Joson v. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 131255.

May 20, 1998]

FACTS
Petitioner Governor Joson was filed a complaint before the Office of the President for barging violently into
the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of armed men. The case was endorsed
to the DILG. For failure to file an answer after three (3) extensions, petitioner was declared in default and
ordered the petitioner 60-day preventive suspension. Petitioner later “Motion to Conduct Formal
Investigation”. DILG denied the motion declaring that the submission of position papers substantially
complies with the requirements of procedural due process in administrative proceedings. Later, the
Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, adopted the findings and recommendation of the DILG
Secretary. The former imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months without
pay.
ISSUES
Whether or not:
(a) Preventive suspension is proper;
(b) Procedural due process is violated;
(c) The resolution of DILG Secretary is invalid on the ground of undue delegation; that it is the President who
is the Disciplining Authority, not the Secretary of DILG;
RULING
“(a) Yes. Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the issues
are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is great
probability that the respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. The act of respondent in allegedly
barging violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of armed men
constitutes grave misconduct. The allegations of complainants are bolstered by the joint-affidavit of two
(2) employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Respondent who is the chief executive of the province is
in a position to influence the witnesses. Further, the history of violent confrontational politics in the province
dictates that extreme precautionary measures be taken.
“(b) Yes. The rejection of petitioner’s right to a formal investigation denied him procedural due
process. Section 5 of A. O. No. 23 provides that at the preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority
shall summon the parties to consider whether they desire a formal investigation. This provision does not give
the Investigating Authority the discretion to determine whether a formal investigation would be
conducted. The records show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation. There is nothing in the
Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide that
administrative cases against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position papers. A.O.
No. 23 states that the Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit their respective memoranda
but this is only after formal investigation and hearing.
“(c) No. The DILG resolution is valid. The President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is
the power to investigate, not the power to discipline. The power to discipline evidently includes the power
to investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the Constitution itself
to investigate complaints against local government officials. A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the power
to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining
Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson’s claim.
Under the doctrine of qualified political agency “…which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except
in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies
of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of
the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President provided in the Constitution. Control is said to
be the very heart of the power of the presidency. As head of the Executive Department, the President,
however, may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the
Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally. The
members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in certain matters because the President
cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time. Each head of
a department is, and must be, the President’s alter ego in the matters of that department where the
President is required by law to exercise authority.
G.R. No. 178021 : January 25, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner,v.MINERVA M.P. PACHEO,
Respondent.

FACTS:

Pacheo was a Revenue Attorney IV, Assistant Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue(BIR) in
Revenue Region No. 7 (RR7), Quezon City. The BIR issued Revenue Travel Assignment Order (RTAO)No. 25-2002, ordering
the reassignment of Pacheo as Assistant Chief, Legal Division from RR7 in Quezon City to RR4 in San Fernando,
Pampanga.

Pacheo questioned the reassignment through her Letter addressed to Rene G. Banez, then Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (CIR). She considered her transfer from Quezon City to Pampanga as amounting to a constructive dismissal.

Due to the then inaction of the BIR, Pacheo filed a complaint before the CSC- National Capital Region (CSC-NCR),
praying for the nullification of RTAO No. 25-2002. The BIR, through its Deputy Commissioner for Legal and Inspection
Group, Edmundo P. Guevara (Guevara), denied Pacheos protest for lack of merit. It contended that her reassignment
could not be considered constructive dismissal as she maintained her position as Revenue Attorney IV and was
designated as Assistant Chief of Legal Division.

Pacheo appealed to the CSC where the latter granted the same. However, the CSC held that rules and so holds that
the withholding by the BIR of her salaries is justified as she is not entitled thereto since she is deemed not to have
performed any actual work in the government on the principle of no work no pay. Still not satisfied, Pacheo moved for
reconsideration. She argued that the CSC erred in not finding that she was constructively dismissed and, therefore,
entitled to back salary. However, the motion was dismissed.

Undaunted, Pacheo sought recourse before the CA via a petition for review. The CA reversed the CSC decision, stating
that Pacheo was constructively dismissed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Pacheo was constructively dismissed and entitled to backwages

HELD: No.

Political Law- transfer or assignment of personnel cannot be done when the same is a preliminary step toward his
removal or a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position.

While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employee's prior consent, it cannot
be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or a scheme to lure him away from his permanent
position, or when it is designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect
circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service.

