OP-ED BY SECRETARY WEINBERGER

h o.ve.... be. ,.,

'F4:i fs R'IE> F l'UJl.9 ~ i 11 ions of Americans a~e feeliA9
o.~se,ec9..
frightened, a ~ , horrified, or simply drained by a

vision of life "The Day Aftpr" a nuclear war. They have

come face to fi\ce wit.h the terrible reality that I, as

S«ac-retary of Defense, but a J so as a father and grandfather,

11111st live with every day. J\nd they a.re iisking themselvea
, I hope they are asking themselves -- "INhat we as a

nation can do to m~ke sure tPlevision drama never turns

into real life.

We must never become n11mb to the horror of nuclear

weapons. There could be no "winners" in a nuclear war.

~s ~r~sident Reagan has said on many occasipns, and just

rcL·cntly reaffirmed before the Jap;::rnese Diet,",4:'Nuclear

l')eve_-
Wftr c a ~ be won, and must never be fought."

nut neither can we nfford to become paralyzed with

rear. It is not, tragically, within our power to put an

end to the knowledge that could put an end to us. We

~onnot banish the discoveries of nuclear physics: neither

can we leave these discoyeries to other nations which may

. he less appalled by their prospect •

I

The ABC film did not try to take us into the minds

of the Soviet leaders. And in fact we cannot know if

1hose leaders share our vision of nuclear disaster,

or how long they will be leaders. What we do know is

t 11at over the past two decodes the Soviets have developed
more, and more powerful and accurate, nuclear weapons
than they could possibly need simply to deter attack. And,
with the refiring capability of tbeir weapons, which we do

not have, and based on their extensive military literature

on the subject, it appears that t'hey believe a nuclear war

ci\n be fought and won~ ~ ~ only wish the Soviet leaders

would allow their citizens to see a film like "The Day

After."

If we cannot return to the world that existed befo~e

the 6ecret of the atom was unlocked, and if it appears

lhRt t.he Soviets no ·not s1ia r e our conviction that nuclear

w.-.r is unwinnable, how can we make certain that these

t Pr-rible weapons are never 1Jsed?

Every American Presinrnt since the dawn of the

1111l'lear age has answered this question in the same way:

we must convince any potential adversary that the costs

of aggression by tl1em would be far, far higher than any

poasible benefit. As Pre~inent Kennedy said in his

initugural adnress, "only when our arms are sufficient

heyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they

will never be employed." l\nd history has proved that

this strategy works.

I often hear the fear expressed that this strategy

«>f ~elerrence, even if i t h~s prevented nuclear war for

,, 1111ost 40 yea rs, hns fuel e d a 1lnn9erous arms race. Well,

wl1;it we hdVC wi tncsGcd for the 1 ast fi ftcen years is a

rn1c-s:ic1°'-.arms. rr1ce: a race I.he United States has not

In fact, <luring the 1970s we m~de a conscious

 -3-

-- nnd public -- choice to restrict our nuclear weapons

developments, hoping that the Soviets would imitate our

restraint. They did not. Today there are 25 percent

fewer weapons in our nuclear stockpile than 20 years ago.

As recently ~s two weeks ago, we and our NATO Allies agreed

to take 1,400 more nuclear weapons out of Europe.

Dy contrast, the size of the Soviet nuclear weapons

stockpile has grown sjgnificantly during this same period.

We want the Soviet Union to join us in dramatically

reducing both sides' nuclear stockpiles. Overall, the

rresidept's START proposals would reduce U.S. and Soviet

p t:l.11 .,.s:-\-
1c..- m ,ss I I~ wo.-h e.c...J_r
elr~tegie er • ea~ls by one-third below present levels.

l'\nd while, ' in the · face of the Soviet nuclear buildup, we

must upgrade and modernize our existing forces to ensure

that they still pose a believable retaliatory threat,

this does not mean we are seeking to increase our nuclear .

ftrsenal. Indeed, the President has proposed eliminating

~Jr wa,,.." ~ "- e.a.. l:J. \
two ballistic missile,. for every MX missile,\ we eild. ol e P t> ft
l'\ deep reduction in _the most terrible weapons ever .to . .. .

threaten mankind is an ambitious but a proper, even noble;--::---···-- - _

goal. And we must accept that the Soviets will test our

resolve on this goal. They are tough negotiators. They

will not easily give up the hope that we will unilaterally

rl!duce our own strength nnd ;illow them uncontested military

Ruperiority which would be the end of peace through

,Jeterrence. They will not casi ly believe that any nation

which allows a free and open debate about matters as

- - -~ ~ ~ - •
uerious as war and peace can mc\intain a steady course. ··-·- --- ---

We must convince them that we are committed to the pursuit -·

of p e ~ t;;,£-,--./~~ -~
811 the say ,a,Fic tj( "The Day After, " what can each of us

,10 to prevent tragedy · on a glohal scale? We can fight

off the temptation to inoulge in despair. We can remain

ulrong in our determination to preserve deterrence, and to

perHevere in our scdrch for <J""nuine, mutual, significant

iirms reduct:ion. And we can share our conviction that

1n1clec\r war h«s no winners with the individuals whom we

11101:Jl need to convince: the lt?nnArship of the Soviet Union.

Our petitions and our mare-hes should be directed to that

leadership -- and qllickly.

FOR---,-,--;---;-:-:--::--:------t-~------::~=---- - - - - - - : : - - = - - - , , : - ,= ~-

CALLER
---~-------------
ORGAN I ZATIO N ~ Co-o-L_ -
05fJ -
PHONE NO. (J{J✓ i,..j!£ (ffl f-iisf

- -PLEASE CALL

RETURNED YOUR CALL ,

MESSAGE ~ - - ~Y5
u~ ~