II.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES (RULE 128)

A. DEFINITION

G.R. No. L-2068 October 20, 1948

DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, respondent.

E. M. Banzali for petitioner.

Acting Provincial Fiscal Albino L. Figueroa and Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marcelo L. Mallari for respondent.

TUASON, J.:

The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga after he
had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace
court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her
witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused.
The motion was denied and that denial is the subject matter of this proceeding.

According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to the Court of First Instance in support of his
motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the justice of
the peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea
of not guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be
examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected,
invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his
intention to renounce his right to present evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first
instance.

Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing his right to present evidence, and by reason of that
waiver he was committed to the corresponding court for trial, is estopped, we are of the opinion that the respondent
judge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the accused's motion to return
the record for the purpose set out therein. In Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336, recently
promulgated, in which case the respondent justice of the peace had allowed the accused, over the complaint's objection,
to recall the complainant and her witnesses at the preliminary investigation so that they might be cross -examined, we
sustained the justice of the peace's order. We said that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the
justice of the peace on the matter. We said that "while section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the defendant's right
in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the autho rity, inherent in a court of
justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth."
But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right, compel the complaint and his witnesses to repeat
in his presence what they had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest." We called
attention to the fact that "the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not
apply to preliminary hearings' nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to
confront witnesses." As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the
constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.

The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther than the majority and denied even
any discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge holding the preliminary investigation to compel the
complainant and his witnesses to testify anew.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 190846, February 03, 2016

TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Petitioner, v. JOSE G. HOSANA, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 challenging the August 28, 2009 decision 2 and November 17, 2009
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88645.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Facts

The respondent Jose G. Hosana (Jose) married Milagros C. Hosana (Milagros) on January 14, 1979.4During their marriage,
Jose and Milagros bought a house and lot located at Tinago, Naga City, which lot was covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 21229.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On January 13, 1998, Milagros sold to the petitioner Tomas P. Tan, Jr. (Tomas) the subject property, as evidenced by a
deed of sale executed by Milagros herself and as attorney-in-fact of Jose, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
executed by Jose in her favor. 6 The Deed of Sale stated that the purchase price for the lot was P200,000.00. 7 After the
sale, TCT No. 21229 was cancelled and TCT No. 32568 was issued in the name of Tomas.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On October 19, 2001, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of Title/Reconveyance and
Damages against Milagros, Tomas, and the Register of Deeds of Naga City. 9 The complaint was filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62, Naga City. In the complaint, Jose averred that while he was working in Japan, Milagros,
without his consent and knowledge, conspired with Tomas to execute the SPA by forging Jose's signature making it
appear that Jose had authorized Milagros to sell the subject property to Tomas. 10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In his Answer, Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good faith and for value. 11 Before he paid the full consideration
of the sale, Tomas claimed he sought advice from his lawyer-friend who told him that the title of the subject lot was
authentic and in order.12 Furthermore, he alleged that the SPA authorizing Milagros to sell the property was annotated at
the back of the title.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Tomas filed a cross-claim against Milagros and claimed compensatory and moral damages, attorney's fees, and
expenses, for litigation, in the event that judgment be rendered in favor of Jose. 14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The RTC declared Milagros in default for her failure to file her answer to Jose's complaint and Tomas' cross-claim.15 On
the other hand, it dismissed Tomas' complaint against the Register of Deeds since it was only a nominal
party.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued. 17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Jose presented his brother, Bonifacio Hosana (Bonifacio), as sole witness. Bonifacio testified that he learned of the sale of
the subject property from Milagros' son. 18 When Bonifacio confronted Milagros that Jose would get angry because of the
sale, Milagros retorted that she sold the property because she needed the money. Bonifacio immediately informed Jose,
who was then in Japan, of the sale. 19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Jose was furious when he learned of the sale and went back to the Philippines. Jose and Bonifacio verified with the
Register of Deeds and discovered that the title covering the disputed property had been transferred to
Tomas.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Bonifacio further testified that Jose's signature in the SPA was forged. 21 Bonifacio presented documents containing the
signature of Jose for comparison: Philippine passport, complaint-affidavit, duplicate original of SPA dated 16 February
2002, notice of lis pendens, community tax certificate, voter's affidavit, specimen signatures, and a handwritten
letter.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On the other hand, Tomas submitted his own account of events as corroborated by Rosana Robles (Rosana), his
goddaughter. Sometime in December 1997, Tomas directed Rosana to go to the house of Milagros to confirm if Jose
knew about the sale transaction. Through a phone call by Milagros to Jose, Rosana was able to talk to Jose who
confirmed that he was aware of the sale and had given his wife authority to proceed with the sale. Rosana informed
Tomas of Jose's confirmation.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

With the assurance that all the documents were in order, Tomas made a partial payment of P350,000.00 and another
P350,000.00 upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed of Sale). Tomas noticed that the consideration
written by Milagros on the Deed of Sale was only P200,000.00; he inquired why the written consideration was lower than
the actual consideration paid. Milagros explained that it was done to save on taxes. Tomas also learned from Milagros
that she needed money badly and had to sell the house because Jose had stopped sending her
money.24chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The RTC Ruling

In its decision dated December 27, 2006, 25 the RTC decided in favor of Jose and nullified the sale of the subject property
to Tomas. The RTC held that the SPA dated June 10, 1996, wherein Jose supposedly appointed Milagros as his
attorney-in-fact, was actually null and void.

Tomas and Milagros were ordered to jointly and severally indemnify Jose the amount of P20,000.00 as temperate
damages.26chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The CA Ruling

Tomas appealed the RTC's ruling to the CA.

In a decision dated August 28, 2009, 27 the CA affirmed the RTC ruling that the deed of sale and the SPA were void.
However, the CA modified the judgment of the RTC: first, by deleting the award of temperate damages; and second, by
directing Jose and Milagros to reimburse Tomas the purchase price of P200,000.00, with interest, under the principle of
unjust enrichment. Despite Tomas' allegation that he paid P700,000.00 for the subject lot, the CA found that there was
no convincing evidence that established this claim. 28chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Tomas filed a motion for the reconsideration of the CA decision on the ground that the amount of P200,000.00 as
reimbursement for the purchase price of the house and lot was insufficient and not supported by the evidence formally
offered before and admitted by the RTC. Tomas contended that the actual amount he paid as consideration for the sale
was P700,000.00, as supported by his testimony before the RTC. 29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The C A denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit" in a resolution dated November 17,
2009.30chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Petition

Tomas filed the present petition for review on certiorari to challenge the CA ruling which ordered the reimbursement of
P200,000.00 only, instead of the actual purchase price he paid in the amount of P700,000.00.31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Tomas argues that, first, all matters contained in the deed of sale, including the consideration stated, cannot be used as
evidence since it was declared null and void; second, the deed of sale was not specifically offered to prove the actual
consideration of the sale;32third, his testimony establishing the actual purchase price of P700,000.00 paid was
uncontroverted;33 and, fourth, Jose must return the full amount actually paid under the principle of solutio
indebiti.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Jose, on the other hand, argues that first, Jose is estopped from questioning the purchase price indicated in the deed of
dale for failing to immediately raise this question; and second, the terms of an agreement reduced into writing are
deemed to include all the terms agreed upon and no other evidence can be admitted other than the terms of the
agreement itself.35chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Issues

The core issues are (1) whether the deed of sale can be used as the basis for the amount of consideration paid; and (2)
whether the testimony of Tomas is sufficient to establish the actual purchase price of the
sale.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

OUR RULING

We affirm the CA ruling and deny the petition.

Whether Tomas paid the purchase price of P700,000.00 is a question of fact not proper in a petition for review
on certiorari. Appreciation of evidence and inquiry on the correctness of the appellate court's factual findings are not the
functions of this Court, as we are not a trier of facts.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This Court does not address questions of fact which require us to rule on "the truth or falsehood of alleged
facts,"37 except in the following cases:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in
the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The present case does not fall under any of these exceptions.

Whether Tomas sufficiently proved that he paid P700,000.00 for the subject property is a factual question that the CA
had already resolved in the negative. 39 The CA found Tomas' claim of paying P700,000.00 for the subject property to be
unsubstantiated as he failed to tender any convincing evidence to establish his claim.

We uphold the CA's finding.

In civil cases, the basic rule is that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of
evidence.40 Moreover, the parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense
offered by their opponent.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible
evidence."42 Preponderance of evidence is a phrase that, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence
that is more convincing to the court as it is worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto.43chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

We agree with the CA that Tomas' bare allegation that he paid Milagros the sum of P700,000.00 cannot be considered as
proof of payment, without any other convincing evidence to establish this claim. Tomas' bare allegation, while
uncontroverted, does not automatically entitle it to be given weight and credence.

It is settled in jurisprudence that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it; 44 the burden rests on the
defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment.45 A mere allegation is not
evidence,46 and the person who alleges has the burden of proving his or her allegation with the requisite quantum of
evidence, which in civil cases is preponderance of evidence.

The force and effect of a void contract is distinguished from its admissibility as evidence.

The next question to be resolved is whether the CA correctly ordered the reimbursement of P200,000.00, which is the
consideration stated in the Deed of Sale, based on the principle of unjust enrichment.

The petitioner argues that the CA erred in relying on the consideration stated in the deed of sale as basis for the
reimbursable amount because a null and void document cannot be used as evidence.

We find no merit in the petitioner's argument.

A void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. 47 This rule applies to contracts that are
declared void by positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouse's written
consent.48 A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. 49 It cannot be validated either
by ratification or prescription. 50 When, however, any of the terms of a void contract have been performed, an action to
declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it. 51chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It is basic that if a void contract has already "been performed, the restoration of what has been given is in order." 52 This
principle springs from Article 22 of the New Civil Code which states that "every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same." Hence, the restitution of what each party has given is a
consequence of a void and inexistent contract.
While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be enforced since it is deemed inexistent, it does not preclude
the admissibility of the contract as evidence to prove matters that occurred in the course of executing the contract, i.e.,
what each party has given in the execution of the contract.

Evidence is the means of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact, sanctioned by the
Rules of Court.53 The purpose of introducing documentary evidence is to ascertain the truthfulness of a matter at issue,
which can be the entire content or a specific provision/term in the document.

The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be used as a means to ascertain the truthfulness of the consideration
stated and its actual payment. The purpose of introducing the deed of sale as evidence is not to enforce the terms
written in the contract, which is an obligatory force and effect of a valid contract. The deed of sale, rather, is used as a
means to determine matters that occurred in the execution of such contract, i.e., the determination of what each party
has given under the void contract to allow restitution and prevent unjust enrichment.

Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of these rules.54There is no provision
in the Rules of Evidence which excludes the admissibility of a void document. The Rules only require that the evidence is
relevant and not excluded by the Rules for its admissibility. 55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence because the purpose of introducing it as evidence is to ascertain the
truth respecting a matter of fact, not to enforce the terms of the document itself.

It is also settled in jurisprudence that with respect to evidence which appears to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency,
or admissibility, the safer policy is to be liberal and not reject them on doubtful or technical grounds, bu t admit them
unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent; for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the
consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent. On the other hand, their admission, if they
turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring
them.56chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null and void by positive provision of the law prohibiting th e sale of
conjugal property without the spouse's consent. It does not, however, preclude the possibility that Tomas paid the
consideration stated therein. The admission of the deed of sale as evidence is consistent with the liberal policy of the
court to admit the evidence: which appears to be relevant in resolving an issue before the courts.

An offer to prove the regular execution of the deed of sale is basis for the court to determine the presence of the
essential elements of the sale, including the consideration paid.

Tomas argues that the Deed of Sale was not specifically offered to prove the actual consideration of the sale and, hence,
cannot be considered by the court. Tomas is incorrect.

The deed of sale in the present case was formally offered by both parties as evidence.57 Tomas, in fact, formally offered it
for the purpose of proving its execution and the regularity of the sale. 58chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The offer of the deed of sale to prove its regularity necessarily allowed the; lower courts to consider the terms written
therein to determine whether all the essential elements 59 for a valid contract of sale are present, including the
consideration of the sale. The fact that the sale was declared null and void does not prevent the court from relying on
consideration stated in the deed of sale to determine the actual amount paid by the petitioner for the purpose of
preventing unjust enrichment.

Hence, the specific offer of the Deed of Sale to prove the actual consideration of the sale is not n ecessary since it is
necessarily included in determining the regular execution of the sale.

The consideration stated in the notarized Deed of Sale is prima facie evidence of the amount paid by the petitioner.

The notarized deed of sale is a public document and is prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated
therein.60chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the judgment of the law,
is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense and which if
not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient. 61chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the present case, the consideration stated in the deed of sale constitutes prima facie evidence of the amount paid by
Tomas for the transfer of the property to his name. Tomas failed to adduce satisfactory evidence to rebut or contradict
the consideration stated as the actual consideration and amount paid to Milagros and Jose.

