Vda. deOuano vs.

Republic
G.R. NO. 168770, 9 FEBRUARY 2011

FACTS:

1. In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAA’s predecessor agency pursued a
program to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City.
2. As an assurance from the government, there is a promise of reconveyance or repurchase of said
property so long as Lahug ceases its operation or transfer its operation to Mactan – Cebu Airport.
3. Some owners refused to sell, and that the Civil Aeronautics Administration filed a complaint for
the expropriation of said properties for the expansion of the Lahug Airport.
4. The trial court then declared said properties to be used upon the expansion of said projects and
order for just compensation to the land owners, at the same time directed the latter to transfer
certificate or ownership or title in the name of the plaintiff.
5. At the end of 1991, Lahug Airport completely ceased its operation while the Mactan-Cebu airport
opened to accommodate incoming and outgoing commercial flights.
6. This then prompted the land owners to demand for the reconveynace of said properties being
expropriated by the trial court under the power of eminent domain. Hence these two consolidated
cases arise.
7. In G.R. No. 168812 MCIAA is hereby ordered by court to reconvey said properties to the land
owners plus attorney’s fee and cost of suit, while in G.R. No. 168770, the RTC ruled in favor of
the petitioners Oaunos and against the MCIAA for the reconveynace of their properties but was
appealed by the latter and the earlier decision was reversed, the case went up to the CA but the
CA affirmed the reversed decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
 Should MCIAA reconvey the lands to petitioners? YES

1
 HELD:

The notion that the government via expropriation proceedings acquires unrestricted ownership over or a
fee simple title to the covered land is no longer tenable. Expropriated lands should be differentiated from
a piece of land, ownership of which was absolutely transferred by way of an unconditional purchase and
sale contract freely entered by two parties, one without obligation to buy and the other without the duty to
sell. In that case, the fee simple concept really comes into play. There is really no occasion to apply the
“fee simple concept” if the transfer is conditional.

The taking of a private land in expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on its continued
devotion to its public purpose.Once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily abandoned, then the
former owner, if he so desires, may seek its reversion subject of course to the return at the very least
of the just compensation received.

In expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against his will. The mandatory requirement
of due process ought to be strictly followed such that the state must show, at the minimum, a genuine
need, an exacting public purpose to take private property, the purpose to be specifically alleged or least
reasonably deducible from the complaint.

Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to include any use
that is of “usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit [of the public].” If the
genuine public necessity—the very reason or condition as it were—allowing, at the first instance, the
expropriation of a private land ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the
government’s retention of the expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if the government
devotes the property to another public use very much different from the original or deviates from the
declared purpose to benefit another private person. It has been said that the direct use by the state of its
power to oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession to another citizen, who will use it
predominantly for that citizen’s own private gain, is offensive to our laws.

The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and in the
process dishonor the judgment of expropriation. A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant
to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the
new purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the
latter so desires.

Hence, equity and justice demand the reconveyance by MCIAA of the litigated lands in question to
the Ouanos and Inocians. In the same token, justice and fair play also dictate that the Ouanos and
Inocian return to MCIAA what they received as just compensation for the expropriation of their
respective properties plus legal interest to be computed from default, which in this case should run from
the time MCIAA complies with the reconveyance obligation.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT SANGKAY

G.R. No. 165828 August 24, 2011

BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS:

 Pursuant to its legal mandate under Republic Act No. 6395 (An Act Revising the Charter of the
National Power Corporation), NPC undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project

