be dedicated to the vehicle‘s lateral motion. Therefore, those two
boundaries (-90° and 90°) will be were the trajectory is more affected by the bank angle,
so those will be the angles used.
As a simple way to visualize, the results for each landing site will be shown in a Earth plot
as well as the displacement in meters from the point that the capsule would land if the
angle was set as zero.

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5.8.1.11 Required landing sites
According to the specific landing sites defined in chapter 5.2 there is an acceptable error
in the landing site coordinates; the error is defined based on the rescue expectation. This
allowed error tolerates the capsule to be landed within a circle defined by the allowed
error radius. The circle is centered at the landing coordinates from this centre; the error
radius is drawn for all directions (forming a circle on Earth‘s surface). For the same
reasons presented in chapter 5.8.1.8 this analysis is initially required only for the
latitude.
From the non-Euclidian geometry a circle of radius r on a sphere of radius R will have on
the x-y plane an angle variation from the sphere centre equal to:
On the above formula for Earth‘s case the value R is the radius of the planet and r is the
radius of the circle. The circle defined by this error radius will be identified to as error
circle.
With an allowed error radius of 100 Km for the capsule, the angle variation, α, will result
of approximately 1.7966°
5.8.1.12 First landing site coordinates
For the first landing site the allowed landing latitude will be:
5.8.1.13 Second landing site coordinates
For the second landing site the allowed landing latitude will be:
5.8.1.14 Third landing site coordinates
For the third landing site the allowed landing latitude will be:

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5.8.1.15 Maximum temperature allowed
It is known that the maximum temperature that the body will experience during the entry
phase is located at the stagnation point; usually cone-shaped nose receives the highest
heat flux as the stagnation line is attached at it.
For each complete entry the maximum temperature achieved at this point will come
evaluated. The method of this valuation is described at chapter 5.7.3.5 at the stagnation
point label.
The maximum temperature achieved in an ablative heat shield is the ablation temperature
itself, reason for this behavior is, (like when boiling water) during the process when the
vaporization temperature is achieved the material been heated will conserve this
temperature until all of it is not present anymore. For this reason during the re-entry all
the material in the ablative heat shield will absorb the heating rate until the shield be
release; due to this all the heat will be carried away from the capsule for the heat shield
and after ablation the capsule‘s temperature start from the ablative decreasing tending to
a particular value.
Therefore, in order to obtain the maximum temperature allowed, the ablative

temperature, the heat shield mass and material, iterative analyses were made for the
capsule with the Thermal work package (chapter 8).The materials for the capsule were
then selected as:
Heat shield: Aleastrasil tiles of silica-phenolic materials
Entire body, except the front shield: Norcoat 62250 FI, cork tiles.
The value of the thermal shield is design for the worst case scenario (the ballistic re-
entry); in this case the shield has to be thicker in order to withstand the high thermal
loads faced by the capsule. Moreover, being the thermal shield design for the worst case
makes it robust to all the other cases. The characteristics are: thickness of 89.23mm for
the front shield, and 26.08mm for the after body, mass of 859.33 Kg. Refer to chapter 8
for more details about the heat shield‘s material and mass calculation by the thermal work
package.

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5.8.2 Maximum acceleration allowed

The maximum acceleration endured by the capsule during the entry process must be
restrained to preserve the crew‘s life, the payload and the capsule‘s structure. The value
is usually obtained by testing the structures and the payload instruments, as well as pre-
defined value for the comfort and safety of the astronauts. Therefore, this value must be
defined in order to perform the next analyses. In accordance with NASA‘s studies, the
maximum acceleration value of 5Gs is defined for the lifting body scenario (nominal) and
10Gs is defined for the ballistic scenario (zero lift, emergency); for the NASA‘s
requirement refer to ―Creer, 1960‖.
The Gs mentioned above are Earth Gs which is equal to 9.81 m/s2. Therefore, 5Gs and
10Gs of acceleration are equal to 49.05 m/s2 and 98.10 m/s2, respectively for nominal and
emergency scenarios. These accelerations were implemented as a boundary on the AREM
program in a way that the program will discard any trajectory that have a maximum
acceleration greater than the ones presented above for the respective scenarios.
5.8.3 Method used in the Simulations

The total number of parameters varied is 2 being 3 landing sites for each scenario. Which
gives 6 values in total for all parameters; therefore, for each simulation performed 26; as a
result, 64 combinations are possible per scenario. The parameters do affect each other and
the way they influence is governed by the partial derivative equations of motion which are
either linear or second degree (chapter 5.7.2). In this case, as it is just a matter of finite
number of possible scenarios, it is faster and more effective to create a multidimensional
matrix with the number of dimensions, which is equals to the number of parameters in a
vector specified for each parameter. Then the values in the matrix are simulated by using
the AREM. Thus, the values which comply with the requirements are selected. This method
excludes the need of more complex optimization algorithms like genetics, which are often
very hard to configure and does not guarantee the minimum or maximum function,
depending on how much time the simulation is left running.

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5.9 Nominal Scenario

The nominal scenario will be standard scenario, with lift and drag different from zero,
refer to chapter 5.1.1.
From chapter 5.8.1 the not known initial parameters, which mean the parameters that
will have more than one possible solution, are flight-path angle and latitude. Those
parameters will be varied for each capsule in order to obtain a range of possible
combinations that will result at the desired landing site. The boundary conditions will be
the required landing site coordinates within the allowed error area determined at chapter
4.8.1.11 for each capsule.
As a result an entry envelope will come built evaluating the cloud defined by the resulting
points.
5.9.1 First landing site
Initial parameters:
→initial altitude
→initial mass
→reference area
→nose radius
→initial velocity
→Lift coefficient
→Drag coefficient

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Coordinates of the allowed landing site are:
The simulations‘ results can be seen below:
First Landing Site

-47.5
-48
-48.5
Latitude [deg]
-49
-49.5
-50
-50.5
-51
-51.5
-6.25 -6.15 -6.05 -5.95 -5.85
Flight-path angle [deg]
Figure 51 - First landing site's entry envelope for nominal scenario

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5.9.2 Bank angle variation

In the next figure it is presented an Earth plot of the points obtained in the envelope with
the bank angle of ±90°. The points utilized in the simulation are the boundary points of the
flight-path angle envelope; these points were selected for being the most significative
when measuring the maximum displacement.
Figure 52 - Earth plot with trajectories for first landing site envelope with variable bank angle
The figure above provides a qualitative idea of the maximum extension that is possible to
maneuver with the capsule‘s AOCS. As a simple evaluation some points are shown in the
next table. They are the landing latitude with a bank angle of 0°, 90° and -90°; this
provide a quantitative idea of how many meters the capsule can be deviated. For the
reasons already mentioned in chapter 5.8.1.8 the longitude will not be taken in account
here.
A very simple relation can be used to assess the distance in Kilometers having the
difference of latitudes. From the non-Euclidian geometry a circular sector of angle α on a
sphere of radius R will have a length equal to:
On the above formula for Earth‘s case the value R is the radius of the planet and α is the
latitude.

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Final Latitude
distance in
first landing site bank 0 bank -90 difference
Km
-6.25 -47.50 -14.72 -22.59 7.87 875.57
-6.20 -49.50 -16.42 -24.37 7.95 884.82
-6.20 -48.00 -14.82 -22.81 7.99 889.38
-6.15 -51.00 -17.59 -25.63 8.04 895.06
-6.15 -48.00 -14.38 -22.51 8.13 905.05
-6.10 -51.00 -17.15 -25.33 8.18 910.42
-6.10 -48.50 -14.46 -22.72 8.26 919.46
-6.05 -51.00 -16.70 -25.02 8.32 926.27
-6.05 -49.00 -14.54 -22.93 8.39 934.11
-6.00 -51.00 -16.23 -24.70 8.47 942.65
-6.00 -49.50 -14.60 -23.13 8.53 949.01
-5.95 -51.00 -15.75 -24.37 8.62 959.58
-5.95 -50.00 -14.66 -23.32 8.66 964.17
-5.90 -51.00 -15.26 -24.04 8.78 977.09
-5.90 -50.50 -14.71 -23.51 8.80 979.57
-5.85 -51.00 -14.75 -23.69 8.94 995.24
Figure 53 - Maximum displacement provided by the bank angle for first landing site
For the table is possible to see that the maneuverability that can be provided is a minimum
of 4 times the allowed error radius.

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5.9.3 Second landing site
Initial parameters:
→initial altitude
→initial mass
→reference area
→nose radius
→initial velocity
→Lift coefficient
→Drag coefficient
Second Landing Site

-45.5
-46.5
-47.5
Latitude
-48.5
-49.5
-50.5
-51.5
-6.35 -6.15 -5.95 -5.75
Flight-path angle
Figure 54 - Second landing site's entry envelope for nominal scenario

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Figure 55 - Earth plot with trajectories for second landing site envelope with variable bank angle
here.
latitude.

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Final Latitude
distance in
second landing site bank 0 bank -90 difference
Km
-6.30 -45.50 -13.03 -20.81 7.78 865.59
-6.30 -45.00 -12.51 -20.29 7.79 866.76
-6.25 -47.50 -14.72 -22.59 7.87 875.57
-6.25 -45.50 -12.61 -20.52 7.91 880.88
-6.20 -48.50 -15.36 -23.33 7.98 887.87
-6.20 -46.00 -13.13 -20.74 7.60 846.34
-6.15 -49.00 -15.45 -23.55 8.10 901.76
-6.15 -46.00 -12.24 -20.43 8.19 911.44
-6.10 -49.50 -15.54 -23.77 8.23 915.87
-6.10 -46.50 -12.31 -20.64 8.32 926.47
-6.05 -50.00 -15.62 -23.97 8.36 930.21
-6.05 -47.00 -12.37 -20.83 8.46 941.79
-6.00 -50.50 -15.69 -24.18 8.49 944.78
-6.00 -47.50 -12.43 -21.03 8.60 957.39
-5.95 -51.00 -15.75 -24.37 8.62 959.58
-5.95 -48.00 -12.47 -21.21 8.74 973.27
-5.90 -51.00 -15.26 -24.04 8.78 977.10
-5.90 -48.50 -12.50 -21.39 8.89 989.45
-5.85 -51.00 -14.75 -23.69 8.94 995.25
-5.85 -49.00 -12.53 -21.56 9.04 1005.94
-5.80 -51.00 -14.22 -23.33 9.11 1014.07
-5.80 -49.50 -12.54 -21.73 9.19 1022.74
-5.75 -51.00 -13.67 -22.95 9.29 1033.62
-5.75 -50.00 -12.54 -21.88 9.34 1039.86
-5.70 -51.00 -13.10 -22.57 9.47 1053.95
-5.70 -50.50 -12.53 -22.03 9.50 1057.32
-5.65 -51.00 -12.51 -22.17 9.66 1075.11
Figure 56 - Maximum displacement provided by the bank angle for second landing site

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5.9.5 Third landing site
Initial parameters:
→initial altitude
→initial mass
→reference area
→nose radius
→initial velocity
→Lift coefficient
→Drag coefficient
Third Landing Site

-50.3
-50.4
-50.5
-50.6
Latitude
-50.7
-50.8
-50.9
-51
-51.1
-6.16 -6.15 -6.14 -6.13 -6.12 -6.11 -6.1
Flight-path angle
Figure 57 -Third landing site's entry envelope for nominal scenario

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Figure 58 - Earth plot with trajectories for third landing site envelope with variable bank angle
here.
latitude.
Final Latitude
third landing site bank 0 bank -90 difference distance in Km
-6.15 -51.00 -17.59 -25.63 8.04 895.06
-6.15 -50.50 -17.06 -25.11 8.06 896.74
-6.10 -51.00 -17.15 -25.33 8.18 910.42
Figure 59 - Maximum displacement provided by the bank angle for third landing site

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5.10 Emergency Scenario

The emergency scenario will be the scenario where the vehicle‘s control system is not
working properly or is off, with lift equals to zero and drag different from zero, refer to
chapter 5.1.2.
The analysis process is the same as described above for the nominal scenario.
5.10.1 First landing site

Initial parameters:
→initial altitude
→initial mass
→reference area
→nose radius
→initial velocity
→Lift coefficient
→Drag coefficient
First Landing Site

-44.5
-45.5
-46.5
Latitude [deg]
-47.5
-48.5
-49.5
-50.5
-51.5
-5.56 -5.46 -5.36 -5.26 -5.16 -5.06 -4.96
Flight-path angle [deg]
Figure 60 - First landing site's entry envelope for emergency scenario

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5.10.2 Second landing site
Initial parameters:

→initial altitude
→initial mass
→reference area
→nose radius
→initial velocity
→Lift coefficient
→Drag coefficient
Second Landing Site

-42.5
-43.5
-44.5
-45.5
Latitude
-46.5
-47.5
-48.5
-49.5
-50.5
-51.5
-5.65 -5.45 -5.25 -5.05 -4.85
Flight-path angle
Figure 61 - Second landing site's entry envelope for emergency scenario

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5.10.3 Third landing site
Initial parameters:

→initial altitude
→initial mass
→reference area
→nose radius
→initial velocity
→Lift coefficient
→Drag coefficient
Third Landing Site

-47.5
-48
-48.5
-49
Latitude
-49.5
-50
-50.5
-51
-51.5
-5.5 -5.45 -5.4 -5.35 -5.3 -5.25 -5.2 -5.15
Flight-path angle
Figure 62 - Third landing site's entry envelope for emergency scenario

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5.11 Catastrophic Scenario

This scenario needs to be evaluated for the safety of the ground population. Each small
piece after the capsule‘s explosion will describe a ballistic orbit. If the capsule blows in
any point of the entry trajectory it will not harm the population on ground due to the fact
that the whole trajectory does not pass over any populated area. As the wreckage will
have a ballistic trajectory with low mass the falling area will be closer to the re-entry
point and it will not spread much.
A more realist analysis of this scenario would require a set of simulations using Mote Carlo
propagator for defining the characteristic of the wreckage. This analysis is very demanding
and timing consuming in computational power and it is considered out of the scope of this
preliminary study.
Further studies can be carried out in the next steps of the project.
5.12 ATV body Re-Entry

As for the capsule the re-entry of the ATV body also needs to be analyzed but this time
with different requirements. The ATV body needs to be completely burn during re-entry.
Therefore, a trajectory needs to be design in such a way that the entry flight-path angle is
in the limit that provides the vehicle a direct re-entry type and not a skip re-entry; which
means to re-enter at once and not several orbits later).
The requirement above is based on security reasons, first is that at a trajectory with a
flight-path angle at the limit will present the highest temperatures of all possible
trajectories, and second is that making the vehicle re-enter without making it orbit during
a long period will also be safer because it won‘t need and prolonged tracking and the
landing area is easier and more accurate to evaluate.
From chapter 5.8.1 the not known initial parameters, which mean the parameters that
will have more than one possible solution, are flight-path angle and latitude. Those
parameters will be varied for The ATV body capsule in order to obtain a trajectory with a
characteristics described above and the higher flight-path angle possible.
Referring back to the vehicle‘s equations of motion, chapter 5.7.3.1, we have the
following equation for the flight-path angle:

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In the above equation one of when the cosines of the latitude is maximum and the sinus of
the same is minimum the flight-path angle is maximum. This characteristic can be easily
obtained at latitude of 0°; where the cosines will be 1 and sinus zero.
With the latitude value found its leaves just the flight-path angle to be varied.
For the reasons already mentioned in chapter 5.8.1.8 the longitude will not be taken in
account here. The longitude can be evaluated latter in order to make the selected
trajectory not pass over a populated area, contributing in this way, for the security of the
population on ground.
The designed trajectory can be seen below with the selected flight-path angle of -5.15°.
Initial parameters:

→initial altitude
→initial mass
→reference area
→nose radius
→initial velocity
→Lift coefficient
→Drag coefficient
→initial latitude
6 Trajectory plot
x 10
4
60
2
30
-2
-4
-6 0
0
6
-30
x 10 -5
-5 0 120 180 240
5 6
x 10
Figure 63 - Trajectory of the ATV body in Earth plot Figure 64 - Ground track of the ATV body trajectory

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5.13 Future Lunar Missions

One of the goals that motivate ESA to develop the actual ATV and to convert it in a Crew
Vehicle is to open the possibility for Europe of future manned missions beyond LEO orbits.
Thereby, the design of our Crew Vehicle should cope with further needed developments to
achieve that goal. Although the design of the whole lunar mission is out of the scope of
this project, a brief outline of the mission structure and the needed developments is
carried out.
The lack of a launcher with enough capability to put in orbit the big amount of mass
needed for lunar missions and the high reliability of the actual orbital rendezvous systems,
make the Earth-orbit rendezvous a very suitable option for these missions. Thereby, the
concept of the mission will be to add additional stages to the evolved ATV in order to
achieve the needed propulsion to put it in the interplanetary orbits. Since cooperation
with the Russian agency Roscosmos may be considered, these stages would be launched by
means of Ariane 5-6 or Proton-Angara.
The first and simplest mission considered is a lunar fly-by. In this case only one additional
module will be added to the Crew Vehicle (evolved ATV). This will be the Earth departure
stage that will provide the necessary thrust to escape from Earth‘s orbit.
Figure 65 - Lunar fly-by

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In the previous Figure, a sketch of the fly-by is illustrated. The main mission milestones
are the following:
 Crew Vehicle launch
 Earth Departure Stage launch
 Rendezvous between CV and EDS
 Ignition of EDS
 Jettison of EDS
 Moon crossing
 Moon return with attitude and orbital control
 Direct re-entry and landing
Once the Lunar fly-by is accomplished, it is possible to think on the Moon landing mission.
This mission entails a much higher degree of complexity and risk for the astronauts than in
the previous one: 3 different stages will be assembled with the Crew Vehicle and 4
rendezvous (3 in Earth orbit and 1 in lunar orbit) will be required. A sketch of the mission
is illustrated in Figure 66.
Figure 66 - Lunar landing

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The milestones of the mission are:
 Launch of the Crew Vehicle

 Launch of the Lunar Departure Stage
 Rendezvous between CR and LDS
 Launch of Lunar Module
 Rendezvous between LDS-CR and LM
 Launch of Earth Departure Stage
 Rendezvous between LDS-CR-LM and EDS
 First ignition of EDS for injection in interplanetary orbit
 Second ignition of EDS for Moon orbit injection and circularization
 Jettison of EDS
 Deployment of LM
 Separation and landing of LM
 Astronauts Moon Activities
 Ejection of LM´s upper stage
 Rendezvous between LDS-CV and LM´s upper stage
 Jettison of LM´s upper stage
 Ignition of LDS and for injection in interplanetary orbit
 Jettison of LDS
 Direct re-entry and landing
Regarding the design of the Crew Vehicle it is important to point out that a direct re -
entry is programmed. This aspect means a significant change in the re-entry conditions
with respect to the re-entry from LEO: whereas Low-earth orbital (LEO) velocities are
in the vicinity of 7.8 km/s, lunar return velocity can exceed 11 km/s at atmospheric
interface. This lunar return energy is nearly double a typical LEO return. Thus, the
return from the Moon presents a more hostile environment with extremely high energy
levels that must be dissipated without harming the crew. For this purpose, a pure
ballistic trajectory is not a valid method since it produces deceleration up to 17 g. The
capsules from the Apollo program performed a controlled ballistic re-entry using the
atmospheric lift force in a direct re-entry profile that allowed the deceleration forces
to be reduced with typical lunar returns experiencing loads of around 7.5 g. These
mid-range g-levels were uncomfortable but survivable for the returning crew. Heating
levels were still very high, and required the use of a massive ablative heat shield.
Also, the ability to perform precision landing during direct re-entry was extremely
limited and mandated open ocean landings.
However, for longer missions than Apollo, were astronauts become physically de -
conditioned lowering their abilities to resist high g-forces, a softer trajectory is
required. Thereby maximum g values accepted for NASA safety standards is 7 g for de -
conditioned crew. In addition the bad landing precision of Apollo is an issue that
should be improved. These two aspects suggest that a better re-entry profile should be
implemented for future lunar missions.

