Ass.
13 Persons
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 57227 May 14, 1992
AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the latter represented
herein by the former, his mother and natural guardian, petitioners,
vs.
IVAN MENDEZ and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Roberto M. Sarenas for petitioners.
Bienvinido D. Cariaga for private respondent.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari questioning the decision1 dated April 30,
1981 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 61552-R which dismissed petitioner's
complaint and set aside the resolution2 dated October 21, 1976 of the then Court of
First Instance of Davao, 16th Judicial District, amending the dispositive portion of its
decision dated June 21, 1976 and ordering private respondent Ivan Mendez: (1) to
acknowledge the minor Michael Constantino as his illegitimate child; (2) to give a
monthly support of P300.00 to the minor child; (3) to pay complainant Amelita
Constantino the sum of P8,200.00 as actual and moral damages; and (4) to pay
attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000 plus costs.
It appears on record that on June 5, 1975, petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an
action for acknowledgment, support and damages against private respondent Ivan
Mendez. The case was filed with the then CFI of Davao, 10th Judicial District and
docketed as Civil Case No. 8881. In her complaint, Amelita Constantino alleges,
among others, that sometime in the month of August, 1974, she met Ivan Mendez at
Tony's Restaurant located at Sta. Cruz, Manila, where she worked as a waitress; that
the day following their first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel
Enrico where he was billeted; that while dining, Ivan professed his love and courted
Amelita; that Amelita asked for time to think about Ivan's proposal; that at about 11:00
o'clock in the evening, Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home to which the latter
agreed, that on the pretext of getting something, Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel
room and through a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
the latter; that after the sexual contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married
man; that they repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and
November, 1974, whenever Ivan is in Manila, as a result of which Amelita got
pregnant; that her pleas for help and support fell on deaf ears; that Amelita had no
sexual relations with any other man except Ivan who is the father of the child yet to be
born at the time of the filing of the complaint; that because of her pregnancy, Amelita
was forced to leave her work as a waitress; that Ivan is a prosperous businessman of
Davao City with a monthly income of P5,000 to P8,000. As relief, Amelita prayed for
the recognition of the unborn child, the payment of actual, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees plus costs.
In his answer dated August 5, 1975, Ivan admitted that he met Amelita at Tony's
Cocktail Lounge but denied having sexual knowledge or illicit relations with her. He
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action. By way of
counterclaim, he further prayed for the payment of exemplary damages and litigation
expense including attorney's fees for the filing of the malicious complaint.
On September 1, 1975, Amelita Constantino filed a motion for leave to amend the
complaint impleading as co-plaintiff her son Michael Constantino who was born on
August 3, 1975. In its order dated September 4, 1975, the trial court admitted the
amended complaint.
On September 11, 1975, Ivan Mendez filed his answer to the amended complaint
reiterating his previous answer denying that Michael Constantino is his illegitimate
son.
After hearing, the trial court rendered a decision dated June 21, 1976, the dispositive
portion of which reads, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiff Amelita Constantino and against
defendant Ivan Mendez, ordering the latter to pay Amelita
Constantino the sum of P8,000.00 by way of actual and moral
damages; and, the sum of P3,000.00, as and by way of attorney's
fees. The defendant shall pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
From the above decision, both parties filed their separate motion for reconsideration.
Ivan Mendez anchored his motion on the ground that the award of damages was not
supported by evidence. Amelita Constantino, on the other hand, sought the
recognition and support of her son Michael Constantino as the illegitimate son of Ivan
Mendez.
In its resolution dated October 21, 1976, the trial court granted Amelita Constantino's
motion for reconsideration, and amended the dispositive portion of its decision dated
June 21, 1976 to read as follows, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiff Amelita Constantino and plaintiff-minor
Michael Constantino, and against defendant Ivan Mendez ordering
the latter to pay Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,000.00 by way
of actual and moral damages and the sum of P200.00 as and by
way of payment of the hospital and medical bills incurred during the
delivery of plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino; to recognize as his
own illegitimate child the plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino who
shall be entitled to all the rights, privileges and benefits appertaining
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to a child of such status; to give a permanent monthly support in
favor of plaintiff Michael Constantino the amount of P300.00; and
the sum of P5,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees. The
defendant shall pay the costs of this suit.
Let this Order form part of the decision dated June 21, 1976.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the above amended decision was set aside and
the complaint was dismissed. Hence, this petition for review.
Basically, the issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not the Court of
Appeals committed a reversible error in setting aside the decision of the trial court and
in dismissing the complaint.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the factual findings of
the trial and in not affirming the decision of the trial court. They also pointed out that
the appellate court committed a misapprehension of facts when it concluded that Ivan
did not have sexual access with Amelita during the first or second week of November,
1976 (should be 1974), the time of the conception of the child.
It must be stressed at the outset that factual findings of the trial court have only a
persuasive and not a conclusive effect on the Court of Appeals. In the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, it is the duty of the Court of Appeals to review the factual
findings of the trial court and rectify the errors it committed as may have been
properly assigned and as could be established by a re-examination of the evidence
on record. It is the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, not those of the trial court,
that as a rule are considered final and conclusive even on this Court (Hermo v. Hon.
Court of Appeals, et al., 155 SCRA 24 [1987]). This being a petition
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this Court will review only errors of
law committed by the Court of Appeals. It is not the function of this Court to re-
examine all over again the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties
unless the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals is not supported by the evidence
on record or the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts (Remalante v. Tibe,
et al., 158 SCRA 138 [1988]; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, et al., 149 SCRA 97
[1987]).
It is the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, based on the evidence on record, that
Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that
Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino. Such conclusion based on
the evaluation of the evidence on record is controlling on this Court as the same is
supported by the evidence on record. Even the trial court initially entertained such
posture. It ordered the recognition of Michael as the illegitimate son of Ivan only when
acting on the motions for reconsideration, it reconsidered, on October 21, 1976, its
earlier decision dated June 21, 1976. Amelita's testimony on cross-examination that
she had sexual contact with Ivan in Manila in the first or second week of November,
1974 (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 108) is inconsistent with her response that she
could not remember the date of their last sexual intercourse in November, 1974 (Ibid,
Ass. 13 Persons
p. 106). Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of November,
1974 is the crucial point that was not even established on direct examination as she
merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September,
October and November, 1974.
Michael Constantino is a full-term baby born on August 3, 1975 (Exhibit 6) so that as
correctly pointed out by private respondent's counsel, citing medical science (Williams
Obstetrics, Tenth Ed., p. 198) to the effect that "the mean duration of actual
pregnancy, counting from the day of conception must be close to 267 days", the
conception of the child (Michael) must have taken place about 267 days before
August 3, 1975 or sometime in the second week of November, 1974. While Amelita
testified that she had sexual contact with Ivan in November, 1974, nevertheless said
testimony is contradicted by her own evidence (Exh. F), the letter dated February 11,
1975, addressed to Ivan Mendez requesting for a conference, prepared by her own
counsel Atty. Roberto Sarenas to whom she must have confided the attendant
circumstances of her pregnancy while still fresh in her memory, informing Ivan that
Amelita is four (4) months pregnant so that applying the period of the duration of
actual pregnancy, the child was conceived on or about October 11, 1974.
Petitioner's assertion that Ivan is her first and only boyfriend (TSN, December 8,
1975, p. 65) is belied by Exhibit 2, her own letter addressed to Mrs. Mendez where
she revealed the reason for her attachment to Ivan who possessed certain traits not
possessed by her boyfriend. She also confided that she had a quarrel with her
boyfriend because of gossips so she left her work. An order for recognition and
support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family or
lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established
by clear and convincing evidence. The burden of proof is on Amelita to establish her
affirmative allegations that Ivan is the father of her son. Consequently, in the absence
of clear and convincing evidence establishing paternity or filiation, the complaint must
be dismissed.
As regards Amelita's claim for damages which is based on Articles 193 & 214 of the
Civil Code on the theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage, she surrendered her
virginity, we cannot but agree with the Court of Appeals that more sexual intercourse
is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages could only be awarded if sexual
intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. At the time she met
Ivan at Tony's Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 years old and she admitted that
she was attracted to Ivan (TSN, December 3, 1975, p. 83). Her attraction to Ivan is
the reason why she surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or deceived
because of a promise of marriage, she could have immediately severed her relation
with Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual contact sometime in August,
1974, that he was a married man. Her declaration that in the months of September,
October and November, 1974, they repeated their sexual intercourse only indicates
that passion and not the alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made
her submit herself to Ivan.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
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 Ass. 13 Persons

EN BANC 6. ID.; ID. — There is no legal provision that declares the said right to demand the
recognition of a natural child to be nontransferable to the latter’s heirs, and specially
[G.R. No. 4275. March 23, 1909. ] to his natural mother, nor is there any rule declaring such right extinguished at the
death of the natural child.
PAULA CONDE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROMAN ABAYA, Defendant-Appellant.
7. ID.; ID. — In the intestate succession of a natural child who dies during his
C. Oben, for Appellant. minority, recognized by the law in favor of his father or mother who have
acknowledged him, no limitation has been established excluding the said right from
L. Joaquin, for Appellee. transferable rights, nor has it been expressly declared that the above-mentioned right
to demand the recognition of the natural child is extinguished at the latter’s death,
SYLLABUS wherefore it is necessary to admit that the mother inherits from the natural child at his
death, and that she is entitled to institute the corresponding action.
1. ESTATES: ACTION AGAINST EXECUTION OR ADMINISTRATIONS. — While an
estate is in the course of settlement in a special proceeding, no ordinary action can be
maintained by a person claiming to be an heir, against the executor or administrator, DECISION
for the purpose of having his rights in the estate determined. (Pimentel v. Palanca, 5
Phil. Rep., 436.)
ARELLANO, C.J. :
2. DISTINCTION BETWEEN RIGHTS OF ACTION BY LEGITIMATE AND BY
NATURAL CHILDREN TO COMPEL RECOGNITION. — As a general rule, the right
of action of a child to enforce recognition of its legitimacy lasts during the lifetime of From the hearing of the appeal interposed by Roman Abaya in the special
such child, but the right of a natural child to compel acknowledgment of its status proceedings brought in the Court of First Instance of La Laguna for the settlement of
continues only during the life of the alleged parents. The right of action for a the intestate estate and the distribution of the property of Casiano Abaya it
declaration of legitimacy is transmitted to the heirs of the child only when the latter appears:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
dies during minority or while insane, or in case the action has already been instituted.
Action by a natural child can only be brought against the heirs of the parents in the I. As antecedents: that Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and
event of the death of the parents during the minority of the child, or upon the Sabina Labadia, died on the 6th of April 1899; that Paula Conde, as the mother of the
discovery of a document, after the death of the parents, expressly acknowledging natural children Jose and Teopista Conde, whom she states she had by Casiano
such child. This right of action which the law concedes to this natural child is not Abaya, on the 6th of November, 1905, moved the settlement of the said intestate
transmitted to his ascendants or descendants. (Arts. 18 and 137, Civil Code.) succession; that an administrator having been appointed for the said estate on the
25th of November, 1905, Roman Abaya, a son of the said Romualdo Abaya and
Per Torres, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Sabina Labadia, the parents of the late Casiano Abaya, came forward and opposed
said appointment and claimed it for himself as being the nearest relative of the
3. NATURAL CHILDREN; SUCCESSION AND TRANSMISSION OF RIGHTS TO deceased; that this was granted by the court below on the 9th of January, 1906; that
DEMAND RECOGNITION. — Although article 137 of the Civil Code contains no on the 17th of November, 1906, Roman Abaya moved that, after due process of law,
disposition authorizing the transfer, in favor of the natural mother in her capacity of the court declare him to be the sole heir of Casiano Abaya, to the exclusion of all
heir of her natural child, of the right to judicially demand the recognition of her child by other persons, especially of Paula Conde, and to be therefore entitled to take
the heirs of his late natural father; yet there is no express provision therein that possession of all the property of said estate, and that it be adjudicated to him; and
prohibits such transfer or that declares such right to be nontransferable. that on November 22, 1906, the court ordered the publication of notices for the
declaration of heirs and distribution of the property of the estate.
4. ID.; ID. — The relation of paternity and filiation between natural parents and
children is also of a natural character, and therefore, reciprocal intestate succession II. That on the 28th of November, 1906, Paula Conde, in reply to the foregoing motion
between them is exclusively governed by articles 944 and 945 of the Civil Code. of Roman Abaya, filed a petition wherein she stated that she acknowledged the
relationship alleged by Roman Abaya, but that she considered that her right was
5. ID.; ID. — If the right of succession granted by the law to the natural children superior to his and moved for a hearing of the matter, and, in consequence of the
corresponds reciprocally to the natural father or mother in the same cases, and if the evidence that she intended to present she prayed that she be declared to have
estate includes all property, rights and obligations of a person which do not expire at preferential rights to the property left by Casiano Abaya, and that the same be
the latter’s death, it is certain that, among the rights transferred to the natural mother adjudicated to her together with the corresponding products thereof.
by inheritance, at the time of the death of her natural child, is the right held by such
child during his lifetime to demand his recognition as such by his natural father, III. That the trial was held, both parties presenting documentary and oral evidence,
should the latter still live, or by his heirs. and the court below entered the following judgment:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