The deed of sale was declared null and void by a positive provision of law requiring the consent of both spouses for the
sale of conjugal property. There is, however, no question on the presence of the consideration of the sale, except with
respect to the actual amount paid. While the deed of sale has no force and effect as a contract, it remains prima
facie evidence of the actual consideration paid.

As earlier discussed, Tomas failed to substantiate his claim that he paid to Milagros the amount of P700, 000.00, instead
of the amount of P200,000.00 stated in the deed of sale. No documentary or testimonial evidence to prove payment of
the higher amount was presented, apart from Tomas' sole testimony. Tomas' sole testimony of payment is self-serving
and insufficient to unequivocally prove that Milagros received P700,000.00 for the subject property.

Hence, the consideration stated in the deed of sale remains sufficient evidence of the actual amount the petitioner paid
and the same amount which should be returned under the principle of unjust enrichment.

Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains money
or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience."62 The prevention of
unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State and is based on Article 22 of the Civil
Code.63chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The principle of unjust enrichment requires Jose to return what he or Milagros received under the void contract which
presumably benefitted their conjugal partnership.

Accordingly, the CA correctly ordered Jose to return the amount of P200,000.00 since this the consideration stated in the
Deed of Sale and given credence by the lower court. Indeed, even Jose expressly stated in his comment that Tomas is
entitled to recover the money paid by him in the amount of P200,000.00 as appearing in the contract.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for review on certiorari. The decision dated August 28, 2009 and the
resolution dated November 17, 2009, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88645 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

G.R. No. 185590, December 03, 2014

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, v. LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION AND SPOUSES MANUEL LEY AND JANET LEY, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals’
Decision1 dated September 4, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 75590 dismissing the appeal of petitioner Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company assailing the dismissal of its complaint by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 56, and
the Resolution2 dated December 5, 2008 denying the Bank’s motion for reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals adopted the following recital of facts in the Decision 3 dated July 3, 2001 of the RTC in Civil Case No.
91-1878:

This is an action for recovery of a sum of money and damages with a prayer for the issuance of writ of
preliminary attachment filed by the plaintiff Philippine Banking Corporation 4 against the defendants,
namely: Ley Construction and Development Corporation (hereafter “LCDC”) and Spouses Manuel and
Janet C. Ley (hereafter “[defendant]-spouses”).

The complaint alleges that: Defendant LCDC, a general contracting firm, through the oral
representations of defendant-spouses, applied with plaintiff, a commercial bank, for the opening of a
Letter of Credit. Plaintiff issued, on April 26, 1990, Letter of Credit DC 90[-]303-C in favor of the
supplier-beneficiary Global Enterprises Limited, in the amount of Eight Hundred Two Thousand Five
Hundred U.S. Dollars (USD 802,500.00). The letter of credit covered the importation by defendant LCDC
of Fifteen Thousand (15,000) metric tons of Iraqi cement from Iraq. Defendant applied for and filed with
plaintiff two (2) Applications for Amendment of Letter of Credit on May 3, 1990 and May 11, 1990,
respectively.

Thereafter, the supplier-beneficiary Global Enterprises, Inc. negotiated its Letter of Credit with the
negotiating bank Credit Suisse of Zurich, Switzerland. Credit Suisse then sent a reimbursement claim by
telex to American Express Bank Ltd., New York on July 25, 1990 for the amount of Seven Hundred
Sixty[-]Six Thousand Seven Hundred Eight U.S. Dollars (USD 766,708.00) with a certification that all terms
and conditions of the credit were complied with. Accordingly, on July 30, 1990, American Express Bank
debited plaintiff’s account Seven Hundred Seventy Thousand Six Hundred Ninety[-]One U.S. Dollars and
Thirty Cents (USD 770,691.30) and credited Credit Suisse Zurich Account with American Express Bank,
Ltd., New York for the negotiation of Letter of Credit. On August 6, 1990, plaintiff received from Credit
Suisse the necessary shipping documents pertaining to Letter of Credit DC 90-303-C that were in turn
delivered to the defendant. Upon receipt of the aforesaid documents, defendants executed a trust
receipt. However, the cement that was to be imported through the opening of the subject Letter of
Credit never arrived in the Philippines.

The prompt payment of the obligation of the defendant LCDC was guaranteed by [defendant]-spouses
under the Continuing Surety Agreement executed by the latter in favor of the defendant.

The obligation covered by the subject Letter of Credit in the amount of USD 802,500.00 has long been
overdue and unpaid, notwithstanding repeated demands for payment thereof. Plaintiff, therefore,
instituted the instant complaint for recovery of the following amounts: Twenty[-]Three [M]illion Two
Hundred [F]ifty[-]Nine Thousand One Hundred Twenty[-]Four Pesos and Fourteen Centavos
(PHP23,259,124.14) as of June 15, 1991, inclusive of interest and penalty, plus additional interest thereon
of Thirty percent (30%) per annum; attorney’s fees equivalent to Twenty[-]Five percent [25%] of the total
obligation; and costs of suit.

In support of its cause of action against defendant, plaintiff presented the testimony of Mr. Fenelito
Cabrera, Head of the Foreign Department of plaintiff’s Head Office. (T.S.N. dated June 16, 1995, p. 4)
There being no other witness to be presented by the plaintiff (Order dated June 27, 1997), the plaintiff
filed its formal offer of exhibits dated July 18, 1997 to which defendant filed its comments/objections to
formal offer of evidence dated February 23, 1998. In an order dated March 4, 1998, Exhibits “A” to “N”
to “N-4” including [their] sub-markings were admitted for the purposes they were respectively offered.
 However, on defendants’ motion for reconsideration dated [March 30,] 1998 that was duly opposed by
the plaintiff in its opposition dated June 3, 1998, this Court partially granted defendants’ motion for
reconsideration. Consequently, Exhibits “ D ” , “ E ” , “ H ” , “ I ” , “ J ” , “ K ” , “ L ” , and “ M ” and their
sub-markings were not admitted for not being properly identified and authenticated by a competent
witness. Only Exhibits “A”, “B”, “C”, “C-1”, and “N”, “N-1” to “N-4” remain admitted in evidence.
(Order dated September 9, 1998)

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that plaintiff’s
witness Mr. Fenelito Cabrera was incompetent to testify with respect to the transaction between the
plaintiff and the defendant and that the plaintiff’s documentary exhibits were not properly identified and
authenticated.5

The trial court found that the Bank’s only witness, Fenelito Cabrera, was incompetent to testify on the documents
presented by the Bank during the trial. Cabrera was with the Bank’s Dasmariñas Branch and not with the Head Office
from March 1990 to June 1991, the period the transaction covered by the documents took place. Thus, he could not
have properly identified and authenticated the Bank’s documentary exhibits. His lack of competence was even admitted
by the Bank’s counsel who did not even ask Cabrera to identify the documents. As the documents were not identified
and duly authenticated, the Bank’s evidence was not preponderant enough to establish its right to recover from LCDC
and the spouses Ley.6

The trial court further ruled that only the following documents remained admitted in evidence:

Exhibit Document

“A” Continuing Surety Agreement dated July 25, 1989

“B” Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit

“C” and “C-1” Letter of Credit No. DC 90-303-C

“N” and “N-1” to “N-4” Statement of Outstanding Obligations

For the trial court, these were insufficient to show that LCDC and the spouses Ley were responsible for the improper
negotiation of the letter of credit. Thus, the trial court concluded in its Decision dated July 3, 2001 that the Bank failed to
establish its cause of action and to make a sufficient or preponderant case. 7 The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, the demurrer to evidence is granted. The case is dismissed. 8

The Bank appealed to the Court of Appeals. It claimed that the trial court erred in granting the demurrer to evidence of
LCDC and the spouses Ley on the ground that the Bank failed to establish its cause of action. The Bank insisted that,
even without considering the exhibits excluded in evidence by the trial court, the Bank was able to prove by
preponderant evidence that it had a right and that right was violated by LCDC and the spouses Ley. It explained that the
trial court was wrong in considering only Exhibits “A,” “B,” “C,” “C-1,” “N” and “N-1” to “N-4” as the following
documents were also admitted in evidence and should have been considered in the resolution of the demurrer to
evidence.9

Exhibit Document

“F” Register Copy or Memorandum on the Letter of Credit

“G” Trust Receipt No. TRI432/90 dated August 16, 1990

“G-1” Bank Draft

“G-2” Bill of Exchange

The Bank asserted that the consideration of Exhibits “F,” “G” and “G-1” to “G-2” would have established the following:

(a) On August 16, 1990, LCDC and the spouses Ley received from the Bank the necessary shipping
documents relative to the Letter of Credit evidencing title to the goods subject matter of the
importation which the Bank had previously received from Credit Suisse;

(b) Upon receipt of the shipping documents, LCDC and the spouses Ley executed a trust receipt, Trust
Receipt No. TRI432/90, in favor of the Bank covering the importation of cement under Letter of Credit
No. DC 90-303-C;

(c) The issuance of the trust receipt was an acknowledgement by LCDC and the spouses Ley of their
receipt of the shipping documents and of their liability to the Bank;

(d) By signing the trust receipt, constituted an admission by LCDC and the spouses Ley that the Letter of
Credit was in order, including the Bank’s payment of the amount of US$766,708.00 under the Letter of
Credit.10

Thus, even with only the testimony of Cabrera and Exhibits “A,” “B,” “C,” “C-1,” “N” and “N-1” to “N-4” and “F,” “G”
and “G-1” to “G-2,” the demurrer should have been denied and LCDC and the spouses Ley held liable to the Bank.

Moreover, the Bank contended that its Exhibits “D,” “E,” “H,” and “I” should have been also admitted in evidence
because LCDC and the spouses Ley effectively admitted the authenticity of the said documents when they stated in the
pre-trial brief which they submitted during the pre-trial of the case at the trial court:

III. DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS

Defendants shall adopt the documents submitted by plaintiff and marked as Annexes
 “A”, “B”, “C”, “D”, “E”, “E-1”, “F”, “G”, “G-1”, “H” and “H-1” in the plaintiff ’s
complaint.

Defendants reserve the right to mark or adopt such other documentary evidence as
may be discovered or warranted to support its claim in the course of the trial. x x x. 11

The Court of Appeals found no merit in the Bank’s appeal. It observed that Cabrera, the Bank’s only witness, prepared
and properly identified Exhibits “F,” “G,” “N” and “N-1” to “N-4” only. The Bank’s counsel even admitted in open
court during Cabrera’s direct examination that Cabrera was incompetent to testify on the rest of the Exhibits. The trial
court was therefore correct in not giving any evidentiary weight to those Exhibits not properly identified by Cabrera.12

For the Court of Appeals, the statement in the pre-trial brief that LCDC and the spouses Ley “shall adopt” Annexes “A,”
“B,” “C,” “D,” “E,” “E-1,” “F,” “G,” “G-1,” “H” and “H-1” of the Bank’s complaint did not constitute an admission of the
said documents by LCDC and the spouses Ley. However, the appellate court noted that LCDC and the spouses Ley
admitted the existence and authenticity of the Bank’s Exhibits “A,” “B,” “C,” “C-1,” and “G.”13

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals ruled that the following Exhibits of the Bank were admitted in evidence:

Exhibit Document

“A” Continuing Surety Agreement dated July 25, 1989

“B” Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit

“C” and “C-1” Letter of Credit No. DC 90-303-C

“F” Register Copy or Memorandum on the Letter of Credit

“G” Trust Receipt No. TRI432/90 dated August 16, 1990

“N” and “N-1” to “N-4” Statement of Outstanding Obligations

Even upon inclusion and consideration of the above-mentioned exhibits, the Court of Appeals held that the Bank still
failed to show that LCDC and the spouses Ley were directly responsible for the improper negotiation of the letter of
credit. Thus, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated September 4, 2008, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
decision of the trial court.14 The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of
the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 56, Makati City in Civil Case No. 91-1878 is AFFIRMED.15

The Court of Appeals denied the Bank’s motion for reconsideration, prompting the Bank to file this petition.
The Bank insists that it has been able to establish its cause of action not only through preponderance of evidence but
even by the admissions of LCDC and the spouses Ley. It maintains that its cause of action is not predicated on the
improper negotiation of the letter of credit but on the breach of the terms and conditions of the trust receipt.16

The petition fails.

First, the Bank’s petition suffers from a fatal infirmity. In particular, it contravenes the elementary rule of appellate
procedure that an appeal to this Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court “shall raise
only questions of law.”17 The rule is based on the nature of this Court’s appellate function – this Court is not a trier of
facts18 – and on the evidentiary weight given to the findings of fact of the trial court which have been affirmed on appeal
by the Court of Appeals – they are conclusive on this Court.19 While there are recognized exceptions to the rule, 20 this
Court sees no reason to apply the exception and not the rule in this case.

