tlb .

PII,
Republican
National
Committee
William I. Greener, Ill
Director of
Communications

November 17, 1983

MEMORANDUM
To: DAVID R. GERGEN
Director of Communications,
The White House
From: WILLIAM I. GREENER, III ~ \ ~
Director of Communications,
Republican National Committee
Subject: Upcoming Movie on ABC

Per our conversation of last evening, I am providing you with

a set of the information that we will be using in contacting Party
leaders so that they might be better equipped to discuss the ABC
movie dealing with nuclear war to be aired this Sunday evening.
The key points we are trying to make are:
(1) Everyone· ·agrees nuclear war would be horrible, beyond anyone's
ability to imagine.
(2) The movie raises the question as to what the best way to pre-
vent such horror actually is.
(3) The movie seems to suggest that one policy would increase the
likelihood of such a horror happening.
(4) The ABC people certainly are entitled to represent that view-
point with the movie, but we disagree that the policies in the
movie would increase the likelihood of such a horror.
(5) We believe the President's approach of reducing weapons after
we have achieved parity is the best way to prevent such a war.
The information we sent yesterday is the first attachment. It
includes: (1) a cover letter, (2) some criticisms about the way ABC
has done the movie, and (3) talking points that address our point of
view.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Republican Center: 310 First Street Southeast, Washington, D.C. 20003. (202) 484-6500.
UPCOMING ABC MOVIE, PAGE 2, NOVEMBER 17, 1983

The second attachment includes the information we plan to send

today. It includes: (1) material generated by the National
Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) that reinforces the fact
that all of us must come across as strong proponents of peace and as
aware of the fact a nuclear war would be horrible, (2) a copy of an
article which appeared in Reader's Digest asking proponents of the
nuclear freeze a set of questions. In addition, we will be using the
most recent talking points available on the subject.
Thank you for discussing this matter with me. You can be assured
that no one, most especially the Chairman, has any plans to attack the
right of ABC to do what they have done. We do plan to make certain
that we strongly support the notion that President Reagan's policies
are the best way to prevent a nuclear war.
Let me know if there is anything else you want/need us to do.
Thanks, again.

CC: MICHAEL . BAROODY

BILL PHILLIPS
KATHRYN MURRAY
 \o ¥e mber 16, 1983
Dea~ State Chairman:
I?J. anticipation of the p-ublic debate in the wake of the ABC
television movie 11 The Day After, 11 we thought the following
information might be useful foi you, your Executive Director,
or Co~rnunications Director.
11
The Day After 11 is a dramatization of the effects of nuclear
i ·ZT 2.s experienced in La1..Tence, Kansas . \12.ny groups v:ho support a
nuclear freeze or total unilateral disarmament are taking advantage
o::: the emotional impact . of the film to rally support for their
causes. Unfortunately, many of these efforts are based on fear
and emotional appeals rather than sound re2.soning and reliable informat
It iscruci2.l that you, as 2. Republican Party leader, be prepar~d
to respond to inquiries and make comments, wnere appYopriate, on the
film itself and the entire issue of nuclear arms control .
It is essential that Renublican . Partv, leaders across the country,
cc~ti~ue to support President Reagan's policies cf peace t hrough
strength, 2nd of negotiating re2.l, mutual, permarn ent, an6 verifiable
reductions in nuclear arms. As contrasted with the nuclear freeze
:;:, r op one n t s, ·who i\a n t to :free z e the r is k o £ nu c 1 ear war at. the pre sent
!level, President Re2.gan's policies ire designed to actually reduce
tnat threat through arms reductions, not just arms limitations .
• If you ·h-ould like any further assistance on thi's topic, please feel
free to call either Kathryn Murray or Robert Meyne at (202) 86-3 - 8741.
Tr:e following ··is background information and 11 T2lking Points" on
tne film, ' 1 The Day After, 11 and the issue of nuclear arms control. .
. .
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NUCLEAR ARMS ISSUES