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The ―skipping re-entry‖ profile is a good option to mitigate the problems mentioned
above and has been mandated as a baseline requirement for future projects such as
Orion lunar return missions. In this re-entry profile the spacecraft intercepts the outer
atmosphere and then uses substantial aerodynamic forces to dissipate enough energy
to allow the spacecraft to be captured into a low Earth orbit. After the initial re -entry
the spacecraft re-orbits or ―skips‖ and performs a second final re-entry with greatly
reduced g-force level and peak heating.
Figure 67 - Effects of lift-to-drag ratio on landing precision for skipping re-entry
Andersen et al. proved that the precision landing (available bank angle and cross range)
for a skipping re-entry drops critically when L/D values are smaller than 0.3 (see Figure
above).
This then defines a new constraint for the design of our re-entry Crew Vehicle. To sum up,
we can say that the analysis of the future needs regarding re-entry coming from lunar orbit
are the following:
 Ruling out of pure ballistic trajectories

 L/D values must be greater than 0.3 in order to have the possibility of performing
skipping re-entry in future lunar missions.

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6 LANDING SYSTEM
A landing system must be designed so as to ensure that the crew returns safely to Earth,
namely, to reduce the terminal velocity to a level in which the impact loads are minimal
and the capsule does not roll over.
The most common initial deceleration systems for spacecraft returning to earth from space
are parachutes and, although aircraft like landing systems are the safest, they require long
runways and skilled pilots. In addition the wings and wheels constitute about 20 percent of
the vehicle weight whereas a parachute system is much lighter consisting of 3-6 percent of
the vehicle weight (Ong, et al., 2006). The parachute system serves not only to provide
probe deceleration at specific descent rates and timelines but also to provide probe
stability for precision landings.
A parachute is a flexible, porous and bluff body which main role is to produce drag. The
study of the aerodynamics of a parachute must deal with its unsteady, separated and
compressible flow as well as its non-uniform upstream conditions and for reliability, either
backup chutes or multiple chutes are needed.
Since in this mission the safety of the crew is one of the main objectives, in order to
ensure a safe landing besides a parachute system, some secondary landing systems have
also been studied. Also the capsule should be able to make a safe landing both on sea and
land, so to satisfy this criterion other options such as retro-rockets and airbags have been
chosen as secondary landing devices. All of which will be explained in this chapter.

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6.1 Main requirements

The ATV re-entry vehicle has a landing weight, after the completed mission, of 5000 kg.
Undamaged landing shall be possible in rough terrain.
6.1.1 Requirements for nominal operations
Variables Values
Recovery velocity 0.4-1.4 M
vertical velocity parachute (VT) 8.4 m/s
Vertical landing velocity (VF) 1 m/s
Initial horizontal velocity due to wind (VHo) < 20 m/s
Horizontal landing velocity (VHf) < 5 m/s
Maximum allowable impact deceleration at landing (a) 9 g‘s
Maximum total parachute force (Fmax) 8 g‘s
Stability, oscilation < 10 deg
Maximum sea state (emergency conditions) 5
Figure 68 - Landing requirements
The performance characteristics are rated based on the importance of the mission
requirements where 3 represents a high importance, 2 a medium importance, 1 low
importance and 0 not applicable.
Performance characteristics Importance

Reliability of operation 3
Reusability 0
Low weight and volume: weight and volume efficiency 3
Stability: Stabilization in a transonic deceleration 2
High drag: Parachute drag area 2
Low opening forces 1
Low maintenance/service: simplicity of design, manufacturing, 1
maintenance and service
Cost: Low acquisition cost and low life cycle cost. Cost efficiency 1
Figure 69 -Performance characteristics
Other primary requirements are the design of textiles to withstand hostile environments
and control descent time. Nonetheless those points are out of the scope of this study.

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6.2 Parachute system

The parachute system which will satisfy the ATV requirements will be deployed in the
subsonic regimen and will consist on a pilot parachute; the main parachute; and a stability
drogue parachute. A pilot parachute is a small parachute which is attached to a larger
parachute and provides the force required to deploy this larger parachute. A drogue
parachute provides stabilization and initial deceleration. The sequence is the as follows:
First the deployment of the drogue parachute stabilizes the capsule to provide the
required conditions for the pilot parachute deployment. This stage stabilizes the vehicle
and assists in deceleration to a condition which is compatible with the deployment of the
main stage; at a certain altitude, the main parachute detaches. The main stage
decelerates the ATV re-entry vehicle to conditions compatible with the landing. This
process is explained in the next figure,
Figure 70 - Parachute system process
The option of only one deceleration subsystem (a unique and main parachute) has been
ruled out due to the lack of heritage and because of the fact that the use of different
parachutes permits optimizing the drag enhancement system for each re-entry stage and
involves a simple sequence. The reasons are explained in more detail in posterior sections.

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The main parts of a parachute are shown in the following figure,
Figure 71 - Parachute parameters
6.2.1 Aerodynamic study for the parachute

Hypothesis:
 A simplified study for a steady and incompressible flow is considered here. The
forces are time averaged.
 Cd·S is constant (parachute fully open or undeployed)
The forces acting in a parachute are due to its pressure distribution (p) perpendicular to
the body and the shear stress distribution ( ) tangent to the body at each point.
These forces are shown in the following picture,
Figure 72 - Aerodynamic forces on a

parachute

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In the last figure the distance between the point where the momentum M is applied and
the center of pressure (point where the total sum of the aerodynamic pressure field acts)
is .
The aerodynamic forces are,
And this yields to,
Some dimensionless parameters are used in order to simplify the calculations. In these
equations is the nominal diameter, namely, the diameter of a circle whose area is the
surface of the canopy including the veny and any other openings.
Dimensionless parameter Value

Resultant force coefficient
Moment coefficient
Fineness ratio
Mach number
Reynolds number
Mass ratio
Effective porosity
Froude number
Dimensionless time
Geometric porosity
Dynamic pressure
Lift coefficient
Drag coefficient
Normal force coefficient
Tangent force coefficient
Moment coefficient
Nominal area
Figure 73 – Dimensionless parameter

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6.2.2 Parachute options

Slotted parachutes have been used for recovery terrestrial manned mission up to now as
they provide a higher drag than the typical flat parachutes. The Ringslot, ringsail and
ribbon slotted parachutes will be analyzed them to determine which one is the most
indicated for the ATV re-entry vehicle. Another interesting parachute used in planetary re-
entry is the Disk-Gap-Band as seen in Figure 74, nonetheless it has been used in Mars
missions due to the different atmospheric characteristics existing there.
At first glance the Ringslot parachute provides a bit more drag than the Conical Ribbon one
for the same stability and force opening coefficient. The Ringsail design, on the other
hand, gives a higher drag than the Ringslot one and a shorter filling time but a slightly
reduced stability.
The Gore design for a Ringslot parachute is shown in Figure 76. The individual gore is
formed by a grid of horizontal and vertical ribbons. Radial ribbons are used to connect the
individual gores.
The ringslot parachute, developed as a low-cost supplement to the ribbon parachute, has
similar aerodynamic characteristics, but has a 10 to 14% higher drag.
The ringsail parachute, a modification of the ringslot parachute, has a quarter-spherical

cross section in the lower part, and a conical cross section in the upper part of the canopy.
was used as main descent parachute for the three manned spacecraft,Mercury, Gemini,
and Apollo. Both are shown in Figure 75 and 77.
Much more details about these parachute designs are presented in (Knacke, 1991).

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Figure 74 - Parachute systems used for planetary entry systems
Figure 75 - Gore design of a Ribbon parachute

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Figure 76 - Basic design of a ringslot parachute
Figure 77 - Main Ringsail design

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The drag coefficient and opening force coefficient of each system are presented in the
following figure:
Figure 78 - Main coefficients of each design
6.2.3 Parachute design

The final proposed design for the parachute based on all the study above is going to be
explained in this part.
6.2.3.1 Mass of the parachute system
The first important parameter to be determined in a preliminary design is the mass and
volume of the parachute assembly. A rough estimation of these values can be obtained
from previous missions. In the following table the percentage weight of a parachute
recovery system as function of the primary vehicle weight is presented for Mercury, Gemini
and Apollo missions. The relative weight of the parachute system decreases with an
increase in vehicle weight.
Vehicle Mercury Gemini Apollo

Vehicle weight [kg] 1270 2000 5900
Parachute assembly [%] 3.7 3.3 2.8
Parachute container structure [%] 4 3.8 3.2
Figure 79 - Comparison of parachute system weights for previous manned missions

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Representing these values in a graph it can be obtained that a roughly estimation of the
parachute assembly and parachute container structure for the 5000 kg ATV re-entry
vehicle would be a 6.4% of the vehicle weight. This represents 320 kg.
It can be inferred from (Knacke, 1991) that the parachute assembly weight (2.9% of the
total weight, namely 145 kg) is split as follows,
Relative weight Mass [kg]

Main parachute 1 101,398601
Main deployment bag 0,05 5,06993007
Pilot chute + deployment bag 0,03 3,04195804
Drogue assembly 0,35 35,4895105
Parachute assembly 145
Figure 80 - Weight subdivision for the parachute assembly
A trade-off is carried out to decide if the first parachutes should be deployed in a

supersonic or subsonic environment. The main consideration for each options are
presented in the following table,
Supersonic Subsonic
Main parachute better for
transonic stabilization Main parachute loads lower and
therefore a lighter parachute
Large bridle required Main parachute inflates subsonically.
for stability Better inflation
Figure 81 - Tradeoff Subsonic vs. Supersonic
So as to improve reliability (the major factor) in the design the subsonic option is the
chosen one. Therefore the rank of possible Mach values for the drogue parachute
deployment is reduced to 0.4-0.7. It is important to mention that a Mach near 1 could lead
to unpredictable behaviors due to transonic effects.
It is necessary to first establish the main parachute characteristics and then follow up with
the pilot and drogue parachutes analysis. For the main parachute the first step is to
determine the required decelerations. This leads to some restrictions in the dynamic
pressure and from this we can obtain the surface. As this surface is too big for just one
parachute we carry out a tradeoff to determine the number of parachutes in the cluster.
Finally we can calculate the weight and, if the assumptions are fulfill we can repeat the
same process for the pilot and drogue parachutes.

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6.2.3.2 Main parachute
A definition of the main parachute is obtained by performing analysis to establish:
 Parachute weight (rough estimation obtained from the section before)

 Parachute size
 Number of parachutes
 Deployment altitude and velocity
The high-weight item in any recovery system is selected from a high drag requirement.
Obtaining the lowest weights and volumes guides the selection of the material. The reefing
time and inflation time are out of the scope of this preliminary design.
6.2.3.3 Size and number of parachutes
An approximation given by (Ong, et al., 2006) for the surface of the main parachute as
function of its mass is,
Due to the large mass of the ATV re-entry capsule the last equation yields to a surface of
961 m2 for the main parachute. Such a surface implies a diameter of 35 meters which is
unaffordable. Therefore the main parachute will be formed by a cluster of various single
parachutes. In this case, due to the loss in drag caused by cluster interference parachute
clusters have 5 to 10% higher weight than a single parachute of equal drag area.
Considering a packing density allowable for damage free packing of 552.63 kg/m3, as
(Eilertson, 1969) uses, an approximation of the main parachute volume,
The analysis is done here for a cluster formed by two, three or four parachutes. The
results are shown in the following table,
Number of parachutes 2 3 4
Mass [kg] 53,2342657 35,4895105 26,6171329
Surface So [m2] 504,590197 336,393464 252,295098
Diameter Do [m] 25,3468774 20,6956387 17,9229489
Figure 82 - Number of parachutes in the cluster

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The selection of the number of parachutes depends on the interference they could provoke
among them, the volume they require or the increase in mass. Although a repartition of
the main parachute mass has been done equally in a cluster of two, three or four
parachutes it has to be taken into account that, in order to assure that the configuration
has no single failure points an independent deployment system for each parachute
consisting of deployment bag, pilot chute bridle, riser and pilot chute increases the mass
of the total parachute assembly. Moreover the complexity increases with the number of
parachutes in the cluster as non-uniform stretches and canopy inflations can appear as a
result of opening-force variations. Due to this fact the option of four parachutes is ruled
out.
Terminal ballistic coefficient

The terminal velocity of most parachute recovery systems is approximately 6 to 12 m/s.
Here a terminal velocity of 8.4 m/s has been selected (we are primarily concerned with
the velocity at the time of deployment of the last parachute). This allows keeping the size
of parachute systems reasonable and optimizing the weight of the landing system. In
addition to the terminal vertical velocity, the parachute and capsule move horizontally
depending on the wind speed. Without some type of mitigation for impact loads, capsules
with parachutes alone are likely to produce crew injuries on land landing.
As this preliminary design deals with an ocean landing a vertical velocity of 8.4 m/s should
be achieved during most of the trajectory until some meters above sea when retrorockets
would decelerate the vehicle. Assuming a density of ρ=1.227 kg/m3 the ballistic
coefficient,
The ballistic coefficient is defined as the ability of a body to overcome the resistance of a
fluid.
The terminal dynamic pressure,
The required drag area for a parachute considering N parachutes in the cluster is,
The total drag area is the combination of,

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Where P/L means payload and P each parachute system. In the case of the payload or
capsule,
Considering a cluster of two parachutes each one would have a drag area of 484 and, in
the case of three parachutes it will be 322.6 The contribution of the pilot chutes in the
drag area is considered as negligible here.
As mentioned before three main parachute designs are proposed providing the following
characteristics,
Design Dc/Do Dp/Do Cdo M
Ringslot 1 0,68 0,6 0,1-0,9

Ringsail 0,84 0,69 0,8 0,1-0.7
Ribbon 0,96 0,7 0,52 0,1-2
Figure 83 - Possible parachute designs
Do is the nominal or canopy diameter, Dc is the constructed or skirt diameter and Dp is the
projected diameter.
Although a high drag coefficient is important when selecting the main parachute, a better
evaluation criterion is the weight-efficiency ratio (CdS)o/Wp which shows how much
parachute drag area is produced per parachute weight. The deciding factor has to take
also into account the cost efficiency.
It is possible now to determine in a more accurate way the diameter of each parachute in
a 2 or 3 parachutes cluster configuration. In order to take into account the modification in
performance of a single parachute when operating in a cluster an efficiency factor that
depends on the number of parachutes is introduced in the equation (Mansfield, 1973).
Where N is the number of parachutes in the cluster and is the efficiency factor
introduced in the case of a cluster. These values are related as follows,
N 1 2 3 4
 1 0,94 0,9 0,89
Figure 84 - Efficiency factor in the case of a cluster

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This yields to these required parachute diameters,
N 1 2 3 4
Do [m] Do [m] Do [m] Do [m]
Ringslot 45,3220307 33,0544881 27,5821095 24,0206283
Ringsail 39,25003 28,6260264 23,8868076 20,8024743
Ribbon 48,6836705 35,5062159 29,6279384 25,8022938
Figure 85 - Diameter in the case of a cluster
Main Parachute diameter

50
45 Ringslot
40 Ringsail
Do: parachute diameter [m]
35 Ribbon
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1 2 3 4
N: number of parachutes in the cluster
Figure 86 - Parachute diameter as a function of the number of parachutes in the cluster
Although the cost of manufacturing is higher in the case of a Ringsail parachute, it has the
highest nominal draft coefficient. Moreover, as it can be seen in the last figure, it presents
the lowest diameter and therefore the lowest mass. Considering the weight of each
performance characteristic the Ringsail is the chosen design for the main parachute.
Regarding the number of parachutes in the cluster three parachutes are chosen as the
optimal solution mainly. This selection is based on the fact that a two-parachutes
configuration is riskier as if one of them fails the mission success cannot be assured and it
permits reducing the size for each parachute.
(Doherr, 2002) considers a suspension-line ratio of 1.2 as a general rule. Thus, the selected
length of suspension lines:

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Design Dc/Do Do [m] Dc [m] lc [m]

Ringsail 0,84 23,88 20,06 24,07
Figure 87 - Length of suspension lines
Each parachute needs its own extraction and deployment system to avoid interference
during deployment and inflation. A fast-opening extraction parachute is used on each main
parachute. To force the ejection of these pilot chutes a mortar system is used. The
extraction or pilot chutes deploy the three main parachutes at different angles to avoid
interference.
Taking the maximum deployment pressure used for the ringsail main parachutes employed
in the Apollo mission an estimation of the opening load can be done.
This implies that the maximum dynamic pressure in the main parachute deployment is,
roughly,
Taking a nominal value of 300 kg/m2 for the deployment pressure used,
6.2.3.4 Pilot parachute
The pilot parachute is a small parachute used to provide the required force to deploy the
main parachute. Opening quickly, Pilot chutes must be stable and must have sufficient
drag to pull the main parachute pack away from the payload and extract the main
parachute.