Significantly, Section 6, Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of 1998, defines constructive dismissal as a
situation when an employee quits his work because of the agency heads unreasonable, humiliating, or demeaning
actuations which render continued work impossible. Hence, the employee is deemed to have been illegally dismissed.
This may occur although there is no diminution or reduction of salary of the employee. It may be a transfer from one
position of dignity to a more servile or menial job.

The CSC, through the OSG, contends that the deliberate refusal of Pacheo to report for work either in her original station
in Quezon City or her new place of assignment in San Fernando, Pampanga negates her claim of constructive dismissal.

It is clear, however, from E.O. 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (7) that there is no such duty to first
report to the new place of assignment prior to questioning an alleged invalid reassignment imposed upon an employee.
Pacheo was well within her right not to report immediately to RR4, San Fernando, Pampanga, and to question her
reassignment.

Reassignments involving a reduction in rank, status or salary violate an employees security of tenure, which is assured by
the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Security of
tenure covers not only employees removed without cause, but also cases of unconsented transfers and reassignments,
which are tantamount to illegal/constructive removal.

Having ruled that Pacheo was constructively dismissed, is she entitled to reinstatement and back wages? The Court
agrees with the CA that she is entitled to reinstatement, but finds Itself unable to sustain the ruling that she is entitled to
full back wages and benefits. It is a settled jurisprudence that an illegally dismissed civil service employee is entitled to
back salaries but limited only to a maximum period of five (5) years, and not full back salaries from his illegal dismissal up
to his reinstatement.
G.R. No. 187858 : August 9, 2011

THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. RICHARD G. CRUZ, Respondent.

BRION, J.:

FACTS:

The respondent, Storekeeper A of the City of Malolos Water District (CMWD), was charged with grave misconduct
and dishonesty by CMWD General Manager (GM) Nicasio Reyes. He allegedly uttered a false, malicious and
damaging statement (Masasamang tao ang mga BOD at General Manager) against GM Reyes and the rest of the
CMWD Board of Directors (Board); four of the respondent subordinates allegedly witnessed the utterance. The
dishonesty charge, in turn, stemmed from the respondent act of claiming overtime pay despite his failure to log in and
out in the computerized daily time record for three working days.

The respondent denied the charges against him. On the charge of grave misconduct, he stressed that three of the
four witnesses already retracted their statements against him. On the charge of dishonesty, he asserted that he never
failed to log in and log out. He reasoned that the lack of record was caused by technical computer problems. The
respondent submitted documents showing that he rendered overtime work on the three days that the CMWD
questioned.

GM Reyes preventively suspended the respondent for 15 days. Before the expiration of his preventive suspension,
however, GM Reyes, with the approval of the CMWD Board, found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct and
dishonesty, and dismissed him from the service.

The CSC found no factual basis to support the charges of grave misconduct and dishonesty. The CSC, however,
found the respondent liable for violation of reasonable office rules for his failure to log in and log out. It imposed on
him the penalty of reprimand but did not order the payment of back salaries.

Both the CMWD and the respondent elevated the CSC ruling to the CA via separate petitions for review under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court. The CA dismissed the CMWD petition and this ruling has lapsed to finality. Hence, the issue
of reinstatement is now a settled matter. The CA ruled in the respondent favor on the issue of back salaries.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is entitled to back salaries after the CSC ordered his reinstatement to his former position
in consonant with the CSC ruling that he was guilty only of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations?
HELD: Petition lacks merit.

The issue of entitlement to back salaries, for the period of suspension pending appeal, of a government employee
who had been dismissed but was subsequently exonerated is settled in the Court jurisdiction. The Court starting point
for this outcome is the "no work-no pay" principle public officials are only entitled to compensation if they render
service. It is excepted from this general principle and awarded back salaries even for unworked days to illegally
dismissed or unjustly suspended employees based on the constitutional provision that "no officer or employee in the
civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law"; to deny these employees their back
salaries amounts to unwarranted punishment after they have been exonerated from the charge that led to their
dismissal or suspension.

The present legal basis for an award of back salaries is Section 47, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Section 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. x x x.

(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the
respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in
the event he wins an appeal.

This provision, however, on its face, does not support a claim for back salaries since it does not expressly provide for
back salaries during this period; the Court established rulings hold that back salaries may not be awarded for the
period of preventive suspension as the law itself authorizes its imposition so that its legality is beyond question.

