Criminal Law II

MIDTERM CASES

G.R. No. L-2128 May 12, 1948

MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN MOSTERO, petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF MUNICIPAL JAIL, BOTH OF CITY OF
MANILA,respondents.
Enrique Q. Jabile for petitioners.
Acting City Fiscal A. P. Montesa, Assistant City Fiscal Arsenio Nañawa and D. Guinto Lazaro for
respondents.
FERIA, J.:
Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having committed the
crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the petitioners
on April 2, 1948, and presented a complaint against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until
April 7, 1948, when the petition for habeas corpus filed with this Court was heard, the petitioners
were still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed against them
an information with the proper courts justice.
This case has not been decided before this time because there was not a sufficient number of
Justices to form a quorum in Manila, And it had to be transferred to the Supreme Court acting in
division here in Baguio for deliberation and decision. We have not until now an official
information as to the action taken by the office of the city fiscal on the complaint filed by the
Dumlao against the petitioners. But whatever night have been the action taken by said office, if
there was any, we have to decide this case in order to lay down a ruling on the question involved
herein for the information and guidance in the future of the officers concerned.
The principal question to be determined in the present case in order to decide whether or not
the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, is the following: Is the city fiscal of
manila a judicial authority within the meaning of the provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code?
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalties provided in the next
proceeding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any
person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of six hours."
Taking into consideration the history of the provisions of the above quoted article, the precept
of our Constitution guaranteeing individual liberty, and the provisions of Rules of Court regarding
arrest and habeas corpus, we are of the opinion that the words "judicial authority", as used in
said article, mean the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to
order the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having committed a
public offense, that is, "the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by
law". (Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.)
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was substantially taken from article 202 of the old Penal
Code formerly in force of these Islands, which penalized a public officer other than a judicial
officer who, without warrant, "shall arrest a person upon a charge of crime and shall fail to deliver
such person to the judicial authority within twenty four hours after his arrest." There was no
doubt that a judicial authority therein referred to was the judge of a court of justice empowered
by law, after a proper investigation, to order the temporary commitment or detention of the
person arrested; and not the city fiscals or any other officers, who are not authorized by law to
do so. Because article 204, which complements said section 202, of the same Code provided that
"the penalty of suspension in its minimum and medium degrees shall be imposed upon the
following persons: 1. Any judicial officer who, within the period prescribed by the provisions of
the law of criminal procedure in force, shall fail to release any prisoner under arrest or to commit
such prisoner formally by written order containing a statement of the grounds upon which the
same is based."
Although the above quoted provision of article 204 of the old Penal Code has not been
incorporated in the Revised Penal Code the import of said words judicial authority or officer can
not be construed as having been modified by the mere omission of said provision in the Revised
Penal Code.
Besides, section 1 (3), Article III, of our Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons...against unreasonable seizure shall not be violated, and no warrant [of
arrest, detention or confinement] shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge after the examination under oath or affirmation of the complaint and the witness he
may produce." Under this constitutional precept no person may be deprived of his liberty, except
by warrant of arrest or commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after examination of
the complainant and his witness. And the judicial authority to whom the person arrested by a
public officers must be surrendered can not be any other but court or judge who alone is
authorized to issue a warrant of commitment or provisional detention of the person arrested
pending the trial of the case against the latter. Without such warrant of commitment, the
detention of the person arrested for than six hours would be illegal and in violation of our
Constitution.
Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17, Rule 109 of the Rules of court, which, referring to the
duty of an officer after arrest without warrant, provides that "a person making arrest for legal
ground shall, without unnecessary delay, and within the time prescribed in the Revised Penal
Code, take the person arrested to the proper court or judge for such action for they may deem
proper to take;" and by section 11 of Rule 108, which reads that "after the arrest by the defendant
and his delivery to the Court, he shall be informed of the complaint or information filed against
him. He shall also informed of the substance of the testimony and evidence presented against
him, and, if he desires to testify or to present witnesses or evidence in his favor, he may be
allowed to do so. The testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced to writing but that of the
defendant shall be taken in writing and subscribed by him.
And it is further corroborated by the provisions of section 1 and 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
According to the provision of said section, "a writ of habeas corpus shall extend any person to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is illegally deprived of his liberty";
and "if it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a judgement or order of a court
of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render judgment, or
make the order, the writ shall not be allowed. "Which a contrario sensu means that, otherwise,
the writ shall be allowed and the person detained shall be released.
The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be construed
to include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a warrant
of arrest or of commitment or temporary confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the
detention of a person arrested without warrant. (Section 7, Rule 108; Hashim vs. Boncan, 40 Off.
Gaz. 13th Supp., p.13; Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159, promulgated on January 30, 1947, 43 Off. Gaz.,
1214). The investigation which the city of fiscal of Manila makes is not the preliminary
investigation proper provided for in section 11, Rule 108, above quoted, to which all person
charged with offenses cognizable by the Court of First Instance in provinces are entitled, but it is
a mere investigation made by the city fiscal for the purpose of filing the corresponding
information against the defendant with the proper municipal court or Court of First Instance of
Manila if the result of the investigation so warrants, in order to obtain or secure from the court
a warrant of arrest of the defendant. It is provided by a law as a substitute, in a certain sense, of
the preliminary investigation proper to avoid or prevent a hasty or malicious prosecution, since
defendant charged with offenses triable by the courts in the City of Manila are not entitled to a
proper preliminary investigation.
The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper preliminary investigation in case
of temporary absence of both the justice of the peace and the auxiliary justice of the peace from
the municipality, town or place, are the municipal mayors who are empowered in such case to
issue a warrant of arrest of the caused. (Section 3, Rule 108, in connection with section 6, Rule
108, and section 2 of Rule 109.) The preliminary investigation which a city fiscal may conduct
under section 2, Rule 108, is the investigation referred to in the preceding paragraph.
Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the commission of an offense cognizable by
the courts of Manila is not filed with municipal court or the Court of First Instance of Manila,
because as above stated, the latter do not make or conduct a preliminary investigation proper.
The complaint must be made or filed with the city fiscal of Manila who, personally or through
one of his assistants, makes the investigation, not for the purpose of ordering the arrest of the
accused, but of filing with the proper court the necessary information against the accused if the
result of the investigation so warrants, and obtaining from the court a warrant of arrest or
commitment of the accused.
When a person is arrested without warrant in cases permitted by law, the officer or person
making the arrest should, as above stated, without unnecessary delay take or surrender the
person arrested, within the period of time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, to the court or
judge having jurisdiction to try or make a preliminary investigation of the offense (section 17,
Rule 109); and the court or judge shall try and decide the case if the court has original jurisdiction
over the offense charged, or make the preliminary investigation if it is a justice of the peace court
having no original jurisdiction, and then transfer the case to the proper Court of First Instance in
accordance with the provisions of section 13, Rule 108.
In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly with the municipal court or the Court
of First Instance, the officer or person making the arrest without warrant shall surrender or take
the person arrested to the city fiscal, and the latter shall make the investigation above mentioned
and file, if proper, the corresponding information within the time prescribed by section 125 of
the Revised Penal Code, so that the court may issue a warrant of commitment for the temporary
detention of the accused. And the city fiscal or his assistants shall make the investigation
forthwith, unless it is materially impossible for them to do so, because the testimony of the
person or officer making the arrest without warrant is in such cases ready and available, and
shall, immediately after the investigation, either release the person arrested or file the
corresponding information. If the city fiscal has any doubt as to the probability of the defendant
having committed the offense charged, or is not ready to file the information on the strength of
the testimony or evidence presented, he should release and not detain the person arrested for a
longer period than that prescribed in the Penal Code, without prejudice to making or continuing
the investigation and filing afterwards the proper information against him with the court, in order
to obtain or secure a warrant of his arrest. Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal
liability of an officer detaining a person for more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of arrested and other circumstances, such
as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and
file in time the necessary information, must be taken into consideration.
To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, would be to authorize the detention of a person arrested without warrant for a period
longer than that permitted by law without any process issued by a court of competent
jurisdiction. The city fiscal, may not, after due investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an
information or prosecuting the person arrested and release him, after the latter had been illegally
detained for days or weeks without any process issued by a court or judge.
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint
of the offended party or any other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law.
What he or the complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal of Manila,
or directly with the justice of the peace courts in municipalities and other political subdivisions.
If the City Fiscal has no authority, and he has not, to order the arrest even if he finds, after due
investigation, that there is a probability that a crime has been committed and the accused is guilty
thereof, a fortiori a police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an
offense upon complaint of the offended party or other persons even though, after investigation,
he becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged.
In view of all the foregoing, without making any pronouncement as to the responsibility of the
officers who intervened in the detention of the petitioners, for the policeman Dumlao may have
acted in good faith, in the absence of a clear cut ruling on the matter in believing that he had
complied with the mandate of article 125 by delivering the petitioners within six hours to the
office of the city fiscal, and the latter might have ignored the fact that the petitioners were being
actually detained when the said policeman filed a complaint against them with the city fiscal, we
hold that the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby
ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent court of
justice. So ordered.
Paras, Actg. C.J., Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-26723 December 22, 1966