On Sunday night, November 20, 1983, ABC wl 11 air a made-for-te l evi sion
movie called "The Day After." The movie depicts the effects of a nuc'ear
war on the town of Lawrence, Kansas. It is very graphic and emotiona lly
powerful. It is likely to help bring the nuclear freeze issue back ;~to the
forefront of American attention.
Congressional candidates should be prepared to discuss this issue wi thin
the framework of the h~ightened awareness of the American people. (This is
true whether you support a freeze or oppose it . )
The freeze lssue has always been an emotional topic. The effect or
nuclear war '.3 hard to imagine but terrifying. Seeing how "The Da y After"
portrays an answer the \•1h at if ... ?" question \vi 11 strengthen the fears of
11

many vi e1·1ers.
"The Day After" will be aired during the November ratings "sweep "
period, and seen by a large nationwide audience. After the movie airs. many
peop l e may be more receptive to the freeze id ea--and its supporters-- and
less receptive to those who oppose a nuclear freeze. It wil 1 probab ly help
to ga lv anize support for the nuclear freeze movement
No matter what position you take on this issue, you must share the
values held by all Americans. All Americans want to live a long time. We
all want our children to live, too. You can ' t oppose these values. rou
share them 1
Whe n you talk about this issue in gene ral (especlally if you ta l k abcut
this movi e ) yo u·.must begin by stressing yo ur desire for peace and the
prese rv ation of life. Sharing your own fears--personalizing the disc ussion
to your own family, neighborhood, town, and district--is probabl y the most
effective wa y of doing this. M6ve from the inside and reach out .
First talk about your own hope for peace, about how you want to grow ol d
and see your children grow up. Talk about how you want them to be ab le to
do the same. Then talk about how much you care about preventing a nuc lear
war. Pledge yourself to this effort. Only after you have made your
feelings and intentions clear v1ill people listen to your actual app roach to
the problem.
Hhen talking about ways to avo id a nuclear war, stress that eve r v-:,ne is
working towa rd the same goal. <Some just hav e different wa ys of reac ~;~~
i t. ) Those suoport ing the nu c l ea r freeze ar e (in mos t cases > fo 1· a
negotiated f r ee ze on nuc lear weapons at curr ent l eve l s. Most als o"
r eductions in th e numbers of nuclear arms afte r a f r eeze i s achie ve •
Those supporting President Reagan's program are for a negotiated
reduction i n nuclear weapons and freezing their numbers at lower leve ls.
Inform your constituents that both approaches include a reducti on in
nuclear weapons. Tell them no one wants to inc r ease our nuclear arsena ls
except in the inter est of keeping peace .
 ARMS CON TROL BACKGROUND
The :·e are tv10 main approa.: hes to ar ms co ntrnl being debated '.n the
United State s today. Both, however, have t he 5ame goal--world peace . Th ese
are a 1ucl ea r weapons freeze and a negotiated nu cl ear weapons reduction .
Nuc1ear Freeze
The nuclear freeze movement consist s of loos e ly-organized groups across
the country. It is supported by man y in Congr ess --mostl y Democrats, some
moderate Republicans.
Cong ress narrowly defeated a nuclear freeze r esolution in Au gust 1982.
Instead it passed a substitute resoluti on support i ng President Reagan's arms
reduction plan. <The nuc l ear freeze resolution cal l ed for negotiations with
the Sov iet Union for an immed i ate freeze in nuclear weapons at current
l eve l s. )
In 1982 the nuclear freeze was on t he ba llo t i n nine states and the
Distr ic t of Columbia. It passed in California. t he District of Columbia,
Mass ach usetts, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakot a, Or egon, Rhode
Island, and Wisconsin . It failed in Ari zona.
