THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 151876. June 21, 2005]

SUSAN GO and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. FERNANDO L.

DIMAGIBA, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Administrative Circular 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular 13-2001, merely

establishes a rule of preference in imposing penalties for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP
22), the Bouncing Checks Law. When the circumstances of both the offense and the offender indicate
good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone -- instead
of imprisonment -- is the preferred penalty. As the Circular requires a review of the factual
circumstances of a given case, it applies only to pending or future litigations. It is not a penal law; hence,
it does not have retroactive effect. Neither may it be used to modify final judgments of conviction.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the October 10,
2001[2] and the October 11, 2001[3] Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) (Branch 5), Baguio
City.[4] The October 10, 2001 Order released Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba from confinement
and required him to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of imprisonment. The October 11, 2001 Order
disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, [in] applying the doctrine as held in the above-entitled cases in this case, the
instant petition for Habeas Corpus should be, as it is hereby, GRANTED. The Baguio City Jail
Warden is hereby ordered to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE the petitioner from confinement unless
he is being held for some other lawful cause other than by virtue of the Sentence Mittimus dated
September 28, 2001 issued by CESAR S. VIDUYA, Clerk of Court, MTC 4, Baguio City. Further,
the petitioner is required to pay a fine in the amount of P100,000.00 in lieu of his imprisonment, in
addition to the civil aspect of the Joint Judgment rendered by MTC 4 dated July 16, 1999.[5]

The Facts

The pertinent facts are not disputed. Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to Petitioner
Susan Go thirteen (13) checks which, when presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment
on the due dates, were dishonored for the reason account closed.[6] Dimagiba was subsequently
prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22[7] under separate Complaints filed with the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Baguio City.[8] After a joint trial, the MTCC (Branch 4) rendered a
Decision on July 16, 1999, convicting the accused in the 13 cases. The dispositive portion reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, this Court finds the evidence of the
prosecution to have established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses
charged and imposes upon the accused the penalty of 3 months imprisonment for each count (13
counts) and to indemnify the offended party the amount of One Million Two Hundred Ninety Five
Thousand Pesos (P1,295,000.00) with legal interest per annum commencing from 1996 after the
checks were dishonored by reason ACCOUNT CLOSED on December 13, 1995, to pay attorneys
fees of P15,000.00 and to pay the costs.[9]
 The appeal of Dimagiba was raffled to Branch 4 of the RTC in Baguio City.[10] On May 23, 2000,
the RTC denied the appeal and sustained his conviction.[11] There being no further appeal to the Court
of Appeals (CA), the RTC issued on February 1, 2001, a Certificate of Finality of the Decision.[12]
Thus, on February 14, 2001, the MTCC issued an Order directing the arrest of Dimagiba for the
service of his sentence as a result of his conviction. The trial court also issued a Writ of Execution to
enforce his civil liability.[13]
On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the MTCC Order. He
prayed for the recall of the Order of Arrest and the modification of the final Decision, arguing that the
penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also, should have been imposed on him.[14] The
arguments raised in that Motion were reiterated in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of
Execution filed on February 28, 2001.[15]
In an Order dated August 22, 2001, the MTCC denied the Motion for Reconsideration and directed
the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against Dimagiba.[16] On September 28, 2001, he was arrested and
imprisoned for the service of his sentence.
On October 9, 2001, he filed with the RTC of Baguio City a Petition[17] for a writ of habeas corpus.
The case was raffled to Branch 5, which scheduled the hearing for October 10, 2001. Copies of the
Order were served on respondents counsels and the city warden.[18]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Right after hearing the case on October 10, 2001, the RTC issued an Order directing the
immediate release of Dimagiba from confinement and requiring him to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of
imprisonment. However, the civil aspect of the July 16, 1999 MTCC Decision was not touched
upon.[19] A subsequent Order, explaining in greater detail the basis of the grant of the writ of habeas
corpus, was issued on October 11, 2001.[20]
In justifying its modification of the MTCC Decision, the RTC invoked Vaca v. Court of
Appeals[21] and Supreme Court Administrative Circular (SC-AC) No. 12-2000,[22] which allegedly
required the imposition of a fine only instead of imprisonment also for BP 22 violations, if the accused
was not a recidivist or a habitual delinquent. The RTC held that this rule should be retroactively applied
in favor of Dimagiba.[23] It further noted that (1) he was a first-time offender and an employer of at least
200 workers who would be displaced as a result of his imprisonment; and (2) the civil liability had
already been satisfied through the levy of his properties.[24]
On October 22, 2001, Petitioner Go filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Orders dated
October 10 and 11, 2001.[25] That Motion was denied on January 18, 2002.[26]
Hence, this Petition filed directly with this Court on pure questions of law.[27]

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for this Courts consideration:

1. [The RTC] Judge was utterly devoid of jurisdiction in amending a final and conclusive decision
of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 4, dated July 16, 1999, in nullifying the Sentence Mittimus,
dated September 28, 2001, issued by x x x [the] Municipal Trial Court, Branch 4, Baguio City, and
in ordering the release of [Dimagiba] from confinement in jail for the service of his sentence under
the said final and conclusive judgment;

2. Assuming only for the sake of argument that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, the Petition for
Habeas Corpus is utterly devoid of merit as [Dimagiba was] not entitled to the beneficent policy
enunciated in the Eduardo Vaca and Rosa Lim cases and reiterated in the Supreme Court Circular
No. 12-2000; x x x

3. Granting for the sake of argument that [Dimagiba was] entitled to the beneficent policy
enunciated in the Eduardo Vaca and Rosa Lim cases and reiterated in the Supreme Court Circular
No. 12-2000, the minimum fine that should be imposed on [Dimagiba] is one million and two
hundred ninety five thousand pesos (P1,295,000.00) up to double the said amount or (P2,590,000),
not just the measly amount of P100,000; and

4. [The RTC] judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in hearing and deciding [Dimagibas] Petition for Habeas Corpus without notice and without
affording procedural due process to the People of the Philippines through the Office of [the] City
Prosecutor of Baguio City or the Office of the Solicitor General.[28]

In the main, the case revolves around the question of whether the Petition for habeas corpus was
validly granted. Hence, the Court will discuss the four issues as they intertwine with this main
question.[29]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Main Issue:
Propriety of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus

The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which
individuals are deprived of liberty.[30] It was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint; or, more specifically, to obtain immediate relief for those who may
have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus deliver them from unlawful
custody.[31] It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the circumstances under which a person is
detained.[32]
The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue
of a valid judgment.[33] However, as a post-conviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a
consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1)
there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the court
had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus
voiding the sentence as to such excess.[34]
In the present case, the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was anchored on the ruling
in Vaca and on SC-AC No. 12-2000, which allegedly prescribed the imposition of a fine, not
imprisonment, for convictions under BP 22. Respondent sought the retroactive effect of those rulings,
thereby effectively challenging the penalty imposed on him for being excessive. From his allegations,
the Petition appeared sufficient in form to support the issuance of the writ.
However, it appears that respondent has previously sought the modification of his sentence in a
Motion for Reconsideration[35] of the MTCCs Execution Order and in a Motion for the Partial Quashal
of the Writ of Execution.[36] Both were denied by the MTCC on the ground that it had no power or
authority to amend a judgment issued by the RTC.
In his Petition for habeas corpus, respondent raised the same arguments that he had invoked in
the said Motions. We believe that his resort to this extraordinary remedy was a procedural infirmity.
The remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC Order denying his Motions, in which he should
have prayed that the execution of the judgment be stayed. But he effectively misused the action he
had chosen, obviously with the intent of finding a favorable court. His Petition for a writ of habeas
corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had already become final and executory. Such an
action deplorably amounted to forum shopping. Respondent should have resorted to the proper,
available remedy instead of instituting a different action in another forum.
The Court also finds his arguments for his release insubstantial to support the issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus.
Preference in the
Application of Penalties
for Violation of BP 22

The following alternative penalties are imposable under BP 22: (1) imprisonment of not less than
30 days, but not more than one year; (2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the check,
a fine that shall in no case exceed P200,000; or (3) both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion
of the court.[37]
SC-AC No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC-AC No. 13-2001,[38] established a rule of preference in
imposing the above penalties.[39] When the circumstances of the case clearly indicate good faith or a
clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone may be considered as
the preferred penalty.[40] The determination of the circumstances that warrant the imposition of a fine
rests upon the trial judge only.[41] Should the judge deem that imprisonment is appropriate, such
penalty may be imposed.[42]
SC-AC No. 12-2000 did not delete the alternative penalty of imprisonment. The competence to
amend the law belongs to the legislature, not to this Court.[43]

Inapplicability of
SC-AC No. 12-2000

Petitioners argue that respondent is not entitled to the benevolent policy enunciated in SC-AC No.
12-2000, because he is not a first time offender.[44] This circumstance is, however, not the sole factor
in determining whether he deserves the preferred penalty of fine alone. The penalty to be imposed
depends on the peculiar circumstances of each case.[45] It is the trial courts discretion to impose any
penalty within the confines of the law. SC-AC No. 13-2001 explains thus:

x x x. Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the
penal provisions of BP 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender
clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a
fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination
of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. x x
x.

It is, therefore, understood that:

xxxxxxxxx

2. The Judges concerned, may in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the
peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best
serve the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the
seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the
imperatives of justice;

The Court notes that the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus relied mainly on the alleged
retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000, which supposedly favored BP 22 offenders.[46] On this point,
Dimagiba contended that his imprisonment was violative of his right to equal protection of the laws,
since only a fine would be imposed on others similarly situated.[47]
The rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws may be applied retroactively if favorable to the
accused. This principle, embodied in the Revised Penal Code,[48] has been expanded in certain
instances to cover special laws.[49]
 The issue of retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000 was settled in De Joya v. Jail Warden of Batangas
City,[50] which we quote:

Petitioner's reliance of our ruling in Ordoez v. Vinarao that a convicted person is entitled to benefit
from the reduction of penalty introduced by the new law, citing People v. Simon, is misplaced.
Thus, her plea that as provided for in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, SC Admin. Circular No.
12-2000 as modified by SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001 should benefit her has no basis.

First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code is not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its
effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment.

Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001, SC Admin. Circular No.
12-2000 merely lays down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent behind the law. SC
Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely urges the courts to take into account not only the purpose of
the law but also the circumstances of the accused -- whether he acted in good faith or on a clear
mistake of fact without taint of negligence -- and such other circumstance which the trial court or
the appellate court believes relevant to the penalty to be imposed.[51]

Because the Circular merely lays down a rule of preference, it serves only as a guideline for the
trial courts. Thus, it is addressed to the judges, who are directed to consider the factual circumstances
of each case prior to imposing the appropriate penalty. In other words, the Administrative Circular does
not confer any new right in favor of the accused, much less those convicted by final judgment.
The competence to determine the proper penalty belongs to the court rendering the decision
against the accused.[52] That decision is subject only to appeal on grounds of errors of fact or law, or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Another trial court may not
encroach upon this authority. Indeed, SC-AC No. 12-2000 necessarily requires a review of all factual
circumstances of each case. Such a review can no longer be done if the judgment has become final
and executory.
In the present case, the MTCC of Baguio City had full knowledge of all relevant circumstances
from which respondents conviction and sentence were based. The penalty imposed was well within
the confines of the law. Upon appeal, the conviction was sustained by RTC-Branch 4 of Baguio City.
Eventually, the Decision attained finality. Hence, RTC-Branch 5 did not have the jurisdiction to modify
the lawful judgment in the guise of granting a writ of habeas corpus.
The doctrine of equal protection of laws[53] does not apply for the same reasons as those on
retroactivity. Foremost of these reasons is that the Circular is not a law that deletes the penalty of
imprisonment. As explained earlier, it is merely a rule of preference as to which penalty should be
imposed under the peculiar circumstances of a case. At any rate, this matter deserves scant
consideration, because respondent failed to raise any substantial argument to support his
contention.[54]

Modification of Final
Judgment Not Warranted

The Court is not unmindful of So v. Court of Appeals,[55] in which the final judgment of conviction
for violation of BP 22 was modified by the deletion of the sentence of imprisonment and the imposition
of a fine. That case proceeded from an Urgent Manifestation of an Extraordinary Supervening
Event,[56] not from an unmeritorious petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as in the present case. The
Court exercised in that case its authority to suspend or to modify the execution of a final judgment
when warranted or made imperative by the higher interest of justice or by supervening events.[57] The
supervening event in that case was the petitioners urgent need for coronary rehabilitation for at least
one year under the direct supervision of a coronary care therapist; imprisonment would have been
equivalent to a death sentence.[58]
 The peculiar circumstances of So do not obtain in the present case. Respondents supposed
unhealthy physical condition due to a triple by-pass operation, and aggravated by hypertension, cited
by the RTC in its October 10, 2001 Order,[59] is totally bereft of substantial proof. The Court notes that
respondent did not make any such allegation in his Petition for habeas corpus. Neither did he mention
his physical state in his Memorandum and Comment submitted to this Court.
Respondent seeks the retroactive application of SC-AC No. 12-2000 in his favor on the basis
alone of the alleged settlement of his civil liability.[60] Citing Griffith v. Court of Appeals,[61] he theorizes
that answering for a criminal offense is no longer justified after the settlement of the debt.
Respondent, however, misreads Griffith. The Court held in that case that convicting the accused
who, two years prior to the filing of the BP 22 cases, had already paid his debt (from which the checks
originated) was contrary to the basic principles of fairness and justice.[62] Obviously, that situation is
not attendant here.
The civil liability in the present case was satisfied through the levy and sale of the properties of
respondent only after the criminal case had been terminated with his conviction.[63]Apparently, he had
sufficient properties that could have been used to settle his liabilities prior to his conviction. Indeed,
such an early settlement would have been an indication that he was in good faith, a circumstance that
could have been favorably considered in determining his appropriate penalty.
At any rate, civil liability differs from criminal liability.[64] What is punished in the latter is not the
failure to pay the obligation, but the issuance of checks that subsequently bounced or were dishonored
for insufficiency or lack of funds.[65] The Court reiterates the reasons why the issuance of worthless
checks is criminalized:

The practice is prohibited by law because of its deleterious effects on public interest. The effects of
the increase of worthless checks transcend the private interest of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interest of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting
valueless commercial papers in circulation multiplied a thousand-fold can very well pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of
society and the public interest. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an
offense against public order.[66]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Orders NULLIFIED. Respondents
Petition for habeas corpus is hereby DENIED. Let this case be REMANDED to MTCC of Baguio City
for the re-arrest of respondent and the completion of his sentence.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 113255-56. July 19, 2001]

DECISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO GONZALES y
SUN, accused-appellant.
PARDO, J.:

The case is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Angeles City finding
accused Romeo Gonzales y Sun guilty of possession and sale of marijuana and sentencing him to six (6) years
and one (1) day imprisonment and a fine of P6,000.00[2] and life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00.[3]
On February 27, 1991, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Jaime J. Bustos of Pampanga filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Angeles two informations charging accused Romeo Gonzales y Sun with violation of R.A. No.
6425, Sections 8[4] and 4,[5] reading as follows:

Crim. Case No. 91-180:

That on or about the 13th day of February 1991, in the municipality of Mabalacat, province of
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the above-named
accused, ROMEO GONZALES y SUN, without having been lawfully authorized, permitted and/or
licensed, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody
and control two (2) block size of marijuana weighing 1.5 kilos more or less and ten (10) medium
size plastic bags of dry marijuana weighing 300 grams more or less, which when subjected to
examination yielded positive of THC, tetro hydro canabinol (sic), an active ingredient found in
marijuana, a prohibited drug.

