RODOLFO SORIA et al vs. HON.

ANIANO DESIERTO et al
G.R. Nos. 153524-25. January 31, 2005
Justice Chico-Nazario

FACTS:

Petitioners Rodolfo Soria and Edimar Bista were arrested on May 13, 2001 (a Sunday and the
day before May 14 elections) without a warrant by respondents for alleged illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition. One police identified Bista to have a standing warrant of arrest for violation of BP Blg.
6.From the time of Soria’s detention up to the time of his release, 22 hours had already elapsed and Bista
was detained for 26 days.
The crimes for which Soria was arrested without warrant are punishable by correctional penalties or their
equivalent, thus, criminal complaints or information should be filed with the proper judicial authorities
within 18 hours of his arrest. The crimes for which Bista was arrested are punishable by afflictive or
capital penalties, or their equivalent, thus, he could only be detained for 36 hours without criminal
complaints or information having been filed with the proper judicial authorities.
Article 125 stated that Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. - The
penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee
who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper
judicial authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light
penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional
penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or
capital penalties, or their equivalent.
Petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for Military Affairs a complaint- affidavit for
violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code against herein private respondents. The office dismissed
the complaint for lack of merit. Petitioners then filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied
for lack of merit in the second assailed Resolution.

ISSUE:

WON officers of the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused their discretion in dismissing the
complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (Delay in the delivery of detained
persons)

HELD:

Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of
the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law.

17
No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the respondents. Their disposition of petitioners'
complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be said to have been conjured
out of thin air as it was properly backed up by law and jurisprudence.
Regarding the complaint of Soria, based on applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election day or a special
holiday, should not be included in the computation of the period prescribed by law for the filing of
complaint/information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it being a 'no-office day. Hence, there
could be no arbitrary detention or violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the same vein, the complaint of Bista against the respondents for Violation of Article 125, will not
prosper because the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law for the filing of the
complaint against him from the time of his arrest was tolled by one day (election day). Moreover, he has
a standing warrant of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and he could only be released if he has no other
pending criminal case requiring his continuous detention.

18
 ARTICLE 152 Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in Authority

PEOPLE VS. CARPIZO

80 Phil. 234, G.R. No. L-1424, February 17, 1948

FACTS:

On or about the 29th day of April, 1946, in the municipality of Jolo, Province of Sulu, the said
accused being the husband of Mrs. Martina Carpizo, the creditor of provincial voucher No. A-2250,
which voucher is on pre-audit in the possession of Eutiquio de la Victoria, clerk, duly appointed in the
office of the Provincial Auditor of Sulu, and while the said Eutiquio de la Victoria was in the point of
writing on the typewriter the tentative suspension of said voucher No. A-2250, for being defective
attacked the said Eutiquio de la Victoria and took hold of his neck with his left hand and at the same time
inflicted upon him a fistic blow on his left cheek which produced a contusion thereon and scratches on
the left arm, which injuries have required and will require medical attendance for a period of four days
and have incapacitated and incapacitate him in the customary performance of his official duties as such
clerk for the same period of time. He was charged with assault upon an agent of authority with slight
physical injuries but later on filed a motion to quash based on the ground that the facts alleged in the said
information do not constitute the crime charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a clerk is a person in authority

HELD:

No. A mere clerk in the provincial auditor's office is not a person in authority or an agent of a
person in authority. A person in authority, in the words of article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, is "any
person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or
governmental corporation, board or commission;" while an agent of a person in authority is one who, by
direct provisions of law, or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of
public order and the protection and security of life and property, or who comes to the aid of a person in
authority. Even if, it be possible that this particular clerk might be clothed with functions that bring him
under the above definition of an agent of a person in authority, still such functions must be clearly shown
in the information. Merely to say that a clerk is an agent of a person in authority is a conclusion of the
law. Therefore the offense is of slight physical injuries, formerly a mere misdemeanor, and punishable
with arrestomenor. The order of the lower court granting the motion to quash is affirmed.

RATIO:A mere clerk in the provincial auditor’s office is not a person in authority or an agent of a person
in authority as provided in Article 152 of the revised Penal Code.

