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G.R. No. Nos.

101127-31 November 18, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs. CRESENCIA C. REYES, Accused-Appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. chanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry

Timoteo A. David for Oriental Assurance Corporation. chanroble s virtual law l ib rary

Rosendo C. Ramos for accused-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:

The appellant has instituted this proceeding for the reversal of


the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila dated March
12, 1991, convicting her of estafa and violation of BP 22 under
five separate informations which had been consolidated and
tried jointly on her own motion. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

From the unrebutted evidence of the prosecution, the trial


court that complainant Lorie Garcia came to know Cresencia
Reyes through Manny Carbrera, a friend and business
acquaintance of Garcia, who requested her to deliver rice to
Reyes because he had no more stock to sell. Garcia initially
refused but eventually agreed to sell to Reyes but only on the
condition that Reyes first make a purchase order and, upon
delivery, pay 50% of the cost of the rice, the balance to be
paid with a postdated check. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

The first purchase order was for 200 sacks. On April 4, 1986,
Garcia delivered to Reyes 100 sacks of rice worth P 31,500.00,
for which two checks were issued, each in the amount of
P15,750.00. One was dated April 4, 1986 and the other April
10, 1986. On April 9, 1986, Garcia delivered 98 more sacks of
rice to Reyes, and Reyes again issued two checks, each in the
amount of
P14,210.00, the first dated April 10, 1986, and the other April
15, 1986. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

On April 9, 1986, Reyes placed another order for 200 sacks of


rice, which Garcia delivered to her on the same day. While the
200 sacks were being unloaded, Reyes asked to buy an
additional 200 sacks, and since there were 400 sacks of rice
loaded on the truck, Garcia agreed to sell the whole stock to
her.chanroblesv irtualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

For the 400 sacks (plus 2 more sacks to complete the first
purchase order for 200 sacks), Reyes again issued two checks,
each for P66,330.00, one dated April 9, 1986 and the other
April 15, 1986. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virt ual law lib rary

All the checks were drawn against the Bank of the Philippine
Islands at its España Branch. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

Of the six checks issued by Reyes, only three were made good,
to wit, the check dated April 4, 1986 for P15,750.00, which
was encashed by Garcia; the check dated April 10, 1986 for
P14,210.00, which was redeemed by Reyes; and the check
dated April 9, 1986 for P66,330, which was paid by Reyes by
installments.chanroblesvi rtu alawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary

The other three checks were, either upon encashment or


deposit, returned by the drawee bank to Garcia due to
"insufficient funds." Garcia notified Reyes of their dishonor and
the latter promised to pay their total value. Despite repeated
demands on Reyes, however, she failed to make good the
checks or to replace them with cash chanrobles v irt ual law l ibra ry

The five criminal cases filed against Reyes were Criminal Cases
Nos. 86-51206 to 86-51208, for violation of BP 22 in
connection with the issuance of BPI Check No. 308202 for
P5,750, 1 BPI Check No. 308223 for
P14,210.00, 2BPI check No. 308226 for P66,330.00, 3 and
Criminal Cases Nos. 86-51209 and 86-51210, both for estafa
involving the same checks. chanroblesv irtualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

After the prosecution had rested its case, Reyes manifested


through her counsel that she would file a demurrer to
evidence. She did not do so during the 10-day period allowed
her, whereupon the trial court, on motion of the prosecution,
declared the cases submitted for decision. Instead of filing a
motion for reconsideration, Reyes, assisted by her counsel,
submitted a waiver of appearance. 4 Judge Angelina S.
Gutierrez thereafter rendered the challenged decision in which
she disposed as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, finding the guilt of the accused beyond


reasonable doubt, she is hereby sentenced as follows: chanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