The conceptual distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is well-settled in case law:

There is a “question of law” when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state
of facts, and which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a “question of fact” when the doubt or controversy
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. x x x. 21

The issue of whether or not the Bank was able to establish its cause of action by preponderant evidence is essentially a
question of fact. Stated in another way, the issue which the Bank raises in this petition is whether the evidence it
presented during the trial was preponderant enough to hold LCDC and the spouses Ley liable.

The required burden of proof, or that amount of evidence necessary and sufficient to establish one’s claim or defense, in
civil cases is preponderance of evidence. 22 Preponderance of evidence is defined as follows:

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and
is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of evidence” or “greater weight
of the credible evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability to truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto. 23 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.)

As preponderance of evidence refers to the probability to truth of the matters intended to be proven as facts, it concerns
a determination of the truth or falsity of the alleged facts based on the evidence presented. Thus, a review of the
respective findings of the trial and the appellate courts as to the preponderance of a party’s evidence requires that the
reviewing court address a question of fact.

Moreover, a demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Evidence is the
means, sanctioned by the Rules of Court, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of
fact.24 As such, the question of sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence, the basic issue presented by the Bank, pertains to
the question of whether the factual matters alleged by the Bank are true. Plainly, it is a question of fact and, as such, not
proper subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It was incumbent upon the Bank
to demonstrate that this case fell under any of the exceptions to this rule but it failed to do so.

Second, the Bank attempts to avoid the “only questions of law” rule for appeals filed under Rule 45 by invoking the
misapprehension of facts exception. 25 According to the Bank, the trial and the appellate courts misapprehended the
facts with respect to the determination of the basis of the Bank’s cause of action.26 In particular, the Bank contends that
both the trial and the appellate courts erred in the consideration of the proper actionable document upon which the
Bank based its cause of action. The Bank asserts that its cause of action is not grounded on the Letter of Credit but on
the Trust Receipt.

The Bank’s reference to the Trust Receipt as its “primary actionable document”27 is mistaken and misleading.

The nature of the cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint. 28 A party’s cause of action is not
what the party says it is, nor is it what the designation of the complaint states, but what the allegations in the body defin e
and describe.29

In this case, the Bank’s allegations as to the basis of its cause of action against LCDC and the spouses Ley, however, belie
the Bank’s claim. In particular, the relevant portion of the Bank’s Complaint30 reads:

1.2 The defendants:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

a. Ley Construction and Development Corporation (LCDC) is a general contracting firm

engaged in the construction of buildings, infrastructures, and other civil works with
principal office at Mapulang Lupa St., Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila where it [may
be] served with summons and other processes of this Court.

b. Sps. Manuel and Janet C. Ley, the major stockholders of defendant (LCDC) with
business address at 23rd Floor Pacific Star Bldg., Makati Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila
where the processes of this Honorable Court [may be] served upon them are
impleaded herein in their capacity as Surety for the obligation incurred by defendant
LCDC with the herein plaintiff by virtue of a Continuing Surety Agreement they
executed in favor of the plaintiff, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex “A”;

2. STATEMENT OF CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT LCDC AND SPOUSES MANUEL AND
JANET LEY

2.1 In conjunction with its business, defendant LCDC sought to import “Iraqi Cement” from Iraq thru its
supplier “Global Enterprises, Limited” with address at 15 A. Tuckeys Lane, Gibraltar.

2.2 To finance this importation, defendant LCDC applied with the plaintiff for the opening of Letter of
Credit as evidenced by the Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit, copy of which is
marked as Annex “B” and made integral part hereof.

2.3 Acting on defendant[’]s oral representation and those stated in its application (Annex “B”), plaintiff
issued on April 26, 1990 its Letter of Credit No. DC 90[-]303-C in favor of the supplier Global Enterprises
Limited, as beneficiary in the amount of U.S. Dollars: EIGHT HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED (US $802,500) for the account of defendant, covering the importation of 15,000 metric tons
of Iraqi Cement from Iraq, copy of the Letter of Credit is marked as Annex “C” and made integral part
hereof;

2.4 On May 3, 1990, defendant applied for and filed with plaintiff an Application for Amendment of
Letter of Credit, copy of which is attached as Annex “ D ” hereof, and another application for
amendment was filed on May 11, 1990 copy of which is marked as Annexes “E” and “E-1” hereof;

2.5 After these amendments were communicated to the negotiating bank, Credit Suisse of Zurich,
Switzerland, the beneficiary negotiated its Letter of Credit therewith. Thereafter, Credit Suisse sent a
reimbursement claim by telex to American Express Bank Ltd., New York on July 25, 1990 for the amount
of US$766,708.00 with a Certification that all terms and conditions of the credit were complied with;

2.6 Accordingly, on July 30, 1990, American Express Bank debited plaintiff’s account US$770,691.30 and
credited Credit Suisse Zurich Account with American Express Bank Ltd., New York for the negotiation of
Letter of Credit;

2.7 On August 6, 1990, plaintiff received from Credit Suisse the necessary shipping documents
pertaining to Letter of Credit DC 90-303-C all of which were in turn delivered and received by the
defendant on August 16, 1990 as evidenced by their acknowledgment appearing on the plaintiff’s
register copy, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex “F”;

2.8 Upon defendant’s receipt of the shipping documents and other documents of title to the imported
goods, defendant signed a trust receipt manifesting its acceptance/conformity that the negotiation of
the LC is in order. A copy of the TR and the draft issued by the defendant as a means of paying its LC
obligation to the plaintiff are hereto attached and marked as Annexes “G” and “G-1” hereof;

2.9 Sometime during the 3rd week of August, defendant LCDC informed the plaintiff that the expected
shipment of cement subject matter of the LC was allegedly held up in Iraq purportedly on account of the
trade embargo imposed against it by the United Nation[s] and sought assistance from the plaintiff to
secure no-dollar import permit from the Central Bank as defendant was negotiating with its supplier
Global Enterprises Limited, Inc. for an alternate shipment of Syrian Cement.

2.10 Plaintiff acceded to the request of the defendant and conformably secured the requested approval
from Central Bank to allow the defendant to import cement on a no-dollar basis, a copy of the
defendant’s request as well as the Central Bank approval are hereto attached as Annexes “H” and “H-1”.
 2.11 About two months after the plaintiff has obtained the requested Central Bank approval (Annex
“H-1”)[,] plaintiff was again advised by the defendant that the alternate shipment of Syrian Cement is no
longer forthcoming and that defendant LCDC after a series of negotiation with its supplier has agreed
with the latter for a reimbursement of the value of the negotiated Letter of Credit.

2.12 While defendant was negotiating with its supplier for that replacement of Syrian cement, defendant
advised plaintiff not to initiate any move as it might jeopardize defendant’s negotiation with its supplier.

2.13 In December 1990, four (4) months from defendant’s receipt of the shipping and export documents
from plaintiff, as it became perceptible that defendant’s negotiation with its supplier for reimbursement
or replacement would fail[,] defendant for the first time asked for copies of the beneficiary ’s draft, the
Charter Party Agreement even as it contested the validity of defendant’s obligation to plaintiff.

2.14 For the first time, defendant also began to assail the validity of the payment made by the plaintiff to
the supplier (Global Enterprises Ltd.) through Credit Suisse, with the intention of avoiding the payment
of its lawful obligation to reimburse the plaintiff the amount of US $802,500 which obligation is now
long overdue and unpaid notwithstanding repeated demands.

2.15 The obligation covered by the aforesaid Letter of Credit bears interest and charges at the rate of
30% per annum which rate [may be] increased or decreased within the limits allowed by the law.

2.16 The prompt payment of the obligations contracted by defendant LCDC from the plaintiff inclusive
of the subject Letter of Credit is guaranteed by defendant Sps. Manuel and Janet Ley by making
themselves jointly and severally liable with the defendant LCDC in accordance with the terms of a
Continuing Surety Agreement which they executed in favor of the plaintiff (Annex “A”).31 (Emphases
supplied.)

That the Bank’s cause of action was hinged on the Letter of Credit is unmistakable. Taken as a whole, the Bank’s
allegations make a cause of action based on the Letter of Credit. The Trust Receipt was mentioned incidentally and
appears only in paragraph 2.8 of the Complaint. 32 In stark contrast, the Letter of Credit figures prominently in the
Complaint as it is mentioned in almost all of the paragraphs of Part 2 (Statement of Cause of Action Against Defendant
LCDC and Spouses Manuel and Janet Ley). More tellingly, in paragraph 2.15, the Bank speaks of “the obligation
covered by the aforesaid Letter of Credit.” 33

Moreover, under paragraphs 1.2(b) and 2.16 of the Complaint, the spouses Ley have been impleaded as co -defendants
of LCDC on account of their execution of a Continuing Surety Agreement in the Bank’s favor to guarantee the “prompt
payment of the obligations contracted by defendant LCDC from the plaintiff inclusive of the subject Letter of Credit. ”
34
In short, the Bank seeks to hold liable (1) LCDC for its obligations under the Letter of Credit, and (2) the spo uses Ley
for their obligations under the Continuing Surety Agreement which stands as security for the Letter of Credit and not for
the Trust Receipt.

Another significant factor that contradicts the Bank’s assertion that its “primary actionable document” is the Trust
Receipt is the manner it pleaded the Letter of Credit and the Trust Receipt, respectively.

The relevant rule on actionable documents is Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Section 7. Action or defense based on document. – Whenever an action or defense is based upon a
written instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the
pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall
be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading.

An “actionable document” is a written instrument or document on which an action or defense is founded. It may be
pleaded in either of two ways:

(1) by setting forth the substance of such document in the pleading and attaching the document thereto
as an annex, or

(2) by setting forth said document verbatim in the pleading. 35

A look at the allegations in the Complaint quoted above will show that the Bank did not set forth the contents of the
Trust Receipt verbatim in the pleading. The Bank did not also set forth the substance of the Trust Receipt in the
Complaint but simply attached a copy thereof as an annex. Rather than setting forth the substance of the Trust Receipt,
paragraph 2.8 of the Complaint shows that the Bank simply described the Trust Receipt as LCDC’s manifestation of “its
acceptance/conformity that the negotiation of the [Letter of Credit] is in order.”36

In contrast, while the Bank did not set forth the contents of the Letter of Credit verbatim in the Complaint, the Bank set
forth the substance of the Letter of Credit in paragraph 2.3 of the Complaint and attached a copy thereof as Annex “C”
of the Complaint. The Bank stated that it “issued on April 26, 1990 its Letter of Credit No. DC 90[-]303-C in favor of the
supplier Global Enterprises Limited, as beneficiary[,] in the amount of U.S. Dollars: EIGHT HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED (US$802,500.00) for the account of defendant [LCDC], covering the importation of 15,000 metric tons of
Iraqi Cement from Iraq.”37

Thus, the Bank’s attempt to cling to the Trust Receipt as its so-called “primary actionable document” is negated by the
manner of its allegations in the Complaint. Thus, too, the trial and the appellate courts did not misapprehend the facts
when they considered the Letter of Credit as the basis of the Bank’s cause of action.

Third, a look at the Letter of Credit, the actionable document on which the Bank relied in its case again st LCDC and the
spouses Ley, confirms the identical findings of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.

In Keng Hua Paper Products Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held38:

 In a letter of credit, there are three distinct and independent contracts: (1) the contract of sale between
the buyer and the seller, (2) the contract of the buyer with the issuing bank, and (3) the letter of credit
proper in which the bank promises to pay the seller pursuant to the terms and conditions stated therein.
x x x.

Here, what is involved is the second contract – the contract of LCDC, as the buyer of Iraqi cement, with the Bank, as the
issuer of the Letter of Credit. The Bank refers to that contract in the Petition for Review on Certiorari and the
Memorandum filed by the Bank in this case when the Bank argues that, as LCDC and the spouses Ley have admitted the
issuance of the Letter of Credit in their favor, they are “deemed to have likewise admitted the terms and conditions
thereof, as evidenced by the stipulation therein appearing above the signature of respondent Janet Ley,”39 viz:

“In consideration of your arranging, at my/o[u]r request[,] for the establishment of this commercial letter
of credit (thereinafter referred to as the [“]Credit[”]) substantially in accordance with the foregoing, I/we
hereby covenant and agree to each and all of [the] provisions and conditions stipulated on the reverse
side hereof.”40

The above stipulation actually appears on the Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit, the Bank’s
Exhibit “B.” It is the contract which contains the provisions and conditions governing the legal relationship of the Bank
and LCDC, particularly their respective rights and obligations, in connection with the Bank’s issuance of Letter of Credit
No. DC 90-303-C. The importance of the provisions and conditions supposed to be stipulated on the reverse side of the
Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit is underscored by the following note appearing below the
space for the signature of Janet Ley:

IMPORTANT: PLEASE READ PROVISIONS AND CONDITIONS ON REVERSE SIDE HEREOF BEFORE
SIGNING ABOVE.41

However, the Bank’s Exhibit “B” has nothing on its reverse side. In other words, the reverse side of the Application and
Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit is a blank page. 42 Even the copy of the Application and Agreement for
Commercial Letter of Credit attached to the Bank’s Complaint also has nothing on its back page. 43

A cause of action – the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another44 – has three essential elements:

(1) the existence of a legal right in favor of the plaintiff;

(2) a correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect such right; and

an act or omission by such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff with a resulting injury or damage to
(3)
the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for the recovery of relief from the defendant. 45

Although the first two elements may exist, a cause of action arises only upon the occurrence of the last element, giving
the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. 46 In this case,
however, even the legal rights of the Bank and the correlative legal duty of LCDC have not been sufficiently established
by the Bank in view of the failure of the Bank’s evidence to show the provisions and conditions that govern its legal
relationship with LCDC, particularly the absence of the provisions and conditions supposedly printed at the back of the
Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit. Even assuming arguendo that there was no impropriety in
the negotiation of the Letter of Credit and the Bank’s cause of action was simply for the collection of what it paid under
said Letter of Credit, the Bank did not discharge its burden to prove every element of its cause of action against LCDC.