19
 ARBITRARY DETENTION (ART. 124)
BENITO ASTORGA, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 154130 October 1, 2003
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:

On September 1, 1997, a team was sent to the island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct
intelligence gathering and forest protection operations in line with the government’s campaign against
illegal logging.
Upon investigation of the group, Mayor Astorga was found to be the owner of two boats. A heated
altercation ensued and Mayor Astorga called for reinforcements. Ten armed men arrived in the scene.
The offended parties were then brought to Mayor Astorga’s house where they had dinner and drinks and
left at 2:30am. SPO1 Capoquian were allowed to go down from the house, but not to leave the barangay.
On the other hand, SPO3 Cinco and the rest just sat in the house until 2:00 a.m. when the team was finally
allowed to leave.

ISSUE:

Whether Mayor Astorga is guilty of arbitrary detention.

HELD:

Yes. Mayor Astorga is guilty of arbitrary detention. Arbitrary Detention is committed by any
public officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains a person. The elements of the crime are:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee. 2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.
In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas, the witnesses and the
complainants were not allowed by petitioner to go home. This refusal was quickly followed by the call
for and arrival of almost a dozen "reinforcements," all armed with military-issue rifles, who proceeded
to encircle the team, weapons pointed at the complainants and the witnesses. Given such circumstances,
we give credence to SPO1 Capoquian’s statement that it was not "safe" to refuse Mayor Astorga’s orders.
It was not just the presence of the armed men, but also the evident effect these gunmen had on the actions
of the team which proves that fear was indeed instilled in the minds of the team members, to the extent
that they felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The intent to prevent the departure of the
complainants and witnesses against their will is thus clear.

20
 ELI LUI and LEO ROJAS, vs. SPOUSES EULOGIO and PAULINA MATILLANO

G.R. No. 141176. May 27, 2004

FACTS:

That plaintiffs are merchants by occupation and have been residing in Bansalan, Davao del Sur,
for several years. They are law-abiding and peaceful citizens in the community. That at about 3:00 oclock
in the afternoon of November 6, 1988, while plaintiff husband was away from his residential house at
Lily St., Bansalan, Davao del Sur, and plaintiff wife was there tending the house, defendants, without
any lawful search warrant, arrived and thru intimidation succeeded in searching the house owned by the
plaintiff after which they brought with them two floor mats, two pairs of ladies shoes, two pairs of pants,
two polo shirts, two T-shirts, one Relova wrist watch, one necklace (sinubong), one ring (sinubong) and
several old coins, without the consent of the plaintiffs and without even giving any receipt for the items
taken. That the defendants allegedly wanted to recover the items taken by one Elinito Lariosa but
defendants thru the use of naked power and brute force, illegally searched the house of the herein
plaintiffs in gross violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Paulina Matillano consented to the petitioners entry into her house,
as well as to the taking of the clothes, shoes and pieces of jewelry owned by her and her family.

RULING:

The evidence of the respondents show that the petitioners, Tan and Mendoza, guns drawn and
with the handcuffed Lariosa in tow, kicked the kitchen door and barged into the house of the
respondents. They proceeded to the sala where respondent Paulina Matillano was. Over her vehement
protests, and because of petitioner Luis warning that she might be harmed, respondent Paulina Matillano
was forced to accompany the petitioner and his cohorts to the second floor of their house. Petitioner
Rojas reliance on Mission Order No. MRF-A-004-98 issued to him by Sergeant Alberto Genise is
misplaced. It bears stressing that the petitioner was merely tasked in the said order to follow up a theft
case within the area of responsibility of the Metrodiscom, Davao City. The petitioner was not authorized,
under the said order, to commit or tolerate the commission of a crime, such as violation of domicile as
defined in Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code.

21
 T-2 VIOLATION OF DOMICILE
EDIGARDO GEROCHE, et al, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 179080 November 26, 2014
Justice Peralta

FACTS:
That at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of May 14, 1989, the above-named accused
EDIGARDO GEROCHE, being a Barangay Captain and the rest being CAFGUs, hence, persons in
authority, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with garand rifles, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without proper judicial order, entered the house of
ROBERTO MALLO by forcibly breaking the door of said house against the will of the occupants thereof,
search the effects of the house without the previous consent of the owner and then mauled one of the
occupant BARILIANO LIMBAG inflicting injuries to the latter.

Baleriano Limbag (Baleriano) testified that the crime happened around 10:00 o’clock in the
evening of May 14, 1989 inside his house. He roused from sleep when petitioners, who were not armed
with search warrant, suddenly entered the house by destroying the main door. The petitioners mauled
him, striking with a garand rifle, which caused his injuries. They looked for firearms but instead found
and took away his airgun.