In May 1983 a modified nuclear f r eeze reso l ution passed 278 to 149. It
was supported by 60 Republicans. The resoluti on had bee n amended to require
that freeze negotiations preser ve the essent iai equivalence of U.S . and
Soviet nucl ear fo r ces. The f ull Senate has no ~ considered a nucl ea r creeze
proposal in 1983.
Strateg i c Ar ms Reduction Ta lk s (START )
President Reagan announce d his START initiativ e in May 1982. It
originally called for negot iat ion s with the So 1 iet Union to reduce t he
number cf ballistic missile warh ea ds on eac h side by one t hird. This wo uld
reduce the warhead totals on each side from about 7, 500 to 5 ,000.
The President has r ecomme nded to build the MX mi ssile and the B- 1 bomber
<to modernize our aging nu c l ear forces ), until such an agreement is r eacned .
•
Th e Administration has evidenc e that the Sovie t nucle ar forces ar e much
more up-to- date than ours. For exampl e, t hre e quarter s of the Sovi et Unio n' s
strateg i c war heads are on deli very s vstems wnich are 5 years old or l ess.
Howe ver, three auarters of U.S . strategic warh eads are on de liv ery systems
15 years old or ol der. This means our forces may no longer be an effective
dete rr ent to war.
The President has accepted t he concept of "build -down." He has
i nst ruct ed the chi ef U.S. neg ot iator to offer build -down as one posslble
arms -c on t rol proposal. The Sovi et Union has not been enthusiastic ab out the
proposa l . Nei t her sid e has so far ta ken an offic ia l position on bui ld - down .
hmiever .
(Und er a bui l d- down ag r eeme nt, eac h side would have to retire some
number of old weapons for each new weapon depl oyed. Man y proponents suggest
a retirement ratio of 1 . 3-- for each new warhead deployed, 1 . 3 old ones would
have to be wi thdrawn.)
Inter mediate Nuclear Force <INF) negotiations
In 19 79 NA TO de ci ded to deploy in termediat e rang e nuc l ear miss l l es Cth e
Pershing II> and ground - laun ched cruise mi ss il es in Eur ope. Th ese would
deter a Sovi et attack on Europ e. The Soviet Union now has 243 SS - 20
missil es--each wi th 3 warhe ads-- aimed at Europ e . The r e are no NATO
intermed iate- 1·a nge nuc l ear missiles now deploye d against the Soviet Union.
The r e has been a very visible mo vement i n Europe opposing the deploymen t
of nuclear missiles there. Pershing II missiles will be deployed in Nest
Ge rmany. Great Britain, Italy, t he Nethe rl and s, and Belgium are to rec e iv e
the ground controlled cruise missi l es.
President Reagan has been working to eliminate the need for U.S. missile
deployment --or at least r educe the number of missiles in Europe--t hrough the
INF nego tiations. Thes--e negotiati ons, l ike the STAR T negotiations, are now
going on in Geneva.
In 1981 the initial American proposa l i n the INF ·negotiations was t he
"zero option." Under the zero option, th e U.S. would not deploy its
i nte rmediat e- ra nge missiles in Europe i f the Soviet Union would dismantle
i ts SS-2 0s (which were alread y deployed) . The Soviet Un ion rejected that
idea.
In September 1983 President Reagan announ ced th r ee new proposals:
o Instead of foc usin g on intermediate nu clear weapons i n Euro pe, the U.S.
now may bargain for worldwide eq ua lity i n intermediate nuclear weapons.
This is to protect our Fa r East allies.
o The U.S. would consider Soviet demands that INF negotiations be expand ed
to include nuclear bomb -c arr ying aircraft . The Soviet Union says these
weapons must be inc lud ed, since the U. S. leads in this eategory.
Presid ent Reagan has agreed to discuss these categories, showi ng U. S. good
fa i th and fle xibi l ity .
o Th e U. S. would conside r reduc ing t he numb er of Pe r shing II missi l es
dep loyed . (This is the weapon the Soviet Unio n is most worried abo ut . )