2
 in the 1970s to generate electricity for Mindanao. The project included the construction of several
underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the
hydroelectric plants.[2]
 1997: Respondents sued NPC in the RTC for the recovery of damages and of the property, with
the alternative prayer for the payment of just compensation
 Allegations: that one of the underground tunnels of NPC that diverted the water flow of
the Agus River for the operation of the Hydroelectric Project in Agus V, Agus VI and
Agus VII traversed their land
 that the underground tunnel had been constructed without their knowledge and consent;
that the presence of the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial
and residential value of their land
 NPC’s Answer: the Heirs of Macabangkit had no right to compensation under section 3(f) of
Republic Act No. 6395, under which a mere legal easement on their land was established; that
their cause of action, should they be entitled to compensation, already prescribed due to the
tunnel having been constructed in 1979; and that by reason of the tunnel being an apparent and
continuous easement, any action arising from such easement prescribed in five years
 RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs finding that an underground tunnel was constructed therein
 Ordered NPC to pay P113,532,500.00 as actual damages or just compensation
 NPC to pay rental fees
 the RTC issued a supplemental decision stating that respondents’ land or properties are
condemned in favor of defendant National Power Corporation, upon payment of the aforesaid
sum
 the Heirs of Macabangkit filed an urgent motion for execution of judgment pending appeal. [9]
 The RTC granted the motion and issued a writ of execution
 NPC assailed such decision by filing a writ by petition for certiorari in the CA
 CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC
Rationale:
 the testimonies of NPCs witness Gregorio Enterone and of the respondents witness Engr.
Pete Sacedon, the topographic survey map, the sketch map, and the ocular inspection
report sufficiently established the existence of the underground tunnel traversing the land
of the Heirs of Macabangkit
 Section 3(i) of R.A. No. 6395, being silent about tunnels, did not apply to the present
case
 Contention of NPC: the CA should have applied Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395, which
provided a period of only five years from the date of the construction within which the affected
landowner could bring a claim against it; and that even if Republic Act No. 6395 should be
inapplicable, the action of the Heirs of Macabangkit had already prescribed due to the
underground tunnel being susceptible to acquisitive prescription after the lapse of 10 years
pursuant to Article 620 of the Civil Code due to its being a continuous and apparent legal
easement under Article 634 of the Civil Code.
 National Power Corporation (NPC) seeks the review on certiorari of the decision of the CA

ISSUE: WON NPC is liable for payment of just compensation?

RULING: Yes.
1. Factual findings of the RTC are binding since it was affirmed by the RTC
 the evidence on the tunnel was substantial, for the significance of the topographic survey
map and the sketch map (as indicative of the extent and presence of the tunnel
construction) to the question on the existence of the tunnel was strong

3
  These two (2) pieces of documentary evidence readily point the extent and presence of
the tunnel construction coming from the power cavern near the small man-made lake
which is the inlet and approach tunnel, or at a distance of about two (2) kilometers away
from the land of the plaintiffs-appellees, and then traversing the entire and the whole
length of the plaintiffs-appellees property, and the outlet channel of the tunnel is another
small man-made lake
 The ocular inspection done by the RTC actually confirmed the existence of the tunnel
2. Five-year prescriptive period under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 does not apply
to claims for just compensation
 prescription did not bar the present action to recover just compensation
 Section 3(i) includes no limitation except those enumerated after the term works.
Accordingly, the term works is considered as embracing all kinds of
constructions, facilities, and other developments that can enable or help NPC to
meet its objectives of developing hydraulic power expressly provided under
paragraph (g) of Section 3.[23] The CAs restrictive construal of Section 3(i) as
exclusive of tunnels was obviously unwarranted, for the provision applies not
only to development works easily discoverable or on the surface of the earth but
also to subterranean works like tunnels
 the prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395
is applicable only to an action for damages, and does not extend to an action
to recover just compensation like this case

JUST COMPENSATION (inverse DAMAGES

condemnation)
has the objective to recover the
value of property taken in fact by the
governmental defendant, even
though no formal exercise of the
power of eminent domain has been
attempted by the taking agency.
Just compensation is the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator.
The measure is not the takers gain,
but the owner’s loss. The
word just is used to intensify the
meaning of the
word compensation in order to
convey the idea that the equivalent
to be rendered for the property to be
taken shall be real, substantial, full,
and ample
Basis: Constitution
arises from the exercise by the State
of its power of eminent domain
against private property for public
use
seeks to vindicate a legal wrong
through damages, which may be
actual, moral, nominal, temperate,
liquidated, or exemplary
When a right is exercised in a
manner not conformable with the
norms enshrined in Article
19[28] and like provisions on
human relations in the Civil
Code, and the exercise results to
the damage of another, a legal
wrong is committed and the
wrongdoer is held responsible
statutory enactments
emanates from the transgression
of a right

 Due to the need to construct the underground tunnel, NPC should have first
moved to acquire the land from the Heirs of Macabangkit either by voluntary