In Criminal Case No. 51206, to suffer imprisonment of six (6)


months and to pay the fine of P15,750.00; chanrobles vi rtua l law lib rary

In Criminal Case No. 51207, to suffer imprisonment of six (6)


months and to pay the fine of P14,210.00; chanrobles vi rtua l law lib rary
In Criminal Case No. 51208, to suffer one year imprisonment
and to pay the fine of P66,330.00; chanroble s virtu al law lib rary

In Criminal Case No. 51209, to suffer 22 years of reclusion


perpetua together with the accessory penalties and to
indemnify the complaining witness by way of actual damages
in the sum of P80,540.00 and to pay the costs; and chanroble s virtual law l ib rary

In Criminal Case No. 51210, there being no modifying


circumstances that attended the commission of the offense, to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and 1 day
ofprision mayor as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal as maximum together with the accessory
penalties and to indemnify the complaining witness by way of
actual damages in the sum of P15,750.00 and to pay the
costs.

On May 13, 1992, the First Division referred en consulta to the


Court en banc the question of whether the appellant, having
been sentenced to serve 22 years of reclusion perpetua,
should be allowed to remain on bail during the pendency of her
appeal. 5 On August 7, 1992, the Court en banc ordered the
surrender of Reyes by her bondsman to the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 37, for her confinement by the Bureau
of Corrections. 6chanrobles v irt ual law li bra ry

In the appellant's brief, it is alleged that the trial court


committed grave errors:

(1) In convicting Reyes of estafa and violation of BP 22 when


on the face of the evidence itself it is clear that the issuance of
the checks in question was involved in a credit transaction and
that the said checks were issued by the latter as guarantee for
the payment of her civil obligation to the complainant; chanroble s virtual law lib rary

(2) In holding her guilty of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of
the Revised Penal Code when there was no deceit employed by
her in the issuance of the checks in question; chanroble s virtual law l ibra ry

(3) In holding that there was sufficient evidence her to justify


her conviction for estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code and for violation of BP 22; and chanrob les vi rtu al law lib rary

(4) In convicting her for the crime of estafa under Art. 315,
par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code for having issued a bad
check, even if the check had been issued in payment of a pre-
existing obligation.
The Court, after deliberating on the above assignment of
errors and the briefs submitted by the parties, finds for the
People.chan roblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

We re-affirm at the outset the established doctrine that:

While the filing of the two sets of Information under the


provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa,
may refer to identical acts committed by the petitioner, the
prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because
a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses
and where there is variance or differences between the
elements of an offense in one law and another law as in the
case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what the
rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements
in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the
same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for
the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets of
information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy (People
v. Miraflores, 115 SCRA 570). 7 chanroble s virtual law l ibra ry

The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of


making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentment for payment. The law has
made the mere act of issuing a bad check a malum
prohibitum, an act proscribed by the legislature for being
deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. 9 chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

According to Chief Justice Pedro L. Yap in the landmark case of


Lozano v. Martinez: 10

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the


private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interest of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee
or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice
of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels
of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

The appellant argues that the questioned checks were not


intended for deposit or encashment but merely to guarantee
payment of her obligations to Garcia, who, she stresses,
admitted that for every delivery of rice the corresponding
checks were given in return. She contends that in credit
transactions, a check may serve merely as a guaranty for the
payment of the amount indicated therein, to be redeemed later
by the drawer "on the maturity date of the check or on a much
later date, depending on the availability of funds of the
latter."
chanrobles vi rtua l law lib rary

It is now settled that BP 22 applies even in cases where the


dishonored checks were issued merely in the form of a deposit
or a guaranty and not as actual payment. The law does not
make any distinction. Criminal liability attaches to the drawer
of the check whether it was issued in payment of an obligation
or merely to guarantee the said obligation. As we held in Que
v. People: 11