This failure of the Bank to present preponderant evidence that will establish the liability of LCDC under the Letter of
Credit necessarily benefits the spouses Ley whose liability is supposed to be based on a Continuing Surety Agreement
guaranteeing the liability of LCDC under the Letter of Credit.

The Court therefore finds no reason to disturb the rulings of the courts a quo as the petition put forward insufficient
basis to warrant their reversal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 156284 February 6, 2007

AUGUSTO GOMEZ, as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA RITA GOMEZ-SAMSON, MARCIAL SAMSON, JESUS B. GOMEZ, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASIG and
MARIKINA, RIZAL, Respondents.

x----------------------x

AUGUSTO GOMEZ, as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez, Petitioner,
vs.
ARISTON A. GOMEZ, SR. (who died during the pendency of the cases below and substituted by his surviving wife, LUZ
BAYSON GOMEZ, and children namely: ARISTON B. GOMEZ, JR., MA. RITA GOMEZ-SAMSON, JESUS B. GOMEZ, MA.
TERESA G. BLOOM, MARIANO B. GOMEZ, and CARLOS B. GOMEZ) and ARISTON B. GOMEZ, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Which came first, the chicken or the egg?

This age-old question has spurned millions of debates in scientific and religious circles, and has stimulated the
imagination of generations of children and adults. Many profess that they are certain of the answer, and yet their
answers are divergent.

The case at bar involves a similarly baffling question, but in significantly lesser proportions of philosophical mystery.
Petitioner claims that, in the two Deeds of Donation he is impugning, the signatures of the donee were jotted down
before the bodies of the Deeds were typewritten. Respondents maintain that the bodies of the Deeds were encoded first,
and then, a clashing presentation of expert witnesses and circumstantial evidence ensued. Petitioner’s expert claims she
is certain of the answer: the signature came first. Respondents’ expert, on the other hand, says that it is impossible to
determine which came first accurately. As both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of respondents,
petitioner is furious how these courts could adopt an opinion that was "neither here nor there."

However, as it is with the chicken and egg riddle, is the person certain of which came first necessarily the one who is
more credible?

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision 1 and Resolution2 dated 4 September 2002 and 27 November
2002, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40391 affirming the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City dated 8 April 1992 in Civil Cases No. 36089 and No. 36090.

The facts of the case, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

On February 15, 1980, [petitioner] instituted these cases, to wit: (1) Civil Case No. 36089, entitled: "Augusto Gomez, as
Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez, Plaintiff, versus Maria Rita Gomez-Samson, Marcial
Samson, Jesus B. Gomez, and the Registers of Deeds of Pasig and Marikina, Rizal, Defendants"; and (2) Civil Case No .
36090, entitled: "Augusto Gomez, as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez, Plaintiff, versus
Ariston Gomez, Sr., and Ariston B. Gomez, Jr., Defendants", both in the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City.

CONSUELO, ARISTON, SR. and Angel, all surnamed Gomez, were sister and brothers, respectively. MARIA-RITA
Gomez-Samson, JESUS Gomez and ARISTON Gomez, JR. are the children of ARISTON, SR. while AUGUSTO Gomez is the
child of Angel.

In Civil Case No. 36089, plaintiff AUGUSTO alleged in his complaint that CONSUELO, who died on November 6, 1979,
was the owner of the following real properties:

"(a) A parcel of land, with all the improvements thereon, situated in Marikina, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 340233 in her name, x x x;

"(b) A parcel of land, with all the improvements thereon, situated in Marikina, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 353818 in her name, x x x,"

"(c) A parcel of land, with all the improvements thereon, situated in Pasig, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 268396 in her name, x x x;"
that after the death of Consuelo, defendants Rita and Jesus fraudulently prepared and/or caused to be prepared a Deed
of Donation Intervivos; that in the said document, Consuelo donated the above described properties to defendants Rita
and Jesus; that the said defendants forged or caused to be forged the signature of the donor, Consuelo; that the notarial
acknowledgement on the said document was antedated to April 21, 1979; that on the basis of the said document
defendants sought the cancellation of the certificates of title in the name of Consuelo and the issuance of new ones in
the names of defendants Rita and Jesus.

On the basis of the foregoing, plaintiff prayed that the Deed of Donation Intervivos be declared false, null and void ab
initio, and/or be nullified; that TCT Nos. 340233, 353818, and 268396 be reinstated or be replaced by titles in the name of
the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez; and, that defendants be ordered to pay damages, by way of attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation plus costs.

On April 24, 1980, private defendants, and nominal defendants Registers of Deeds of Pasig and Marikina, Rizal, filed their
common answer, denying the material allegations in the complaint and asserting that a copy of the deed of donation
was submitted to the Notarial Section of the CFI of Quezon City as early as July 2, 1979; that the said document is valid
and not a forgery or otherwise subject to similar infirmity; that the said document being valid, the properties covered
therein passed in ownership to private defendants, as early as April 20, 1979; that defendants have the perfect and
absolute right to cause the cancellation of TCT Nos. 340233, 353818, and 26839 and request for the issuance of new
certificates of titles in their respective names; that they have the right to use, enjoy, possess, dispose and own these
properties; that no law was violated by the nominal defendants when the old certificates of title were cancelled and new
certificates were issued in the name of the private defendants, hence, plaintiff has no cause of action against the nominal
defendants neither has the court jurisdiction over the foregoing issue.

Defendants thereafter prayed for moral damages of ₱ 2,000,000.00; compensatory damages of ₱ 1,000,000.00;
exemplary damages of ₱500,000.00; attorney’s fees of ₱200,000.00; and that individual plaintiff be made jointly and
severally liable with the estate of Consuelo Gomez.

In Civil Case No. 36090, the same plaintiff alleged in his complaint that Consuelo was also the sole and absolute owner of
the following personal properties:

(a) Seventy-five (75) common shares of stock of V-Tri Realty, Inc. with a total par value of ₱75,000.00 and covered by
Stock Certificate No. 003;

(b) Eleven thousand eight hundred fifty three (11,853) common shares of stock of First Philippine Holdings Corporation
with a total par value of ₱118,530.00 covered by Stock Certificates Nos. A-02614 (7,443 shares) and A-02613 (2,040
shares) and A-09018 (2,370 shares);

(c) Jewelries and collector’s items, contained in Consuelo Gomez’s Safe Deposit Box No. 44 at the PCI Bank, Marikina
Branch, which were inventoried on January 9, 1980 per Order of the Court in Special Proceedings No. 9164;

(d) A four-door sedan 1978 Mercedes Benz 200 with Motor No. 11593810-050706, Serial/Chassis No. 12302050-069893,
Plate No. A6-252 and LTC Registration Certificate No. 0140373 valued at ₱200,000.00, more or less at the time Consuelo
Gomez died;
(e) A four-door sedan 1979 Toyota Corona with Motor No. 12RM-031643, Serial/Chassis No. RT-130-901150, Plate No.
B-09-373 and LTC Registration Certificate No. 0358757, valued at ₱50,000.00, more or less at the time Consuelo Gomez
died;

(f) Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000.00) including accrued interests on money market placement with the BA
Finance Corporation per its promissory note No. BAT-0116 dated March 9, 1978.

that after the death of Consuelo, defendants fraudulently prepared and/or caused to be prepared a Deed of
Donation Intervivos; that in the said document Consuelo donated the above described properties to defendants Ariston,
Sr. and Ariston, Jr.; that the said defendants forged or caused to be forged the signature of the donor, Consuelo; that the
notarial acknowledgment on the said document was antedated to April 21, 1979; that on the basis of the said document
defendant Ariston, Sr., [in] December 1978, effected or tried to effect a change of the LTC registration of the two (2)
vehicles; that defendant Ariston, Jr., for his part, pre-terminated the money market placements with BA Finance and
received checks in the sums of ₱187,027.74 and ₱4,405.56; that with the exception of the jewelries, which are with the
bank, defendant Ariston, Sr., has benefited and will continue to benefit from the use of the two (2) vehicles and from the
dividends earned by the shares of stocks.

On the basis of the foregoing, the plaintiff prayed that the Deed of Donation Intervivos be declared false, null and
void ab initio, and/or be nullified; that defendant Ariston, Sr., be ordered to deliver the stock certificates, jewelries,
collector’s items, and vehicles in his possession plus all the cash dividends earned by the shares of stock and reasonable
compensation for the use of the two (2) motor vehicles; that defendant Ariston, Jr. be ordered to pay the amount of ₱
191,533.00 received by him from BA Finance, with interest from the time he received the amount until he fully pays the
plaintiff; and, damages, by way of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, plus costs.

On March 19, 1980, defendants Ariston, Sr. and Ariston Jr., filed their answer, denying the material allegations in the
complaint and asserting that a copy of the Deed of Donation was submitted to the Notarial Section of the CFI of Quezon
City as early as July 2, 1979; that the said document is valid and not a forgery or otherwise subject to similar infirmity; t hat
the said document being valid, the properties covered therein passed in ownership to defenda nts, as early as April 20,
1979; and that defendants have the perfect and absolute right to use, enjoy, possess and own these properties.

Defendants thereafter prayed for moral damages of ₱ 2,000,000.00; compensatory damages of ₱ 1,000,000.00;
exemplary damages of ₱500,000.00; attorney’s fees of ₱200,000.00; and that individual plaintiff be made jointly and
severally liable with the estate of Consuelo Gomez.

On May 27, 1980, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Consolidate, in both cases, which the trial court in Civil Case No. 36090
granted in its Order dated June 6, 1980. Whereupon, the records of Civil Case No. 36090 were transmitted to the RTC,
Branch 23.

After appropriate proceedings, the trial court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda th irty (30) days
from their receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes.

In its joint decision dated April 8, 1992, the trial court dismissed the complaints. 3
The dispositive portion of the RTC Joint Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, it is Ordered:

1. That the instant complaints be dismissed;

2. That the replevin bonds nos. 2223, 2224, 2225, and 2226 of the Stronghold Insurance Company, Incorporated be
cancelled;

3. That Augusto Gomez and the estate of the late Consuelo Gomez, jointly and solidarily, should pay to Ariston Gomez,
Jr. the following amounts:

Moral damages of ₱1,000,000.00;

Exemplary damages of ₱250,000.00

Attorney’s fees of ₱200,000.00

And costs of suit; with legal interest on all the amounts, except on costs and attorney’s fees, commencing from February
15, 1980, until fully paid.4

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. The latter affirmed the RTC’s Joint Decision in the 4
September 2002 assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto. 5

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in the assailed Resolution
dated 27 November 2002.

Petitioner filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, bringing forth before us the following issues for our
consideration:

1) Whether or not the instant petition presents several exceptions to the general rule that an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 may only raise questions of law and that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Honorable
Court;

2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals’ Decision is based on a misapprehension of facts and on inferences that are
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in its finding of fact that Consuelo Gomez herself paid the donor’
s tax of the properties subject of the donation on 09 October 1979 when the evidence on record point to the contrary;

4) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in giving credence to the testimony of former judge Jose
Sebastian, the Notary Public who notarized the assailed Deeds of Donation;
5) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in dismissing the irregularities apparent on the fac e of the
assailed Deeds of Donation as mere lapses of a non-lawyer who prepared them;

6) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in totally disregarding the very unusual circumstances relative to
the alleged totally execution and notarization of the assailed Deeds of Donation;

7) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred and is manifestly mistaken in inferring that respondents were able
to sufficiently and substantially explain the reason for the belated transfer of the pertinent prope rties covered by the
assailed Deeds of Donation;

8) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred and is manifestly mistaken in not giving due weight to the expert
opinion of the NBI representative, which the lower court itself sought; and

9) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in not finding that the totality of circumstantial evidence
presented by petitioner produced a single network of circumstances establishing the simulation and falsification of the
assailed Deeds of Donation.6

As acknowledged by petitioner, findings of fact of the trial court, especially when upheld by the Court of Appeals, are
binding on the Supreme Court.7 Petitioner, however, seeks refuge in the following established exceptions 8 to this rule:

1) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible. 9

2) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts.10

3) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. 11

4) Where the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; 12 and

5) Where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are premised on absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence of record. 13

Weight and Credibility of the Expert Witnesses

The core issue in this Petition, as in that in the lower courts, is whether petitioner was able to prove that the Deeds of
Donation were merely intercalated into two sheets of paper signed by Consuelo Gomez (Consuelo).