4
 tender to purchase or through formal expropriation proceedings. In either case,
NPC would have been liable to pay to the owners the fair market value of the
land, for Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395 expressly requires NPC to pay
the fair market value of such property at the time of the taking
3. The construction constitutes taking of the land as to entitle the owners to just compensation
 there was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were not
completely and actually dispossessed.
 It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable,
need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation. [36] Indeed, the expropriators
action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but
may still amount to a taking
 As a result, NPC should pay just compensation for the entire land
 Just compensation was based on the valuation of the OIC of the City Assessors Office
who testified that, within that area, that area is classified as industrial and residential.
That plaintiffs land is adjacent to many subdivisions and that is within the industrial
classification. He also issued a certificate stating that the appraised value of plaintiffs
land ranges fromP400.00 to P500.00 per square meter
 the fixing of just compensation must be based on the prevailing market value at the
time of the filing of the complaint, instead of reckoning from the time of the taking
pursuant to Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395
 Compensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either
when NPC entered or when it completed the tunnel, as NPC submits, would not
be just, for it would compound the gross unfairness already caused to the owners
by NPCs entering without the intention of formally expropriating the land, and
without the prior knowledge and consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit
 NPCs entry denied elementary due process of law to the owners since then until
the owners commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings

REPUBLIC VS. SAMSON-TATAD 696 SCRA 809 (2013)

G.R. No. 187677 April 17, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND

HIGHWAYS (DPWH), Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon
City, and SPOUSES WILLIAM AND REBECCA GENATO, Respondents.

Facts:

On 13 July 2001, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH), filed a Complaint against several defendants, including private respondents, for
the expropriation of several parcels of land affected by the construction of the EDSA-Quezon Avenue
Flyover.5 Private respondents, Spouses William and Rebecca Genato, are the registered owners of a piece
of land ("subject property") covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-11603 (383648)6 and
having an area of 460 square meters.

During the pendency of the proceedings, petitioner received a letter dated 14 June 2002 from Engr.
Patrick B. Gatan, Project Manager IV of the DPWH-NCR, reporting that the subject property was
"government land and that the transfer certificate of title of the said claimant respondent x xx is of
dubious origin and of fabrication as it encroached or overlapped on a government property."7 As a result,

5
petitioner filed an Amended Complaint on 24 June 2002,8 seeking to limit the coverage of the
proceedings to an area conforming to the findings of the DPWH:

4. To accomplish said project, which is to be undertaken by the Department of Public Works and
Highways [DPWH], it is necessary and urgent for plaintiff to acquire in fee simple portions of the
following parcels of land belonging to, occupied, possessed, and/or the ownership of which are being
claimed by the defendants, to wit:

x xxx

[c] Defendants William O. Genato and Rebecca G. Genato. –

x xxx

5. The portion of the above properties that are affected by the project and shaded green in the sketch plan
hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex E, consisting of an area of: x xx [c] 460 square
meters of the aforedescribed property registered in the name of defendants spouses William and Rebecca
Genato; x xx. (Emphasis in the original)

On 18 July 2002, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion9 to have the subject property "declared or
considered of uncertain ownership or subject to conflicting claims."

In an Order dated 10 December 2002,10 the RTC admitted petitioner’s Amended Complaint, deferred the
release to respondents the amount of eighteen million four hundred thousand pesos (P18,400,000)
deposited in the bank, equivalent to the current zonal valuation of the land, and declared the property as
the subject of conflicting claims.

While petitioner was presenting evidence to show that the subject property actually belonged to the
Government, private respondents interposed objections saying that petitioner was barred from presenting
the evidence, as it constituted a collateral attack on the validity of their TCT No. RT-11603 (383648). The
RTC then required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda.

Upon receipt of the Memoranda, the trial court issued on 12 July 2005 an Order11 as follows:

WHEFEFORE, premises considered, the Court finds that the issue of the validity of the TCT No. 11603
(383648) can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose and not in this instant
proceeding. Accordingly, plaintiff is barred from presenting evidence as they [sic] constitute collateral
attack on the validity of the title to the subject lot in violation of Sec. 48 of P. D. 1529.

On 4 August 2005, petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration,12 but the motion was denied
by the RTC in an Order dated 17 November 2005.13

On 4 January 2006, private respondents filed a Motion for the payment of just compensation amounting
to twenty million seven hundred thousand pesos (₱20,700,000) and for the release of eighteen million
four hundred thousand pesos (₱P18,400,000) deposited in the Land Bank–South

Harbor Branch as partial payment.14 This Motion remains pending in the RTC to date.

On 9 February 2006, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.15

6
The appellate court ruled that since the subject property was covered by a Torrens title, Presidential
Decree No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree (P. D. 1529), necessarily finds significance. Thus, it
held that the RTC rightly applied Sec. 48. Accordingly, the CA issued its 29 September 2008 Decision,16
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The prayer for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is accordingly DENIED.