ABOUT THE MOVIE

o "The Day After" seems po l iticall y moti vated. Howe ver, freeze ooponents
should no t confuse the issue by attacking ABC or freeze supporters. The
issue is America's fear of nuclear war and concerns abo ut ways t o deter
war. Talk about those fears and concerns. Don't quibble about politics
in the face of high emotions. We are all concerned about the potential
for a nuclear war.
o Free ze oppo nents should be aware t ha t f r eeze suppor te rs wil l run pol it ic al
adv ertisements dur in g and after the airing of t he movi e. Pro- f r eeze
celebriti es such as Mer yl Streep and Paul Newma n will be featu r ed .
Viewe r s 1-,ill be in vited to call an "800" num ber to voic e the ir concern.
o Freeze oppon ents should also be aware the freeze movement has targeted 10
states that house nuclear missile s i los. (The movie is set i n Kans as--one
of t hes e states). The movie points ou t the Sov ie t Union would target
missile silos for attack. Some of these states are Missouri, Kansas,
Arkansas, Montana, North Da kot a, Wyoming, Arizona, and South Dakota.
 KEY QU ESTIONS
Here are some questions you may be as ked about nuclear arms and some i~eas
on how t o an swer t hem.
Hhy ar e we pu tt in g Per shing II missile s in Europe when nobody ther e re a l ly
\-,ants th em 7
o The U.S. wants worl d peace. Our NATO allies need to be able to deter a
Sovi et attack. The U.S. agr eed wit h other NATO countries to pl ace
Pe rs hing II mi ssil es i n Euro pe to keep the peace. (The Soviet Union now
has 360 SS-2 0 mis s il es--each with t hree warheads -- aimed at Europe.)
o It is n' t t r ue that "no body the r e" want s Pershing II's to be deployed in
Europe. Bot h Bri t i sh Prime Min i ste r Ma r ga r et Thatcher, and West German
Chance llo r He lmu t Kobl won r e-e l·ect ion dur in g the last year. Both l eaders
str ong ly support ed depl oyment o~ Per shin g II ' s in Europe prior to
rece ivi ng t he ir e lect oral mandat es.
o Thr eate ned dep loyment of Pershin g missil es has brought the Soviet Union to
t he ba r gain i ng tab l e . Nh en th e Sovi et s had t he only missiles in Europe ,
t hey weren't willin g t o nego t iat e for reduct io ns.
o A nuc l ear freeze woul d block th e plann ed Decembe r deployment of these
we apon5, removing the i nce nt iv e f or the Sovi et Union to negotiate.
Since both sid es can blow each other up manv tim es ov er , what di ffe r ence
doe s it make how muc h nu c l ea r power we hav e 7
--
0 The U.S. has nuc l ear wea pon s t o pr eserv e pea ce by deter r ing war. What we
want to work with t he Sov iet Unio n for i s t o r ed uce of t he nu mber of
nucl ear weapons, eventuall y el i mi nat i ng th em.
o If the Soviet Union has more nucl ea r weapon s t han the U.S. (of sufficient
power and accuracy ) it might atte mpt to laun ch a f i r st st rik e aga in st the
U.S. By keer}ng our f or ce up-ro- date, t he U.S . dete r s such an atte mp t .
o START proponents believe the mode rni zation program proposed by Pr eside nt
Reagan is essentia l . With mode rn nucl ear weapon s 1-1e maintain t he potential•
t o pun i sh aggressi on so se ver e ly t hat · th e Sovi et Un ion wo n' t dar e t o
attac k the U.S.
o Our system of nuclear dete r rence was des i gned f or one purpose onl y--to
pr event the outbreak of nuclear war . And it has been successfu l in doing
this . It has been more stabilizing i n t his sense to the world than NATO,
the United Nations or the internationa l f i nance system .
' How can we a l low these bl g incr ease s in defense spending when social
prog r ams are being cut?
o Sinc e t he pea k of th e Vietnam Nar in 19 68, defense expenditures ha ve
steadily moved down . This is true both as a perce nta ge of the gross
nation al product and as a per ce ntage of the federa 1 budget.
o President Reagan's FY '84 defense budget proposed S240 billion in
outlays. This is 6.8 percent of the gross national product and 29 percent
of federal spending.
o Only 10 percent of t he defense budget will go to strategic nuclear forces
(m issi l es and bombers ). New progr ams ( by this Ad min istr ation) account for
12 l/2 percent of defense spending i n the 1984 budget. 42 percent of
defense spending goes to manpowe r costs.
o In the 1970s non-defense spending inc re ased dramatically; defense spending
did not even keep up with inflation . Today, direct payments to
individuals r epresent 42 percent of total budget outlays.

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15 Questions for :1 it:rll~1t~itl

Your Nuclear-Freeze
Frie11ds
Cu11d1'11-<ed fmm
D.~RT~IOL'TH RJ::vJE\\'
GREG FossEDAL