To resolve the seeming conflict, the Court crafted two conditions before an employee may be entitled to back
salaries:

a) the employee must be found innocent of the charges and

b) his suspension must be unjustified.

The reasoning behind these conditions runs this way: although an employee is considered under preventive
suspension during the pendency of a successful appeal, the law itself only authorizes preventive suspension for a
fixed period; hence, his suspension beyond this fixed period is unjustified and must be compensated.

It is the Court consistent stand in determining the propriety of the award of back salaries that the government
employees must not only be found innocent of the charges; their suspension must likewise be shown to be
unjustified.

The CA was correct in awarding the respondent his back salaries during the period he was suspended from work,
following his dismissal until his reinstatement to his former position. The records show that the charges of grave
misconduct and dishonesty against him were not substantiated. As the CSC found, there was no corrupt motive
showing malice on the part of the respondent in making the complained utterance. Likewise, the CSC found that the
charge of dishonesty was well refuted by the respondent evidence showing that he rendered overtime work on the
days in question.

The Court ise fully in accord with the CA conclusion that the two conditions to justify the award of back salaries exist
in the present case.

The first condition was met since the offense which the respondent was found guilty of (violation of reasonable rules
and regulations) stemmed from an act (failure to log in and log out) different from the act of dishonesty (claiming
overtime pay despite his failure to render overtime work) that he was charged with.

The second condition was met as the respondent committed offense merits neither dismissal from the service nor
suspension (for more than one month), but only reprimand.

In sum, the respondent is entitled to back salaries from the time he was dismissed by the CMWD until his
reinstatement to his former position - i.e., for the period of his preventive suspension pending appeal. For the period
of his preventive suspension pending investigation, the respondent is not entitled to any back salaries.
Carpio-Morales vs. Binay, G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015 (Digest on RA 6770)
Carpio-Morales vs. Binay, G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015
(RE: Validity of 1st and 2nd paragraphs of RA 6770)
FACTS:
– The Ombudsman’s argument against the CA’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition, and
her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman
Act, which reads in full:
Section 14. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of
the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman,
except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
– The Ombudsman’s maintains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from
extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage of
the general phrase “[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court,” the Ombudsman herself concedes that
the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Are the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770, valid and constitutional?
RULING: The first paragraph is declared INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular duly issued; The second paragraph is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID.
The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took
away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court’s constitutional rule-making authority. Through this provision,
Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules
of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every court’s exercise of judicial power. Without the
Court’s consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the
separation of powers principle.
In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in
the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it
also practically dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be
mooted by supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the same.
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against “decision or findings” of the
Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770- attempts
to effectively increase the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, it is
therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the
Ombudsman’s posturing, Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are
in part materia in that they “cover the same specific or particular subject matter,” that is, the manner of judicial
review over issuances of the Ombudsman.
Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the existence of the
CA’s subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all subsequent
proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed, the Court deems it proper to resolve
this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion):
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected
unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised
at any time or on the court’s own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at
any point in the case where that fact is developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own
jurisdiction in any proceeding.
JOSE C. MIRANDA vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 154098. July 27, 2005.

Good Faith - - Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees
FACTS:
The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose C. Miranda then the mayor of Santiago City,
Isabela, under preventive suspension for six months from 25 July 1997 to 25 January
1998 for alleged violations of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Subsequently, then
Vice Mayor Amelita S. Navarro filed a Complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman.
Vice Mayor Navarro contended that Mayor Miranda committed the felony of usurpation
of authority or official functions. Mayor Miranda asserted that he reassumed office on
the advice of his lawyer and in good faith. He also averred that, on the day he
reassumed office, he received a memorandum from DILG Undersecretary Manuel
Sanchez instructing him to vacate his office and he immediately complied with the
same. Notably, Mayor Miranda’s counter-affidavit also stated that he left the
mayoralty post after “coercion” by the Philippine National Police.
ISSUE:
Whether or not good faith may be invoked by the petitioner.