Contrary to law.

Crim. Case No. 91-181:

"That on or about the 13th day of February 1991, in the municipality of Mabalacat, province of
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, ROMEO GONZALES y SUN, not having been previously licensed, authorized and/or
permitted by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell more or less one (1)
kilo of high-grade marijuana, for and in consideration of the amount of ONE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00), Philippine Currency, to a NARCOM poseur buyer, which said
marijuana, when subjected to examination was found positive of THC, tetro hydro canabinol (sic),
an active ingredient found in marijuana, a prohibited drug.

Contrary to law.

On March 25, 1991 and on May 13, 1991, the trial court arraigned the accused in Tagalog[6] and in
English.[7] He pleaded not guilty to both charges. The cases were tried jointly.
Early in February 1991, the police in Agusu, Brgy. San Francisco, Mabalacat, Pampanga received an
information that accused Romeo Gonzales was selling large quantities of marijuana. They conducted a
surveillance for four (4) days. On February 13, 1991, they conducted a buy-bust operation.[8]
The buy-bust team was composed of Pfc. Danilo Cruz, Pfc. Edgar Arimbuyutan, Sgt. Aurelio Ortiz, Pfc.
Celestino dela Cruz, Sgt. Juanito de la Cruz and a confidential informant. Sgt. Ortiz acted as the
poseur-buyer.[9] They conducted the entrapment operation at the backyard of a house in Agusu, San Francisco,
Mabalacat, Pampanga.[10] Their informant introduced Sgt. Ortiz to accused Gonzales as a buyer of
marijuana. They talked about the deal, and accused Gonzales handed him a bag containing more or less one (1)
kilogram of marijuana. After ascertaining its contents, Sgt. Ortiz delivered to accused Gonzales P1,200.00[11] as
payment. He then took out his handkerchief as a pre-arranged signal to the other members of the team, who
immediately rushed to the scene. They introduced themselves as Narcom agents and arrested the accused. Sgt.
Ortiz handed over the bag of marijuana to Pfc. Danilo Cruz.[12]
Pfc. Cruz positioned himself about 10-15 meters away from accused Gonzales and Sgt. Ortiz. When he saw
Sgt. Ortiz take out his handkerchief, he immediately rushed to the scene, introduced himself as a Narcom agent,
and arrested accused Gonzales. They recovered the bag of marijuana sold by accused Gonzales[13] and the
P1,200.00 marked money. Accused Gonzales tried to run away, but Pfc. Cruz grabbed him at once. The team
confiscated one more bag containing two (2) blocks of marijuana[14] weighing about 1.5 kilograms and ten (10)
medium size plastic bags[15] each containing 300 grams of marijuana.[16]
Pfc. Cruz prepared a handwritten Confiscation Receipt[17] which accused Gonzales refused to sign.[18] Pfc.
Arimbuyutan conducted a field test on the confiscated marijuana. The tests yielded positive indications for the
presence of tetrahydrocannabinol, or THC.[19] The confiscated bags of marijuana were then endorsed to the PC
Crime Laboratory for examination.[20]
After the arrest, the team brought accused Gonzales to their office for interrogation. Pfc. Cruz informed
him of his constitutional rights. Pfc. Cruz testified that accused Gonzales orally admitted that he was selling
marijuana to different buyers, but claimed that somebody else owned the marijuana he sold. When asked to
identify the owner, he kept silent. He also refused to give a written statement, so Pfc. Cruz proceeded to prepare
the charges against him.[21]
Inspector Daisy P. Babor, forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory, testified that she personally
examined the marijuana subject of the case. She placed her signature on all the bags of marijuana.[22]The
examination gave positive results for marijuana.[23]
On July 5, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty as charged, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, considering that the prosecution has abundantly established the guilt of the accused
by proof beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused ROMEO
GONZALES y SUN guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Sections 8 and 4, Art. II., R.
A. 6425, and hereby accordingly imposes upon him the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years
and one (1) day and a fine of P6,000.00 with regard Criminal Case No. 91-180 and the penalty of
life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00 with regard Criminal Case No. 91-181.

SO ORDERED.

Angeles City, July 5, 1993.

(Sgd.) MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

J u d g e[24]

Hence, this appeal.[25]

In his brief, accused-appellant claimed that he was a victim of a frame-up. And, assuming arguendo that he
was guilty in both charges, he was entitled to a modification of the sentence imposed upon him.[26]
The Solicitor General contends that the trial courts ruling was based on facts and evidence on record, and
that it correctly imposed the appropriate penalty.[27]
The doctrine is well-entrenched that factual findings of the lower courts are accorded great respect as trial
judges had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. Such findings are binding on this Court
unless substantial facts and circumstances were overlooked which, if considered, would materially affect the
result of the case.[28]
In the case at bar, accused-appellants contention of frame-up is incredible. He claimed that he was inside
the comfort room of a neighbor from whom he borrowed P100.00 to buy medicines for his sick mother. He was
just wearing underwear when he was brought out of the house. As pointed out by the trial court, his version of
facts defies logic.[29]
The defense of frame-up like an alibi is viewed with disfavor as it can be easily concocted.[30] Evidence
therefor must be clear and convincing. In the absence of proof of any ill-motive on the part of the apprehending
officers, this defense will not prosper.[31]
 A buy-bust operation, normally preceded by surveillance, is an effective mode of apprehending drug
pushers and, if carried out with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards, [it] deserves judicial
sanction.[32] A warrant of arrest is not essential because the violator is caught in flagrante delicto. Searches made
incidental thereto are valid.[33]
Pfc. Danilo Cruz testified that accused-appellant tried to run away when the buy-bust team approached him
and confiscated the bag of marijuana he sold. When asked further on how the team confiscated the other bags of
marijuana, Pfc. Cruz said that they found those bags beside accused-appellant while the latter was sitting under
a tree. The testimony of Pfc. Cruz[34] runs, thus:
Q: And what is the contents (sic) of this plastic bag?
A: The contents (sic) is 1 kilogram of marijuana.
Q: How about the second and third plastic bags?
A: They contain two blocks of marijuana of approximately 1.5 kilos, and the ten medium size plastic bags also
contained marijuana.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Where did you find these two blocks of marijuana weighing approximately 1.5 kilos?
A: I found it near the accused where he was sitting besides (sic) a tree.
Q: Besides (sic) a tree near where the accused was sitting?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How far was the tree from the accused?
A: Very near from him because near the tree is a bamboo bench and they were waiting there.
Q: Can you not approximate the distance between where you arrested the accused to the tree where you found the two
blocks of marijuana?
A: One meter.
Q: How about the ten medium size plastic bags of marijuana, where did you find the same?
A: Also in the brown paper bag.
To corroborate Pfc. Cruzs testimony, Sgt. Ortiz testified[35] in this wise:
Q: Did you tell us a while ago that Romeo Gonzales delivered to you one (1) kilogram marijuana did you not notice at
that time where these two (2) block size and ten (10) medium plastic bag of marijuana were?
A: It was placed together with the one (1) kilogram I purchased from Gonzales in a bag, brown paper bag, sir.
Q: For clarification purposes, do you want us to understand that all these marijuana contained only in one (1) brown
paper bag?
A: Yes, sir.
Lastly, accused-appellants view on the imposable sentence is misplaced.
Accused-appellant cannot invoke the beneficial application of the Death Penalty Law[36] inasmuch as the
evidence showed that he sold over one (1) kilogram of marijuana.[37] During the search conducted after the arrest,
some 4.5 kilograms of marijuana were found in his possession.[38]
Under our criminal justice system, an amendatory law can not be given retroactive effect unless it is
favorable to the accused.[39] In the case at bar, accused-appellant, therefore, shall suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment imposed by the trial court.[40]
However, the trial court erred in imposing a straight penalty in Crim. Case No. 91-180. The Indeterminate
Sentence Law applies.[41]
The Dangerous Drugs Act,[42] Section 8, prescribes as penalty for possession of Indian hemp (marijuana),
regardless of amount, an imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, and a
fine ranging from P6,000.00 to P12,000.00. This is the equivalent of prision mayor under the Revised Penal
Code. The question now arises as to whether the scale and graduation of penalties under the Revised Penal
Code will apply for purposes of determining the imposable indeterminate sentence.[43]
Republic Act 6425[44] is a special law. In People vs. Simon,[45] we categorically stated that it is amendatory
to and in substitution of Articles 190 to 194 of the Revised Penal Code.[46] The Court said that we must be
guided by the rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code concerning the application of penalties which distill
the deep legal thought and centuries of experience in the administration of criminal laws.[47]
 Applying the pro reo doctrine in criminal law,[48] we hold that the penalty prescribed in R. A. No. 6425,
Section 8 while not using the nomenclature of the penalties under the Revised Penal Code is actually prision
mayor. Consequently, it is the first part of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which shall apply in
imposing the indeterminate sentence. There are no modifying circumstances; hence, the maximum penalty shall
be within the medium period of prision mayor, and the minimum penalty shall be any period within the penalty
next lower in degree to that prescribed for the offense, or prision correccional.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case No.
91-181, the accused-appellant is sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00. In Criminal
Case No. 91-180, the accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
and to pay a fine of P6,000.00.
With costs in each case.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 9527. August 23, 1915. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSE TAMPARONG ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

The appellants in their own behalf.

Acting Attorney-General Harvey for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE; APPEALS IN THIRD INSTANCE; EXTENT OF REVIEW. — Under the Spanish criminal procedure, appeals from
justices’ courts were allowed only to Courts of First Instance. By section 43 of General Orders No. 58, this procedure has been so
amended that appeals can be taken to the Supreme Court in such cases when the validity or constitutionality of a statute is involved. This
amendment of the procedure does not carry with it the right of review of the facts, but is confined to the purpose stated — that is, of
determining the validity or constitutionality of the statute or ordinance upon which the judgment was predicated. Former cases reviewed,
showing that such has uniformly been the interpretation of section 43 by this court.

DECISION

TRENT, J. :

The defendants were convicted by the justice of the peace of Baguio for having played the game of chance called "monte" in violation of
Ordinance No. 35. They appealed to the Court of First Instance, where they were again tried and convicted upon the same charge. An
appeal was allowed to this court because the validity of Ordinance No, 35 was drawn in question during the trial of the cause in the court
below.

Two questions are raised by this appeal: (1) Is Ordinance No. 35 valid, and (2) is this court required under the law to examine the
evidence for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of the defendants?

The first question is answered in the affirmative by this court in the case of the United States v. Joson (26 Phil. Rep., 1). The cases are
on all fours, and a further discussion of this branch of the case is unnecessary.

With reference to the second question, it is said that by reason of the defendants’ having in the lower court questioned the legality of
Ordinance No. 35, for the violation of which they have been convicted, this case has been brought to us in all its details of law and fact,
including the evidence taken at the trial, on which the Court of First Instance founded its judgment touching the guilt and condemning
the defendants. While, on the other hand, it is contended that the questions of fact, which we are [not] authorized to examine, are those
which are essential to be examined for the purpose of determining the legality of Ordinance No. 35 and the penalties provided for therein,
and no other.

At the outset it may be well to briefly outline the criminal procedure in force in this jurisdiction prior to the promulgation on the 23d day
of April, 1900, of General Orders No. 58.

The royal order dated December 17, 1886, directing the execution of the royal decree of September 4, 1884, wherein it was ordered that
the Penal Code in force in the Peninsula, as amended in accordance with the recommendations of the code committee, be published and
applied in the Philippine Islands, as well as the Provisional Law of Criminal Procedure which accompanied it. These two laws, having been
published in the Official Gazette of Manila on March 13 and 14, 1887, became effective four months thereafter.

According to the provisions of Rule 1 of the above-mentioned provisional law, the justices of the peace, or gobernadorcillos, had original
jurisdiction over the offenses set forth in Book 3 of the Penal Code.

Rule 2 provided that "when the justice of the peace or the gobernadorcillo receives notice that there has been committed any one of the
offenses provided for in Book 3 of the Penal Code which can be prosecuted by the Government, he shall issue summons for an oral trial
to the complainant, if any, to the alleged culprit, and to the witnesses who may be able to testify as to the facts, fixing the day and hour
for holding the trial. If this (the trial) takes place at the residence of the promotor fiscal, he shall also be summoned." Rule 3 provided
that the same procedure should be followed in those cases which can only be prosecuted at the instance of a private party, except that
the promotor fiscal was not cited.

