SUSAN HAACK

THE TWO F A C E S OF Q U I N E ' S N A T U R A L I S M *

ABSTRACT. Quine's 'naturalized epistemology' is ambivalent between a modest natu-

ralism according to which epistemology is an a posteriori discipline, an integral part of
the web of empirical belief, and a scientistic naturalism according to which epistemology
is to be conducted wholly within the natural sciences. This ambivalence is encouraged
by Quine's ambiguous use of "science", to mean sometimes, broadly, 'our presumed
empirical knowledge' and sometimes, narrowly, 'the natural sciences'. Quine's modest
naturalism is reformist, tackling the traditional epistemological problems in a novel way;
his scientistic naturalism is revolutionary, requiring restriction and reconceptualization of
epistemological problems. In particular, his scientistic naturalism trivializes the question
of the epistemic standing of the natural sciences, whereas modest naturalism takes it
seriously, and can offer a plausible answer.

Quine characterizes naturalism thus:

[N]aturalism: abandonment of the goal of a first philosophy . . . . The naturalistic philo-

sopher begins his reasoning with the inherited world theory as a going concern. He
tentatively believes all of it, but believes also that some unidentified portions are wrong.
He tries to improve, clarify and understand the system from within. He is the busy sailor
adrift on Neurath's boat.

He also characterizes naturalism thus:

[Naturalism] sees science as an inquiry into reality, fallible and corrigible but not answer-
able to any suprascientific tribunal, and not in need of any justification beyond observation
and the hypothetico-deductive method. Naturalism has two sources, both negative. One
of them is despair of being able to define theoretical terms generally in terms of phenom-
ena . . . . The o t h e r . . , is an unregenerate realism, the robust state of mind of the natural
scientist who has never felt any qualms beyond the negotiable uncertainties internal to
science . . . .
Naturalism does not repudiate epistemology, but assimilates it to empirical psychology.
Science itself tells us that our information about the world is limited to irritations of our
surfaces, and then the epistemological question is in turn a question within science, the
question how we human animals can have managed to arrive at science from such limited
information. Our scientific epistemologist pursues this inquiry and comes out with an
account which has a good deal to do with the learning of language and the neurology of
perception . . . . Evolution and natural selection will doubtless figure in this account, and
he will feel free to apply physics if he sees a way.

Synthese 94: 335-356, 1993.

© 1993 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Primed in the Netherlands.
336 SUSAN HAACK

The picture presented in the first of these quotations is of an approach

which sees epistemology not as a separate, distinctively philosophical,
a priori discipline, but as an integral and interlocking part of the whole
web of our beliefs about the world. T h e r e is nothing to suggest that
this, as I shall call it, modest naturalism, poses any challenge to the
legitimacy of the traditional epistemological questions: W h a t are the
criteria for assessing the worth of evidence for a belief?; W h a t is the
connection between a belief's satisfying these criteria and the likelihood
that it is true?; D o we really know what we take ourselves to know?;
and so on - it sounds, so to speak, reformist in character.
But the picture presented in the second quotation is of an approach
which sees epistemology as internal to the natural sciences, as assimi-
lated, in effect, to empirical psychology. Despite Quine's disavowal of
any intention to repudiate epistemology, this, as I shall call it, scientistic
naturalism seems as if it will involve significant restriction and revision
of the traditional epistemological concerns. A t any rate, it rests, we are
told, on an " u n r e g e n e r a t e realism" which declines to take seriously any
epistemological issues not strictly internal to science, such as, presum-
ably, the question of the epistemic standing of science itself - it sounds,
in short, revolutionary in tendency.
These two pictures are significantly different. Yet the two passages
quoted are not, as the contrast between the modest and the scientistic
pictures offered might lead one to expect, from different contexts of
discussion, or from different periods of Quine's work; in fact, not only
are they f r o m the same p a p e r - 'Five Milestones of Empiricism' - they
are also from the same page of that paper, with the second passage
occurring between the first sentence of the first passage and the rest. 1
Quine seems to offer a sort of composite of the modest and the scien-
tistic pictures.
Quine's assimilation of the two conceptions of naturalism is ubiqui-
tous. H e r e is a particularly striking example, this time from Quine's
p a p e r on Russell's ontological development:

[T]here is [in Russell's work] an increasing naturalism, an increasing readiness to see

philosophy as natural science trained upon itself... Russell had stated the basis for such
an attitude already in 19t4: "There is not any superfine brand of knowledge, obtainable
by the philosopher, which can give us a standpoint from which to criticize the whole of
the knowledge of daily life. The most that can be done is to examine and purify our
common knowledge by an internal scrutiny, assessing the canons by which it has been
obtained."a
 THE TWO FACES OF Q U I N E ; S N A T U R A L I S M 337

The quotation from Russell bespeaks sympathy with modest naturalism;

Quine interprets it as indicating that Russell was moving towards scien-
tistic naturalism.
Putnam's comment, that Quine's naturalism is "all extremely puz-
zling", 3 is an understandable reaction. My object, in what follows, is
to dispel the puzzlement. This will require a diagnosis which is in part
exegetical, to explain how the ambivalence in Quine's naturalism comes
about, and in part epistemological, to explain which version of natural-
ism is more defensible, and why.
My diagnosis runs, in outline, as follows. First: Quine's naturalism
is developed against the background of his critique of earlier epistemo-
logical work, especially Carnap's. Modest naturalism is a straightfor-
ward consequence of Quine's repudiation of the a priori, his gradualism,
and is consonant with his fallibilism, his stress on the role of obser-
vation, and his sympathy with a non-linear conception of evidential
support. Scientistic naturalism is a stronger thesis, and does not follow
from Quine's critique of apriorism (Section 1 below). But, second:
Quine uses the term "science" ambiguously, sometimes in a narrow
sense in which it refers to the natural sciences exclusively, and some-
times in a broad sense in which it refers to our empirical knowledge
generally. Quine's gradualism disinclines him to attach much signifi-
cance to the difference between the broader and the narrower senses,
and hence encourages his ambiguous usage. This ambiguity, however,
masks the distinction between modest and scientistic naturalisms, and
hence partly explains how it comes about that Quine shifts apparently
unself-consciously between the two pictures (Section 2). Third: Modest
naturalism is, though reformist in tendency-, recognizably an approach
to the traditional projects of epistemology; scientistic naturalism, how-
ever, can be made to seem plausible only at the price of a shifting and
narrowing of focus which threatens to break continuity with traditional
epistemological concerns. In his scientistic mood, Quine finds himself
obliged to shift his focus away from the traditional notion of the worth
of evidence and onto the notion of the reliability of processes of belief-
acquisition, and to retreat from the traditional question 'Do we really
know what we take ourselves to know?' to 'Could the natural sciences
have been arrived at by means certified by the natural sciences them-
selves as truth-conducive? (Section 3). Fourth: In particular, scientistic
naturalism trivializes a substantial question: whether, and if so why,
the natural sciences enjoy a distinguished or privileged epistemic status.
338 SUSAN HAACK