WAS l.! --.TERESTING, for a w eek benveen DO\\" 2nd 1963. when th e

f: or two. to cont emplate the ne- United States unilaterally pul led
gotiation of a joint and veri fi - its nuclear missile5 out of Turkev.
able (emphasis on the larre r) freeze Italy and Britain- but the So\·iei:;
of nuclear-weapons deployment neither cut back nor froze, but
along with our friends in Moscow . expand ed.
You knew the Russians would nev- 6. Gi\·e the total number of So-
er agree to verification an yway, so \·iet citizens murciered in the Gulag
mu relax ed and indulged the im- Arch ipelago from 1936 to 1950.
. . .L ~ l
pu lse to U<1yoream . (Hint : some 16 :ni ll ion .)
But now i,·s time to politely i. C omp2~e the r:-iilitary budget
ch:1nge the subject. If you find of the l ;_S.S .R ., a mere 13 percent of
yourself getting bogged down in Soviet gross nationa l prociuct, with
the fr eeze debate, pop one of these that of the :---= ATO countries. a pro-
15 questions : vocative and mi!ita-istic .; percent
I. Describe in I oo \vords or less of GJ\:P . and of the United States , a·
the So.,.iet monument to detente · whopping 6 percent of G:s-=P.
that stand s in Berlin. 8. State the SoYiet bill of rights.
2. }\;ame rhe last three arms- 9. Outline the mam differe~nces
control treaties upheld by the Sov i- between now and 1976, ,vhen the
et Union. (Th is is a trick question.) United States beran unilateral disen-
3. Estimate the total number of gagement of its ~nti -b2llistic-missi le
deaths in Sovi et prisons from 191 i pr~gram- but the Russians neither
rirlf
to 1923 . (Hint : up to fi\'e million. ) cut back' nor froze. but expanded.
: ,,.. 4. Illuminate the vigor of the So- l 0 . . · arrate th e stunning success
~ ~c..iwiou.....:"~"'l
,·i et election system by comparing it of the Soviet "'C hemicals for Peace "
and cinnamon-ifs
with such "fascist'' American allies as program in .-\fgha nistan. Cambo-
!neiits of fiber.
fest,.-Ie. So we make El Sal va dor , Chile and Guatemala. dia and Laos.
xiness in e\'ery ('.. 5. Outline the many d ifferences 11. P lace a check by each coun-
..11-·
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15 QLESTJO.\'S FOR YOC-C:: .\"CCLE.1R-FREEZE Ff!E.\DS

tr\' in which che So, iets estJbli sh ed
a milit:iry presence in recent ye:irs:
a. Moz:imbique, b . J\:icaragua ,
c. Ir ag . d. Angola. e. Ethi op ia, f. All
of the above, and more .
12. Re\'ie,,· the Russian policy of
pro,·iding support for world peace-
makers, such as J\fuammar el -Qad-
dafi, Fi del Ca stro. Yasir Ar::ifat.
13. Relate the p rog r~ss of So,·iet
good-will missions to -Pol::ind ,
CzechosloYakia, H u ngary.· An gola
and South Yemen.
14. E xamine America 's aggres-
si, e. jingoistic withdrawal from the
Panama Cana l as a contributing
factor in defe nsiv e Soviet actions in
l\"icaragua and El Sah-:i do r.
15 . Tr ace the developmen t of
Russia"s nuclear-freeze moveme nt,
including the many protes t
marche s, pamphlets, SoYiet TV
special s advocating a nuclear
freeze . (An oth er trick question .)
That should proYid e you with
en ough ammunition to blow up
your friends· world 15 times over.
'Ne might JS well stop there and see
if tl:ie othe r side will recipro-
cate- i.e., stop talking about a
nonsense freeze and come back to
the earth on which there li¢s a
So,·iet Union.
For iniormatior, on reprints
oi this article. see page 2i8

Jf i,wr Points r
;
~ -
EACH Sc,·D.w the minister ulled the ch ildren to the from of the church
I I
\•,hile he told them a storv. O nce he broul!ht ;i telephone to better
i!lu~trate the idea of praye r. · ~ ·
-- --- ..... .
- - .: "You talk to peopl e on the telephone and don 't see them on the other
enci of the li ne , r ight : " he beran. The children nodded ves . "Wei . ta ikinr
to God is like talking on th; telep hone. He's on the oih er end, but yo~
-- • i can 't see him. He's listening. though.''
-~ I
-- ! Just then 2 little boy piped up and asked. "What's his nwnber:"
''
I '
;I --Conai~uteC b~ B,rhai, Fr,hm __,~ J' anywhere

~ f~~~~= i~:
' / I
1
I H AD T.-\KEJ\" OFF three days from my· job as a pre-school bus driver in
order to get married. On my return I noticed that one little girl, norma lly a

• •• :.c •.
.c ' I
~.

··-:-·'': r-/ :~. -c-1, .

a chatterbox, had remained silent all the wav to school. Just as she was
getting off the bus, she asked if I'd been out ·because I got married .
"Yes," I replied .
"Does that mean you ha ve a husband:·· she continued.
. rP-:a: ;· lis:
"'Yes. it does.''
She· ;hourht this over for a moment. and then asked. "Weli wha t did
Name __
you name him;·· -Contributed by Su»n ~\. Eshcru D Address_
--·---<-'. 0 :-: : - - -- B City_
..OT Ml' ST H.WE TAKE1' a lot of courage to disco\'e r that frog legs are Write tc
edible. - Doug Larson. Cnired Fe> ru rc Syndicm
B
I 1·