ARTHUR MEDINA Y YUMUL, petitioner,
vs.
MARCELO F. OROZCO, JR., Acting City Warden of Caloocan City, respondent.
Federico Magdangal for petitioner.
Francisco A. Garcia for respondent.
SANCHEZ, J.:
On application for habeas corpus. The facts are:
At about 12:00 p.m. on November 7, 1965, petitioner Arthur Medina y Yumul was arrested and
thereafter incarcerated in the Caloocan City jail, allegedly as one of those responsible for the
death of one Marcelo Sangalang y Diwa which occurred on October 31, 1965 in said city. At about
9:00 o'clock in the morning of the same day, November 7, 1965, the case against Medina and
two others for Sangalang's murder was referred to a fiscal, who forthwith conducted a
preliminary investigation in petitioner's presence. At about 3:40 p.m. on November 10, 1965, an
information for murder was filed against petitioner Arthur Medina y Yumul, and Antonio Olivar y
Flores and Alexander Enriquez y Raginio in the Caloocan branch of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, docketed as Criminal Case No. C-1197 of said court. By court order, they were promptly
committed to jail. Arraigned, Medina and his co-accused stood trial — which has not yet
terminated.
1. First to be considered is the charge of arbitrary detention. Petitioner claims violation of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime — for which petitioner is detained — is murder, a
capital offense. The arresting officer's duty under the law1 was either to deliver him to the proper
judicial authorities within 18 hours, or thereafter release him. The fact however is that he was
not released. From the time of petitioner's arrest at 12:00 o'clock p.m. on November 7 to 3:40
p.m. on November 10 when the information against him for murder actually was in court, over
75 hours have elapsed.
But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday; November 8 was declared
an official holiday; and November 9 (Election Day) was also an official holiday. In these three no-
office days, it was not an easy matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and stenographer, draft the
information and search for the Judge to have him act thereon, and get the clerk of court to open
the courthouse, docket the case and have the order of commitment prepared. And then, where
to locate and the certainty of locating those officers and employees could very well compound
the fiscal's difficulties. These are considerations sufficient enough to deter us from declaring that
Arthur Medina was arbitrarily detained. For, he was brought to court on the very first office day
following arrest.2
2. Nor could discharge from custody, by now, be justified even on the assumption that detention
was originally arbitrary.
Petitioner at present is jailed because of the court's order of commitment of November 10, 1965
upon a murder indictment. No bail was provided for him, because he is charged with a capital
offense. Such detention remains unaffected by the alleged previous arbitrary detention. Because,
detention under a valid information is one thing, arbitrary detention anterior thereto another.
They are separate concepts. Simply because at the inception detention was wrong is no reason
for letting petitioner go scot-free after the serious charge of murder has been clamped upon him
and his detention ordered by the court. The first is illegal; but the second is not. 3 Thus, the
petition for habeas corpus came too late.4
3. As unavailing is petitioner's claim that no preliminary investigation was conducted by the fiscal
before the criminal charge against him was registered in court. Other than that averment in the
petition herein, petitioner has nothing whatsoever to show for it. Upon the other hand, the
assertion that such investigation was made on the very day of petitioner's arrest and in his
presence, is confirmed by the fact that on November 12, 1965 he moved the office of the city
fiscal for a reinvestigation of his case. And that reinvestigation was held on December 1, 1965.
Thereafter, the case against him proceeded to trial. Add to all of these the legal presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties,5 and the question of lack of preliminary
investigation is well nailed down.
4. Besides, the proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be
ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not this Court. Reason is not wanting for this view.
Absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to
the regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived.6 These
are matters to be inquired into by the trial court, not an appellate court.
5. The cry of deprivation of a speedy trial merits but scant consideration. The arraignment of
petitioner set for December 1, 1965 was postponed to December 20, 1965, thence to February
28, 1966, to March 14, 1966, all on petition of counsel for the accused, including petitioner. Then,
on April 14, 1966, petitioner's counsel moved to reset the date of hearing on the merits. And
again, the hearing scheduled on July 26, 1966 was transferred to September 6, 1966 on motion
of defendant Alexander Enriquez with the conformity of petitioner's counsel. Finally, on motion
of petitioner's counsel, the hearing on September 6, 1966 was recalendared for December 6,
1966. In this factual environment, we do not see denial to petitioner of the right to speedy trial.
Delay of his own making cannot be oppressive to him.7
For the reasons given, the petition herein to set petitioner Arthur Medina y Yumul at liberty is
hereby denied. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Castro,
JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Tañada, Wigberto E. Tañada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo,
Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by
respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
[Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and
784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and
printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued
for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer,
Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City,
their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined
from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other
accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People
v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The
plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983,
later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the
aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the
legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for
preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come
to this Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before
respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants before this
Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this
procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness
and urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by
the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in
all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise
its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in
the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power of the court [Supreme
Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the
purposes of justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is
laid on the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant
petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of
more than six [6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the
petition thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation] with the
fact that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more than half a year after the petitioners'
premises had been raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited this long to
bring their case to court, it was because they tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The events
of the past eleven fill years had taught them that everything in this country, from release of public
funds to release of detained persons from custody, has become a matter of executive
benevolence or largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the President, like
Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet asking the
return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles. And after such a letter had been sent,
through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security
Command, they were further encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to Court. [pp. 123-
124, Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no
ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial
efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned
their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against
them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked
as evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped
from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic of respondents.
These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases
with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot
in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in
question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath
or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted
constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court . 6 This objection,
however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded
during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by
respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No.
19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the
latter address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e.,
No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant
No. 20- 82[b] which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing the crime
of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he is keeping and concealing the same
at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were
applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It
would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended
for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were
specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the
team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the
typographical error is more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search
Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously
this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with
sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the
place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the
executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows
that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has
also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to
resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants
were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos,
Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized
under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under
subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen
property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose
possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no
consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control
or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to
have in relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the
disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery,
receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry
or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to
meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao
Sawmill Co. v. Castillo9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery
which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement,
property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having
only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which
the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact
bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col.
Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom.10 The application was
accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members
of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a
surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants on
December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have
provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly
issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against
a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in
the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification,
stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to
publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's
application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other
paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously
being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential
Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements
of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable
cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave
error for respondent judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained
in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered
and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and
things above-described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in
conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire
Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant
or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified.
In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the
truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit
and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." As couched, the
quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of
sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe
the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters, cabinets,
tables, communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used
and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents
communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to promote the
objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization known as Movement for Free Philippines,
Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive
materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books,
records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written
instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme
Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith
the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a
search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate
Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of
conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the
articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized
differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English history:
the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the
Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and
destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such historical
episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any
newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and
imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and
seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and
publication of said newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the
press guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners'
freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a
democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that
they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which
authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged in
subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance
with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense."
It is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of any
implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than
President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property
seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:
The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration of the WE
FORUM newspaper and its printing presses, according to Information Minister Gregorio S.
Cendana.
On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in Quezon City
and took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all materials in the premises.
Cendaña said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain at the disposal
of the owners, subject to the discretion of the court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed by
the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S.
Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM
" case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:
2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our authorities to
close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the equipment and materials it uses. 21
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent
judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The
prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is hereby granted
and all articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez,
Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.
G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO L.
MANZANAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
35, UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice, LUIS C. VICTOR, THE
CITY FISCAL OF MANILA and PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at
Manila, THE HON. LUIS VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT, and THE MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS
SERVING UNIT AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.
G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988.
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ,
UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA JESUS F.
GUERRERO, and JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional
Trial Court, at Manila, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 82585.
Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioner in G.R. Nos.
82827 and 83979.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners
were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding
of the existence of a prima faciecase was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and,
subsequently, by the President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were
violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining
the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and (3) whether or not
the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against
the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the
Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of
the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against
petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the
Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary,
affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these
developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies
available under the law has lost factual support.
It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due
process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting
his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his
right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that
the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary
investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant
of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now
requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination
of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down
guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated
and clarified in this resolution.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus,
with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may
subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's
jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity
from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible
contempt of court or perjury.
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering
that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the
office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may
be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf.
Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and
submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is
solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any
other person.
As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because
of the privileged character or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and
that such a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the
parties.
As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling
effect" on press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.
The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused
their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition
prayed for cannot issue.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos.
82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of
the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is
LIFTED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990

HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents.
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.

SARMIENTO, J.:
This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and
seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.
The facts are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn
statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for brevity)
charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz:
04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito at
nagbibigay ng salaysay.
S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay
ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. — Horty
Salazar — 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.
05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang panloloko sa
iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?
S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.
06. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari?
S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako. Kinuha
ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ng
booking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na ako sa Phils. ay
hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako ng ibang
company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC Card
ko.
2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said complaint
was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following telegram:
YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON
NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW.
4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a
recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged
CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:
HORTY SALAZAR
No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order
No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O.
Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia
being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having
verified that you have —
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and
deploy workers for overseas employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation
to Article 38 of the same code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws.
Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987.
5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued
an office order designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto
Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so,
the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal
and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos
St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie
Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a
certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora
Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman
Development (Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce
any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance
number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes
which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter:
Gentlemen:
On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, we respectfully
request that the personal properties seized at her residence last January 26, 1988 be immediately
returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the owner
thereof. Among our reasons are the following:
1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure Order
No. 1205 dated November 3, 1987 violates "due process of law" guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III,
of the Philippine Constitution.
2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which guarantees right of the
people "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose."
3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi Marquez and five (5) others (including 2 policemen)
are the private residence of the Salazar family, and the entry, search as well as the seizure of the
personal properties belonging to our client were without her consent and were done with
unreasonable force and intimidation, together with grave abuse of the color of authority, and
constitute robbery and violation of domicile under Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code.
Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) in all (and
which were already due for shipment to Japan) are returned within twenty-four (24) hours from
your receipt hereof, we shall feel free to take all legal action, civil and criminal, to protect our
client's interests.
We trust that you will give due attention to these important matters.
7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the instant petition;
on even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint against her with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal,
docketed as IS-88-836.1
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be
barred are alreadyfait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as
one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.
The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest)
under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue squarely raised by the petitioner for the
Court's resolution.
Under the new Constitution, which states:
. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. 2
it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. 3 In one case, it was declared that
mayors may not exercise this power:
xxx xxx xxx
But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the state of the
law as it was in September, 1985. The law has since been altered. No longer does the mayor have
at this time the power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of arrest.
Section 143 of the Local Government Code, conferring this power on the mayor has been
abrogated, rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2,
1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized." The constitutional proscription
has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and
issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only
by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase, "such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said
1973 Constitution, who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary investigations and issue
warrants of arrest or search warrants. 4
Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:
We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise,
prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge"
to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a
magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his office "is
to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused,"
he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search
warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right,
when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional. 5
Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential
Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory
powers:
(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to
recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment. 6
On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the avowed
purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The Decree gave the
Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers:
(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention
of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after proper investigation it is determined that
his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further
exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the closure of companies, establishment and
entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without
having been licensed or authorized to do so. 7
On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving the Labor
Minister search and seizure powers as well:
(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the
power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after
investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public
order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the search of the
office or premises and seizure of documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements
used in illegal recruitment activities and the closure of companies, establishment and entities
found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having
been licensed or authorized to do so. 8
The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.
The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its
twilight moments.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest
warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare
Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo 9 is not well-taken. Vivo involved a
deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised Administrative Code and by
Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We have ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest (of an
undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly authorized representatives, in order to
carry out a final decision of deportation is valid. 10 It is valid, however, because of the recognized
supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs. We have held: 11
xxx xxx xxx
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S.
549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive
"when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation."
Justice Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose
continued presence in the country is injurious to the public interest, "he may, even in the absence
of express law, deport them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In
re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).
The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is detrimental
to public welfare is absolute and unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commissioner of
Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956). 12
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional.
It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar.
Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was
validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant:
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order
No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O.
Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia
being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having
verified that you have —
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and
deploy workers for overseas employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation
to Article 38 of the same code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws. 13
We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and
void, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe
the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment, typewriters, cabinets,
tables, communications/ recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used
and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all
documents/communications, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM"
newspaper.
2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote the
objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free
Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and
3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive
materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;
3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;
4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and
5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records,
pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments
concerning the Communist Parties of Texas, and the operations of the Community Party in
Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner,
directions to "seize any evidence in connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise"
have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure
of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General
Statutes (the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy)" was held to be a general warrant, and
therefore invalid. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants
in question cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a notable chapter in English history;
the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the
Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and
destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan." Reference herein to such historical
episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any
newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and
imminent danger to state security. 14
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may
issue warrants of arrest and search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President
or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation,
for the purpose of deportation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials
seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-50884 March 30, 1988