Neither the Provisional Law, the criminal procedural laws of the Peninsula, nor the autos acordados prescribed any special form for the
complaint to be presented to the justice of the peace or the gobernadorcillo. As to this point, it seems that the Compilation of the Laws
of Criminal Procedure of 1879 was applicable. Articles 405, 406, and 412 read: "ART. 405. The complaint made in writing must be signed
by the complainant, and if he cannot do so, by some other person at his request. The authority or official who receives it shall rubricate
and seal every page in the presence of the person who presents it, which also he may do himself or through another person at his
request.

"ART. 406. When the complaint is oral, it shall be reduced to writing by the authority or official who receives it, wherein, in the form of
a declaration, shall be set forth such information as the complainant may have regarding the act complained of and the circumstances
thereof, and both shall sign it at the bottom. If the complainant cannot sign his name, some other person shall do so at his request."
virt ua1aw library
cralaw

"ART. 412. Criminal cases that are not instituted by the Government must begin with a complaint." cral aw virt ua1aw library

The oral trial referred to in Rule 2 was held within three days next following the date when the justice of the peace or the gobernadorcillo
received information that the offense had been committed (Rule 4), the procedure being that provided for in Rule 9, which reads: "The
trial shall be public, beginning with the reading of the complaint, if any there be, followed by the examination of the witnesses summoned
and the introduction of such other evidence as the complainant, accuser, and public prosecutor, if he take part, may request and the
justice of the peace or the gobernadorcillo may regard as pertinent. Immediately thereafter the accused shall be given a hearing, the
witnesses who appear in his defense shall be examined, and such other evidence as the justice or the gobernadorcillo may declare to be
admissible shall be adduced. The parties shall forthwith make such pleas as they think expedient in support of their respective
contentions, the first to speak being the public prosecutor, if he take part, then the private complainant, and finally the accused.

"The representative of the public prosecutor shall attend the trial for misdemeanors, whenever he is cited thereto, in accordance with
Rule 2." cral aw virt ua1aw library
A record of the trial was made, wherein the whole procedure was clearly and succinctly set forth, and signed by all the parties
participating in the trial. (Rule 11.)

After trial and rendition of judgment, either of the parties could appeal to the Court of First Instance within the first day next following
that on which notice of the rendition of judgment was served. The appeal suspended the judgment. After the appeal had been allowed,
the justice of the peace or the gobernadorcillo remitted to the Court of First Instance the original record and cited the parties to appear
within the period of five days before the appellate court. This time could be extended, if the circumstances of the case required. (Rule
14.) If the appellant appealed, a day was fixed for the trial; but if he did not appear, the appeal was dismissed. (Rule 15.) Rule 16
provides the procedure for the trial in the second instance. This rule reads: "The hearing at the trial shall be public, and all the
proceedings in the case shall be read therein; then the parties or their attorneys may speak in their turn, and thereafter the judgment
shall be pronounced and communicated to them.

"A record of the trial shall be drawn up in the same manner as fixed by Rule 11." cral aw virt ua1aw library

Rule 17 reads: "In this second instance no evidence may be admitted other than that which, offered in the first instance, was not taken
for reasons independent of the will of the parties who had offered it." cral aw virt ua1aw library

Rule 19 provides: "The judgment of the Court of First Instance will be executory, and there will be no recourse from the same except that
of responsibility before the audiencia del territorio." cralaw virtua1 aw library

The provisions of General Orders No. 58 pertinent to the question under consideration, are as follows: jgc:chanrobl es.com.p h

"SEC. 43. From all final judgments of the Courts of First Instance or courts of similar jurisdiction, and in all cases in which the law now
provides for appeals from said courts an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court as hereinafter prescribed. Appeals shall also lie from
the final judgments of justices of the peace in criminal cases to the courts of the next superior grade, and the decisions of the latter
thereon shall be final and conclusive except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute, wherein appeal may be made
to the Supreme Court." cral aw virtu a1aw library

"SEC. 54. All cases appealed from a justice’s court shall be tried in all respects anew in the court to which the same are appealed; but
on the hearing of such appeals it shall not be necessary, unless the appeal shall involve the constitutionality or legality of a statute, that
a written record of the proceedings be kept; but shall be sufficient if the appellate court keeps a docket of the proceedings in the form
prescribed in the next preceding section." cral aw virtu a1aw library

Section 43 has been amended by section 34 of Act No. 1627 so as to read as follows: jgc:chan robl es.com .ph

"From all final judgments of the Court of First Instance or courts of similar jurisdiction, and in all cases in which the law now provides for
appeals from said courts, an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court as hereinafter prescribed. The convicted party may appeal from
any final judgment of a justice of the peace in a criminal cause to the Court of First Instance by filing a notice of appeal with such justice
within fifteen days after the entry of judgment. Upon such notice being so filed, the justice shall forward to the Court of First Instance
all original papers and a transcript of all docket entries in the cause, and the provincial fiscal shall thereupon take charge of the cause
in behalf of the prosecution. The judgment of the Court of First Instance in such appeals shall be final and conclusive, except in cases
involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute or the constitutionality of a municipal or township ordinance." cral aw virt ua1aw library

In view of the fact that this court took the view, prior to the passage of Act No. 1627, that the military governor and the framers of
General Orders No. 58 intended by the use of the word "statute" found in section 43 (supra) to include "ordinances," the amendment of
this section by section 34 of that Act does not affect the issue in the instant case. The original section provided that "an appeal may be
made to the Supreme Court in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute," and the section, as amended, authorizes
appeals to the Supreme Court in the same class of cases.

It is urged that as the civil-law term "appeal" is used in section 43 (supra), we must apply the same rule of construction that the courts
in England and the United States have ,almost uniformly applied to the same term and thus derive an unqualified review of both the law
and the facts. This doubtless would be a correct position in some jurisdictions in the American Union, as there the technical civil-law
meaning of the term "appeal" is followed. The reason for so doing is set forth in the case of Nashville Ry. & Light Co. v. Bunn (168 Fed.
Rep., 862), wherein the court said: jgc:chan robl es.com .ph

"The distinction between a ’writ of error,’ which brings up the record in an action of law for a review of questions of law only, and
an ’appeal,’ which involves a rehearing upon both the facts and the law, is vital. These remedies have their origin and functions in the
inherent difference between courts of law and courts of equity, differences which are recognized in the Constitution of the United States
and the laws of Congress. The ’writ of error’ is a common law writ, and searches the record for errors of law in the final judgment of a
common-law court. If error is found, the judgment awards a venire facias de novo. The ’appeal’ is a procedure which comes to us from
the civil law along with the fundamentals which go to make up the jurisprudence of a court of equity. Its office is to remove the entire
cause, and it subjects the transcript to a scrutiny of fact and law and is in substance a new trial." cral aw virt ua1aw library

Under the system of procedure which obtains in the Philippine Islands, both legal and equitable relief is dispensed in the same tribunal.
We have no courts of law and courts of equity as they are known and distinguished in England and the United States. All cases (law and
equity) are presented and tried in the same manner, including their final disposition in the Supreme Court. Therefore, the word "appeal,"
as used in section 43 (supra), does not necessarily imply the removal of the cause from one tribunal to another in its entirety, subjecting
the facts, as well as the law, to a review or a retrial, but it is to be interpreted by the ordinary rules of construction.

The intention of the framers of General Orders No. 58 i8 the law. In order to ascertain that intention the provisions of the order must be
construed in the light of existing law and the circumstances at the time of its promulgation.

At the time General Orders No. 58 went into effect, criminal cases originating in Courts of First Instance came to the audiencia in their
entirety, subjecting both the law and the facts to a review or retrial. But the audiencia, or Philippine Supreme Court, could not review the
judgment of a Court of First Instance in any case tried on appeal from courts of justices of the peace wherein the latter courts had
jurisdiction. Such judgments were final and conclusive. The aggrieved party could go no further with the case. The only recourse he had
was that mentioned in Rule 19 (supra). The penalties for violations of the provisions of Book 3 of the Penal Code over which justices of
the peace then had jurisdiction were generally arreto or arresto menor and small fines. This was the law in force at the time section 43
(supra) was framed and these were the conditions confronting the framers of that section at that time. What changes did the section
make?

Section 43 authorizes appeals to the Supreme Court from all final judgments of Courts of First Instance "and in all cases in which the law
now provides for appeals from said courts." This part of the section is limited to judgments rendered in criminal cases originating in
Courts of First Instance. This is necessarily true because the latter part of the section makes the decisions of the "courts of next superior
grade (which were Courts of First Instance) rendered in cases appealed from justices’ courts final and conclusive, except in cases
involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute." The result is that the former procedure was amended by section 43 so as to also
authorize appeals to the Supreme Court in the cases mentioned in the latter part thereof when the validity or constitutionality of a statute
was drawn in question. To this extent only was the former procedural law changed in so far as, the question at issue is concerned. Among
the reasons which induced the lawmakers to make this change was the fact that the jurisdiction of justices of the peace was "extended
to all offenses which the Penal Code designates as punishable by arresto mayor in all of its grades." (Sec. 108.)

If we had found the ordinance attacked in the case at bar to be illegal and unconstitutional, the judgment appealed from would
necessarily have to be set aside and defendants would have no interest in presenting to us the evidence taken at the trial. But we have
maintained the legality of that ordinance, and in so doing have we exhausted our powers and reached the limit of our inquiry? Section
43 does not expressly so limit our power. Neither does it expressly authorize us to review the testimony touching the guilt or innocence
of the defendants.

The distinction between the illegality of a penalty imposed by a municipal corporation and the correctness of that imposed by a justice
of the peace under a municipal ordinance, and between the illegality of the ordinance and that of the proceedings or actions taken under
it, is plain and broad. An ordinance may, from the standpoint of the regularity of all the proceedings leading up to and inclusive of its
enactment, be absolutely faultless and yet the ultimate act done or enacted may be inherently or intrinsically illegal or unconstitutional.
On the other hand, the latter may be perfectly unassailable and yet the ordinance be illegal or unconstitutional by reason of some fact
or circumstance connected with its passage. It may, for instance, have been presented in a wrong manner, at a wrong time, or not voted
for as directed by law. It is to facts of this class or character that section 43 refers when it says "the latter thereon shall be final and
conclusive except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute." cral aw virt ua1aw library

Such appears to be the meaning and intention manifested from the provisions of the latter part of section 43, already quoted, especially
when they are considered in the light of the former practice above indicated. Under that practice no appeals whatever were allowed to
the Supreme Court from judgments of Courts of First Instance in cases originating in justices’ courts. We must assume that the framers
of section 43 had knowledge of this practice and its effects. The framers desired to amend this practice to the extent only of providing
a way by which statutory questions, which might arise in these cases, could be reviewed by the Supreme Court. This object could be very
imperfectly obtained, if, when the court assumed jurisdiction of such a case, it would not only determine the statutory questions, but also
inquire into and determine every other question raised during the progress of the trial. In effect, this would entirely destroy the former
practice, because it would render it possible to bring every case here in its entirety. All that would be necessary would be to raise some
statutory question, whether material to the decision of the case or not, and the right of appeal and reexamination of the whole case
would be assured. Clearly, no such result was intended, nor is it manifest from the language employed in section 43. But it is urged that
our ruling in this matter "involves the legal absurdity of disjoining a single case and turning over one fragment to one court and another
parcel to another court." (Elliott on Appellate Procedure, sec. 17.) In this section the author is speaking of appellate jurisdiction where
the distinction between law and equity is rigidly maintained. He says: "Where a court of equity retains jurisdiction for one purpose, it will
retain it for all purposes." The same author recognizes a difference in the two systems of appellate jurisdiction — that is, the one where
the distinction between law and equity is maintained and, the other, where the two are blended. (Section 24.) In this last section the
author says: "In some respects an appeal under the code system may be less comprehensive in its scope than an appeal under the old
system," citing Judge Curtis, wherein he said that "it is evident that an appeal under the code system does not necessarily bring up the
entire case." In view of the fact that the code system prevails in the Philippine Islands, blending legal and equitable rights and providing
for one remedial system, our holding in the instant case is not in conflict with Elliot on Appellate Procedure.

It is also urged that the rule announced in the case of Loeb v. . Columbia Township Trustees (179 U. S., 472), and followed in the late
case of Boise Artesian Hot and Cold Water Co., Ltd. v. Boise City (230 U. S., 84), is directly opposed to our holding in the case under
consideration. These two cases went to the Supreme Court of the United States on writs of error directly from the circuit courts in
accordance with the provisions of section 5 of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891. This section provides "that appeals or writs of error may
be taken from the district courts, or from the existing circuit courts, direct to the Supreme Court in the following cases: . . ." Here
Congress maintains the distinction between "appeals" and "writs of error." In each case above cited the Supreme Court of the United
States held that it not only had jurisdiction to review the constitutional questions, but also every other question properly arising. The
court then proceeded to review all legal questions in those cases and not questions of fact, for the reason that the cases were before the
court on writs of error. Even granting that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction under the Act above mentioned to review both questions
of law and fact in cases appealed to that court, such holding would not be antagonistic to our views in the instant case for the reason that
our power to review the facts touching the guilt or innocence of the defendants must be found in section 43 of General Orders No. 58.
Our view is, as above indicated, that the framers of that section did not intend to confer upon this court that power. And all must admit
that the military governor at the time he promulgated General Orders No. 58 had the power to limit or restrict the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to statutory questions in cases of the character of the one under consideration.

Our ruling in the case at bar is fully supported by the adjudicated cases of this Supreme Court.