HELD:
The court is not a bit persuaded by the posture of the petitioner that he reassumed
office under an honest belief that he was no longer under preventive suspension.
Petitioner’s pretense cannot stand scrutiny. Petitioner’s own affidavit
states.Petitioner’s excuse for violating the order of preventive suspension is too
flimsy to merit even a side-glance. He alleged that he merely followed the advice of
his lawyer. If petitioner and his counsel had an iota of respect for the rule of law,
they should have assailed the validity of the order of suspension in court instead of
taking the law into their own hands.
[ GR No. 85815, May 19, 1989 ]

ELENO T. REGIDOR v. GOV. WILLIAM CHIONGBIAN

Facts: This petition for prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction was filed by the petitioners who are
the duly elected city officials of Tangub City in Misamis Occidental. respondents
approved Resolution No. 340-88 recommending the suspension of the petitioners who
failed to appear on November 18, 1988 at the hearing of a complaint for unspecified
misconduct which respondent Robert O. Taclob filed against them in the office of the
Governor and the SangguniangPanlalawigan. The petition alleges that respondents
Governor Chiongbian and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan acted without authority, and
contrary to law, in issuing the Order of Preventive Suspension against the petitioners
because under Section 63 of the Local Government Code, a provincial or city official may
be preventively suspended by the Minister of Local Government, not by the Provincial
Governor. In their comment on the petition, the respondents justified the suspension of
the petitioners as a valid exercise of the Provincial Governor's power of general
supervision over a component city (Par. 6.4, Section 1, Rule 4 of the Implementing Rules
& Regulations of the Local Government Code), and that it was done "in pursuance to
(sic) the provisions of the Local Government Code and the Rules & Regulations
implementing said law." However, the pertinent provisions of the Local Government
Code and the Implementing Rules and Regulations thereof do not sustain the
respondents' contention in this case.
ISSUE: WON preventive suspension is proper.
Held: There is no merit in the respondents' contention that the order of
preventive suspension issued by Governor Chiongbian was within the
authority granted in Section 7, Rule 18 of the Implementing Rules &
Regulations to "the Minister of Local Government, provincial governor, or
municipal mayor, as the case may be," to "preventively suspend an elective
provincial, city, municipal or barangay official, respectively." No rule or
regulation issued by the Secretary of Local Government may alter, amend,
or contravene a provision of the Local Government Code. The
implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the law that they
implement, for a regulation which operates to create a rule out of harmony
with the statute is a nullity. In this case, the implementing rule (Sec. 7, Rule
18) does not in fact clash with the law (Sec. 63, Local Government Code) -
the draftsmanship is not perfect but the use of the phrase "as the case may
be" and the term "respectively" indicates a delineation of the power to
suspend.
 Romualdez vs. COMELEC GR 19976

Facts:

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte, stating that she is 7-months resident in the said district.
Montejo, incumbent Representative and a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification, alleging that Imelda did not meet the constitutional one-year
residency requirement. Imelda thus amended her COC, changing “seven” months to “since
childhood.” The provincial election supervisor refused to admit the amended COC for the reason that
it was filed out of time. Imelda, thus, filed her amended COC with Comelec's head office in Manila.

On April 24, 1995, the Comelec Second Division declared Imelda not qualified to run and struck off
the amended as well as original COCs. The Comelec in division found that when Imelda chose
to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a
voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have
abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
The Comelec en banc affirmed this ruling.

During the pendency of the disqualification case, Imelda won in the election. But
the Comelec suspended her proclamation. Imelda thus appealed to the Supreme Court.

Imelda invoked Section 78 of B.P. 881 which provides that a petition seeking to deny due course or
to cancel a certificate of candidacy must be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than 15
days before the election. Since the Comelec rendered the resolution on on April 24, 1995, fourteen
(14) days before the election, Comelec already lose jurisdiction over her case. She contended that it
is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the Comelec which has jurisdiction over
the election of members of the House of Representatives.

Issues:

1. Was Imelda a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year
at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
2. Does the Comelec lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case after the
elections?
3. Does the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the
question of Imelda's qualifications after the May 8,

Held:

1. Imelda was a resident of the First District of Leyte for election purposes, and therefore possessed
the necessary residence qualifications to run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the House of
Representatives for the following reasons:
a. Minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is
gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her
domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was established when her father brought his
family back to Leyte.

b. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one;
and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be
deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirementscan the
presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. Petitioner
held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes
unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.

c. It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a
result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. A wife does not
automatically gain the husband’s domicile. What petitioner gained upon marriage was actual
residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin. The term residence may mean one thing in civil
law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar
as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife — the term
residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The
inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when
petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a
new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
d. Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage
and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her
return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of
origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally
expressed in her letters to the Chairmanof the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission
to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte ... to make them livable for
the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence
certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman.