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Size of the pilot parachutes

According to (Knacke, 1991) the ratio of the drag area of the pilot parachute to the drag
area of the main parachute for a deployment velocity in the 0.2-0.35 M range is between
0.02 and 0.03. Taking 0.025 as the ratio value,
Each body produces a wake that affects the parachute, depending on the relationship
between the inflated parachute diameter and the body diameter. As consequence there is
a drag loss as shown in 10.
(Eilertson, 1969) hints that the pilot chute should be ejected to a distance at least four
times and ideally six times the diameter of the vehicle. Using the ideal value this distance
would be 27 meters. This implies,
As it can be seen in Figure 88, the ringsail parachute is used only as a main parachute and
not as an extraction one. Therefore the selection is done between the ribbon and ringslot
parachutes. Both provide the same stability and force opening coefficient so the Ringslot is
selected as it has a higher drag coefficient.
The effect of the suspension lines length in the drag coefficient is shown in Figure 89.
Selecting a Le/Do ratio of 1.8 increases the drag coefficient by 10%.
At the end, considering a ringslot parachute with CD=0.6,
The canopy surface area is,

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Therefore the nominal parachute diameter is 4.35 m.
Figure 88 - Drag loss cause by forebody wake Figure 89 - Drag coefficient variation with suspension line ratio
(Knacke, 1991)
Using the same approximation as in the previous section and considering a diameter of
4.35 m for the pilot parachute, its mass is roughly 1.6 kg. The total weight of the pilot
parachute assembly including riser and deployment bag could be estimated as 1.5·1.6 kg =
2.4 kg. Including the three pilot chutes used during the re-entry this adds up to 7.22 kg.
6.2.4 Drogue parachute

The following requirements are established for the drogue parachute:
 It must have reliable operation in the velocity range from 0.4 to 1 Mach
 Stability must be better than ± 3 degrees
 The drogue chute must be able to decelerate the capsule to the permissible
opening speed of the pilot and main parachute
 Minimum weight and volume is mandatory

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First stage drogue parachutes require a high level of stability. This requirement tends to
rule out many high drag parachute designs. The following candidates can be obtained in
(Knacke, 1991) for a subsonic deployment,
Type of parachute Stability Subsonic drag coefficient

Guide surface 0 to ± 2º 0.3 to 0.4
Annual < ± 6º 0.85 to 0.95
Cross 0 to ±3º 0.6 to 0.85
Ribbon conical 0 to ± 3º 0.55
Ribbon hemisflo 0 to ± 2º 0.45
Ringslot 0 to ± 5º 0.65
Rotafoil 0 to ± 7º 0.85 to 0.99
Figure 90 - Possible designs for the drogue parachute
From the last table the rotafoil, ringslot and annual designs are ruled out because of the
stability requirement. The drag coefficient of the guide surface and ribbon hemisflo
parachutes is too small and the cross parachute does not offer the possibility of varying the
drag through reefing. Therefore the ribbon conical seems to be the proper solution.
Moreover there is a large experience for this kind of parachutes in manned missions.
In order to determine a trajectory compatible with

requirements a drag staging is obtained by using a
combination of multiple parachutes and a reefing
technique. The reefing refers to a process by which the
canopy is restricted from taking its full open shape and
used to tailor the drag profile and hence load history
produced by the parachute. This process is explained in
the figure besides.
The drogue parachute design has to consider that the

payload should be recoverable from any conceivable flight
condition. This high-speed deceleration parachute will be
deployed and operated when the capsule is moving at
maximum speed.
Figure 91 - Stages of parachute inflation

(Mansfield, 1973)

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6.2.5 Deployment altitude, Mach and dynamic pressure: Nominal

case
First the nominal trajectory for the ATV without any parachute system is shown in the next
plots,
Figure 92 - Recovery envelope
Figure 93 -Mach and dynamic pressure

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Figure 94 - Mach and dynamic pressure for the rank of interest
Figure 95 - Mach and altitude for the rank of interest
From previous studies the pilot parachute should be deployed in a Mach range between 0.4
and 1.4. Nonetheless, as a subsonic behavior is desired the range is diminished towards 0.4
to 0.7 M (transonic effects appear from 0.7 to 1.2 Mach). Taking into account the flight
profile shown in the last figures it would imply an altitude between 10.6 and 17.4 km and a
dynamic pressure between 2700 and 2840 kg/m/s2.

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6.2.6 Deployment altitude, Mach and dynamic pressure:

Emergency case
For the emergency case the profiles obtained are,
Figure 96 - Recovery envelope in the emergency case
Figure 97 - Mach and dynamic pressure profile in the emergency case

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Figure 98 – Mach and dynamic pressure profile in the rank of interest
Figure 99 - Mach and altitude profile in the emergency case
Considering the same premises as for the nominal case in an emergency case the required
altitude would rank between 9.7 and 15.8 km and the dynamic pressure would be covered
between 3120 and 3660 kg/m/s2.
As it can be seen the thermal requirements (i.e. dynamic pressure) are more demanding in
the emergency case. The same parachute assembly should be capable of performing the
nominal and the emergency case. This entails that the deployment of the pilot chutes‘s
altitude should be in the rank between 10.6 and 15.8 km. Applying a margin of 20% to take
into account possible differences between the real and the theoretical profile the
definitive interval of altitudes is: 11.6 – 14.7 km.
The materials should provide the capability to withstand 3570 kg/m/s2.

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6.2.6.1 Required Drogue chute diameter
The size of the fully open drogue chute is determined by the requirement that it must
decelerate the 5000 kg capsule to the allowable opening speed of the main parachute.
A preliminary calculation showed that the deployment pressure of the main parachutes
used is,
Therefore the required drogue chute drag area (Knacke, 1991),
Using two drogue parachutes of 14 m2 each one (accounting for the losses of drag area in a
cluster) the diameter of each drogue parachute is approximately 4.1 m.
6.2.7 Parachute system summary

The following table shows the main parameters obtained in last sections,
Main parachute Pilot parachute Drogue parachute
Number 3 3 2
Type Ringsail Ringslot Ribbon conical
Surface [m2] 322.6 15 14
Diameter [m] 23.8 4.35 4.1
Figure 100 - Main parameters of the parachute system

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6.3 Secondary landing system

One of the main requirements for this mission is that the vehicle shall be capable of
landing on the sea. Accelerations for water impact are much lower than the required in
the case of land impact because the stopping distance is longer. Moreover in contrast to
water, which has consistent mechanical properties, the properties of soil are highly
variable (moisture, size of soil particles and void between grains), especially for dynamic
impacts. An incredible amount of testing would be required to determine the accelerations
and the percent of dissipated and recoverable elastic energy appearing in each type of
landing.
In order to achieve an impact of roughly 1 m/s the velocity of the manned vehicle must be
reduced enormously and this deceleration is accomplished using a combination of several
different technologies, which include parachutes, airbags and retrorockets. The option of
an airbag system is examined here because it provides the capability of reuse some parts
of the reentry capsule and to float on the sea. Although the anti-bottoming airbag is
heavier than retrorocket landing systems, airbag systems can prevent the structure from
contacting the impact surface (sea), provide the capability of reuse some parts of the
reentry capsule reducing the impact loads and float on the sea.
The option of a mid-air retrieval, where the vehicle is slowed by means of parachutes, and
then a specially-equipped aircraft matches the vehicle's trajectory and catches it in mid-
air is unaffordable due to the risk it involves as it requires correct operation of the
retrieving aircraft, favorable atmospheric conditions and successful execution. Due to the
large mass of the vehicle and the need for multiple recovery aircraft (and human aviators)
this method is considered as impractical.
The study conducted here tries to find a concept to attenuate impact loads transmitted to
the crew to non-injurious levels. In this way human tolerance to impact is discussed in the
next section.
6.3.1 Human tolerance to impact

Crew in ejection seats experience an acceleration of 20g‘s for 0.1 second. From
operational experience and human tolerance studies, it is known that any sustained
acceleration of 20g‘s or more along the spine can produce serious injuries including
cracked vertebra (Shayler, 2009).

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The maximum allowable acceleration on the seat and occupant in an impact are measured
in local X, Y and Z directions as shown here,
Figure 101 - Body-axis system
The limits used by the constellation program for Orion nominal landings are shown in the
next table and are used here as a reference for a low risk.
Dynamic
X Y Z
response
Very low risk -22.4 31 -11.8 11.8 -11 13.1
Figure 102 - Orion dynamic response limits (Fasanella, 2008)
6.3.2 Airbag landing system

The use of large external airbags would reduce landing loads and protect the capsule from
damage providing reusability. Internal airbags are deployed in milliseconds and typically
use a hot gas generator system for deployment.
This system has been tested several times in the F-111 fighter (with the same vertical
impact velocity as a reentry capsule) using a neoprene-coated nylon cloth airbag and
compressed air tanks. Unfortunately the design was not satisfactory as it appeared
undesirable accelerations and produced excessive rebound velocity. The use of ejection
seats seemed to provide a fewer spinal injury rate than this method.

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6.3.3 Retrorocket landing system

The ATV reentry vehicle could experience several different conditions before landing
depending on weather conditions and a range in vertical and horizontal velocities.
Moreover, even with a failure in one of the parachutes the vertical velocity should permit
touching down at an attitude such that the astronauts would not be injured.
Retrorockets have been chosen for the ATV reentry vehicle due to the following
characteristics,
 Weight efficient and highly reliable

 Previous experience in manned missions: mainly Soyuz
 Provide precision: The pitch and yaw angles when landing should be small
enough to keep the capsule from rolling over
 It would enable reusability of the capsule, if practical
 Used in both vertical and horizontal directions can avoid the effect of the
wind speed
 It could be modified for a posterior version that contemplates a landing on
soil option
In order to determine the number, direction and thrust they must provide the following
study is conducted:
Retrorockets design
 Touchdown velocity and position
For a nominal landing the touchdown velocity has been determined to be 1 m/s. This
selection has been done from previous studies in manned missions (Soyuz and Orion
especially).
The ideal position of the thruster is mounted in the base. A thruster above the capsule
could entail some problems related to the entanglement during parachute deployment.
Two options were possible: the first one was to design blowout ports in the heatshield to
expose the rockets or to release it. The second option that consisted on jettisoning the
heat shield seemed to be far simpler as blowout ports would entail a high risk due to the
lack of heritage and the possible added difficulty of having two different thermal
protection materials on the heatshield.
 Thrust profile
The thrust profile is determined taking into account that it should be low enough so that
the deceleration does not exceed the acceptable amount from the injury charts.
Furthermore the thrust vectors should pass through the center of mass of the capsule so as
to avoid any extra angular moment. Adding this requirement to the fact that the vertical
rockets need a cant angle (supposed here to be 30º considering the dimensions of the
actual capsule) to avoid plume impingement with the curved back part of the capsule and
that this implies a loss of thrust in the vertical direction their position is fixed. Needless to
say the vertical thrusters have to be located in a symmetrical way so as to avoid a global

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horizontal acceleration due to the horizontal components these vertical retrorockets

create.
In a nominal behavior the vehicle will be decelerated by the retrorockets from 8.4 m/s to
1 m/s. One option considered was to fire a different number of thrusters depending on the
parachute terminal velocity and, in this way, lower the sink velocity to the optimal value.
Nonetheless to increase simplicity the same thrust level will be use for all landing cases
and to avoid the thrusters firing after the spacecraft touched down they are designed
considering the minimum terminal velocity (8.4 m/s).
The burning time is determined after a trade-off between the performance (required
propellant) and risk (required burn rate). A burn time between 0.4 and 1.3 seconds is
considered.
Considering that the heatshield mass represent a 15 percent of the capsule mass the
landing mass is approximately 4250 kg. An extra mass of 100 kg is considered to take into
account possible uncertainties.
Vertical Thrust provided by

Burn time Required ΔV Deceleration
thrust the thrusters
[s] [m/s] [m/s^2]
[N] [N]
0,4 -7.4 28,3 123105 142149,4
0,5 -7.4 24,6 107010 123564,5
0,6 -7.4 22,1 96280 111174,6
0,7 -7.4 20,4 88616 102324,6
0,8 -7.4 19,1 82868 95687,1
0,9 -7.4 18,0 78397 90524,7
1 -7.4 17,2 74820 86394,7
1,1 -7.4 16,5 71894 83015,6
1,2 -7.4 16,0 69455 80199,7
1,3 -7.4 15,5 67392 77817,0
Figure 103 - Burn time analysis
A burn time of 0.8 seconds is chosen as a compromise. Therefore the total thrust the
thrusters must provide is 95687 N (23921 N each one).

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 Number and type thrusters
Solid propellant thrusters instead of liquid propellant ones have been chosen due to the
reduction in mass. An altimeter is needed to determine the precise moment to fire the
thrusters and in order to elude misbehavior, the altimeter starts working after the
heatshield release.
Another trade off has been done to decide the number of thrusters needed. Increasing the
number of them entails a greater complexity but, in the case of a fail in one of them a
smaller amount of thrust is lost. The mass constraint and aim to simplicity in the design
yield to chose the smallest possible number of thrusters taking into account that a thruster
should not provide more than 40 kN due to their size.
This conditions lead to four 24 kN vertical thrusters. Three rockets giving the same thrust
would create a global horizontal component and a design consisting of two thrusters would
not be adequate considering a possible failure in one of them.
On the other hand the rank of velocities that the horizontal thrusters have to withstand is
more demanding as they have to face up and unknown wind speed of up to 20 m/s (see
landing system requirements). Therefore they are in need of a control system that orients
the vehicle to align the horizontal retrorockets towards the detected horizontal velocity.
Instead of designing horizontal thrusters providing a variable thrust, four different rockets,
two located at each side of the capsule will be used. In this way each horizontal rocket in
each side will be sized to take out a certain amount of horizontal velocity. Considering a
different level of thrust for each one of them three different levels of thrust can be
obtained: the highest level of thrust using both rockets, and two lower levels of thrust
using one thruster or the other.
In order to avoid additional attitude rates or uncertainties the same burn time (0.8 s) is
adopted for the horizontal thrusters and the vertical ones. The horizontal retrorockets will
be designed to decelerate the vehicle 10 m/s or 5 m/s. If the wind speed is approximately
20 m/s both of these thrusters will be used in order to achieve a horizontal velocity at
landing of 5 m/s. The total horizontal thrust will be 81.5 kN.
The retrorockets will be fired at a height between 1 and 2 meters measured by a precise
altimeter.
It is important to orient the capsule on impact to assure that the capsule slide instead of
‗dig‘ into the sea. In other words the capsule should have a large pitch with respect to the
+Z axis to provide a softer impact.

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6.3.4 Airbag / spare tire design

The proposed design includes an airbag landing system that attenuates the vehicle‘s
impact with the sea following a controlled parachute descent after atmospheric reentry.
Just before the splashdown these airbags will deploy cushioning the impact on the sea and
providing flotation for the capsule.
Studies for different cases (combinations of vertical velocity, horizontal velocity, pitch and
sea state) should be carried out. The use of these airbags should avoid a roll-over of the
capsule during landing, lower overall landing loads and increase stability.
Moreover the main airbag inflation pressures could be adjusted to obtain the required
conditions.
6.3.5 Additional systems

An additional support will be obtained thanks to a stroking (spring-loaded suspension) seat
for each astronaut that will absorb a part of the impact energy. For additional protection
crushable foams or honeycombs will be used whenever possible to reduce the acceleration
to the occupants.