Page | 3

"That the administrator of the estate of Casiana Abaya should recognize Teopista and
Jose Conde as being natural children of Casiano Abaya; that the petitioner Paula
Conde should succeed to the hereditary rights of her children with respect to the
inheritance of their deceased natural father Casiano Abaya; and therefore, it is hereby
declared that she is the only heir to the property of the said intestate estate, to the
exclusion of the administrator, Roman Abaya."cralaw virtua1aw library
IV. That Roman Abaya excepted to the foregoing judgment, appealed to this court,
and presented the following statement of errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The fact that the court below found that an ordinary action for the acknowledgment
of natural children under articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code, might be brought in
special probate proceedings.
2. The finding that after the death of a person claimed to be an unacknowledged
natural child, the mother of such presumed natural child, as heir to the latter, may
bring an action to enforce the acknowledgment of her deceased child in accordance
with articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code.
3. The finding in the judgment that the alleged continuous possession of the
deceased children of Paula Conde of the status of natural children of the late Casiano
Abaya, has been fully proven in these proceedings; and
4. On the hypothesis that it was proper to adjudicate the property of this intestate
estate to Paula Conde, as improperly found by the court below, the court erred in not
having declared that said property should be reserved in favor of relatives of Casiano
Abaya to the third degree, and in not having previously demanded securities from
Paula Conde to guarantee the transmission of the property to those who might fall
within the reservation.
As to the first error assigned, the question is set up as to whether in special
proceedings for the administration and distribution of an intestate estate, an action
might be brought to enforce the acknowledgment of the natural child of the person
from whom the inheritance is derived, that is to say, whether one might appear as heir
on the ground that he is a recognized natural child of the deceased, not having been
so recognized by the deceased either voluntarily or compulsory by reason of a
preexisting judicial decision, but asking at the same time that, in the special
proceeding itself, he be recognized by the presumed legitimate heirs of the deceased
who claim to be entitled to the succession opened in the special proceeding.
According to section 782 of the Code of Civil Procedure — difference that separates these two classes of children is still great, as proven by so
"If there shall be a controversy before the Court of First Instance as to who the lawful
heirs of the deceased person are, or as to the distributive share to which each person
is entitled under the law, the testimony as to such controversy shall be taken in writing
by the judge, under oath and signed by witness. Any party in interest whose
distributive share is affected by the determination of such controversy, may appeal
from the judgment of the Court of First Instance determining such controversy to the
Supreme Court, within the time and in the manner provided in the last preceding
section."cralaw virtua1aw library
This court has decided the present question in the manner shown in the case of
Ass. 13 Persons
Juana Pimental v. Engracio Palanca (5 Phil. Rep. 436.)
The main question with regard to the second error assigned, is whether or not the
mother of a natural child now deceased, but who survived the person who, it is
claimed, was his natural father, also deceased, may bring an action for the
acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of such child in order to appear in his
behalf to receive the inheritance from the person who is supposed to be his natural
father.
In order to decide in the affirmative the court below has assigned the following as the
only foundation:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In resolving a similar question Manresa says: ’An acknowledgment can only be
demanded by the natural child and his descendants whom it shall benefit, and should
they be minors or otherwise incapacitated, such person as legally represents them;
the mother may ask it in behalf of her child so long as he is under her authority.’ On
this point no positive declaration has been made, undoubtedly because it was not
considered necessary. A private action is in question and the general rule must be
followed. Elsewhere the same author adds: ’It may so happen that the child dies
before four years have expired after attaining majority, or that the document
supporting his petition for acknowledgment is discovered after his death, such death
perhaps occurring after his parents had died, as is supposed by article 137, or during
their lifetime. In any case such right of action shall pertain to the descendants of the
child whom the acknowledgment may interest.’ (See Commentaries to arts. 135 and
137, Civil Code. Vol. I.) ’
The above doctrine, advanced by one of the most eminent commentators of the Civil
Code, lacks legal and doctrinal foundation. The power to transmit the right of such
action by the natural child to his descendants can not be sustained under the law, and
still less to his mother.
It is without any support in law because the rule laid down in the code is most
positive, limiting in form, when establishing the exception for the exercise of such right
of action after the death of the presumed parents, as is shown hereafter. It is not
supported by any doctrine, because up to the present time no argument has been
presented, upon which even an approximate conclusion could be based.
Although the Civil Code considerably improved the condition of recognized natural
children, granting them rights and actions that they did not possess under the former
laws, they were not, however, placed upon the same plane as legitimate ones. The
many articles dealing with the rights of the family and with succession in relation to
the members thereof. It may be laid down as a legal maxim, that whatever the code
does not grant to the legitimate children, or in connection with their rights, must still
less be understood as granted to recognized natural children or in connection with
their rights. There is not a single exception in its provisions.
If legitimacy is the attribute that constitutes the basis of the absolute family rights of
the child, the acknowledgment of the natural child is, among illegitimate ones, that
which unites him to the family of the father or the mother who recognizes him, and
affords him a participation in the rights of the family, relatively advantageous
according to whether they are alone or whether they concur with other individuals of
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 Ass. 13 Persons

the family of his purely natural father or mother. code grants it in the first case, but not the second. It contains provisions for the
transmission of the right of action which, for the purpose of claiming his legitimacy
Thus, in order to consider the spirit of the Civil Code nothing is more logical than to inheres in the child, but it does not say a word with regard to the transmission of the
establish a comparison between an action to claim the legitimacy, and one to enforce right to obtain the acknowledgment of the natural filiation.
acknowledgment.
Therefore, the respective corollary of each of the two above-cited articles is: (1) That
"Art. 118. The action to claim its legitimacy may be brought by the child at any time of the right of action which devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy under article
its lifetime and shall be transmitted to its heirs, should it die during minority or in a 118, may be transmitted to his heirs in certain cases designated in the said article; (2)
state of insanity. In such cases the heirs shall be allowed a period of five years in That the right of action for the acknowledgment of natural children to which article 137
which to institute the action. refers, can never be transmitted, for the reason that the code makes no mention of it
in any case, not even as an exception.
"The action already instituted by the child is transmitted by its death to the heirs, if it
has not lapsed before then. It is most illogical and contrary to every rule of correct interpretation, that the right of
action to secure acknowledgment by the natural child should be presumed to be
"Art. 137. The actions for the acknowledgment of natural children can be instituted transmitted, independently, as a rule, to his heirs, while the right of action to claim
only during the life of the presumed parents, except in the following legitimacy from his predecessor is not expressly, independently, or, as a general rule,
cases:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph conceded to the heirs of the legitimate child, but only relatively and as an exception.
Consequently, the pretension that the right of action on the part of the child to obtain
"1. If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter the acknowledgment of his natural filiation is transmitted to his descendants is
may institute the action before the expiration of the first four years of its majority. altogether unfounded. No legal provision exists to sustain such pretension, nor can an
argument of presumption be based on the lesser claim when there is no basis for the
"2. If, after the death of the father or mother, some instrument, before unknown, greater one, and when it is only given as an exception in well-defined cases. It is
should be discovered in which the child is expressly acknowledged. placing the heirs of the natural child on a better footing than the heirs of the legitimate
one, when, as a matter of fact, the position of a natural child is no better than, nor
"In this case the action must be instituted within the six months following the even equal to, that of a legitimate child.
discovery of such instrument."cralaw virtua1aw library
From the express and precise precepts of the code the following conclusions are
On this supposition the first difference that results between one action and the other derived:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
consists in that the right of action for legitimacy lasts during the whole lifetime of the
child, that is, it can always be brought against the presumed parents or their heirs by The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his
the child itself, while the right of action for the acknowledgment of a natural child does whole life, while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only
not last his whole lifetime, and, as a general rule, it can not be instituted against the during the life of his presumed parents.
heirs of the presumed parents, inasmuch as it can be exercised only during the life of
the presumed parents. Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his legitimacy lasts
during his whole life, he may exercise it either against the presumed parents, or their
With regard to the question at issue, that is, the transmission to the heirs of the heirs; while the right of action to secure the acknowledgment of a natural child, since
presumed parents of the obligation to admit the legitimate filiation, or to recognize the it does not last during his whole life, but depends on that of the presumed parents, as
natural filiation, there exists the most radical difference in that the former continues a general rule can only be exercised against the latter.
during the life of the child who claims to be legitimate, and he may demand it either
directly and primarily from the said presumed parents, or indirectly and secondarily Usually the right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal
from the heirs of the latter; while the second does not endure for life; as a general character and pertains exclusively to him, only the child may exercise it at any time
rule, it only lasts during the life of the presumed parents. Hence the other difference, during his lifetime. As an exception, and in three cases only, it may be transmitted to
derived as a consequence, that an action for legitimacy is always brought against the the heirs of the child, to wit, if he died during his minority, or while insane, or after
heirs of the presumed parents in case of the death of the latter, while the action for action had been already instituted.
acknowledgment is not brought against the heirs of such parents, with the exception
of the two cases prescribed by article 137 transcribed above. An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be
exercised against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event of
So much for the passive transmission of the obligation to admit the legitimate filiation, the death of the latter during the minority of the child, and second, upon the discovery
or to acknowledge the natural filiation. of some instrument of express acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father or
mother, the existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter.
As to the transmission to the heirs of the child of the latter’s action to claim his
legitimacy, or to obtain the acknowledgment of his natural filiation, it is seen that the But as such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by

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him. It can not be transmitted to his descendants, or to his ascendants.
In support of the foregoing the following authorities may be cited:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
Sanchez Roman, in his Treatise on Civil Law, propounds the question as to whether
said action should be considered transmissive to the heirs or descendants of the
natural child, whether he had or had not exercised it up to the time of his death, and
decides it as follows;
"There is an entire absence of legal provisions, and at most, it might be deemed
admissible as a solution, that the right of action to claim the acknowledgment of a
natural child is transmitted by analogy to his heirs on the same conditions and terms
that it is transmitted to the descendants of a legitimate child, to claim his legitimacy,
under article 118, but nothing more; because on this point nothing warrants placing
the heirs of a natural child on a better footing than those of the legitimate child, and
even to compare them would not fail to be a strained and questionable matter, and
one of great difficulty for decision by the courts, for the simple reason that for the heirs
of the legitimate child, the said article 118 exists, while for those of the natural child,
as we have said, there is no provision in the code authorizing the same, although on
the other hand there is none that prohibits it." (Vol. V.)
Diaz Guijarro and Martinez Ruiz in their work on "The Civil Code as construed by the
supreme court of Spain," commenting upon article 137, say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Article 118, taking into account the privileges due to the legitimacy of children, grants
them the right to claim said legitimacy during their lifetime, and even authorizes the
transmission of said right for the space of five years to the heirs thereof, if the child
die during his minority or in a state of insanity. But as article 137 is based on the
consideration that in the case of a natural child, ties are less strong and sacred in the
eyes of the law, it does not fix such a long and indefinite period for the exercise of the
action; it limits it to the life of the parents, excepting in the two cases mentioned in
said article; and it does not allow, as does article 118, the action to pass on to the
heirs, inasmuch as, although it does not prohibit it, and for that reason it might be
deemed on general principles of law to consent to it, such a supposition is
inadmissible for the reason that a comparison of both articles shows that the silence
of the law in the latter case is not, nor can it be, an omission, but a deliberate intent to
establish a wide difference between the advantages granted to a legitimate child and
to a natural one."cralaw virtua1aw library
(Ibid., Vol. II, 171.)
Navarro Amandi (Cuestionario del Codigo Civil) raises the question: "Can the heirs of
a natural child claim the acknowledgment in those cases wherein the father or mother
are under obligation to acknowledge" ? And says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Opinions are widely divergent. The court of Rennes held (on April 13, 1844) that the
right of investigation forms a part of the estate of the child, and along with his
patrimony is transmitted to his heirs. The affirmation is altogether too categorical to be
admissible. If it were correct the same thing would happen as when the legitimacy of
a child is claimed, and as already seen, the right of action to demand the legitimacy is
not transmitted to the heirs in every case and as an absolute right, but under certain
Ass. 13 Persons
limitations and circumstances. Now, were we to admit the doctrine of the court of
Rennes, the result would be that the claim for natural filiation would be more favored
than one for legitimate filiation. This would be absurd, because it can not be
conceived that the legislator should have granted a right of action to the heirs of the
natural child, which is only granted under great limitations and in very few cases to
those of a legitimate one. Some persons insist that the same rules that govern
legitimate filiation apply by analogy to natural filiation, and that in this conception the
heirs of the natural child are entitled to claim it in the cases prescribed by article 118.
The majority, however, are inclined to consider the right to claim acknowledgment as
a personal right, and consequently, not transmissive to the heirs. Really there are not
legal grounds to warrant the transmission." (Vol. 2, 229.)
In a decision like the present one it is impossible to bring forward the argument of
analogy for the purpose of considering that the heirs of the natural child are entitled to
the right of action which article 118 concedes to the heirs of the legitimate child. The
existence of a provision for the one case and the absence thereof for the other is a
conclusive argument that inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, and it can not be
understood that the provision of law should be the same when the same reason does
not hold in the one case as in the other.
The theory of the law of transmission is also entirely inapplicable in this case. This
theory, which in the Roman Law expressed the general rule that an heir who did not
accept an inheritance during his lifetime was incapacitated from transmitting it to his
own heirs, included at the same time the idea that if the inheritance was not
transmitted because the heir did not possess it, there were, however, certain things
which the heir held and could transmit. Such was the law and the right to accept the
inheritance, for the existing reason that all rights, both real and personal, shall pass to
the heir; quia haeres representat defunctum in omnibus et per omnia. According to
article 659 of the Civil Code, "the inheritance includes all the property, rights, and
obligations of a person, which are not extinguished by his death." If the mother is the
heir of her natural child, and the latter, among other rights during his lifetime was
entitled to exercise an action for his acknowledgment against his father, during the life
of the latter, or after his death in some of the excepting cases of article 137, such
right, which is a portion of his inheritance, is transmitted to his mother as being his
heir, and it was so understood by the court of Rennes when it considered the right in
question, not as a personal and exclusive right of the child which is extinguished by
his death, but as any other right which might be transmitted after his death. This right
of supposed transmission is even less tenable than that sought to be sustained by the
argument of analogy.
The right of action pertaining to the child to claim his legitimacy is in all respects
superior to that of the child who claims acknowledgment as a natural child. And it is
evident that the right of action to claim his legitimacy is not one of those rights which
the legitimate child may transmit by inheritance to his heirs; it forms no part of the
component rights of his inheritance. If it were so, there would have been no necessity
to establish its transmissibility to heirs as an exception in the terms and conditions of
article 118 of the code. So that, in order that it may constitute a portion of the child’s
inheritance, it is necessary that the conditions and the terms contained in article 118
shall be present, since without them, the right that the child held during his lifetime,
being personal and exclusive in principle, and therefore, as a general rule not
susceptible of transmission, would and should have been extinguished by his death.
Therefore, where no express provision like that of article 118 exists, the right of action
Page | 6
 Ass. 13 Persons

for the acknowledgment of a natural child is, in principle and without exception,
extinguished by his death, and can not be transmitted as a portion of the inheritance
of the deceased child.