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FILOMENO SALUFRANIA, defendant-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:
In an information, dated 7 May 1976, Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman was charged before the Court
of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch I, with the complex crime of parricide with
intentional abortion, committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of December, 1974, in Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court the accused Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence on
MARCIANA ABUYO-SALUFRANIA, the lawfully wedded wife of the accused, by then and there
boxing and stranging her, causing upon her injuries which resulted in her instantaneous death;
and by the same criminal act committed on the person of the wife of the accused, who was at
the time 8 months on the family way, the accused likewise did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously cause the death of the child while still in its maternal womb, thereby committing
both crimes of PARRICIDE and INTENTIONAL ABORTION as defined and punished under Art. 246
and Art. 256, paragraph I, of the Revised Penal Code, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
said woman and child in the amount as the Honorable Court shall assess.
CONTRARY TO LAW
Upon arraignment, the accused, assisted by counsel de officio, pleaded not guilty to the offenses
charged.
After trial the lower court rendered a decision ** dated 9 August 1978, the dispositive part of
which states:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of DEATH, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Marciano Abuyo in the sum of
P12,000.00 and to pay the costs. "For unselfish, valuable and exemplary service rendered by
counsel de oficio, Atty. Marciano C. Dating, Jr., a compensation of P500.00 is hereby
recommended for him subject to the availability of funds
SO ORDERED.
The accused having been sentenced to suffer the penalty of death, this case is on automatic
review before this Court.
At the trial in the court a quo, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Dr. Juan L.
Dyquiangco Jr., Pedro Salufrania and Narciso Abuyo.
Dr. Juan L. Dyquiangco Jr., who was then Rural Health Officer of Talisay, Camarines Norte,
testified that, after passing the Board Examination, he was employed as a Resident Physician of
La Union Provincial Hospital, then as Junior Resident Physician of Bethane Hospital in San
Fernando, La Union and that later, he joined the government service, starting from 1968 up to
the time of the trial; that as a Doctor of Medicine, he had performed about ten (10) post mortem
examinations; that he was called upon by the Municipal Judge of Talisay to examine the corpse
of Marciana Abuyo-Salufrania that was exhumed from its grave in the Municipal Cemetery of
Talisay at around 11:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 December 1974; that his post
mortem examination lasted from 12:30 o'clock to 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day.
He reduced his findings of injuries into writing. (Exhibit "A"), which, together with their probable
cause, as testified to by him, are as follows:

Injury Cause

1) Multiple abrasions with "Blunt object or friction by

contusion, left leg, middle part, hard object" (tsn., Aug. 20, posterior

covering an area of 1976, p. 7)

about 2 & 1/2 by 5 inches.

2) Abrasions, 1/2 by 2 Friction on a hard object"

inches, medial side of the cubi (tsn., Aug. 20, 1976, p. 7)

tal fossa (back left leg)

3) Multiple pinhead sized Hard pinhead sized material

wounds, right face, starting (tsn., Aug. 20, 1976, p. 7)

from the side of the right eye

down to mandibular bone

(right check)

4) Upper right eyelid No cause given

more prominent than the left

eyelid ("the right upper eyelid a

little bit bulging than the left

eye "and" sort of "swollen") (tsn.,

Aug. 20, 1976, pp. 7-8)

5) Tongue protruding bet Usually, the main cause of

ween the lips, about 1 inch teeth protruding tongue during

line. death is (by) strangulation.

 (tsn., Aug. 20, 1976, p. 8)

6) Deceased is pregnant

with a baby boy about 7-8

months old (tsn., Aug. 20,

1976, p. 8).