. . . Inasmuch as the law does not make any distinction in this


regard, no such distinction can be made by means of
interpretation of application. Furthermore, the history of the
enactment of subject statutes evinces the definitive legislative
intent to make the prohibition all embracing, without making
any exception from the operation thereof in favor of a
guarantee. This intent may be gathered from the statement of
the sponsor of the bills . . . which was enacted later into BP
22, when it was introduced before the Batasang Pambansa
that the bill was introduced to discourage the issuance of
bouncig checks, to prevent checks from becoming "useless
scrap of paper" and to restore respectability to checks, all
without distinction as to the purpose of the issuance of the
checks. . . . chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

Consequently, what are important are the facts that the


accused had deliberately issued the checks in question to
cover accounts and that the checks were dishonored upon
presentment regardless of whether or not the accused merely
issued the checks as a guarantee. (Emphasis added)

Even on the assumption, then, that the subject checks were


given by the appellant as a mere guaranty and not as
payment, this circumstance will not absolve Reyes from her
violation of BP 22. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary

The appellant has also been convicted under Art. 315 (2) (d)
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 4885,
which penalizes any person who shall defraud another "by
postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his
funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check." chanrobles vi rtua l law lib rary
To constitute estafa under this provision, the act of postdating
or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the
efficient cause of the defraudation; as such, it should be either
prior to or simultaneous with the act of fraud. 12 The offender
must be able to obtain money or property from the offended
party because of the issuance of the check, whether postdated
or
not. 13 It must be shown that the person to whom the check
was delivered would not have parted with his money or
property were it not for the issuance of the check by the other
party. Stated otherwise, the check should have been issued as
an inducement for the surrender by the party deceived of his
money or property and not in payment of a pre-existing
obligation. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

It is recalled that Garcia was unwilling at first to deal with


Reyes but was finally persuaded when she issued the two
checks in payment for the first 100 sacks of rice. One of these
checks was encashed before the second could mature and be
subsequently dishonored. Believing the Reyes' credit was
good, Garcia accepted two more checks from her in payment
for another 100 sacks, and Reyes redeemed one of them
before the other could mature and be subsequently
dishonored. Garcia was still unaware of Reyes's deception
when she entered into their last sale of 400 sacks, for which
Reyes issued another two checks in payment, one of which
was also to be dishonored later. In all this series of
transactions, Garcia was induced to sell because of the checks
issued by the appellant which the complainant believed to be
funded.chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

The deceit practiced by Reyes on Garcia is all too palpable.


Reyes was able to maintain Garcia's confidence by making
good three of the checks she had issued and thus giving Garcia
the impression that the other checks, which she could not yet
present for payment, would be honored. Reyes' timing was
clever. She saw to it that one of her checks for the first
delivery was valid (and was subsequently encashed) before
she made her second purchase, for which she issued two more
checks. She redeemed one of these checks before she bought
the final 400 sacks, for which she issued another two checks.
All this time, Garcia believed that the remaining postdated
checks she had yet to encash were all good when they were in
fact all worthless. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

The three postdated checks that were subsequently dishonored


were issued at a time when the funds in her account were
insufficient and even nil. Two of these checks were dated April
10, 1986, and the third April 15, 1986. The records of the
drawee bank showed that Reyes had a zero balance at the
time the checks were issued and also when they were
presented for payment. 14 The dishonored checks she had
issued to Garcia had a total value of P96,290.00, and this
represented the damage sustained by Garcia because of the
appellant's deceit. Reyes had issued these check upon her
fraudulent assurance to Garcia that they were fully funded. chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

Her situation worsened when she failed to make good the


checks within three days from receipt of notice of their
dishonor and the demand from the complainant for their value.
Her failure to take advantage of this grace period offered by
the law raised the prima facie inference of deceit consisting of
"false pretense or a fraudulent act." 15 chanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry

The appellant's final contention is the, prior to the delivery of


the rice, she had agreed that only 50% of the purchase price
would be paid upon delivery and that the remaining 50%
would be covered by a postdated check. Hence, as the subject
checks covered the balance of the purchase price of the 600
sacks of rice, they were issued in payment of a pre-existing
obligation and so did not violate Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code or BP 22. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

The facts established by the prosecution belie this assertion.