On the other hand, it said right of action formed a part of the child’s inheritance, it
would be necessary to establish the doctrine that the right to claim such an
acknowledgment from the presumed natural father and from his heirs is an absolute
right of the heirs of the child, not limited by certain circumstances as in the case of the
heirs of a legitimate child; and if it is unreasonable to compare a natural child with a
legitimate one to place the heirs of a natural child and his inheritance on a better
footing than those of a legitimate child would not only be unreasonable, but, as stated
in one of the above citations, most absurd and illegal in the present state of the law
and in accordance with the general principles thereof.

For all of the foregoing reasons we hereby reverse the judgment appealed from in all
its parts, without any special ruling as to the costs of this instance.

Page | 7

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124853. February 24, 1998]
FRANCISCO L. JISON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA
JISON, respondent.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the 27 April
1995 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 32860[1] which
reversed the decision of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City in
Civil Case No. 16373.[2] The latter dismissed the complaint of private respondent
Monina Jison (hereafter MONINA) for recognition as an illegitimate child of petitioner
Francisco Jison (hereafter FRANCISCO).
In issue is whether or not public respondent Court of Appeals committed
reversible error, which, in this instance, necessitates an inquiry into the facts. While
as a general rule, factual issues are not within the province of this Court,
nevertheless, in light of the conflicting findings of facts of the trial court and the Court
of Appeals, this case falls under an exception to this rule.[3]
In her complaint[4] filed with the RTC on 13 March 1985, MONINA alleged that
FRANCISCO had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end
of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F.
Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter,
Lourdes). As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and
since childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate
child of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family. MONINA further alleged that
FRANCISCO gave her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a
Master's degree, became a certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a
Central Bank examiner. In view of FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly recognize her,
MONINA prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that
FRANCISCO support and treat her as such.
In his answer,[5] FRANCISCO alleged that he could not have had sexual
relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the complaint as she
had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and did not know of her
whereabouts since then; further, he never recognized MONINA, expressly or
impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As affirmative and special defenses, FRANCISCO
contended that MONINA had no right or cause of action against him and that her
action was barred by estoppel, laches and/or prescription. He thus prayed for
dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages due to the malicious filing of the
complaint.
Ass. 13 Persons
After MONINA filed her reply,[6] pre-trial was conducted where the parties
stipulated on the following issues:
1. Did Francisco Jison have any sexual relation[s] with Esperanza Am[o]lar
about the end of 1945 or the start of 1946?
2. Is Monina Jison the recognized illegitimate daughter of Francisco Jison
by the latters own acts and those of his family?
3. Is Monina Jison barred from instituting or prosecuting the present action
by estoppel, laches and/or prescription?
4. Damages.[7]
At trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total of eleven (11) witnesses,
namely: herself, Ruben Castellanes, Sr., Adela Casabuena, Arsenio Duatin, Zafiro
Ledesma, Danthea Lopez, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tingson, Alfredo Baylosis,
Dominador Zavariz and Lope Amolar.
Ruben Castellanes, Sr., a 63-year old resident of Iloilo City, testified that he had
worked for FRANCISCO for a total of six (6) years at Nelly Garden, FRANCISCO's
Iloilo residence. Towards the end of the Japanese occupation, FRANCISCOs wife
suffered a miscarriage or abortion, thereby depriving FRANCISCO of
consortium; thereafter, FRANCISCOs wife managed a nightclub on the ground floor
of Nelly Garden which operated daily from 6:00 p.m. till 3:00 a.m. of the following day,
thereby allowing FRANCISCO free access to MONINAs mother, Esperanza Amolar,
who was nicknamed Pansay.
Adela Casabuena, a 61-year old farmer, testified that she served as
the yaya (nanny) of Lourdes from July 1946 up to February
1947. Although Pansay had left Nelly Garden two (2) weeks before Adela started
working for the Jisons, Pansay returned sometime in September 1946, or about one
month after she gave birth to MONINA, to ask FRANCISCO for support. As a
result, Pansay and Lilia Jison, FRANCISCO's wife, quarreled in the living room, and
in the course thereof, Pansay claimed that FRANCISCO was the father of her
baby. To which, Lilia replied: I did not tell you to make that baby so it is your
fault. During the quarrel which lasted from 10:30 till 11:00 a.m., FRANCISCO was
supposedly inside the house listening.
Arsenio Duatin, a 77-year old retired laborer, testified that from 1947 until 1977,
he worked as FRANCISCOs houseboy at the latters house on 12th Street, Capitol
Subdivision, Bacolod City. Arsenio met MONINA in 1967, when Felipe Lagarto, the
bookkeeper at Nelly Garden, informed Arsenio that MONINA, FRANCISCOs
daughter, would arrive at Bacolod City with a letter of introduction from Lagarto.
Initially, Arsenio identified seven (7) black-and-white photographs (Exhs. X-5 to
X-11) of MONINA,[8] and as he paid for the telephone bills, he likewise identified six
(6) telephone cards (Exhs. G to L). Arsenio then declared that when MONINA arrived
in Bacolod City, she introduced herself to him as FRANCISCOs daughter. She stayed
at FRANCISCOs house, but when the latter and his wife would come over, Arsenio
would conceal the presence of MONINA because Mrs. Jison did not like to see her
face. Once, Arsenio hid MONINA in the house of FRANCISCOs sister, Mrs. Luisa
Jison Alano, in Silay City; another time, at the residence of FRANCISCOs cousin,
Mrs. Concha Lopez Cuaycong. Finally, Arsenio declared that the last time he saw
Page | 8

MONINA was when she left for Manila, after having finished her schooling at La Salle
College in Bacolod City.
On re-direct and upon questions by the court, Arsenio disclosed that it was
FRANCISCO who instructed that MONINA be hidden whenever FRANCISCO and his
wife were around; that although FRANCISCO and MONINA saw each other at the
Bacolod house only once, they called each other through long distance; and that
MONINA addressed FRANCISCO as Daddy during their lone meeting at the Bacolod
house and were affectionate to each other. Arsenio likewise declared that MONINA
stayed at FRANCISCO's Bacolod house twice: first for a month, then for about a
week the second time. On both occasions, however, FRANCISCO and his wife were
abroad. Finally, Arsenio recalled that FRANCISCO likewise bade Arsenio to treat
MONINA like his (FRANCISCOs) other daughters.
The testimony of Zafiro Ledesma, a 74-year old banker and former mayor of
Iloilo City, initially touched on how he and his wife were related to FRANCISCO,
FRANCISCO's wife and MONINA. Zafiro first identified Exhibit R, a diagram of the
family trees of the Jison and Lopez families, which showed that former Vice-President
Fernando Lopez was the first cousin of FRANCISCOs wife, then told the court that
the family of Vice-President Lopez treated MONINA very well because she is
considered a relative xxx by reputation, by actual perception. Zafiro likewise identified
Exhibits X-13 to X-18, photographs taken at the 14 April 1985 birthday celebration of
Mrs. Fernando Lopez, which showed MONINA with the former Vice-President and
other members of the Lopez family.
Zafiro further testified that while MONINA lived with Mrs. Cuaycong, the latter
paid for some of MONINAs school needs and even asked MONINA to work in a
hospital owned by Mrs. Cuaycong; and that another first cousin of FRANCISCOs wife,
a certain Remedios Lopez Franco, likewise helped MONINA with her studies and
problems, and even attended MONINAs graduation in 1978 when she obtained a
masteral degree in Business Administration, as evidenced by another photograph
(Exh. X-12). Moreover, upon Remedios recommendation, MONINA was employed as
a secretary at Merchant Financing Company, which was managed by a certain
Danthea Lopez, the wife of another first cousin of FRANCISCOs wife, and among
whose directors were Zafiro himself, his wife and Dantheas husband. In closing,
Zafiro identified MONINAs Social Security Record (Exh. W), which was signed by
Danthea as employer and where MONINA designated Remedios as the beneficiary.
Danthea Lopez, a 58-year old housekeeper, declared that FRANCISCO was the
first cousin of her husband, Eusebio D. Lopez; and that she came to know MONINA in
the latter part of 1965 when Remedios Franco recommended MONINA for
employment at Merchant Financing Co., which Danthea managed at that
time. Remedios introduced MONINA to Danthea as being reputedly the daughter of
Mr. Frank Jison; and on several occasions thereafter, Remedios made Danthea and
the latters husband understand that MONINA was reputedly the daughter of
[FRANCISCO]. While MONINA worked at Merchant Financing, Danthea knew that
MONINA lived with Remedios; however, in the latter part of 1966, as Remedios left
for Manila and MONINA was still studying at San Agustin University, Danthea and her
husband invited MONINA to live with them. During MONINAs 6-month stay with them,
she was not charged for board and lodging and was treated as a relative, not a mere
employee, all owing to what Remedios had said regarding MONINAs filiation. As
Danthea understood, MONINA resigned from Merchant Financing as she was called
by Mrs. Cuaycong, a first cousin of Dantheas husband who lived in Bacolod City.
Ass. 13 Persons
Romeo Bilbao, a 43-year old seaman, testified that he had worked for
FRANCISCO from 1969 up to 1980 at Nelly Garden in various capacities: as a
procurement officer, hacienda overseer and, later, as hacienda
administrator. Sometime in May, 1971, Romeo saw and heard MONINA ask her
Daddy (meaning FRANCISCO) for the money he promised to give her, but
FRANCISCO answered that he did not have the money to give, then told MONINA to
go see Mr. Jose Cruz in Bacolod City. Then in the middle of September that year,
FRANCISCO told Romeo to pick up Mr. Cruz at the Iloilo pier and bring him to the
office of Atty. Benjamin Tirol. At said office, Atty. Tirol, Mr. Cruz and MONINA entered
a room while Romeo waited outside. When they came out, Atty. Tirol had papers for
MONINA to sign, but she refused. Atty. Tirol said that a check would be released to
MONINA if she signed the papers, so MONINA acceded, although Atty. Tirol intended
not to give MONINA a copy of the document she signed. Thereafter, Mr. Cruz gave
MONINA a check (Exh. Q), then MONINA grabbed a copy of the document she
signed and ran outside. Romeo then brought Mr. Cruz to Nelly Garden. As to his
motive for testifying, Romeo stated that he wanted to help MONINA be recognized as
FRANCISCOS daughter.
Rudy Tingson, a 45-year old antique dealer, testified that in 1963-1964, he was
employed by FRANCISCOs wife at the Baguio Military Institute in Baguio City; then in
1965, Rudy worked at FRANCISCOs office at Nelly Garden recording hacienda
expenses, typing vouchers and office papers, and, at times, acting as paymaster for
the haciendas.From the nature of his work, Rudy knew the persons receiving money
from FRANCISCOs office, and clearly remembered that in 1965, as part of his job,
Rudy gave MONINA her allowance from FRANCISCO four (4) times, upon
instructions of a certain Mr. Lagarto to give MONINA P15.00 a month. Rudy likewise
recalled that he first met MONINA in 1965, and that she would go to Nelly Garden
whenever FRANCISCOs wife was not around. On some of these occasions, MONINA
would speak with and address FRANCISCO as Daddy, without objection from
FRANCISCO. In fact, in 1965, Rudy saw FRANCISCO give MONINA money
thrice. Rudy further declared that in April 1965, FRANCISCOs office paid P250.00 to
Funeraria Bernal for the funeral expenses of MONINAs mother. Finally, as to Rudy's
motives for testifying, he told the court that he simply wanted to help bring out the
truth and nothing but the truth, and that MONINAs filiation was common knowledge
among the people in the office at Nelly Garden.
On re-direct, Rudy declared that the moneys given by FRANCISCOs office to
MONINA were not reflected in the books of the office, but were kept in a separate
book, as Mr. Lagarto explained that FRANCISCOs wife and children should not know
[of] this. Rudy further revealed that as to the garden meetings between FRANCISCO
and MONINA, Rudy saw MONINA kiss FRANCISCO on the cheek both upon arriving
and before leaving, and FRANCISCOs reaction upon seeing her was to smile and say
in the Visayan dialect: Kamusta ka iha? (How are you, daughter?); and that MONINA
was free to go inside the house as the household staff knew of her filiation, and that,
sometimes, MONINA would join them for lunch.
Alfredo Baylosis, a 62-year old retired accountant, testified that he worked for
FRANCISCO at Central Santos-Lopez in Iloilo from 1951 up to 1961, then at Nelly
Garden from 1961 until 1972. Alfredo first served FRANCISCO as a bookkeeper, then
when Mr. Lagarto died in 1967 or 1969, Alfredo replaced Mr. Lagarto as office
manager.
Page | 9