Dr. Dyquiangco testified that after conducting the post mortem examination, he issued a
certification thereof (Exhibit "A"); that he issued a death certificate (Exhibit "B") for the deceased
Marciano Abuyo-Salufrania, bearing the date of 5 December 1974, made on the basis of the
information relayed by a certain Leonila Loma to his nurse before the burial, without mentioning
the cause of death; that the cause of death, as cardiac arrest, was indicated on said death
certificate only after the post mortem examination on 11 December 1974.
The other witness for the prosecution was Pedro Salufrania, son of herein appellant and of the
deceased. The lower court's decision states that, by reason of interest and relationship, before
Pedro Salufrania was allowed to testify against his father-accused Filomeno Salufrania, he was
carefully examined by the prosecuting officer and the defense counsel under the careful
supervision of the court a quo, to determine whether, at his age of 13 years old, he was already
capable of receiving correct impressions of facts and of relating them truly and, also, whether he
was compelled and/or threatened by anybody to testify against his father-accused. 1
The lower court found Pedro Salufrania to be determined and intelligent. He convincingly
declared that he was not threatened by any of his uncles on his mother's side to testify against
his father, because it was true that the latter killed his mother. Then, formally testifying as the
prosecution's lone eyewitness, he stated that his father Filomeno Salufrania and his mother
Marciana Abuyo quarrelled at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of 3 December 1974, in their
small house at a far away sitio in barrio Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte; that during said quarrel,
he saw his father box his pregnant mother on the stomach and, once fallen on the floor, his father
strangled her to death; that he saw blood ooze from the eyes and nose of his mother and that
she died right on the spot where she fell.
Pedro Salufrania further testified that after killing his mother, the accused- appellant went out of
the house to get a hammock; that his brother Alex and he were the only ones who witnessed
how the accused killed their mother because his sister and other brothers were already asleep
when the horrible incident happened; that his brothers Celedonio, Danilo and sister Merly woke
up after the death of their mother and kept watch at their mothers body while their father was
away; that their father arrived early the next morning with the hammock and after placing their
dead mother on the hammock, the accused carried her on his shoulder and brought the cadaver
to the house of his sister Conching, located at a populated section of Tigbinan that from Tigbinan
the corpse was transferred to Gabon, Talisay, Camarines Norte for burial.
Continuing his testimony, Pedro Salufrania stated that he is now living with his uncle Eduardo
Abuyo and had refused and still refused to live with his father-accused, because the latter has
threatened to kill him and his other brothers and sister should he reveal the true cause of his
mother's death.
The third witness for the prosecution was Narciso Abuyo, a resident of Gabon, Talisay, Camarines
Norte. He testified that the accused Filomeno Salufrania and his sister, the deceased Marciana
Abuyo, were lawfully wedded husband and wife as evidenced by a marriage contract (Exhibit
"C"). He declared that his sister was more or less seven (7) months pregnant when she died; that
he first came to know about his sister's death on 4 December 1974 thru his nephews Pedro and
Alex Salufrania who first informed him that their mother died of stomach ailment and headache;
that he went to Tigbinan to request for the body of his sister so that it may be buried in Talisay,
Camarines Norte and, as intended, Marciana Abuyo was buried in the Talisay Cemetery on 6
December 1974.
Narciso Abuyo also declared that after the burial of Marciana Abuyo, the three (3) children of his
deceased sister went to his house and refused to go home with their father Filomeno Salufrania;
that when asked for the reason why, his nephew Alex Salufraña told him that the real cause of
death of their mother was not stomach ailment and headache, rather, she was boxed on the
stomach and strangled to death by their father; that immediately after learning of the true cause
of death of his sister, he brought the matter to the attention of the police authorities of Talisay,
Camarines Norte, who investigated Alex and Pedro Salufirania and later, to that of the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte.
The defense had for witnesses Geronimo Villan, Juanito Bragais, Angeles Liling Balce and the
accused Filomeno Salufrania.
Geronimo Villan testified that he was a neighbor of Filomeno Sulfrania. He declared that
Marciana Abuyo died at around 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974 in her house at
Sitio Kapagisahan Tigbinan Labo, Camarines Norte; that he happened to pass by said house
because his attention was attracted by the bright light in the fireplace and he saw Filomeno
Salufrania boiling "ikmo" and garlic as medicine for his wife who was about to deliver a child; that
he helped the accused by applying "ikmo" to the different parts of the body of Marciana Abuyo
and by administering the native treatment known as "bantil", that is, by pinching and pulling the
skin with two fingers of his closed fist; that when the condition of Marciana Abuyo worsened, he
told Filomeno Salufrania to go and get Juanita Bragais who is known as a healer but the latter
arrived at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974 and that at that time Marciana
Abuyo was already dead.
Witness Juanita Bragais testified that he was fetched by Felipe Salufrania, another son of
Filomeno Salufrania at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974. He further testified
that when he reached the house of the Salufranias, Marciana Abuyo was already dead so he just
helped Filomeno Salufrania in transferring the body of his wife to the house of the latter's
brother-in-law at Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte.
Angeles Liling Balce, who claimed to be a former resident of Kapagisahan Tigbinan, Labo,
Camarines Norte testified that she arrived in the house of Filomeno Salufrania at about 6:00
o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974 after being called by one of the latter's sons; that she
saw Marciana still in a coma lying on the lap of her husband who informed her that Marciana was
suffering from an old stomach ailment.
The accused Filomeno Salufrania admitted that he was that lawful husband of the deceased
Marciana Abuyo; that at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning of 3 December 1974, Marciana
arrived home from Talisay where she had earlier stayed for about a week; that she was hungry
upon her arrival, so he allegedly cooked their food and after eating their lunch, he proceeded to
his work while his wife rested in their house; that when he returned home at 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of that same day, his wife complained to him of stomach pain and he was told to
prepare the beddings because she was already sleepy; that at about 4:00 o'clock in the morning
of 4 December 1974, he was awakened by his wife who was still complaining of stomach pain,
and that she asked for a drink of hot water; that while he was boiling water, Geronimo Villan
arrived and assisted him in administering to his wife the native treatments known as "hilot" or
massaging and "banti" that Geronimo Villan and Francisco Repuya alternately applied "bantil" to
his wife but when her condition worsened, he woke up his children, Pedro and Alex to fetch Rico
Villanueva who might be able to ,save the life of their mother; that his children left and returned
without Rico Villanueva but the latter arrived a little later.
Accused-appellant then went on to say that he sent for Juanito Bragais but the latter was not
able to cure his wife, since the latter was already dead when he arrived; that after the death of
his wife, he ordered his children to get the hammock of Kaloy Belardo whose house was about
two (2) kilometers away from their house, and upon the arrival of the hammock, he placed the
body of his wife thereon and brought it to the house of his sister Consolacion Salufrania in
Tigbinan; that while the corpse of Marciana Abuyo was at Tigbinan he sent Chiding and his elder
son to inform the brothers and sisters of his wife at Talisay about her death and that Leonila
Abuyo and Salvador Abuyo came; that he informed the Barangay Captain of Tigbinan of the cause
of death of his wife; that upon the suggestion of the brothers and sisters of Marciana Abuyo,
especially Salvador Abuyo, the body of their sister was brought home to Talisay and thereafter
buried at the Talisay Cemetery; that there was no quarrel between him and his wife that
preceded the latter's death, and that during the lifetime of the deceased, they loved each other;
that after her burial, his son Pedro Salufrania was taken by his brother-in-law Narciso Abuyo and
since then, he was not able to talk to his son until during the trial; and that at the time of death
of his wife, aside from the members of his family, Geronimo Villan Francisco Repuya and Liling
Angeles Balce were also present.
The case was considered submitted for decision by the trial court on 18 July 1978. As aforestated,
the trial court found the appellant guilty of the crimes charged and sentenced him to the penalty
of death.
The appellant assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON THE BASIS OF THE TESTIMONY OF AN
INCOMPETENT WITNESS, AND ON INCONSISTENT AND INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION, THEREBY VIOLATING THE RULE THAT THE ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO AN
ACQUITTAL UNLESS HIS GUILT IS SHOWN BEYOND ANY REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION IS CREDIBLE AND
SUFFICIENT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE COMPLEX CRIME OF
PARRICIDE WITH INTENTIONAL ABORTION.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCREDITING THE EVIDENCE FOR THE ACCUSED.
Appellant alleges that the trial court failed to determine the competence of Pedro Salufrania
before he was allowed to testify. Since Pedro was allegedly a child of tender age, being only
thirteen (13) years old when he testified, and only eleven (11) years old when the offense charged
occurred, he is presumed incompetent under Rule 130 Sec. 19 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court,
which includes among those who cannot be witnesses:
Children who appear to the court to be of such tender age and inferior capacity as to be incapable
of receiving correct impressions of the facts respecting which they are examined, or of relating
them truly.
Therefore, according to appellant, for failure of the trial court to determine Pedro's competence,
the presumption of incompetency was not rebutted and Pedro's testimony should not have been
admitted. Moreover, appellant stresses that there is no basis for the trial court's finding that
Pedro is intelligent.
Appellant's contention is without merit. The record shows that the trial court determined Pedro
Salufrania's competency before he was allowed to testify under oath. 2 The trial court's
conclusion that Pedro was intelligent and competent is fully supported by Pedro's responsiveness
to the questions propounded to him when he was already under oath:
A. Did you go here in court to testify voluntarily?
Q. Yes, Your Honor.
A. Were you not forced by your uncle to testify in his case?
Q. No, I was not forced by my uncle.
xxx xxx xxx
A. The accused is your father?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. Do you love him?
Q. No, sir.
A. Your father is accused now of crime which carries the penalty of death, are you still willing to
testify against him?
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Why did you say that you don't love your father
A. Because he killed my mother.
Q. And that is the reason why you hate your father now?
A. Yes, sir. (tsn., pp. 3, 7,17, Nov. 12, 1976).
Pedro's strong sense of moral duty to tell the truth, even though it should lead to his father's
conviction, shows that he fully appreciated the meaning of an oath, which likewise proves that
he was no longer a child of tender years at the time of his testimony.
Appellant also alleges that, since Pedro changed his answer from no to yes when he was asked
whether he was threatened by his uncle to testify against his father, shows that Pedro was lying
and proves that he did not appreciate the meaning of an oath at all. 3
Again, this contention is without merit, Pedro became confused when the trial court ordered that
the original question be reformed. Pedro's confusion is apparent from the fact that when asked
the third time, he affirmed his first answer,
Q. Isn't it that your uncle threatened you with bodily harm if you will not give statement before
the police?
A. No, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. But later you actually went with your uncle to the police because you were threatened by him
with bodily harm if you will not follow him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is it true that your uncle threatened you with bodily harm if you will not give statement to the
police?
A. No, sir. (tsn., pp. 6, 7, Nov. 12, 1976)
Appellant next lists the following alleged inconsistencies to discredit the testimony of Pedro.
First, Pedro testified on direct examination that his mother died in the evening of December 3.
while on cross-examination he said that she died in the morning of December 4. It must be noted
that he affirmed twice during cross-examination that his mother died on December 3, just as he
had testified during direct examination. Significantly, he did not mention December 4 as the date
when she died, as appellant would make it appear. Pedro merely answered 'yes' to the question
"And isn't it that your mother died in the early morning on that day (December 4) and not on the
evening of December 3?" 4 Thus, Pedro's answer could have resulted only from a
misapprehension of the a question, and for no other reason.
Second, appellant alleges that Pedro testified on direct examination that he saw appellant leave
the house to get a hammock after strangling the victim and then came back the following
morning. However, upon cross-examination, Pedro testified that appellant left at noon or in the
afternoon of December 4. Moreover, Pedro allegedly testified on re-direct that he saw appellant
sleep beside the dead body of his mother. Again Pedro misapprehended the question
propounded to him. Ajudicious reading of the transcript will bear this out:
Q. When did your father leave to get the hammock?
A. In the afternoon.
Q. That may be when the body was brought to Talisay. When your father, rather, when you said
that your father left to get a hammock so that your mother may be brought to Tigbinan what
time was that?
A. About 12:00 o'clock noon. (Tsn, p. 16, Nov. 12, 1976)
One may discern that the court itself noticed that there was a missapprehension when it
commented "that maybe when the body was brought to Talisay" after Pedro answered "In the
afternoon". When Pedro answered "about 12:00 noon' he must have been referring to the time
when appellant carried his dead wife to Tigbinan. It must be noted that the question was so