The only direct evidence presented by petitioner on this matter is the testimony of Zenaida Torres, Document
Examiner14 of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Respondents, on the other hand, presented their own expert
witness, Francisco Cruz, Chief of Document Examination 15 of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory. Other direct evidence
presented by respondents includes testimonies positively stating that the Deeds of Donation were signed by Consuelo in
their completed form in the presence of Notary Public Jose Sebastian. These testimonies are that of Jose Sebastian
himself, and that of several of the respondents including Ariston Gomez, Jr. (Ariston, Jr.), who allegedly drafted said
Deeds of Donation.
As the testimony of Zenaida Torres is the single most important evidence of petitioner, it is imperative to examine the
lengthy discussion of the trial court analyzing her testimony, and the contradictory findings of Francisco Cruz.

Zenaida Torres’s testimony, as noted by the trial court, was that she had examined the two Deeds of Donation,
denominated as Documents No. 401 and No. 402, and her findings were that the signatures therein were indeed those of
Consuelo. However, she opined that Documents No. 401 and No. 402 were not typed or prepared in one continuous
sitting because the horizontal lines had some variances horizontally. Nevertheless, she admitted that the vertical lines did
not show any variance.

Zenaida Torres also testified that with respect to Document No. 401, the typewritten words "Consuelo C. Gomez" were
typed after the handwritten signature "Consuelo C. Gomez." This is based on her analysis of the letter "o" in the
handwritten signature, which touches the letter "n" in the typewritten name "Consuelo C. Gomez." She could not,
however, make any similar findings with respect to Document No. 402, because the typewritten words "Consuelo C.
Gomez" and the handwritten signature "Consuelo C. Gomez" "do not even touch" in the latter document.

Zenaida Torres failed to convince the trial court that the Deeds of Donation were not prepared in one sitting:

To start with, it is very significant that Torres herself admits that the signatures of Consuelo in the Donations 401 and 402
are genuine.

(This is contrary to the allegations of Augusto in his complaint; wherein he alleged that the signatures of Consuelo were
forged. In fact, as per the allegations, in Augusto’s complaint, the signatures were forged, after the death of Consuelo).

(In effect, Augusto is now trying to shift the thrust of his attack, to a scenario wherein Consuelo allegedly signed two
papers in blank, and thereafter, said Donations 401 and 402 were typed on top.)

Furthermore, Torres fell apart during, cross-examination. Torres admitted that she had not taken any specialized studies
on the matter of "Questioned Documents," except on one or two seminars on "Questioned Documents." She admitted
that she had not passed the Board Exams, as a Chemist; she further admitted that she has not written any thesis or similar
work on the subject matter at issue.

Regarding non-typing in one continuous sitting, she admitted that she had never seen the typewriter used to type the
Donations 401 and 402, nor even tried to get hold of it, before she made the report; that there were no variances insofar
as the vertical alignments of the typewritten documents were concerned; that there were only variances insofar as the
horizontal alignments are concerned; she admitted that if anybody had wanted to incorporate a document into a blank
sheet of paper, on top of a signature, the normal step to be taken would be to be careful on horizontal alignment, which
can be seen via the naked eye; and not the vertical alignment. Yet, the vertical alignment, as admitted by her, was
perfect.

In fact, she had to admit that it is possible that if the paper roller is loose, the horizontal alignment will have a varianc e;
whereas, the vertical alignment would have no variance, and there would be nothing sinister about this. She had to admit
this, because she was confronted with an authority on the matter, more particularly the book of Wilson Harrison (vide
Exhibit "17"). She admitted that she had not used bromide when she took the photographs of the two (2) Donations 401
and 402, which photographs she later on enlarged. She admitted that when she had taken the photographs of the two (2)
Donations, she had not put the typewritten pitch measure on top. She admitted that when the photographs were
enlarged, the alignment of the typewritten words became distorted; more so when a typewriter pitch measure is not
used, when photographing the documents.

In effect, insofar as the issue of typewriting in one sitting or not, is concerned, the testimony of Torres was completely
discredited (Vide TSN of May 19, 1986).16

On the other hand, the trial court gave weight to the testimony of Francisco Cruz:

Cruz testified on this point that the Donations 401 and 402 were both typed in one continuous sitting. He elucidated
clearly on how he arrived at this conclusion.

To start with, he was able to determine that the typewriter used was the elite typewriter, because as per Cruz, when his
typewriting measuring the instruments were placed over the documents, there were twelve (12) letters that went inside
one inch, which is a characteristic of an elite typewriter.

Secondly, he noticed that the color tone of the typewriter ink is the same, thru the entire documents.

As per Cruz, this is another indication that the Donations 401 and 402 were prepared in one continuous sitting, because,
as per Cruz, if the typewriter is used one time and sometime after that, the typewriter is used again, the color tone will
most probably be different.

He further concluded that both the horizontal and vertical alignments are in agreement. He explained how he arrived at
this conclusion.

As per Cruz, by using an instrument which is a typewriting measuring instrument produced by the Criminal Research Co.,
Inc. in the USA and placing said instrument to test the vertical alignment from the top down to the bottom, there is a
perfect vertical alignment.

In fact, as per Cruz, when he took photographs of the documents, he had already placed the typewriting measuring
instrument over the document and he showed to the court the enlarged photographs, indicating clearly that all the
vertical alignments are all in order.

He also found out that the horizontal and vertical alignments are in agreement.

He explained that the slight variances as to the spacing of the words "Know All Men By These Presents" and the words
"That I Consuelo C. Gomez, single, of legal age, Filipino, and a resident of 24 Pine Street, New Marikina Subdivision,
Marikina", there is a slight disagreement in the spacing, but not in the alignment.

He explained that the normal reason for such discrepancy in the spacing is because the typist sometimes tries to push
the variable spacer; the [button] on the left side of the roller, and if you press that round [button], there will be a variance
spacing namely one space, two spaces, and three spaces; and these are not attached so there is a variable in the spacing.
In short, this was due to the pushing of the variable paper by the typist.

Furthermore, he emphasized that the left margins are aligned and this signifies that there was typing in one continuous
sitting, because if you type on a paper and re-insert it again, there are differences in the left hand margin. All of his
findings appear in the blow up photographs which were marked as Exhibits "31" to "34".

He even pointed out the differences in the Jurat wherein admittedly, Judge Sebastian inserted the date "21ST" and "1"
(page number), "401" (document number), "I" (book number), and "82" (series); and also his signature "Jose R. Sebastian"
and his "PTR Number" (vide pages 12 to 19, TSN of April 25, 1982).

All attempts by opposite counsel to discredit the testimony of Cruz on this issue, proved futile. 17

As stated above, petitioner also alleges that the signature "Consuelo C. Gomez" was written before the typewritten name
"Consuelo C. Gomez." In this second round of analysis of the respective testimonies of Zenaida Tor res and Francisco
Cruz, the trial court arrived at the same conclusion:

[ZENAIDA TORRES’S] FINDINGS ARE BASED SOLELY ON A SINGLE HANDWRITTEN LETTER "O", WHICH TOUCHES
(DOES NOT EVEN INTERSECT) THE TYPEWRITTEN LETTER "N". BASED ON THIS, WITHOUT MORE, TORRES CONCLUDED
THAT THE TYPEWRITTEN NAME "CONSUELO C. GOMEZ" CAME AFTER THE HANDWRITTEN SIGNATURE "CONSUELO C.
GOMEZ".

We need but cite authorities on the matter (with which Authorities Torres was confronted and which authorities she had
to admit), which read as follows:

The Intersection of Ink Lines with Typescript. It is often stated that is possible to determine whether an ink line which
intersects typescript was written before or after the typing. The theory is simple; most typewriter inks are greasy and an
ink line tends to shrink in width as it passes over a greasy place on the paper. If, indeed, an ink line is observed to suffer a
distinct reduction in width every time it intersects the typescript it may safely be concluded that the ink line was written
after the typescript.

In practice, however, ink lines written across typescript are rarely seen to suffer any appreciable shrinkage in width, since
the amount of oily medium transferred from the ribbon to the paper is rarely sufficient to have any effect. Indeed, if the
ink happens to be alkaline, surplus ink, instead of shrinking, may spread out into the typescript to increase the width of
the inkline at the intersection. In the case the proof that the ink followed the typescript would be the presence of a
swelling rather than a shrinkage.

Experience has shown that it is rarely possible for any definite opinion as to the order of appearance on the paper for
intersecting ink lines and typescript to be justified on the [meager] amount of evidence which generally available.

A similar state of affairs will be found to hold for carbon paper and waxer; which have much in common with typewriter
ribbons in the way the mark they make on paper react with intersecting ink lines". (Wilson, Suspect Documents; Exhibits
"19"; "19-A"; "37"; "37-D"; underscoring ours).

In fact, the very authority of Torres on the matter, states as follows:

"Sequence of Writing

Intersecting writing strokes may have distinctive patterns, depending upon the order of writing the lapse of time
between the two writings, the density of the two strokes and the kind of inks, writing instruments, and paper used. With a
binocular microscope or a hand-magnifier aided by skillfully controlled light and photography, the true order of
preparation may be revealed and demonstrated to a lay observer.

What appears to be the obvious solution may not always be the correct answer. For example, the line of deepest color
usually appears on top even if it was written first. Careful study and testing is necessary before reaching a conclusion.
Some of the more common criteria for determining sequence are considered in the following paragraphs.

If we considered the intersection of two writing strokes or the intersection of writing and typewriting the majority of
problems are covered. Substantial, repeated intersections of two writings offer a higher probability of success than a
single indifferent intersection, such as a weak stroke crossing another which only very infrequently can produce a clear
indication of the order of writing". (Exhibits "V" and "V-1" (underscoring ours).18

The trial court again sided with Francisco Cruz who testified, citing authorities, 19 that it is impossible to determine
accurately which came first, because there were no intersections at all. 20 The trial court added: "[i]n fact, common sense,
without more, dictates that if there are no intersections (between the typewritten and the handwritten words), it would
be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine which came first."21 The Court of Appeals found nothing erroneous
in these findings of the trial court. 22

Petitioner claims that the testimony of Zenaida Torres, having positively maintained that the handwritten signatures
"Consuelo C. Gomez" in both Deeds of Donation were affixed before the typewritten name of Consuelo C. Gomez,
cannot possibly be overcome by the opinion of Francisco Cruz that was "neither here not there." 23

Petitioner also puts in issue the fact that Zenaida Torres was a court-appointed expert, as opposed to Francisco Cruz
who was merely designated by respondents. Petitioner also assails the credibility of Francisco Cruz on the ground that he
had once testified in favor of respondent Ariston, Jr. 24

Finally, petitioner stresses that Zenaida Torres conducted her tests on the carbon originals of both Deeds of Donation
that were then in the possession of the Notarial Register of Quezon City. On the other hand, Francisco Cruz conducted
his tests, with respect to Document No. 401, on the original in the possession of Ariston, Jr.

On the first point, we agree with petitioner that positive evidence 25 is, as a general rule, more credible than negative
evidence.26 However, the reason for this rule is that the witness who testifies to a negative may have forgotten what
actually occurred, while it is impossible to remember what never existed. 27

Expert witnesses, though, examine documentary and object evidence precisely to testify on their findings in court. It is,
thus, highly improbable for an expert witness to forget his examination of said evidence. Consequently, whereas faulty
memory may be the reason for the negative testimonies delivered by ordinary witnesses, this is unlikely to be so with
respect to expert witnesses. While we, therefore, cannot say that positive evidence does not carry an inherent advantage
over negative evidence when it comes to expert witnesses, 28 the process by which the expert witnesses arrived at their
conclusions should be carefully examined and considered.

On this respect, Prof. Wigmore states that the ordinary expert witness, in perhaps the larger proportion of the topics
upon which he may be questioned, has not a knowledge derived from personal observation. He virtually reproduces,
literally or in substance, conclusions of others which he accepts on the authority of the eminent names responsible for
them.29 In the case at bar, the expert witnesses cited sources as bases of their observations. Francisco Cruz’s statement
that "no finding or conclusion could be arrived at," 30 has basis on the sources presented both by him and by Zenaida
Torres. Both sets of authorities speak of intersecting ink lines. However, the typewritten words "Consuelo C. Gomez"
barely touch and do not intersect the handwritten signature Consuelo C. Gomez in Document No. 401. In Document No.
402, said typewritten words and handwritten signature do not even touch.

In the case at bar, therefore, the expert testimony that "no finding or conclusion can be arrived at," was found to be more
credible than the expert testimony positively stating that the signatures were affixed before the typing of the Deeds of
Donation. The former expert testimony has proven to be more in consonance with the authorities cited by both experts.