Alfredo knew MONINA since 1961 as she used to go to Nelly Garden to claim
her P15.00 monthly allowance given upon FRANCISCOs standing order. Alfredo
further declared that MONINAs filiation was pretty well-known in the office; that he
had seen MONINA and FRANCISCO go from the main building to the office, with
FRANCISCOs arm on MONINAs shoulder; and that the office paid for the burial
expenses of Pansay, but this was not recorded in the books in order to hide it from
FRANCISCOs wife. Alfredo also disclosed that the disbursements for MONINAs
allowance started in 1961 and were recorded in a separate cash book. In 1967, the
allowances ceased when MONINA stopped schooling and was employed in Bacolod
City with Miller, Cruz & Co., which served as FRANCISCOs accountant-
auditor. Once, when Alfredo went to the offices of Miller, Cruz & Co. to see the
manager, Mr. Atienza, and arrange for the preparation of FRANCISCOs income tax
return, Alfredo chanced upon MONINA. When Alfredo asked her how she came to
work there, she answered that her Daddy, FRANCISCO, recommended her, a fact
confirmed by Mr. Atienza. Alfredo then claimed that Mr. Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller,
Cruz & Co., was the most trusted man of FRANCISCO.
Dominador Savariz, a 55-year old caretaker, testified that he worked as
FRANCISCOs houseboy at Nelly Garden from November 1953 up to 1965. One
morning in April 1954, MONINA and her mother Pansay went to Nelly Garden and
spoke with FRANCISCO for about an hour, during which time, Dominador was
vacuuming the carpet about six (6) to seven (7) meters away. Due to the noise of the
vacuum cleaner, FRANCISCO and MONINA spoke in loud voices, thus Dominador
overheard their conversation. As FRANCISCO asked Pansay why they
came, Pansay answered that they came to ask for the sustenance of his child
MONINA. FRANCISCO then touched MONINA's head and asked: How are you Hija?,
to which MONINA answered: Good morning, Daddy. After FRANCISCO
told Pansay and MONINA to wait, he pulled something from his wallet and said
to Pansay: I am giving this for the child.
In May 1954, Dominador saw MONINA at Mr. Lagartos office where Dominador
was to get the days expenses, while MONINA was claiming her allowance from Mr.
Diasnes. The next month, Dominador saw MONINA at Nelly Garden and heard in the
office that MONINA was there to get her allowance from her Daddy. In December
1960, Dominador saw MONINA at Nelly Garden, in the room of Don Vicente (father of
FRANCISCOs wife), where she asked for a Christmas gift and she was calling Don
Vicente, Lolo (grandfather). At that time, FRANCISCO and his wife were not
around. Then sometime in 1961, when Dominador went to Mr. Lagartos office to get
the marketing expenses, Dominador saw MONINA once more claiming her
allowance.
Dominador further testified that in February 1966, after he had stopped working
for FRANCISCO, Dominador was at Mrs. Francos residence as she recommended
him for employment with her sister, Mrs. Concha Cuaycong. There, he saw MONINA,
who was then about 15 years old, together with Mrs. Francos daughter and son. Mrs.
Franco pointed at MONINA and asked Dominador if he knew who MONINA
was. Dominador answered that MONINA was FRANCISCOs daughter with Pansay,
and then Mrs. Franco remarked that MONINA was staying with her (Mrs. Franco) and
that she was sending MONINA to school at the University of San Agustin.
Lope Amolar, a 50-year old resident of Dingle, Iloilo, and the younger brother of
Esperanza Amolar (Pansay), testified that he worked for FRANCISCO as a houseboy
from March to November 1945 at Nelly Garden. Thereafter, FRANCISCO sent Lope
Ass. 13 Persons
to work at Elena Apartments in Manila. By November 1945, Pansay was also working
at Elena Apartments, where she revealed to Lope that FRANCISCO impregnated
her. Lope then confronted FRANCISCO, who told Lope dont get hurt and dont cause
any trouble, because I am willing to support your Inday Pansay and my child. Three
(3) days after this confrontation, Lope asked for and received permission from
FRANCISCO to resign because he (Lope) was hurt.
On 21 October 1986, MONINA herself took the witness stand. At that time, she
was 40 years old and a Central Bank Examiner. She affirmed that as evidenced by
certifications from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. E and F) and
baptismal certificates (Exhs. C and D), she was born on 6 August 1946 in Barangay
Tabugon, Dingle, Iloilo, to Esperanza Amolar (who passed away on 20 April 1965)
and FRANCISCO.[9] MONINA first studied at Sagrado where she stayed as a
boarder. While at Sagrado from 1952 until 1955 (up to Grade 4), her father,
FRANCISCO, paid for her tuition fees and other school expenses. She either received
the money from FRANCISCO or from Mr. Lagarto, or saw FRANCISCO give money
to her mother, or Mr. Lagarto would pay Sagrado directly. After Sagrado, MONINA
studied in different schools,[10] but FRANCISCO continuously answered for her
schooling.
For her college education, MONINA enrolled at the University of Iloilo, but she
later dropped due to an accident which required a week's hospitalization. Although
FRANCISCO paid for part of the hospitalization expenses, her mother shouldered
most of them. In 1963, she enrolled at the University of San Agustin, where she
stayed with Mrs. Franco who paid for MONINA's tuition fees. However, expenses for
books, school supplies, uniforms and the like were shouldered by FRANCISCO. At
the start of each semester, MONINA would show FRANCISCO that she was enrolled,
then he would ask her to canvass prices, then give her the money she needed. After
finishing two (2) semesters at University of San Agustin, as evidenced by her
transcript of records (Exh. Z showing that FRANCISCO was listed as Parent/Guardian
[Exh. Z-1]), she transferred to De Paul College, just in front of Mrs. Francos house,
and studied there for a year. Thereafter, MONINA enrolled at Western Institute of
Technology (WIT), where she obtained a bachelors degree in Commerce in April
1967. During her senior year, she stayed with Eusebio and Danthea Lopez at Hotel
Kahirup, owned by said couple. She passed the CPA board exams in 1974, and took
up an M.B.A. at De La Salle University as evidenced by her transcript (Exh. AA),
wherein FRANCISCO was likewise listed as Guardian (Exhs. AA-1 and AA-2).
MONINA enumerated the different members of the household staff at Nelly
Garden, to wit: Luz, the household cook; the houseboys Silvestre and Doming; the
housemaid Natang; the yaya of the adopted triplets, Deling; the yaya of Lolo Vicente,
Adelina; and others. MONINA likewise enumerated the members of the office staff
(Messrs. Baylosis, Lagarto, Tingson, Diasnes, Jalandoni, Supertisioso, Doroy, and
others), and identified them from a photograph marked as Exhibit X-2. She then
corroborated the prior testimony regarding her employment at Merchant Financing
Co., and her having lived at Hotel Kahirup and at Mrs. Cuaycongs residence in
Bacolod City, while working at the hospital owned by Mrs. Cuaycong.
MONINA further testified that in March 1968, she went to Manila and met
FRANCISCO at Elena Apartments at the corner of Romero and Salas Streets,
Ermita. She told FRANCISCO that she was going for a vacation in Baguio City with
Mrs. Francos mother, with whom she stayed up to June 1968. Upon her return from
Baguio City, MONINA told FRANCISCO that she wanted to work, so the latter
Page | 10

arranged for her employment at Miller & Cruz in Bacolod City. MONINA went to
Bacolod City, was interviewed by Mr. Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller & Cruz, who told
her she would start working first week of September, sans examination. She resigned
from Miller & Cruz in 1971 and lived with Mrs. Cuaycong at her Forbes Park
residence in Makati. MONINA went to see FRANCISCO, told him that she resigned
and asked him for money to go to Spain, but FRANCISCO refused as she could not
speak Spanish and would not be able find a job. The two quarreled and FRANCISCO
ordered a helper to send MONINA out of the house. In the process, MONINA broke
many glasses at the pantry and cut her hand, after which, FRANCISCO hugged her,
gave her medicine, calmed her down, asked her to return to Bacolod City and
promised that he would give her the money.
MONINA returned to Bacolod City by plane, using a Filipinas Orient Airways
plane ticket (Exh. M) which FRANCISCO gave. She called Mr. Cruz, then Atty. Tirol,
as instructed by Mr. Cruz. These calls were evidenced by PLDT long distance toll
cards (Exhs. G to L), with annotations at the back reading: charged and paid under
the name of Frank L. Jison and were signed by Arsenio Duatin (Exhs. G-1 to L-
1). PLDT issued a certification as to the veracity of the contents of the toll cards (Exh.
BB). Likewise introduced in evidence was a letter of introduction prepared by Mr. Cruz
addressed to Atty. Tirol, on MONINA's behalf (Exh. N).
MONINA also declared that Atty. Tirol then told her that she would have to go to
Iloilo and sign a certain affidavit, before Mr. Cruz would turn over the money promised
by FRANCISCO. She went to Atty. Tirols office in Iloilo, but after going over the draft
of the affidavit, refused to sign it as it stated that she was not FRANCISCOs
daughter. She explained that all she had agreed with FRANCISCO was that he would
pay for her fare to go abroad, and that since she was a little girl, she knew about her
illegitimacy. She started crying, begged Atty. Tirol to change the affidavit, to which
Atty. Tirol responded that he was also a father and did not want this to happen to his
children as they could not be blamed for being brought into the world. She then wrote
a letter (Exh. O) to FRANCISCO and sent it to the latters Forbes Park residence
(Bauhinia Place) by JRS courier service (Exhs. O-5 to O-7). MONINA subsequently
met FRANCISCO in Bacolod City where they discussed the affidavit which she
refused to sign. FRANCISCO told her that the affidavit was for his wife, that in case
she heard about MONINA going abroad, the affidavit would keep her peace.
MONINA then narrated that the first time she went to Atty. Tirols office, she was
accompanied by one Atty. Fernando Divinagracia, who advised her that the affidavit
(Exh. P)[11] would boomerang against FRANCISCO as it is contrary to law. MONINA
returned to Bacolod City, then met with Atty. Tirol once more to reiterate her plea, but
Atty. Tirol did not relent. Thus, on the morning of 20 or 21 September 1971, she
signed the affidavit as she was jobless and needed the money to support herself and
finish her studies. In exchange for signing the document, MONINA received a Bank of
Asia check for P15,000.00 (Exh. Q), which was less than the P25,000.00 which
FRANCISCO allegedly promised to give. As Atty. Tirol seemed hesitant to give her a
copy of the affidavit after notarizing it, MONINA merely grabbed a copy and
immediately left.
MONINA then prepared to travel abroad, for which purpose, she procured letters
of introduction (Exhs. S and T) from a cousin, Mike Alano (son of FRANCISCOs elder
sister Luisa); and an uncle, Emilio Jison (FRANCISCOs elder brother), addressed to
another cousin, Beth Jison (Emilios daughter), for Beth to assist MONINA. Exhibit S
contained a statement (Exh. S-1) expressly recognizing that MONINA was
Ass. 13 Persons
FRANCISCOs daughter. Ultimately though, MONINA decided not to go abroad,
opting instead to spend the proceeds of the P15,000.00 check for her CPA review,
board exam and graduate studies. After finishing her graduate studies, she again
planned to travel abroad, for which reason, she obtained a letter of introduction from
former Vice President Fernando Lopez addressed to then United States Consul
Vernon McAnnich (Exh. V).
As to other acts tending to show her filiation, MONINA related that on one
occasion, as FRANCISCOs wife was going to arrive at the latters Bacolod City
residence, FRANCISCO called Arsenio Duatin and instructed Arsenio to hide
MONINA. Thus, MONINA stayed with Mrs. Luisa Jison for the duration of the stay of
FRANCISCOs wife.MONINA also claimed that she knew Vice President Fernando
Lopez and his wife, Mariquit, even before starting to go to school. Thus, MONINA
asked for a recommendation letter (Exh. U) from Mrs. Mariquit Lopez for possible
employment with Mrs. Rosario Lopez Cooper, another second cousin of
FRANCISCO. In Exhibit U, Mrs. Lopez expressly recognized MONINA as
FRANCISCOs daughter. As additional proof of her close relationship with the family of
Vice President Lopez, MONINA identified photographs taken at a birthday celebration
on 14 April 1985.
MONINA finally claimed that she knew the three (3) children of FRANCISCO by
wife, namely, Lourdes, Francisco, Jr. (Junior) and Elena, but MONINA had met only
Lourdes and Junior. MONINA's testimony dealt lengthily on her dealings with Junior
and the two (2) occasions when she met with Lourdes. The last time MONINA saw
FRANCISCO was in March 1979, when she sought his blessings to get married.
In his defense, FRANCISCO offered his deposition taken before then Judge
Romeo Callejo of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48. As additional
witnesses, FRANCISCO presented Nonito Jalandoni, Teodoro Zulla, Iigo
Supertisioso, Lourdes Ledesma, Jose Cruz and Dolores Argenal.
FRANCISCO declared that Pansays employment ceased as of October, 1944,
and that while employed by him, Pansay would sleep with the other female helpers on
the first floor of his residence, while he, his wife and daughter slept in a room on the
second floor. At that time, his household staff was composed of three (3) female
workers and two (2) male workers. After Pansay left in October 1944, she never
communicated with him again, neither did he know of her whereabouts. FRANCISCO
staunchly denied having had sexual relations with Pansay and disavowed any
knowledge about MONINAs birth. In the same vein, he denied having paid for
MONINAs tuition fees, in person or otherwise, and asserted that he never knew that
Mr. Lagarto paid for these fees. Moreover, FRANCISCO could not believe that
Lagarto would pay for these fees despite absence of instructions or approval from
FRANCISCO. He likewise categorically denied that he told anyone, be it Danthea
Lopez, Zafiro Ledesma, Concha Cuaycong or Remedios Franco, that MONINA was
his daughter.
FRANCISCO also disclosed that upon his return from the United States in 1971,
he fired Alfredo Baylosis upon discovering that Alfredo had taken advantage of his
position during the formers absence. FRANCISCO likewise fired Rudy Tingson and
Romeo Bilbao, but did not give the reasons therefor.
Finally, FRANCISCO denied knowledge of MONINAs long distance calls from
his Bacolod residence; nevertheless, when he subsequently discovered this, he fired
certain people in his office for their failure to report this anomaly. As regards the
Page | 11