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7 STRUCTURES
7.1 Capsule Shape definition

Previously through a trade off analysis the shape of the capsule was chosen to be a blunted
cone. In this section, the characteristics of the capsule shaped would be defined in more
details.
7.1.1 Benchmarking analysis

During the selection process, the shape was defined to be a blunted cone. However, there
are several parameters which define the cone, as for example angles or radius that are still
not fixed. To do it, some historical data will be used, because this shape is the most used
for reentry manned vehicles.
In order to select the best option, the lift to drag ratio, which is extremely depending on
the shape, will be used to evaluate the different capsules.
The capsule uses the lift to control its reentry trajectory. This control allows to reduce g-
forces for the crew and structure, as well as to reduce the peak heat and heat loads
transferred into the capsule.
Capsule L/D with AoA 20o

Mercury 0.16
Gemini 0.16
Apollo 0.35
Soyuz 0.25-0.3
Shezou 0.3
Figure 104 - L/D with an AoA of 20° for different capsules
From the values above, the shape that has the best lift to drag ratio, is the one from the
Apollo program. So the selected shape will be a blunted cone with Apollo‘s shape.
7.1.2 Atmospheric Re-entry Demonstrator (ARD)

The Apollo capsule is the best shape for the reentry vehicle; however its technology is old,
so it is necessary to actualize it. For that reason, the European Space Agency worked on
the Atmospheric Reentry Demonstrator (ARD), an experiment to prove that European
technology is able to successfully carry out an Earth reentry.
The ARD was an 80 percent scale model of the Apollo Command Module, and a technology
test for a possible International Space Station Crew Rescue Vehicle.

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The equipment included is the following:
 TDRS satellite communications system

 GPS navigation system
 DASA 40 kgf hydrazine attitude control thrusters
 2.8 m diameter heat shield
 three 23 meter diameter parachutes
 SARSAT recovery beacon
Figure 105 - ARD
The ARD separated from the Ariane EPS upper stage at 12 minutes 2 seconds after launch.
ARD and the EPC stage maneuvered into a 1 km x 830 km orbit, guaranteeing re-entry at
the end of the first orbit. The spacecraft splashed down in the Pacific at 3.69 degrees N,
153.35 degrees W, and was successfully recovered by the French Navy.
7.1.3 Shape selection

From the previous chapters two main reasons are used to define the final shape for the
vehicle these are:
 Use Apollo shape, due to its high lift drag ration

 Use as far as possible the ARD‘s shape, structure and materials. First because it is
European technology, and second because it is a proven technology.
So the final shape will be a blunted cone Apollo‘s and ARD shape capsule.

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7.2 Vehicle configuration

Now that a baseline for the capsule shape is defined the next step would be to come up
with the actual configuration of the capsule and its dimensioning, which will be introduced
here.
7.2.1 Vehicle-ATV integration

The ATV is divided in two modules:
 Service module: This section which includes propulsion systems, electrical power,
computers, communications and most of the avionics.
 Cargo module: It represents the 60% of the total ATV volume, and it is dedicated to
carry the entire re-supply payload to the ISS.
Service Module Cargo Module
Figure 106 – Modules of the ATV
The ATV modifications consists in suppressing the cargo module and adding in its place the
capsule with the cargo module‘s docking system and hatch at the top of the capsule. In
this way, the propulsion systems, electrical power, computers and communications can be
reused from the actual ATV.
Moreover, it will be necessary to create and interface which connect the service module
with the capsule. The following picture shows a representation of the new vehicle.

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Figure 107 - ESA representation of the CTV
Finally, in order to do the trip more comfortable to the astronauts, two 30 cm diameter
circular windows will be added on the laterals of the vehicle.
To see more detailed data about the dimensions, cf. ATV-modification plans in Appendix 2.
7.2.2 Vehicle’s definition constrains

In order to define the capsule‘s dimensions, it is necessary to take into account several
constrains:
 The launcher vehicle that will be used is the Ariane V ES-ATV. In this case, the
maximum fairing available diameter is 4570 mm, so the maximum capsule diameter
must be equal or inferior to this value.
 The maximum length available in the fairing is 10039 mm. Although the maximum
length is 15589 mm, the extra 5550 mm will not be considered, because the
diametric section is decreasing due to the conic shape of the fairing.
 The hatch of the capsule and the docking system must be compliant with the
Russian docking system dimensions. This is because the vehicle is supposed to dock
at the same place where ATV. As the ATV docks at the Russian module Zvezda, the
Russian docking system must be used as well.
 In order to create a spacious and comfortable vehicle, the considered habitable

volume has to be equal or higher than 6.5 m3. As the vehicle is supposed to do a
reach the moon, the Apollo mission is used to find a preliminary value. However,
the considered one is bigger than the Apollo capsule. As a reference, the following
table shows the different habitable volumes for a several 3 crew members‘ capsules

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Capsule Habitable volume

Soyuz 3.50
Shenzou 6.00
Apollo 6.17
ATV 6.50
Figure 108 - Habitable volume for different capsules
 As the shape is derived from the ARD, the capsule length ratios have to be
proportional to the ARD ones. This means, that the angles and the ratio between
lengths will be kept as far as they do not clash with the previous constrains.
7.2.3 Vehicle’s plans

The pictures which follow were done by ourself on CATIA.
Figure 109 - Global view of the design of our project

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Figure 110 - View of the capsule
There are also the plans enclose in the appendix.

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7.3 Structure Materials

In this section the structure materials and wall thickness will be defined. As the thermal
protection systems are an extensive section, it was decided to explain it in another
chapter, so only the structure materials and wall thickness (without TPS) will be defined.
Several parameters are used to define the materials selections; these are the most
important ones:
 They should resist the loads during all the flight phases, the most restrictive one is
during the reentry and landing.
 The materials and thickness have to protect the astronauts from the space
radiations
The materials and thickness must isolate the crew cabin from the space extreme
temperatures.
As a first approximation, as the reentry has to be considered, the wall thickness will be
increased in order to resist the loads during the landing and reentry. The values used for
the walls will similar to the ones for the Apollo mission this is:
 3.81 cm for the base cone

 Between them they will decrease linearly
 0.63 cm for the upper part, where the hatch is localized
Considering that the ATV cargo module worked properly during the last mission. The
selected materials will be the same as the ATV.
 Pressurized shell: Al-2219
 Micrometeoroid and Debris protection system:
o Primary bumper: Al-6061-T6
o Secondary bumper: Nextel/Kevlar blankets
 Internal structure: AL-6061-T6
 Thermal insulation: Goldised Kapton Multi-layer Insulation blanked & aluminized
beta cloth
7.4 Vehicle dimensions

The following table gives a summary of all the data for the reentry capsule:
Shape Blunted cone, 33º
Total length 3.61 m
Base area 16.56 m2
Internal volume 7.23m3
Walls thickness (without TPS) 0.63-3.81 cm
Materials Aluminum alloys with composites
Dry mass 1740 kg
Figure 111 - Re-entry capsule data

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8 THERMAL ANALYSIS
8.1 Thermal Protection System

8.1.1 Main description
Its function is to achieve a successful reentry in the Earth atmosphere. To achieve this, it
is necessary to isolate the vehicle from the high temperatures that surround it during the
reentry phase.
This system is only used during the reentry phase; however it is a critical subsystem for the
vehicle. Hence, the protection has to isolate always, because if it fails, a recovery is not
possible.
So, to choose the best Thermal Protection System (TPS) two parameters need to be
considered:
 Peak heat flux (maximum energy received): The maximum convective heat flux at
the stagnation point. It depends on trajectory. The stagnation point is where the
velocity to the surface adiabatically comes to zero. Its location depends on angle of
attack and deviation behind the shock.
 Heat loads (quantity of heat): It is the convective heat flux integrated over flight
time. Normally the highest heat load is at the stagnation point. The heat loads vary
over the vehicle surface.
Finally, a non reusable vehicle is defined in the main specifications. So the Thermal
Protection will only be used once.
8.1.2 Types of thermal protection systems

Currently, there are several methods to isolate a vehicle from the high temperatures
during a reentry phase. The most used, so the most well-know and more reliable, are the
followings.
Radiative systems
The radiative systems are a passive simple and reliable thermal protection. In order to
minimize the mass, they are made by materials with low energy absorption. The surface
balance temperature is given by the equilibrium between the radiated heat and the heat
received due to the reentry.
The radiative heat shield is limited to the maximum temperature limit, whereas other
systems are limited to a total heat input.

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Once the maximum operating temperature is defined, the maximum heat flux can be
defined and the system can operate indefinitely at this condition. The only penalty
associated to increasing the operating time is that more insulation is required between the
shield and the inner structure. Because they are nearly independent of total heat input,
radiative materials are more appropriate for the long duration trajectories, characteristic
of lifting bodies entry vehicles, than for the shorter ballistic flights.
Examples of radiative systems are cobalt, nickel and chromium based super alloys, which
its maximum temperature is 1600K. Refractory ceramics are used as well; they offer some
improvements for the maximum temperature limits, which is 2500K approximately.
In spite of the ceramics improvements, radiative systems operating temperature is about

1400K due to oxidation limitation. They are mostly used for cool surfaces on lifting entry
bodies, or on low performance ballistic flights.
Heat sink systems

These are the simplest type of absorptive thermal protection system. The heat sink
absorbs aerodynamic heat without melting, vaporization or chemical reaction. The
temperature limits of most of the practical heat sinks are too low to permit emission of
significant amounts of thermal radiation.
They are highly reliable, simple and well-know technology. However, the earlier version of
this technique required a considerable quantity of metal, this means high mass. Nowadays,
Radiatively Cooled TPS are still used but reinforced by a Carbon-Carbon structure, leading
to a low density material. They are called RCC.
Recently, newer radiatively cooled TPS materials have been developed that could be
superior to RCC. Referred to by their prototype vehicle "SHARP" (Slender Hypervelocity
Aerothermodynamic Research Probe), these TPS materials have been based upon
substances such as zirconium diboride and hafnium diboride. SHARP TPS have suggested
performance improvements. Nevertheless, they are still underdevelopment.
Transpiration and film cooling systems

Thermal protection systems in which liquid or gaseous material is injected into the
boundary layer are classified as transpiration and film cooling systems. The mass is
injected through a series of discrete slots. The injectant may or may not be chemically
inert in the presence of the boundary layer gases. The surface heat transfer is reduction in
proportion to the mass injection rate by cooling and thickening the boundary layer in such
a way that the velocity and temperature gradients adjacent to the wall are greatly
diminished. However, injection into a laminar boundary layer may destabilize the flow and
cause a premature transition to turbulent state, with an associated increase in heating
rates.

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For a given mass transfer rate, the heat flux reduction is inversely proportional to the
molecular weight of the injected gas. Therefore, for cases in which chemical reactions can
be neglected hydrogen appears to be the most efficient injecting. Liquid injectants are
also interesting due to the latent heat of vaporization, the most promising ones is water.
Ammonia and lithium hybrid can be considered too. However, there are design problems
because of the large volume change that accompanies vaporization of the liquid inside the
porous. There are also problems with blockage of the surface porous by solid contaminants
in the liquid. Gaseous coolants tend to solve this difficulties, however the large volume
pressurized storage containers is an important drawback.
These systems are considered for an extremely high heating rate where shape changes
cannot be tolerated. They can be useful where low vehicle observables or low signal
attenuation is required.
Ablative shields
The ablative heat shields are the ones that best protect against high heat fluxes. However,
they are non reusable, so they can be only used once. The process to reduce the heat flux
on the outer wall is called blockage. Ablation causes the TPS layer to char, melt, and
sublime through the process of pyrolysis. The gas produced by pyrolysis is what drives
blowing and causes blockage of convective and catalytic heat flux. Ablation can also
provide blockage against radiative heat flux by introducing carbon into the shock layer,
thus making it optically opaque. Each ablative shield has to be chosen in function of the
peak heat flux and the heat loads. If the heat flux is higher than the designed one, the
system and the entire mission will fail. Nevertheless, if the heat flux is lower than the
predicted, the pyrolysis will not occur and then the TPS conductivity could allow the heat
flux conduction inside the vehicle, thus leading to TPS to fail.
 Subliming and Oxidizing Ablators
The subliming ablators, typified by Teflon, decompose directly from solid to the
gaseous state; that is, the material is sublimed. The energy is absorbed in the
phase-change process and the heat flux is reduced by the transpiration effect on
the evolving gases.
Teflon is one of the most used materials for this kind of shields. Teflon is a low to
moderate temperature ablator with moderate efficiency, with a well
characteristic thermal performance. Because of its high ablation rates, a Teflon
heat shield may change its shape considerably in long duration heat pulses.
Graphite thermal protection systems have been studied as well. Graphite, which
sublimates at temperatures as high as 4000K, absorbs or rejects the received
heating thorough mechanisms of oxidation, latent heat sublimation and surface
radiation. Graphite has a relatively low ablation rate, so because of this graphite
offers the minimum amount of ablation and shape change in areas subject to high
heating rates, such as small radius nose.

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In addition, pyrolytic graphite is an excellent insulator because of the way it is

formed. It is deposited in layers and is therefore anisotropic. Its thermal
conductivity in the direction normal to the deposition plane is almost two orders
of magnitude lower than in the plane of deposited layers. This means, that the
heat received by inners structure is decreased.
The principal disadvantages of graphite as a thermal protection system are its

brittleness and low resistance to thermal stress, which restrict its maximum
usable thickness. Moreover, pyrolytic graphite is also difficult and expensive to
manufacture, particularly in shapes with small radii in relation to their thickness.
 Melting vaporizing ablators
The glassy, or melting, ablator is represented by materials as quartz, pyrex and

fused silica. These materials melt at high heating rates and low surface shear
stresses, absorbing the latent heat to vaporize and providing transpiration.
However, when the surface shear is moderately high, or when there is a large
pressure gradient, the liquid layer may be removed before it vaporizes, decreasing
the ablative effectiveness.
Their principal disadvantage is their brittleness, although their thermal stress

resistance is high. The high surface temperatures attained during the ablation
(around 3000K) do not always result in a high radiant cooling because of the
material‘s low emissivity. Also, since the glassy materials are transparent, self
heating by radiation to the interior can be high. Both of these difficulties can be
decreased with the use of additives in the base material to increase both
emissivity and opacity.
These materials are usually used in specialized applications requiring high

temperature optical or dielectric properties, as windows or antennas.
 Charring ablators
This thermal protection system can be made of a homogeneous thermosetting

resin, such as the phenolics, epoxies or silicones; of the same resin with an
organic powder, such as nylon; or of a refractory fiber, such as glass or graphite.
Ablative effectiveness is usually proportional to the material density, while the

insulation is inversely proportional to the density. It is therefore useful to reduce
the density and thermal conductivity of most ablative materials by adding
microballons (tiny hollow spheres approximately 40 microns in diameter) made of
phenolic resin or glass with a wall thickness of 1 to 2 microns. The additives can
be so graded that the density varies uniformly through the material and the
weight is reduced with a minimal effect on the ablation performance. Some loss of
char strength can appear due to the use of microballons.

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 Thermosetting resins
When an organic resin is heated, the temperature increases until the surface
reaches a temperature at which the material begins to decompose (pyrolyze) and
release gaseous products, leaving a porous carbon residue. The pyrolysis
temperature is a function of the local pressure and ablation rate, and is relatively
low, from 500K to 800K. As the heating continues, the pyrolysis zone proceeds into
the material and the decomposition occurs below the surface. The gaseous
products diffuse through the porous charm to the surface, absorbing energy from
the char. They finally exit into the boundary layer, where they act as a
transpirant, and may chemical react with the boundary layer‘s gas.
The char is primarily carbonaceous and continues to absorb heat until it reaches
the temperature at which it oxidizes or sublimes, or until it is mechanically
removed. A thick char provides an insulation barrier, radiates a large amount of
heat form the surface and is a quite effective ablator. However, the char formed
is usually weak and brittle. Thus the material is susceptible to rapid removal due
to mechanical shear. Hence, the insulation effectiveness is reduced, and the
cooler internal material is exposed to the surface.
To improve the char retention characteristics of the ablative resins, reinforcing
fibers are usually added to the material. The fibers add strength to the char until
they reach their own melting or decomposition temperature. However, the use of
fibers increases the complexity of the material.
In addition, because the fibers possess a higher thermal conductivity than the
resin, fibers that are normal to the surface will increase the overall conductivity
of the composite. When the fibers are placed parallel to the surface, the
conductivity approaches that of the resin, but the char‘s shear strength is reduced
and the material is subject to delamination. Since any variation between these
extremes is possible, the fiber orientation can be selected on the basis of the
particular shear stress and heat conduction requirements.
 Elastomeric materials
For some application, silicone elastomeric ablators have several advantages over
other charring materials. They form a siliceous char layer that is inert and does
not recede at temperatures below approximately 1950K. This result in an
extremely high ablative effectiveness for long-duration and low heat flux
environment, characteristic of lifting entry bodies.
Elastomeric materials are frequently fabricated in a fiberglass honeycomb matrix
to reinforce the char. At surface temperatures above 1950K, surface recession
begins, caused by melting, oxidation, and/or internal reactions. At higher heating
rates, so higher temperatures, elastomers usually provide less efficient thermal
protection than that obtainable from other low density ablators. Many additives
are being used in order to improve the insulative and ablative efficiency of the
silicone base materials.