Modest naturalism, by contrast, not only acknowledges this as a sub-

stantial question, but also can supply some resources from which one
may devise at least the beginnings of a promising answer (Section 4).

Naturalistic epistemology is motivated, obviously, by the belief that

earlier, non-naturalistic epistemology is in some way unsatisfactory. It
is as well to be clear what it is in Quine's criticisms of earlier epistemo-
logical work, especially Carnap's, which motivates the naturalistic turn.
The epistemological project of the Aufbau might be described as
'foundationalist'; it is foundationalist, in fact, in two distinct senses. 4
First, the hope is to develop an account of the structure of empirical
knowledge which mirrors the structure of the logicist reconstruction of
mathematical knowledge: as, in the logicist program, logical truths are
to form the basis on which the superstructure of mathematical truths
is to be erected by definition and deduction, so beliefs about one's
immediate sensory experience are to form the basis on which the super-
structure of empirical knowledge is to be erected by definition and
induction. So the project is foundationalist in the sense that it requires
a distinction between basic and derived beliefs, and a linear conception
of evidential support. But, second, this rational reconstruction of em-
pirical knowledge is supposed to constitute an a priori legitimation of
the bona tides of our presumed knowledge of the world. It is foun-
dationalist, in the sense that it conceives of epistemology as a discipline
the task of which is to establish, a priori, the legitimacy of empirical
science.
Quine points to the failure of Carnap's hope of reducing statements
about physical objects to statements about the subject's experience;
skeptical, in any case, of the desire for certainty which he sees as the
remote motivation of this project, Quine stresses the inadequacy of
Carnap's 'reduction forms' to the goal of translational reduction, and
urges the desirability of focusing rather on observation sentences, re-
porting publicly observable objects and events, than on private, subjec-
tive, experiential reports. 5 Quine hints, also, that the conception of
justification as exclusively linear is inadequate, and stresses the impor-
tance of mutual explanation in "The Interanimation of Sentences". 6
But Quine's critique of Carnap's foundationalism would not suffice by
itself to establish a need for naturalism. Neither the failure of Carnap's
 T H E TWO F A C E S OF Q U I N E ' S N A T U R A L I S M 339

particular kind of strong foundationalism, nor indeed the failure of

foundationalism even of more modest stripe, would do this. 7 It is,
rather, Quine's critique of the a priori, and hence his repudiation of
foundationalism, which motivates his naturalism.
Qnine repudiates the a priori, and with it the idea that there is a
difference of kind or status between the truths sought by philosophy,
in general, or by epistemology, in particular, and the rest of "our so-
called knowledge or beliefs". 8 Modest naturalism in epistemology is a
direct consequence of Quine's gradualism, his insistence on the conti-
nuity of philosophy with the whole web of our beliefs about the world.
Obviously, however, scientistic naturalism does not follow. But there
is a curious irony in the situation. Gradualism is the thesis that philos-
ophy is essentially like, is continuous with, empirical inquiry generally;
since the natural sciences constitute a major and central part of such
inquiry, gradualism highlights the similarity in method and purpose
between philosophy and the natural sciences. It thus encourages Quine
to use the term "science", which ordinarily refers to those disciplines
classified as natural sciences, as a convenient way of referring to our
beliefs about the world, quite generally. And this extension of usage,
in turn, encourages Quine's ambivalence between modest and scientistic
naturalisms.

It will be convenient to introduce a typographical convention to mark

the distinction of the two senses of "science", which will play a central
role in my diagnosis: 'science' for the narrower usage, referring to the
natural sciences exclusively, and 'SCIENCE' for the broader, referring
to our empirical beliefs generally (and thus including common sense,
the social sciences, history, and, according to Quine, mathematics,
logic, and philosophy as well as science). In terms of this convention,
modest naturalism may be characterized as the thesis that epistemology
is part of SCIENCE, i.e., that it must be conceived as an integral part
of the whole web of empirical belief; and scientistic naturalism as the
thesis that epistemology is part of science, i.e., that it must be conceived
as internal to the natural sciences. The second component of my diag-
nostic conjecture, then, is that Quine uses the term "science" to mean
sometimes 'SCIENCE' and sometimes 'science', and that this ambiguity
340 SUSAN HAACK

b o t h encourages and at the same time masks his ambivalence b e t w e e n

m o d e s t and scientistic naturalisms.
It is n o t h a r d to find textual evidence supporting this diagnosis. In
this passage "science" can be taken to m e a n 'science':

[S]cience is self-conscious common sense. And philosophy in turn, as an effort to get

clear on things, is not to be distinguished in essential points of method or purpose from
good or bad science. (Quine 1960, pp. 3-4)

W h a t is being claimed here is that philosophy is n o t different in kind

from, is c o n t i n u o u s with, the natural sciences. C o m p a r e :

Sciences, after all, differs [sic] from common sense only in degree of methodological
sophistication. (Quine 1969b, p. 129)9

I n the next passage we find b o t h usages:

[T]his structure of interconnected sentences is a single connected science including all

sciences, and indeed anything we ever say about the world. (Quine 1960, p. 12)