As regards the assertion that Zenaida Torres conducted her tests on the carbon originals of both Deeds of Donation
found in the notarial registrar, whereas Francisco Cruz merely examined the original in the possession of Ariston, Jr. with
respect to Document No. 401, suffice it to say that this circumstance cannot be attributed to respondents. After the
examination of the documents by Zenaida Torres, fire razed the Quezon City Hall. The carbon originals of said Deeds
were among the documents burned in the fire. Petitioner never rebutted respondents’ manifestation concerning this
incident, nor accused respondents of burning the Quezon City Hall.

Other than the above allegations, petitioner’s attack on the entire testimony of Francisco Cruz (including the part
concerning whether the Deeds were typed in one continuous sitting) rests primarily in the contention that, while Zenaida
Torres was court-appointed, Francisco Cruz’s testimony was solicited by respondents, one of whom had previously
solicited such testimony for another case.

In United States v. Trono,31 we held:

Expert testimony no doubt constitutes evidence worthy of meriting consideration, although not exclusive on questions of
a professional character. The courts of justice, however, are not bound to submit their findings necessarily to such
testimony; they are free to weigh them, and they can give or refuse to give them any value as proof, or they can even
counterbalance such evidence with the other elements of conviction which may have been adduced during the
trial. (Emphasis supplied.)

Similarly, in Espiritu v. Court of Appeals32 and Salomon v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 33 this Court held:

Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place whatever weight they choose upon such
testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly
within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the
witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor
of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study or observation of
the matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which serve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of the
expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the
case and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect (20 Am. Jur.,
1056-1058). The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the
discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that
discretion. (Underscoring supplied.)

Thus, while the expert witness’ possible bias in favor of the side for whom he or she testifies, and the fact that he or she
is a paid witness, may be considered by the trial court, the latter should weigh the same with all the other evidence
adduced during trial, as well as with the witness’ deportment, actions, ability, and character upon the witness stand. The
trial court is consequently given the discretion in weighing all these circumstances in its determination of the expert
witness’ credibility, as it is in a better position than the appellate courts to observe the demeanor of these witnesses. As
there is no evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in such determination, the latter is not reviewable
by this Court.

Alleged patent irregularities on the face of the assailed Deeds of Donation

As previously mentioned, the testimony of Zenaida Torres constitutes the only direct evidence presented by petitioner to
prove that the Deeds of Donation were merely intercalated over the signature of Consuelo. Petitioner, however, also
presents the following circumstantial evidence and arguments to prove the same, claiming that there are patent
irregularities on the face of the assailed Deeds of Donation:

1) Both deeds are each one-page documents contained in a letter size (8" ½" x "11") paper, instead of the usual legal size
(8" ½" x "14") paper, and typed single spaced, with barely any margin on its four sides; 34

2) In Doc. 401, three parcels of land located in two different municipalities were purportedly donated to two donees in
the same document;35

3) In Doc. 402, shares of stock in two corporations, jewelries and collector’s items in a bank deposit box, two registered
cars, cash and money placement in another bank, and a bodega were donated to three donees in the same document; 36

4) The bodega mentioned in Doc. No. 402 was not owned by Consuelo. If the Deeds were executed by Consuelo, she
would surely have known this fact as she was the treasurer of V-TRI Realty Corporation;37

5) If Doc. 401 is superimposed on Doc. 402, the signature of Consuelo on both documents appear almost in the same
place;38

6) The whole of both Deeds of Donation, including the notarial acknowledgement portion and the TAN Num bers and
Residence Certificates of the signatories, were typed with only one typewriter. The only portions that seemed to have
been typed with a different machine are the date ("21 st") below the acknowledgement and the filled-in numbers of the
"Doc. No. ___; Book No. ___; Page No. ___’" portion, the name "Jose R. Sebastian" above the words NOTARY PUBLIC and
the PTR Number with date and place of issue; 39
7) The PTR Number and its date and place of issue appear in the right hand side of the name and signature of Jose
Sebastian, instead of below it;40

8) The inserted date (which was typed with the same machine used for typing the name of notary public Jose Sebastian)
is different from the date of the clause "In WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereunto set their hands in Quezon City, on
the 20th day of April/1979" (which was typed with another machine; the one used in typing the body of the deed and the
body of the acknowledgment);41

9) The TAN Numbers and the Residence Certificate Numbers of the purported donor and donees have already been
typed with the same machine that was used in typing the body of the deed and the body of the acknowledgement; 42

10) It is highly questionable that a supposedly well-educated person like Ariston Gomez, Jr. would not have thought of
preparing at least five copies of each document as there were four donees and one donor. 43

The Court of Appeals ruled:

As to the alleged intercalation of the text of the deeds of donation above the supposedly priorly affixed signature of
CONSUELO on a blank sheet of bond paper, as shown by the one-page document in a letter size paper, typed single
space with barely any room left on the top, bottom and left and right margins, as well as the lack of copies thereof, it has
been explained that the same was due to the fact that the said documents were prepared by defendant ARISTON, JR., a
non-lawyer inexperienced with the way such documents should be executed and in how many copies. x x x.

xxxx

Accordingly, it is not surprising that someone as unfamiliar and inexperienced in preparing a deed of donation, or any
deed of conveyance for that matter, as ARISTON, JR., prepared the documents that are the subject matter of the case at
bar in the manner that he did. 44

Petitioner counters that the alleged irregularities "do not relate to the proper construction or manner of writing the
documents as would necessitate the expertise of a lawyer. Rather, they relate to matters as basic as observing the proper
margins at the top, left, right and bottom portions of the document, using the appropriate paper size and number of
pages that are necessary and observing appropriate spacing and proper placement of the words in the document."

All these alleged irregularities are more apparent than real. None of these alleged irregularities affects the validity of the
subject Deeds of Donation, nor connotes fraud or foul play. It is true that the condition and physical appearance of a
questioned document constitute a valuable factor which, if correctly evaluated in light of surrounding circumstances,
may help in determining whether it is genuine or forged. 45 However, neither the expert witnesses, nor our personal
examination of the exhibits, had revealed such a questionable physical condition.

Legal documents contained in 8 ½ x 11 paper are neither unheard of, nor even uncommon. The same is true with
regard to single-spaced legal documents; in fact, petitioner’s Supplemental Memorandum was actually single-spaced.

That the subject Deeds of Donation appear to have conveyed numerous properties in two sheets of paper does not
militate against their authenticity. Not all people equate length with importance. The simplicity and practicality of
organizing the properties to be donated into real and personal properties, and using one-page documents to convey
each category, are clearly appealing to people who value brevity. The same appeal of conciseness had driven petitioner
to make a single-spaced Supplemental Memorandum whose only object was to summarize the arguments he has laid
down in the original twice-as-long Memorandum,46 an endeavor that we, in fact, appreciate.

The allegation concerning the use of one typewriter to encode both Deeds of Donation, including the notarial
acknowledgment portion, TAN, and residence certificates, is purely paranoia. Being in the legal profession for many years,
we are aware that it is common practice for the parties to a contract to type the whole document, so that all the notary
public has to do is to input his signature, seal, and the numbers pertaining to his notarial registry.

The use of single-paged documents also provides an explanation as to why the PTR number and the date and place of
issue are found in the right-hand side of the name and signature of Jose Sebastian, instead of below it. We agree with
respondents that it is irrational, impractical, and contrary to human experience to use another page just to insert those
minute but necessary details. Such use of single-paged documents, taken together with the fact that the Deeds of
Donation are of almost the same length, are also the reasons why it does not baffle us that the signatures of Consuelo
appear at around the same portions of these Deeds. Indeed, we would have been suspicious had these documents been
of varying lengths, but the signatures still appear on the same portions in both.

The only observations concerning the physical appearance of the subject Deeds of Donation that truly give us doubts as
to their authenticity are the relatively small margins on the sides of the same, the lack of copies thereof, and the alleged
inclusion in Document No. 402 of a bodega allegedly not owned by Consuelo. However, these doubts are not enough to
establish the commission of fraud by respondents and to overturn the presumption that persons are innocent of crime or
wrong.47 Good faith is always presumed. 48 It is the one who alleges bad faith who has the burden to prove the
same,49 who, in this case, is the petitioner.

The small margins in the said Deeds of Donation, while indicative of sloppiness, were not necessarily resorted to because
there was a need to intercalate a long document and, thus, prove petitioner’s theory that there were only two pieces of
paper signed by Consuelo. Respondents admit that the use of one sheet of paper for both Deeds of Donation was
intentional, for brevity’s sake. While the ensuing litigation could now have caused regrets on the part of Ariston, Jr. for his
decision to sacrifice the margins for brevity’s sake, there still appears no indication that he did so maliciously. Indeed, law
professors remind bar examinees every year to leave margins on their booklets. Despite the importance examinees put
into such examinations, however, examinees seem to constantly forget these reminders.

The testimonies of Ariston Gomez, Sr. (Ariston, Sr.), Ariston, Jr., Maria Rita Gomez-Samson (Maria Rita), and Notary Public
Jose Sebastian tend to show that there were one original and two copies each of Documents No. 401 and No. 402. Of
these documents, it was the original of Document No. 402 and a duplicate original of Document No. 401 which were
actually presented by petitioner himself before the trial court, through the representative of the notarial registrar of
Quezon City, who testified pursuant to a subpoena. The latter two documents were submitted to the NBI for examination
by petitioner and by the NBI Handwriting Expert, Zenaida Torres.
Petitioner testified that he could not find copies of the two Deeds of Donation with the Bureau of Records Management .
He, however, was able to find certified true copies of these documents with the Register of Deeds and the Land
Transportation Commission.50

According to the testimony of Ariston, Jr., the original of Document No. 401 was separated from the brown envelope,
containing the other copies of the Deeds of Donation, which Jose Sebastian left with respondents, as they were trying to
fit the same into a certain red album. On the other hand, Maria Rita testified that one copy each of the duplicate originals
of Documents No. 401 and No. 402 were lost. Maria Rita explained that when she was about to leave for Spain to visit her
sister in Palma de Mallorica, her father, Ariston, Sr., gave her the brown envelope, containing duplicate originals of the
Deeds of Donation in question, to show to her sister in Palma de Mallorica. 51Maria Rita explained in detail how her
handbag was stolen as she was praying in a chapel while waiting for the connecting flight from Madrid to Palma de
Mallorica. The handbag allegedly contained not only duplicate originals of the said Deeds of Donation, but a lso other
important documents and her valuables. Maria Rita presented the police report of the Spanish police authorities 52 and
her letter to the Valley National Bank of U.S.A.,53 regarding these losses.

Notary public Jose Sebastian retained two copies of the Deeds of Donation in his files. Jose Sebastian explained t hat he
did so because Consuelo wanted two copies of each document. Since Jose Sebastian had to transmit to the Notarial
Registrar duplicate originals of the document, he had to photocopy the same to keep as his own copies, and transmit to
the Notarial Registrar whatever duplicate original copies he had. Jose Sebastian did not notice that, instead of retaining a
duplicate original of Document No. 402, what was left with him was the original. 54

While it cannot be denied that the unfortunate incidents and accidents presented by respondents do arouse some
suspicions, the testimonies of Ariston, Jr., Maria Rita, and Jose Sebastian had been carefully examined by the tr ial court,
which found them to be credible. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the findings of the trial court respecting the
credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect since it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses as they testified before the court. Unless substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or
misunderstood by the latter which, if considered, would materially affect the result of the case, this Court will
undauntedly sustain the findings of the lower court.55

All petitioner has succeeded in doing, however, is to instill doubts in our minds. While such approach would succeed if
carried out by the accused in criminal cases, plaintiffs in civil cases need to do much more to overturn findings of fact and
credibility by the trial court, especially when the same had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It must be stressed
that although this Court may overturn a conviction of the lower court based on reasonable doubt, overturning
judgments in civil cases should be based on preponderance of evidence, and with the further qualification that, when the
scales shall stand upon an equipoise, the court should find for the defendant. 56

Respondents also point out that Ariston, Jr., the person they claim to have prepared said Deeds of Donation, was never
confronted during the trial with all these alleged irregularities on the face of the Deeds of Donation. As such, the trial
court was never given a chance to determine whether Ariston, Jr. would have given a rational, logical and acceptable
explanation for the same.
Respondents are correct. As the alleged irregularities do not, on their faces, indicate bad faith on the part of respondents,
it is necessary for petitioner to confront respondents with these observations. Respondents would not have thought that
the Deeds of Donation would be impugned on the mere basis that they were written on short bond paper, or that their
margins are small. Respondents were thus deprived of a chance to rebut these observations by testimonies and other
evidence, and were forced to explain the same in memoranda and briefs with the appellate courts, where these
observations started to crop up. It would have been different if the date of the documents had been after Consuelo ’s
death, or if there had been obvious alterations on the documents. In the latter cases, it would have been the
responsibility of respondents’ counsel to see to it that Ariston, Jr. explain such inconsistencies.