caretaker of his Bacolod residence, FRANCISCO explained that since MONINA lived
at Mrs. Cuaycongs residence, the caretaker thought that he could allow people who
lived at the Cuaycong residence to use the facilities at his (FRANCISCOs) house.
Nonito Jalandoni, bookkeeper and paymaster at Nellys Garden from 1963 up to
1974, then from 1980 up to 1986, the assistant overseer of Hacienda Lopez, testified
that he did not know MONINA; that he learned of her only in June 1988, when he was
informed by FRANCISCO that MONINA had sued him; and that he never saw
MONINA at Nellys Garden, neither did he know of any instructions for anyone at
Nellys Garden to give money to MONINA.
Teodoro Zulla, FRANCISCOs bookkeeper and paymaster from 1951 up to 1986,
testified that FRANCISCO dismissed Alfredo Baylosis due to certain unspecified
discrepancies; and that he never saw MONINA receive funds from either Mr. Lagarto
or Mr. Baylosis. Upon questions from the trial court, however, Teodoro admitted that
he prepared vouchers for only one of FRANCISCOs haciendas, and not vouchers
pertaining to the latters personal expenses.
Iigo Supertisioso testified that he worked for FRANCISCO at Nellys Garden from
1964 up to 1984 as a field inspector, paymaster, cashier and, eventually, officer-in-
charge (OIC). He confirmed Alfredo Baylosis dismissal due to these unspecified
irregularities, then denied that FRANCISCO ever ordered that MONINA be given her
allowance.Likewise, Iigo never heard FRANCISCO mention that MONINA was his
(FRANCISCOs) daughter.
Lourdes Ledesma, FRANCISCOs daughter, testified that she saw (but did not
know) MONINA at the Our Lady of Mercy Hospital, on the occasion of the birth of
Lourdes first son, Mark. Over lunch one day, Lourdes aunt casually introduced
Lourdes and MONINA to each other, but they were referred to only by their first
names. Then sometime in 1983 or 1984, MONINA allegedly went to Lourdes house in
Sta. Clara Subdivision requesting for a letter of introduction or referral as MONINA
was then job-hunting. However, Lourdes did not comply with the request.
Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller, Cruz & Co., testified that MONINA worked at
Miller & Cruz from 1968 up to 1971, however, he did not personally interview her
before she was accepted for employment. Moreover, MONINA underwent the usual
screening procedure before being hired. Jose recalled that one of the accountants, a
certain Mr. Atienza, reported that MONINA claimed to be FRANCISCOs
daughter. Jose then told Mr. Atienza to speak with MONINA and see if he (Mr.
Atienza) could stop her from spreading this rumor. Mr. Atienza reported that he spoke
with MONINA, who told him that she planned to leave for the United States and
needed P20,000.00 for that purpose, and in exchange, she would sign a document
disclaiming filiation with FRANCISCO. Thus, Jose instructed Mr. Atienza to request
that MONINA meet with Jose, and at that meeting, MONINA confirmed Mr. Atienzas
report. Jose then informed Atty. Tirol, FRANCISCOs personal lawyer, about the
matter.
Atty. Tirol told Jose to send MONINA and her lawyer to his (Atty. Tirols) office in
Iloilo. Jose then wrote out a letter of introduction for MONINA addressed to Atty.
Tirol. Jose relayed Atty. Tirols message to MONINA through Mr. Atienza, then later,
Atty. Tirol told Jose to go to Iloilo with a check for P15,000.00. Jose complied, and at
Atty. Tirols office, Jose saw MONINA, Atty. Tirol and his secretary reading some
documents. MONINA then expressed her willingness to sign the
document, sans revisions. Jose alleged that he drew the P15,000.00 from his
Ass. 13 Persons
personal funds, subject to reimbursement from and due to an understanding with
FRANCISCO.
Dolores Argenal, a househelper at Nelly Garden from May 1944 up to May
1946, testified that she knew that Pansay was Lourdes nanny; that Lourdes slept in
her parents room; that she had not seen FRANCISCO give special treatment
to Pansay; that there was no unusual relationship between FRANCISCO
and Pansay, and if there was any, Dolores would have easily detected it since she
slept in the same room as Pansay. Dolores further declared that whenever
FRANCISCOs wife was out of town, Pansay would bring Lourdes downstairs at
nighttime, and that Pansay would not sleep in the room where FRANCISCO
slept. Finally, Dolores declared that Pansay stopped working for FRANCISCO and his
wife in October, 1944.
The reception of evidence having been concluded, the parties filed their
respective memoranda.
It need be recalled that Judge Catalino Castaeda, Jr. presided over trial up to 21
October 1986, thereby hearing only the testimonies of MONINAs witnesses and about
half of MONINAs testimony on direct examination. Judge Norberto E. Devera, Jr.
heard the rest of MONINA's testimony and those of FRANCISCOs witnesses.
In its decision of 12 November 1990[12] the trial court, through Judge Devera,
dismissed the complaint with costs against MONINA. In the opening paragraph
thereof, it observed:
This is a complaint for recognition of an illegitimate child instituted by plaintiff Monina
Jison against defendant Francisco Jison. This complaint was filed on March 13, 1985
at the time when plaintiff, reckoned from her death of birth, was already thirty-nine
years old. Noteworthy also is the fact that it was instituted twenty years after the death
of plaintiffs mother, Esperanza Amolar. For the years between plaintiffs birth and
Esperanzas death, no action of any kind was instituted against defendant either by
plaintiff, her mother Esperanza or the latters parents. Neither had plaintiff brought
such an action against defendant immediately upon her mothers death on April 20,
1965, considering that she was then already nineteen years old or, within a
reasonable time thereafter. Twenty years more had to supervene before this
complaint was eventually instituted.
The trial court then proceeded to discuss the four issues stipulated at pre-trial,
without, however, summarizing the testimonies of the witnesses nor referring to the
testimonies of the witnesses other than those mentioned in the discussion of the
issues.
The trial court resolved the first issue in the negative, holding that it was
improbable for witness Lope Amolar to have noticed that Pansay was pregnant upon
seeing her at the Elena Apartments in November 1945, since Pansay was then only
in her first month of pregnancy; that there was no positive assertion that copulation
did indeed take place between Francisco and Esperanza; and that MONINAs attempt
to show opportunity on the part of FRANCISCO failed to consider that there was also
the opportunity for copulation between Esperanza and one of the several domestic
helpers admittedly also residing at Nellys Garden at that time. The RTC also ruled
Page | 12

that the probative value of the birth and baptismal certificates of MONINA paled in
light of jurisprudence, especially when the misspellings therein were considered.
The trial court likewise resolved the second issue in the negative, finding that
MONINAs evidence thereon may either be one of three categories, namely: hearsay
evidence, incredulous evidence, or self-serving evidence." To the first category
belonged the testimonies of Adela Casabuena and Alfredo Baylosis, whose
knowledge of MONINAs filiation was based, as to the former, on utterances of
defendants wife Lilia and Esperanza allegedly during the heat of their quarrel, while
as to the latter, Alfredo's conclusion was based from the rumors going [around] that
plaintiff is defendants daughter, from his personal observation of plaintiffs facial
appearance which he compared with that of defendants and from the way the two
(plaintiff and defendant) acted and treated each other on one occasion that he had
then opportunity to closely observe them together. To the second category belonged
that of Dominador Savariz, as:
At each precise time that Esperanza allegedly visited Nellys Garden and allegedly on
those occasions when defendants wife, Lilia was in Manila, this witness was there
and allegedly heard pieces of conversation between defendant and Esperanza
related to the paternity of the latters child. xxx
The RTC then placed MONINAs testimony regarding the acts of recognition
accorded her by FRANCISCOs relatives under the third category, since the latter
were never presented as witnesses, for which reason the trial court excluded the
letters from FRANCISCOs relatives (Exhs. S to V).
As to the third issue, the trial court held that MONINA was not barred by
prescription for it was of the perception that the benefits of Article 268 accorded to
legitimate children may be availed of or extended to illegitimate children in the same
manner as the Family Code has so provided; or by laches, which is [a] creation of
equity applied only to bring equitable results, and addressed to the sound discretion
of the court [and] the circumstances [here] would show that whether plaintiff filed this
case immediately upon the death of her mother Esperanza in 1965 or twenty years
thereafter in 1985, xxx there seems to be no inequitable result to defendant as related
to the situation of plaintiff.
The RTC ruled, however, that MONINA was barred by estoppel by deed
because of the affidavit (Exh. P/Exh. 2) which she signed when she was already
twenty-five years, a professional and under the able guidance of counsel.
Finally, the RTC denied FRANCISCOs claim for damages, finding that MONINA
did not file the complaint with malice, she having been propelled by an honest belief,
founded on probable cause.
MONINA seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 32860)
and sought reversal of the trial courts decision on the grounds that:
I is the illegitimate daughter of [FRANCISCO] and that she had continuously enjoyed
THE TRIAL COURT WAS ERRONEOUSLY PREDISPOSED TO
ADJUDGE THIS CASE AGAINST APPELLANT DUE TO ITS
MISPERCEPTION THAT APPELLANTS DELAY IN FILING HER
COMPLAINT WAS FATAL TO HER CASE.
Ass. 13 Persons
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REJECTION OF THE
TESTIMONIES OF APPELLANTS WITNESSES AS TAILOR-MADE,
INADEQUATE AND INCREDIBLE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REJECTION OF THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CERTIFIED COPIES OF PUBLIC
DOCUMENTS PRESENTED BY APPELLANT AS PART OF HER
EVIDENCE.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REQUIREMENT THAT A
WITNESS TO THE ACTUAL ACT OF COPULATION BETWEEN THE
APPELLEE AND APPELLANTS MOTHER SHOULD HAVE
POSITIVELY TESTIFIED TO SAID EFFECT.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
THE DULY IDENTIFIED NOTES AND LETTER OF THE RELATIVES
OF THE APPELLEE AS HEARSAY.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANTS
AFFIDAVIT (EXH. P) SERVED AS A BAR AGAINST HER CLAIM FOR
RECOGNITION INSTEAD OF REINFORCING SAID CLAIM.[13]
Expectedly, FRANCISCO refuted these alleged errors in his Appellees Brief. [14]
In its decision of 27 April 1995,[15] the Court of Appeals initially declared that as
no vested or acquired rights were affected, the instant case was governed by Article
175, in relation to Articles 172 and 173, of the Family Code.[16] While the Court of
Appeals rejected the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Dingle, Iloilo
(Exhs. E and F) as FRANCISCO did not sign them, said court focused its discussion
on the other means by which illegitimate filiation could be proved, i.e., the open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or, by any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, such as the baptismal certificate of
the child, a judicial admission, a family bible wherein the name of the child is entered,
common reputation respecting pedigree, admission by silence, testimonies of
witnesses xxx.[17] To the Court of Appeals, the bottom line issue was whether or not
MONINA established her filiation as FRANCISCOs illegitimate daughter by
preponderance of evidence, as to which issue said court found:
[N]ot just preponderant but overwhelming evidence on record to prove that [MONINA]
such status by direct acts of [FRANCISCO] and/or his relatives.
Page | 13

In so ruling, the Court of Appeals observed that the testimonies of Lope Amolar,
Adela Casabuena and Dominador Savariz were already sufficient to establish
MONINAs filiation:
As adverted to earlier, the trial court discredited Lope Amolars testimony by saying
that Lope could not have detected Esperanzas pregnant state in November, 1945
since at that point in time [sic] she was still in the initial stage of
pregnancy. Apparently, the trial court paid more emphasis on the date mentioned by
Lope Amolar than on the tenor and import of his testimony. As xxx Lope xxx was
asked about an incident that transpired more than 41 years back, [u]nder the
circumstances, it is unreasonable to expect that Lope could still be dead right on the
specific month in 1945 that [he] met and confronted his sister. At any rate, what is
important is not the month that they met but the essence of his testimony that his
sister pointed to their employer [FRANCISCO] as the one responsible for her
pregnancy, and that upon being confronted, [FRANCISCO] assured him of support for
Esperanza and their child. It would appear then that in an attempt to find fault with
Lopes testimony, the trial court has fallen oblivious to the fact that even
[FRANCISCO], in his deposition, did not deny that he was confronted by Lope about
what he had done to Esperanza, during which he unequivocally acknowledged
paternity by assuring Lope of support for both Esperanza and their child.
The Court of Appelas further noted that Casabuena and Savariz testified on
something that they personally observed or witnessed, which matters FRANCISCO
did not deny or refute. Finally, said court aptly held:
Taking into account all the foregoing uncontroverted testimonies xxx let alone such
circumstantial evidence as [MONINAs] Birth Certificates xxx and Baptismal
Certificates which invariably bear the name of [FRANCISCO] as her father, We
cannot go along with the trial courts theory that [MONINAs] illegitimate filiation has not
been satisfactorily established.
xxx
Significantly, [MONINAs] testimony finds ample corroboration from [FRANCISCOs]
former employees, Arsenio Duatin, Rudy Tingson and Alfredo Baylosis. xxx
xxx
Carefully evaluating appellants evidence on her enjoyment of the status of an
illegitimate daughter of [FRANCISCO] vis-a-vis [FRANCISCOs] controversion thereof,
We find more weight in the former. The positive testimonies of [MONINA] and [her]
witnesses xxx all bearing on [FRANCISCOs] acts and/or conduct indubitably showing
that he had continuously acknowledged [MONINA] as his illegitimate daughter have
not been succeessfully [sic] refuted. In fact, [FRANCISCO] himself, in his deposition,
only casually dismissed [MONINAs] exhaustive and detailed testimony as untrue, and
with respect to those given by [MONINAs] witnesses, he merely explained that he had
fired [them] from their employment. Needless to state, [FRANCISCOs] vague denial is
grossly inadequate to overcome the probative weight of [MONINAs] testimonial
evidence.
Ass. 13 Persons
Even the affidavit (Exh 2) which [FRANCISCO] had foisted on the trial court xxx does
not hold sway in the face of [MONINAs] logical explanation that she at first did agree
to sign the affidavit which contained untruthful statements. In fact, she promptly
complained to [FRANCISCO] who, however explained to her that the affidavit was
only for the consumption of his spouse xxx. Further, the testimony of Jose Cruz
concerning the events that led to the execution of the affidavit xxx could not have
been true, for as pointed out by [MONINA], she signed the affidavit xxx almost five
months after she had resigned from the Miller, Cruz & Co. xxx
At any rate, if [MONINA] were not his illegitimate daughter, it would have been
uncalled for, if not absurd, for [FRANCISCO] or his lawyer to have secured
[MONINAs] sworn statement xxx On the contrary, in asking [MONINA] to sign the said
affidavit at the cost of P15,000, [FRANCISCO] clearly betrayed his intention to
conceal or suppress his paternity of [MONINA]. xxx
In fine, We hold that [MONINAs] filiation as [FRANCISCOs] illegitimate daughter has
been conclusively established by the uncontroverted testimonies of Lope Amolar,
Adela Casabuena and Dominador Savariz to the effect that appellee himself had
admitted his paternity of the appellee, and also by the testimonies of appellant,
Arsenio Duatin, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tingson and Alfredo Baylosis unerringly
demonstrating that by his own conduct or overt acts like sending appellant to school,
paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms, books, board and lodging at the Colegio
del Sagrado Corazon de Jesus, defraying appellants hospitalization expenses,
providing her with [a] monthly allowance, paying for the funeral expenses of
appellants mother, acknowledging appellants paternal greetings and calling appellant
his Hija or child, instructing his office personnel to give appellants monthly allowance,
recommending appellant for employment at the Miller, Cruz & Co., allowing appellant
to use his house in Bacolod and paying for her long distance telephone calls, having
appellant spend her vacation in his apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes
residence, allowing appellant to use his surname in her scholastic and other records
(Exhs Z, AA, AA-1 to AA-5, W & W-5), appellee had continuously recognized
appellant as his illegitimate daughter. Added to these are the acts of [FRANCISCOs]
relatives acknowledging or treating [MONINA] as [FRANCISCOs] daughter (Exh U) or
as their relative (Exhs T & V). On this point, witness Zafiro Ledesma, former Mayor of
Iloilo City, whose spouse belongs to the Lopez clan just like [FRANCISCO], testified
that [MONINA] has been considered by the Lopezes as a relative. He identified
pictures of the appellee in the company of the Lopezes (Exhs X-16 & X-17). Another
witness, Danthea H. Lopez, whose husband Eusebio Lopez is appellees first cousin,
testified that appellant was introduced to her by appellees cousin, Remedios Lopez
Franco, as the daughter of appellee Francisco Jison, for which reason, she took her in
as [a] secretary in the Merchants Financing Corporation of which she was the
manager, and further allowed her to stay with her family free of board and
lodging. Still on this aspect, Dominador Savariz declared that sometime in February,
1966 appellees relative, Ms. Remedios Lopez Franco pointed to appellant as the
daughter of appellee Francisco Jison.
Finally, the Certifications of the Local Civil Registrar of Dingle (Exhs E and F) as well
as [MONINAs] Baptismal Certificates (Exhs C & D) which the trial ocurt admitted in
evidence as part of [MONINAs] testimony, may serve as circumstantial evidence to
further reinforce [MONINAs] claim that she is [FRANCISCOs] illegitimate daughter by
Esperanza Amolar.
Page | 14