2. With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, it is
evident that the Comelec does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification
case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Moreover, it is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified
time is generally construed to be merely directory, "so that non-compliance with them does not
invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly
indicated it.

3. HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the
House of Representatives. Imelda, not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is
obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. (Romualdez-Marcos vs
Comelec, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995)
Lonzanida vs Comelec GR 135150
Facts:

Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. However, his proclamation
relative to the 1995 election was protested and was eventually declared by the RTC and
then by COMELEC null and void on the ground of failure of elections.
On February 27, 1998, or about three months before the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida
vacated the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and writ of execution it
issued. Juan Alvez, Lonzanida’s opponent assumed office for the remainder of the
term.
In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His
opponent, Efren Muli, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida
had already served three consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998,
petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner.
The COMELEC granted the petition for disqualification.
Petitioner Lonzanida challenged the validity of the COMELEC resolution maintaining
that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption
of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the
three term limit for local government officials, because he was not the duly elected
mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections. He also argued that the COMELEC
ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed
winner in the 1998 mayoral elections as the proper remedy is a petition for quo warranto
with the appropriate regional trial court under Rule 36 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.
The private respondent maintained that the petitioner’s assumption of office in 1995
should be considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of
mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next
mayoral elections.

Issues:

1. WON petitioner’s assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May
1995 to 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying
the three-term limit for elective local government officials.

2. WON COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after
petitioner was proclaimed winner.

Held:

1. NO. Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
“To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the
right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive
terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for
the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.”
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the
petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995
elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by
reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.

After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself
declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral
elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His
assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid
election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court
that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a
proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the
Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the
final outcome of the election protest. Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to
the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later
overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May
1995 mayoral elections.

Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term
because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The
respondents’ contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full
term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no
legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application of the
disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive terms. The second
sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, “Voluntary renunciation of
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which he was elected. “The clear intent of the framers of the
constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their
elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation
of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner
vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary
renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the
COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of
continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral
term.

In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for
the full term; hence, his assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be
counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term limit. The Resolution of the
COMELEC finding him disqualified on this ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral
elections should therefore be set aside.

2. NO. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC that the proclamation or the
assumption of office of a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is
pending before the COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue
hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits.

The clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of
the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered. The outright
dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained
unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly
reward the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede
the resolution of the petition until after he has been proclaimed.

It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the

candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of
the election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected
does not signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the
subject of a separate investigation.”
Penera vs. Commission on Elections, et al.
G.R. No. 181613
25 November 2009
(motion for reconsideration)

Facts:

On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court affirmed the COMELEC’s decision to

disqualify petitioner Rosalinda Penera (Penera) as mayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for
engaging in election campaign outside the campaign period, in violation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code).

Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing that she was not yet a candidate at the time of the supposed
premature campaigning, since under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC
to use an automated election system for the process of voting, counting of votes, and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No.
9369, one is not officially a candidate until the start of the campaign period.

Issue:

Whether or not Penera’s disqualification for engaging in premature campaigning should be reconsidered.

Holding:

Granting Penera’s motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court En Banc held that
Penera did not engage in premature campaigning and should, thus, not be disqualified as a mayoralty
candidate. The Court said –

(A) The Court’s 11 September 2009 Decision (or “the assailed Decision”) considered a
person who files a certificate of candidacy already a “candidate” even before the start of the campaign
period. This is contrary to the clear intent and letter of Section 15 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, which
states that a person who files his certificate of candidacy will only be considered a candidate at the start of
the campaign period, and unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon
the start of such campaign period.

Thus, applying said law:

(1) The effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a
candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign
period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.

(2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only for

acts done during the campaign period, not before. In other words, election
offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon the start of the campaign
period. Before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be
so committed. Since the law is clear, the Court has no recourse but to apply it. The forum for examining the
wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not the Court but the Legislature.

(B) Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15 of R.A. 8436, as amended, does not
provide that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may
be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political
acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the
start of the campaign period. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act
and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.