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 Thermal soak
Thermal Soak is the necessary complement for the ablative shields. Once the
outer wall temperature of the TPS drops below the minimum value to realize the
pyrolysis, the ablative shield losses most of its effectiveness. So in this case, it is
necessary to add a thermal soak to avoid the thermal conduction from the
external wall to the inner one.
The Thermal Soak is designed to resist heat loads, instead of peak heat fluxes.
8.2 Benchmarking analysis

We will now analyze the various types of ablative TPS used in previous space missions in
order to do satisfactory trade-offs. The table below gives the benchmarking of different
TPS used on missions involving atmospheric entry to a variety of planets in Solar system;
however the main concern of our analysis will be the ones used for re-entry on Earth and in
accordance with previously made trade-offs for vehicle shape (capsule). The benchmarking
missions of interest to the goal of our project and design are therefore the Apollo missions
and Atmospheric Reentry Demonstrator. The former used always a capsule of same
dimensions and mass, but with different entry angles and velocities which resulted in
different lift to drag ratios and therefore different heat loads during re-entry. The latter
is the most relevant benchmark for our study, due to the fact that it was specifically
designed to test reentry equipment on the trajectories from the Earth orbits, whereas all
of Apollo capsules were designed with trans-lunar entry velocities in mind, that are
naturally, quite superior from what our mission has to deal with. We are therefore most
likely to use low ablative Silia fibers with phenolic resin, and expected mass-fraction for
the TPS around 20-25%, but the final estimate of the heat load and the material to be used
must be reassessed once the data from trajectory analysis is incorporated, namely entry
angle and velocity.
The table presenting the comparison is given in Appendix 3.

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8.3 TPS selection

8.3.1 TPS technology
The ablative TPS can be classified in several categories: low ablative TPS based on high
density systems with a low recession rates, partially ablative system and a totally ablative
system, like SLA-561V, used on Apollo missions. Furthermore, the ablative systems can be
ejectable and non-ejectable in the atmosphere upon completion of their main objective.
Our choice has fallen on an ejectable ablative system. We have selected a resin-
impregnated silica material that was flight-proven during the ARD testing flight in 1998 and
demonstrated high performance characteristics, whose shape and properties shall be
examined shortly.
8.3.2 TPS shape definition

Considering our choice of an ARD-type capsule, we decided to use ARD‘s TPS technologies
that exceeded expectations during ARD testing flight. ARD had a twofold TPS consisting on
one side (main thermal shield) of material called Aleastrasil and, on the other side, of
Norcoat-Liege compound for the rear-cone. Their mutual disposition was as given on the
figure below:
Figure 112 - TPS on the ARD
The main difference compared to the ARD design is the use of ejecteable Aleastrasil layer
of our TPS in order to accommodate the retro-rockets needed to slow-down the capsule
prior to landing impact. We realize this by incorporating a thin pyrotechnic layer between
the structure and Aleastrasil TPS that will blow off the remaining Aleastrasil structure once
the important heating phase of the re-entry is over.

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8.3.3 TPS material

Let us now take a deeper look into some physical properties of the selected TPS for our
mission. The main thermal shield consists of a high-density (1600 kg/m3) Aleastrasil tiles,
made of a degradable silica substrate impregnated of phenolic resin. It demonstrated a low
surface recession (0.1-0.3 mm) in Earth atmosphere re-entry conditions.
The rear cone was covered with a lower density (480 kg/m3) Norcoat material consisting of
cork powder impregnated of phenolic resin.
Alternative design comprises two windows situated on the rear side, 30 cm in diameter
each. They will be composed of fused silica quartz, a material characterized with a very
high temperature and thermal shocks resistance that can withstand continuous operating
temperature of 1000 C. Its density is 2200 kg/m3.
8.3.4 TPS thickness

For the thickness computation of both parts of our TPS we used a rather approximate
method that consisted of two separate (total thermal load and thermal heat fluxes) cross-
multiplications taking ARD data on thermal loads and heat fluxes and the designed
thickness on one side and the thermal loads and heat fluxes obtained in our own mission
analyses. From the neighboring values obtained by the described methods, we have kept
the more stringent one in terms of thickness. The results of this computation are given in
the table below.
Temperature
Heat load Peak heat flux Front shield: After body:
max.
[J/cm²] [W/cm²] Aleastrasil Norcoat
[ºC]
Atmospheric reentry
17700.00 110.00 1050.00 65.00 19.00
simulator (ARS)
ATV ballistic reentry 12780.00 151.00 2093.00 89.23 26.08
ATV 10º reentry 15324.00 140.00 2050.00 82.73 24.18
ATV 20º reentry 20429.00 136.00 2032.00 80.36 23.49
Figure 113 – TPS data
The thickness values used for the TPS mass budget calculation will be those of ballistic re-
entry as most restrictive ones.
8.3.5 TPS mass fraction and total mass

Once the thickness of the TPS computed, we can easily deduce the total mass budget for
our TPS from that input and the geometrical considerations of our design. From the
structural analysis and the sizing of the capsule, we get that the area covered by
Aleastrasil is 17.34 m2 and the one covered by Norcoat-Liege 14.53 m2. This quantity,
multiplied by the respective thicknesses (controlled ballistic-re-entry) and densities of the
two TPS yield a mass of 2475.8 kg for Aleastrasil and 181.9 kg for Norcoat-Liege. The total
TPS mass is therefore 2657.7 kg.

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In case of use of alternative design with windows, the overall TPS mass budget is slightly
modified. The windows will substitute portion of the Norcoat TPS, 0.14 m2 big, and of the
same thickness in order to have a smooth surface with the rest of the surrounding TPS and
therefore prevent having thermal fluxes differentials on the rear part due to surface
irregularities.
With this in mind, we get that the modified TPS mass budget would be:
Aleastrasil: 2475.8 kg
Norcoat: 180.14 kg
Fused Silica Quartz: 8.03 kg
Total: 2663.97 kg

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9 POWER
The power system for the vehicle was designed based on the ATV power subsystem. Of
course modifications were made to fit the current design. Below the process gone through
to design the power subsystem for the vehicle is explained.
9.1 Actual ATV power

The actual power sub-system of the actual ATV is:
 4 solar arrays with a 22,3 span 8,4m² each; 4,8kW

 4 rechargeable batteries NiCd
 4 Power Conditioning and Distribution Units (PCDU)
 4 Non rechargeable batteries composed of 33 cells LIMnO2 technology of 86 Ah
capacity, to provide power to specific equipment (safety and the docking system)
The ATV Power System is composed of 4 identical completely independent power chains.
Each independent power chain is composed of:
 1 Power Conditioning and Distribution Unit (PCDU)

 1 rechargeable batteries NiCd
 1 solar array
Figure 114: Solar sections to PCDU allocation

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The solar array:
One solar wing provides power of 1135 W (end of life, solar pointing mode).
During the mission the solar arrays are in rotating mode and provide variable power from
250 W to 1135W (for each wing) depending on ATV attitude (Sun angle incidence and
shadow).
During the attached phase, the ISS is able to provide power to ATV through two ISS panels
with a maximum capability of 50A each under a nominal voltage of 28.5 V.
ATV uses from 400 W during ―Dormant‖ mode up to a maximum of 900W during active
operations. Power is distributed to up to 80 ―users‖, for a total ATV power load from 1200
to 2300 W depending on the mission phase.
9.2 Data to do the power budget

For this new ATV, we will use the same power characteristic as the actual ATV as it is
describe on the previous part.
To do this first preliminary power budget, we have used the same equipment used for the
actual ATV. The following table is a preliminary database of equipment used for this
budget, with their power. The estimated data power comes from the different sources find
in internet or during the class.
Equipment Power Data (in W)

Sun Sensor 3.7
Star Tracker 8
Videometer 36
Telegoniometer 70
Accelerometer 2
Gyrometer Assembly 43
TCU (Thermal Control Unit) 10
GPS Receiver 12
Heaters Line 50
MMU (Mass Memory Unit) 35
CMU (Command Monitoring Unit) 30
Figure 115: Some estimated data power
We also do some assumptions because of the lack of information on the computer unit. We
assume that all computer units from the on-board management subsystem have a power
consumption of 30W (like the CMU). The following assumption has been done:
Assumption on equipment Power Data assumption (in W)

MSU (Monitoring Safety Unit) 30
Figure 116: Power equipment assumption

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9.3 Power budget

For all the power budget estimation, we add a 10% margin for each subsystem because of
the lack of power information on some equipments and because it is a preliminary power
budget. Some equipment can be missing.
The next schema shows the preliminary power budget if we suppose that everything works
together.
Figure 117: Preliminary power budget estimation if all equipments work simultaneously
We can also see the nominal power needed for each phase of the mission and for each
subsystem. The following table presents the preliminary estimation power budget for each
phase:
System Engineering preliminary power budget estimation (in W)
Transfer Approach and

Subsystem Attached De-docking Deorbitation Re-entry Landing
Orbit docking
Thermal 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
ECLS 161 161 161 161 161 161 161
Communication 374 374 0 374 374 374 374
GNC 131 175 0 131 131 113 146
Power 83 83 0 83 83 0 0
On-board Management 138 138 138 138 138 138 138
Total (System) 952 996 365 952 952 852 885
Figure 118: Preliminary power budget estimation for all the mission phase
The actual ATV uses a maximum of 900W during active operations. With the new design,
we should use a maximum of 1000W for active operations.
The following table presents the preliminary power budget (detailed) if we suppose that
everything works together:

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Preliminary study on the Power Sub-system of the

New ATV (manned vehicle)
System Engineering
Subsystem Mean power (in W):
System 1505
Thermal 264
ECLS 161
Communication 374
GNC 271
Power 297
On-board Management 138
Communication Sub-system
Equipments: Quantity Mean power:
GPS receiver 2 24
Communications Equipment 2 316
Power Sub-system
2 SADM 2 10
Power to charge the 4 batteries 4 260.4
Thermal Sub-system
4 TCU 4 40
Heaters 4 200
ECLS Sub-system
Cabin Relief Valves 3 3
Toilet System 1 10
Tank Valves 3 6
O2/N2 Concentration Sensors 6 0.6
Electrical Heaters 2 20
Humidity Condensator 2 10
Water Pump 3 10
Food Warmer 1 5
Illumination 2 20
Cabin Fan Assembly 1 50
Infrared Detectors 6 6
Smoke Detector 6 6

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On-board Managment Sub-system

2 MSU (Monitoring Safety Unit) 2 60
CMU (Command Monitoring Unit) 1 30
MMU (Mass Memory Unit) 1 35
GNC Sub-system
2 Star trackers 2 16
8 Front Thruster Control Valve 8 36
6 Gyrometer 6 54
6 Accelerometers Assembly (ACCA) 6 3
2 Telegoniometers 2 20
2 Videometers 2 20
Propulsion Drive Electronics 2 10
Rear Thruster Control Valve 20 80
2 Sun Sensor 2 7.4
4 IR Earth Sensor 4 16
2 Inertial Measurement Unit 2 60
Figure 119: Preliminary power budget estimation (detailed) if all equipments work simultaneously
9.4 New solar array dimension estimation

Assumptions to do this preliminary dimension estimation:
 We consider a pessimistic case where all the equipments should work
simultaneously.
 We consider that one solar panel (so one power line) can be able to provide the
power needed for all the equipments (if they should work together)
From the preliminary power budget, we see that the total amount of power required for
all the system is equal to 1500W. So one solar array should provided 1500W.
The first step to do is to find the actual characteristic of the ATV solar Array which is
presented in the next table.
Solar Array Actual ATV
Area (1 SA) 8.4 m²
Power (1 SA) 1200 W
Power density 143 W/m²
3-mil High efficiency Si Solar Cell
Specific weight 574 W/kg
Mass of cells 2 kg
Mass 1 Solar Array (if rigid) 48 kg
Figure 120: Actual ATV Solar Array Characteristics

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We know the area of 1 solar array and the power which is provided. So we can find the
power density and then the solar array cells‘ characteristics with the following table from
―Emcore Photovoltaics‖.
Figure 121: Solar Cell Technology
The following graph shows us the specific solar area weight:
Figure 122: Specific power

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Then, we can now find the new dimension of one solar array of the ATV:
Solar Array Manned Re-entry Vehicle

Max power needed 1505 W
Area needed (1 SA) 10.54 m²
New Length (1 SA) 9.10 m
Difference (New-actual ATV) 1.82 m
Mass Solar Array (if rigid) 47.0 kg
Figure 123: Solar Array manned Re-entry Vehicle
We conclude than we need 1.8m more than the actual ATV solar array in order to provide
the 1500W required power.
9.5 New NiCd battery dimension estimation

The second part is the ATV specification assumptions, which are:
 28 V power bus
 We assume that the battery should provide the power on nominal mode, on the
phase where the power consumption is the highest. As we have ssen before,
with the new design, we should use a maximum of 1000W for active operations.
 We also assume that the maximal duration of the use of the battery is 1h, which
is more than the re-entry and landing phase and more than the eclipse duration.
 We also suppose that the re-entry phase begin when the capsule is detached
from the part where are located the solar arrays. If we cannot land to the first
landing site, but to the second or third predefine landing site, we do not
detached the capsule from the part where are located the solar arrays.

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The next table presents the preliminary dimension estimation of the new NiCd battery:
NiCd battery New ATV

Specification NiCd accumulator Unit
Capacity 3 Ah
Mean discharge voltage 1.25 V
Temperature range -5 to +15 °C
Recharge current 1.5 A
Max voltage 1.55 A
Min voltage 1 V
Max DOD 30%
ATV important specification assumption Unit
Electrical bus 28 V
Nominal mode power needed 1000 W
Max duration battery use (assumption) 1 h
Battery design Unit
In serie 28 accu.
Min voltage obtained 28 V
Max voltage obtained 43.4 V
Mean discharge voltage 35 V
Current needed 29 A
Maximum charge amount Qd discharged 29 Ah
Minimum battery capacity 95 Ah
In parallel 32 accu.
Power to charge the battery 65.1 W
Mass 1 battery 25 kg
Figure 124: NiCd battery Manned Re-entry Vehicle
We can conclude that the mass of 1 battery is equal to 25 kg (so 100kg for the 4 battery).
9.6 Mass budget of the power subsystem

Power Sub-system
Equipments: Quantity Mass (kg)
PCDU 4 120
Electrique interface 1 3.9
SADM 2 10
Solar Array 4 188
NiCd batteries 4 100
Total 422
Figure 125: Mass budget of the power subsystem
We will need around 422kg for the PCDU, the batteries and the Solar Array.

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10 PROPULSION
10.1 Overview of the propulsion system
The ATV propulsion system is contained in the unpressurised Service
Module, located aft of the habitable Pressurized Module. The
Service Module also contains electrical power, computers,
communications and avionics.
The propulsion system is a bipropulsion one made of the

combination of monomethyl hydrazine fuel and nitrogen tetroxide
oxidizer.
Figure 126 – ATV Service module
The main elements of the ATV propulsion are:
- 4 x 490 N main navigation engines

- 28 x 220 N attitude control and braking thrusters
- 8 titanium propellant tanks of 7 tons capacity (2.3 tons for free flight maneuvers
and 4.7 tons for maneuvering the ISS)
- 2 high pressure carbon fiber-wound helium pressuring vessels.
This bipropellant propulsion is used to perform different operations which are linked to the
phases described in the Mission Analysis (cf. Chapter 5):
1) Navigation from the separation with Ariane 5 to the ISS (Phase 3: Transfer Orbit)
2) Automatic maneuvers for rendezvous and docking (Phase 4: Approach & Docking)
3) Reboost the ISS altitude, debris avoidance, … during the docking phase (Phase 5:
Attached phase)
4) Automatic maneuvers for undocking and departure (Phase 6: De-docking &
Departure)
5) Deorbitation maneuvers thanks to a retroburn (Phase 7: De-orbitation)
In all the other phases (1, 2, 8 and 9), the propulsion system of the ATV is not used.

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10.2 Propulsion budget

In this second part, we will define a simplified problem in order to calculate the order of
magnitude of the V corresponding to the following main phases: from the injection point
to the ISS orbit and from the undocking up to the deorbitation.
We will take into account the following hypothesis and data:
 Injection point:
o Altitude = 260 km
o Inclination = 51.6°
 Circular orbits
 Hohmann transfer
 Phasing phase at
 ISS orbit = 360 km
To reach the International Space Station, we apply the following strategy:
By using the Hohmann transfer

between two coplanar circular orbit
and computing them, we found the 2
following V:
Figure 127 - Simplified strategy to reach the ISS orbit
We can have the same reasoning to go to the deorbitation point, except that the thrust
vector will be in the opposite direction to the movement.

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10.3 The Equipped Propulsion bay

The Equipped Propulsion Bay is a non-pressurized compartment structurally composed of
a Thruster and a Tankage module. The EPB mainly accommodates the Propulsion and Re-
boost Subsystem.
Figure 128 - Representation of the Equipped Propulsion bay
The Propulsion and Re-boost Subsystem (PRSS) accommodated mainly in the EPB is a
MON /MMH bi-propellant system and can be broken down into:
 The pressurisation subsystem: which pressurises the propellant tanks with helium
stored in 2 high pressure bottles,
 The propellant storage and distribution: 8 tanks (4 MON and 4 MMH) and the
distribution piping and latch valves down to the engines.
 The propellants are stored in 8 identical surface tension titanium propellant tanks
(4 for MON and 4 for MMH) with overall maximum capacity of nearly 7 tons of
propellant for both ATV propulsion and ISS re-boost needs. The propellants used for
ATV propulsion and for the ISS re-boost are not allocated to specific tanks. A proper
propellant consumption management throughout the mission may allow to save/re-
distribute propellant between the propulsive phase and the station re-boost
activities.
 The Service Valves Assembly used on ground to test the sub-system and to fill all
tanks with propellants and helium,
 The PDE (Propulsion Drive Electronics): which receive power from the PCDU and
commands from the FTC (Fault Tolerant Computer), and transmit status of the
Propulsion S/S to the FTC.
 The engines (main and attitude control): which provide thrusts.