The evidence to the contrary is overwhelming. There is no
doubt that the subject checks were issued by Reyes (and
accepted by Garcia) in exchange for the three deliveries of rice
as each delivery was made. We are satisfied that the
postdated checks were issued by the appellant not as payment
for a pre-existing obligation but as the consideration for each
shipment of rice she received from the complainant. chanroblesv irt ua lawlibra ryc hanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry

The argument that the postdated checks were promissory


notes and not for negotiation is so unsubstantial as to deserve
no serious attention.chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

The Court notes the following observations of the trial court on


the personality of the appellant:

Accused, past 50, is a physically handicapped lady whose


height is barely two (2) feet. In fact, whenever she came to
court, she was always assisted by one or two companions. But
she is well educated and speaks English fluently. The Court
discerns that it is this unique combination of bizarre physical
make-up and seeming trustworthiness which led others, like
herein complainant, to repose their confidence in her. Her
counsel manifested that she is also facing similar charges in
other branches of this Court.

It is indeed pathetic that the appellant should suffer the


physical handicap above described, but what is especially
tragic is she has chosen to use this handicap for the deception
of Garcia, who trusted her partly out of sympathy for her
abnormal appearance. By her deceitfulness, Reyes has
forfeited all feelings of charity or kindness toward her and
earned instead the punishment of the laws she has scorned.
virtua l law lib rary
chanroblesv irtualawli bra rycha nrob les

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED and the


appeal is DENIED, with costs against the appellant. It is so
ordered.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Republic of the Philippines


Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE G.R. No. 184053


PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
VIRGINIA BABY P.
MONTANER,
Accused-Appellant. August 31, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal of the Decision[1] dated February 12, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01162, entitled People of the Philippines
v. Virginia Baby P. Montaner, which affirmed the Decision[2] dated April 8,
2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93, in
Criminal Case No. 0748-SPL. The RTC found appellant Virginia Baby P.
Montaner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa as defined
and penalized under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

In an Information[3] dated April 21, 1998, appellant was charged as


follows:

That on or about May 17, 1996 in the Municipality of San Pedro,


Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
accused Virginia (Baby) P. Montaner did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud one Reynaldo Solis in the following
manner: said accused by means of false pretenses and fraudulent acts that
her checks are fully funded draw, make and issue in favor of one Reynaldo
Solis the following Prudential Bank Checks Nos.:

1. 0002284 P5,000.00
2. 0002285 P5,000.00
3. 0002286 P5,000.00
4. 0002287 P5,000.00
5. 0002288 P5,000.00
6. 0002289 P5,000.00
7. 0002290 P5,000.00
8. 0002291 P5,000.00
9. 0002292 P5,000.00
10. 0002293 P5,000.00

all having a total value of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) and


all aforesaid checks are postdated June 17, 1996 in exchange for cash
knowing fully well that she has no funds in the drawee bank and when the
said checks were presented for payment the same were dishonored by the
drawee bank on reason of ACCOUNT CLOSED and despite demand
accused failed and refused to pay the value thereof to the damage and
prejudice of Reynaldo Solis in the aforementioned total amount
of P50,000.00.

Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge leveled against her during
her arraignment on June 10, 1998.[4] Thereafter, trial ensued.

The parties evidence was summarized by the trial court, as follows:

The evidence for the prosecution disclose that on May 17, 1996, accused
Virginia Baby P. Montaner, in exchange for cash, issued to private
complainant Reynaldo Solis in his house at Caliraya Street, Holiday Homes,
San Pedro, Laguna, ten (10) Prudential Bank checks, specifically, check
nos. 0002284, 0002285, 0002286, 0002287, 0002288, 0002289, 0002290,
0002291, 0002292, and 0002293 all postdated June 17, 1996, each in the
amount of P5,000.00 all in the total amount of P50,000.00. Accused
represented to complainant Solis that the checks were fully funded. When
private complainant deposited the checks for encashment however, they
were dishonored for the reason account closed. Private complainant
verbally and thereafter, thru demand letter (Exhibit A) formally demanded
that accused settle her accounts. Despite receipt of the demand letter,
accused Montaner failed to pay the value of the ten (10) checks, thus private
complainant Reynaldo Solis filed the instant complaint for estafa. In
connection with this complaint, private complainant Solis executed a sworn
statement (Exhibit D).