(C) That Section 15 of R.A. 8436 does not expressly state that campaigning before the start of the campaign
period is lawful, as the assailed Decision asserted, is of no moment. It is a basic principle of law that any act
is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. The mere fact that the law does not declare an act
unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15
of R.A. 8436 that partisan political activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is
sufficient for Congress to state that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect
only upon the start of the campaign period.” The only inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if
done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful.

(D) The Court’s 11 September 2009 Decision also reversed Lanot vs. COMELEC (G.R.
No. 164858; 16 November 2006). Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. This ground was based on
the deliberations of the legislators who explained that the early deadline for filing certificates of candidacy
under R.A. 8436 was set only to afford time to prepare the machine-readable ballots, and they intended to
preserve the existing election periods, such that one who files his certificate of candidacy to meet the early
deadline will still not be considered as a candidate.
When Congress amended R.A. 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the
Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the provision in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that a person who files his certificate
of candidacy shall be considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. Congress wanted to
insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline required by the automated
election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan political act done before the start of the
campaign period. This provision cannot be annulled by the Court except on the sole ground of its
unconstitutionality.
The assailed Decision, however, did not claim that this provision is unconstitutional. In fact, the assailed
Decision considered the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision was self-contradictory — reversing
Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of the said provision.
Aldovino VS COMELEC
FACTS:

Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001,
2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order
of 90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said suspension order was
subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of his office.

Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was sought by herein
petitioners on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in violation of the
three-term Constitutional limit.

ISSUE:

WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of COMELEC?

RULING:

NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term limit
rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).

The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in
contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not
interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo
B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilo’s disqualification.

“Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and
should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation,” held the Court. It noted that preventive
suspension can pose as a threat “more potent” than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself
disallows to evade the three-term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated
administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR – SANTIAGO versus FIDEL RAMOS (253
SCRA559)Facts:The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and
lost in the May 1992 election. In her Motion on the 16th day of August in the year
1995, reiterated in her comment of the 29th of August of the same year, protestant
Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision in the remaining precincts of the pilot
areas be dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed
computed.The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the
protestant and protestee to submit their respective memoranda. Hence, this
petition.Issue:Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is
moot and academic by her election as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her
assumption of office as such on the 30th of June in the year 1995.Held:YES. The
Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been abandoned or
considered withdrawn as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as
Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions thereof.The protestant
abandoned her “determination to protest and pursue the public interest involved in
the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.Moreover, the dismissal of
this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty
as to the results of the 1992 presidential elections, thereby enhancing the all too
crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery.Also,
the PET issued a resolution ordering the protestant to inform the PET within 10
days if after the completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she
still wishes to present evidence. Since DS has not informed the Tribunal of any such
intention, such is a manifest indication that she no longer intends to do so.
EFREN RACEL ARATEA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ESTELA D. ANTlPOLO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012
CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
Lonzanida and Antipolo ran for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in 2010. Rodolfo filed
a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) to disqualify Lonzanida and to
deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida
was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms.
The COMELEC Second Division cancelled Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy.
Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained
pending during said elections. Lonzanida and Aratea garnered the highest number of votes and
were proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor, respectively.
Vice-Mayor elect Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor.
Subsequently, the COMELEC En Banc disqualified Lonzanida from running for Mayor
based on two grounds: (1), Lonzanida had served as Mayor for more than three consecutive
terms without interruption; and (2) Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of ten
counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Second-placer Antipolo intervened and claimed her right to be proclaimed as Mayor
because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when the COMELEC Division ordered
the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and the striking out of his name from the list of
official candidates.
Aratea asserted that Antipolo could not be proclaimed as the winning candidate. He
reasoned that since Lonzanida’s disqualification was not yet final during election day, the votes
cast in his favor could not be declared stray. Lonzanida’s subsequent disqualification resulted in
a permanent vacancy in the Office of Mayor, and Aratea, as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor was
mandated to succeed as Mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the OEC, or made a false material
representation under Section 78 of the OEC that resulted in his certificate of candidacy
being void ab initio.
Whether the second-placer or the Vice-Mayor elect should succeed as Mayor in this case.
RULING:
The Court ruled that Lonzanida was disqualified under Sec. 78 of the OEC. It also held
that Antipolo, the "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s certificate
of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for
Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo actually garnered the highest number of votes for the
position.
False Material Representation
Section 78 of the OEC states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled
when there is false material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy.
Section 74 of the OEC details the contents of the certificate of candidacy. This included
among others a statement that the person filing it is eligible for said office.
The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisión
mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from being elected to any
public office. This perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of the judgment of
conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy.
Lonzanida became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office
from the time the judgment of conviction against him became final. The judgment of conviction
was promulgated on 20 July 2009 and became final on 23 October 2009, before Lonzanida filed
his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009 .
Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs Commission
on Elections
FACTS: Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on
Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being
qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the
COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some
principles established in the two aforestated cases.
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional
parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections
will encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political
constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The
Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list
elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In
the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the
intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is
that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to
include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature
are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic
Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of
professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as
“marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as
they are ideologically marginalized.
MAQUILING vs COMELEC GR. NO. 195649

