TITLE: La Vista Inc. vs CA G.R. No.

95252

FACTS: The area comprising the 15-meter wide roadway was originally part of a vast
tract of land owned by the Tuasons in Quezon City and Marikina. On 1 July 1949 the
Tuasons sold to Philippine Building Corporation a portion of their landholdings amounting
to 1,330,556 square meters by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Mortgage. On 7 December
1951 the Philippine Building Corporation, which was then acting for and in behalf of
Ateneo de Manila University (ATENEO) in buying the properties from the Tuasons, sold,
assigned and formally transferred in a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Mortgage,
with the consent of the Tuasons, the subject parcel of land to ATENEO which assumed
the mortgage.

On their part, the Tuasons developed a part of the estate adjoining the portion
sold to Philippine Building Corporation into a residential village known as La Vista
Subdivision. Thus the boundary between LA VISTA and the portion sold to Philippine
Building Corporation was the 15-meter wide roadway known as the Mangyan Road. the
Tuasons developed its 7.5-meter share of the 15-meter wide boundary. ATENEO deferred
improvement on its share and erected instead an adobe wall on the entire length of the
boundary of its property parallel to the 15-meter wide roadway.

ATENEO subsequently sold to Solid Homes Inc. the land which the latter developed
into a subdivision now known as LOYOLA Grand Villas. Solid Homes Inc. now
claims tohave an easement of right-of-way along Mangyan Road through which they
could have access to Katipunan Avenue.LA VISTA however instructed its security
guards to prohibit agents and assignees ofSolid Homes, Inc., from traversing
Mangyan Road, and even constructed concrete posts that prevented the residents
of LOYOLA from passing through.

Solid Homes, Inc., filed a case before the Regional Trial Court and
prayed that LAVISTA been joined from preventing and obstructing the use and
passage of LOYOLA residents through Mangyan Road. The lower court recognized the
easement of right-of-way along Mangyan Road in favor of Solid Homes, Inc., and
ordered LA VISTA to pay damages. On appeal by LA VISTA, the decision of the lower
court was affirmed

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road?

RULING: From the facts of the instant case it is very apparent that the parties and
their respective predecessors-in-interest intended to establish an easement of right-
of-way over Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit, both as dominant and servient
estates. These certainly are indubitable proofs that the parties concerned had indeed
constituted a voluntary easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road and, like any
other contract, the same could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by
renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate. Resultantly, when the court says
that an easement exists, it is not creating one. For, even an injunction cannot be
used to create one as there is no such thing as a judicial easement. As in the instant
case, the court merely declares the existence of an easement created by the parties.
TITLE: Trias vs. Araneta G.R. No. L-20786

FACTS: In May 1963, Rafaela Trias, married, filed in the Rizal court of first instance, a petition to
cancel from her Torrens certificate of title, the annotation appearing on its back. She alleged she was
the registered owner of this lot in Quezon City; that she wanted the cancellation, not for the purpose
of erecting a factory thereon, but merely to facilitate approval of a loan she had applied for; that the
restriction was illegal, because it impaired the owner's dominical rights; and that it was a mere
surplusage anyhow, because there are zoning ordinances prohibiting establishment of factories in that
district.

Two weeks later, Gregorio Araneta, Inc. moved for reconsideration of the order, alleging: (a) that the
condition had been inserted in the title pursuant to a contract of sale between it and Rafaela's
predecessor-in-interest; (b) that it received no timely notice of petition; (c) that the order disregards
contractual rights and obligations; (d) that the prohibition against factories was valid, and not a
surplusage; and (e) that the Court had no jurisdiction to act on the petition.

There are no issues of fact. The parties agree: (1) that the lot was part of a subdivision and originally
belonged to J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. which corporation upon selling it (thru Araneta Inc.) to a
purchaser (Garcia Mateo and Deogracias Lopez), imposed the prohibition; that such prohibition was
accordingly printed on the back of the transfer certificate issued to the purchaser; (2) after several
transfers, always subject to the prohibition, Rafaela acquired the lot, again subject to the limitation
which was repeated on the back of her certificate; (3) that upon receiving her certificate, she noticed
the prohibition; and so, arguing that it infringes the owner's right to use her land, she asked for its
cancellation; (4) as already stated, she obtained relief.

Upon denial of its motion to reconsider, Gregorio Araneta, Inc. appealed to this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prohibitions are valid?

RULING: It is in reality an easement,1 which every owner of real estate may validly impose under Art.
594 of the Civil Code or under Art. 688 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "the owner of a
piece of land nay establish thereon the easements which he may deem suitable, ... provided he does
not contravene the law, public policy or public order". The limitation is essentially a contractual
obligation which the seller, Tuason & Co., Inc. (thru Araneta Inc.) imposed, and the purchaser agreed
to accept. Of course, it restricts the free use of the parcel of land by the purchaser. However, "while
the courts have manifested some disfavor of covenants restricting the use of property, they have
generally sustained them where reasonable, and not contrary to public policy ... ."
TITLE: Cortes vs Yu-Tibo G.R. No. 911
FACTS: house No. 65 Calle Rosario, this city, property of the wife of the plaintiff, has certain windows
therein, through which it receives light and air, said windows opening on the adjacent house, No. 63
of the same street these windows have been in the existence since the year 1843 and (3) that the
defendant, the tenant of the said house No. 63, has commenced certain work with the view to raising
the roof of the house in such a manner that one-half of the windows in said house No. 65 has been
covered, thus depriving the building of a large part of the air and light formerly received through the
window. the court below practically finds the preceding facts, and further finds that the plaintiff has not
proven that he has, by any formal act, prohibited the owner of house No. 63, from making
improvements of any kind therein at any time prior to the complaint.

The contention of the plaintiff is that by the constant and uninterrupted use of the windows referred
to above during a period of fifty-nine years he acquired from prescription an easement of light in
favor of the house No. 65, and as a servitude upon house No. 63, and, consequently, has acquired
the right to restrain the making of any improvements in the latter house which might in any manner
be prejudicial to the enjoyment of the said easement. He contends that the easement of light is
positive; and that therefore the period of possession for the purposes of the acquisition of a
prescriptive title is to begin from the date on which the enjoyment of the same commenced, or, in
other words, applying the doctrine to this case, from the time that said windows were opened with
the knowledge of the owner of the house No. 63, and without opposition on this part.

The defendant, on the contrary, contends that the easement is negative, and that therefore the time
for the prescriptive acquisition thereof must begin from the date on which the owner of the dominant
estate may have prohibited, by a formal act, the owner of the servient estate from doing something
which would be lawful but for the existence of the easement.

ISSUE: Whether or not

RULING: That the easement of light which is the object of this litigation is of a negative character,
and therefore pertains to the class which can not be acquired by prescription as provided by article
538 of the Civil Code, except by counting the time of possession from the date on which the owner
of the dominant estate has, in a formal manner, forbidden the owner of the servient estate to do an
act which would be lawful were it not for the easement. In consequence thereof, the plaintiff, not
having executed any formal act of opposition to the right of the owner of the house No. 63 Calle
Rosario (of which the defendant is tenant), to make therein improvements which might obstruct the
light of the house No. 65 of the same street, the property of the wife of the appellant, at any time
prior to the complaint, as found by the court below in the judgment assigned as error, he has not
acquired, nor could he acquire by prescription, such easement of light, no matter how long a time
have elapsed since the windows were opened in the wall of the said house No. 65, because the
period which the law demands for such prescriptive acquisition could not have commenced to run,
the act with which it must necessarily commence not having been performed.