On 29 October 2008, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,17 but the motion was also denied in a
Resolution dated 27 April 2009.18

Hence, the instant Petition.

A Comment19 on the Petition was filed by private respondents on 1 September 2009, and a Reply20
thereto by petitioner on 27 January 2010.

Issue:
whether petitioner may be barred from presenting evidence to assail the validity of respondents’ title
under TCT No. RT-11603 (383648).

Ruling:
The answer is No. We rule that petitioner may be allowed to present evidence to assert its
ownership over the subject property, but for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to just
compensation.

Proceeding from the principle of jus regalia, the right to eminent domain has always been considered as a
fundamental state power that is inseparable from sovereignty.23 It is described as the State’s inherent
power that need not be granted even by the Constitution,24 and as the government's right to appropriate,
in the nature of compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose.25

Expropriation, or the exercise of the State’s right to eminent domain, is proscribed by the restraints of
public use and just compensation.26It is governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which presents
procedural guidelines for the court to ensure that due process is observed and just compensation rightly
paid to the private owners.

Indeed, this Court first had the occasion to interpret Section 9, Rule 67 in the case of Republic. In
addressing the issue of "whether or not the court that hears the expropriation case has also jurisdiction to
determine, in the same proceeding, the issue of ownership of the land sought to be condemned," the Court
answered in the affirmative:

The sole issue in this case, i.e., whether or not the court that hears the expropriation case has also
jurisdiction to determine, in the same proceeding, the issue of ownership of the land sought to be
condemned, must be resolved in the affirmative. That the court is empowered to entertain the conflicting
claims of ownership of the condemned or sought to be condemned property and adjudge the rightful
owner thereof, in the same expropriation case, is evident from Section 9 of the Revised Rule 69, which
provides:

SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership. Conflicting claims. — If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain,
or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as
compensation for the property to be paid to the clerk of court for the benefit of the persons adjudged in
the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums

7
awarded to either the defendant or the clerk before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for
the public use or purpose if entry has already been made.

In fact, the existence of doubt or obscurity in the title of the person or persons claiming ownership of the
properties to be expropriated would not preclude the commencement of the action nor prevent the court
from assuming jurisdiction thereof. The Rules merely require, in such eventuality, that the entity
exercising the right of eminent domain should state in the complaint that the true ownership of the
property cannot be ascertained or specified with accuracy.27

We arrived at the same conclusion in Republic v. Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc.,28 in which we held thus:

The trial court should have been guided by Rule 67, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which provides
thus:

SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. — If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain,
or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as
compensation for the property to be paid to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same
proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded
to either the defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the
public use or purpose if entry has already been made.

Hence, the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court’s Order to award payment of just
compensation to the defendants-intervenors. There is doubt as to the real owner of Lot No. 3080.

Despite the fact that the lot was covered by TCT No. T-61963 and was registered under its name, the
Rural Bank of Kabacan manifested that the owner of the lot was no longer the bank, but the defendants-
intervenors; however, it presented no proof as to the conveyance thereof. In this regard, we deem it proper
to remand this case to the trial court for the reception of evidence to establish the present owner of Lot
No. 3080 who will be entitled to receive the payment of just compensation.1âwphi1 (Emphases supplied)

However, the authority to resolve ownership should be taken in the proper context. The discussion in
Republic was anchored on the question of who among the respondents claiming ownership of the
property must be indemnified by the Government:

Now, to determine the person who is to be indemnified for the expropriation of Lot 6, Block 6, Psd-2017,
the court taking cognizance of the expropriation must necessarily determine if the sale to the Punzalan
spouses by Antonio Feliciano is valid or not. For if valid, said spouses must be the ones to be paid by the
condemnor; but if invalid, the money will be paid to someone else. x x x.29

Thus, such findings of ownership in an expropriation proceeding should not be construed as final and
binding on the parties. By filing an action for expropriation, the condemnor (petitioner), merely serves
notice that it is taking title to and possession of the property, and that the defendant is asserting title to or
interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the
taking.30

If at all, this situation is akin to ejectment cases in which a court is temporarily authorized to determine
ownership, if only to determine who is entitled to possession. This is not conclusive, and it remains open
to challenge through proper actions.31 The consequences of Sec. 9, Rule 67 cannot be avoided, as they
are due to the intimate relationship of the issue of ownership with the claim for the expropriation
payment.32

8
Inapplicability of Section 48, P. D. 1529

Verily, our interpretation of Sec. 9, Rule 67 does not run counter to Section 48 of P.D. 1529. Under Sec.
48, collateral attacks on a Torrens title are prohibited. We have explained the concept in Oño v. Lim,33 to
wit:

An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when its objective is to nullify the title, thereby
challenging the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the objective
is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect
or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made
as an incident thereof.