FACTS: Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship.
Arnado applied for repatriation and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10
July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was
issued in his favor. On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and
executed an affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog
C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy. Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration
indicating the nationality of Arnado as †œUSA-American.†• To further bolster his claim of
Arnado†™s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record
indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport in entering and departing the Philippines. On 30
April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order requiring the respondent to personally file his
answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof. After Arnado failed to answer the
petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present evidence ex-parte. Neither motion was
acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of
votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate. It was only after his proclamation that
Arnado filed his verified answer. THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION Instead of treating
the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on misrepresentation, the
COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. In the matter of the issue of citizenship,
however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado†™s claim that he is a Filipino citizen. †œWe find that
although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225,
Arnado†™s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April
2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation. x x x x Arnado†™s continued use of his US
passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship and that
he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office. x x x x†• The Motion for
Reconsideration and the Motion for Intervention Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before
the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that †œthe evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and
that the said Resolution is contrary to law.†• Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another
candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010
elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration
together with an Opposition to Arnado†™s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that
while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the
Local Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of
Arnado†™s candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate
who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner. RULING OF THE
COMELEC EN BANC The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the
petition as one for disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by
law. However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted
Arnado†™s Motion for Reconsideration. †œx x x The use of a US passport [†¦] does not operate to
revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More
succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to †œunrenounce†• what he has earlier on
renounced. x x x He was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he was actually
able to get it about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport,
the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. x x x In his Separate Concurring
Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of foreign passport is not one of the
grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship
may be lost.

ISSUES: 1. WON intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.

2. WON the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one†™s qualifications
to run for public office. 3. WON the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable to this
case.

HELD: 1. Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper when there has not yet been
any proclamation of the winner. The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No.
6646: Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong. Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact
that the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the
exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and therefore would
not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the
matter before this Court. Arnado†™s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original
petitioner and respondents therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be
sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this
Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed
by Balua against Arnado will attain finality. 2. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one†™s
foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one†™s nationality and
citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position. Section 5(2) of The Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides: Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: x x x x (2)Those
seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath. x x x The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can
simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual
renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the
foreign country which granted the citizenship. Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of
identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise
demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one†™s flag and country. While those who
acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or
appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public
trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other. We
therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has
recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to
his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate
in the May 2010 elections. 3. Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified candidates. With Arnado†™s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes
the winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified
candidates. Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is
still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the
sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate
candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected. With Amado being barred from even
becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It could not
have produced any other legal effect except that Amado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were
conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner. Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes
cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government
Code will not apply.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.

FACTS:

On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its Decision convicting petitioner by final judgment.Consequently,
he was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal for each count,
respectively, which carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of
the Revised Penal Code. On April 30, 2007, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued an order commuting his
prison term to sixteen (16) years, three (3) months and three (3) days.

On April 26, 2012, petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However, because of his previous
conviction, his application was denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the Election Registration Board (ERB),
prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities of Zamboanga City. Pending resolution of the same, he filed a CoCon October 5, 2012, seeking to run as
mayor for Zamboanga City in the upcoming local elections scheduled on May 13, 2013. In his CoC, petitioner
stated,inter alia,that he is eligible for the said office and that he is a registered voter of Barangay Tetuan,
Zamboanga City.

On October 18, 2012,the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual absolute
disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in any election. Such denial was affirmed by the
Regional Trial Court in its Order which, pursuant to Section 138 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended,
otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code" (OEC), was immediately final and executory.

The COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 on January 15, 2013, resolving "to CANCEL and
DENY due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Romeo G. Jalosjos as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May
13, 2013 National and Local Elections" due to his perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply
with the voter registration requirement.