H e r e "science" is used first in the b r o a d e r sense and then in the

n a r r o w e r , the distinction being m a r k e d , as in the q u o t a t i o n f r o m ' N a t u -
ral Kinds', by a shift f r o m the singular to plural. W h a t is being claimed
is that S C I E N C E includes science and the rest of o u r empirical beliefs.
S o m e t i m e s the picture Q u i n e presents is u n a m b i g u o u s l y m o d e s t natu-
ralism:

What reality is like is the business of scientists, in the broadest sense, painstakingly to
surmise; and what there is, what is real, is part of that question. The question how we
know what there is is simply part of the question.., of the evidence for truth about the
world. The last arbiter is so-called scientific method, however amorphous.., a matter
of being guided by sensory stimuli, a taste for simplicity in some sense, and a taste for
old things. (Quine 1960, p. 22)

Q u i n e ' s talk of " t h e business of scientists, in the b r o a d e s t sense" pre-

s u m a b l y indicates that " s c i e n c e " refers to S C I E N C E . ( C o m p a r e : "Phil-
osophical or [i.e., i.e.?] b r o a d l y scientific m o t i v e s . . . " : Q u i n e 1969b,
p. 136.) W h a t is being claimed is that w h a t there is, and h o w we k n o w
w h a t there is, are questions that b e l o n g to S C I E N C E , questions which
do n o t transcend the web of belief. A n d in this context, especially with
the hint supplied by "so-called", "scientific m e t h o d " can be taken to
refer to o u r criteria of empirical evidence, generally, rather than to any
m e t h o d of inquiry s u p p o s e d peculiar to science; this is confirmed by
Q u i n e ' s choosing a n o t a b l y general, even, as he says, " a m o r p h o u s " ,
 THE TWO FACES OF QUINE'S NATURALISM 341

characterization of what "scientific method" (i.e., SCIENTIFIC

method) consists in.
Elsewhere one also finds a gradualist conception, of philosophy as
part of SCIENCE, continuous with science, of which modest naturalism
is the obvious and direct consequence:
I see philosophy not as an a priori propaedeutic or groundwork for science, but as
continuous with science. I see philosophy and science as in the same boat - a boat which,
to revert to Neurath's figure as I so often do, we can rebuild only at sea while staying
afloat on it. There is no external vantage point, no first philosophy. (Quine 1969b, pp.
126-27).

One reads "science" here as ~science', and takes Quine to claim that
philosophy is continuous with (not part of) science. This interpretation
can comfortably be sustained as Quine continues:
All scientific findings, all scientific conjectures that are at present plausible are therefore
in my view welcome for use in philosophy as elsewhere . . . .

which continues the gradualist theme by observing that, in view of the

continuity between philosophy and science, there is no objection of
principle or inevitable irrelevance to philosophers using scientific find-
ings.
But in many passages the ambiguity of "science" leads to a fudging
of modest with scientistic naturalism. One such passage, ironically
enough, is this one from Quine's reply to Putnam in the Hahn-Schilpp
volume; the irony is that Quine is here supposedly replying to Putnam's
charge of "scientism": 1°
I should like to clarify what Putnam and others have called my scientism. I admit to
naturalism and even glory in it. This means banishing the dream of a first philosophy
and pursuing philosophy rather as a part of one's system of the world, continuous with
the rest of science. A n d why, of all the natural sciences, do I keep stressing physics?
Simply because it is the business of physics, and of no other branch of science,

to s a y . . , what minimum catalog of states would be sufficient to justify us in saying

that there is no change without a change in position or states ("Facts of the Matter").
(Quine 1986a, pp. 430-31) 1~

Here "I admit to naturalism" might at first be thought to carry the

conversational implication that Quine is disavowing scientism; not only
does he not say so explicitly, however, but he also describes this remark
as 'clarif3~ing' what Putman calls his scientism. "[B]anishing the dream
of a first philosophy and pursuing philosophy rather as a part of one's
342 SUSAN HAACK

system of the world" sounds like modest naturalism; and "continuous

with the rest of science" could be read, compatibly with this, as 'con-
tinuous with the rest of SCIENCE'. But in the next sentence Quine
shifts to speaking of "the natural sciences", i.e., of science, and by the
sentence after that he is focusing on physics. Though Quine presents it
as clarifying his position, this paragraph is, in fact, paradigmatic of its
ambivalence.
Significant among the other passages where the shifts and strains in
Quine's use of "science" become conspicuous, and where it becomes
apparent that these shifts and strains are both prompting and disguising
a switch from modest to scientistic naturalism, are these, where Quine
is discussing skepticism:

Doubt prompts the theory of knowledge, yes; but knowledge, also, was what prompted
the doubt. Scepticism is an offshoot of science . . . . Illusions are illusory only relative to
a prior acceptance of genuine bodies with which to contrast them . . . . The positing of
bodies is already rudimentary physical science . . . .
Rudimentary physical science, that is, common sense about bodies, is thus needed as
a springboard for s c e p t i c i s m . . . [S]ceptical doubts are scientific doubts . . . .
Epistemology is best looked on, then, as an enterprise within natural science. (Quine
1975, pp. 67-68) 12

"[K]nowledge" in the first sentence is replaced by 'science' in the

second; so charity prompts one to read "science" as "SCIENCE". But
almost immediately this charitable impulse is frustrated by Quine's
insistence on classifying "the positing of bodies" as "rudimentary physi-
cal science", on identifying "common sense about bodies" with "rudi-
mentary physical science". The positing of bodies, of course, undeni-
ably is part of SCIENCE; but as Quine strains to describe it as
"rudimentary physical science", one begins to suspect that he is propos-
ing that it is part of science. So it is not surprising to find that the final
sentence - "Epistemology i s . . . an enterprise within natural science" -
demands to be read as scientistic rather than modest, as claiming that
epistemology is part of science, not just of SCIENCE.
Compare:

[T]he epistemologist is confronting a challenge to natural science that arises from within
natural science . . . .
Ancient skepticism, in its more primitive way, likewise challenged science from within.
The skeptics cited familiar illusions to show the fallibility of the senses; but this concept
of illusion consisted simply in deviation from external scientific reality . . . .
 T H E T W O F A C E S OF Q U I N E ~ S N A T U R A L I S M a4a