In the case of Trinidad v. Sweeney (4 Phil. Rep., 531), the court said: "Upon the facts stated in the complaint the plaintiff is entitled to
prosecute an appeal to this court; but upon such appeal the only question to be considered will be that of the validity or invalidity of the
ordinance. We cannot review the evidence nor pass upon any other question of law which may appear in the record." cral aw virtu a1aw library

In United States v. Trinidad (7 Phil. Rep., 325), the defendant was convicted in the municipal court of the city of Manila for violating a
municipal ordinance. He appealed to the Court of First Instance, where he was again convicted. An appeal was allowed to the Supreme
Court on the ground that the constitutionality or validity of the ordinance was drawn in question. On appeal the appellant insisted, among
other things, that the trial court erred in deciding the case without first consulting with the two assessors. This court held the ordinance
valid and, after quoting with approval the language used in the case of Trinidad v. Sweeney (supra), said: "In cases where the appeal
involves the constitutionality or validity of a statute, the disagreement of the assessors with the judgment of the Court of First Instance
on appeal does not authorize this court to review the evidence, but its decision shall be confined only to the question of the validity of
the Act or statute in question, as occurs in the present case." cral aw virt ua1aw library

In the case of The United States v. Espiritusanto (23 Phil. Rep., 610), we examined the facts touching the due enactment of the
ordinance. After so doing, the ordinance was held valid, but the facts touching the guilt or innocence of the appellant were not gone into.

In United States v. Ten Yu (24 Phil. Rep., 1), the court used this language at page 12: "While we have discussed at length each of the
assignments of error made by the appellants, nevertheless, the only question, in fact, presented by the appeal under the law, in the first
instance, is whether or not the ordinance under which the defendants were sentenced is legal. Having concluded that said ordinance is
legal and within the express powers of the Municipal Board to enact, the appeal must be dismissed, with costs in this instance against
the appellants in equal parts."cral aw virt ua1aw library

In United States v. Abendan (24 Phil. Rep., 165), the court, after quoting the testimony of a sanitary inspector and after holding the
ordinance valid, said: "The evidence in the case, which is undisputed, is sufficient, in our judgment, to warrant the order complained of.
It does not appear therefrom, the defendant himself having introduced substantially no proof in the case, that he was treated differently
from other persons in that locality, or that he was required to do a thing that the others had not been required to do, or that he had in
any way been discriminated against in the application of this ordinance to the facts of his case, or that its application was oppressive or
unreasonable in this particular instance.

"The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs." cral aw virt ua1aw library

Considering this language, together with that used in the opinion wherein the court said, "The sole question raised on this appeal is that
presented by the claim of the appellant that the ordinance in question is unreasonable and oppressive," it is clear that the court did not
intend to hold that it had authority to examine into the question of the guilt or innocence of the Appellant.

In United States v. Co Chee (R. G. No. 8269, not reported) the appellants were convicted of a violation of Ordinance No. 152 of the city
of Manila and, having drawn in question the validity of that ordinance, an appeal was allowed to this court. In disposing of this case the
court said: "Precisely this question was presented in the case of the United States v. Ten Yu (24 Phil. Rep., 1), just decided by this court,
in which we held that said Ordinance No. 152 of the city of Manila was valid and constitutional. That case is on all fours with the present
one, and the judgment of conviction of the Court of First Instance is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants, on the authority
of that case."cralaw virt ua1aw library

No attempt was made to examine or pass upon the testimony touching the guilt or innocence of the appellants.

In United States v. Tiu Un (R. G., No. 7804); United States v. Gaw Kee (R. G., No. 7816); United States v. Lim Cui (R. G., No. 7815);
United States v. See Kea (R. G., No. 7828); United States v. Go Tin (R. G., No. 7481); United States v. Sia Kim (R. G., No. 7716); United
States v. Lim Baey (R. G., No. 7915); United States v. Li Tia (R. G., No. 7826); and United States v. Tam Bak (R. G., No. 7814), not
reported, the appellants were convicted for a violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 152 of the city of Manila and, having drawn in question
the validity of that ordinance, appeals were allowed to this court. This court, upon the authority of the United States v. Ten Yu (supra),
dismissed the appeals and directed the records to be returned to the court below for execution of the sentences.

Other cases might be cited, but we think the above are sufficient to show that we have followed in the instant case the uniform holding
of this court for more than ten years. In fact, the court has not, since its organization, held in any case that it has the power to review
the facts touching the guilt of an accused person in cases of the character of the one under consideration.

Some discussion has arisen in regard to the language we should use in the final disposition of cases wherein the statute or ordinance has
been upheld. Sometimes we say, "The judgment is affirmed," and at other times we have said "the appeal is dismissed," etc. The result
is the same and it is of little importance which expression we use. But, as the case comes to us on appeal for the purpose of testing the
legality of the statute or ordinance upon which the judgment rests and as the judgment cannot be executed without the sanction of this
court, it is perfectly legal to "affirm" or "reverse" the judgment as the case may be.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the defendants. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ARAULLO, J., concurring: chanrob1es virt ual 1aw library

I agree to the judgment contained in the foregoing, for the reason that this question has already been settled by former decisions of this
court.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.

Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.

ELLIOTT, J.:

The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by
section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the judgment entered thereon appealed to this court, where under proper
assignments of error he contends: (1) that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court; (2) that under the evidence the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3) that Act
No. 55 as amended is in violation of certain provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and void as applied to
the facts of this case; and (4) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.

The information alleges:

That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, the said H. N. Bull was then and there master of
a steam sailing vessel known as the steamship Standard, which vessel was then and there engaged in carrying and
transporting cattle, carabaos, and other animals from a foreign port and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that the
said accused H. N. Bull, while master of said vessel, as aforesaid, on or about the 2d day of December, 1908, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the port and city of Manila, aboard said
vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and carabaos,
without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary
suffering to the said animals, in this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull, master, as aforesaid, did then and there fail to
provide stalls for said animals so in transit and suitable means for trying and securing said animals in a proper
manner, and did then and there cause some of said animals to be tied by means of rings passed through their noses,
and allow and permit others to be transported loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel without being tied or
secured in stalls, and all without bedding; that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide
suitable means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said animals were cruelly torn, and
many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and
killed.

All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission.

Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that —

The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other
animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine
Islands, shall carry with them, upon the vessels carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for
the suitable sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage from the port
of shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided with adequate forage and fresh
water at least once in every twenty-four hours from the time that the animals are embarked to the time of their final
debarkation.

By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended by adding to section 1 thereof the following:

The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other
animals from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine
Islands, shall provide suitable means for securing such animals while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and
unnecessary suffering to the animals, and suitable and proper facilities for loading and unloading cattle or other
animals upon or from vessels upon which they are transported, without cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is hereby
made unlawful to load or unload cattle upon or from vessels by swinging them over the side by means of ropes or
chains attached to the thorns.

Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that —

Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who knowingly and willfully fails to comply with the
provisions of section one, shall, for every such failure, be liable to pay a penalty of not less that one hundred dollars
nor more that five hundred dollars, United States money, for each offense. Prosecution under this Act may be
instituted in any Court of First Instance or any provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals
are disembarked.

1. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not state that the court was sitting at a port where
the cattle were disembarked, or that the offense was committed on board a vessel registered and licensed under the
laws of the Philippine Islands.

Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of First Instance or any provost court
organized in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked, and there is nothing inconsistent therewith
in Act No. 136, which provides generally for the organization of the courts of the Philippine Islands. Act No. 400
merely extends the general jurisdiction of the courts over certain offenses committed on the high seas, or beyond the
jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the waters of the Philippine Islands on board a ship or water craft of any
kind registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with the laws thereof. (U.S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil.
Rep., 614.) This jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province into which such ship or
water upon which the offense or crime was committed shall come after the commission thereof. Had this offense
been committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine registry, there could have been no doubt of the Jurisdiction of the
court, because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is in accordance with well recognized and established public law.
But the Standard was a Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the Philippine
Islands under the laws thereof. We have then the question whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this
character, committed on board a foreign ship by the master thereof, when the neglect and omission which constitutes
the offense continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of the United States. No court of the
Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters
of any other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the
entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton,
Int. Law (Dana ed.), p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sec 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and
her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject through the proper political agency.
This offense was committed within territorial waters. From the line which determines these waters the Standard must
have traveled at least 25 miles before she came to anchor. During that part of her voyage the violation of the statue
continued, and as far as the jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may have
existed while the vessel was on the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at the port of departure in
Formosa, was a continuing one, and every element necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage across the
territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was done within American waters, and the court therefore had
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the offense and the person of the offender.

The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, but the objection to the jurisdiction
raises the further question whether that jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the nationality of the ship. Every. Every
state has complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters. According to strict legal right, even public vessels
may not enter the ports of a friendly power without permission, but it is now conceded that in the absence of a
prohibition such ports are considered as open to the public ship of all friendly powers. The exemption of such vessels
from local jurisdiction while within such waters was not established until within comparatively recent times. In 1794,
Attorney-General Bradford, and in 1796 Attorney-General Lee, rendered opinions to the effect that "the laws of
nations invest the commander of a foreign ship of war with no exemption from the jurisdiction of the country into
which he comes." (1, Op. U.S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.) This theory was also supported by Lord Stowell in an opinion
given by him to the British Government as late as 1820. In the leading case of the Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden
(7 Cranch (U.S.), 116, 144), Chief Justice Marshall said that the implied license under which such vessels enter a
friendly port may reasonably be construed as "containing exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign within
whose territory she claims the rights of hospitality." The principle was accepted by the Geneva Arbitration Tribunal,
which announced that "the priviledge of exterritoriality accorded to vessels of war has been admitted in the law of
nations; not as an absolute right, but solely as a proceeding founded on the principle of courtesy and mutual
deference between nations."
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256; Ortolan, Dip de la Mer,
2. C.X.)

Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and go freely. Local official exercise but little
control over their actions, and offenses committed by their crew are justiciable by their own officers acting under the
laws to which they primarily owe allegiance. This limitation upon the general principle of territorial sovereignty is
based entirely upon comity and convenience, and finds its justification in the fact that experience shows that such
vessels are generally careful to respect local laws and regulation which are essential to the health, order, and
well-being of the port. But comity and convenience does not require the extension of the same degree of exemption
to merchant vessels. There are two well-defined theories as to extent of the immunities ordinarily granted to them,
According to the French theory and practice, matters happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern the
tranquillity of the port or persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the court of the country to which the
vessel belongs. The French courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board French
merchant vessels in foreign ports by one member of the crew against another. (See Bonfils, Le Droit Int. (quat. ed.),
secs. 624-628; Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp. 338, 339; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, tit. 1, p. 292; Masse, Droit Int.,
tome 2, p. 63.) Such jurisdiction has never been admitted or claim by Great Britain as a right, although she has
frequently conceded it by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's ed.), vol. 1, 231; British Territorial Waters Act, 1878.)
Writers who consider exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory have sought to restrict local jurisdiction, but Hall, who
is doubtless the leading English authority, says that —
It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality of merchant vessels that so soon as the latter
enter the ports of a foreign state they become subject to the local jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of the
country are touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.)

The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is subject
to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or through treaty
arrangements consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, Int. Law
Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean Gregory, Mich. Law Review, Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of
the Exchange, said that —

When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of trade, in would be obviously in convinient and dangerous to society
and would subject the laws to continual infraction and the government to degradation if such individual merchants did
not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amendable to the jurisdiction of the country.

The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant vessels of one country visiting the ports
of another for the purpose of trade, subject themselves to the laws which govern the ports they visit, so long as they
remain; and this as well in war as in peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S.,
520-525.)

Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed by article 13 of the treaty of commerce and
navigation between Sweden and Norway and the United States, of July 4, 1827, which concedes to the consul,
vice-consuls, or consular agents of each country "The right to sit as judges and arbitrators in such differences as may
arise between the captains and crews of the vessels belonging to the nation whose interests are committed to their
charge, without the interference of the local authorities, unless the conduct of the crews or of the captains should
disturb the order or tranquillity of the country." (Comp. of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 754.) This exception applies to
controversies between the members of the ship's company, and particularly to disputes regarding wages. (2 Moore,
Int. Law Dig., sec. 206, p. 318; Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass., 188.) The order and tranquillity of the country are
affected by many events which do not amount to a riot or general public disturbance. Thus an assault by one member
of the crew upon another, committed upon the ship, of which the public may have no knowledge whatever, is not by
this treaty withdrawn from the cognizance of the local authorities.

In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and Carolina engaged in a "quarrel" on board the vessel in the port
of Galveston, Texas. They were prosecuted before a justice of the peace, but the United States district attorney was
instructed by the Government to take the necessary steps to have the proceedings dismissed, and the aid of the
governor of Texas was invoked with the view to "guard against a repetition of similar proceedings." (Mr. Fish,
Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish and Norwegian charged, May 16, 1876; Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not
appear that this "quarrel" was of such a nature as to amount to a breach of the criminal laws of Texas, but when in
1879 the mate for the Norwegian bark Livingston was prosecuted in the courts of Philadelphia County for an assault
and battery committed on board the ship while lying in the port of Philadelphia, it was held that there was nothing in
the treaty which deprived the local courts of jurisdiction. (Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.)
Representations were made through diplomatic channels to the State Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr. Evarts,
Secretary of State, wrote to Count Lewenhaupt, the Swedish and Norwegian minister, as follows:

I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful consideration in connection with the views and
suggestion of your note and the provisions of the thirteenth article of the treaty of 1827 between the United States
and Sweden and Norway. The stipulations contained in the last clause of that article . . . are those under which it is
contended by you that jurisdiction is conferred on the consular officers, not only in regard to such differences of a civil
nature growing out of the contract of engagement of the seamen, but also as to disposing of controversies resulting
from personal violence involving offense for which the party may be held amenable under the local criminal law.

This Government does not view the article in question as susceptible of such broad interpretation. The jurisdiction
conferred upon the consuls is conceived to be limited to their right to sit as judges or abitrators in such differences as
may arise between captains and crews of the vessels, where such differences do not involve on the part of the
captain or crew a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country. When, however, a complaint is made to a local
magistrate, either by the captain or one or more of the crew of the vessel, involving the disturbance of the order or
tranquillity of the country, it is competent for such magistrate to take cognizance of the matter in furtherance of the
local laws, and under such circumstances in the United States it becomes a public duty which the judge or magistrate
is not at liberty voluntarily to forego. In all such cases it must necessarily be left to the local judicial authorities
whether the procedure shall take place in the United States or in Sweden to determine if in fact there had been such
disturbance of the local order and tranquillity, and if the complaint is supported by such proof as results in the
conviction of the party accused, to visit upon the offenders such punishment as may be defined against the offense
by the municipal law of the place." (Moore, Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)

The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over offenses committed on board a merchant
vessel by one member of the crew against another which amount to a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the
country, and a fair and reasonable construction of the language requires un to hold that any violation of criminal laws
disturbs the order or traquillity of the country. The offense with which the appellant is charged had nothing to so with
any difference between the captain and the crew. It was a violation by the master of the criminal law of the country
into whose port he came. We thus find that neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place of the
commission of the offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of public law, are the court of the
Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction over the offense charged in the information in this case.