In several instances, we have considered an Answer praying for the cancellation of the plaintiff's Torrens
title as a form of a collateral attack.34 We have afforded the similar treatment in a petition questioning the
validity of a deed of sale for a registered land,35 and in a reformation of a deed of sale to include areas
registered under the name of another party.36 But a resolution on the issue of ownership in a partition
case was deemed neither to be a direct or collateral attack, for "until and unless this issue of co-ownership
is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties."37

Here, the attempt of petitioner to present evidence cannot be characterized as an "attack." It must be
emphasized that the objective of the case is to appropriate private property, and the contest on private
respondents' title arose only as an incident to the issue of whom should be rightly compensated.

Contrary to petitioner's allegations, the Complaint and Amended Complaint cannot also be considered as
a direct attack. The amendment merely limited the coverage of the expropriation proceedings to the
uncontested portion of the subject property. The RTC's Order declaring the property as subject of
conflicting claims is a recognition that there are varying claimants to the sums to be awarded as just
compensation. This serves as an authority for the court to conduct a limited inquiry on the property's
ownership.

TITLE: SY V LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF QC

GR No. 202690
Date: June 5, 2013
Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Parties:
petitioner: Henry L. Sy
respondent: Local Government of Quezon City

Facts:
November 7, 1996, the City through then Mayor Ismael Mathay, filed a complaint for expropriation with
the RTC in order to acquire a 1,000 sq. m. parcel of land, owned and registered under the name of Henry
Sy, which was intended to be used as a site for several government activities.
March 18,1997, pursuant to Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), the City deposited
the amount pf P241,090 with the Office of the Clerk of Court, representing 15% of the fair market value
of the subject property based on its tax declaration. Sy did not question the right to expropriate the
property but only the amount of just compensation. The RTC tasked 3 commissioners to determine the
proper amount of just compensation. It was decided by 2 of them that it should be P5,500 per sq. m. to be
computed from the date of the filing of the expropriation complaint (November 7, 1996). On the other
hand, 1 said that the amount should be P13,500 per sq. m.

9
The RTC ruled that just compensation should be P5,500 per sq. m. It also didn’t award damages and back
rentals in favor of Sy. For equity considerations, 6% legal interest was awarded computed from the date
of the filing of the expropriation until full payment of just compensation. The CA affirmed the RTC’s
ruling with the modification that the City should pay Sy the amount of P200,000 as exemplary damages
(because the City took the property without even initiating expropriation proceedings) and attorney’s fees
equivalent to 1% of the total amount due. Sy was denied payment for back rentals and damages for
shelved plans of utilization.
Both Sy and the City’s motion for reconsiderations were denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in upholding the amount of just compensation, its grant of 6% legal interest,
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees-PARTLY
Ratio:

Rate of legal interest and time of accrual:

The correct legal interest is 12% owing to the nature of the City’s obligation as an effective forbearance.
It was held in Republic v. CA that “the debt incurred by the government on account of the taking of the
property subject of an expropriation constitutes and effective forbearance which therefore, warrants the
application of the 12% legal interest.” Also, legal interest should accrue from the time of the “taking” of
the property in 1986 (when the property was already used as a Barangay day care and office) and not
from the filing of the complaint for expropriation on November 7, 1996. The lack of proper authorization,
i.e. resolution to effect expropriation, did not affect the character of the City’s taking of the subject
property in 1986. There is “taking’ when the owner is actually deprived of the use of his property thus, the
legal character of the City’s action as one of “taking” did not change.
Because of such irregularity in the actual “taking” and filing of the expropriation proceedings, exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees should be awarded to the landowner for equity purposes. MIAA v. Rodriguez
states that “these are wanton and irresponsible acts which should be suppressed and corrected. Hence the
award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees is in order.”
With regard to the amount of just compensation, the P5,500 per sq. m. cannot be sustained. This was
derived from documents that were issued in 1996. Valuation should be based as of the time of the taking
which was in 1986. Thus, the case should be remanded to the RTC for proper assessment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The CA decision is SET ASIDE and the case is
REMANDED to the RTC.