... Our liberated epistemologist ends up as an empirical psychologist, scientifically

investigating man's acquisition of science. (Quine i974, pp. 2-3) 13
The scientistic tone of this passage is unmistakable, but it is also clear
that Quine is once again straining the notion of science. I shan't com-
ment on "external scientific reality", though it is certainly a phrase
worthy of notice. Nor shall I debate at length whether ancient skepti-
cism challenged S C I E N C E from within, though I think it relevant that
ancient skepticism relied, not on a contrast of illusion with reality, but
rather on conflicts among appearances. The point I want to stress
here is that Quine's argument again requires a shift from 'ancient
s k e p t i c i s m . . , challenged S C I E N C E from within' to 'ancient skepti-
c i s m . . , challenged science from within'; which is doubly dubious, since
one might reasonably question whether there was such a thing as science
at the time of ancient skepticism. Only by switching from the broad to
the narrow interpretation of "science" can Quine reach his strikingly
scientistic conclusion: " O u r liberated epistemologist ends up as an em-
pirical psychologist, scientifically investigating man's acquisition of sci-
ence", i.e., scientifically investigating man's acquisition of science.
F r o m the point of view of scientistic naturalism, Cartesian hyperbolic
skepticism must be ruled senseless (for the scientistic naturalist is an
'unregenerate realist'); not so, however, from the point of view of the
modest naturalist. So there is further evidence of Quine's ambivalence
in this passage, where Quine seems almost to claim that in its gen-
eralized, Cartesian form, skepticism is incoherent:
Transcendental argument, or what purports to be first philosophy, tends generally to
take on rather this status of immanent epistemologyinsofar as I succeed in making sense
of it. What evaporates is the transcendental question of the reality of the external
world . . . .
but immediately draws back:
Radical skepticism stems from the sort of confusion I have alluded to, but is not itself
incoherent. (Quine 1981b, p. 22)

Noting the strain that is apparent as Quine tries to suggest that ancient
skepticism is internal to science leads naturally to the third component
of my diagnostic conjecture. It has to be conceded, of course, that
there is a degree of vagueness about what would count as pursuing
344 SUSAN HAACK

reformulated but recognizably continuous versions of traditional epis-

temotogical projects, as opposed to pursuing new projects altogether.
Nevertheless, I think it is clear enough that in his scientistic mood
Quine tends to a re¥~sion of the old projects sufficiently radical to
threaten continuity.
This is hardly surprising. On the face of it, after all, it seems implaus-
ible to suppose that the traditional projects of epistemology could be
successfully undertaken by the natural sciences. Supposing one grants
Quine's picture of philosophy as continuous with science - a picture
which, let me say, I find appealing - still it doesn't follow that there is
no difference of degree between philosophy and science. And it seems
reasonable to expect that the kinds of assumptions about human cogni-
tive capacities and limitations on which epistemology might need to call
will be of the kind of generality and abstraction characteristic rather of
the philosophical than of the scientific end of the continuum of SCI-
ENCE. In short, it would be reasonable to expect that commitment to
the claim that epistemology is part of science would put one under
pressure to reconceptualize the projects of epistemology - for the pros-
pects for successful resolution of the traditional projects within science
are unpromising.
Quine's explicit remarks about his attitude to the old projects are
strikingly equivocal. The comment in the second, scientistic quotation
with which this paper opened, that "[n]aturalism does not repudiate
epistemology, but assimilates it to empirical psychology", is character-
istic. In 'Epistemology Naturalized' Quine speaks of "[e]pistemology,
or something like it" as "fall[ing] into place as a chapter of psycholo-
gy,,;14 in 'Things and their Place in Theories' of "[e]pistemology, for
me, or what comes nearest to it" as s t u @ n g "how we animals can have
c o n t r i v e d . . , science"; 15 in The Roots of Reference, after admitting that
his projects are a "far c r y . . , from [the] old epistemology", Quine goes
on to observe that this is "no gratuitous change of subject matter,
but an enlightened persistence rather in the original epistemological
problem ''16 - suggesting at once that there is no change of subject-
matter, and that there is, but not a gratuitous one.
In at least one place Quine seems to subscribe to the traditional
conception of the distinction between the characteristic problems of
psychology and the typical projects of epistemology:

IT]he story of the origins and intensities of our beliefs, the story of what happens in our
 THE TWO F A C E S OF Q U I N E ' S N A T U R A L I S M 345

heads, is a very different story from the one sought in our quest for evidence. Where we
are rational in our beliefs the stories may correspond; elsewhere they may diverge. The
former story is for psychology to telI. On the other hand, our present concern is with
grounds, with reasons, with the evidential relations which hold among betiefs . . . . (Quine
and Ullian 1970, p. 7)

This suggests a familiar picture according to which, while it may fall to

psychology to tell us what a subject's evidence for a belief is, it is the
task specifically of epistemology to analyze the concept of evidence and
supply criteria for appraising the worth of evidence. But this passage
is omitted from the second edition of The Web of Belief; 17 and in
'Epistemology Naturalized' one finds Quine straining to insist that the
investigation of the concept of evidence is the proper business of psy-
chology:
Epistemology... falls into place as a chapter of psychology . . . . It studies a natural
phenomenon, viz., a human physical subject. This human subject is accorded a certain
experimentally controlled input - certain patterns of irradiation in assorted frequencies
for instance - and in the fullness of time the subject delivers as output a description of
the three-dimensional external world and its history. The relation between the meager
input and the torrential output is a relation that we are tempted to study for somewhat
the same reasons that always prompted epistemology; namely, in order to see how
evidence relates to theory, and in what ways one's theory of nature transcends any
available evidence. (Quine 1969a, pp. 82-83)

One might get the impression that Quine hopes that psychology will
be capable of resolving the problems of epistemology because, in his
'enlightened' epistemology, the normative character of the notion of
evidence has been given up. Another passage even more strongly sug-
gests a 'descriptivist' position: t8
[WJhatever evidence there is for science is sensory evidence . . . .
But why all this [Carnap's] creative reconstruction, all this make-believe? The stimula-
tion of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has to go on, in arriving at his
picture of the world. Why not just see how this construction really proceeds? Why not
settle for psychology? (Quine 1969a, p. 75)