worded that it could have misled Pedro to think that what was being asked was the time when
appellant brought his dead wife to Tigbinan. In fact, there is nothing inconsistent with Pedro's
testimony that he saw his father leave in the evening of December 3 and again saw him asleep
and thus not noticed appellant's coming back after securing a hammock and sleeping beside the
deceased. Pedro was therefore telling the truth when he said that, upon waking up, he saw his
father sleeping beside his dead mother. By then, appellant had already returned with the
hammock.
Third, Pedro allegedly testified on direct examination that the corpse was carried to Tigbinan in
the morning of December 4, while on cross-examination, he said it was in the evening. 5 It must
be pointed out that Pedro merely answered "yes" to a question purportedly mentioning the time
when the victim's body was transferred to Tigbinan. The question is as follows: "The corpse of
your mother was brought to the Tigbinan proper when the vigil was had in the evening of
December 4, is that right?" It is to be noted that the question's thrust is whether or not the
victim's body was brought to Tigbinan. The time it was brought was merely incidental. Thus,
Pedro may not have paid attention to the part of the question involving time. Moreover, the
phrase "in the evening" may have referred either to the time of transport of the body or to the
vigil, which could have definitely confused Pedro.
Fourth, Pedro allegedly testified on direct examination that he, together with his brothers and
sister, kept vigil beside their mother's dead body that night, while on cross-examination, he
testified that they just kept lying down and pretended to sleep. 6 There is nothing inconsistent
here. The children could have kept vigil while lying down with their deceased mother.
Appellant further cites other alleged improbabilities to discredit Pedro's testimony. Appellant
contends that it was improbable for Pedro to have seen the attack on his mother since he testified
that the room was dimly lighted, and that, while the attach was going on, he closed his eyes
pretending to sleep. 7 This contention is without merit. Even though the room was dimly lighted,
Pedro was only two (2) meters away from his parents; thus, he could easily see, as he saw, the
attack on his mother. 8 Also, although he pretended to be asleep, it was unlikely that he kept his
eyes closed all the while, as he was aware that a fight was going on. Rather, it was to be expected
that he had his eyes open and, thus, he saw the heinous crime unfold and ultimately consumated.
Appellant alleges that he does not believe that it was fear of him that caused the delay in Pedro's
divulging the real cause of his mother's death until 10 December 1974. According to appellant,
such fear could no longer have influenced Pedro from December 6, the date he started to live
separately from him. This contention is untenable. Even though Pedro started to live separately
from his father from December 6, it cannot be said that the influence of appellant's threat
suddenly ceased from that time. It must be noted that Pedro was young and was still very much
under appellant's influence and control. The thought and memory of his father's viciousness were
still too fresh even after three days from his mother's death. The fear that he too could be killed
by appellant in like manner must have deterred him from divulging the truth earlier.
Appellant also alleges that it was improbable for Pedro to have just watched the killing of his
mother. This contention is untenable. At that moment, when his mother was being assaulted and
strangled, Pedro must have been so shocked as to be rendered immobile and powerless to do
anything. This is a normal reaction in such a situation. Besides, it is a fact of life that different
people react differently to the same types of situations. 9 One cannot overlook that there is no
standard form of behaviour when one is confronted by a shocking occurrence.10
Appellant next alleges that since the prosecution has failed without satisfactory explanation to
present Pedro's brother Alex who is alleged to be also an eyewitness to the killing of the victim,
it is presumed that Alex's testimony would be adverse to the prosecution if presented. This
contention is without merit. First, Alex, who is younger than Pedro by 3 years, may not have been
competent to testify due to his tender age. Second, even assuming that he was competent to
testify, his testimony could be merely corroborative. Corroboration is not necessary in this case
because the details of the crime have already been testified to by Pedro with sufficient clarity.
The failure to present all the eyewitnesses to an act does not necessarily give rise to an
unfavorable presumption, especially when the testimony of the witness sought to be presented
is merely corroborative. 11 Witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered, and it is a well
established rule that the testimony of a single witness, even if uncorroborated, but positive and
credible, is sufficient to support a conviction. 12 In any event, it is not for the appellant to say how
many witnesses the prosecution should have presented. 13
The inconsistencies magnified by appellant in the testimony of Pedro Salufrania have been
satisfactorily explained. In fact, some of them are not material since they neither touch upon the
manner of death of the victim nor question the identity of the killer, both of which were
unwaveringly testified upon by Pedro. Thus, with the alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities
explained away, Pedro's testimony remains unperturbed. Even if there were discrepancies, such
discrepancies were minor and may be considered as earmarks of verisimilitude.14
The trial court's assessment of Pedro's testimony, as quoted hereunder, deserves more than
passing consideration:
... The testimony of eye-witness Pedro Salufrania, 13-year old son of the victim Marciana Abuyo
and her killer-spouse Filomeno Salufrania, appears to be very clear, convincing and truthful. It is
vivid as to the details of the horrible occurence that took place at about 6:00 o'clock in the
evening of December 3, 1974 in their small house at a far away sitio of Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines
Norte, resulting in the untimely and cruel death of her (sic) mother. He and his brother Alex were
the only eyewitnesses to the gory crime committed by their father. The credibility of this witness
(Pedro Salufrania) and his testimony was invested when, despite rigid cross-examination, the
veracity of his testimony in chief was not impeached. He remained firm and on the verge of
crying, when he pointed an accusing finger at his father during the trial. He was unshaken
notwithstanding a long and detailed cross-examination. And, there is reason to bestow complete
credence to his testimony because he had the opportunity to closely observe how his father had
deliberately and cruelly ended the life of his mother. Despite his tender age and apparent childish
innocence, this Court believes that he can clearly perceive and perceiving, make known his
perception, precluding the possibility of coaching or tutoring by someone. His declaration as to
when, where and how the horrible incident complained of happened is the believable version. 15
Appellant questions the competence of Dr. Dyquiangco as an expert witness, since this is the first
time that the doctor conducted an autopsy on a cadaver which had been buried for about a week.
It must be noted, however, that although this was the doctor's first autopsy under circumstances
present in this case, he had, however, conducted similar post-mortem examinations on ten (10)
other occasions. This would constitute sufficient experience. Significantly, appellant did not
object to the doctor's expression of medical opinions during the trial. Being an expert in his field,
the doctor is presumed to have taken all pertinent factors into consideration with regard to the
autopsy, including embalming and the state of the cadaver's decomposition. Dr. Juan Dyquiangco
Jr., was a disinterested witness in the case, and a reputable public official in whose favor the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties must be applied.
Appellant further alleges that the findings of Dr. Dyquiangco and the testimony of Pedro
Salufrania do not tally. Suffice it to say that the Court finds no inconsistencies between the
findings of Dr. Dyquiangco and Pedro Salufrania's testimony. Both are consistent on material
points. Thus, the Court sees no reason to disturb the conclusions reached by the trial court insofar
as their credibility and the appellant's guilt are concerned.
Appellant's third assignment of error alleges that the trial court erred in discrediting his evidence
simply because the testimonies of the defense witnesses were consistent on material points.
Moreover, there is no showing, according to the appellant, that said testimonies were rehearsed
so as to dovetail with each other.
This contention is without merit. The Court notes, first of all, that appellant did not even bother
to discuss his defense in order to refute the massive evidence against him. This is tantamount to
an admission that he could not adequately support his version of Marciana Abuyo's death. The
trial court's reasons for rejecting the defense version, as hereunder quoted, are tenable and
sound. Thus —
On the contrary, the testimonies of defense witnesses Geronimo Villan, Angeles Liling Balce and
the accused Filomeno Salufrania suspiciously dove-tailed in every detail as to when, where and
how .Marciana Abuyo died at 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974, in their house at
sitio Kapagisahan Tigbinan Labo, Carnarines Norte, of stomach pain. On these points, these
witnesses and the accused made statements which seemed to be very fresh and clear in their
minds, despite the lapse of four long years. Their exact and uniform declarations on these points,
their phenomenal recollections, without sufficient special or uncommon reason to recall,
rendered their testimonies unconvincing. If at all, their testimonies appeared to this Court to be
an eleventh hour concoction. And, as defense witnesses, after observing them and their
declarations on the witness stand, they appeared to the Court to be untruthful and unreliable.
For, despite the synchronization of time when, the place where and how the incidence happened,
their testimonies on other material points revealed their tendency to exaggerate and their
propensity to falsehood, thus-Aside from the accused Filomeno Salufrania, there are three other
witnesses for the defense Geronimo Villan Angeles Liling Balce and Juanita Bragais. There is
nothing in the testimony of Juanito Bragais because he did not witness how and when Marciana
Abuyo died. Francisco Repuya, who was also alleged by Filomeno Salufrania to be present when
Marciana Abuyo died, did not testify. Accused Filomeno Salufrania never claimed that he
summoned for Angeles Liling Balce. According to him Angeles Liling Balce was not present during
the moment of death of Marciana Abuyo, for she was fetched by him only after the death of his
wife. Logically, therefore, there is no basis for the presentation of Angeles Liling Balce that she
was present during the moment of death of Marciana Abuyo. She was merely play-acting.
Geronimo Villan who claimed he passed-by the house of Filomeno Salufrania and saw the latter
boiling water with "ikmo" and garlic, as medicine for his wife Marciana Abuyo, who was about to
give birth was discredited by accused himself who declared he was merely boiling water for the
hot drink of his wife, who was suferring from her old stomach ailment. In like manner, witness
Geronimo Villan discredited the accused Filomeno Salufrania, about the presence of Francisco
Repuya, who allegedly alternated with Geronimo Villan in applying the native treatments of 'hilot'
and 'bantil' to Marciana Abuyo, when throughout his testimony he (Geronimo Villan) never
mentioned the presence of Francisco Repuya.
After closely observing defense witnesses Geronimo Villan and Angeles Liling Balce, this Court is
convinced that their testimonies and accounts of the incident are fabricated, untruthful and not
worth of credence. Certainly, they were not present immediately before and during the moment
of death of Marciana Abuyo. ...
Added to these, there is one scandalous circumstance, which to the mind of this Court, betrays
the guilty conscience of the accused. If there was nothing revealing in the face of the deceased
Marciana Abuyo, why was her face covered by a piece of cloth by the accused. ...
Trial judges are in the best position to ascertain the truth and detect falsehoods in the testimony
of witnesses. This Court will normally not disturb the findings of the trial court on the credibility
of witnesses, in view of its advantage in observing first hand their demeanor in giving their
testimony.16 Such rule applies in the present case.
Lastly, appellant alleges that, assuming he indeed killed his wife, there is no evidence to show
that he had the intention to cause an abortion. In this contention, appellant is correct. He should
not be held guilty of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion but of the complex
crime of Parricide with Unintentional Abortion. The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as
follows:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after having been
expelled therefrom. 17
The Solicitor General's brief makes it appear that appellant intended to cause an abortion
because he boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to fall and then strangled
her. We find that appellant's intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently established.
Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim in a
fight, is not sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an abortion. In fact, appellant must have
merely intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion.
The evidence on record, therefore, establishes beyond reasonable doubt that accused Filomeno
Salufrania committed and should be held liable for the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion. The abortion, in this case, was caused by the same violence that caused
the death of Marciana Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily exerted by the herein accused upon
his victim.
It has also been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to eight (8) months
pregnant when she was killed; (b) that violence was voluntarily exerted upon her by her husband
accused; and (c) that, as a result of said violence, Marciana Abuyo died together with the foetus
in her womb. In this afternoon, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code states that the accused
should be punished with the penalty corresponding to the more serious came of parricide, to be
imposed in its maximum period which is death. However, by reason of the 1987 Constitution
which has abolished the death penalty, appellant should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, as modified, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The indemnity of P12,000. 00
awarded to the heirs of the deceased Marciana Abuyo is increased to P30,000.00 in line with the
recent decisions of the Court. With costs against the appellant,
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 101919 July 3, 1992