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The ATV orbit transfer (phasing, de-orbit), re-boost and debris avoidance manoeuvre of the
ISS are performed by the Main Engines also named Orbit Control System (OCS). 2 of the 4
main engines are used for orbit manoeuvres in Free Flight with two others serving for
redundancy, whereas all 4 main engines can be used for ISS re-boost. Their thrust level is
490 N each, the specific impulse exceeds 310 s at reference point.
The ATV attitude control and all the maneuvers for rendezvous with the station are
performed by means of the Attitude Control System (ACS) that includes 28 ACS thrusters.
The ACS also contributes to ISS attitude control in the attached phase. The engines are of
about 220 N each, their specific impulse is 285 s.
The EPB shell is protected by the Micrometeoroids and Debris Protection Subsystem
(MDPS).
All the maneuvers to go from the injection point to the ISS docking are summarized in the
following scheme:
Figure 129 - Maneuvers to go to the ISS
In conclusion, as the existing propulsion system is highly reliable - in particular with the
successful first flight of the ―Jules Verne‖ (maiden flight) - and corresponds to our needs,
we didn‘t focus on this subsystem and decide to keep the same architecture and data, at
this phase of the project.

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11 COMMUNICATION STRATEGY
For the communication subsystem it was thought that the same system used on board the
ATV would be adapted and used for this project. However there are some rising issues
which had to be looked into for example the fact that ARTEMIS would
11.1 Actual ATV communication

The following schema shows us all the communication interaction between ATV and the
others segments, which are the ISS and the control centers (Toulouse, Houston and
Moscow).
Figure 130 -Overview of the communication system of the ATV
As we can see, there are three different types of direct links with the ATV:
 During all flight phases (free flight and attached) the link with the ground (ATV-CC)
is established via the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) and
ARTEMIS.
 During rendezvous, the relative navigation is performed on-board by the ATV GPS
receivers. The ISS GPS measurements are transmitted to the ATV via proximity link
so that ATV can compute the relative state vector (Relative GPS, hereafter referred
to as RGPS).De
 GPS localization link, which give the ATV localization.

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11.2 The Artemis issue

The main link between the ATV and the ATV-CC in Toulouse is the Artemis satellite. The
other link is performed via the American satellite constellation TDRSS.
Figure 131 -Artists View of Artemis
Artemis is a geostationary earth orbit satellite (GEOS) for telecommunications, built for
and owned by ESA. The mission was planned for many years, with launch initially intended
for 1995 and slipping. Finally, Artemis has been launched by an Ariane 5 rocket on 12 July
2001. Artemis is used operationally for data relay from ESA's satellites in low Earth orbit.
Artemis communicates with the ATV, receiving telemetry and sending telecommands
whenever the two spacecraft are within sight of one another. During every ATV orbit,
there is close to 40 minutes of continuous contact.
The problem of Artemis is that it arrives at the end of its life in a few years. So the
European will be totally dependent to the American TDRSS (Tracking and Data Relay
Satellite System) and especially for the ATV program.
But fortunately, the Artemis satellite is a demonstrator satellite of the ARTES (Advanced
Research in Telecommunications Systems), a European space program.
11.3 The EDRS solution

As it is written before, Artemis is considered as a precursor for the EDRS program. The
European Data Relay Satellite (EDRS) system will be a constellation of GEO satellites
intended to relay information between other satellites and ground stations, to allow full-
time communications even with satellites in low-Earth orbit which are often not visible
from any European-operated ground station.
The program is quite similar to the American Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
(TDRSS) which was set up to support the Space Shuttle; it is unclear whether it will have as
large a military component as TDRSS.

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Furthermore, the system is already used for the communication with the ATV. The fact to
have our own EDRS program will do the European independence with respect to the
American system.
Besides, the EDRS will be operational in 2012, which solve the Artemis issue for the next
evolution of the ATV, the Manned Re-entry Vehicle.
Figure 132 -Artists view of EDRS structure
11.4 The Galileo option

The geo-localization of the actual ATV is performed by the GPS (American GNSS). So a GPS
receiver is inside the ATV.
In a few years, the European GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System), called Galileo, will
be operational.
Figure 133 - Artists view of the Galileo system
In order to be more independent from the American GPS system, a Galileo receiver will be
used for the geo-localization of the Manned Re-entry Vehicle.

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12 GNC
Although they will have many components in common, we will analyze separately the sub-
systems of Orbital GNC, Docking GNC and Atmospheric GNC. As it was already explained in
the design of this new ATV, the service module from the non-crewed ATV will be
conserved. Thereby it is assumed that all the GNC equipments present in this module will
be available with the crewed ATV version. It is not the scope of this study to analyze the
design and performance of the ATV Service Module and therefore only the equipments
present in the Crew Capsule will be considered.
12.1 Docking GNC

The high reliability and safety level demonstrated by the Docking GNC System of the non
crewed ATV suggest the suitability of reusing it for the crewed version. Thereby all the
equipments that were placed in the Cargo Module will now be assembled in the Crew
Capsule, near the hatch. The equipments used will be:
 2 Telegoniometers
 2 Videometers
 2 Star Trackers
 6 Gyro
 3 GPS receivers
 6 Accelerometers
 8 Front Attitude Control System Thrusters arranged in 4 clusters and
their associated latch valves
 20 rear Attitude Control Thrusters placed in 4 clusters and positioned in
the Service Module
 2 Propulsion Drive Electronics
In order to perform the Collision Avoidance Maneuver (CAM) commands, related to the
Proximity Flight Safety Function, each Propulsion Drive Electronics channel is associated
wih an independent board, provided with hardware logic and independently commanded
by the Safe Chain in order to inhibit all nominal thrusters´operations, to command 4
predefines CAM thrusters once the CAM is issued.
Figure 134 - Rear Attitude Thrusters´ Cluster

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12.2 Orbital GNC

Orbital GNC will be used during the phasing with the ISS and the de-orbiting phase before
the atmospheric reentry. For this subsystem, the same equipments as for Docking GNC will
be used, with exception of the Telegoniometers and Videometers.
The orbit transfers will be carried out by means of the Main Engines. 2 of the 4 main
engines are used for the propulsion and the other 2 are used as redundancy.
12.3 Re-entry GNC

GNC is critical at the re-entry phase. If the spacecraft attitude is not the right one, the
structures will not manage to stand the aerodynamic loads and the capsule may blow up.
Thereby, as for docking and orbit phasing, several redundancies are implemented. As it
was already pointed out in the Mission Analysis Chapter, if the redundant systems fail, a
safe mode consisting on a pure ballistic reentry will be performed. The equipments
involved are the following:
 6 Gyro
 6 Accelerometers
 3 GPS Receivers
 8 Front Attitude Control System Thrusters arranged in 4 clusters and
their associated latch valves
 2 Propulsion Drive Electronics

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13 OBDH & MISSION MANAGEMENT

In Figure 131, the architecture from the functional chain OBDH is shown. Since this chain is
in charge of the management of the different redundancy equipment, the correct
processing and transmission of the commands, it is a very critical chain for the mission.
The computational processes performed by this chain will be assured by the majority
voting method. This consists in evaluating the results obtained by different Data
Management Unit (DMU), when a DMU has output values different than the other ones, it is
assumed there is a failure and it is automatically switched off. Since the functional chain
needs to be Fail Operational/ Fail Safe, there will be 3 DMU´s used for the nominal mode
and 1 more for the safe mode. Thereby, when one failure occurs, two of the nominal
DMU´s will work until the moment they have different outputs. At this moment it is
assumed a new failure has occurred, and the safe mode DMU will take the control of the
mission. As it is logic, to perform this majority voting system, all DMU´s must work in hot
redundancy.
Each Data Management Unit is subdivided into three modules: one high capacity memory
storage, one medium capacity processor and one interface in order to set the
communication with the different external links.
All the DMU´s will be connected to the 3 main data buses. By these connections they will
be able to send and receive TM/TC. Each computer will be the master of each Data Bus.
The bus used is the USAF military standard (Mil-std-1553B).
The power will be taken from one of the two available nominal power buses. It is worth to
say, the safe mode DMU will be available to get power from the nominal power buses but
the safe mode power bus will only be able to feed the safe mode chain. The reason for
that are the different energy requirements that the safe mode has in comparison with
nominal mode: the low energy needed for the safe mode defines and dimensions the safe
mode power unit making impossible for it to feed the normal equipment.
In the attached phase the OBDH chain will be the link between ISS and ATV. This will be
possible thanks to the power and data buses connecting both spacecrafts.
Finally the majority voting and the OBDH safe mode triggering will be performed thanks to
the interconnection link.

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Figure 135 - OBDH Functional Chain Configuration

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14 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND LIFE

SUPPORT SYSTEM
The Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS), in accordance with the European
Standard ECSS-E-ST-34C definition, is the ―engineering discipline dealing with the
physical, chemical and biological functions to provide humans and other life forms with
suitable environmental conditions‖ and ―the objective of ECLS is to create a suitable
environment by controlling the environmental parameters, providing resources, and
managing waste products‖.
We can summarize then the main functions, the ECLS System (ECLSS) must carry out:
Maintain environment:
 Control atmosphere pressure & composition
 Control thermal conditions for crew & equipment
 Control atmospheric humidity
 Circulate atmosphere
Respond to environmental contingencies:

 Respond to uncontrolled pressure changes
 Respond to fire
 Respond to hazardous atmosphere
Provide resources:
 Provide oxygen for breathing
 Provide diluent atmospheric gas
 Provide water
 Provide food
 Provide vacuum/venting
Manage wastes:
 Manage carbon dioxide
 Manage waste water
 Manage gas, solid and liquid wastes
Maintain crew health:

 Support first aid
 Support medical assistance on board
 Provide access to telemedicine services
 Provide medical equipment
 Support gravity countermeasures

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In order to perform these functions, it is necessary to implement a number of different

sub-systems. These are the following:
 Atmosphere Control & Supply (ACS)

 Temperature & Humidity Control (THC)
 Water Supply & Management (WSM)
 Fire Detection & Suppression (FDS)
 Waste Management (WM)
 Food Storage & Preparation (FSP)
 Crew Health Care (CHeC)
 Crew Systems (CS)
In the following Figure, the general overview of the ECLS sub-systems configuration is
presented:
Figure 136 - ECLSS Overview

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14.1 Scenarios and Astronauts Needs

As it was already pointed out in the Mission Analysis Chapter, the re-entry can be
performed in only 8 hours. However, when there is not an urgent need of landing, a longer
mission can be performed. Thereby, the ECLS System will be dimensioned to support
crew‘s lives for a period of 5 days.
In the following table the overall budgets of the astronaut‘s needs derived for the life
support is presented:
Kg/(day*CM) Kg/(5day*3CM)
Oxygen 1.02 15.30
Dried food 0.3 4.50
Fresh canned food 0.8 12.00
Beverage powder 0.4 6.00
Food Pakaging 0.7 10.50
Hygienic Products 0.2 3.00
Total solid 2.4 36.00
Drinking water 2.1 31.50

Water for Hygienic
27.00
Purposes 1.8
Food hydratation
10.50
water 0.7
Total water 4.6 69.00
TOTAL INPUT 8.02 120.30
14.2 Atmospheric Control and Supply (ACS)

Atmospheric pressure and composition control functions shall provide a method to regulate
and monitor the partial and total pressure of gases in the space habitat atmosphere, i.e.,
mainly O2/N2 pressure control vent and relief, storage and distribution.
The controls shall operate autonomously with limited or no crew intervention necessary.
The cabin atmosphere is maintained at the desired total pressure, with a partial pressure
of oxygen sufficient to sustain human life. The subsystem to accomplish this requires
pressure sensors and regulators, shutoff valves, check valves, relief valves, distribution
lines and tanks, and valves and controls to provide the proper concentrations of oxygen
and nitrogen.

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In the following image, the interaction between ACS and THC is shown:
Figure 137 - interactions between ACS and THC systems
14.2.1 O2/N2 Supply and Control

In the following Figures a comparison between atmosphere regenerative systems such as
ISS ARS (Atmosphere Revitalization and Sampling) or ASTRIUM ARES Systems and a simply
tank-storage system is done in terms of mass and volume. It is clear that for our case, the
length of the mission suggest clearly to use the tank system. Apart from the best mass and
volume necessities, it is not power consuming.
500 3000
400 2500
2000
300 Tanks Tanks
1500
200 ARS ARS
1000
100 ARES 500 ARES
0 0
0 50 100 0 50 100
Figure 138 - Mass (left) and volume (right) variation over time (in days) for tanks, ARS and ARES system

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Although it is known the N2 does not participate in any process, a reserve of it is

needed in order to compensate possible leaks. The percentage of N2 will oscillate
around 75%
The equipment will comprise:
 O2 Tanks
 N2 Tanks
 Automatic controlled Tank Valves
 Tanks pressure and level sensors
 Relief valves
 Shutoff valves
 Distribution Lines
 O2 and N2 concentration sensors
14.2.2 CO2 Removal System

The current NASA requirement for CO2 levels on board a spacecraft is 0.5 to 1.0 percent,
which is an order of magnitude higher than atmospheric CO2 levels on Earth. As for the O2
supply, the short length of the mission makes suitable the use of non regenerative
techniques to remove CO2. Thereby, a non re-generable lithium hydroxide cartridge
system will be used to absorb CO2
 CO2 removal cartridge system

 Additional stored Cartridges
 CO2 concentration sensors
14.2.3 Trace Contaminants Removal

Controlling trace contaminants begins with the careful screening and control of materials
allowed on board the spacecraft to limit off-gassing, which can cause the crew discomfort
or sickness. Despite all the precautions, a system in charge of detect and remove this
possible contamination, must be implement. The system will consist in two re-generable
activated-charcoal cartridges, a cartridge containing a catalytic oxider and a filter. Then,
the charcoal beds adsorb high molecular weight trace contaminants. The catalyst oxidizes
carbon monoxide to carbon dioxide, and the hydrogen to water.
 Charcoal Cartridge system situated in the return air ducts

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14.2.4 Pressure Control System

This system assures to keep the pressure constant at 101 KPa. Moreover, during the
docking phase, it equalizes the total pressure with the one in the ISS. This is necessary to
open the hatch between the vehicle and the ISS.
 cabin positive pressure relief valves

 cabin negative pressure relief valves
 cabin pressure sensors
14.3 Temperature and Humidity Control (THC)

This Subsystem helps maintain a habitable environment within the Caravan atmosphere by
circulating cool dry air, removing humidity and particulates, and maintaining the
temperature. Circulation of the atmosphere minimizes temperature variations, ensures
homogeneous atmospheric composition, and provides a means for smoke detection.
14.3.1 Air Circulation System

The requirement is the same as in ISS: Cabin air velocity: between 0.076 – 0.203 m/s
 Air Fans
 Fan state sensors
 Re-circulating air ducts
Figure 139 - Cabin Fan Assembly

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14.3.2 Temperature Control

The temperature will be controlled by placing heater in the air recirculation ducts
 Electric heaters and heat exchangers

 Temperature sensors
14.3.3 Humidity Control

 Atmospheric Condensate Water Regeneration System (ACWRS): It recovers

the water from the atmosphere. The moisture is condensed on the cold
surfaces of the Thermal Control System heat exchangers. Then the
condensed water vapor is processed into water for ACWRS
 Humidity sensors
14.4 Water Supply and Management

As it was already pointed out in previous sections, each member of the crew needs around
5 liters of water each day, mainly for drinking and hygienic purposes. The necessary water
for the crew will be supplied by external tanks. No recycling system is considered, because
it is expensive, heavy and less reliable than an external tank. Thereby the equipments will
be the following:
 Water tanks
 Water pipes
 Water pumps
 Tank level indicators
 Water state sensors
14.5 Fire Detection and Suppression System

Fires on spacecrafts can be disastrous. Using materials which are fire resistant and
designing a habitat and its systems to not propagate fire reduces the likelihood of a major
fire. Even so, the possibility of a fire cannot be totally eliminated.
If a fire occurs, the first seconds are essential to control the situation. Therefore apart
from the crew‘s sense of smell, a good net of detectors must be implemented. For this
purpose, both smoke and flame (infrared) detectors will be used. In both cases, the
detectors will be spread around the dwelling and behind the vehicle‘s panels, which
contains high power consumption.

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Figure 140 - Smoke Detector [4]
The fire suppression will be carried out by means of portable fire extinguishers (see Figure
below). Some of the methods used on Earth cannot be used in space: in the case of water,
because fires are usually related to electrical failures, and in the case of foam because of
cleanup problems. Methods already used were CO2 (ISS) due to the heat capacity and
simplicity of cleanup.
Figure 141 - Portable Fire Extinguisher
The last option in case the fire cannot be handled with the extinguisher, is the partial
module depressurization. The actual assessment of a potential fire must be made by a
crew member who personally determines whether a fire exists and takes appropriate
action to extinguish that fire. During this partial depressurization, portable breathing
apparatus such as the one in the figure will be used.