However, though Quine sometimes gives the impression that he is

psychologizing epistemology by making it purely descriptive, Putnam
reports that Quine insists that he never meant to eliminate the norma-
tive. I9 And this deserves to be taken seriously, in view of the fact that
in 'Epistemology Naturalized' itself, despite the descriptivist tenor of
the passages just quoted, Quine is at pains to dissociate himself from
the "epistemological nihilism" he attributes to Kuhn, Polanyi, and
346 SUSAN HAACK

Hanson. 2° A better interpretation has Quine, not denying their norma-

tive character, but shifting and narrowing the focus of epistemological
concerns. The clearest confirmation is to be found in Quine's reply to
White in the H a h n - S c h i l p p volume:

A word now about the status, for me, of epistemic values. Naturalization of epistemology
does not jettison the normative and settle for the indiscriminate description of ongoing
procedures. For me normative epistemologyis a branch of engineering. It is the technol-
ogy of truth-seeking, or, in more cautiously epistemic terms, prediction. Like any technol-
ogy, it makes free use of whatever scientific findings may suit its purpose. It draws upon
mathematics in computing standard deviation and probable error and in scouting the
gambler's fallacy. It draws upon experimental psychologyin exposingperceptual illusions,
and upon cognitivepsychologyin scoutingwishful thinking. It draws upon neurology and
physics, in a general way, in discounting testimony from occult or parapsychological
sources. There is no question here of ultimate value, as in morals; it is a matter of efficacy
for an ulterior end, truth or prediction. The normative here, as elsewhere in engineering,
becomes descriptive when the terminal parameter has been expressed. (Quine 1986b, pp.
664-65)21

I shan't comment on the way Quine strains to suggest that we need

cognitive psychology to tell us that wishful thinking tends not to be
truth-conducive, nor ask to what branch of natural science it is supposed
to fall to tell us whether, and if so why, successful prediction indicates
the truth of a theory. My present concern is to point out, first, that
Quine no longer speaks in terms of the appraisal of evidence but in
terms of the reliability of belief-forming processes; and, second, that
his concern is with what processes can be certified as truth-conducive
by science itself. The two points are obviously connected, but I shall
comment on them, in the first instance, separately.
Traditionally, epistemology has been concerned with the criteria for
the appraisal of the worth of evidence; traditionally, it has also been
taken for granted that a subject's evidence for a belief must be construed
as something, so to speak, accessible to the subject - either as consisting
(in coherentist pictures) of other beliefs of his, or as including (in
foundationalist pictures) besides other beliefs of his, the subject's sen-
sory experience. One can find in Quine's epistemological writings a
number of intriguing, if often tantalizingly brief and elusive, suggestions
about the proper construal of the concept of evidence. I want to draw
attention particularly to two points. First: Quine talks of "sensory
evidence", of "the information conveyed by one's senses", of the "sur-
face irritations" which prompt a subject's dispositions to assent to this
or that sentence, zz Second: Quine stresses the "interanimation of sen-
 THE TWO FACES OF QUINE'S NATURALISM 347

tences" and suggests that "there can be mutual reinforcement between

an explanation and what it explains". 23 The former indicates sympathy
with the idea, characteristic of foundationatism, that a subject's evi-
dence for an empirical belief cannot be exclusively a matter of further
beliefs, but must include experiential evidence. The latter indicates
sympathy with the idea, characteristic of coherentism, that relations of
evidential support are to be conceived in terms of mutual reinforcement
rather than as exclusively linear. This hints at a theory of evidence
neither foundationalist nor coherentist in character, but combining ele-
ments of both (and perhaps explains why commentators cannot agree
whether Quine is to be classified as foundationalist, as coherentist, or
as neither). 24 There are some grounds, in short, for construing Quine
as a kind of proto-foundherentist; I can testify, at any rate, that Quine's
hints in this direction had some influence on my development of the
foundherentist theory. 25
The new conception of evidence to which Quine's hints point is
consonant with, indeed tends to encourage, a modest naturalist stance.
"Sensory evidence", in this conception, has to refer to sensory experi-
ences conceived of as both prompting, and, in virtue of prompting,
supporting, a subject's beliefs. One would anticipate, therefore, that
an analysis of this concept would turn out to be not exclusively logical,
but in part causal. And this causal element would encourage the charac-
teristic concern of modest naturalism with the nature and limitations
of human beings' cognitive capacities.
In scientistic mood, however, Quine seems, not to hint at the merits
of a theory of evidence intermediate between foundationalism and
coherentism, but to suggest the virtue of displacing the concept of
evidence in favor of the concept of reliability. Traditionally, as I said,
the subject's evidence for a belief is conceived as something accessible
to the subject, something, that is, of which the subject is aware - as
the etymology of "evidence" suggests. In 'Epistemology Naturalized',
however, though Quine presents his naturalized epistemologist as per-
sisting in the traditional concern with "how evidence relates to theo-
ry", 26 he introduces a modification which turns out to be much more
significant than it perhaps initially appears. "[I]t is simply the stimula-
tions of our sensory receptors", Quine writes, "that are best looked on
as the input to our cognitive mechanism", and "[w]hat is to count as
observation", he suggests, "can be settled in terms of the stimulation
of sensory receptors, let consciousness fall where it may". 27 This pre-
348 SUSAN HAACK

sages, it s e e m s , t h e shift w h i c h is a p p a r e n t in t h e r e p l y to W h i t e , w h e r e
Q u i n e n o l o n g e r w r i t e s o f t h e s t r e n g t h o r w e a k n e s s of t h e s u b j e c t ' s
evidence, but of the truth-conduciveness or otherwise of the processes
b y w h i c h b e l i e f s a r e a c q u i r e d . A n d this is q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r : a
s u b j e c t m a y h a v e a c q u i r e d a b e l i e f b y a p r o c e s s w h i c h is t r u t h - c o n -
d u c i v e , t h o u g h h e m a y h a v e n o , o r n o g o o d , e v i d e n c e for it; a n d , u n l e s s
t h e s k e p t i c a l h y p o t h e s i s is i n c o h e r e n t , he m a y h a v e g o o d e v i d e n c e f o r
a b e l i e f , a n d y e t h a v e a r r i v e d at t h a t b e l i e f b y a p r o c e s s t h a t is n o t
t r u t h - c o n d u c i v e . 28
T h e s a m e shift, a w a y f r o m a focus o n t h e c o g e n c y o f e v i d e n c e a n d
t o w a r d s a focus o n t h e r e l i a b i l i t y o f p r o c e s s e s o f b e l i e f - a c q u i s i t i o n , is
i m p l i c i t in t h e o v e r t l y scientistic c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f n a t u r a l i s m o f f e r e d
in The Roots o f Reference:

