Rogeline R.

Magno

Block B

Case # 43

CAROLINA CASTILLO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL &
INTERNATIONAL BANK, respondents.
G.R. No. 104319 | 1999-06-17

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner was an employee since April 1981 of private respondent Philippine Commercial &
International Bank (PCIB) as Foreign Remittance Clerk from 1987 to January 31, 1988 in the private
respondent bank's Ermita branch.

On January 12, 1988, Faisal Al Shahab, a Jordanian national, went to respondent bank's Ermita branch to
claim a foreign remittance in the amount of US$2,000.00. Shahab paid P450.00 as commission charges
as computed by petitioner. Upon re-computation, the correct amount of the charges amounted to only
P248.75.2

On January 25, 1988, Shahab filed a formal complaint with the branch manager of the respondent bank
regarding the over-charging of commission on foreign remittances, specifically mentioning petitioner as
the one who attended to his withdrawals. The branch manager decided to pursue further investigation
on the matter.

On February 2, 1988, branch manager Gilbert Marquez issued a Memorandum to petitioner requiring
her to explain within seventy-two (72) hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against her.
Petitioner did not submit a written explanation. Respondent bank deferred further action on the matter.
She was then transferred to the position of Remittance Clerk-Inquiry from her position of Foreign
Remittance Clerk and was later barred from reporting for work on February 5, 1988 by the security
guards upon instruction of the management of respondent bank. A case for illegal dismissal earlier filed
by petitioner.

Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner contenting that while the positions of Foreign Remittance Clerk
for Inquiry and Foreign Remittance Clerk for Payment Order Collection are within Level III of the position
classification of the private respondent bank, the latter position is vested with more power and
responsibilities, thus concluding that petitioner was demoted in her position. On appeal NLRC ruled that
there was no demotion because the position to which she was being reassigned belongs to the same job
level as her former position and both positions have the same rate of compensation.
ISSUE:

1. Whether respondent NLRC erred in disregarding the factual findings of the labor arbiter;
2. Whether respondent NLRC erred in ruling that petitioner was not constructively and illegally
dismissed.

HELD:

No. The court found that respondent NLRC did not abuse its discretion when it reversed the findings of
the Labor Arbiter. Mere variance in evidentiary assessment between the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter
does not automatically call for a full review of the facts by this Court. The NLRC's decision, so long as it is
not bereft of substantial support from the records, deserves respect from this Court.As a rule, the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to review a decision or resolution of respondent NLRC in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not include a correction of its evaluation of the
evidence but is confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the NLRC's factual
findings, if supported by substantial evidence, are entitled to great respect and even finality, unless
petitioner is able to show that it simply and arbitrarily disregarded the evidence before it or had
misappreciated the evidence to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion if such evidence had
been properly appreciated.

No. Well-settled is the rule that it is the prerogative of the employer to transfer and reassign employees
for valid reasons and according to the requirement of its business. An owner of a business enterprise is
given considerable leeway in managing his business. Our law recognizes certain rights collectively called
management prerogative as inherent in the management of business enterprises. One of the
prerogatives of management is the right to transfer employees in their work station. The Court has
consistently recognized and upheld the prerogative of management to transfer an employee from one
office to another within the business establishment, provided that there is no demotion in rank or a
diminution of his salary, benefits and other privileges.

In this case, the respondent Commission upheld PCIB's contention that the remittance clerk payment
order/collection item is given the same weight in terms of duties and responsibilities as that of a
remittance clerk inquiry. It was established that both positions are remittance clerks under level S-S III24
and that these positions are of "co-equal footing, co-important and of the same level of authority"25
[p.14, Ibid., p.38, Rollo.] and that the transfer did not entail any reduction of wages and other benefits.
Accordingly, petitioner's bare assertion that the transfer or reassignment was arbitrary and without any
basis was rejected by respondent NLRC, which held that the respondent bank was acting within its
management prerogative to protect its interest and that of its clients.
Case # 55

DANILO LEONARDO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION and REYNALDO'S MARKETING
CORPORATION, ET. AL., respondents.
G.R. No. 125303 | 2000-06-16

DE LEON, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner AURELIO FUERTE was originally employed by private respondent REYNALDO'S MARKETING
CORPORATION on August 11, 1981 as a muffler specialist, receiving P45.00 per day. When he was
appointed supervisor in 1988, his compensation was increased to P122.00 a day, augmented by a weekly
supervisor's allowance of P600.00. On the other hand, DANILO LEONARDO was hired by private
respondent on March 4, 1988 as an auto-aircon mechanic at a salary rate of P35.00 per day. His pay was
increased to P90.00 a day when he attained regular status six months later. From such time until he was
allegedly terminated, he claims to have also received a monthly allowance equal to P2,500.00 as his
share in the profits of the auto-aircon division.