SEC. OF DPWH vs. TECSON

FACTS:
The 7,268 sq. m. parcel of land, owned by respondent spouses Tecson, was among the properties
taken by the government sometime in 1940 without the owners’ consent and without the necessary
expropriation proceedings. This parcel of land was usedfor the construction of MacArthur Highway.
On 1994, respondents demanded the payment of the fair market value of the subject parcel of
land. Petitioner Contreras, then District Engineer of the First Bulacan Engineering District of petitioner
DPWH, offered to pay the subject land at the rate of P0.70 per square meter per. Unsatisfied with the
offer, respondents demanded for the return of their property or the payment of compensation at the current
fair market value.
As their demand remained unheeded, respondents filed a Complaint for recovery of possession
with damages against petitioners. They claimed that the subject parcel of land was assessed
at P2,543,800.00.
On the other hand, petitioners insist that the action is barred by prescription having been filed 54
years after the accrual of the action in 1940. Also, petitioners claim that the just compensation should be
based on the value of the property at the time of taking in 1940 and not at the time of payment.
ISSUES:

10
 1. Whether or not the action was barred by laches.
2. Whether the value of the property shall be based on the time of taking or on the time of payment.
RULING:
1. NO
Laches is principally a doctrine of equity which is applied to avoid recognizing a right when to do
so would result in a clearly inequitable situation or in an injustice.This doctrine finds no application in
this case, since there is nothing inequitable in giving due course to respondents’ claim. Both equity and
the law direct that a property owner should be compensated if his property is taken for public use.Neither
shall prescription bar respondents’ claim following the long-standing rule "that where private property is
taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto either through expropriation or
negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe.”
2.
Jurisprudence dictates that just compensation due respondents in this case should be fixed not as
of the time of payment but at the time of taking, that is, in 1940.For where property is taken ahead of the
filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for
which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or,
there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time it is taken to the time the
complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be
compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond
his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken.
Both the RTC and the CA recognized that the fair market value of the subject property in 1940
was P0.70/sq m.Hence, it should, therefore, be used in determining the amount due respondents instead of
the higher value which is P1,500.00. While disparity in the above amounts is obvious and may appear
inequitable to respondents as they would be receiving such outdated valuation after a very long period, it
is equally true that they too are remiss in guarding against the cruel effects of belated claim. The concept
of just compensation does not imply fairness to the property owner alone. Compensation must be just not
only to the property owner, but also to the public which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation.
Also, respondents are entitled to adequate compensation in the form of actual or compensatory
damages which in this case should be the legal interest of 6% per annum on the value of the land at the
time of taking in 1940 until full payment.This is based on the principle that interest runs as a matter of
law and follows from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good position as money can
accomplish, as of the date of taking.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES SALVADOR and NENITA

CRUZ

FACTS:

Civil Case No. 111-M-97 was an expropriation proceeding commenced by Napocor against respondents
who are the owners of individual lots located in Del Monte Park Subdivision, Dulong Bayan, San Jose
Del Monte, Bulacan. The complaint, filed on February 17, 1997, primarily sought the determination of
just compensation due the respondents after the negotiations for the purchase of the lots failed.

The RTC directed the Bulacan Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) "to review and submit an updated
appraisal report on the properties to be acquired by [Napocor] in order 'to judicially guide the Court in
fixing the amount to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendants.'" 4 In the meantime, the RTC allowed

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Napocor to take possession of the lots, after Napocor deposited an amount equivalent to their assessed
value pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. 5

On October 22, 1997, the PAC submitted its report 6 to the RTC which pegged the just compensation at
P2,200.00 per square meter. After considering the PAC's report, the RTC issued an order dated March 31,
1998 fixing the just compensation at P3,000.00 per square meter.

Napocor appealed the RTC's March 31, 1998 order with the CA. It assailed the appointment of the PAC,
claiming that its appointment was contrary to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. It also alleged that the
determination of the amount of just compensation was without basis.

ISSUE:
1.Whether or not the appointment of the PAC was contrary to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
2.Whether the determination of the amount of just compensation was without basis.