[T]he epistemologist is confronting a challenge to natural science that arises from within
natural science . . . . In short, if our science were true, how could we know it? Clearly,
in confronting this challenge, the scientist may make free use of all scientific theory. His
problem is that of finding ways, in keeping with natural science, whereby the human
animal can have projected this same science from the sensory information that could
reach him according to this science. (Quine 1974, p, 2)

The epistemologist . . . . can fully grant the truth of natural science and still raise the
question, within natural science, how it is that man works up his command of natural
science from the limited impingements that are available from his sensory surfaces.
(Quine 1974, p. 3)

Science, t h e s u g g e s t i o n is, tells us t h a t we c a n a r r i v e at t r u e b e l i e f s

a b o u t t h e w o r l d o n l y b y i n f e r e n c e f r o m i n p u t r e c e i v e d f r o m o u r senses;
t h e e n l i g h t e n e d e p i s t e m o l o g i s t ' s q u e s t i o n is: C o u l d w e h a v e a r r i v e d at
science b y such m e a n s ?
This is h o w , in scientistic :mood, Q u i n e t r a n s f o r m s t h e o l d p r o b l e m
of i n d u c t i o n :

Why induction should be trusted. , ~is the perennial philosophical problem of induction.
One part of the problem, the part which asks why there should be regularities in nature
at all, can, I think, be dismissed . . . . What does make clear sense is this other part of
the problem of induction: why does our innate subjective spacing of qualities have a
special purchase on nature and a lien on the future?
There is some encouragement in Darwin. (Quine 1969b, p. 126)

Q u i n e tells us t h a t his n a t u r a l i z e d e p i s t e m o l o g y can a n s w e r p a r t o f t h e

p e r e n n i a l p r o b l e m o f i n d u c t i o n , t h e p a r t t h a t m a k e s sense. B u t h o w
c o u l d Q u i n e ' s q u e s t i o n - W h a t e x p l a n a t i o n is t h e r e o f t h e fact t h a t t h e
 THE TWO FACES OF QUINE'S NATURALISM 349

inductions we make usually turn out right? - even be a part of the old
question - What reason is there to think that our inductions usually do
turn out right? For Quine's new question presupposes that our induc-
tions usually do work - as, indeed, Quine elsewhere seems to concede:

Our innate standards of perceptual similarity show a gratifying tendency to run with the
grain of nature. This concurrence is accountable, surely, to natural selection . . . .
These thoughts are not meant to justify induction . . . . What natural selection contrib-
u t e s . . , is a reason why induction works, granted that it does. (Quine 1974, pp. 19-20)

In the light of the problem-shift already diagnosed, one can interpret

Quine as pointing out that induction is certified by science as (mostly)
truth-conducive.
Elsewhere, also, Quine is at pains to tell us that his goal is not to
justify but to understand or explain the success of induction, and that
this lowering of epistemic aspirations is necessary to avoid vicious circu-
larity. There is an irony here; for what necessitates the lowering of
epistemic aspirations is Quine's scientism, while the non-linear concep-
tion of evidential support at which Quine hints in his modest naturalist
mood would not presuppose a contrast between justification and expla-
nation, and would not presume that mutual reinforcement is inevitably
viciously circular. 29 Perhaps Quine is half aware of this; for in at least
one place he writes, after all, in the language of justification:

Might another c u l t u r e . . , take a radically different line of scientific development, guided

by norms that differ sharply from ours but that are justified by their scientific findings as
ours are by ours? (Quine 1981c, p. I8I). 3°

Most often, though, Quine takes the scientistic line, and so finds
himself obliged to shift and narrow the focus of epistemology until the
old question 'Do we really know what we take ourselves to know?' is
replaced by the new question: 'Could we have arrived at science by
means certified by science itself as truth-conducive?'. It goes without
saying, I take it, that this new question, though still normative, falls
well short of the unrestricted scope and generality of the questions
which preoccupy the epistemological tradition.

In particular, scientistic naturalism trivializes what is surely a substantial

question: Does science have a special epistemic status, and, if so, why?
350 SUSAN HAACK