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Figure 142 - Portable breathing apparatus
We can summarize then the needed equipment:
 Smoke detectors
 Flame-infrared detectors
 Fire extinguishers
 Portable breathing apparatus
14.6 Waste Management

The waste management system includes a toilet subsystem for collecting urine and feces
and a cleaning system for managing other wastes, e.g., food waste.
The ISS standards for calculating human waste are the following:
 Faeces 123 g/CM-d
 Urine 1562 g/CM-d
 Toilet Paper 28 g/CM-d
 Human skin, hair, sweat solids,… 16 g/CM-d
 Mensus (during menstruation) 113 g/fem-d
 Wipes 178 g/CM-d
 Paper 77 g/CM-d
 Clothing/Towels/Wash Clothes 486 g/CM-d
 Food packaging/adhered food 324 g/CM-d
We can thereby assume that in average, a person will produce around 3 kg of waste each
day. The sytem will then comprise:
 Toilet system
 Waste tank
 Small vacuum cleaner
 Waste ducts

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14.7 Food Storage and Preparation

Food is essential for the support of crew‘s health. It must be prevented from any microbial
contamination, but it also has to bring the adequate nutrition for each crew member.
Figure 143 - ISS Food Container – Source: NASA
The system will have the following equipments:
 Food Bags: They can store the necessary food to keep the entire crew during
3 days. Their contents can be kept at the ambient temperature for 240 days
 Electric food warmer: It is used to heat the food, before eat it.
14.8 Crew Health Care

In case of accident or disease of a crew member in the ISS, ATV can be used to perform a
fast evacuation and transport the astronaut to a hospital in less than 10 hours. This 10
hours can be critical for the astronaut´s life and thereby, medical equipment should be
available.
The equipments needed are:
 First aid kit

 Medicines kit
 Basic Surgery kit
 Defibrillator with included battery
Figure 144 - Defibrillator Lifepak 1000

qualified for space applications

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14.9 Crew Systems

All the requirements that are not fulfilled by the previous functions are satisfied by what is
called Crew Systems. This includes:
 Illumination
 Crew Seats: they will help the crew to withstand the strong accelerations in
the reentry and take off. The use of the new seats patented by ASTRIUM ST
for the space jet is a very interesting option: they have a passive system
that balance the seat and place it in the optimal position to withstand the
acceleration. By doing this it is possible to adapt the seat position to the
spacecraft angle of attack.
 Video and Photographical kit: It will be used to record astronauts
experience and transmit the society the success of the mission
Figure 145 - Balancing seats for withstanding accelerations
14.10 Redundancy level and type

Following the ESA and NASA standards for crewed missions, the ATV should be Fail
Operational/ Fail Safe (FO/FS). It is clear then, that ECLS should be dimensioned to
accomplish this requirement. Although all the systems will be designed with a security
margin and will have some type of redundancy, only the most critical ones that are
essential to preserve astronauts lives will have a safe mode. In any case, when the safe
mode is needed, the main concern of the crew and of the ground control team will be to
land as soon as possible. If the emergency occurs before the docking with ISS, the mission
will be cancelled and they automatically will return to Earth without any contact with ISS.
It is assumed that during the time the vehicle is at the ISS, the crew will do preventive
maintenance every 6 month.

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We can summarize the redundancy level and types:
 O2/N2 Supply: The gasses will be contained in two different tanks for O2 and
other 2 tanks for N2. By doing this separation, it is assured that a failure in a
valve or in a distribution line will not prevent the crew to have access to the
gasses. A valve connecting the two tanks will be implemented. As safe mode,
the portable breathing apparatus (see previous section) will be used. Since the
atmosphere composition will have progressive changes, only a cold redundancy
is needed.
 CO2 removal: One redundant CO2 removal cartridge system will be placed in
the recirculation air ducts. The safe mode will consist in the use of the portable
breathing apparatus, as it was done for O2 and N2 supply.
 Trace Contaminant Removal: One redundant Charcoal cartridge will be placed

in the air ducts. As safe mode the portable breathing apparatus will be used
 Pressure Control: Three different valves will be used. Two for nominal mode
and one for safe mode.
 Water Supply System: The water will be stored in three tanks, two for nominal
mode and one for safe mode. In this way, although a failure appears in one
tank, the others can still supply water.
 Air Circulation System: One redundant fan will be placed as a tepid redundancy.
For safe mode, a less powerful fan will be used also in tepid redundancy.
 Temperature Control: In order to keep redundancy in the thermal control, the

system is duplicated. So, it will be necessary to install two different loops of
liquid air heat exchanger. In order to decrease its workload the two systems will
work simultaneously. However, each one has to be able to control the
temperature alone.
 Humidity Control System: One tepid redundant Atmospheric Condensate Water

Regeneration System will be used.
 Fire Suppression: Three fire extinguishers will be placed in the cabin. As it was
already pointed out, the safe mode, when the crew is not able to control the
fire, will be a partial depressurization of the cabin. The astronauts will use the
portable breathing apparatus at this moment.
 Waste Management: Sanitation bags will be placed into the vehicle as a

redundant system.
 Illumination: Two illumination lines will be used in tepid redundancy. As safe

mode the astronauts will use their own portable lanterns.
 Sensors: All the sensors from the previous systems will be triplicated: two will
be used in the nominal mode and one in the safe mode. They will all work in hot
redundancy.

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14.11 ECLSS Configuration

The general schema of the system is represented in the following figure. As it can be seen,
all the computational processes are carried out by the on-board computers of the OBDH
functional chain.
Figure 146 - ECLSS

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15 BUDGETS
One of the main constraints of any project is the limitation of mass that can be used and
also the limitations of power. This is more critical for space projects as they are very
expensive and normally no chance for repair. Hence care must be taken in every step of
the way that the project does not go over the boundaries.
For this project a budget was kept for power and mass which would be presented in this
chapter.
15.1 Power budget

The power budgeting was explained in details in the chapter related to power. Here just a
summary would be given.
The table below is a summary of the power budget and it shows the consumption of each
subsystem. As mentioned before to calculate the total power a margin of 10% was taken
into account.
System Engineering
Subsystem Mean power [W]: % of the total
Thermal 264 16.04102614
ECLS 161 9.782595487
Communication 374 22.72478703
GNC 313 19.00861598
Power 297 18.07288945
On-board
Management 237 14.37008592
System 1646
Figure 147 - Summary of the power
In the bar chart shown next the percentage of the power consumption of each subsystem is
clearly shown.
25 23
19 18
20 16
14
15
10
10
5
0
Figure 148 - Percentage of power consumption for each subsystem

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15.2 Mass budget

In order to be able to actually launch the spacecraft, due to constraints of the launcher
and propellant a limit of 20 tones for the mass was decided upon.
While calculating the mass budgets, certain margins were used. Overall and lower level
margins are set in accordance with accepted international standards, derived by the space
agencies based upon experience from previous missions.
Two types of margins were used:
1.Unit level margins: depending upon development status, to be applied for all
spacecraft units are specified below:
Development status Associated Margin

Completely new developments 20%
New developments derived from existing hardware 15%
Existing units requiring modification 5%
Existing units 0%
Attitude control propellant 2%
Delta-V propellant 2%
Figure 149 - Unit level margins
2. System level margins: System mass margin equals 20% of the dry mass.
Here a summary is given of the Mass budget from a system point of view:
Figure 150 - Mass budget

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Each subsystem mass is first given without margin, and then including the subsystem
margin. From those data, the system mass is computed through three ways, the final mass
with no margin at all, the mass including subsystems‘ margin, and the mass including
subsystems‘ margin more a system margin of 10%. Indeed as we are considering a very
preliminary study, we included a 10% margin.
Payload Communica OBDH GNC

ECLS 11% tions 2% 2% Power
12% 2% 11%
Landing
System
13%
Structure
47%
Figure 151: Mass allocation by subsystem
The structure represents almost half of the final vehicle mass, it is justified by the
important margin policy taking into account over this subsystem. Moreover several
assumptions were made in the structure design, refer to this part.
The next table presents the complete mass breakdown of the system.

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Figure 152 - Budget (part 1)

194

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Taking as basis the mass budget specifications of the ATV, we consider that our system
should be limited to 7500kg. With that, the vehicle mass with the subsystems and system
margins.
Figure 155 -ATV mass specifications

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16 TESTING
In order not to put to waste all the energy, money and time put into designing a spacecraft
that is to be operational for over fifteen years, then everything should be done to ensure
the reliability and success of the mission.
This is why before a spacecraft can be launched it is made ―flight ready‖. This means that
all of the spacecraft‘s subsystems must be tested on the ground individually and then
integrated together and tested as a system to see if the design will work as expected. The
satellite and its scientific instruments are actually tested at every stage in their
development. This is to ensure that the spacecraft can withstand the severe conditions of
its ride into space and still be functional.
16.1 Introduction
In ESA a spacecraft has two-step verification. In the first step which is the design
qualification phase the Structural and Thermal model and the Electrical model of the
system is tested. Several of these take place in environments tougher than the expected
real conditions in space and launch. In the later stages of this phase the flight model of the
spacecraft is also tested.
When all the requirements were met and the success of the design is proven, the second
phase of the testing is started which is called the acceptance phase. At this stage, there is
no longer any doubt about the success of the design, but now the key objective is to make
sure that the built spacecraft has been assembled properly and everything is according to
the design that had been qualified in the previous phase.
For the project at hand, since it is in phase A, we must bear in mind that in the next steps
the success of the suggested design has to be tested. Which means that based on ESA‘s
plan the design qualification testing has to be done.
These tests can be divided into three categories:
 Environmental tests
 Electrical tests
 Functional tests
All these tests are usually carried out at different locations: at ESTEC, at the prime
contractor facilities, at the suppliers of individual electronic equipment, or at the various
dedicated space environment and optical test facilities, such as the Centre Spatial de
Liège (CSL). Qualification and acceptance phases can take over two years.
The nature of these tests is explained in more details below.

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16.2 Environmental tests

There are three kinds of environmental tests on a spacecraft, its modules and science
instruments.
 Thermal vacuum tests, where the satellite or equipment is placed in a vacuum

chamber with a sun simulator that reproduced the intensity of sunlight, which
recreated the environment of space with its extreme variations in temperature.
 Vibration tests, where the spacecraft is progressively shaken at different strengths

on a vibrating table, or 'the shaker'. The conditions created are up to 25% more
severe than those expected at lift-off. The spacecraft resonance is also measured
to evaluate how its different parts would react to set frequencies, including those
that it would probably encounter at launch.
 Acoustic tests, where the complete spacecraft is submitted in a reverberating

chamber to very intense noise similar to that it would encounter during launch.
16.3 Electrical tests

The electrical tests verify the integrity of all the circuits on board the satellite, but also
the electromagnetic compatibility with the launcher and its ground installations. We
cannot have equipment on the spacecraft creating interference that could jeopardize the
launch. Compatibility tests are conducted to verify that the internal electric circuits of the
spacecraft do not interfere with each other.
16.4 Functional tests

The environmental tests that lead up to launch are not the whole story. We must ensure
that a satellite will work properly in space once it has been launched. More tests
accompany each stage of development. For example, we must test that:
 Electrical signals generated by one part of the spacecraft are received and
understood where they are meant to be used;
 Software covers all operating modes and flight procedures;
 The spacecraft sends the right information to the ground and processes received
information correctly;
 The spacecraft can navigate and point in the desired direction in space.

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CONCLUSION
After the success of the first ATV mission, Europe is willing to develop its own manned re-
entry capsule. Currently, the ATV is unable to return to Earth without burning into the
atmosphere. Based on the interest of the space community on a manned re-entry vehicle,
it was decided that it would be quite relevant for a project to be done regarding this as
part of the Master course in Astronautics and space engineering in Supaero University.
The main objective of this project was to create a vehicle that can carry three astronauts
from Kourou to ISS and from ISS back to Earth. This project would only go as far as the first
step – phase ―A‖ project - would go and would try to satisfy the requirements and
constraints defined by the stockholders.
The proposed design in this report is to re-use the ATV Jules Verne design, but to put a
crew compartment in place of the current cargo section. The shape chosen for the crew
compartment or better said for the re-entry capsule is a blunted cone Apollo‘s and ARD
shape capsule. For most of the subsystem as far as possible it has been tried to keep the
ATV‘s flight proven subsystems. Since the vehicle would be launched on an adapted model
of Ariane 5, the characteristics of the design has been crossed checked with this launcher,
such as the mass and dimensions. Due to the requirements the vehicle will have the
capability to land both on sea and land.
Figure 156 - Artist view of the Advanced Re-entry Vehicle (TAS)

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APPENDIX
Appendix 1 – Risk assessment table ..........................................................204
Appendix 2 – Catia plans ................................................................................212
Appendix 3 – Thermal Protection Comparison .....................................213

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Appendix 1 – Risk assessment table

1
Idea Evaluation
2
Feasibility
3
Developm ent
4
Im plem entation
5
Control
Project: ITP - Designing a Manned Re-entry Vehicle Date: March 2010
Project - Risk Assessment

After Mitigation
Residual Risk
Category Action Plan: Action Plan: Verification:
Risk Score
Probability
Probability
Severity
Severity
What / Whe n / How Who Action Plan Re vie w / Audit and
1-3-5
Score
1-3-5
1-3-5
1-3-5
Mission Analysis Gaps Clos e d
Potential Risk
MA: Wrong trajectory s hape What: Regular m eetings and a good inform ation flux Verification on 28 February
des ign: Pos s ibility of chos ing between the m is s ion analys is team and the s ys tem s Mission Analysis
a therm al profile that is not engineering team When: To be perfom during February
able to be des igned. How: Several iterations will be carried out before Thermal
3 5 15 achieving the final des ing. Therm al team m us t as s ure 1 5 5
the final des ign will cope with the previous ly des igned Systems Engineering
trajectory. In cas e that would not be pos s ible, they have
the obligation to com unicate it to the Sys tem s
Engineering team
MA: Wrong trajectory s hape What: Regular m eetings and a good inform ation flux Verification on 28 February
des ign: Pos s ibility of having a between the m is s ion analys is team and the s ys tem s
final m as s different than the engineering team When: To be perfom during February Mission Analysis
one fores een. Critical How: Several iterations will be carried out before
influence in the trajectory
5 5 25 achieving the final des ing. Each iteration will be Systems Engineering
1 5 5
s im ulated.
MA: Des ign of a landing area What: The landing area needed for m eeting the Verification on 28 February
too big for m eeting the requirem ents will be defined by com puting the wors t
requirem ents of tim e res cue pos s ible cas e for an helicopter res cue. A s afety factor of Mission Analysis
for the as tronauts 1.3 will be applied to the nom inal accuracy of the reentry
3 5 15 s pacecraft When: To be perfom during February How:
1 5 5
Inform ation about res cue helicopters and real tim e
res cues will be us ed.
MA: Wrong Trajectory Des ign What:To s tart s im ulation of the whole trajectory taking Continual Follow up
into account the new m as s of the caps ule and
cons traint in the acceleration and therm al profile. When: Mission Analysis Final Verification on 10 of March
To be perfom during firs week of February and to be
5 5 25 iterated during the project until the m as s , and therm al
1 5 5
budget is frozen How: To us e a Sim ulation Program
MA: Wrog Re-entry Trajectory What:To s tart s im ulation of the Re-entry trajectory taking Continual Follow up
Therm al Profile into account the new m as s of the caps ule. When: o be
perfom during firs week of February and to be iterated Mission Analysis Final Verification on 10 of March
during the project until the m as s and therm al budget is
5 5 25 frozen. How: To us e Re-entry Sim ulation Program
1 5 5

204
Technical Report
MA: Wrong Re-entry Trajectory What:To start simulation of the Re-entry trajectory taking Continual Follow up
Accelaration Profile into account the new mass of the capsule When: o be
perfom during firs week of February and to be iterated Mission Analysis Final Verification on 10 of March
5 5 25 during the project until the mass and thermal budget is 1 5 5
frozen. How: To use Re-entry Simulation Program
MA: Selection of Landing sites What:To select Landing sites that are under the ISS Continual Follow up
in a very difficult zone to be Orbit trajectory taking into consideration that even a
reached from the ISS orbit by small change of a few minutes in the orbital time will Mission Analysis Final Verification on 08 of March
the capsule 5 5 25 alter the orbital path the ISS takes over the Earth. When: 1 5 5
To be perfom during third and last week of February.
How: To track ISS orbit and select landing sites under
its path.
MA: Not able to land at the first What: To select three lading sites in sequence (one per Continual Follow up
attempt because of external orbital period – 90min). If the capsule is not able to re-
situations (need of emergency entry in the first window, it will remain orbiting around Mission Analysis Final Verification on 08 of March
landing sites) the Earth. The second orbit will not pass over the same
point and a new entry window will be related with a
5 5 25 different landing site because of the new location over 1 5 5
the Earth. If the capsules fail to re-entry again, a third
landing site will be needed.When: To be perfom during
third and last week of February. How: To track ISS orbit
and select 3 emergency landing sites under its path.
MA: Service Module and What: The debris are expected to land within Continual Follow up
docking mechanism debris designated unpopulated areas. To select three lading
falling in a populated area sites with a debris ellipse, which encompasses a track Mission Analysis Final Verification on 08 of March
approximately 900 nmi (1666.8Km) long from toe-to-
5 5 25 heel, and not infringe on landing and populated areas
1 5 5
When: To be perfom during third and last week of
February. How: To select 3 emergency landing sites
using the debris ellipse.
0 tbd Luis Ganuza/Bruno Sarli/ Carolina Gallardo
Mission Analysis
1 Focal Point: Bruno Sarli
Acceptable
TEAM:
LEGEND
3
5 ALARP (As Low as
9 Reasonably Practicable)
15
Intolerable
25