RODOLFO ALCANTARA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee.

PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal by petition for review on certiorari from the Decision of the Sandiganbayan
promulgated on August 1, 1991 and its Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration,
promulgated on October 2, 1991, in Criminal Case No. 14885, entitled "People of the Philippines
v. Rodolfo Alcantara", for violation of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
The information upon which the petitioner was tried and convicted by the respondent
Sandiganbayan, reads:
That on or about the 1st day of July 1987, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then a contractual
employee of the Quezon City government; taking advantage of his official position and
committing the offense in relation to his duties did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make an untruthful statement in a narration of facts, by then and there declaring in
the Personal Data Sheet (Civil Service Form No. 212), a public document where the accused is
legally bound to disclose the truth, that he is a Civil Service Eligible (Professional) having taken
the examination in December 1978 at the Ramon Magsaysay Elementary School, with a rating of
80.35% when in truth and in fact, as the said accused well knew, he is not so, the truth being that
he is a Career Service (Sub-Professional) eligible having taken the examination in Quezon City on
December 7, 1980 with a rating of 70.36%, and by virtue of which misrepresentation, he was
appointed Community Relation Officer which requires the qualification of a Career Service
(Professional).
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The prosecution witnesses presented were Orlando Abad and Editha Isles. The former testified
that he has worked as Community Relation Assistant in the Office of the Community Relations,
Quezon City from 1980. During the change of administration after the EDSA revolution, accused
Alcantara with a designation as Management and Information Analyst, took over their office.
Accused according to Abad was already a Quezon City Hall employee being then a Technical
Assistant of the Mayor (Brigido Simon, Jr.). (Rollo, pp. 27
& 28)
Abad also averred that when he discovered that the accused was applying for the position of
Community Relation Officer, he (Abad) went to the Office of the Personnel Officer and found out
that the accused was being proposed for appointment to the vacant position, hence, he filed a
formal protest with the Civil Service Commission being the next-in-rank employee and with the
lateral entry of accused Alcantara, (Ibid., p. 28) a contractual employee, Abad's chance for
promotion would be diminished.
The same witness even admitted that he came across the appointment (Exhibit B) of the accused
when the same was returned together with accused's personal data sheet (Exhibit A) and the
position description form (Exhibit C). These documents were returned to the City Personnel
Department by the Civil Service Commission, requiring the accused, as the proposed appointee,
to submit the original of his Civil Service Eligibility (Professional). The City Personnel Department
transmitted these documents to their office and he (Abad) got Exhibits A, B and C among the
bunch of communications sent back to their office from the CSC. At the time he got them from
the table, there was no one at the office, except him and the janitor and he did not notify their
Chief about it. (Ibid., p. 29).
Abad further testified that upon knowing about the accused's appointment, he lodged a
complaint with the Tanodbayan, after he personally went to the Civil Service Commission and
verified the accused's eligibility, successfully obtaining through misrepresentation, a Certification
(Exhibit F) from the Civil Service Commission dated January 28, 1988, to the effect that the
accused is only a "sub-professional eligible." Abad also admitted that when he went to the Civil
Service Commission and asked to accomplish a form, and to accomplish his purpose ". . . he signed
the latter's (accused) signature, since he would not be able to secure said certification without
being authorized by the accused." (Exhibit E; Rollo, p. 30).
Likewise, Abad testified that the accused was a contractual employee under a separate payroll,
but when he was proposed for the position of Community Relation Officer, there was already a
common payroll of Quezon City for the month of October 16 to 30, 1987, wherein they were all
paid as CRO officers. (Rollo, p.30)
Editha Isles, the second prosecution witness, has been a Record Officer 3, Chief of Division,
Examination Records Service Division, since February 16, 1988. She declared that upon
verification from the Master List for 1979 with respect to the Career Civil Service Examination
given in December, the name of Alcantara did not appear therein, hence, the accused is not
eligible as a career service professional, but the CSC records show that the accused took an
examination on December 7, 1980, passing it with a rating of 70.36% as career service sub-
professional. Further, she stated that the one qualified to inform the trial court as to the proper
qualifications for appointment as Community Relation Officer is the Qualification Standard
Division.
Thus, Felicidad Tesoro, Chief Personnel Specialist of the Civil Service Commission was called to
testify. She declared that she became the Personnel Specialist whose duties are to evaluate job
description and qualification standards and conduct training in the local government units. As
regards the qualification standard for the position of Community Relations Officer of the Office
of the City Mayor, Quezon City, she declared that "they do not have the approved qualification
standard for Quezon City. However, they have that for the National Power Corporation which
was approved on August 1, 1989 . . . ." Although they have not conducted an audit with respect
to the job description of Community Relations Officer in Quezon City, it is believed that the
qualification standards adopted by NPC should also be adopted for the Community Relation
Officer in Quezon City. In the absence of any qualification standard, they just adopt those that
are comparable to the same position. The Commission compares other positions which have
similar job description, such as in the local government wherein they have a Community
Development Officer. She also declared that a "Technical Assistant to the Mayor is quite different
from a Community Relation Officer. The latter is a technical position in the sense that it deals
with the community. As of the present, based on qualification index, she has not found any
Community Relations Officer in the government." (Ibid., p. 32)
Accused Rodolfo Alcantara testified that on December 12, 1986, he entered into a Contract of
Services between himself and the Quezon City government through the Office of the Mayor,
represented by the Hon. Brigido R. Simon, Jr., some pertinent provisions of which follow:
That the City and the Second Party in consideration of mutual covenants made therein, enter into
this contract of services whereby the CITY GOVERNMENT commissions the services of the
SECOND PARTY as Management and Information System Officer under the Community Relations
Office, OCM under the following terms and conditions:
1. That the CITY GOVERNMENT shall commission the services of the SECOND PARTY on a full time
basis for a period of 01 January 1987 to December 31, 1987; (Exhibit 2-A)
2. That the SECOND PARTY shall well and faithfully serve the CITY GOVERNMENT and shall
perform all such services connected therewith as directed by the Executive Assistant;
3. That for services to be rendered by the SECOND PARTY, the CITY GOVERNMENT shall grant an
allowance to the SECOND PARTY in the amount of TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHT &
30/100 (P2,808.30); payable 15th and 30th of every month; and
4. That this Contract shall be renewable upon agreement of both parties and may be terminated
sooner upon prior advice of either party.
The above contractual relation was renewable every three (3) months as testified to by the
accused. He also testified that he first saw the Personal Data Sheet (Exhibit A), when he learned
that Abad filed a case against him. However accused questioned the entries on Item No. 18,
saying that he was not the one who filled up the questioned entries therein.
With respect to his alleged appointment as Community Relations Officer (Exhibit B), accused
averred that he had not come across the said document; insisted that he was never appointed as
such and although he had knowledge that he was being recommended to the said position, his
immediate supervisor, Mr. Tamayo did not inform him that he (accused) was being considered
for the position in question; and he claimed that he was not interested because the salary to the
position was lower by P1,000.00 plus a month, besides, even if there was security of tenure to
the proposed appointment, he was not attracted to it because it was a demotion.
He also denied having received the salary as Community Relations Officer, contrary to the
assertion of the complainant Abad that he received his salary as CRO for the period of October
15 to 30, 1987, as evidence by Exhibits D and D-1. Accused also denied having filled up the entries
after his signature on Exhibit C, which is the job description of the position as Community Relation
Officer and when asked whether or not he signed the said document on July 15, 1987, he declared
that the date is a later addition. (Rollo, p. 35)
As regards Exhibit E, which is request for certification of rating before the Civil Service
Commission, accused denied that he had affixed the signature appearing therein as well as the
other entries on the same form, nor did he ever authorize Abad to do so, including the
preparation of Exhibit G, the request submitted by Abad to the Civil Service Commission signing
the name of the accused in order to secure the certification of rating, Exhibit E above.(Ibid., p.
36)
Accused further testified that due to the falsification and misrepresentation of the complainant-
witness in procuring his civil service rating, he lodged a complaint for forgery against Orlando
Abad before the Regional Trial Court, evidenced by a subpoena which he marked as Exhibit 6 for
the defense. (Ibid., p. 36) Abad, according to the accused is his subordinate and that he belonged
to the Anti-Administration Association of Government Organizations. (Ibid., p. 37)
A rebuttal witness, Felimon de la Rosa, Personnel Officer III of the Personnel Office, Quezon City
Mayor's Office, testified that he has been the personnel officer in said office since April 1981. He
declared that the words "Professional" and "July 1, 1987" in line No. 18 in Exhibits A and A-1 had
both been typed in the original. (Ibid., p. 38)
From the antecedent facts culled from the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan, penned by
Second Division Chairman, Justice Romeo M. Escareal, and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose
S. Balajadia and Nathanael M. Grospe, it is obvious that the instant case arose due to jealousy
and intrigue, resulting in vengeance by means of misrepresentation, falsification of signatures
and documents and entries thereon. It is not understandable how the respondent court fell prey
to a vindictive Orlando Abad, using precious time and resources of the judicial system of the land.
That the case is doubtlessly the product of a sick mind is buttressed by the following testimonies
and documentary evidence which the court a quo did not bother to evaluate before arriving at
the conviction, based mainly on speculation, assumptions and baseless conclusions.