Payment of donor’s tax before the death of Consuelo

In ruling that there had been no antedating or falsification of the subject Deeds of Donation, the Court of Appeals was
also persuaded by the following evidence: (1) the finding that it was the deceased CONSUELO herself who paid the
donor’s tax of the properties subject of the donation, as evidenced by the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
(PCIB) check she issued to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on 9 October 1979, in the amount
of ₱119,283.63, and (2) the testimony and certification dated 22 November 1979 of Jose Sebastian that the said
documents were acknowledged before him on 21 April 1979. 57 Respondents had presented evidence to the effect that
Consuelo made an initial payment of ₱119,283.63 for the Donor’s Tax on 9 October 1979, while respondent Ariston, Sr.,
supplied the deficiency of ₱2,125.82 on 4 December 1979.

Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in its finding of fact that Consuelo herself paid the donor’s tax
of the properties subject of the donation on 9 October 1979, as the evidence allegedly shows that the Donor ’s Tax was
paid on 4 December 1979, or a month after Consuelo’s death.58 Petitioner thereby calls our attention to his Exhibit "O," a
certificate dated 4 December 1979 issued by Mr. Nestor M. Espenilla, Chief of the Transfer Taxes Division of the BIR,
confirming the payment of the donor’s tax. The certificate reads:

LUNGSOD NG QUEZON

December 4, 1979

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that MS. CONSUELO C. GOMEZ of 8059 Honradez St., Makati, Metro Manila, paid
donor’s tax on even date in the amount of ₱121,409.45 inclusive of surcharge, interest and compromise
penalties as follows:

RTR No. 2814499, PTC Conf. Receipt No. 2896956 – ₱119,283.63

RTR No. 2814500/PTC Conf. Receipt No. 2896957 – 2,125.82

---------------
Total
₱121,409.45
 This certification is issued upon request of Mr. Ariston Gomez, Sr.

(SGD)NESTOR M. ESPENILLA
Chief, Financing, Real Estate and Transfer

Taxes Division
TAN E2153-B0723-A-759

Petitioner highlights the fact that the Revenue Tax Receipts (RTRs) and the Confirmation Receipts for the payments
supposedly made by Consuelo on 9 October 1979 and by respondent Ariston, Sr. on 4 December 1979 bore consecutive
numbers, despite being issued months apart. Petitioner also points to the fact that the tax was stated in the certification
to have been paid "on even date" -- meaning, on the date of the certification, 4 December 1979.

Petitioner presented further the check used to pay the Donor’s Tax, which, petitioner himself admits, was signed by
Consuelo.60 Petitioner draws our attention to the words "RECEIVED – BIR, P.T.C. CUBAO BR., NON-NEGOTIABLE, T-10
DEC. 4." Petitioner concludes that Philippine Trust Company Bank, Cubao Branch, received the check on 4 December
1979 as a collection agent of the BIR.

Respondents, on the other hand, presented the following documents to prove payment of the Donor ’s Tax before the
death of Consuelo on 6 November 1979:

1) The covering letter to the BIR Commissioner dated 24 September 1979 and prepared by Mariano A. Requija,
accountant of Consuelo and Ariston, Jr., which included the Donor’s Tax Return for the properties covered by the two
Deeds of Donation. The letter was stamped received by the BIR Commissioner on 8 October 1979; 61

2) Another letter dated 24 September 1979 executed by Mariano A. Requija containing the breakdown of the donations
received by the BIR on 8 October 1979; 62

3) A schedule of gifts which was also dated 24 September 1979 and which was also received by the BIR on 8 October
1979, enumerating all the donated properties included in the Deeds of Donation. 63

4) The Donor’s Tax Return covering the properties transferred in the two Deeds of Donation filed, received, and
receipted by the BIR Commissioner on 8 October 1979; 64

5) The 9 October 1979 PCIB Personal Check No. A144-73211 issued by Consuelo in favor of the BIR Commissioner in the
amount of ₱119,283.63.65

6) An "Authority to Issue Tax Receipt" issued by the BIR Commissioner on 21 October 1979 for a total amount of ₱
119,283.63.66

Before proceeding further, it is well to note that the factum probandum 67 petitioner is trying to establish here is still the
alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on blank pieces of paper containing the signatures of Consuelo. The
factum probans68 this time around is the alleged payment of the Donor’s Tax after the death of Consuelo.
Firstly, it is apparent at once that there is a failure of the factum probans, even if successfully proven, to prove in turn the
factum probandum. As intimated by respondents, payment of the Donor’s Tax after the death of Consuelo does not
necessarily prove the alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on blank pieces of paper containing the signatures
of Consuelo.

Secondly, petitioner failed to prove this factum probandum.

Ariston, Jr. never testified that Consuelo herself physically and personally delivered PCIB Check No. A144-73211 to the BIR.
He instead testified that the check was prepared and issued by Consuelo during her lifetime, but that he, Ariston, Jr.,
physically and personally delivered the same to the BIR. 69 On the query, however, as to whether it was delivered to the
BIR before or after the death of Consuelo, petitioner and respondents presented all the conflicting evidence we
enumerated above.

The party asserting a fact has the burden of proving it. Petitioner, however, merely formulated conjectures based on the
evidence he presented, and did not bother to present Nestor Espenilla to explain the consecutive numbers of the RTRs
or what he meant with the words "on even date" in his certification. Neither did petitioner present any evidence that the
records of the BIR Commissioner were falsified or antedated, thus, letting the presumption that a public official had
regularly performed his duties stand. This is in contrast to respondents’ direct evidence attesting to the payment of said
tax during the lifetime of Consuelo. With respect to respondents’ evidence, all that petitioner could offer in rebuttal is
another speculation totally unsupported by evidence: the alleged fabrication thereof.

Credibility of Jose Sebastian

Petitioner claims that no credence should have been given to the testimony of the notary public, Jose Sebastian, as said
Jose Sebastian is the same judge whom this Court had dismissed from the service in Garciano v. Sebastian. 70Petitioner
posits that the dismissal of Judge Jose Sebastian from the service casts a grave pall on his credibility as a witness,
especially given how, in the course of the administrative proceedings against him, he had lied to mislead the investigator,
as well as employed others to distort the truth.

Petitioner further claims that the reliance by the Court of Appeals on the 22 November 1979 Certification by J ose
Sebastian is misplaced, considering the questionable circumstances surrounding such certification. Said certification,
marked as petitioner’s Exhibit "P," reads:

November 22, 1979

HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO

Executive Judge
CFI – Quezon City

Sir:

In connection with the discrepancies noted by the Acting Clerk of Court in my notarial report pertaining
to another document submitted to the Notarial Section last July 2, 1979 I have the honor to certify that
 documents Nos. 401 and 402 referring to Donations Inter Vivos executed by Donor Consuelo C. Gomez
in favor of Donees Ma. Rita Gomez-Samson et. al. were signed in my presence by all the parties and
their instrumental witnesses on April 21, 1979 in my office. I hereby further certify that said two
documents among other documents were reported by me in accordance with law on July 2, 1979, for all
legal intents and purposes.

In view of the above, it is respectfully requested that the certified true copies of the said two documents
officially requested by one of the Donees be issued.

Very respectfully,

(Sgd.) JOSE R. SEBASTIAN

Notary Public71

Petitioner points out that the Certification was made after the death of Consuelo, and claims that the same appears to be
a scheme by Jose Sebastian to concoct an opportunity for him to make mention of the subject Deeds of Donation
intervivos, "despite the plain fact that the latter had utterly no relation to the matter referred to by J ose Sebastian in the
opening phrase of the letter."72

It is well to note that, as stated by the Court of Appeals, Jose Sebastian was originally a witness for petitioner Augusto. As
such, Rule 132, Section 12, of the Rules of Court prohibits petitioner from impeaching him:

SEC. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. – Except with respect to witnesses referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e)
of section 10, the party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility.

A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon adequate showing of his
adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.

The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may be impeached by the party
presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, except by evidence of his bad character. He
may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse party, but such cross-examination must only be on the
subject matter of his examination-in-chief.

This rule is based on the theory that a person who produces a witness vouches for him as being worthy of credit, and
that a direct attack upon the veracity of the witness "would enable the party to destroy the witness, if he spoke against
him, and to make him a good witness, if he spoke for him, with the means in his hands of destroying his credit, if he
spoke against him."73

Neither had there been declaration by the court that Jose Sebastian was an unwilling or hostile witness. Jose Sebastian is
also neither an adverse party, nor an officer, director nor a managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a
partnership or association which is an adverse party. 74
Be that as it may, even if Jose Sebastian had been declared by the court as an unwilling or hostile witness, the third
paragraph of Section 12 as quoted above, in relation to Section 11 75 of the same Rule, only allows the party calling the
witness to impeach such witness by contradictory evidence or by prior inconsistent statements, and never by evidence of
his bad character. Thus, Jose Sebastian’s subsequent dismissal as a judge would not suffice to discredit him as a witness
in this case.

We have also ruled in People v. Dominguez, 76 which, in turn cited Cordial v. People,77 that:

(E)ven convicted criminals are not excluded from testifying in court so long as, having organs of sense, they "can perceive
and perceiving can make known their perceptions to others."

The fact of prior criminal conviction alone does not suffice to discredit a witness; the testimony of such a witness must be
assayed and scrutinized in exactly the same way the testimony of other witnesses must be examined for its relevance and
credibility. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

The effect of this pronouncement is even more significant in this case, as Jose Sebastian has never been convictedof a
crime before his testimony, but was instead administratively sanctioned eleven years after such testimony. Scrutinizing
the testimony of Jose Sebastian, we find, as the trial court and the Court of Appeals did, no evidence of bias on the part
of Jose Sebastian. On top of this, Jose Sebastian’s testimony is supported by the records of the notarial registry, which
shows that the documents in question were received by the Notarial Registrar on 2 July 1979, which was four months
before the death of Consuelo on 6 November 1979.

Alleged unusual circumstances relative to the execution and notarization of the subject Deeds of Donation

The last set of circumstantial evidence presented by petitioner to prove the alleged intercalation of the subject Deeds of
Donation on two blank papers signed by Consuelo are the following allegedly unusual circumstances relative to the
execution and notarization of the said deeds. According to petitioner:

1. The signing and acknowledgement of the Deeds of Donation on 21 April 1979 is highly improbable and implausible,
considering the fact that Consuelo left the same day for the United States on a pleasure trip; 78

2. The flight time of Consuelo on 21 April 1979 was 11:00 a.m.. And even assuming that the flight time was 1:00 p.m., as
contended by respondents, the ordinary boarding procedures require Consuelo to be at the airport at least two hours
before flight time, or 11:00 a.m.. Petitioner points out that respondents’ alleged time frame (from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.)
is not enough to accomplish the following acts: respondents and Consuelo leaving Marikina at 7:00 a.m. and arriving at
the notary public Jose Sebastian’s house at Pag-asa, Q.C. at about 8:00 a.m. to 8:30 a.m.; some "small talk with Jose
Sebastian; Jose Sebastian examining the documents; Jose Sebastian having a closed meeting with Consuelo to discuss
the documents; Jose Sebastian reading the documents to respondents line by line and asking the latter whether they
accepted the donation; Jose Sebastian typing the notarial entries; the parties signing the deeds; Jose Sebastian talking
privately with Consuelo, who paid the former in cash for his services; Ariston Gomez, Jr. driving Consuelo and other
respondents back to Marikina, and dropping the other respondents at their respective residences; picking up Consuelo’s
luggage; and Ariston Gomez, Jr. bringing Consuelo to the Manila International Airport;79
3. It is contrary to human experience for Consuelo and respondents not to make a prior arrangement with the notary
public Jose Sebastian and instead take a gamble on his being in his office; 80

4. It is illogical for Consuelo to rush the execution of the donations when she was in fact planning to come back from her
pleasure trip shortly, as she did;81 1awphi1.net

5. The choice of a notary public from Quezon City is highly suspect, when Consuelo and respondents reside in Marikina.
It is also illogical that Consuelo would have chosen a notary public whom she met only on the same day she executed
the Deeds, especially when Consuelo had a regular lawyer whose notarial services she availed of only two weeks before
her death;82

6. It is improbable that Consuelo paid Jose Sebastian in cash, for there is no reason for her to carry much cash in peso
when she was about to leave for the United States in that same morning; 83

7. Maria Rita’s residence certificate was obtained from Manila when she is a resident of Marikina. Also, Maria Rita
obtained said residence certificate on 20 April 1979, and yet Maria Rita testified that she was surprised to know of the
donation only on 21 April 1979. 84 Also suspicious are the circumstances wherein Ariston Gomez, Jr. obtained a residence
certificate on 17 April 1979, when he testified that he knew of the schedule for signing only on 20 April 1979, and
Consuelo had two residence certificates, as she used different ones in the Deeds of Donation and the document
notarized two weeks before her death; 85 1awphi1.net

8. If Consuelo was really frugal, she could have also made a will;86

9. All the instrumental witnesses of the Deeds of Donation are biased, being themselves either donees of the other Deed
of Donation, or a relative of a donee; 87 and

10. Respondents were not able to sufficiently and substantially explain the belated transfer of the properties cove red by
the assailed Deeds of Donation. Petitioner points to Maria Rita’s testimony that the real properties were transferred after
the death of Consuelo. While respondents assert that the personal properties were transferred to them prior to
Consuelo’s death, evidence shows otherwise.88

This Court does not find anything suspicious in a person wanting to transfer her properties by donation to her loved
ones before leaving for abroad via an airplane. While many believe these days that taking the plane is the "safest way to
travel," this has not always been the case. The fear that planes sometimes crash, now believed to be irrational, has always
been at the back of the minds of air travelers. Respondents maintain in their testimonies before the RTC that the Deeds
were completed to the satisfaction of Consuelo only on 20 April 1979. She allegedly wanted to have the documents
signed and notarized before she left for abroad.