It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not allege that the animals were disembarked at
the port of Manila, an allegation which it is claimed is essential to the jurisdiction of the court sitting at that port. To
hold with the appellant upon this issue would be to construe the language of the complaint very strictly against the
Government. The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to constitute the completed offense, and a
reasonable construction of the language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into which
the animals are bought. They are then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact of their
disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be different if the disembarkation of the
animals constituted a constitutional element in the offense, but it does not.

It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it fails to allege that the
defendant knowingly and willfully failed to provide suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to
avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The allegation of the complaint that the act was committed willfully includes
the allegation that it was committed knowingly. As said in Woodhouse vs. Rio Grande R.R. Company (67 Texas, 416),
"the word 'willfully' carries the idea, when used in connection with an act forbidden by law, that the act must be done
knowingly or intentionally; that, with knowledge, the will consented to, designed, and directed the act." So in
Wong vs. City of Astoria (13 Oregon, 538), it was said: "The first one is that the complaint did not show, in the words
of the ordinance, that the appellant 'knowingly' did the act complained of. This point, I think, was fully answered by the
respondent's counsel — that the words 'willfully' and 'knowingly' conveyed the same meaning. To 'willfully' do an act
implies that it was done by design — done for a certain purpose; and I think that it would necessarily follow that it was
'knowingly' done." To the same effect is Johnson vs. The People (94 Ill., 505), which seems to be on all fours with the
present case.

The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly done, but his defense rests upon the
assertion that "according to his experience, the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is
preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals." It was conclusively proven that what was done
was done knowingly and intentionally.

In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58, paragraph 3, it is only necessary to state the act or
omission complained of as constituting a crime or public offense in ordinary and concise language, without
repitition. It need not necessarily be in the words of the statute, but it must be in such form as to enable a person of
common understanding to know what is intended and the court to pronounce judgment according to right. A
complaint which complies with this requirement is good. (U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep., 556.)

The Act, which is in the English language, impose upon the master of a vessel the duty to "provide suitable means for
securing such animals while in transit, so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the animals." The
allegation of the complaint as it reads in English is that the defendant willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carried the
cattle "without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and
unnecessary suffering to the said animals in this . . . that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused
to provide suitable means for securing said animals were cruelty torn, and many of said animals were tossed about
upon the decks and hold of said vessels, and cruelty wounded, bruised, and killed."

The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information does not charge him with failure to
provide "sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words used are "medios suficientes" and "medios adecuados." In
view of the fact that the original complaint was prepared in English, and that the word "suitable" is translatable by the
words "adecuado," "suficiente," and "conveniente," according to the context and circumstances, we determine this
point against the appellant, particularly in view of the fact that the objection was not made in the court below, and that
the evidence clearly shows a failure to provide "suitable means for the protection of the animals."

2. The appellant's arguments against the constitutionality of Act No. 55 and the amendment thereto seems to rest
upon a fundamentally erroneous conception of the constitutional law of these Islands. The statute penalizes acts and
ommissions incidental to the transportation of live stock between foreign ports and ports of the Philippine Islands, and
had a similar statute regulating commerce with its ports been enacted by the legislature of one of the States of the
Union, it would doubtless have been in violation of Article I, section 3, of the Constitution of the United States.
(Stubbs vs. People (Colo.), 11 L. R. A., N. S., 1071.)

But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the United States is controlled by constitutional principles
different from those which apply to States of the Union. The importance of the question thus presented requires a
statement of the principles which govern those relations, and consideration of the nature and extent of the legislative
power of the Philippine Commission and the Legislature of the Philippines. After much discussion and considerable
diversity of opinion certain applicable constitutional doctrines are established.

The Constitution confers upon the United States the express power to make war and treaties, and it has the power
possessed by all nations to acquire territory by conquest or treaty. Territory thus acquired belongs to the United
States, and to guard against the possibility of the power of Congress to provide for its government being questioned,
the framers of the Constitution provided in express terms that Congress should have the power "to dispose of and
make all needful rules and regulations respecting territory and other property belonging to the United States." (Art. IV,
sec. 3, par. 3.) Upon the acquisition of the territory by the United States, and until it is formally incorporated into the
Union, the duty of providing a government therefor devolves upon Congress. It may govern the territory by its direct
acts, or it may create a local government, and delegate thereto the ordinary powers required for local government.
(Binns vs. U. S., 194 U. S., 486.) This has been the usual procedure. Congress has provided such governments for
territories which were within the Union, and for newly acquired territory not yet incorporated therein. It has been
customary to organize a government with the ordinary separation of powers into executive, legislative, and judicial,
and to prescribe in an organic act certain general conditions in accordance with which the local government should
act. The organic act thus became the constitution of the government of the territory which had not been formally
incorporated into the Union, and the validity of legislation enacted by the local legislature was determined by its
conformity with the requirements of such organic act. (National Bank vs. Yankton, 11 Otto (U. S.), 129.) To the
legislative body of the local government Congress has delegated that portion of legislative power which in its wisdom
it deemed necessary for the government of the territory, reserving, however, the right to annul the action of the local
legislature and itself legislate directly for the territory. This power has been exercised during the entire period of the
history of the United States. The right of Congress to delegate such legislative power can no longer be seriously
questioned. (Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; U. S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370, 385.)

The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force operate within such territory, although the liberality of
Congress in legislating the Constitution into contiguous territory tended to create an impression upon the minds of
many people that it went there by its own force. (Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 289.) In legislating with reference to
this territory, the power of Congress is limited only by those prohibitions of the Constitution which go to the very root
of its power to act at all, irrespective of time or place. In all other respects it is plenary. (De Lima vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S.,
1; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 244; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197; Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138;
Rassmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S., 516.)

This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the whole history of the United States, and legislation
founded on the theory was enacted long prior to the acquisition of the present Insular possessions. Section 1891 of
the Revised Statutes of 1878 provides that "The Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not locally
inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within all the organized territories, and in every Territory hereafter
organized, as elsewhere within the United States." When Congress organized a civil government for the Philippines,
it expressly provided that this section of the Revised Statutes should not apply to the Philippine Islands. (Sec. 1, Act
of 1902.)

In providing for the government of the territory which was acquired by the United States as a result of the war with
Spain, the executive and legislative authorities have consistently proceeded in conformity with the principles above
state. The city of Manila was surrendered to the United States on August 13, 1898, and the military commander was
directed to hold the city, bay, and harbor, pending the conclusion of a peace which should determine the control,
disposition, and government of the Islands. The duty then devolved upon the American authorities to preserve peace
and protect person and property within the occupied territory. Provision therefor was made by proper orders, and on
August 26 General Merritt assumed the duties of military governor. The treaty of peace was signed December 10,
1898. On the 22d of December, 1898, the President announced that the destruction of the Spanish fleet and the
surrender of the city had practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of the Spanish
sovereignty therein, and that by the treaty of peace the future control, disposition, and government of the Islands had
been ceded to the United States. During the periods of strict military occupation, before the treaty of peace was
ratified, and the interim thereafter, until Congress acted (Santiago vs. Noueral, 214 U.S., 260), the territory was
governed under the military authority of the President as commander in chief. Long before Congress took any action,
the President organized a civil government which, however, had its legal justification, like the purely military
government which it gradually superseded, in the war power. The military power of the President embraced
legislative, executive personally, or through such military or civil agents as he chose to select. As stated by Secretary
Root in his report for 1901 —

The military power in exercise in a territory under military occupation includes executive, legislative, and judicial
authority. It not infrequently happens that in a single order of a military commander can be found the exercise of all
three of these different powers — the exercise of the legislative powers by provisions prescribing a rule of action; of
judicial power by determination of right; and the executive power by the enforcement of the rules prescribed and the
rights determined.

President McKinley desired to transform military into civil government as rapidly as conditions would permit. After full
investigation, the organization of civil government was initiated by the appointment of a commission to which civil
authority was to be gradually transferred. On September 1, 1900, the authority to exercise, subject to the approval of
the President. "that part of the military power of the President in the Philippine Islands which is legislative in its
character" was transferred from the military government to the Commission, to be exercised under such rules and
regulations as should be prescribed by the Secretary of War, until such time as complete civil government should be
established, or congress otherwise provided. The legislative power thus conferred upon the Commission was
declared to include "the making of rules and orders having the effect of law for the raising of revenue by taxes,
customs duties, and imposts; the appropriation and expenditure of public funds of the Islands; the establishment of
an educational system to secure an efficient civil service; the organization and establishment of courts; the
organization and establishment of municipal and departmental government, and all other matters of a civil nature
which the military governor is now competent to provide by rules or orders of a legislative character." This grant of
legislative power to the Commission was to be exercised in conformity with certain declared general principles, and
subject to certain specific restrictions for the protection of individual rights. The Commission were to bear in mind that
the government to be instituted was "not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the
happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Island, and the measures adopted should be made
to conforms to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the
accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government." The specific restrictions upon
legislative power were found in the declarations that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense; that excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted; that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy
for the same offense or be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; that the right to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall
exist except as a punishment for crime; that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed; that no law shall
be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and
petition the Government for a redress of grievances; that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed."

To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings being raised, the Spooner amendment to the Army
Appropriation Bill passed March 2, 1901, provided that "all military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the
Philippine Islands . . . shall until otherwise provided by Congress be vested in such person and persons, and shall be
exercised in such manner, as the President of the United States shall direct, for the establishment of civil government,
and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said Islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and
religion." Thereafter, on July 4, 1901, the authority, which had been exercised previously by the military governor,
was transferred to that official. The government thus created by virtue of the authority of the President as
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy continued to administer the affairs of the Islands under the direction of the
President until by the Act of July 1, 1902, Congress assumed control of the situation by the enactment of a law which,
in connection with the instructions of April 7, 1900, constitutes the organic law of the Philippine Islands.

The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substancial changes in the form of government which the President had erected.
Congress adopted the system which was in operation, and approved the action of the President in organizing the
government. Substantially all the limitations which had been imposed on the legislative power by the President's
instructions were included in the law, Congress thus extending to the Islands by legislative act nor the Constitution,
but all its provisions for the protection of the rights and privileges of individuals which were appropriate under the
conditions. The action of the President in creating the Commission with designated powers of government, in
creating the office of the Governor-General and Vice-Governor-General, and through the Commission establishing
certain executive departments, was expressly approved and ratified. Subsequently the action of the President in
imposing a tariff before and after the ratification of the treaty of peace was also ratified and approved by Congress.
(Act of March 8, 1902; Act of July 1, 1902; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370; Lincoln vs. U.S., 197 U.S., 419.) Until
otherwise provided by law the Islands were to continue to be governed "as thereby and herein provided." In the future
the enacting clause of all statutes should read "By authority of the United States" instead of "By the authority of the
President." In the course of time the legislative authority of the Commission in all parts of the Islands not inhabited by
Moros or non-Christian tribes was to be transferred to a legislature consisting of two houses — the Philippine
Commission and the Philippine Assembly. The government of the Islands was thus assumed by Congress under its
power to govern newly acquired territory not incorporated into the United States.

This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory, although its form and organization somewhat
resembles that of both. It stands outside of the constitutional relation which unites the States and Territories into the
Union. The authority for its creation and maintenance is derived from the Constitution of the United States, which,
however, operates on the President and Congress, and not directly on the Philippine Government. It is the creation of
the United States, acting through the President and Congress, both deriving power from the same source, but from
different parts thereof. For its powers and the limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines looked to the
orders of the President before Congress acted and the Acts of Congress after it assumed control. Its organic laws are
derived from the formally and legally expressed will of the President and Congress, instead of the popular sovereign
constituency which lies upon any subject relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress, and when it exercise
such power its act is from the viewpoint of the Philippines the legal equivalent of an amendment of a constitution in
the United States.

Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a complete governmental organism with
executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising the functions commonly assigned to such departments.
The separation of powers is as complete as in most governments. In neither Federal nor State governments is this
separation such as is implied in the abstract statement of the doctrine. For instance, in the Federal Government the
Senate exercises executive powers, and the President to some extent controls legislation through the veto power. In
a State the veto power enables him to exercise much control over legislation. The Governor-General, the head of the
executive department in the Philippine Government, is a member of the Philippine Commission, but as executive he
has no veto power. The President and Congress framed the government on the model with which Americans are
familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the protection of
individual rights and priviliges.

In instituting this form of government of intention must have been to adopt the general constitutional doctrined which
are inherent in the system. Hence, under it the Legislature must enact laws subject to the limitations of the organic
laws, as Congress must act under the national Constitution, and the States under the national and state constitutions.
The executive must execute such laws as are constitutionally enacted. The judiciary, as in all governments operating
under written constitutions, must determine the validity of legislative enactments, as well as the legality of all private
and official acts. In performing these functions it acts with the same independence as the Federal and State
judiciaries in the United States. Under no other constitutional theory could there be that government of laws and not
of men which is essential for the protection of rights under a free and orderly government.

Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of the Philippine Islands, it is apparent that the courts must
consider the question of the validity of an act of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, as a State
court considers an act of the State legislature. The Federal Government exercises such powers only as are expressly
or impliedly granted to it by the Constitution of the United States, while the States exercise all powers which have not
been granted to the central government. The former operates under grants, the latter subject to restrictions. The
validity of an Act of Congress depends upon whether the Constitution of the United States contains a grant of
express or implied authority to enact it. An act of a State legislature is valid unless the Federal or State constitution
expressly or impliedly prohibits its enaction. An Act of the legislative authority of the Philippines Government which
has not been expressly disapproved by Congress is valid unless its subject-matter has been covered by
congressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some provision of the organic laws.