Anent the testimony of Abad, the private complainant being the most aggrieved party for having
been by-passed by the Quezon City government in the promotion to Community Relation Officer,
he declared that:
Subsequently, he came across the appointment (Exhibit B) of the accused when the same was
returned together with the accused's personal data sheet (Exhibit A) and the position description
form (Exhibit C). These documents were returned by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to the
City Personnel Department, requiring the accused, as the proposed appointee, to submit the
original of the Civil Service Eligibility (Professional). The City Personnel Department transmitted
these documents to their office and he got Exhibits A, B and C among the bunch of
communications sent back to their office from the CSC. At the time he got them from the table,
there was no one at the office, except him and the janitor and did not notify their Chief about it.
(Decision, p. 6, Rollo, p. 23)
Thus, being in possession of the documents by stealing them from the Office where Alcantara
and Abad are both assigned, the latter being motivated by hatred and envy for the accused for
the proposed appointment as Community Relation Officer, Abad was truck with the idea
sabotaging the appointment of Alcantara, his boss, and mortal enemy for the coveted position,
went to the extent of getting hold of the true data regarding the civil service eligibility of the
accused from the Civil Service Commission, and finding the opportunity to supply some words to
the Personal Data Sheet of the accused, Abad filled up the blank with the wrong words or
information, making it appear that the accused was the one who supplied said words such as
"Professional" in Exhibit A and the date "July 1, 1987" on page 2 of the same document, and
possibly even the Position Description listing the duties of the position of Community Relations
Officer, Exhibit C. The above scenario is clearly illustrated by the following admission of the
disgruntled complainant, Orlando Abad, as detailed in the questioned decision:
When he (Abad) first came across the document marked as Exhibit A, the word "professional" in
Item No. 18 was already there. The eligibility shown there was Civil Service Examination
(Professional), taken in 1979 at the Ramon Magsaysay Elementary School with a rating of 80.70%
plus. Said document bears the signature of accused with which he is familiar, being office-mates.
Upon knowing about the accused's appointment, he lodged a complaint with the Tanodbayan.
Furthermore, he went to the Civil Service Commission to verify the accused's eligibility, The Civil
Service Commission issued a Certification, dated January 28, 1988, to the effect that the accused
is only a "sub-professional eligible". In asking for the civil service eligibility of the accused, he
(Abad) was made to accomplish a form (Exhibit E), wherein he signed the latter's (Alcantara)
signature, since he (Abad) would not be able to secure said certification without being authorized
by the accused.
From the documents given to him by the CSC, he found out that the accused was not included in
the list of those with Professional Eligibility. He inspected the document marked as Exhibit A, the
personal data sheet and noticed that the word "professional" in Item No. 18 thereof, was a later
addition in said document. Moreover, the rating of civil service eligibility of the accused in said
document does not jibe with his sub-professional eligibility which is something like 77% . . . .
(Ibid., p. 30)
Undoubtedly, Abad was reeking with hate against Alcantara, so much so that he even presented
and identified Exhibit D, alleged common payroll of Quezon City for October 16 to 30, (sic) 1987,
which allegedly showed the salaries paid to the CRO officers. (Ibid., p. 30) If as claimed by Abad
that accused Alcantara accepted the position, how come that the latter's salary payroll was not
introduced in evidence commencing from the time he assumed the position? Besides, where is
the oath of office of the accused when he left his contractual assignment and assumed the
permanent appointment?
Besides, Abad admitted that when the documents (Exhibits A, B and C) were returned by the Civil
Service Commission to the City Personnel Department of Quezon City, it was for the purpose of
"requiring the accused, as the proposed appointee, to submit the original of his Civil Service
Eligibility (Professional)." (Ibid., p. 29) Thus, under this situation, the appointment had not yet
been approved, because the accused as proposed appointee had still something to comply with
as required by the Civil Service Commission and pending this compliance which was aborted since
Abad stole the documents, the proposed appointment did not materialize.
Furthermore, why would Abad know what the Civil Service Commission requirement was, if he
did not also get hold of the transmittal letter, which he did not introduce in evidence. Given this
fact, the Sandiganbayan should have required the complainant-witness to produce the
transmittal in order to substantiate his self-serving allegation, instead of ruling that the accused's
defense was purely denial of the accusation against him. In this regard, the presumption that the
withheld document when presented will be adverse to the case of the complainant, and
therefore, both the prosecution and the respondent did not bother to have Abad produce the
same.
It is also intriguing how the Sandiganbayan took the testimony of the private complainant hook,
line and sinker, when it is tainted from the beginning to end, with scheme and deceit driving Abad
to steal the documents which he subsequently used in charging the accused of a crime that never
was. Even the rebuttal witness Felimon de la Rosa, Personnel Officer III of the Personnel Office,
Quezon City Mayor's Office, admitted that the words "Professional" in line No. 18 in Exhibits A
and A-1 have both been typed in the original. (Ibid., p. 38) Not only this, the naked eye could
clearly see that the typewriter used in inserting the word "Professional" and the date "July 1,
1987" on page 2 of the Personal Data Sheet, is different from the typewriter used in filling up the
other information contained in the same document (Exhibit A), showing that they were insertions
made on a different date. (Rollo, p. 55)
Again, the respondent failed to honor the constitutional guarantee securing unto the accused the
right to be convicted on the strength of the prosecution's evidence and not the weakness of the
evidence of the defense. Sad to note, too, that the respondent court also failed to consider that
the prosecution was not able to prove the elements of the charge of Falsification of Public
Document as defined and penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. In the case
of People v. Guinto, this Court held, that:
The principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench and the bar that in this jurisdiction,
accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The accused is protected by the constitutional
presumption of innocence which the prosecution must overcome with contrary proof beyond
reasonable doubt. This Court has repeatedly declared that even if the defense is weak, the case
against the accused must fail if the prosecution is even weaker, for the conviction of the accused
must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecution. Indeed, if
the prosecution has not sufficiently established the guilt of the accused, he has a right to be
acquitted and released even if he presents naught a shred of evidence. . . . The accused-appellants
have been condemned . . . based on uncertain evidence clearly insufficient to sustain their
conviction. It is their guilt and not their innocence that has been presumed. It is their innocence
and not their guilt that should have been pronounced. In these circumstances, only one thing
that has to be done if the Constitution is to be observed and justice is to be served." (184 SCRA
287)
In retrospect, respondent court did not also heed the ruling (En Banc) of this Court in Fajelga v.
Hon. Romeo M. Escareal, Hon. Conrado M. Molina and Hon. Ramon V. Jabson, Second Division,
Sandiganbayan, (167 SCRA 350) wherein the essential elements of Falsification of Public
Documents defined and penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code were enumerated
and discussed as follows:
Malicious intent or wrongful intent to injure a third person is an essential element for conviction,
unless the document falsified is a public document in which case wrongful intent is not essential
(People v. Po Giok To, 96 Phil. 917). Citing the case of People v. Quasha, in the Fajelga case above,
this Court held:
Commenting on the above provisions, Justice Albert, in his
well-known work on the Revised Penal Code (new edition, pp. 407-408), observes, on the
authority of U.S. v. Reyes, (1 Phil. 341), that the perversion of truth in the narration of facts must
be made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person; and on the authority of U.S. v.
Lopez (15 Phil. 515) the same author further maintains that even if such wrongful intent is proven,
still the untruthful statement will not constitute the crime of falsification if there is no legal
obligation on the part of the narrator to disclose the truth. Wrongful intent to injure a third person
and obligation on the part of the narrator to disclose the truth are thus essential to a conviction
for the crime of falsification under the above articles (sic) of the Revised Penal Code. . . . Besides,
malicious intent to injure a third person is absent. In fact, neither the government nor any third
person incurred any loss by reason of the "untruthful" narration.
With respect to the second element of "abuse of office", it was further held by this Court in the
same case, that "it is not enough that the falsification be committed by a public officer, it is also
necessary that it was committed with abuse of his office, that is, in deeds, instruments,
indentures, certificates, etc., in the execution of which, be participates by reason of his office."
(Ibid., p. 351)
Unfortunately, all the elements pointed out in the above case by this Court, have not been
considered by the respondent Court, because Abad was not injured with an aborted appointment
of the accused and the accused did not abuse his office, the documents claimed to have been the
basis for the alleged crime of Falsification of Public Document, were not prepared for the purpose
of securing the proposed appointment as accused was already a contractual worker in the Office
of the City Mayor of Quezon City, with a valid contract up to December 31, 1987, which term may
have been extended periodically as the parties see fit.
On the other hand, the trumped up charge filed by a jealous co-worker, Orlando Abad, caused
considerable damage to the government for wasting the government's time and manpower
resources by entertaining farcical indictment as in this case.
Thus, when the respondent Sandiganbayan failed to apply the aforestated doctrines in the
instant case, it stands to reason that the accused should be acquitted, however, as regards the
issue raised by the accused concerning the lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to try the
alleged violation of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, this position is not tenable.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision promulgated on August 1, 1991 and
the resolution of October 2, 1991, are REVERSED and the accused-appellant, Rodolfo Alcantara,
is ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.
NICASIO I. ALCANTARA, G.R. No. 156183
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA* and
GARCIA, JJ.