RULING:
1.No. The appointment of the PAC was not contrary to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

The settled rule in expropriation proceedings is that the determination of just compensation is a judicial
function. To assist the courts in this task, Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court requires the
appointment of "not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to
ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." Although the
appointment of commissioners is mandatory, the Rules do not impose any qualifications or restrictions on
the appointment, other than that the commissioners should not number more than three and that they
should be competent and disinterested parties.

In this case, the Court finds that the appointment of the PAC as commissioners substantially complies
with Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. It is immaterial that the RTC appointed a committee instead
of three persons to act as commissioners, since the PAC is composed of three members — the Provincial
Assessor, the Provincial Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer. Considering their positions, we find each
member of the PAC competent to perform the duty required of them, i.e., to appraise the valuation of the
affected lots. As correctly found by the CA, they "are government officials entrusted with the updating
and time-to-time determination of currently assessed, as well as, market value of properties within their
jurisdiction." The mere fact that they are government officials does not disqualify them as disinterested
persons, as the provincial government has no significant interest in the case.

2. No. The determination of the amount of just compensation was with basis.

Neither do we find significant Napocor's claim that it was denied due process in the determination of the
amount of just compensation. As against Napocor's bare allegation that it was not notified of the PAC's
hearing, the obtaining circumstances, set out below, lead us to believe otherwise.

The PAC members, upon their appointment and oath, are considered officers of the court, and we can
extend to them the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official functions. 19 It is hard to
believe that Napocor was completely left in the dark in the proceedings conducted by the PAC to
determine just compensation, considering its interest in the case.

Likewise, we find untenable Napocor's claim that the amount of just compensation was without factual
and legal basis. That the properties were valued at P427.76 per square meter in August 1996, then at
P2,200.00 in October 1997 does not necessarily indicate that the assessment by the PAC was manipulated.
Napocor itself acknowledge an increase in the value of the properties when it modified its offered

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settlement from P427.76 to P1,900.00. Also, the LBP Appraisal Report, which Napocor itself
commissioned, has pegged the fair market value of the properties at P2,200.00 per square meter. The
report considered important improvements in the vicinity, among them, the construction of a school, a
church and several public buildings.

SPOUSES JESUS DYCOCO and JOELA E. DYCOCO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
On November 23, 1994, petitioner-spouses filed a complaint for ejectment, cancellation of certificates of
land transfer, damages and injunction against private respondents Nelly Siapno-Sanchez and
InocencioBerma in the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Albay. EusebioSiapno, Rogelio Siapno, Felix Sepato, Sr., Leonora
Talagtag and Pablo Bonde, Sr. were also named respondents in the complaint.

In their complaint, petitioner-spouses alleged that they are the absolute and registered owners of Lot No.
216, a 38,157 sq.m.-parcel of land situated at Bonbon, Libon, Albay, covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. VH-5187 of the Register of Deeds of Albay. According to them, the respondents named in
the complaint took advantage of the liberality of petitioner-spouses, entered the subject property,
successfully registered themselves as tenants for agrarian reform purposes, and occupied and cultivated the
property to the prejudice of petitioner-spouses. Said respondents deprived petitioner-spouses of the
enjoyment and possession of the property without paying petitioner-spouses or the Land Bank the rentals
due thereon. Moreover, in violation of agrarian reform laws, said respondents subleased their respective
landholdings to other persons.

On motion of petitioner-spouses, the Provincial Adjudicator issued a writ of execution dated November 22,
1995 ordering, among others, the ejectment of private respondents from their respective tillage.
Subsequently, petitioner-spouses filed a Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution and to Cite
Respondents in Contempt, claiming that private respondents returned to the subject property although they
have already been ordered ejected. Private respondents filed a Motion to Quash or Suspend Implementation
of the Writ of Execution. They explained that they are already the owners of their respective portions of the
property in question by virtue of the Operation Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27.According
to petitioner-spouses, they were deprived of their property without just compensation either from the
tenant-beneficiaries or from the government.

ISSUE:
W/N petitioner-spouses were deprived of their property without just compensation and denied of due
process.

HELD:
There is no question that petitioner-spouses are entitled under the law to receive just compensation for the
property taken from them and transferred to private respondents by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.
Due process guarantees that taking of private property by the State for public use should be with payment
of just compensation. Unfortunately, petitioner-spouses themselves did not consider the issue of just
compensation as compelling enough because they did not raise it in the complaint or in the position paper
which they filed in the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator. They only claimed just compensation for the
first time on appeal, that is, when they filed their petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The settled
rule that issues not raised in the proceedings below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal bursts the
bubble that is the alleged compelling nature of petitioner-spouses' claim. Petitioner-spouses ask for due

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process, but fairness and due process dictate that evidence and issues not presented below cannot be taken
up for the first time on appeal.