It was alleged in the Information that petitioner Geroche was a Barangay Captain while
petitioners Garde and Marfil were members of Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of the crime of Violation of Domicile under Article 128
of the Revised Penal Code

HELD:
Yes, the petitioners are guilty of the crime of Violation of Domicile. In their judicial
admissions, in their testimony before the open court as well as in the pleadings they filed, neither
Geroche denied that he was a barangay captain nor Garde and Marfil refuted that they were CAFGU
members. In holding such positions, they are considered as public officers/employees.

Under Article 128 of the RPC, violation of Domicile is committed by any public officer or
employee, not being authorized by judicial order, shall enter any dwellings against the will of the owner
thereof, search papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner, or
having surreptitiously entered said dwelling, and being required to leave the premises, shall refuse to do
so. And the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (two [2] years,
four [4] months and one [1] day to six [6] years) if Violation of Domicile be committed at nighttime or
if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search
made by the offender. In this case, petitioners barged in the house of Baleriano while they were sleeping
at night and, in addition, they took away with them his airgun.

22
Art. 125: Delay in the Delivery of Detained Persons to the Proper Judicial Authorities

People vs. Garcia

G.R. No. 126252, August 30, 1999
Justice Puno

FACTS:

On Nov. 18, 1994 herein accused Jesus Garcia boarded a jeep carrying a plastic bag, and occupied
the seat next to the driver. Also in that jeepney two policeman who were in civilian clothes. After herein
accused boarder smelled marijuana of which seemed to emanate from the plastic bag carried by Garcia.
To confirm their suspicion, they decided to follow the accused when he gets of the jeepney. When the
two policeman were certain that it was indeed marijuana that the accused was in possession they quickly
identified themselves and arrested Garcia. The accused after the arrest was turned over to the CIS office
at the Baguio Water district compound for further investigation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was delay in the delivery of the person as provided for in Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code?

RULING:
NO. The Sc held that there was no irregularity with the turn over of the appellants to the CIS
office. It was clarified that this has been the practice of the arresting officers as their office had previously
arranged with the CIS for assistance with respect to investigations of suspected criminals, the CIS office
being more specialized in the area of investigation. Neither can the police officers be held liable for
arbitrarily detaining appellant at the CIS office. Art. 125 of the RPC, penalizes a public officer who shall
detain another for some legal ground and fail to deliver him to the proper authorities for 36 hours for
crimes punishable by the afflictive or capital penalties. In the present case, the record bears that appellant
was arrested for possession of 5 kls. Of marijuana in Nov. 28, 1994 at 2 p.m. a crime punishable with
reclusion perpetua to death. He was detained for further investigation and delivered by the arresting
officers to the court in the afternoon of the next day. Clearly, the detention of appellant for purposes of
investigation did not exceed the duration allowed by law. i.e., 36 hours from the time of his arrest.

23
 PAPA ET AL VS MAGO

G.R. No. L-27360; 28 Feb 1968; 22 SCRA 857

Justice Zaldivar

FACTS:

Mago, the owner of the goods that were seized, when the truck transporting the goods was
intercepted by the BOC, questioned the validity of the search conducted by them since it was made
without any search warrant and whether the BOC has jurisdiction over the forfeited goods.

ISSUE:

Was the search conducted by the BOC valid?

HELD:

Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without
any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said
warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of
the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or
building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and
any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in the
search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and
searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." It is our considered view,
therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority
under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of
customs laws.
In, Carroll vs US, it was made lawful for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within
their own and adjoining districts, but also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on
which or whom they should suspect there was merchandise which was subject to duty, or had been
introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person in charge of the
vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they should find any goods, wares, or merchandise thereon, which
they had probably cause to believe had been so unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and secure
the same, and the vehicle or beast as well, for trial and forfeiture.

24
 JASPER AGBAY VS. DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR MILITARY
G.R. No. 134503, July 2, 1999
Justice Gonzaga-Reyes

FACTS:

On September 7, 1997 Jasper Agbay together with a Sherwin Jugalbot were arrested and detained
at the Liloan Police Station by herein private respondent policemen. They were arrested for an alleged
violation of R.A. 7160. The following day a complaint for violation of said law was filed against the two
accused before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu by one Gicarya for and behalf
of her daughter Gayle.

On September 10, 1997 the petitioner argued to the Chief of Police that they be released,
considering that the latter had failed to deliver the detained petitioner to the proper judicial authority
within 36 hours from Sept. 7, 1997.