True it is that a trial judges assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded
great respect on appeal. But the rule admits of certain exceptions. One such
exception is where the judge who rendered the judgment was not the one who heard
the witnesses testify. [citations omitted] The other is where the trial court had
overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated some facts or circumstances of weight
and substance which, if properly considered, might affect the result of the case.
[citations omitted] In the present case, both exceptions obtain. All of [MONINAs]
witnesses xxx whose testimonies were not given credence did not testify before the
judge who rendered the disputed judgment. xxx
The Court of Appeals then decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE
and another one is hereby entered for appellant Monina Jison, declaring her as the
illegitimate daughter of appellee Francisco Jison, and entitled to all rights and
privileges granted by law.
Costs against appellee.
SO ORDERED.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its
resolution of 29 March 1996,[18] FRANCISCO filed the instant petition. He urges us to
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, alleging that said court committed
errors of law:
I.
IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND
DECLARING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS THE ILLEGITIMATE
CHILD OF PETITIONER, CONSIDERING [THE] IMPOSSIBILITY OF
SEXUAL CONTACT BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S MOTHER AT THE TIME CONCEPTION
WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE OCCURRED.
II.
IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING CONSIDERING
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE OF
PATERNITY AND FILIATION IS NOT CLEAR AND CONVINCING.
III.
IN GIVING CREDENCE TO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS EVIDENCE OF
FILIATION CONSIDERING THAT THE SAME ARE HEARSAY, SELF-
SERVING AND CANNOT BIND THE PETITIONER UNDER THE
BASIC RULES OF EVIDENCE.
IV.
Ass. 13 Persons
IN INTERPRETING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S SWORN
STATEMENT (EXH. P/EXH. 2) IN A MANNER NOT IN
CONSONANCE WITH THE RULINGS OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT.
V.
IN NOT CONSIDERING THE LONG AND UNEXPLAINED DELAY IN
THE FILING OF THE PRESENT PATERNITY SUIT AS EQUIVALENT
TO LACHES.
As regards the first error, FRANCISCO insists that taking into account the
second paragraph of MONINAs complaint wherein she claimed that he
and Pansay had sexual relations by about the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, it was
physically impossible for him and Pansay to have had sexual contact which resulted
in MONINAs birth, considering that:
The normal period of human pregnancy is nine (9) months. If as claimed by private
respondent in her complaint that her mother was impregnated by FRANCISCO at the
end of 1945 or the start of 1946, she would have been born sometime in late
September or early October and not August 6, 1946 xxx. The instant case finds
factual and legal parallels in Constantino vs. Mendez,[19] thus: xxx
FRANCISCO further claims that his testimony that Pansay was no longer
employed by him at the time in question was unrebutted, moreover, other men had
access to Pansay during the time of or even after her employment by him.
As to the second error, FRANCISCO submits that MONINAs testimonial
evidence is shaky, contradictory and unreliable, and proceeds to attack the credibility
of her witnesses by claiming, in the main, that: (a) Lope Amolar could not have
detected Pansays pregnancy in November 1945 when they met since she would have
been only one (1) month pregnant then; (b) Dominador Savariz did not in fact witness
the meeting between FRANCISCO, Pansay and MONINA; (c) Zafiro Ledesma had an
ulterior motive in testifying for MONINA as he owned a bank in Iloilo which was then
under Central Bank supervision and MONINA was the Bank Examiner assigned to
Iloilo; and (d) Danthea Lopez was not related to him by blood and whatever favorable
treatment MONINA received from Danthea was due to the formers employment at
Merchants Financing Company and additional services rendered at Kahirup Hotel;
besides, Danthea admitted that she had no personal knowledge as to the issue of
paternity and filiation of the contending parties, hence Sections 39 and 40 [20] of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court did not come into play. FRANCISCO likewise re-echoes the
view of the trial court as regards the testimonies of Adela Casabuena and Alfredo
Baylosis.
FRANCISCO further asserts that MONINAs testimony that he answered for her
schooling was self-serving and uncorroborated by any receipt or other documentary
evidence; and assuming he did, such should be interpreted as a manifestation of
kindness shown towards the family of a former household helper.
Anent the treatment given by his relatives to MONINA as his daughter,
FRANCISCO points to the fact that Pansay was the former laundrywoman of Mrs.
Franco; MONINA resided with the families of Eusebio Lopez and Concha Cuaycong
because she was in their employ at Kahirup Hotel and Our Lady of Mercy Hospital,
Page | 15

respectively; MONINA failed to present Mrs. Franco, Eusebio Lopez and Mrs.
Cuaycong; and MONINAs employment at the accounting firm of Miller, Cruz & Co.
was attributable to her educational attainment, there being absolutely no evidence to
prove that FRANCISCO ever facilitated her employment thereat. Hence, in light of
Baluyot v. Baluyot,[21] the quantum of evidence to prove paternity by clear and
convincing evidence, not merely a preponderance thereof, was not met.
With respect to the third assigned error, FRANCISCO argues that the Court of
Appeals reliance on the certifications of the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. E and F) and
Baptismal Certificates (Exhs. C and D) as circumstantial evidence is misplaced. First,
their genuineness could not be ascertained as the persons who issued them did not
testify. Second, in light of Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[22] the contents of the baptismal
certificates were hearsay, as the data was based only on what was told to the priest
who solemnized the baptism, who likewise was not presented as a
witness. Additionally, the name of the father appearing therein was Franque Jison,
which was not FRANCISCOs name. Third, in both Exhibits E and F, the names of the
childs parents were listed as Frank Heson and Esperanza Amador (not
Amolar). FRANCISCO further points out that in Exhibit F, the status of the child is
listed as legitimate, while the fathers occupation as laborer. Most importantly, there
was no showing that FRANCISCO signed Exhibits E and F or that he was the one
who reported the childs birth to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar. As to MONINAs
educational records, FRANCISCO invokes Baas v. Baas [23] which recognized that
school records are prepared by school authorities, not by putative parents, thus
incompetent to prove paternity. And, as to the photographs presented by MONINA,
FRANCISCO cites Colorado v. Court of Appeals,[24] and further asserts that MONINA
did not present any of the persons with whom she is seen in the pictures to testify
thereon; besides these persons were, at best, mere second cousins of
FRANCISCO. He likewise assails the various notes and letters written by his relatives
(Exhs. S to V) as they were not identified by the authors. Finally, he stresses that
MONINA did not testify as to the telephone cards (Exhs. G to L) nor did these reveal
the circumstances surrounding the calls she made from his residence.
Anent the fourth assigned error, FRANCISCO contends that the Court of
Appeals interpretation of MONINAs affidavit of 21 September 1971 ran counter to
Dequito v. Llamas,[25] and overlooked that at the time of execution, MONINA was
more than 25 years old and assisted by counsel.
As to the last assigned error, FRANCISCO bewails the Court of Appeals failure
to consider the long and unexplained delay in the filing of the case.
In her comment, MONINA forcefully refuted FRANCISCOs arguments, leading
FRANCISCO to file his reply thereto.
On 20 November 1996, we gave due course to this petition and required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda, which they subsequently did.
A painstaking review of the evidence and arguments fails to support petitioner.
Before addressing the merits of the controversy, we first dispose of preliminary
matters relating to the applicable law and the guiding principles in paternity suits. As
to the former, plainly, the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209)
governs the present controversy. As correctly cited by the Court of Appeals,
Uyguangco[26] served as a judicial confirmation of Article 256 of the Family
Code[27] regarding its retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights,
Ass. 13 Persons
which does not hold true here, it appearing that neither the putative parent nor the
child has passed away and the former having actually resisted the latters claim below.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's,
may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate
children.Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate
filiation is established, thus:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
This Article reproduces, with amendments, Articles 265, 266 and 267 of the Civil
Code.
For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the second
paragraph, which MONINA relies upon given that she has none of the evidence
mentioned in the first paragraph, a high standard of proof [28] is required. Specifically,
to prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there
must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed
father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental
affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of
such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the
apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in
life, not accidentally, but continuously.[29]
By continuous is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any
particular length of time.[30]
The foregoing standard of proof required to establish ones filiation is founded on
the principle that an order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome
atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family or lives of the parties, so that it must be
issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. [31]
The foregoing discussion, however, must be situated within the general rules on
evidence, in light of the burden of proof in civil cases, i.e., preponderance of evidence,
and the shifting of the burden of evidence in such cases. Simply put, he who alleges
the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil
case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case,
once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of
evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiffs prima facie case, otherwise, a
Page | 16

verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having
the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff
having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
defendants. The concept of preponderance of evidence refers to evidence which is of
greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom,
it means probability of truth.[32]
With these in mind, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the instant
controversy.
FRANCISCOs arguments in support of his first assigned error deserve scant
consideration. While it has been observed that unlawful intercourse will not be
presumed merely from proof of an opportunity for such indulgence, [33] this does not
favor FRANCISCO. Akin to the crime of rape where, in most instances, the only
witnesses to the felony are the participants in the sexual act themselves, in deciding
paternity suits, the issue of whether sexual intercourse actually occurred inevitably
redounds to the victims or mothers word, as against the accuseds or putative fathers
protestations. In the instant case, MONINAs mother could no longer testify as to the
fact of intercourse, as she had, unfortunately, passed away long before the institution
of the complaint for recognition. But this did not mean that MONINA could no longer
prove her filiation. The fact of her birth and her parentage may be established by
evidence other than the testimony of her mother. The paramount question then is
whether MONINAs evidence is coherent, logical and natural.[34]
The complaint stated that FRANCISCO had carnal knowledge of Pansay by
about the end of 1945. We agree with MONINA that this was broad enough to cover
the fourth quarter of said year, hence her birth on 6 August 1946 could still be
attributed to sexual relations between FRANCISCO and MONINAs mother. In any
event, since it was established that her mother was still in the employ of FRANCISCO
at the time MONINA was conceived as determined by the date of her birth, sexual
contact between FRANCISCO and MONINAs mother was not at all impossible,
especially in light of the overwhelming evidence, as hereafter shown, that
FRANCISCO fathered MONINA, has recognized her as his daughter and that
MONINA has been enjoying the open and continuous possession of the status as
FRANCISCOs illegitimate daughter.
We readily conclude that the testimonial evidence offered by MONINA, woven
by her narration of circumstances and events that occurred through the years,
concerning her relationship with FRANCISCO, coupled with the testimonies of her
witnesses, overwhelmingly established the following facts:
1) FRANCISCO is MONINAs father and she was conceived at the time when
her mother was in the employ of the former;
2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his overt acts and
conduct which the Court of Appeals took pains to enumerate, thus:
[L]ike sending appellant to school, paying for her tuition fees, school
uniforms, books, board and lodging at the Colegio del Sagrado de Jesus,
defraying appellants hospitalization expenses, providing her with [a]
monthly allowance, paying for the funeral expenses of appellants mother,
acknowledging appellants paternal greetings and calling appellant his Hija
Ass. 13 Persons
or child, instructing his office personnel to give appellants monthly
allowance, recommending appellant for employment at the Miller, Cruz &
Co., allowing appellant to use his house in Bacolod and paying for her
long distance telephone calls, having appellant spend her vacation in his
apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes residence, allowing appellant
to use his surname in her scholastic and other records (Exhs Z, AA, AA-1
to AA-5, W & W-5)
3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested throughout the
years publicly,[35] spontaneously, continuously and in an uninterrupted
manner.[36]
Accordingly, in light of the totality of the evidence on record, the second
assigned error must fail.
There is some merit, however, in the third assigned error against the probative
value of some of MONINAs documentary evidence.
MONINAs reliance on the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar
concerning her birth (Exhs. E and F) is clearly misplaced. It is settled that a certificate
of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence as to
the issue of paternity, when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in
the preparation of said certificates, and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority
to record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third
person.[37] Simply put, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth
certificate, e.g., supplying the information himself, the inscription of his name by the
mother or doctor or registrar is null and void; the mere certificate by the registrar
without the signature of the father is not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on the
latters part.[38] In like manner, FRANCISCOs lack of participation in the preparation of
the baptismal certificates (Exhs. C and D) and school records (Exhs. Z and AA)
renders these documents incompetent to prove paternity, the former being competent
merely to prove the administration of the sacrament of baptism on the date so
specified.[39] However, despite the inadmissibility of the school records per se to prove
paternity, they may be admitted as part of MONINAs testimony to corroborate her
claim that FRANCISCO spent for her education.
We likewise disagree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the certificates
issued by the Local Civil Registrar and the baptismal certificates may be taken as
circumstantial evidence to prove MONINAs filiation. Since they are per
se inadmissible in evidence as proof of such filiation, they cannot be admitted
indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
As to Exhibits S, T, U and V, the various notes and letters written by
FRANCISCOs relatives, namely Mike Alano, Emilio Jison, Mariquit Lopez and
Fernando Lopez, respectively, allegedly attesting to MONINAs filiation, while their due
execution and authenticity are not in issue, [40] as MONINA witnessed the authors
signing the documents, nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section 39, the contents of
these documents may not be admitted, there being no showing that the declarants-
authors were dead or unable to testify, neither was the relationship between the
declarants and MONINA shown by evidence other than the documents in
question.[41] As to the admissibility of these documents under Rule 130, Section 40,
however, this requires further elaboration.
Page | 17