On jurisdictional grounds, petitioner-spouses could not validly present for the first time the issue of
nonpayment of just compensation in the Court of Appeals. Under the law, the DARAB has primary,
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving payments for lands awarded under Presidential
Decree No. 27.In any event, the right of petitioner-spouses to payment of just compensation does not
include reacquisition of ownership and possession of the property transferred to private respondents
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. Lands acquired under Presidential Decree No. 27 do not revert to
the landowner.

The due process claim of petitioner-spouses has no leg to stand on. They have had ample opportunity to
defend their interests in due course. Stripped to its basic concept, due process is simply the opportunity to
be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain one's side or the
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Petitioner-spouses were given
the chance to sufficiently state their case concerning the timeliness of the notice of appeal filed by private
respondents.

In particular, they submitted to the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator their Comments [on]/Opposition to
the Motion to Quash/Suspend Implementation of Writ of Execution and Notice of Appeal Filed by
Respondents dated September 16, 1996 and Supplemental Comments [on]/Opposition to the Motion to
Quash/Suspend Implementation of Writ of Execution and Notice of Appeal Filed by Respondents dated
October 3, 1996 where they argued that both the motion to quash and the notice of appeal of private
respondents were filed beyond the prescribed period. In the DARAB level, petitioner-spouses filed a
Counter-Memorandum With Motion to Dismiss Appeal dated February 9, 1997 where they again pointed
out that the appeal of private respondents was filed out of time. Thus, petitioner-spouses cannot correctly
claim that they were not heard on the matter.

REPUBLIC VS BPI
FACTS: The DPWH filed a case for expropriation against portions of the properties of Bank of
the Philippine Islands and of Bayani Villanueva situated in Pamplona, Las Piñas City. DPWH
several square meters from the parties’ land for the construction of the Zapote-Alabang Fly-
Over.
Neither BPI nor Villanueva objected to the propriety of the expropriation;hence, the trial
court constituted a Board of Commissioners to determine the just compensation. In their
Report the Board of Commissioners recommended the amount of P40,000.00 per square
meter as the fair market value.
The decision then became final and executory since neither parties appealed with regards to
the said amount. But on December 1998, BPI filed a Motion for Partial New Trial, to
determine the just compensation of its building, which was not included in the decision
which fixed the just compensation for the parcels of land.
The trial court held that just compensation for the building was due and ordered petitioner to
pay BPI the amount of P2,633,000.00. Petitioner moved for reconsideration claiming that the
building was never taken by the government since the original plan affecting the subject
property was not implemented.
ISSUE: Whether the award of additional just compensation for BPI’s building is warranted.
RULING:Eminent domain is the authority and right of the State, as sovereign, to take
private property for public use upon observance of due process of law and payment of just
compensation.The State’s power of eminent domain is limited by the constitutional mandate
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be
expropriated.The general rule is that the just compensation to which the owner of the

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condemned property is entitled to is the market value.Market value is that sum of money
which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled
to sell, would agree on as a price to be paid by the buyer and received by the seller. The
general rule, however, is modified where only a part of a certain property is expropriated.In
such a case, the owner is not restricted to compensation for the portion actually taken, he is
also entitled to recover the consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the
property.
Petitioner’s argument that there was no actual taking of the building is untenable.

No actual taking of the building is necessary to grant consequential damages. Consequential

damages are awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of the owner
suffers from an impairment or decrease in value.
The rules on expropriation clearly provide a legal basis for the award of consequential
damages. Section 6 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides:

x xx The commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the property not taken
and deduct from such consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by
the owner from the public use or public purpose of the property taken, the operation of its
franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of the corporation or person
taking the property. But in no case shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed the
consequential damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the actual value of his
property so taken.

We find the ruling of Republic of the Philippines through the DPWH vs. CA and Rosario R.
Reyes appropriate to apply in this case, to wit:

No actual taking of the remaining portion of the real property is necessary to grant
consequential damages. If as a result of the expropriation made by petitioner, the remaining
lot (i.e., the 297-square meter lot) of private respondent suffers from an impairment or
decrease in value, consequential damages may be awarded to private respondent.

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