The Main argument of herein petitioners that they were not delivered to the proper judicial
authority, hence herein private respondent policemen were in violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal
Code. Petitioner contends that the act of Gicarya in filing the complaint before the MCTC was for the
purposes of P.I. as the MCTC has no jurisdiction to try the case, thus not falling within the requirements
of Art. 25.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a violation of Art. 125 of the RPC?

DECISION:

NO. The SC Held that upon filing of the Complaint to the MCTC, the intent behind Art. 125 of
the RPC is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained person is informed of the crime imputed
against him and, upon his application with the court, he may be released on bail. Petitioner himself
acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order release when he applied for and was granted his release
upon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying Art. 125 of the RPC has been duly served with the
MCTC. That the filing of the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in said Article.

25
 CARLOS CELDRAN Y PAMINTUAN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 220127 March 21, 2018

FACTS:

In celebration of the second anniversary of the May They Be One Campaign (MTBC) and the
launching of the Hand Written Bible which coincided with the feast of Saint Jerome, a throng of people
composed mainly of catholic dignitaries intermixed with those different religions such as members of
the military, police, media, non-catholics, students, representatives of various religious organizations
gathered around the Manila Cathedral in the afternoon of September 30, 2010.While Brother Edgar J.
Tria was a reading a passage from the Bible around 3:00PM, petitioner entered the Manila Cathedral clad
in a black suit and a hat. Petitioner went to the center of the aisle, in front of the altar and suddenly
brought out a placard emblazoned with the word “DAMASO.” Commotion ensued when petitioner
started shouting while inside the church saying “Bishops, stop involving yourself in politics,” disrupting
and showing disrespect to an otherwise solemn celebration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner is guilty of the crime of Offending Religious Feelings under Art. 133
of the RPC

HELD:
Yes. The Higher Court ruled that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, only questions of law may be raised. Any resolution as to questions of fact will not be
entertained by the Court. The findings of fact made by the trial courts are accorded the highest degree of
respect especially when the MeTC, the RTC and the CA have similar findings. Absent any clear showing
of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower court[s], its findings of facts, especially
when affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive upon this Court. The question of whether petitioner
offended the religious feelings of those who were present during the celebration of the MTBC is a
question of fact which will not be entertained in the present petition

26
 ARTICLE 147 Illegal Associations

PEOPLE VS. FERRER

48 SCRA 382, G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972

FACTS:

On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was
filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. On March 10 Judge
Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co,
directed the Government prosecutors to file the corresponding information.

"That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, feloniously
became an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and
illegal organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence,
deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a
totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control and domination of an alien power, by
being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of the New People’s
Army, the military arm of the said Communist Party of the Philippines. Co moved to quash on the ground
that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.

Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, charging the
respondent NiloTayag and five others with subversion. On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash,
impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it
embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denies him the equal
protection of the laws.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder

2) Whether or not the Anti-Subversion Act is vague and embraces more than one subject
3) Whether or not the Anti-Subversion Act denies the equal protection of the laws

HELD:

1) No. it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members
of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become
a bill of attainder.
2) No. What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in the title of the Act is the last proviso of
section 4 which reads: "And provided, finally, That one who conspires with any other person to
overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, or the government of any of its

27
 political subdivisions by force, violence, deceit, subversion or illegal means, for the purpose of
placing such Government or political subdivision under the control and domination of any lien
power, shall be punished by prision correccional to prision mayor with all the accessory penalties
provided therefor in the same code." The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlaw the
Communist Party of the Philippines and Similar Associations, Penalizing Membership Therein,
and for Other Purposes"), has a short title. Section 1 provides that "This Act shall be known as
the Anti-Subversion Act." Together with the main title, the short title of the statute unequivocally
indicates that the subject-matter is subversion in general which has for its fundamental purpose
the substitution of a foreign totalitarian regime in place of the existing Government and not
merely subversion by Communist conspiracies. The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an
index of its contents, and need not recite the details of the Act. It is a valid title if it indicates in
broad but clear terms the nature, scope, and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
A narrow or technical construction is to be avoided, and the statute will be read fairly and
reasonably in order not to thwart the legislative intent.
3) The Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the Government by force, violence or other
illegal means. Whatever interest in freedom of speech and freedom of association is infringed by
the prohibition against knowing membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines, is so
indirect and so insubstantial as to be clearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding
considerations of national security and the preservation of democratic institutions in this country.

28