Ruel Allan Pajarito, Branch Cashier O-I-C of Prudential Bank testified that
they placed the mark account closed on the ten (10) checks issued in the
account of accused Montaner considering that at the time the same were
presented to them, the account of accused Montaner was already closed.
Witness Pajarito further testified that as per their records, the account of
accused Montaner, account no. 00099-000050-4 was closed on July 11,
1996. The checks were returned on October 4, 1996 for the reason account
closed.

Accused, thru counsel initially manifested that she is intending to


file a demurrer to evidence. However, her right to file the same was
considered waived in view of her failure to file the demurrer despite due
notice.

To exculpate herself from criminal liability, accused Virginia Baby


P. Montaner denied the allegations that she issued ten (10) checks in private
complainants favor claiming that the ten (10) checks were borrowed from
her by one Marlyn Galope because the latter needed money. She gave the
ten checks to Galope, signed the same albeit the space for the date, amount
and payee were left blank so that the checks cannot be used for any
negotiation. She further told Galope that the checks were not funded. When
she learned that a case was filed against her for estafa, she confronted
Marlyn Galope and the latter told her that money will not be given to her if
she will not issue the said checks. She has no knowledge of the notice of
dishonor sent to her by private complainant and claimed that her husband,
who supposedly received the notice of dishonor left for abroad in July 1996
and returned only after a year, that is, in 1997.[5]

In a Decision dated April 8, 2003, the trial court convicted appellant for
the crime of estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph 2(d), Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby sentences accused Virginia Baby


P. Montaner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty-two (22) years
of reclusion perpetua as maximum and to indemnify complainant Reynaldo
Solis in the amount of P50,000.00.[6]
Appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but the adverse
ruling was merely affirmed by the appellate court in its Decision dated
February 12, 2008, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is


DENIED. Accordingly, the challenged Decision is hereby AFFIRMED
in toto.[7]

Hence, appellant interposed this appeal before this Court and adopted
her Appellants Brief with the Court of Appeals, wherein she put forth a single
assignment of error:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE


ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315, PAR. 2 (D) OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE.[8]

Appellant maintains that she entrusted the subject checks, purportedly


signed in blank, to Marilyn Galope (Galope) out of pity in order for the latter
to secure a loan. Thus, there is purportedly no certainty beyond reasonable
doubt that she issued the checks purposely to defraud Reynaldo Solis (Solis)
into lending her money. She further claims that no transaction had ever
transpired between her and Solis. Admitting that she may have been
imprudent, she nonetheless insists that her simple imprudence does not
translate to criminal liability.

We are not persuaded.

Paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud


another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow x x x:

xxxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent


acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

xxxx

(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an


obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds
deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The
failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover
his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or
the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or
insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting
false pretense or fraudulent act.
The elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code are: (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack of sufficiency
of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee.[9]

In the case at bar, the prosecution sufficiently established appellants


guilt beyond reasonable doubt for estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code. According to Soliss clear and categorical testimony,
appellant issued to him the 10 postdated Prudential Bank checks, each in the
amount of P5,000.00 or a total of P50,000.00, in his house in exchange for
their cash equivalent. We quote the pertinent portions of the transcript:

[On Direct Examination]

Q: Mr. Witness, why did you file this complaint against the accused?
A: She issued me checks in exchange for cash, ten postdated checks, maam.

Q: When did Mrs. Montaner issue to you these checks?


A: In May 1996, maam.

Q: What was the purpose of issuing to you these checks?