Rule 130, Section 40, provides:
Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. -- The reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of
any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying
thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in
family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and
the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. (underscoring supplied)
It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion
containing the first underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under
which the documents in question may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not
take the witness stand; and the section containing the second underscored
phrase. What must then be ascertained is whether Exhibits S to V, as private
documents, fall within the scope of the clause and the like as qualified by the
preceding phrase [e]ntries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings
on rights [and] family portraits.
We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of
this provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are
commonly known as family possessions, or those articles which represent, in effect, a
familys joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person. [42] These have been
described as objects openly exhibited and well known to the family, [43] or those which,
if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition. [44] Other
examples of these objects which are regarded as reflective of a familys reputation or
tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones, [45] monuments or coffin
plates.[46]
Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private documents not constituting "family
possessions" as discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130,
Section 40.Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section
41 regarding common reputation,[47] it having been observed that:
[T]he weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general
repute, the common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in
community, that is a material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. xxx
[Thus] matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in the family, and not by
reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except where the pedigree in question is
marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the community. [48]
Their inadmissibility notwithstanding, Exhibits S to V, inclusive, may, in like
manner as MONINA's school records, properly be admitted as part of her testimony to
strengthen her claim that, indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO recognized her as his
daughter.
We now direct our attention to MONINAs 21 September 1971 affidavit (Exh.
P/Exh. 2), subject of the fourth assigned error, where she attests that FRANCISCO is
not her father. MONINA contends that she signed it under duress, i.e., she was
jobless, had no savings and needed the money to support herself and finish her
studies. Moreover, she signed Exhibit P upon the advice of Atty. Divinagracia that
filiation could not be waived and that FRANCISCOs ploy would boomerang upon
Ass. 13 Persons
him. On the other hand, FRANCISCO asserts that full credence should be afforded
Exhibit P as MONINA was already 25 years old at the time of its execution and was
advised by counsel; further, being a notarized document, its genuineness and due
execution could not be questioned. He relies on the testimony of Jose Cruz, a partner
at the accounting firm of Miller & Cruz, who declared that he intervened in the matter
as MONINA was spreading rumors about her filiation within the firm, which might
have had deleterious effects upon the relationship between the firm and
FRANCISCO.
On this issue, we find for MONINA and agree with the following observations of
the Court of Appeals:
Even the affidavit (Exh 2) which [FRANCISCO] had foisted on the trial court xxx does
not hold sway in the face of [MONINAs] logical explanation that she at first did agree
to sign the affidavit which contained untruthful statements. In fact, she promptly
complained to [FRANCISCO] who, however explained to her that the affidavit was
only for the consumption of his spouse xxx.
At any rate, if [MONINA] were not his illegitimate daughter, it would have been
uncalled for, if not absurd, for [FRANCISCO] or his lawyer to have secured
[MONINAs] sworn statement xxx On the contrary, in asking [MONINA] to sign the said
affidavit at the cost of P15,000, [FRANCISCO] clearly betrayed his intention to
conceal or suppress his paternity of [MONINA]. xxx
Indeed, if MONINA were truly not FRANCISCOs illegitimate daughter, it would
have been unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that
MONINA denounce her filiation. For as clearly established before the trial court and
properly appreciated by the Court of Appeals, MONINA had resigned from Miller &
Cruz five (5) months prior to the execution of the sworn statement in question, hence
negating FRANCISCOs theory of the need to quash rumors circulating within Miller &
Cruz regarding the identity of MONINAs father. Hence, coupled with the assessment
of the credibility of the testimonial evidence of the parties discussed above, it is
evident that the standard to contradict a notarial document, i.e., clear and convincing
evidence and more than merely preponderant,[49] has been met by MONINA.
Plainly then, the burden of evidence fully shifted to FRANCISCO.
Two (2) glaring points in FRANCISCOs defense beg to be addressed: First, that
his testimony was comprised of mere denials, rife with bare, unsubstantiated
responses such as That is not true, I do not believe that, or None that I know. In
declining then to lend credence to FRANCISCOs testimony, we resort to a guiding
principle in adjudging the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his
statements, laid down as early as 1921:
The experience of courts and the general observation of humanity teach us that the
natural limitations of our inventive faculties are such that if a witness undertakes to
fabricate and deliver in court a false narrative containing numerous details, he is
almost certain to fall into fatal inconsistencies, to make statements which can be
readily refuted, or to expose in his demeanor the falsity of his message.
Page | 18

For this reason it will be found that perjurers usually confine themselves to the
incidents immediately related to the principal fact about which they testify, and when
asked about collateral facts by which their truthfulness could be tested, their answers
not infrequently take the stereotyped form of such expressions as I dont know or I
dont remember. xxx[50]
Second, the reasons for the dismissals of Tingson, Baylosis and Savariz were
unspecified or likewise unsubstantiated, hence FRANCISCOs attempt to prove ill-
motive on their part to falsely testify in MONINAs favor may not succeed. As may be
gleaned, the only detail which FRANCISCO could furnish as to the circumstances
surrounding the dismissals of his former employees was that Baylosis allegedly took
advantage of his position while FRANCISCO was in the United States. But aside from
this bare claim, FRANCISCOs account is barren, hence unable to provide the basis
for a finding of bias against FRANCISCO on the part of his former employees.
As to FRANCISCOs other witnesses, nothing substantial could be obtained
either. Nonito Jalandoni avowed that he only came to know of MONINA in June
1988;[51] that during his employment at Nelly Garden from 1963 up to 1974, he did not
recall ever having seen MONINA there, neither did he know of any instructions from
FRANCISCO nor Mr. Lagarto (FRANCISCOs office manager before passing away)
regarding the disbursement of MONINAs allowance.[52] Teodoro Zulla corroborated
Jalandonis testimony regarding not having seen MONINA at Nelly Garden and
MONINAs allowance; declared that Alfredo Baylosis was dismissed due to
discrepancies discovered after an audit, without any further elaboration, however; but
admitted that he never prepared the vouchers pertaining to FRANCISCOs personal
expenses, merely those intended for one of FRANCISCOs haciendas.[53] Then, Iigo
Superticioso confirmed that according to the report of a certain Mr. Atienza, Baylosis
was dismissed by Mr. Jison for irregularities, while Superticioso was informed by
FRANCISCO that Tingson was dismissed for loss of confidence. Superticioso likewise
denied that MONINA received money from FRANCISCOs office, neither was there a
standing order from FRANCISCO to release funds to her.[54]
It is at once obvious that the testimonies of these witnesses for FRANCISCO are
likewise insufficient to overcome MONINAs evidence. The former merely consist of
denials as regards the latters having gone to Nelly Garden or having received her
allowance from FRANCISCOs office, which, being in the form of negative testimony,
necessarily stand infirm as against positive testimony; [55] bare assertions as regards
the dismissal of Baylosis; ignorance of FRANCISCOs personal expenses incapable of
evincing that FRANCISCO did not provide MONINA with an allowance; or hearsay
evidence as regards the cause for the dismissals of Baylosis and Tingson. But what
then serves as the coup de grce is that despite Superticiosos claim that he did not
know MONINA,[56] when confronted with Exhibit H, a telephone toll ticket indicating
that on 18 May 1971, MONINA called a certain Eing at FRANCISCOs office,
Superticioso admitted that his nickname was Iing and that there was no other person
named Iing in FRANCISCOs office.[57]
All told, MONINAs evidence hurdled the high standard of proof required for the
success of an action to establish ones illegitimate filiation when relying upon the
provisions regarding open and continuous possession or any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws; moreover, MONINA proved her filiation by more
than mere preponderance of evidence.
Ass. 13 Persons
The last assigned error concerning laches likewise fails to convince. The
essential elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one
under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which the complaint seeks a
remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct as having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
defendant that the complaint would assert the right in which he bases his suit; and (4)
injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant,
or the suit is not held barred.[58] The last element is the origin of the doctrine that stale
demands apply only where by reason of the lapse of time it would be inequitable to
allow a party to enforce his legal rights.[59]
As FRANCISCO set up laches as an affirmative defense, it was incumbent upon
him to prove the existence of its elements. However, he only succeeded in showing
MONINAs delay in asserting her claim, but miserably failed to prove the last
element. In any event, it must be stressed that laches is based upon grounds of public
policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims,
and is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim
to be enforced or asserted. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches;
each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The question
of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and since it is an equitable
doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked
to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud and injustice. [60] Since the instant case
involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, MONINA filed her action well within
the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on
ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED
and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals of 27 April 1995 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 32860 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED
Page | 19

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992
CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT CUYUGAN, respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
The instant petition seeks to reverse and set aside the decision 1 of respondent Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, entitled "Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Hon.
Norberto C. Ponce, Judge, Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga and
Emilde Dayrit Cuyugan," promulgated on May 10, 1990, and its resolution denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 2 Said decision, now before us for review,
dismissed petitioner's Petition for Certiorariand Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
on the ground that the denial of the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 7938 of the
court a quo is an interlocutory order and cannot be the subject of the said special civil
action, ordinary appeal in due time being petitioner's remedy.
In said Civil Case No, 7938, herein private respondent, in her capacity as mother and
legal guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed on April 9, 1987 a complaint
denominated "Claim for Inheritance" against herein petitioner as the administratrix of
the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. The operative allegations in said
complaint are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Plaintiff is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son, Chad
Cuyugan, by the father of the defendant, the late Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo; and the defendant is the known administratrix of the real
and personal properties left by her deceased father, said Atty.
Ocampo, who died intestate in Angeles City on September 28,
1983;
3. Plaintiff has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan,
for several years now and during which time, plaintiff and Atty.
Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship with each other
that, as a consequence thereof, they begot a child who was
christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with the ardent desire and
behest of said Atty. Ocampo;
4. Chad, the son of plaintiff by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who
was born in Angeles City on October 5, 1980 bad been sired,
Ass. 13 Persons
showered with exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his
putative father for being his only son as can be gleaned from
indubitable letters and documents of the late Atty. Ocampo to
herein plaintiff, excerpts from some of which are hereunder
reproduced;
. . . Keep good keep faith keep Chad and yourself
for me alone and for me all the time. As I have
now I shall save my heart to you and to Chad.
. . . Please take good care and pray to Sto. Niño
for our sake and for the child sake.
. . . Keep him. Take good care of him.
. . . I'm proud that you are his mother. . . I'm
proud of him and you. Let me bless him by my
name and let me entitle him to all what I am and
what I've got.
. . . I have vowed to recognize him and be my
heir.
. . . How is CHAD and you . . .
. . . Why should we not start now to own him,
jointly against the whole world. After all we love
each other and CHAD is the product of our love.
5. The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is
nevertheless entitled to a share in the intestate estate left by his
deceased father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of the surviving
heirs;
6. The deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death
was the owner of real and personal property, located in Baguio City,
Angeles City and in the Province of Pampanga with approximate
value of several millions of pesos;
7. The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been
inventoried by the defendant and the inheritance of the surviving
heirs including that of said Chad has not likewise been ascertained;
8. The only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo are his children, namely: Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O.
Tayag, Evita O. Florendo, Felina Ocampo, and said minor Chad, for
and in whose behalf this instant complaint is filed;
Page | 20

9. Plaintiff has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the
charity of friends and relatives for the sustenance of her son, Chad,
such that it is urgent, necessary and imperative that said child be
extended financial support from the estate of his putative father,
Atty. Ricardo Ocampo;
10. Several demands, verbal and written, have been made for
defendant to grant Chad's lawful inheritance, but despite said
demands, defendant failed and refused and still fails and refused
and still fails and refuses to satisfy the claim for inheritance against
the estate of the late Atty. Ocampo; 3
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiff thereafter prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering
defendant to render an inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties
left by Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; to determine and deliver the share of the minor child
Chad in the estate of the deceased; and to give him support pendente lite.
Petitioner, as defendant therein, filed her answer with counterclaim on June 3, 1987,
disputing the material allegations in the complaint. She maintained by way of
affirmative defenses, inter alia, that the complaint states no cause of action; that the
action is premature; that the suit as barred by prescription; that respondent Cuyugan
has no legal and judicial personality to bring the suit; that the lower court was no
jurisdiction over the nature of the action; and that there is improper joinder of causes
of action. 4
After the hearing of the motion to dismiss on the grounds asserted as affirmative
defenses, the trial court issued the following order on October 20, 1987:
xxx xxx xxx
The Court is of the considered opinion that there is a need of further
proceedings to adduce evidence on the various claims of the
parties so as to hear their respective sides
WHEREFORE, resolution on the preliminary hearing which
partakes of the nature of a motion to dismiss requiring additional
evidence is in the meantime held in abeyance. The Motion to
Dismiss is hereby denied and the case as set for pre-trial . . . 5
With the denial of her motion for reconsideration of said order on November 19,
1987, 6 petitioner filed on December 10, 1987 a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 13464, which was
granted by the Sixth Division of respondent court on August 2, 1989 and enjoined
respondent judge to resolve petitioner's motion praying for the dismissal of the
complaint based on the affirmative defenses within ten (10) days from notice
thereof. 7
Ass. 13 Persons
In compliance with said decision of respondent court, the trial court acted on and
thereafter denied the motion to dismiss, which had been pleaded in the affirmative
defenses in Civil Case No. 7938, in an order dated October 24, 1989, resolving the
said motion in the following manner:
xxx xxx xxx
The Court now resolves:
No. 1. The complaint sufficiently shows that a cause of action exists
in favor of the plaintiff. A cause of action being the "primary right to
redress a wrong" (Marquez vs. Valera, 48 OG 5272), which
apparently on the face of the complaint, plaintiff has a right to
enforce through this case. Defendant's protestation that there is no
sufficient cause of action is therefore untenable.
No. 2. The present action. despite the claim of defendant is not
premature. It is exactly filed in order to prove filiation, and then
recognition. To go about the step by step procedure outlined by the
defendant by filing one action after another is definitely violative of
the prohibition against splitting a cause of action.
No. 3. It is not the plaintiff that is now bringing the case before the
Court. It is (her) spurious child that she represents as natural
guardian that is instituting the action.
No. 4. Prescription has not set in if we consider that a spurious child
may file an action for recognition within four years from his
attainment of majority (New Civil Code. Art, 285, No. 2). Whether
the letters of the putative father, Atty. Ocampo, is evidence, that
should be inquired into in a hearing on the merits.
No. 5. Several causes of action may be joined in one complaint as
was done in this case. The defendant's claim that there was a
misjoinder is untenable.
No. 6. The Court being a court of general jurisdiction, and of special
jurisdiction, such as a probate court has capacity to entertain a
complaint such as the one now before it.
The nature of the case "CLAIM FOR INHERITANCE" does not
control the body of the complaint.
From all the foregoing, the Court finds that the complaint is
sufficient' in form and substance and, therefore, the motion to
dismiss could not be granted until after trial on the merits in which it
should be shown that the allegations of the complaint are
unfounded or a special defense to the action exists.
Page | 21

