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2. Whether or not the bail bond should be cancelled for failure to abide by the basic
requirement that the prosecution be heard in a case where the accused ischarged with a
capital offense, prior to bail being granted.
Held:
Change of venue
Change of venue has become moot and academic with the transfer of the case to
Bacolod City. However, the case proceeds with this discussion:
The witnesses in the case are fearful of their lives. They are afraid they would be
killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because
of this fear, they may either refuse to testify or testify falsely to save their lives.
Right of bail
The bail bonds must be cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of Executive Judge
Alfonso Baguio for such hearing.
Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense
be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all
the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the
motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action,
the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation
of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be
considered void on that ground.
Justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness
must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true. This
norm which is of the very essence of due process as the embodiment of justice requires
that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of
guilt. It does not suffice, as asserted herein, that the questions asked by the municipal
judge before bail was granted could be characterized as searching. That fact did not cure
an infirmity of a jurisdictional character. (People vs. Sola, G.R. No. L-56158-64 March 17,
1981)
MANIAGO V. CA (G.R. NO. 104392)
One of the shuttle buses owned by petitioner Ruben Maniago, and driven by Herminio
Andaya, figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by
respondent Boado along Loakan Road, Baguio City.
A criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple
physical injuries was filed against petitioner’s driver. A month later, respondent Boado
filed a civil case for damages against petitioner Maniago himself. Petitioner moved that
the civil case be suspended citing that a criminal case was already pending.
The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the civil action could proceed
independently of the criminal action. On appeal to CA, petitioner reiterated his
contention adding that the civil action could not proceed because no reservation to
bring it separately was made in the criminal case. CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Issue: Whether or not the civil action may proceed independently of the criminal action when
no reservation of right to bring it separately was made.
Ruling: NO. SC reached the conclusion that the right to bring an action for damages under the
Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule III, §1, otherwise it should be dismissed.
To begin with, §1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute
separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be
deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case.
Such civil actions are not limited to those which arise “from the offense charged,” as
originally provided in Rule III before the amendment of the Rules of Court in 1988. In
other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil
liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of
the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the
criminal action.
ISSUES:
1. WHETHER THE COURT IS WITHOUT POWER TO CO MPEL HIM TO
B E CO ME A M EMBE R O F T HE I N TEG R ATE D B AR O F TH E
PHILIPPINES.
HELD:
1. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of Edillon’s
constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate
with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of
the regulatory program — the lawyers.
But, assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member
of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the
State.
2. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Court, to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section
5 of the 1973 Constitution) — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers
are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to
which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.
3. Whether the practice of law is a property right, the respondent’s right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry.
And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not
void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But it must be emphasized that the practice of law is not a property right but
a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to
exact compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the
name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and
supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion.
Respondent Marcial A. Edillon is disbarred, and his name was ordered to be stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
In re: Judge Manzano
An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City Committees on
Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees.
Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is provided that—
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shag
not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art.
VIII, Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice,
which discharges an administrative function, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is
constrained to deny his request.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig
(39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:
This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or
unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form
part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases
contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society.
Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance
to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such
assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.