A: Because she needed cash, maam.

Q: And how many checks did she issue to you?


A: Ten checks, maam.

Q: And what is the date of the checks that were issued to you?
A: June 17, 1996, maam.

Q: What is the total value of these ten checks?


A: Fifty Thousand Pesos.

Q: At the time these checks were issued to you, what if any, was her representation
about them?
A: To deposit those checks on their due date, maam.

Q: And aside from telling you to deposit those checks on their due date, what else
did she represent to you regarding these checks?
A: None, maam.

Q: Did you deposit these checks?


A: Yes, maam.

Q: Where?
A: At the Premier Bank, San Pedro, Laguna.

Q: What happened to these checks after depositing the same?


A: The checks bounced, maam.

Q: All these checks?


A: Yes, maam, all checks bounced for reason account closed.

Q: After these checks were dishonored what did you do?


A: I informed her about that.
Q: Thru what, verbal or written?
A: Initially it was verbal, then I informed her thru a demand letter, maam.

xxxx

Fiscal (continuing):

Q: You said that the accused issued to you ten checks in exchange for cash,
where are those checks?
A. The original checks are with me here, maam.

Q. Handed to this representation are checks, Prudential Bank checks Nos. 002284,
002285, 002286, 002287, 002288, 002289, 002290, 002291, 002292,
002293 all dated June 17, 1996 and all in the amount of P50,000 [should
be P5,000.00] each. Mr. Witness, there appears from these checks a
signature at the bottom portion whose signature is this?
A. The signature of Mrs. Montaner, maam.

Q. Why do you say it is her signature?


A. She signed those in my presence, maam.

Q. I am showing these checks to the opposing counsel for comparison

Atty. Peala
The checks are admitted, your Honor.

xxxx

[On Cross-Examination]

Atty. Peala (continuing):

Q: When Mrs. Montaner issued those checks, ten checks were they issued
in your house or in her house?
A: In my house, sir.

Q: Mrs. Montaner brought the checks in your house?


A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you tell us the time of the day when she brought the checks to you?
A: May 17, 1996 at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, sir.

Q: Was she alone or including her husband?


A: She was alone, sir.[10]

From the circumstances narrated above, it was evident that Solis would
not have given P50,000.00 cash to appellant had it not been for her issuance
of the 10 Prudential Bank checks. These postdated checks were undoubtedly
issued by appellant to induce Solis to part with his cash. However, when Solis
attempted to encash them, they were all dishonored by the bank because the
account was already closed.
Solis wrote appellant a demand letter dated October 13, 1996 [11] which
was received by appellants husband to inform appellant that her postdated
checks had bounced and that she must settle her obligation or else face legal
action from Solis. Appellant did not comply with the demand nor did she
deposit the amount necessary to cover the checks within three days from
receipt of notice. This gave rise to a prima facie evidence of deceit, which is
an element of the crime of estafa, constituting false pretense or fraudulent act
as stated in the second sentence of paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code.

As for appellants claims that she merely entrusted to Galope the blank
but signed checks imprudently, without knowing that Galope would give them
as a guarantee for a loan, the Court views such statements with the same
incredulity as the lower courts.

Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a


credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. The Court has no test of the truth of human testimony, except
its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is
repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside judicial
cognizance.[12]

Appellant wishes to impress upon the Court that she voluntarily parted
with her blank but signed checks not knowing or even having any hint of
suspicion that the same may be used to defraud anyone who may rely on
them. Verily, appellants assertion defies ordinary common sense and human
experience.

Moreover, it is elementary that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and


convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence which has far less
evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.[13] We agree with the lower courts that appellants bare
denial cannot be accorded credence for lack of evidentiary support. As aptly
noted by the trial court, appellants failure to produce Galope as a witness to
corroborate her story is fatal to her cause.[14] In all, the Court of Appeals
committed no error in upholding the conviction of appellant for estafa.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated February 12,


2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01162 is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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