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. 8
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said order was denied by the trial court on
January 30, 1990. 9 As a consequence, another petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction was filed by petitioner on March 12, 1990 with respondent
court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, praying that the orders dated October 24,
1989 and January 30, 1990 of the trial court be annulled and set aside for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On May 10, 1990, as earlier stated, respondent court promulgated its decision
dismissing the petition, and likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a
resolution dated September 5, 1990, hence the present petition for review
on certiorari.
In elevating the case before us, petitioner relies on these grounds:
a. The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals dismissed
Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in UTTER
DISREGARD OF APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT providing clear exceptions to the general
rule that interlocutory orders may not be elevated by way of the
special civil action of certiorari;
b. Respondent Court refused to resolve certain issues raised by
Petitioner before the Regional Trial Court and before Respondent
Court of Appeals involving QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE not
theretofore determined by this Honorable Court, such as the
interpretation and application of Art. 281 of the Civil Code requiring
judicial approval when the recognition of an illegitimate minor child
does not take place in a record of birth or in a will: of Art. 175, Par.
2, in relation to Art. 172, Par. 2 of the Family Code, providing for the
prescriptive period with respect to the action to establish illegitimate
filiation; and of Art. 285 of the Civil Code, providing for the
prescriptive period with respect to the action for recognition of a
natural child; and
c. Respondent Court has sanctioned a DEPARTURE by the
Regional Trial Court from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings. 10
Petitioner contends that the action to claim for inheritance filed by herein private
respondent in behalf of the minor child, Chad Cuyugan, is premature and the
complaint states no cause of action, she submits that the recognition of the minor
child, either voluntarily or by judicial action, by the alleged putative father must first be
established before the former can invoke his right to succeed and participate in the
estate of the latter. Petitioner asseverates that since there is no allegation of such
recognition in the complaint denominated as "Claim for Inheritance," then there exists
no basis for private respondent's aforesaid claim and, consequently, the complaint
should be dismissed.
Ass. 13 Persons
The instant case is similar to the case of Paulino vs. Paulino, et al., 11 wherein the
petitioner, as plaintiff, brought an action against the private respondents, as
defendants, to compel them to give her share of inheritance in the estate of the late
Marcos Paulino, claiming and alleging, inter alia, that she is the illegitimate child of the
deceased; that no proceedings for the settlement of the deceased's estate had been
commenced in court; and that the defendants had refused and failed to deliver her
share in the estate of the deceased. She accordingly prayed that the defendants
therein be ordered to deliver her aforesaid share. The defendants moved for the
dismissal of her complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action and that,
even if it does, the same is barred by prescription.
The only difference between the aforecited case and the case at bar is that at the time
of the filing of the complaint therein, the petitioner in that case had already reached
the age of majority, whereas the claimant in the present case is still a minor.
In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and
successional rights from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to
the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in the complaint that the putative
father had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because such
acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There being no
allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition
which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio
decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of
the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the
prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that
the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad
Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for
inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to
compel recognition. Further that the two causes of action, one to compel recognition
and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our
jurisprudence.
As early as 1922, we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et
al., 12 wherein we said:
The question whether a person in the position of the present
plaintiff can any event maintain a complex action to compel
recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior
relief in the character of heir, is one which, in the opinion of this
court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the
conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action
are present in the particular case. In, other words, there is no
absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel
acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a
successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff
seers additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is
nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to
require that a rule should be here applied different from that
generally applicable in other cases. . .
Page | 22

The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly
formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported
by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and
the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child
having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in
fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for
the division of the inheritance against his co-heirs . . .; and the
same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of
the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother . . . In neither of
these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to
show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious
reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the
other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court;
and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
The next question to be resolved is whether the action to compel recognition has
prescribed.
Petitioner argues that assuming arguendo that the action is one to compel
recognition, private respondent's cause of action has prescribed for the reason that
since filiation is sought to be proved by means of a private handwritten instrument
signed by the parent concerned, then under paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family
Code, the action to establish filiation of the illegitimate minor child must be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged putative father. In the case at bar, considering that
the complaint was filed after the death of the alleged parent, the action has prescribed
and this is another ground for the dismissal of the complaint. Petitioner theorizes that
Article 285 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar and, instead,
paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code should be given retroactive effect. The
theory is premised on the supposition that the latter provision of law being merely
procedural in nature, no vested rights are created, hence it can be made to apply
retroactively.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in
the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in
which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four
years from the attainment of his majority;
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation
in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
Ass. 13 Persons
The action must be brought within the same period specified in
Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action is based on the record
of birth of the child, a final judgment, or an admission by the parent of the child's
filiation in a public document or in a private handwritten signed instrument, then the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the child. However, if the action is based
on the open and continuous possession by the child of the status of an illegitimate
child, or on other evidence allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, the view
has been expressed that the action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent. 13
Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in which case the
complaint should have been filed during the lifetime of the putative father, failing
which the same must be dismissed on the ground of prescription. Private respondent,
however, insists that Article 285 of the Civil Code is controlling and, since the alleged
parent died during the minority of the child, the action for filiation may be filed within
four years from the attainment of majority of the minor child.
Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws." It becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether
the right of the minor child to file an action for recognition is a vested right or not.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action
of the minor child bas been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the
regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. 14 We herein
adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,
et al. 15 where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the
petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in
accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be
prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in question
is procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure may
affect pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them
from its operation, is not so pervasive that it may be used to validate or invalidate
proceedings taken before it goes into effective, since procedure must be governed by
the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises especially where
vested rights may be prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no
proper application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of
private respondent and, consequentially, of the mind child she represents, both of
which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is
therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in
holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.
Finally, we conform with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the questioned order
of the court below denying the motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the
Page | 23
 Ass. 13 Persons

subject of a petition for certiorari. The exceptions to this rule invoked by petitioner and
allegedly obtaining in the case at bar, are obviously not present and may not be relied
upon.

WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution
of respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Page | 24

EN BANC
G.R. No. 206248 February 18, 2014
GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner,
vs.
PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the
July 24, 2012 Decision1 and March 5, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406.
As culled from the records, the facts of this case are:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a
period of time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time
already married to someone else.3 Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born:
Andre Lewis (on February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999). 4 The
children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of
Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties’ relationship, however,
eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two children in
May 2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of
Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody,
Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC),
appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children. 5
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent
Antonio, ruling that "[t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming that the best interest of
the children can be promoted if they are under the sole parental authority and
physical custody of [respondent Antonio]." 6 Thus, the court a quo decreed the
following:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby grants [Antonio’s]
prayer for recognition and the same is hereby judicially approved. x x x Consequently,
the Court forthwith issues the following Order granting the other reliefs sought in the
Petition, to wit:
a. Ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of Makati to cause the
entry of the name of [Antonio] as the father of the aforementioned minors in
their respective Certificate of Live Birth and causing the correction/change
and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in their Certificate of Live
Birth from Grande to Antonio;
Ass. 13 Persons
b. Granting [Antonio] the right to jointly exercise Parental Authority with
[Grande] over the persons of their minor children, Andre Lewis Grande and
Jerard Patrick Grande;
c. Granting [Antonio] primary right and immediate custody over the parties’
minor children Andre Lewis Grandre and Jerard Patrick Grande who shall
stay with [Antonio’s] residence in the Philippines from Monday until Friday
evening and to [Grande’s] custody from Saturday to Sunday evening;
d. Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons and custody of
minors Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande unto [Antonio] for the
days covered by the Order;
e. Ordering parties to cease and desist from bringing the aforenamed minors
outside of the country, without the written consent of the other and
permission from the court.
f. Ordering parties to give and share the support of the minor children Andre
Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande in the amount of ₱30,000 per
month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]. 7(Emphasis
supplied.)
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was
denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated November 22, 2010 8 for being pro
forma and for lack of merit.
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part
of the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the
grant of sole custody to the mother over her illegitimate children. 9 In resolving the
appeal, the appellate court modified in part the Decision of the RTC. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision of
the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is
MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:
a. The Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil Registrar of
Makati City are DIRECTED to enter the surname Antonio as the surname of
Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis, in their respective certificates of live birth,
and record the same in the Register of Births;
b. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and
Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande
who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole custody of these
minor children;
c. [Antonio] shall have visitorial rights at least twice a week, and may only
take the children out upon the written consent of [Grande]; and
Page | 25

d. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor
children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of ₱30,000.00 per
month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the father’s
recognition of his children, the mother cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody
over them absent the most compelling of reasons.10 Since respondent Antonio failed
to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act that adversely affected the welfare
of the children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors, she cannot be deprived
of her sole parental custody over their children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the
recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in
conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels
the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO."11
As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in order considering
that not only did Antonio express his willingness to give support, it is also a
consequence of his acknowledging the paternity of the minor children. 12Lastly, the CA
ruled that there is no reason to deprive respondent Antonio of his visitorial right
especially in view of the constitutionally inherent and natural right of parents over their
children.13
Not satisfied with the CA’s Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for
reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the
change of the minors’ surname to "Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner
came to this Court via the present petition. In it, she posits that Article 176 of the
Family Code––as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in
permissive language––may not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his
illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of their mother.
We find the present petition impressed with merit.
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation. Central to the core issue is
the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime
of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing
successional rights shall remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 925514 which now reads:
Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has
Ass. 13 Persons
been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an
action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime
of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
(Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate
child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255
is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record
of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or
private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the
illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the
filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname
of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before
a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court 15 is enough to establish
the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental
authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his children’s surname as
Antonio.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence,
respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the
mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is
shown to be unfit.
Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is there a
legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of
respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and
unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname
of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein
petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate
children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it
must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from
any interpretation.16 Respondent’s position that the court can order the minors to use
his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no
ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision
readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use
the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to
confer discretion17 upon the illegitimate children.
Page | 26

It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting
children are to be measured is their best interest. On the matter of children’s
surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the
father’s surname serves the best interest of the minor child. In Alfon v. Republic, 18 for
instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child to continue using the surname of
her mother rather than that of her legitimate father as it serves her best interest and
there is no legal obstacle to prevent her from using the surname of her mother to
which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v. Republic, 19 this Court, upholding the best
interest of the child concerned, even allowed the use of a surname different from the
surnames of the child’s father or mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a
child’s surname is second only to the rule requiring that the child be placed in the best
possible situation considering his circumstances.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,20 We gave due deference to the choice of an
illegitimate minor to use the surname of his mother as it would best serve his interest,
thus:
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a person’s name to
his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a
legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not be taken lightly as to
deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the right to present evidence in
favor of or against such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the
proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,
and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found
(and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of
Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code,
Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father
while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase
the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest
as it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the United
States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.
(Emphasis supplied.)
An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the
father’s surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255,21 which states:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document is
executed by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a
separate document.
Ass. 13 Persons
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private instrument, the child shall
use the surname of the father, provided the registration is supported by the following
documents:
xxxx
7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the
surname of the father upon the submission of the accomplished AUSF [Affidavit of
Use of the Surname of the Father].
7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use
the surname of the father upon submission of a public document or a private
handwritten instrument supported by the documents listed in Rule 7.1.2.
7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is required if he/she has
reached the age of majority. The consent may be contained in a separate instrument
duly notarized.
xxxx
Rule 8. Effects of Recognition
8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of the child in the
Certificate of Live Birth. The Certificate of Live Birth shall be recorded in the Register
of Births.
xxxx
8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the Certificate of Live
Birth or in a separate public document or in a private handwritten document, the
public document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Live Birth and the
Register of Births as follows:
"The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname) to (new
surname) pursuant to RA 9255."
The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth and
Register of Births shall not be changed or deleted.
Page | 27

8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of registration, the public
document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Legal Instruments. Proper
annotation shall be made in the Certificate of Live Birth and the Register of Births as
follows:
"Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the child is hereby
changed from (original surname) on (date) pursuant to RA 9255." (Emphasis
supplied.)
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot amend a
legislative act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong Corporation,22 We held:
After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative
enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the
law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the
Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law cannot
be broadened by a mere administrative issuance — an administrative agency
certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.
Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous construction where there is no ambiguity
in law and/or the construction is clearly erroneous.23 What is more, this Court has the
constitutional prerogative and authority to strike down and declare as void the rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi- judicial bodies24 when found contrary to
statutes and/or the Constitution.25 Section 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted provisions of the IRR of RA
9255 insofar as it provides the mandatory use by illegitimate children of their father’s
surname upon the latter’s recognition of his paternity.
To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The
clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an
illegitimate father’s surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given
the choice on the surnames by which they will be known.
Ass. 13 Persons
At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now aged
thirteen (13) and fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring their opposition to have
their names changed to "Antonio."26 However, since these letters were not offered
before and evaluated by the trial court, they do not provide any evidentiary weight to
sway this Court to rule for or against petitioner.27 A proper inquiry into, and evaluation
of the evidence of, the children's choice of surname by the trial court is necessary.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 24, 2012
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406 is MODIFIED, the
dispositive portion of which shall read:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly. the appealed Decision of
the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is
MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:
a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and
Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande
who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole custody of these
minor children;
b. [Antonio] shall have visitation rights 28 at least twice a week, and may only
take the children out upon the written consent of [Grande]:
c. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor
children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of ₱30,000.00 per
month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]; and
d. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri,
Cagayan for the sole purpose of determining the surname to be chosen by
the children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis.
Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General Administrative Order No.
1, Series of 2004 are DISAPPROVED and hereby declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
Page | 28