The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in general terms subject to specific limitations.
The general grant is not alone of power to legislate on certain subjects, but to exercise the legislative power subject
to the restrictions stated. It is true that specific authority is conferred upon the Philippine Government relative to
certain subjects of legislation, and that Congress has itself legislated upon certain other subjects. These, however,
should be viewed simply as enactments on matters wherein Congress was fully informed and ready to act, and not as
implying any restriction upon the local legislative authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty. Gen. of U. S., April
16, 1908.)

The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts of legislation by the Government of the Philippine
tends strongly to confirm the view that for purposes of construction the Government of the Philippines should be
regarded as one of general instead of enumerated legislative powers. The situation was unusual. The new
government was to operate far from the source of its authority. To relieve Congress from the necessity of legislating
with reference to details, it was thought better to grant general legislative power to the new government, subject to
broad and easily understood prohibitions, and reserve to Congress the power to annul its acts if they met with
disapproval. It was therefore provided "that all laws passed by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be
reported to Congress, which hereby reserves the power and authority to annul the same." (Act of Congress, July 1,
1902, sec. 86.) This provision does not suspend the acts of the Legislature of the Philippines until approved by
Congress, or when approved, expressly or by acquiescence, make them the laws of Congress. They are valid acts of
the Government of the Philippine Islands until annulled. (Miners Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U. S.), 1.)

In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain whether the Legislature has been expressly or
implication forbidden to enact it. Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution of the United States operated only upon the
States of the Union. It has no application to the Government of the Philippine Islands. The power to regulate foreign
commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of its power to govern the territory belonging to the United States, it
may regulate foreign commerce with such territory. It may do this directly, or indirectly through a legislative body
created by it, to which its power in this respect if delegate. Congress has by direct legislation determined the duties
which shall be paid upon goods imported into the Philippines, and it has expressly authorized the Government of the
Philippines to provide for the needs of commerce by improving harbors and navigable waters. A few other specific
provisions relating to foreign commerce may be found in the Acts of Congress, but its general regulation is left to the
Government of the Philippines, subject to the reserved power of Congress to annul such legislation as does not meet
with its approval. The express limitations upon the power of the Commission and Legislature to legislate do not affect
the authority with respect to the regulation of commerce with foreign countries. Act No. 55 was enacted before
Congress took over the control of the Islands, and this act was amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooner
amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed. The military government, and the civil government instituted by the
President, had the power, whether it be called legislative or administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign
nations and the ports of the territory. (Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How. (U.S.), 164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall.
(U.S.), 73, 87.) This Act has remained in force since its enactment without annulment or other action by Congress,
and must be presumed to have met with its approval. We are therefore satisfied that the Commission had, and the
Legislature now has, full constitutional power to enact laws for the regulation of commerce between foreign countries
and the ports of the Philippine Islands, and that Act No. 55, as amended by Act No. 275, is valid.

3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the meaning of the Act can not be left to the judgment
of the master of the ship. It is a question which must be determined by the court from the evidence. On December 2,
1908, the defendant Bull brought into and disembarked in the port and city of Manila certain cattle, which came from
the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to
avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to said animals, contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The trial court found the following facts, all of which are fully sustained by the
evidence:

That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master of the Norwegian steamer known as the Standard, for a period
of six months or thereabouts prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, was engaged in the transportation of cattle and
carabaos from Chines and Japanese ports to and into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.
That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such master and captain as aforesaid, brought into the city
of Manila, aboard said ship, a large number of cattle, which ship was anchored, under the directions of the said
defendant, behind the breakwaters in front of the city of Manila, in Manila Bay, and within the jurisdiction of this court;
and that fifteen of said cattle then and there had broken legs and three others of said cattle were dead, having broken
legs; and also that said cattle were transported and carried upon said ship as aforesaid by the defendant, upon the
deck and in the hold of said ship, without suitable precaution and care for the transportation of said animals, and to
avoid danger and risk to their lives and security; and further that said cattle were so transported abroad said ship by
the defendant and brought into the said bay, and into the city of Manila, without any provisions being made whatever
upon said decks of said ship and in the hold thereof to maintain said cattle in a suitable condition and position for
such transportation.

That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport cattle abroad steamship coming into Manila Bay and
unloading in the city of Manila is by way of individual stalls for such cattle, providing partitions between the cattle and
supports at the front sides, and rear thereof, and cross-cleats upon the floor on which they stand and are transported,
of that in case of storms, which are common in this community at sea, such cattle may be able to stand without
slipping and pitching and falling, individually or collectively, and to avoid the production of panics and hazard to the
animals on account or cattle were transported in this case. Captain Summerville of the steamship Taming, a very
intelligent and experienced seaman, has testified, as a witness in behalf of the Government, and stated positively that
since the introduction in the ships with which he is acquainted of the stall system for the transportation of animals and
cattle he has suffered no loss whatever during the last year. The defendant has testified, as a witness in his own
behalf, that according to his experience the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is
preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals, but this theory of the case is not maintainable,
either by the proofs or common reason. It can not be urged with logic that, for instance, three hundred cattle supports
for the feet and without stalls or any other protection for them individually can safely and suitably carried in times of
storm upon the decks and in the holds of ships; such a theory is against the law of nature. One animal falling or
pitching, if he is untied or unprotected, might produce a serious panic and the wounding of half the animals upon the
ship if transported in the manner found in this case.

The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The sentence and judgment is affirmed. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

 [G.R. No. L-6201. April 20, 1954.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FELIPE A. LIVARA, Defendant-Appellant.

Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo for Appellee.

Marcelino Lontok for Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. JURISDICTION OF COURTS; CIVIL COURT AND COURTS-MARTIAL. — The civil courts and courts-martial have concurrent jurisdiction
over offenses committed by a member of the Armed Forces in violation of military law and the public law. The first court to take
cognizance of the case does so to the exclusion of the other.

2. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 217 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE. — The presumption provided for in article 217
of the Revised Penal Code is not unconstitutional. There is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing that the
presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting
what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence. "The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming
any public funds or property with which he is chargeable upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that
he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses."

DECISION

BENGZON, J.:

After the corresponding trial in the Court of First Instance of Romblon, Felipe A. Livara, was found guilty of malversation of public funds
and sentenced to imprisonment from four (4) years, two . (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to ten (10) years of prision
mayor, with perpetual special disqualification, to pay a fine of P5,000, to indemnify the government in the sum of P9,597, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. From this judgment he appealed on time. Because he assailed the
constitutionality of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, the expediente was forwarded to this Court.

Appellant was from January, 1947 to July 22, 1948, provincial disbursing officer of the Philippine Constabulary in Romblon. As finance
and accountable officer, he took charge of paying the salaries and subsistence of the PC officers and enlisted men of that region. On July
22,1948, he came to Manila carrying some money, and, having secured a Treasury Warrant from the finance officer at Camp Crame for
more than P8,000, he cashed the same in the Finance Building at Taft Avenue. In November, 1948, an examination of his accounts was
conducted by Major Emilio Baldia, Chief of the Cash Examination and Inspection Branch of the Finance Service, who found him with a net
shortage of P9,597 unaccounted for. Major Baldia submitted a report of his findings to the Adjutant General of the PC. Days afterwards,
a board of officers was created formally to investigate the appellant. That board found him accountable for P9,597, and recommended
his prosecution before the civil courts for malversation of public funds. An information for the crime of malversation of public funds was
consequently filed in the Court of First Instance of Romblon September 10, 1949.

Major Emilio Baldia, testified in the Romblon court that sometime in November 6, 1948, he examined the accountability of Lieutenant
Felipe A. Livara and found he had incurred a net shortage of P9,597; and that in answer to his question, appellant admitted his financial
liability but asserted he had lost the money in Manila on his way to North Harbor to board a vessel for Romblon.

Capt. Teofilo V. Dayao, Zone Finance Officer, testified that in the month of August, 1948, he was dispatched to Romblon to pay the
salaries and subsistence of the officers and enlisted men of the PC stationed in said province; that he inquired into the whereabouts of
Lt. Livara but was informed that he had left for Manila in July 23, 1948, to submit for approval the disbursement he had made and get
the return of the same from the PC headquarters; that finding the safe of the accused locked, he sealed it in the presence of Capt. Diaz
and Lt. Tañedo and brought it to Manila where it was opened in the presence of eleven officers including the appellant; and that no cash
was found in the safe.

Provincial Auditor Aproniano S. Celajes, last prosecution witness, declared that on July 16, 1948, he examined and verified the books of
account and money accountability of the appellant and found a balance of P14,984, represented by cash of P6,330.10, actually found on
hand and vouchers in the amount of P8,654.

The appellant Felipe A. Livara was the lone witness for the defense. He declared that on July 22, 1948, he came to Manila and submitted
his abstract to the Auditor of the PC; that a treasury warrant was issued to him in the amount of more than P8,000; that he proceeded
to the Finance Building at Taft Avenue and cashed the same; that while riding a public utility jeepney bound for the North Harbor to
embark on the S. S. Elena for Romblon, he lost his portfolio containing the said money plus about P1,000 more, and other public
documents. He swore to having made efforts to recover the portfolio but the jeepney was nowhere to be found.

There is no doubt about the shortage. It constitutes prima facie evidence that the accused made personal use of the money, unless he
gives a satisfactory explanation (Art. 217, Rev. Penal Code). His account of the loss of the portfolio was not believed by the board officers
that investigated him, and by the court below. It is really an incredible story. With about ten thousand pesos in it, the portfolio could not
have been forgotten for one moment by any passenger, especially a finance officer like the accused. The alleged loss was obviously a
ruse to conceal his defalcations. As a matter of fact, even before the Manila trip he was already in the red, as shown by the testimonies
of Lt. Bernabe Cadiz, commanding officer of the 83rd PC company and Lt. Damaso C. Quiao, adjutant, supply and finance officer, of
Romblon.

If the portfolio had actually been lost as recounted by appellant, he would not be responsible for the money. Yet he admitted his liability,
made efforts to pay it, even used for that purpose a false check payable to Colonel Selga of the Constabulary.

Counsel for the appellant contends that the Court of First Instance of Romblon had no jurisdiction over the case, arguing that the alleged
crime of malversation of public funds occurred during the incumbency of the accused as an officer of the Philippine Constabulary. Such
contention is without merit. The civil courts and courts-martial have concurrent jurisdiction over offenses committed by a member of the
Armed Forces in violation of military law and the public law. The first court to take cognizance of the case does so to the exclusion of the
other (Grafton v. U. S., 11 Phil., 776; Valdez v. Lucero, 42 Off. Gaz., No. 112835). The accused-appellant having been first tried and
convicted of the crime by the Court of First Instance of Romblon he cannot now claim that the criminal action should have been brought
before a court-martial.
The constitutionality of the last paragraph of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code is likewise assailed. It reads: jgc:chan robl es.com .ph

"The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any
duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses." cral aw virt ua1aw library

Defense counsel maintains the view that this provision is contrary to the constitutional directive that in criminal prosecutions the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven.

This contention deserves no merit, inasmuch as the validity of the said article has already been discussed and upheld in People v. Mingoa,
92 Phil., 856, wherein this court through Mr. Justice Reyes declared: "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law
providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human
conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence." cral aw virt ua1aw library

Wherefore, as this appellant is guilty of malversation of public funds and as the penalty imposed on him accords with the law, we hereby
affirm the judgment with costs against him. So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion and Diokno, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-246 March 27, 1946

SILVERIO VALDEZ, petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, and CELESTINO JIMENEZ, Provincial Warden of
Ilocos Sur, respondents.

Severino D. Dagdag for petitioner.

Respondent judge in his own behalf.
No appearance for respondent Warden.

JARANILLA, J.:

The above-entitled case came up to be regularly heard in this court by virtue of a petition filed by Silverio Valdez
praying that the judgment be rendered "(a) annulling the proceedings of the lower court, (b) declaring the respondent
judge without jurisdiction of the case, (c) commanding the respondent judge to desist from further proceeding in the
cause, (d) ordering the provincial warden, Celestino Jimenez, to discharge the defendant, Silverio Valdez, from jail,
(e) granting preliminary injunction enjoining the respondent judge from hearing the case on the merits pending
proceedings in the case, (f) assessing costs against the respondents, and (g) granting such other or further relief or
reliefs as may be just or equitable."

The undisputed facts are:

That Silverio Valdez was prosecuted for murder under an information filed by the provincial fiscal in the justice of the
peace court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, which information, in part, reads as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of January, 1945, in the barrio of San Julian, municipality of Bantay, province of Ilocos
Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Hon. Court, the above-named defendant, Silverio Valdez, with
intent to kill, and with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of one Juan Ponce, kill the latter with bolo, dagger
and other weapons and died instantly.

That said Silverio Valdez moved for the dismissal of the foregoing information in the justice of the peace court,
alleging that the fiscal had no authority to file it and that the court acquired no jurisdiction of the defendant, which
motion was denied by the justice of the peace on September 5, 1945; and that since that date accused has been
detained as a provincial prisoner in the provincial jail in Vigan, Ilocos Sur;

That on September 13, 1945, the provincial fiscal reproduced the said information in the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur; and that the defendant filed a motion to quash it on December 18, 1945, which motion was denied by the
court on December 20, 1945;

That on December 29, 1945, a petition for the reconsideration of the denial of the motion to quash was filed but was
also denied on January 7, 1946.

The main issue here is whether the civil courts have jurisdiction to take cognizance of and try the case for murder
filed against petitioner Silverio Valdez, as above stated, because, he alleges, he was not only a member of a
recognized guerrilla and hence a member of the United States armed forces in the Philippines, in North Luzon, but
was also later on absorbed into the Philippine Army and therefore, he claims, he should be tried by a general court
martial, which has jurisdiction over the crime charged and the person of the accused pursuant to article 93 of the
Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408).

Petitioner also contends that the whole of Ilocos Sur was at the time imputed in the information overrun by the enemy
and that any place of hiding of the guerrillas in the province was a military reservation for the safety of the Philippine
and American armed forces within the purview of the Articles of War.