205
Technical Report
1 2 3 4 5
Idea Evaluation Feasibility Development Implementation Control

After Mitigation
Residual Risk
Category Action Plan: Action Plan: Verification:
Risk Score
Probability
Probability
Severity
Severity
What / When / How Who Action Plan Review / Audit and
1-3-5
Score
1-3-5
1-3-5
1-3-5
Thermal & Structure Gaps Closed
Potential Risk
T&S: Lack of information of What: Determine the exact altitude and velocity in the Verification on 19 February and
the exact altitude and velocity instant of the parachute deployment. Bruno Sarli first week of March
in the instant of the parachute Who: Bruno (in charge of the re-entry trajectory design)
deployment When: A first profile (estimation) should be done as Mireia Joya Continual Follow-up
soon as possible.
3 5 15 How: Start simulations of the Re-entry trajectory and 1 5 5
settle an altitude-velocity profile. Excel, matlab.
NOTE: Bruno Sarli responsible to deliver the information
requested on time to Mireia.
Mireia Responsible for the Altitude and Velocity of
Parachutes.
T&S: Lack of information What: Determine the estimated position of the center of Verification on 06 February
regarding the estimated mass and of the center of pressure in the vehicle.
position of the center of mass Who: Structure Team Structure Team Continual Follow-up
and of the center of pressure When: As it determines the needed shape of the vehicle
in the vehicle.
3 5 15 an estimation should be done by the end of a week
1 5 5
How: Develop a balance of masses in the vehicle using
Excel
T&S: Lack of information of What: Study of the different ejection seats that are Verification on 06 February
the evaluation of the greatest available and the type of parachutes they use. Mireia Joya
shock that the crew and Who: Julie (in charge of crew rescue) and Mireia (in Continual Follow-up
vehicle could bear both on the 3 5 15 charge of the parachute design) Julie Richards 1 5 5
sea and land. When: As soon as possible
How: comparisons, calculations
T&S: Need of the What: Study of the different ejection seats that are Verification on 28 February
determination of the available and the type of parachutes they use. Mireia Joya
maximum altitude where the Who: Julie (in charge of crew rescue) and Mireia (in Continual Follow-up
ejection seats can be used in charge of the parachute design) Julie Richards
order to evaluate the risk of
3 5 15 When: As soon as possible
1 5 5
crew survival. How: comparisons, calculations

206
Technical Report
T&S: The selection of the What: Study of elements needed and their Verification on 12 February
equipment related to the use performances Mireia Joya
of parachutes in the ATV Who: Mireia (in charge of the parachute design) Continual Follow-up
design (accelerometers, g- When: After the complete design of the parachute
swithces, radar altimeter,
3 5 15 How: research on the available equipment
1 5 5
pressure sensors…) is not
done
T&S: Lack of prediction of the What: Perform the parachute design and analyze the Verification on 28 February
horizontal distance that the worst case situation (in terms of wind, point of Mireia Joya
crew capsule will cover after deployment…) to determine the horizontal distance. Continual Follow-up
the deployment of the Who: Mireia (in charge of the parachute design)
parachute in order to specify
3 5 15 When: Once the point of deployment is obtained
1 5 5
or delimit the landing site. How: calculations
T&S: Lack of Determination of What: Start simulations of the Re-entry trajectory Verification on 06 February (task
the required energy (extra including the velocity direction. Calculate the worst case Mireia Joya delegation)
propellant) to modify the (max. Δangle between the desired velocity vector and the
arrival direction in case of an current one). Verification on 19 February
error in the trajectory or
3 5 15 Who: To be designed
1 5 5
modification of the landing When: After the end of the altitude-velocity profile Continual Follow-up
site determination phase
How: calculations
Thermal & Stucture

0 tbd
1 Focal Point: Mireia Joya
Acceptable
TEAM:
LEGEND
3
5 ALARP (As Low as
15
Intolerable
25

207
Technical Report

After Mitigation
Category
Residual Risk
Action Plan: Action Plan: Verification:
Risk Score
Probability
Probability
Severity
Severity
1-3-5
Score
1-3-5
1-3-5
1-3-5
Thermal & Structure
Gaps Closed
Potential Risk
T&S: Lack of reentry heat flux What:Obtain the values through CFD analysis When: To Verification on 01 and 06 and 28
parmaters from the orbit be perfomed during January How: To use Fluent and of February
analysis Gambit to shape the cabin and simulate it in a Thermal Protection
3 5 15 hypersonic flow. System Team Continual Follow-up by System
1 5 5
Engineering Team
T&S: Fracture of the Thermal What:To find materials able to resist this impacts in a Verification on 06 February
shield due to micrometeorites LEO orbit When: To be perfomed during third week
or debris. January How: To analyse the fragility of several Thermal Protection Continual Follow-up
3 5 15 materials and choose the most resistants ones. System Team
1 5 5
T&S: Oversize the Thermal What: Compare the results to previous Earth reentry Verification on 15 February
protection shield. This leads vehicles conveniently tested. When: To be perfomed
to an increase of the during the second week of February How: Searching Thermal Protection Continual Follow-up
temperature inside the cabin 5 5 25 from previous Earth reentry vehicles and comparing the System Team 1 5 5
due to the high conduction thermal protection shields.
and low convection of the
ablative shield.
T&S: Dimensionate a thinner What: Compare the results to previous Earth reentry Verification on 15 February
Thermal protection shield. vehicles conveniently tested. When: To be perfomed
This can lead to a complete during the second week of February How: Searching Thermal Protection
failure of the mission. 5 5 25 from previous Earth reentry vehicles and comparing the System Team Continual Follow-up by System 1 5 5
thermal protection shields. Engineering Team
Thermal & Stucture

0 tbd
1 Focal Point: Robert Guilanya
Acceptable
TEAM:
LEGEND
3
5 ALARP (As Low as
15
Intolerable
25

208
Technical Report

After Mitigation
Category
Residual Risk
Risk Score
Probability
Probability
Severity
Severity
1-3-5
Score
1-3-5
1-3-5
1-3-5
ECLS Gaps Closed
Potential Risk
ECLS: Up to now, I am the only What: A second person in the team will be in charge of Verification on 28 February
one in charge of this taking my responsibility in case I need to be absent. Luis Ganuza
Subsystem. If I would need to When: During all the project How: This person will be
be absent or to leave the 3 5 15 aware of the work done about ECLS during the whole Robert Guilanya 3 1 3
project, the team would be in project
a critical situation.
ECLS: The equipment that will What:Regular meetings with the Systems Engineering Verification on 5 March
be design may overpass the team will be carried out When: During all the project ECLS
foreseen power and mass How: Regular iterations and a seek for lighter and with
budgets. 3 5 15 lower consumption equipments will be carried out. If any System Engineering 1 3 3
better equipments where founded, ECLS requirements
must prevail since ECLS has a critical importance for
the crew´s survival
0 tbd Focal Point: Luis Ganuza

1
Acceptable
LEGEND
TEAM:
ECLS
3
5 ALARP (As Low as
15
Intolerable
25

209
Technical Report
M: Not finish the report on What:Organize the work in order to finish the work Verification on 05 March
time before the deadline. When: Monitoring each time the
3 5 15 evoution of the work How: Using the Project Manager Project Leader Continual Follow-up 1 5 5
tools
M: When the final report is What: The report should be reviewed at least by 3 14th March
submitted with divergent 5 3 15 different people. When: 2nd week of March How: After Project Leader 3 3 9
ideas finished, 3 people will analyse independently the final
report. th
M: The result of the project is What: The Poject Manager should inform the customer December 26
not alligned with the customer frequently about the progress of the project When: 3 Project Leader February 1 st
expectatives. 3 5 15 different times (Dec 09, Jan 10, Feb 10) How: Producing
March 1
st 1 5 5
early reports about the project.
0 tbd Management Team
Management
1 Team Leader: Robert Ganuza
LEGEND
TEAM:
Acceptable
3
5 ALARP (As Low as
15
Intolerable
25

210
Technical Report

After Mitigation
Category
Residual Risk
Risk Score
Probability
Probability
Severity
Severity
1-3-5
Score
1-3-5
1-3-5
1-3-5
SE Gaps Closed
Potential Risk
SE: A team does not update What: Each team should share all their updates and Everybody Verification on 5 March
its last results that might be progress with the system team, which will then provide
required for others.In such a the required the useful information to the other teams. System Enigeering Continual follow up
case other teams could make 3 5 15 When: During all the project. How: Mailing the files to Team 1 5 5
their analysis with the wrong the SE team, with specifying the version of the file.
files, and so on. That would
be a terrible situation!
SE: A team is late on its work. What: Each team has to anticipate its delay and warn Everybody
The other teams might need the Management team and System team about it so that
the outputs (of the late team) we can get ready for that situation. When: During all the System Enigeering Continual follow up
to start some of its tasks.It will 3 3 9 project How: Any time this situation occurs, just let know Team 1 5 5
induce a delay on all the by email or during any meeting but ASAP the System
project. and Management teams.
SE: A team might go beyond What:Regular meetings with the Systems Engineering Everybody Verification on 5 March
its tasks, or being mistaken team will be carried out and any initiative has to be
on the work it should achieve. reported to SE. When: During all the project How: each System Enigeering Continual follow up
For instance a specific team 3 3 9 team must always be aware of what it has to do, Team 1 5 5
could work hours on objectives and process, in the case there is a doubt it
something we don't really should refer to SE. Inform SE of all initiatives that were
need and it would be a loss of not planned.
time.
Sudeh Kamali / Vincent Domingie

SystemEnginering
0 tbd
1
Acceptable
TEAM:
LEGEND
3
5 ALARP (As Low as
15
Intolerable
25

211
Technical Report
Appendix 2 – Catia plans

212
Technical Report
Appendix 3 – Thermal Protection Comparison

Trajectory Geometry
Velocity at
Entry angle Entry velocity
Mission peak heat Shape Nose radius (m) Vehicle mass (kg)
(º) (km/s)
Planet re-entry (km/s)
Apollo AS-201 -8.58 7.67 5.73 Capsule 33º cone 4,69 m, 3 m effective ?
Apollo AS-202 -3.59 8.29 7.77 Capsule 33º cone 4,69 m, 3 m effective ?
Apollo 4 -6.92 11.14 10.25 Capsule 33º cone 4,69 m, 3 m effective 5424.90
Apollo 6 -5.90 10.00 8.32 Capsule 33º cone 4,69 m, 3 m effective 5424.90
EARTH Paet -40.80 6.60 5.60 Blunt nosed 55º half cone angle 0.46 62.10
Hayabusa -13.80 11.70 10.20 45º sphere cone 0.20 16.27
Genesis -8.00 11.00 9.20 59,81º blunt cone 0.43 210.00
Stardust -8.20 12.80 11.10 Blunt nosed 60º half angle cone 0.23 45.80
ARD -2.60 8.01 ? Apollo like capsule 3.36 2715.00
Mirka -2.51 7.30 6.51 Spherical 0.50 154.00
Viking Lander I -16.99 4.61 4.02 70º sphere cone 0.88 980.00
Mars exploration rovers -11.50 5.55 4.93 70º sphere cone 0.66 836.00
MARS Beagle 2 -15.80 5.63 4.70 60º sphere cone 0.42 68.46
Pathfinder -14.06 7.26 6.61 70º sphere cone 0.66 585.30
Viking Lander II -17.80 4.74 4.00 Blunt nosed 70º half cone 0.88 981.50
Pioneer Venus North probe -68.70 11.54 10.50 Blunt nosed 45º half cone angle 0.19 91.00
VENUS Pioneer Venus Night Probe -41.50 11.54 10.40 Blunt nosed 45º half cone angle 0.19 91.00
Pioneer Venus Day Probe -25.40 11.54 10.40 Blunt nosed 45º half cone angle 0.19 91.00
Pioneer Venus Sounder -32.40 11.54 10.50 Blunt nosed 45º half cone angle 0.36 316.48
JUPITER Galileo -6.64 59.92 39.00 Blunt nosed 44.86º half cone angle 0.22 335.00
TITAN Huygens -65.40 6.00 5.10 60º sphere cone 1.25 319.00

213
Technical Report
Mission Aero/thermal TPS

Heating
Peak Heat
Loads Thickness at
flux w/cm2 TPS mass
Planet reentry L/D J/cm2 Material stagnation point Kind of TPS
(stagnation fraction (%)
(stagnation (cm)
point)
point)
Partial Ablative/ Not
Apollo AS-201 -19,7<α<21,3 7600 186.00 AVCO 5026-39 HC see note 13.70
ejectable
Apollo AS-202 0,28<L/D<0,33 24000 107.00 AVCO 5026-39 HC/G see note 13.70
ejectable
Apollo 4 0,37<L/D<0,44 43000 490.00 AVCO 5026-39 HC/G see note 13.70
ejectable
Apollo 6 0,35<L/D<0,4 32000 240.00 AVCO 5026-39 HC/G see note 13.70
ejectable
Nose: 1-2,5;
EARTH Paet 0 1450 174.00 Berryllium Ablative/Not ejectable 13.70
conical: 0,76
Hayabusa 0 32000 1500.00 Carbon phenolic 3.00 Ablative/Ejectable 43.00
Partially Ablative/Not
Genesis 0 16600 700.00 Fore: Carbon carbon; Aft: SLA 561V 6.00 18.00
ejectable
PICA-18 Phenolic Impregnated Carbon
Stardust 0 36000 1200.00 5.82 Ablative/Not ejectable 22.00
Ablator
Silia fibers with phenolic resin; cork powder Low Ablative/Not
ARD α=-21,2 17700 110.00 4-6,5 23.00
and phenoloic resin ejectable
Carbon Fiber reinforced plastic + surface
Mirka 0 12000 120.00 front: 3; back: 2 Ablative/Not ejectable 36.00
ablator

214
Technical Report
SLA-561V (Super Light

Viking Lander I α=-11,1 1100 21.02 1.38 Ablative/Not ejectable 2.80
weight Ablator)
SLA-561V (Super Light

Mars exploration rovers 0 3687 44.00 1.57 Ablative/Ejectable 3.60
weight Ablator)
MARS Beagle 2 0 2449 72.28 Norcoat Liege 8.00 Ablative/Ejectable 9.20
Pathfinder 0 3864.5 105.87 SLA-561V/SLA-561S 1.90 Ablative/Not ejectable 6.20
Viking Lander II 0.18 1050 21.40 SLA-561V 1.38 Ablative/Ejectable 2.80
Pioneer Venus North probe 0 11700 7200.00 Carbon phenolic 1.20 Ablative/Not ejectable 12.90
VENUS Pioneer Venus Night Probe 0 12500 5500.00 Carbon phenolic 1.20 Ablative/Not ejectable 12.90
Pioneer Venus Day Probe 0 14000 3900.00 Carbon phenolic 1.20 Ablative/Not ejectable 12.90
Pioneer Venus Sounder 0 12400 4500.00 Carbon phenolic 1.60 Ablative/Ejectable 8.38
JUPITER Galileo 0 200000 17000.00 Carbon phenolic 14.60 Ablative/Ejectable 45.40
Fore: Phenoli Silicia

TITAN Huygens 0 40000 50.00 1.80 Ablative/Ejectable 25.00
fibers/Aft:Prosial
Phenolic Impregnated Carbon Ablator Note:

Super Light weight Ablator - TPS thick ness: Ablator = 4.32 cm, braised stainless steel substructure (PH 15-7 MO) = 5.08 cm
- Insulation: (TG-15,000) = 2.03 cm, aluminum honeycomb (2014-T6 and 5052-H39) = 3.81 cm

215

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Technical Report

Lucas DE MENDOCA FONSECA

ITP – Design of a manned re-entry vehicle

ITP – Design of a manned re-entry vehicle

ITP – Design of a manned re-entry vehicle

2.1.10.2 Operational policies & constraints ........................................................... 24

General constraints ....................................................................................................... 24

Operational constraints ............................................................................................... 25

2.2 Functional analysis ......................................................................... 29

ITP – Design of a manned re-entry vehicle

4.2 Expected results and methodology for a Phase 0 project .. 58

5.3 Introduction to Trajectory Design ............................................. 72

ITP – Design of a manned re-entry vehicle

5.6 Earth’s Physical Characteristics.................................................. 76

5.8 Entry Corridor................................................................................... 85

ITP – Design of a manned re-entry vehicle

5.9.1 First landing site ................................................................................................ 96

ITP – Design of a manned re-entry vehicle

6.3.2 Airbag landing system ...................................................................................138

7 Structures ................................................................................... 143

 DASA 40 kgf hydrazine attitude control thrusters ...... 144

9 Power ........................................................................................... 159

ITP – Design of a manned re-entry vehicle

9.4 New solar array dimension estimation ..................................163

ITP – Design of a manned re-entry vehicle

14.5 Fire Detection and Suppression System ................................184

ITP – Design of a manned re-entry vehicle

ITP – Design of a manned re-entry vehicle

LDS Lunar Departure Stage

ITP – Design of a manned re-entry vehicle

Based on the interest of the space community on a manned re-entry vehicle as

1.2 Mission objectives

 To carry three astronauts

1.3 Project requirements

Performances Re-entry specifications

ITP – Design of a manned re-entry vehicle

1.4 Mission overview

Figure 1 - Overview of the different phases of the mission

1.5 Report structure

ITP – Design of a manned re-entry vehicle

2.1 Concept of Operations (ConOps)

The main objectives here are

 Document the total

Figure 2 - ConOps process

ITP – Design of a manned re-entry vehicle

ITP – Design of a manned re-entry vehicle

2.1.5 Process activities

Explore project concepts through several scenarios and trade-off.

Figure 3 - ConOps contents

ITP – Design of a manned re-entry vehicle

2.1.7 Referenced documents

Documents produced ConOps use

Figure 4 - Referenced documents (cf. Fig.3)

ITP – Design of a manned re-entry vehicle

2.1.8 Existing system – ATV “Jules Verne”

2.1.8.2 Operational policies & constraints

ITP – Design of a manned re-entry vehicle

2.1.8.3 System description & operational environment

Figure 5 - ATC operational environment

ITP – Design of a manned re-entry vehicle

2.1.8.4 Modes of operation

2.1.8.5 Users & stakeholders

ITP – Design of a manned re-entry vehicle