VICENTE C. PONCE and the

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. Promulgated:
February 28, 2007
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] from a decision[2] and resolution[3] of the Court of
Appeals (CA).
In 1997, respondent Vicente C. Ponce filed a string of criminal complaints against petitioner
Nicasio I. Alcantara and his family, hereafter the Alcantaras, including one for estafa against
petitioner in the Makati Prosecutors Office docketed as I.S. No. 97-39547. In essence, respondent
Ponce alleged that petitioner had swindled him out of 3,000,000 shares of Floro Cement
Corporation.
It was in the course of the preliminary investigation of the complaint for estafa that respondent
Ponce, shortly after giving his sur-rejoinder affidavit,[4] submitted to the investigating prosecutor
a newsletter[5] purporting to be a belated annex to the affidavit. It was prefaced with the
quotation For every extraordinary fortune there is a great crime and the text:
An example is Marcos. We need not discuss this.
Second example is the Alcantaras.
a) Overshipment of log; b) Land grabbing;
c) Corruption of public office; d) Corporate grabbing.
The newsletter then went on to discuss SEC Case No. 2507 which, in the sur-rejoinder affidavit,
respondent Ponce described as being the forefather of all the cases he had filed against the
Alcantaras. In SEC Case No. 2507 which the Securities and Exchange Commission en banc decided
against him, Ponce accused the Alcantaras of defrauding him of his shares in Iligan Cement
Corporation.
On December 3, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for libel against respondent Ponce with the
Makati Prosecutors Office[6] in connection with the aforesaid newsletter. He claimed that: (1) the
statements therein were defamatory; (2) respondent had circulated it in the Makati Prosecutors
Office and (3) the newsletter could not be considered an annex to the sur-rejoinder because
respondent had not attached it to the said affidavit but had given it thereafter.
The preliminary investigation was conducted by City Prosecutor Imelda P. Saulog. On March 17,
1998, Prosecutor Saulog issued a resolution[7] finding probable cause for libel and recommending
the filing of an information[8] in court. Thereafter, the case was filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Makati and raffled to Judge Tranquil Salvador of Branch 63.
However, respondent Ponce filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice, who
reversed the City Prosecutor in a resolution dated February 28, 2000.[9] This reversal was based
on the finding that the newsletter was a privileged communication, having been submitted to
the investigating prosecutor Benjamin R. Bautista as an intended annex to respondents sur-
rejoinder. The Secretary of Justice thus directed the withdrawal of the information.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[10] but it was denied.[11]
Petitioner elevated the matter via petition for certiorari to the CA where it was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 61543. In a decision dated August 29, 2002, the CA found that the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of discretion, set aside the latters resolution and directed the
reinstatement of the criminal case.[12] After unsuccessfully moving for reconsideration in the
Department of Justice, respondent Ponce attempted to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court
by way of a petition for review on certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 157105. However,
we denied respondent Ponces motion for extension for time to file his petition [13] as well as his
subsequent motions for reconsideration.
 In the meantime, however, before CA-G.R. SP No. 61543 was decided, the Office of the Makati
City Prosecutor, in deference to the resolution of the Justice Secretary, filed a motion to withdraw
information, which the trial court granted on September 28, 2001. [14] The trial court ruled that
the absence of the essential element of publicity precluded the commission of the crime of libel.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the withdrawal but the trial court denied the motion in
an order dated March 21, 2002.[15]
On June 17, 2002, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari in the CA, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 71189. In this case, the CA rendered the assailed decision.
The principal question for our consideration is whether or not the CA, in its decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 71189, gravely erred in finding that Judge Salvador had not committed grave abuse of
discretion for granting the withdrawal of the information for libel against respondent Ponce.
The crime of libel, as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code,[16] has the following
elements:
(1) imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status
or circumstance;
(2) publicity or publication;
(3) malice;
(4) direction of such imputation at a natural or juridical person, or even a dead person and
(5) tendency to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the person defamed.
The factual antecedents are undisputed. The only issue is whether or not the controversial
newsletter constituted privileged communication, which would exempt it from libel.
According to the Special Fifth Division of the CA:
It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the course of judicial
proceedings are absolutely privileged. This absolute privilege remains regardless of the
defamatory tenor and the presence of malice if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to
the cause in hand or subject of the inquiry. The lone requirement imposed to maintain the cloak
of absolute privilege is the test of relevancy.
In this case, a reading of the Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit, contrary to petitioners submission, instantly
shows that there was sufficient reference to the newsletter which justified the Justice Secretary
and respondent Judge in holding that private respondent actually intended the said article to be
included as an annex attached to said pleading and that the same was merely omitted and
belatedly submitted to Prosecutor Bautista during the preliminary investigation. Such sufficient
reference is shown by the fact that the newsletter is about SEC Case No. 2507 the very same case
being discussed by private respondent in pages 8 to 12 of his Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit and hence,
petitioners claim that Annex F mentioned together with Annex E, both articles showing the
devious maneuvering of petitioner in the said case, refers to another article. And even if the
supposed Exhibit F could refer also to that article So The Public May Know, such circumstance
will not exclude the subject newsletter as an intended annex to the said pleading as in fact private
respondent explicitly mentioned articles without stating that there were only two (2) particular
articles being referred or which of those articles caused to be published by his counsel.
As the Justice Secretary opined and which position the respondent Judge adopted, the newsletter
containing the defamatory statement is relevant and pertinent to the criminal complaint for
estafa then under preliminary investigation. The crime of estafa involves deceit, dishonesty and
other fraudulent acts. The inclusion in the Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit of the newsletter discussing
the alleged corporate grabbing by petitioner will tend to support private respondents case of
estafa against petitioner insofar as such alleged corporate grabbing will highlight or manifest
petitioners propensity for dishonest dealing or fraudulent machinations. There is therefore no
doubt that the subject newsletter is relevant and pertinent to the criminal complaint for estafa,
and hence the same comes within the protective cloak of absolutely privileged communications
as to exempt private respondent from liability for libel or damages.
In determining the issue of relevancy of statements made in judicial proceedings, courts have
adopted a liberal attitude by resolving all doubts in favor of relevancy. Thus, in People vs. Aquino,
our Supreme Court has emphasized that it is the rule that what is relevant or pertinent should be
liberally construed to favor the writer, and the words are not to be scrutinized with microscopic
intensity. The doctrine of privileged communication has a practical purpose.
xxx xxx xxx
Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been written, known to
someone other than the person to whom it has been written. There is publication if the material
is communicated to a third person. What is material is that a third person has read or heard the
libelous statement, for a mans reputation is the estimate in which others hold him, not the good
opinion which he has of himself. Our Supreme Court has established the rule that when a public
officer, in the discharge of his or her official duties, sends a communication to another officer or
to a body of officers, who have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of the
communication, such communication does not amount to publication. Applying this rule by
analogy to the present case, private respondents submission of the newsletter intended as an
annex to his Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit in I.S. No. 97-39547 to Prosecutor Bautista who was then
conducting the preliminary investigation in said case, does not amount to publication for the
reason that the sending of such material was made specifically for the purpose of including the
same as evidence in the preliminary investigation. That such submission was belatedly made does
not take out the material from the absolutely privileged communication rule. Prosecutor Bautista
had a legal duty to perform with respect to the subject communication, which is to consider the
same along with the other evidence submitted by private respondent as complainant in I.S. no.
97-39547, in determining the existence of probable cause for the commission of the crime of
estafa and that petitioner as accused-defendant therein should be tried for such offense. Under
the circumstances and in the lawful exercise of private respondents right to present evidence in
support of his accusations against petitioner in the criminal complaint for estafa, We fail to see
how such submission of documentary evidence omitted from the annexes to the Sur-Rejoinder
Affidavit, could amount to publication that would give rise to private respondents liability for a
libel charge especially when there is no proof of the alleged circulation of copies of the subject
newsletter except to the City Prosecutors Office of Makati wherein I.S. No. 97-39547 was then in
the preliminary investigation stage. Petitioners feeble argument that Prosecutor Bautista
remains a third person because the subject newsletter was never included or formally offered as
evidence, hardly convinces Us to hold that there was actual publication for purpose of finding
a prima facie case for libel against the private respondent. He must be reminded that the case
for estafa was still at the preliminary investigation stage and there is no requirement of a formal
offer of such documentary evidence or supporting documents to establish probable cause
(citations omitted).[17]
Since the newsletter was presented during the preliminary investigation, it was vested with a
privileged character. While Philippine law is silent on the question of whether the doctrine of
absolute privilege extends to statements made in preliminary investigations or other proceedings
preparatory to the actual trial, the U.S. case of Borg v. Boas[18]makes a categorical declaration of
the existence of such protection:
It is hornbook learning that the actions and utterances in judicial proceedings so far as the actual
participants therein are concerned and preliminary steps leading to judicial action of an official
nature have been given absolute privilege. Of particular interest are proceedings leading up to
prosecutions or attempted prosecutions for crime xxx [A] written charge or information filed with
the prosecutor or the court is not libelous although proved to be false and unfounded.
Furthermore, the information given to a prosecutor by a private person for the purpose of
initiating a prosecution is protected by the same cloak of immunity and cannot be used as a basis
for an action for defamation. (Emphasis ours)
The ruling in Borg is persuasive in this jurisdiction. We see no reason why we should not adopt
it.
Furthermore, the newsletter qualified as a communication made bona fide upon any subject-
matter in which the party communicating has an interest . . . made to a person having a
corresponding interest or duty, although it contained [in]criminatory matter which without this
privilege would be slanderous and actionable.[19]
While the doctrine of privileged communication can be abused, and its abuse can lead to great
hardships, to allow libel suits to prosper strictly on this account will give rise to even greater
hardships. The doctrine itself rests on public policy which looks to the free and unfettered
administration of justice.[20] It is as a rule applied liberally.[21]
 The one obstacle that those pleading the defense of privileged communication must hurdle is
the test of relevancy. Under this test, a matter alleged in the course of the proceedings need not
be in every case material to the issues presented but should be legitimately related to the issues
or be so pertinent to the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of
trial.[22]
Here, the controversial statements were made in the context of a criminal complaint against
petitioner, albeit for other, separate acts involving greed and deceit, and were disclosed only to
the official investigating the complaint. Liberally applying the privileged communication doctrine,
these statements were still relevant to the complaint under investigation because, like the
averments therein, they also involved petitioners alleged rapacity and deceitfulness.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the September 13, 2002 decision and
November 21, 2002 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71189 AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-48088 July 31, 1978

GOTARDO FLORDELIS, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE EDGAR R. HIMALALOAN, as Acting City Judge, City Court of Tagbilaran, Branch 11;
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and SULPICIO TINAMPAY, respondents.

BARREDO, J.:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the order of respondent judge denying
petitioner's motion to quash a criminal information for perjury against him based on the grounds
that (a) the facts charged therein do not constitute an offense and (b) the said information
contains averments which constitute a defense.
The information in question, which was filed with the City Court of Tagbilaran City, presided over
by respondent judge, on January 13, 1978 reads as follows:
The undersigned, 3rd Assistant City Fiscal, City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, hereby accuses Gotardo
Flordelis of the crime of Perjury, committed as follows:
That, on or about the 2nd day of July, 1977, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, moved by a desire to evade
payment of a just debt and Attorneys' fees for legal services rendered, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously execute and sign a verified answer to the complaint of Atty.
Sulpicio Tinampay and filed with the City Court of Tagbilaran City and which alleges, among other
things, that the herein accused did not owe anything from Atty. Sulpicio Tinampay, much less,
did he engage his legal services, when in truth and in fact, as said accused fully well knew, such
statement on a material matter is false for the records would show that said accused had actually
engaged the legal services of Atty. Sulpicio Tinampay in the cases of THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. GOTARDO FLORDELIS', docketed as Criminal Case No. 4639, for Usurpation of
Official Function, and "THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FERMIN O MAR, ET AL.", docketed as
Criminal Case No. 4640, for Perjury; thus, said accused herein had in said manner willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously made an untruthful statement in a narration of facts, thereby causing
upon said Atty. Sulpicio Tinampay trouble and embarrassment, to his damage and prejudice in
the amount to be proved during the trial of the case.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code.
City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, December 28, 1977.
(Sgd.) MARIANO CAPAYAS 3rd Asst. City Fiscal
APPROVED:
(Sgd.) JOVENCIO S. ORCULLO City Fiscal
(Pages 24-25, Record.)
On February 13, 1978, petitioner filed a motion to quash this information on the two grounds
already stated at the outset of this opinion. On even date, respondent judge denied the said
motion to quash thus:
ORDER
The Court is not yet in the position to resolve the issues thus raised in the motion to quash filed
by the accused thru counsel at this stage of the proceedings without allowing the People to
present in Court the questioned pleadings as basis of the charge of perjury, otherwise, the Court
would be denied of its right to scrutinize the evidence of the prosecution if the case will be
quashed, and if also, the prosecution is not given a chance to present the questioned document
or pleadings as evidence in Court.
Thus, the issues adverted to in the motion to quash are all question of evidence which the Court
cannot resolve without allowing the People to present first its evidence in Court.
WHEREFORE, the motion to quash filed by the accused thru counsel should be denied, as it is
hereby denied for being premature.
Notify the prosecuting Fiscal and Atty. Amado R. Olis of this order accordingly.
SO ORDERED. (Page 41, Record.)
It is plain from even a cursory reading of the above-quoted information that the allegedly false
statement attributed to the petitioner was made by him in "a verified answer to the complaint
of Atty. Sulpicio Tinampay and filed with the City Court of Tagbilaran City".
Without delving any further into the detailed circumstances of the proceeding in the City Court
of Tagbilaran City referred to in the information and confining Our attention even only to the
mention thereon of "a verified answer to a complaint — filed in the City Court", it is at once
apparent that one element of the crime of perjury is absent in the charge as filed against
petitioner, namely, that the sworn statement complained of must be required by law. (The
Revised Penal Code by Justice Ramon C. Aquino, Vol. 111, 1976 ed., pp. 1062-1063.) The answer
to a complaint in an ordinary civil action need not be under oath.
Moreover, it is likewise clear that any statement contained in an appropriate pleading filed in
court that is relevant to the issues in the case to which it relates is absolutely privileged and it is
the law that the same may not be made the subject of a criminal prosecution. (People vs. Aquino,
18 SCRA 555.)
The assertion of respondent judge in his order in question that the prosecution should first be
allowed to "present in court the questioned pleadings as basis of the charge of perjury" overlooks
quite surprisingly that petitioner had attached to his motion to quash the complaint and the
verified answer, and it is not claimed that the authenticity of any of them has been put in issue
by the prosecution. Thus, further evidence to show (1) that those pleadings were filed in an
ordinary action where there is no requirement that the answer to a complaint does not have to
be verified and (2) the relevancy of the allegedly perjured statements and consequently their
absolutely privileged character was superfluous. Actual presentation thereof at the formal trial
could not have altered their legal import in the determination of whether or not under the facts
alleged in the information petitioner could be convicted of perjury.
On the issue of the propriety of certiorari and prohibition under the circumstances of this case,
We only need to reiterate what We held in People vs. Ramos, L-25265, May 9, 1978 thus:
As to the contention of respondents that the denial of a motion to quash is not a ground for
certiorari and prohibition, suffice it to state that to allow an accused to undergo the ordeals of
trial and conviction when the information or complaint against him is patently defective or the
offense charged therein has an indisputably Shown to have already prescribed is unfair and
unjust for which reason, procedurally, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and
adequate. (Page 69, Record.)
WHEREFORE, the petition herein is granted and the respondent court is hereby ordered to
dismiss the abovequoted information for perjury against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 918 of
said court. No costs.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.