During the oral argument of this case, we understood from counsel appearing for petitioner that neither the United
States Army nor the Philippine Army was claming precedence or priority in the trial of the herein petitioner, nor that
either was demanding that he be tried by a court martial. In fact, no allegation to that effect may be found in this
petition.

The petitioner relies mainly on the provision of article 93 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408) which
reads:
1. ART. 93. Murder. — Any person subject to military law who commits murder in time of war shall suffer death or
imprisonment for life, as a court-martial may direct.

He argues that pursuant to said article 93 of the Articles of War only a court martial can have jurisdiction to try his
case for murder, he being a person subject to military law and the crime having been committed in time of war.

Granting all the facts alleged by the petitioner and that he was a regular member of the guerrilla duly recognized by
the United States Army and granting further that his unit was incorporated into the United States Army, thus giving
him the standing of a regular member of the United States armed forces, and that he was subsequently incorporated
into the Philippine Army, we are of the opinion, nevertheless, that the civil courts of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines are not deprived of their jurisdiction over the petitioner herein, but have concurrent jurisdiction with the
military courts or general courts martial to try and take cognizance of the case of murder against the petitioner herein,
for the reason that said article 93 of the Articles of War is almost identical with the 92d Article of War of the United
States Army, and the latter has been interpreted by the courts to mean that even in time of war the civil courts are not
deprived of their jurisdiction over murder cases committed by persons subject to military law. Such was the holding in
Cadwell vs.. Parker (Ala., 1920; 40 Sup. Ct., 388; 252 U. S., 376; 64 Law. ed., 621):

That section 1564 of this Article (Art. 92), providing for punishment of murder or rape as the court-martial may direct,
but prohibiting trial by courts-martial in time of peace, section 1565 of this Article (Art. 93), providing for the
punishment of various other offenses as a court-martial may direct, and this section (Art. 74), requiring military
authorities to deliver accused persons to the civil authorities, except in time of war, do not give military courts
exclusive jurisdiction in time of war over offenses committed in violation of state laws by person in the military service,
and a state court has jurisdiction over such offenses. (Emphasis added.)

Identical doctrines holding that the civil courts have concurrent jurisdiction over cases of murder committed by
persons subject to military law were laid down in the following cases:

Articles of War enacted August 29, 1916, do not deprive the civil courts, either in time of peace or war, of the
concurrent jurisdiction previously vested in them over crimes against either federal or state law, committed within the
United States, by persons subject to military law. (United States vs. Hirsch [D.C., N.Y., 1918], 254 F., 109; emphasis
added.)

Prisoners of war are amenable for offenses malum in se and may be tried by the ordinary tribunals in the country in
which the crime is committed; and this though they may also be triable by courts-martial. (Govt. vs.McGregory [1780],
14 Mass., 499.)

A court of oyer and terminer had jurisdiction to try all cases of murder committed within the country, and that a murder
committed by a soldier in the military service of the United States, in time of war, insurrection, or rebellion, forms no
exception. (People vs.. Gardiner [N.Y., 1865], 6 Parker Cr. R., 143; emphasis added.).

Any changes in Articles of War in years 1913 and 1916 did not alter rule that courts-martial do not have exclusive
jurisdiction for trial of a soldier for murder committed in time of war, but that the state courts have jurisdiction until it is
assumed by military authorities. (People vs.. Denman [1918], 177 P., 461; 179 Cal., 497.)

In the instant case it also appears that when the information for murder was filed the Philippines had already been
liberated and the actual hostilities had already ceased. It is claimed, however, that up to the present time a status of
war still exists for the reason that the treaty of peace has not yet been signed. But this contention cannot be upheld
because, although the formal termination of war by means of the signing of the treaty has not yet been effected, at
the time when the petitioner was prosecuted for murder in the civil courts the actual fighting or hostilities were no
longer going on; in other words, the actual fighting had already ceased and the Philippines had already been
liberated. Thus it was held in the following decision:

Notwithstanding this section (Art. 74), requiring a soldier to be delivered to civil authorities for trial for an alleged
crime except in time of war, the jurisdiction of the military courts over a soldier is not exclusive of the civil court even
during time of war, if the soldier was stationed within one of the states where the civil courts were functioning
and where no actual hostilities were in progress. (Ex parte Koester [1922], 206 P., 166; 56 Cal. App., 621; emphasis
added.)

It clearly appears also in the present case as aforesaid that the military authorities are not claiming priority to try the
petitioner herein as provided in the Articles of War. Such being the case, we are of the opinion that the petitioner
cannot raise and invoke the right to be tried by a court martial without the military authorities' claiming to try him in
accordance with the military law or the Articles of War. To this effect was the ruling in People vs.. Denman (supra):

Conceding paramount right of military authorities in the time of war to custody of soldier notwithstanding criminal
charges against him in the courts of a state, the right inures solely to military authorities and cannot be raised by the
offender. (Emphasis added.).

In Funk vs.. State ([1919], 208 S.W., 509; 84 Tex. Cr. R., 402), the following doctrines were also laid down:
A soldier of the United States who murders a citizen of the state offends against both the military and the state laws
and may be tried in the state courts.

Although under this section (Art. 92), military authorities have the prior right to try soldier who has murdered a citizen,
the soldier who has committed the crime cannot object to being tried by a state court, where the military authorities
have not asserted any right. (Emphasis added.)

In view of all the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur has
jurisdiction over the murder case against the petitioner and cannot be deprived of such jurisdiction. This being our
conclusion, it is unnecessary to pass upon the other questions of law raised by the petition.

Being without any merit whatsoever, the petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, De Joya, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006

LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG) ANDY TORRATO, LT. (SG) ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, CPT. GARY
ALEJANO, LT. (SG) JAMES LAYUG, CPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR FAELDON, LT. (SG)
MANUEL CABOCHAN, ENS. ARMAND PONTEJOS, LT. (JG) ARTURO PASCUA, and 1LT. JONNEL
SANGGALANG, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and B. GEN.
MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., in his capacity as the Judge Advocate General of the Judge Advocate
General’s Office (JAGO), Respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the Petition for Prohibition (with prayer for a temporary restraining order) filed by the
above-named members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), herein petitioners, against the AFP Chief of
Staff and the Judge Advocate General, respondents.

The facts are:

On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports that some members of the AFP,
with high-powered weapons, had abandoned their designated places of assignment. Their aim was to destabilize the
government. The President then directed the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to track and arrest them.

On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP –
mostly from the elite units of the Army’s Scout Rangers and the Navy’s Special Warfare Group – entered the
premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They disarmed the security
guards and planted explosive devices around the building.

Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported red armbands emblazoned with the emblem of
the "Magdalo" faction of the Katipunan. 1 The troops then, through broadcast media, announced their grievances
against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, such as the graft and corruption in the military, the
illegal sale of arms and ammunition to the "enemies" of the State, and the bombings in Davao City intended to
acquire more military assistance from the US government. They declared their withdrawal of support from their
Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as President of the Republic. They also called for the
resignation of her cabinet members and the top brass of the AFP and PNP.

About noontime of the same day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring a state of rebellion,
followed by General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and PNP to take all necessary measures to suppress the rebellion
then taking place in Makati City. She then called the soldiers to surrender their weapons at five o’clock in the
afternoon of that same day.

In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with the soldiers. The aim was
to persuade them to peacefully return to the fold of the law. After several hours of negotiation, the government panel
succeeded in convincing them to lay down their arms and defuse the explosives placed around the premises of the
Oakwood Apartments. Eventually, they returned to their barracks.

A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the authorities.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended that the military personnel
involved be charged with coup d’etat defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. On July 31, 2003, the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing
of the corresponding Information against them.

Meanwhile, on August 2, 2003, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent General Narciso Abaya, then
AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident and directed the
AFP to conduct its own separate investigation.

On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an Information for coup
d’etat 2against those soldiers, docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and eventually raffled off to Branch 61,
presided by Judge Romeo F. Barza. 3 Subsequently, this case was consolidated with Criminal Case No. 03-2678,
involving the other accused, pending before Branch 148 of the RTC, Makati City, presided by Judge Oscar B.
Pimentel.

On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.

On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel
tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations of the Articles of War under
Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 as amended, against the same military personnel. Specifically, the charges are: (a)
violation of Article 63 for disrespect toward the President, the Secretary of National Defense, etc., (b) violation of
Article 64 for disrespect toward a superior officer, (c) violation of Article 67 for mutiny or sedition, (d) violation of
Article 96 for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and (e) violation of Article 97 for conduct prejudicial to
good order and military discipline.

Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including petitioners herein) filed with the RTC,
Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the
military tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055. 5

On September 15, 2003, petitioners filed with the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO) a motion praying for the
suspension of its proceedings until after the RTC shall have resolved their motion to assume jurisdiction.

On October 29, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Initial Report to the AFP Chief of Staff
recommending that the military personnel involved in the Oakwood incident be charged before a general court martial
with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War.

Meanwhile, on November 11, 2003, the DOJ, after conducting a reinvestigation, found probable cause against only
31 (petitioners included) of the 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784. Accordingly, the prosecution filed with the
RTC an Amended Information. 6

In an Order dated November 14, 2003, the RTC admitted the Amended Information and dropped the charge of coup
d’etat against the 290 accused.

Subsequently, or on December 12, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial Investigation
Report 7 to the JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup
d’etatbefore the RTCshould not be charged before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.

For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order 8 stating that "all charges before the court martial
against the accused…are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the
alleged crime of coup d’etat." The trial court then proceeded to hear petitioners’ applications for bail.

In the meantime, Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed the findings of
the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers involved in the Oakwood incident, including
petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman) of the Articles of War.

On June 17, 2004, Colonel Magno’s recommendation was approved by the AFP top brass. The AFP Judge Advocate
General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the charge. Instead of complying, they filed with this Court
the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of
Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation to the Oakwood incident. 9

Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February 11, 2004 that the offense
for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War is not
service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup d’etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to
its jurisdiction.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, counters that R.A. No. 7055 specifies which offenses covered
by the Articles of War areservice-connected. These are violations of Articles 54 to 70, 72 to 92, and 95 to 97. The law
provides that violations of these Articles are properly cognizable by the court martial. As the charge against
petitioners is violation of Article 96 which, under R.A. No. 7055 is a service-connected offense, then it falls under the
jurisdiction of the court martial.

Subsequently, petitioners filed with this Court a Supplemental Petition raising the additional issue that the offense
charged before the General Court Martial has prescribed. Petitioners alleged therein that during the pendency of their
original petition, respondents proceeded with the Pre-Trial Investigation for purposes of charging them with violation
of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War; that the Pre-Trial Investigation
Panel then referred the case to the General Court Martial; that "almost two years since the Oakwood incident on July
27, 2003, only petitioner Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes was arraigned, and this was done under questionable
circumstances;" 10 that in the hearing of July 26, 2005, herein petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case on the
ground that they were not arraigned within the prescribed period of two (2) years from the date of the commission of
the alleged offense, in violation of Article 38 of the Articles of War; 11 that "the offense charged prescribed on July 25,
2005;" 12 that the General Court Martial ruled, however, that "the prescriptive period shall end only at 12:00 midnight
of July 26, 2005;" 13 that "(a)s midnight of July 26, 2005 was approaching and it was becoming apparent that the
accused could not be arraigned, the prosecution suddenly changed its position and asserted that 23 of the accused
have already been arraigned;" 14 and that petitioners moved for a reconsideration but it was denied by the general
court martial in its Order dated September 14, 2005. 15
In his Comment, the Solicitor General prays that the Supplemental Petition be denied for lack of merit. He alleges
that "contrary to petitioners’ pretensions, all the accused were duly arraigned on July 13 and 18, 2005." 16 The
"(r)ecords show that in the hearing on July 13, 2005, all the 29 accused were present" and, "(o)n that day, Military
Prosecutor Captain Karen Ong Jags read the Charges and Specifications from the Charge Sheet in open court (pp.
64, TSN, July 13, 2005)." 17

The sole question for our resolution is whether the petitioners are entitled to the writ of prohibition.

There is no dispute that petitioners, being officers of the AFP, are subject to military law. Pursuant to Article 1 (a) of
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War, the term "officer" is "construed to
refer to a commissioned officer." Article 2 provides:

Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. – The following persons are subject to these articles and shall be understood
as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or "persons subject to military law," whenever used in
these articles:

(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of the Philippine
Constabulary, all members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call to active duty and while on such active
duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to
duty or for training in the said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey
the same.

Upon the other hand, Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 reads:

SEC. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military law, including
members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the
Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians
are co-accused, victims, or offended parties, which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper
civil court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in
which case, the offense shall be tried by court-martial, Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the
interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the
proper civil courts.

As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70,
Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.

In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into consideration the penalty
prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local government ordinances.

Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous. First, it lays down the general rule that
members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup d’etat), other
special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court. Next, it provides the exception to the
general rule, i.e., where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to be service-connected, then
the offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial. Lastly, the law states an exception to the exception, i.e., where
the President of the Philippines, in the interest of justice, directs before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses
be tried by the proper civil court.

The second paragraph of the same provision further identifies the "service-connected crimes or offenses" as "limited
to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97" of the Articles of War. Violations of
these specified Articles are triable by court martial. This delineates the jurisdiction between the civil courts and the
court martial over crimes or offenses committed by military personnel.