FUERTE alleges that on January 3, 1992, he was instructed to report at private respondent's main office
where he was informed by the company's personnel manager that he would be transferred to its Sucat
plant due to his failure to meet his sales quota, and for that reason, his supervisor's allowance would be
withdrawn. For a short time, FUERTE reported for work at the Sucat plant; however, he protested his
transfer, subsequently filing a complaint for illegal termination.

On his part, LEONARDO alleges that on April 22, 1991, private respondent was approached by the same
personnel manager who informed him that his services were no longer needed. He, too, filed a
complaint for illegal termination.

Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner. On appeal, the respondent commission modified the same.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which the Commission denied.

ISSUE:

1. Whether respondent Commissioners gravely abused their discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when they granted respondents appeal.

2. Whether respondent Commissioners gravely abused their discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when they found for respondent Reynaldo's Marketing pronouncing that there was no illegal
dismissal despite contrary findings made by the labor arbiter contrary to law and existing jurisprudence.

HELD:

No. The court did not find any grave abuse of discretion in the Commission's ruling dismissing
LEONARDO's complaint. On this score, the public respondent found that:
Coming now to the case of complainant Danilo Leonardo, the evidence on record indubitably shows that
he abandoned his work with the respondents. As sufficiently established by respondents, complainant
Leonardo, after being pressed by the respondent company to present the customer regarding his
unauthorized solicitation of sideline work from the latter and whom he claims to be his aunt, he never
reported back to work anymore. This finding is bolstered by the fact that after he left the respondent
company, he got employed with Dennis Motors Corporation as Air-Con Mechanic from October 12, 1992
to April 3, 1995.

No. The well-settled rule confines the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in the
review of decisions of the NLRC under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court only to the issue of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is
committed when the judgment is rendered in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner. An
abuse of discretion does not necessarily follow just because there is a reversal by the NLRC of the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. Neither does the mere variance in the evidentiary assessment of the NLRC
and that of the Labor Arbiter would, as a matter of course, so warrant another full review of the facts.
The NLRC's decision, so long as it is not bereft of support from the records, deserves respect from the
Court.

Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Case # 67

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION,

Petitioner, vs. HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG
CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE
PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-
SUPER), Respondents.
G.R. No. 182836 | 2009-10-13

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:

In January 2006, the wife of Rolando Hortillano had a miscarriage which caused the death of their
unborn child. Hortillano, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, then filed death
benefits claim from his employer, the Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation which denied the
claim. Eventually, the issue was submitted for arbitration and both parties agreed to have Atty. Allan
Montaño act as the arbitrator. Montaño ruled that Hortillano is entitled to his claims. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of Montaño.

On appeal, Continental Steel insisted that Hortillano is not entitled because under the CBA, death
benefits are awarded if an employee’s legitimate dependent has died; but that in this case, no “death”
has occurred because the fetus died inside the womb of the mother, that a fetus has no juridical
personality because it was never born pursuant to Article 40 of the Civil Code which provides a
conceived child acquires personality only when it is born; that the fetus was not born hence it is not a
legitimate dependent as contemplated by the CBA nor did it suffer death as contemplated under civil
laws.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the fetus is a legitimate dependent?

2. Whether a person has to be born before it could die?

HELD:

1. Yes. In the first place, the fact of marriage between Hortillano and his wife was never put in question,
hence they are presumed to be married. Second, children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents are legitimate. Hence, the unborn child (fetus) is already a legitimate dependent the moment it
was conceived (meeting of the sperm and egg cell).

2. No. Death is defined as “cessation of life”. Certainly, a child in the womb has life. There is no need to
discuss whether or not the unborn child acquired juridical personality – that is not the issue here. But
nevertheless, life should not be equated to civil personality. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly
provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those
who have acquired juridical personality could die. In this case, Hortillano’s fetus had had life inside the
womb as evidenced by the fact that it clung to life for 38 weeks before the unfortunate miscarriage.
Thus, death occurred on a dependent hence Hortillano as an employee is entitled to death benefit
claims as provided for in their CBA.