ISSUES:

Did the COMELEC En Banc act beyond its jurisdiction when it issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 and in so
doing, violated petitioner's right to due process?

Had petitioner's perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective office already been removed by Section
40 (a) of the LGC?

HELD:
The COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not
assume jurisdiction over any pending petition or resolve any election case before it or any of its divisions.Rather, it
merely performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling petitioner's CoC on the basis of his
perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by his final conviction.In this
regard, the COMELEC En Banc was exercising its administrative functions, dispensing with the need for a motion
for reconsideration of a division ruling under Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same being required
only in quasi-judicial proceedings.
The denial of due course to and/or cancellation of one's CoC generally necessitates the exercise of the COMELEC's
quasi-judicial functions commenced through a petition based on either Sections 12 or 78of the OEC, or Section 40
of the LGC, when the grounds therefor are rendered conclusive on account of final and executory judgments as
when a candidate's disqualification to run for public office is based on a final conviction.
There is also no violation of procedural due process since the COMELEC En Banc would be acting in a purely
administrative manner.
Macalintal vs PET, GR 191618, June 7, 2011
Facts: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by
law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SC’s decision dismissing the former’s petition
and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.

Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does not provide for
the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant of authority
to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec
4, Art VII of the Constitution.

Issue:
1. Whether or not PET is constitutional.
2. Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.
Held:
1. Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal,
with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987
Constitution, they “constitutionalized what was statutory.” Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the
same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed
by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential
elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
2. No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that
the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.” The set
up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an
exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential
election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law,
they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial
power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and
Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution.
FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 10:58 PM

G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]

FACTS:

Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The League
of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a
Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.

Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as
American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:

No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a
citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively
participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United
States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted
to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD
725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
Case Digest: P.E.T. CASE No. 002. March 29, 2005

Ronald Allan Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., protestant, vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, protestee.
____________________________________________________________________________
_

Facts: GMA was proclaimed by the congress as duly elected President of the Philippines.
Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, FPJ, filed an election protest
before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. However, the protestant died in the course of his
medical treatment at St. Luke’s Hospital. Now, the widow of FPJ, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe
submitted a manifestation with urgent petition/motion to intervene as a substitute for deceased
protestant FPJ.

Issue: Whether the widow may substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the
pendency of the latter’s protest case.

Ruling: No. The court held in Vda. de De Mesa that while the right to a public office is personal
and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the
protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to
continue the protest proceedings. Hence, substitution and intervention is allowed but only by a
real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit. Herein movant/intervenor, Mrs.
FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of President. Thus, given the circumstances
of this case, we can conclude that protestant’s widow is not a real party in interest to this
election protest.
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES vs.

COMELEC,et al.

GR Nos. 221697 , GR No. 221698-700

March 8,2016

Perez, J.:
FACTS:

In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9,
2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005.

Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally
adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN
ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore
Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized
American citizen in 2001.

On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating

medical condition, who then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted
her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and finally went home for good to the
Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.

On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her
Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new
Philippine Passport.

In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she
renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to
Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her American
passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen
since she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as
Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in
want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed
misrepresentation in her COC.
On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-
6 that POE is qualified as candidate for Presidency.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen

(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.

HELD:

YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied
the constitutional reqt that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.

(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her
physical features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as
an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents
there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are
Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial evidence are admissible under Rule 128,
Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.

(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as
based on the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to
definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens.

(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to
the country where they are being found, as covered and supported by the UN
Convention Law.

As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she
satisfied the requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently)
coupled with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in
acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting May 24,2005, upon returning to
the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and
intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for
Presidency was granted by the SC.
Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec
Facts:

In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of
plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute
disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada, explicitly stating
that he is restored to his civil and political rights.

In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of the
disqualification cases against him prospered but he only placed second in the results.

In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of
Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before

the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction
for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute
disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation
to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).

The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to
seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former
President Gloria M. Arroyo.

Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the
second highest votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the
contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.

Issue:

May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been convicted of the
crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public
office?

Held:
Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights,
which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this
controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of
the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by former
President Estrada does not actually specify which political right is restored, it could be inferred
that former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore former President Estrada’s
rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification. Even if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the
pardon’s text.

IIf former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s promise
never to seek a public office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the
text of the pardon itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the
decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot
be interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended to former President Estrada