Such delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is necessary to preserve the peculiar nature of military justice
system over military personnel charged with service-connected offenses. The military justice system is disciplinary in
nature, aimed at achieving the highest form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military
efficiency. 18 Military law is established not merely to enforce discipline in times of war, but also to preserve the
tranquility and security of the State in time of peace; for there is nothing more dangerous to the public peace and
safety than a licentious and undisciplined military body. 19 The administration of military justice has been universally
practiced. Since time immemorial, all the armies in almost all countries of the world look upon the power of military
law and its administration as the most effective means of enforcing discipline. For this reason, the court martial has
become invariably an indispensable part of any organized armed forces, it being the most potent agency in enforcing
discipline both in peace and in war. 20

Here, petitioners are charged for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the
Articles of War before the court martial, thus:

All persons subject to military law, did on or about 27 July 2003 at Oakwood Hotel, Makati City, Metro Manila, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously violate their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution, the law and the
duly-constituted authorities and abused their constitutional duty to protect the people and the State by,
among others, attempting to oust the incumbent duly-elected and legitimate President by force and violence,
seriously disturbing the peace and tranquility of the people and the nation they are sworn to protect, thereby
causing dishonor and disrespect to the military profession, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman,
in violation of AW 96 of the Articles of War.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring ours)

Article 96 of the Articles of War 21 provides:

ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. – Any officer, member of the Nurse Corps, cadet, flying
cadet, or probationary second lieutenant, who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall
be dismissed from the service. (Underscoring ours)

We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is expressly
provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners
concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted
authorities.Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the
charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the
"service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same – dismissal from the service
– imposable only by the military court.Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse
the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.

Obviously, there is no merit in petitioners’ argument that they can no longer be charged before the court martial for
violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been declared by the RTC in its Order of February
11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat,"
hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which
expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law has
conferred the court should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court,
tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. 22 And it is only through a
constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the
courts is merely to apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to be." 23 Evidently, such declaration by the RTC
constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.

In Navales v. Abaya., 24 this Court, through Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., held:

We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration made by the RTC (Branch 148) in the dispositive
portion of its Order dated February 11, 2004 that all charges before the court-martial against the accused were not
service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup d’etat, cannot be given effect. x x x, such
declaration was made without or in excess of jurisdiction; hence, a nullity.

The second paragraph of the above provision (referring to Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055) explicitly specifies what are
considered "service-connected crimes or offenses" under Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, also known as
the Articles of War, to wit:

Articles 54 to 70:

Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.

Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.

Art. 56. False Muster.

Art. 57. False Returns.

Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.

Art. 59. Desertion.

Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.

Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.

Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.

Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President,

Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National

Defense.

Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.

Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.

Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.

Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.

Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.

Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.

Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.

Articles 72 to 92:

Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.

Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.

Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.

Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.

Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.

Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.

Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.

Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.

Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.

Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.

Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.

Art. 83. Spies.

Art. 84. Military Property.–Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage

or wrongful Disposition.

Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property

Issued to Soldiers.

Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.

Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.

Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.

Art. 88-A. Unlawful Influencing Action of Court.

Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.

Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.

Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.

Art. 92. Dueling.

Articles 95 to 97:

Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.

Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.

Art. 97. General Article.

Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction over the foregoing offenses. x x x.

It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the military courts of jurisdiction to try cases
involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War as these are
considered "service-connected crimes or offenses." In fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the court-martial.

Moreover, the observation made by Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio during the deliberation of this case is worth quoting,
thus:

The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an
Officer and a Gentleman is ‘absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup d’etat.’ Firstly, the doctrine of
‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same
statute, 25unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has
jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over
service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is
not applicable to this case.

Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 [1975]), applicable only to military personnel because the
military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of discipline separate from that of civilians (see Orloff v.
Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 [1953]). Military personnel carry high-powered arms and other lethal weapons not allowed to
civilians. History, experience, and the nature of a military organization dictate that military personnel must be
subjected to a separate disciplinary system not applicable to unarmed civilians or unarmed government personnel.

A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his superior may question his reassignment by
asking a temporary restraining order or injunction from a civil court. However, a soldier cannot go to a civil court and
ask for a restraining or injunction if his military commander reassigns him to another area of military operations. If this
is allowed, military discipline will collapse.

xxx

This Court has recognized that courts-martial are instrumentalities of the Executive to enable the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, to effectively command, control, and discipline the armed forces (see Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75
Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrop’s Military Law and Precedents, 2nd edition, p. 49). In short, courts-martial form part
of the disciplinary system that ensures the President’s control, and thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the
apex of this disciplinary system is the President who exercises review powers over decisions of courts-martial (citing
Article 50 of the Articles of War; quoted provisions omitted).

xxx

While the Court had intervened before in courts-martial or similar proceedings, it did so sparingly and only to release
a military personnel illegally detained (Ognir v. Director of Prisons, 80 Phil. 401 [1948] or to correct objectionable
procedures (Yamashita v. Styer, 75 Phil. 563 [1945]). The Court has never suppressed court-martial proceedings on
the ground that the offense charged ‘is absorbed and in furtherance of’ another criminal charge pending with the civil
courts. The Court may now do so only if the offense charged is not one of the service-connected offenses specified in
Section 1 of RA 7055. Such is not the situation in the present case.

With respect to the issue of prescription raised by petitioners in their Supplemental Petition, suffice it to say that we
cannot entertain the same. The contending parties are at loggerheads as to (a) who among the petitioners were
actually arraigned, and (b) the dates of their arraignment. These are matters involving questions of fact, not within our
power of review, as we are not a trier of facts. In a petition for prohibition, such as the one at bar, only legal issues
affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board or officer involved may be resolved on the basis of the undisputed
facts. 26

Clearly, the instant petition for prohibition must fail. The office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive
exercise of authority and is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. 27 Stated differently, prohibition is the remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons from
usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law. 28

In fine, this Court holds that herein respondents have the authority in convening a court martial and in charging
petitioners with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice
REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice
 G.R. No. L-5889 July 12, 1911

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. LOOK CHAW ( alias LUK CHIU), Defendant-Appellant.

Thos. D. Aitken for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.

ARELLANO, C.J. :chanrobles virtual law library

This case is a separate part of Case No. 5887 and bears No. 5889 on the general docket of this court,
and No. 377 on the docket of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The complaint in this case states:

That, on or about the 18th of August, 1909, within the boundaries of the municipality of
Cebu of this province and judicial district, the said Look Chaw ( alias Luk Chiu) did,
without having obtained authorization from the Collector of Internal Revenue and without
being authorized in any manner and traffic in the same.

C.J. Milliron, an internal-revenue agent, testified that Vicente Base took to the governor of Cebu a can
of opium containing 200 grammes of the said drug, in order to show him that the accused had sold
opium to Base, and the governor called the witness in order that he might take part in this case. After
the accused was arrested, he confessed before the witness and the provincial fiscal that he had sold to
Vicente Base thirty cans of opium on the 15th of August, 1909, but that he had received the price
thereof, and that the money which was found in a box of his on board the British steamship Erroll,
P1,500 in amount, was obtained in Manila and was seized by the captain of the vessel. According to
the accused, he had purchased in Hongkong 137 cans of opium for the purpose of introducing it as
contraband into Mexico, the destination of the vessel, but that as the latter changed its route touching
first at Manila, the opium arrived at Cebu.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Vicente Base testified that he had negotiated with the accused with respect to the sale of the three
sacks of opium which were seized while in the latter's possession an were the subject matter of the
previous cause; that these three sacks were not taken ashore, because the accused would not permit
this to be done without previous delivery of the whole price of P1,000, of which witness had only paid
P533; that he therefore only took one can from one of the said
sacks.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Court of First Instance of Cebu sentenced the accused to one year's imprisonment and the
payment of a fine of P2,000, with additional subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to
exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to the payment of the costs of the trial. It was ordered in
the judgment that the exhibits connected with the case should be confiscated, and that, in case of an
appeal, and even after the sentence had been served, the defendant should not be released from
custody, but delivered to the customs authorities for the purpose of the enforcement of the existing
immigration laws.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The defendant appealed and has alleged before this court that he can not punished in accordance with
section 15 of Act No. 1761, under which the complaint was
drawn.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This said section 15 reads thus:

( a) No person shall import, cook, or prepare opium, or engage in the business of

purchasing or selling opium or of dealing or trafficking therein, unless he shall first have
secured from the Collector of Internal Revenue a license to transact such business and
shall have paid the license tax prescribed by this Act. . . .

To make an isolated sale, says the appellant, is not to engage in the business of selling. To negotiate
the sale of opium does not mean clandestinely to sell opium
once.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In our opinion, the act defined in section 15 is distinct from that penalized in section 5; the act referred
to in the latter is any act of sale, while that concerned in the former relates to the business of selling, in
an habitual, professional manner, as one of an undertaking or occupation, without license.

SEC. 5. ( a) It shall be unlawful to sell, transfer, give, or deliver opium to any person
except to a duly licensed and practicing physician, pharmacist, or second-class
pharmacist, or a duly licensed dispensator of opium, or duly registered confirmed user of
opium in a licensed opium dispensary for consumption therein only, and in accordance
with the provisions of this Act: . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

( b) Any person violating the provisions of the preceding subsection shall be punished by
a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding
one year, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court: . . .

The crime concerned in this case, according to this section 5, is compromised within the language of
the complaint which charges the act of selling opium without the authorization of the Collector of
Internal Revenue.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The other ground of the appeal is that the confession of the accused were taken into account for the
purpose of his conviction. The trial court pronounced its sentence after considering that "sufficient
proof has been furnished by the evidence,' and the evidence did not consist solely in the confession
that the accused, on the day and at the place mentioned in the complaint, contracted with Vicente
Base for the sale of the opium, the subject matter of the present prosecution; and as this finding does
not appear to be erroneous nor contrary to the conclusions reached from the evidence, it is accepted
by this court in order that thereby the judgment appealed from may be dully affirmed, as we do affirm
the same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This disposes of the appeal; but, in the opinion of this court, the defense of double jeopardy alleged by
the accused in first instance, with exception to the order disallowing it, can not but be taken into
consideration, although in this instance, on appeal, that defense was not reproduced with the
allegation that its disallowance was an error committed by the lower court in its judgment. This point
appears to involve a question of jurisdiction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Before separating the two causes, as related at the beginning of this decision, there was but one single
complaint and there would have been only one trial for the possession of opium and for the sale of
opium. But the defendant's counsel set up a demurrer, arguing that the complaint was defective
inasmuch as it charged two distinct crimes, for according to the defense, it was alleged to be one crime
to possess opium and another different crime to sell opium; and the court deferred to this pretension
and ordered the filing of two complaints, one for the possession of opium and another for the sale of
opium; that for the possession of opium was the one first tried by the lower
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In answering the second complaint for the sale of opium, the defendant alleged that he had already
been in jeopardy.

The defendant was convicted yesterday," said his attorney, "for the violation of law
committed, of possessing opium, and has already been sentenced by this court to five
year's imprisonment and in addition to pay a fine of ten thousand pesos. According to the
principles of penal law, when a crime has been committed which is necessary in order to
commit another, the delinquent, of course, can not be punished for the two crimes, but
must suffer for the crime for which the greater penalty was provided.

The court rejected this allegation: first, because the prosecution of two crimes instead of one was
brought about by the defense itself; and second, because, in the opinion of the trial judge, if the
defendant had first been convicted for selling opium, he certainly would have been in jeopardy in the
cause prosecuted for possessing opium, for the reason that really one can not sell opium without
possessing it, while, if the terms are inverted, the same result does not follow, because one may
posses opium without selling it, and consequently in the present cause the allegation of double
jeopardy is an admissible.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
True it is, we assert, that it is one crime to possess opium, punished by section 31 of the Act, and
another, to sell opium, penalized by section 5 of the same Act before
cited.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

And it is also true that when one single act constitutes two or more crimes, or when one of them is a
necessary means for the commission of the other, only the penalty corresponding to the more serious
crime shall be imposed, in its maximum degree, and thus, he who smokes opium in a pipe, by one
single act lays himself liable to three penalties of the law, one of them, merely for the fact of
possessing opium, another, for the mere possession of a pipe in which opium is smoked, and the other,
for the act of smoking opium; but the penalties corresponding to these three crimes ought not to be
imposed upon the defendant in this case, and only the penalty for the most serious of these
crimes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

But the illegal possession of 137 cans of opium and the illegal sale of 30 cans of opium, which are two
acts confessed by the accused, are not one act which constitutes two crimes, nor a crime which is a
necessary means for the commission of another. They are two isolated acts, punishable, each of them,
in themselves. Only in the event where all the amount of the opium possessed and seized be in its
totality the same as that which was possessed with the sole purpose of being delivered as the matter
or subject of a sale previously agree upon, could it be said, in the opinion of this court, that the
possession of the opium was a necessary means to effect the delivery by reason of the sale, and that
the sale agreed upon was the sole reason for the possession of the opium seized. The possession of
the quantity contained in the pipe can not be considered as a different crime from that of smoking
opium in a pipe, nor the possession of the pipe, as a crime different from that of smoking opium in a
pipe. But if the person surprised in smoking opium in a pipe was also surprised in the possession of
the thirty cans sold by the accused, it could not properly be inferred that the possession of these thirty
cans, which in itself is a crime, was a necessary means for the commission of the other crime of
smoking opium in a pipe, and that the person in whose possession the thirty cans were seized,
possessed the same solely and exclusively for the purpose of smoking opium in a pipe. It might very
well have been that he had acquired the drug for the purpose of inhaling, injecting, chewing,
swallowing, or other uses, and that only by chance did it occur to him to try to smoke it in a pipe, on the
very occasion when he was surprised, this being the evident fact of the commission of the crime which
can not, in its essence, include the existence of thirty cans, not then contained in the pipe, each can
certainly being susceptible of other various uses, every one of which might by its nature constitute a
different crime.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We consider this doctrine equally applicable to crimes which are evils by their very nature, as well as
to those which are merely malum quia prohibitum; because it not only aims at a more or less strict
application of a penal precept which, undoubtedly, in the practice of this court, usually tends toward
the lesser severity and, occasionally, the greatest benignity when the second class, or conventional
crimes, are concerned, but also because that doctrine is the logical result of the process of the
intelligence in the derivation of consequences from the principles constitute of the nature of
things.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Thus it is that we find the institution of this cause, and its separation from the previous one, to be
founded on law and juridical principles, and the judgment appealed from, to be in accordance with right
and equity, except with regard to the amount of the penalty, which we reduce, in harmony with the
provisions of section 5 aforementioned, to six months' imprisonment and a fine of P1,000 Philippine
currency.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Therefore, with the understanding that the imprisonment and the fine imposed shall be, respectively,
six months and P1,000 Philippine Currency, we affirm, as to all the rest, the judgment appealed from,
with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Torres, Mapa, and Johnson, JJ., concur.

Carson, J., concurs in the result.