Quine is anxious to dissociate himself from the cynical sociologism

of some recent philosophy of science:
The dislodging of epistemology from its old status of first philosophy loosed a w a v e . . .
of epistemologicalnihilism. This mood is reflected somewhat in the tendency of Potanyi,
Kuhn, and the late Russell Hanson to belittle the role of evidence and to accentuate
cultural relativism. Hanson ventured even to discredit the idea of observation. . . . The
notion of observation as the impartial and objective source of evidence for science is
bankrupt . . . . It is ironical that philosophers, finding the old epistemologyuntenable as
a whole, should react by repudiating a part which has only now moved into clear focus.
(Quine 1969a, pp. 87-88)
T h e r e seem to be two distinct themes in the work to which Q u i n e
alludes: a sociological claim, to the effect that what scientific theories
or paradigms get accepted is often a matter of politics or propaganda
more than, or perhaps instead of, the weight of evidence; and the
epistemological suggestion that the whole notion of one theory's being
better or worse supported by the evidence than another turns out to
be indefensible. (It shouldn't be, but probably is, necessary to point
out that the first of these doesn't imply the second.) Quine, apparently,
takes it that both claims are false: at the sociological level, that science
is distinguished by its sensitivity to observational evidence; and at the
epistemological level, that being supported by observational evidence
is a good thing, a reliable indication of truth.
Qua scientistic naturalist, however, Quine can allow no suprascientific
tribunal; he can only inform us that that observation is truth-conducive
is certified by science itself. Reflecting, however, that that what is said
in the Sacred Text is true may be certified as true by the Sacred Text
itself, one realizes that this is scarcely the reassurance for which one
hoped. Scientistic naturalism avoids the cynical sociologism from which
Quine dissociates himself only at the price of a kind of scientistic
imperialism which is hardly more appealing. 31
But, it might be argued, may it not be that Quine thinks that that
science is certified by science itself as truth-conducive does after all
supply genuine reassurance, because his conception of science is cov-
ertly value-laden? The suggestion would be that science, for Quine,
amounts in effect to: whatever parts of S C I E N C E are legitimate; by
Quine's lights, that is, those parts which are extensional. Though this
suggestion is not without diagnostic merit, it is nevertheless clear, first,
that the extensions of 'the natural sciences' and 'the extensional parts
of our so-called knowledge or beliefs' do not coincide; mathematics, I
 THE TWO FACES OF QUINE'S NATURALISM 351

suppose, and for that matter Quinean philosophy, falls under the latter
but not the former, as do many common-sense beliefs. More impor-
tantly for present purposes, it is also clear, second, that if science
were identified normatively, if it were construed as 'the extensionally
legitimate parts of SCIENCE', then some episternic standards would
already be presupposed in the identification of science. If these epistemic
standards are conceived as themselves internal to science, the upshot
is, at one remove, the scientistic imperialism already diagnosed; if not,
we are left still in need of an account of what these extra-scientific
standards are, and of what might ground them.
Unlike scientistic naturalism, modest naturalism does not trivialize
the question of the epistemic status of science. Furthermore, within a
modestly naturalistic position it looks possible to devise the beginnings
of a not unpromising answer. The development, in outline, of this
answer, the fourth component of my diagnostic conjecture, will occupy
what remains of this paper.
Does science have a special epistemic status? Thinking about this
question at a common-sense level, unalloyed by sophisticated epistemo-
logical theorizing, I should be inclined to answer, yes and no. Yes,
because science has had spectacular successes, has come up with deep,
broad, and detailed explanatory hypotheses which are anchored by
observation and which interlock surprisingly with each other; no, be-
cause although, in virtue of its spectacular successes, science as a whole
has acquired a certain epistemic authority in the eyes of the tay public,
there is no reason to think that it is in possession of a peculiarly
reliable and effective method of inquiry, nor that it is immune from the
susceptibility to fad and fashion, politics and propaganda, partiality and
power-seeking to which all human cognitive activity is prone. (This of
course concedes something to the Kuhnians' sociological point, while
resisting their epistemological cynicism.)
Can this common-sense answer be given any plausible theoretical
underpinnings? I think it can. Science, as I see it, has done rather well,
by and large and on the whole, at satisfying the criteria by which
we judge the justification of empirical beliefs, central to which are
experiential anchoring and explanatory integration. These criteria are
not restricted to, or internal to, science; they are the criteria we apply
in appraising the evidence for everyday empirical beliefs of all kinds as
well as for scientific theorizing. Nor are they restricted to scientific
cultures; primitive people attributing thunder and lightning to the anger
352 SUSAN HAACK

of the gods, like scientists attributing it to the collision of clouds and

electric discharges in the atmosphere, are seeking explanatory stories
to accommodate their experience. But science has had notable success
by these standards.
Let me refer here to a model that I have suggested elsewhere 32 as a
potentially illuminating analogy for our criteria of empirical evidence:
the crossword puzzle. The analogy is helpful, in particular, to under-
standing how support relations may be non-linear without vicious circu-
larity. The entries in a crossword puzzle are interdependent, mutually
supportive; how reasonable one's confidence is that this entry is correct
depends, in part, on its consistency with other, intersecting entries, and
on how reasonable one's confidence is that those other entries are
correct. I introduced the analogy, in part, to break the hold of the
model of the mathematical proof implicit in foundationalist theories of
justification, and to block the objection that mutual support is inevitably
vicious. I want to use the crossword model now in a new way, to suggest
an analogy between the theoretical successes of science and the great
strides one makes in completing a crosswrd puzzle when one manages
to fill in some long, central entries, after which filling in others is apt
to become notably easier. Science has contributed substantially to the
explanatory integration of our web of empirical belief.
At the same time, it has scored pretty well with respect to experiential
anchoring. Perhaps this is the place to allude to two features of scientific
inquiry which have contributed to its success on this score: experimental
contrivance and co-operative inquiry, both of which have enabled sci-
ence greatly to extend the range and variety of experience available to
anchor its explanatory theorizing.
One might put it like this: science has a distinguished epistemic stand-
ing, but not a privileged one. By our standards of empirical evidence,
it has been, on the whole, a pretty successful cognitive endeavor. But
it is nevertheless fallible, revisable, imperfect; and in judging where it
has succeeded and where failed, in what areas and at what times it is
epistemically better and in what worse, we appeal to standards which
are not wholly internal to, and not simply set by, science itselfY
And what about those criteria of evidence? Are they satisfactory, a
good measure of the likelihood that beliefs which satisfy them are true?
From a modest naturalist point of view, of course, these questions must
themselves be investigated within the web of belief. And, granting the
legitimacy of mutual support, the possibility is not excluded that science
 T H E TWO F A C E S OF Q U t N E ~ S N A T U R A L I S M 353

should contribute to the ratification, or prompt the revision, of our

criteria of evidence. These criteria, after all, rely on certain assumptions
about human beings and their cognitive capacities, central among which
is that the only means we have of figuring out what the world is like,
is our experience of the world and our explanatory theorizing about it.
That these assumptions have turned out to be reinforced by science,
since it wasn't inevitable, 34 may be thought justifiably to improve, to
some modest degree, the modest and conditional confidence to which
we are entitled that satisfaction of our criteria is indicative of truth.
Our epistemic standards are not, as the scientistic naturalist supposes,
internal to science; but science has, so to speak, contributory relevance
to epistemic issues.

! have been concerned here primarily to diagnose what I have argued

is a deep-seated and significant ambivalence in Quine's conception of
naturalism. In the process, though, it has become apparent that scien-
tistic naturalism encounters some formidable difficulties: in general, the
necessity of lowering the aspirations of epistemology, and, in particular,
the inevitability of trivializing the question of the epistemic status of
science; and I have argued that in these respects modest naturalism
fares a good deal better. Of course, though this argument may persuade
one that modest naturalism is better than scientistic naturalism, it falls
well short of a comprehensive defense of modest naturalism. Whether
modest naturalism is defensible is another question - a question I have
exptored elsewhere, 35 but will not embark on here.

NOTES

* Earlier versions of this paper were read at the Moral Sciences Club, Cambridge, U.K.,
Temple University, and the University of Miami. I wish to thank those who made helpfnI
comments on these occasions, and Dirk Koppelberg for helpful correspondence.
i Quine (1981, p. 72).
2 Quine (1981a, p. 85).
3 Putnam (1982, p. 19).
4 Haack (1990a, pp. 117-19; 1990b, pp. 199-200).
5 Quine (1969a, pp. 74ff.).
6 Quine (1960, p. 9), and Quine and Ullian (1970, p. 79).
7 Coherentists, after all, tackle the traditional issues, and some of them do so in tra-
ditional, a priori, style; see BonJour (1985, Ch. 1 and Appendix A).
8 Quine (t953a, p. 42; cf. 1960, pp. 3--4).
9 Quine (1969b, pp. 114-38).
354 SUSAN HAACK

10 Putnam (1986, p. 425).

11 Quine (1986a, pp. 427-31).
12 Quine (1975, pp. 67-81).
13 Quine (1974).
14 Quine (1969a, p. 82).
15 Quine (1981b, p. 21).
16 Quine (1974, p. 3).
17 Published in 1978.
is It is so construed in Seigel (1980). (In this paper Seigel makes some pertinent criticisms
of Haack (1975); the present paper, together with Haack (1990a), should be taken as
superseding this earlier piece, at the time of which I did not appreciate the ambiguities
of Quine's position.) See also Kim (1988), where Quine's naturalism is taken to be
descriptivist.
19 Putnam (1982, p.19).
20 Quine (1969a, pp. 87-88).
21 Quine (1986b, pp. 663-65). For those readers who, like myself, find "scouting"
puzzling, I report the OED's definition:

scout, v.t. reject (proposal, notion) with scorn or ridicule.

[cf. ON skuta a taunt, Sw skujta to shoot; prob. cogn. w.
SHOOT].

22 Quine (1969a, pp. 75, 82-83; 1975, p. 68; 1960, p. 22).

23 Quine (1960, pp. 99ff.) and Quine and Ullian (1970, p. 79).
24 For an interpretation of Quine as critic of foundationalism, see, e.g., Sosa (1980, p.
14); for an interpretation of Quine as supporter of foundationalism, see Cornman (1978,
p. 250).
z5 The term was introduced and the theory sketched in Haack (1982-83); more detailed
discussion is to be found in Haack (1990a, Sec. I).
26 Quine (1969a, p. 83).
27 Quine (1969a, p. 84; my italics). I note that the traditionalist passage from The Web
of Belief, quoted above, continues, in not-so-traditionalist vein: "whether the believer
recognizes them [evidential relations] or not" (Quine and Ullian 1970, p. 7).
28 BonJour (1985, Ch. 3). It should be noted that unlike those reliabilists, such as
Goldman, who offer a reliabilist theory of epistemic justification, Quine's modus operandi
is to shift from the concepts of evidence and justification towards the concept of reliability;
it is not to offer the latter as explicating the former~ Because of this difference I would
classify Goldman's approach as a kind of reformist scientistic naturalism, by contrast
with Quine's revolutionary scientistic naturalism. See Goldman (1979, 1986); cf. Haack
(1990b).
29 I don't mean this to suggest that, granted a non-linear conception of evidential support,
Quine's appeal to evolution would constitute a satisfactory meta-justification of induction;
there are other complexities here, some of them discussed in Haack (1990a, Sec. II).
3o Quine (1981c, pp. 179-81).
31 Cf. Putnam (1982, pp. 7, 12ff.).
32 Haack (1990a, Sec. I).
33 Implicit in this is a point I think quite important: that science is not as uniform or
 THE TWO F A C E S OF Q U I N E ' S N A T U R A L I S M 355

homogeneous as many discussions in philosophy of science presuppose; for instance,

some times, some parts of science may be progressing, some stagnating, some regressing.
34 That science reinforces the role of observation, and that conceivably it might not have
done, are of course points stressed by Quine himself; see, e.g.:

[O]ne of our scientific findings i s . . . that information about the world reaches us only
by forces impinging on our nerve endings . . . . (Quine 1981c, p. 181)

and:

Experience might take a turn that would justify... [the skeptic's] doubts about external
objects. Our success in predicting observations might fall off sharply, and concomitantly
with this we might begin to be somewhat successful in basing predictions upon dreams
and reveries. (Quine 1981b, p. 22)

(The second quotation seems a bit confused: Is it predictions of observable events', or

what, that we are to imagine making on the basis of dreams?) However, unlike Quine,
I am using these points specifically and unambiguously from a modest naturalist perspec-
tive.
3s Haack (1990a, Sec. II). Note, however, that in that paper I defend not the thesis that
epistemology must be conducted wholly within the web of our empirical beliefs, but only
the weaker thesis that epistemology is bound to depend in part on the web of empirical
belief. In terms of the vocabulary of the present paper (which simplifies that of the earlier
piece) it might be clearer to say that my defense was of very modest naturalism. Modest
naturalism is attractive; but to defend it adequately would require one to be in a position
to repudiate the a priori altogether, by showing how the justification of supposedly a
priori beliefs fits into one's theory of empirical justification -- and that I am not able to
do.

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Department of Philosophy
University of Miami
P.O. Box 248054
Coral Gables, FL 33124-4670
U.S.A.