The claim that the flight time of Consuelo was at 11:00 a.m. is hearsay thrice removed, and thus cannot be given any
weight. Petitioner claims that he was told by his twelve-year old son that Consuelo was leaving at 11:00 a.m. on 21 April
1979, such son having learned about this from the maid of Consuelo when the son called Consuelo’s house that
day.89 This is in contrast to Maria Rita’s positive testimony that the flight time was at 1:00 p.m. on the same day. 90 Maria
Rita joined Consuelo in this flight.
As regards petitioner’s claim that respondents’ alleged time frame in the morning of 21 April 1979 was insufficient, this
Court is not convinced. As held by the Court of Appeals, petitioner did not present any proof that it had been impossible
to perform those alleged acts within three hours. 91 As argued by respondents, the one-paged documents can be read
aloud without difficulty within five to ten minutes each. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that traff ic is usually
very minimal on Saturday mornings, and was much less of a problem in 1979.

Respondents and Consuelo’s decision not to make a prior arrangement with notary public Jose Sebastian does not
surprise us either. Respondents explain that, since the telephone lines of Marikina were inefficient in the year 1979, they
decided to take a calculated gamble. It is not at all unreasonable to expect that Jose Sebastian would be at his house on
a Saturday, at around 8:00 a.m.

With respect to the choice of a notary public from Quezon City, we find the explanation relative thereto satisfying. We
quote:

Moreover, ARISTON, JR. disclosed that they could not have gone to the notary public whom his aunt, CONSUELO, knew
because she did not want to go to said notary public since our cousins whom she didn’t like had access to him and she
wanted to keep the execution of the deeds confidential. Thus:

Q: And also you know for a fact that your auntie had a regular Notary Public for the preparation and notarization of legal
documents in the name of Atty. Angeles, now Congressman Angeles of Marikina, is that correct?

A: It depends on the frame of time. Yes and No. He was a regular Notary Public, but way before that date. But after that,
he fall out of graces of my auntie. He was not anymore that regular.

Q: How long before April 30 did he fall out of graces of your auntie, year before that?

A: I don’t specifically remember but what I do know is such confidential document like this, we would not really go to
Angeles.

Q: Even for notarization purposes?

xxxx

A: Even for notarization purposes, no sir. This confidential nature, no.

ATTY. FERRY:

Are you saying that your auntie trusted more Sebastian than Angeles?

A: No. He is trusting her own experience about Atty. Angeles.

Q: Are you saying that she had sad experience with Atty. Angeles in connection with the latter’s performance of his duty
as Notary Public, as a lawyer?

A: That is what she told me.

Q: When was that?

A: She will tell me that regularly.

xxxx

ATTY. FERRY:

Q: Mr. Gomez, you testified last April 6, 1989 that after the execution of the two documents in question dated April 20,
1979, Atty. Angeles fell out of the graces of your auntie and you added that as a consequence, your auntie did not avail
of the notarial services of Atty. Angeles when it comes to confidential matters, is that correct?

A: Yes. After that particular execution of the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos, Atty. Angeles especially if the documents are
confidential in nature.

Q: You used confidential matters, did your aunt spell out what these confidential matters are?

A: This particular document, Deed of Donation was under the category "confidential".

Q: But did you discuss this, the matter of notarizing this document by Atty. Angeles with your auntie such that she made
known to you this falls under confidential matters?

A: Yes we did.

Q: So in other words, you intimated to your auntie that Atty. Angeles would possibly notarized these documents?

A: No.

Q: How did it come about that your auntie gave that idea or information that these documents should be notarized by
other notary public other than Angeles, because it is confidential?

A: It came from her.

Q: Yes, did she tell you that?

ATTY. GUEVARRA:

That’s what he said. "It came from her".

ATTY. FERRY:

My question is, how did it come about your auntie told you that these two documents are of confidential matters?

A: Well, no problem. I said that it has to be notarized, she said more or less, "ayaw ko kay Atty. Angeles".

Q: She said that?

A: That’s correct.

Q: And you were curious to know why she told you that?

A: No. I knew why she told me that. She said that Atty. Angeles….well, my cousins whom she didn’t like have access to
Atty. Angeles.92

The Court of Appeals had fully explained that the belated transfer of the properties does not affect the validity or effects
of the donations at all, nor dent the credibility of respondents’ factual assertions:

Per our perusal of the records, we find that the defendants were able to sufficiently and substantially explain the reason
for the belated transfer of the pertinent properties, i.e., after the death of CONSUELO. Thus, the testimony of MA. RITA
revealed, insofar as the real properties are concerned, the following:

"Q: Since you were already aware as you claim that as early as when you went to the States in the company of your
auntie, Consuelo Gomez, these 2 parcels of land together with the improvements consisting of a house were transferred
to you, you did not exert efforts after your arrival from the States to effect the transfer of these properties?

"A: No, I did not.

"Q: Why?

"A: Well, for delicadeza. My auntie was still alive. I am not that aggressive. Tita Elo told me "akin na iyon" but I did not
transfer it in my name. "Siempre nakakahiya."

"Q: That was your reason for not effecting the transfer of the properties in your name?

"A: Yes, that was my reason.

"Q: Did you not know that the deed supposedly executed by Consuelo Gomez was a donation inter vivos, meaning, it
takes effect during her lifetime?

"A: I do not know the legal term donation inter vivos. I have also my sentiment. Tita Elo was very close to us but I did not
want to tell her: "Tita Elo, ibigay mo Na iyan SA akin. Itransfer mo na sa pangalan ko." It is not my character to be very
aggressive."

In addition, Article 712 of the Civil Code provides:

"ART. 712. Ownership is acquired by occupation and by intellectual creation.

"Ownership and other real rights over property are acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by testate and
intestate succession, and in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition.

"They may also be acquired by means of prescription."

Clearly, the issuance of the titles in the names of the defendants is not the mode by which they acquired ownership of
the properties, but rather the fact that the same were donated to them. The circumstance that aforesaid properties were
actually transferred in the names of the donees only after the death of the donor, although the deeds of donation were
dated April 21, 1979, does not by itself indicate that the said documents were antedated. 93

Petitioner seems to unduly foreclose the possibility – one which experience tells us is not a rare occurrence at all – that
donations are often resorted to in place of testamentary dispositions, often for the purpose of tax avoidance. Such
properties usually remain in the donor’s possession during his or her lifetime, despite the fact that the donations have
already taken effect. Nevertheless, the purpose of utilizing donation as a mode to transfer property is not in issue here.

Finally, the allegations concerning the payment of Jose Sebastian in cash, the suggestion that Consuelo should have also
made a will, and the claim that all the instrumental witnesses of the will are biased, are purely speculative.

In sum, all these circumstantial evidence presented by petitioner had failed to comply with the strict requirements in
using circumstantial evidence, for which Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

While the above provision seems to refer only to criminal cases, it has been pointed out that in some jurisdictions, no
distinction is made between civil and criminal actions as to the quality of the burden of establishing a proposition by
circumstantial evidence. In such jurisdictions the rule is generally stated to be that the circumstances established must
not only be consistent with the proposition asserted but also inconsistent with any other rational theory. 94

In all, what petitioner has succeeded in doing is to raise doubts in our minds. Again, while such approach would succeed
if carried out by the accused in criminal cases, plaintiffs in civil cases need to do much more to overturn findings of fact
and credibility by the trial court, especially when the same had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Leniency in the weighing of petitioner’s evidence could only produce a mere equipoise:

When the scales shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or
the other, the court will find for the defendant.

Under this principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weaknesses of the defendant ’
s claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of
evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action."95 (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner’s liability for damages

The last part of the trial court’s decision, which was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, involves the award of
damages in favor of Ariston, Jr. The trial court held Augusto Gomez and the estate of the late Consuelo "jointly and
solidarily liable" for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

The trial court held:

The records are clear, that plaintiff was so desperate for evidence to support his charges, that he repeatedly subpoenaed
the defendants themselves; at the risk of presenting evidence contradictory to his legal position and which actually
happened, when plaintiff subpoenaed Ariston Gomez Jr., Ariston Gomez Sr., and Maria Rita Gomez-Samson, as his
witnesses.

All told, the court finds plaintiff was motivated not by a sincere desire to insure the totality of the estate of Consuelo, b ut
rather by his desire to cause injury to defendants, and to appropriate for himself and the rest of the Gomez brothers and
nephews, other than the donees, properties which were clearly validly disposed of by Consuelo, via Donations Inter
Vivos.96

Our own examination of the records of the case, however, convinces us of the contrary. Respondents never assailed the
authenticity of petitioner’s evidence, and merely presented their own evidence to support their assertions. As previously
stated, petitioner’s evidence had successfully given us doubts as to the authenticity of the subject Deeds of Donation.
While such doubts are not enough to discharge petitioner’s burden of proof, they are enough to convince us that
petitioner’s institution of the present case was carried out with good faith. The subpoenas directed against respondents
merely demonstrate the zealous efforts of petitioner’s counsel to represent its client, which can neither be taken against
the counsel, nor against its clients.

While, as regards the alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on two blank sheets of paper signed by Consuelo,
the burden of proof lies with petitioner, the opposite is true as regards the damages suffered by the respondents. Having
failed to discharge this burden to prove bad faith on the part of petitioner in instituting the case, petitioner cannot be
responsible therefor, and thus cannot be held liable for moral damages.

This Court has also held that, in the absence of moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages, no exemplar y
damages can be granted, for exemplary damages are allowed only in addition to any of the four kinds of damages
mentioned.97

The attorney’s fees should also be deleted, as it was supposed to be the consequence of a clearly unfounded civil action
or proceeding by the plaintiff.

WHEREFORE, subject to the modification of the assailed Decision, the Petition is DENIED. The Joint Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil Cases No. 36089 and No. 36090, which was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the following portion be DELETED:

3. That Augusto Gomez and the estate of the late Consuelo Gomez, jointly and solidarily should pay to Ariston Gomez, Jr.
the following amounts:
Moral damages of ₱1,000,000.00;

Exemplary damages of ₱250,000.00

Attorney’s fees of ₱200,000.00

And costs of suit; with legal interest on all the amounts, except on costs and attorney’s fees, commencing from February
15, 1980, until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

B. PURPOSE

C. SCOPE

G.R. No. 177188 December 4, 2008

EL GRECO SHIP MANNING AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondent.
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court , filed by petitioner El
Greco Ship Manning and Management Corporation (El Greco), seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 of the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc dated 14 March 2007 in C.T.A. EB No. 162. In its assailed Decision, the CTA En
Banc affirmed the Decision2 dated 17 October 2005 of the CTA Second Division in CTA Case No. 6618, ordering the
forfeiture of the vessel M/V Criston, also known as M/V Neptune Breeze, for having been involved in the smuggling of
35,000 bags of imported rice.

The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:

On 23 September 2001, the vessel M/V Criston docked at the Port of Tabaco, Albay, carrying a shipment of 35,000 bags
of imported rice, consigned to Antonio Chua, Jr. (Chua) and Carlos Carillo (Carillo), payable upon its delivery to Albay.
Glucer Shipping Company, Inc. (Glucer Shipping) is the operator of M/V Criston. 3

Upon the directive of then Commissioner Titus Villanueva of the Bureau of Customs (BOC), a Warrant of Seizure and
Detention, Seizure Identification No. 06-2001, was issued by the Legaspi District Collector, on 23 September 2001 for the
35,000 bags of imported rice shipped by M/V Criston, on the ground that it left the Port of Manila without the necessary
clearance from the Philippine Coast Guard. Since the earlier Warrant covered only the cargo, but not M/V Criston which
transported it, a subsequent Warrant of Seizure and Detention, Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A, was issued on 18
October 2001 particularly for the said vessel. The BOC District Collector of the Port of Legaspi thereafter commenced
proceedings for the forfeiture of M/V Criston and its cargo under Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A and Seizure
Identification No. 06-2001, respectively.4

To protect their property rights over the cargo, consignees Chua and Carillo filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tabaco, Albay, a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) assailing the authority of the Legaspi District Collectors to issue the Warrants of Seizure and Detention and
praying for a permanent injunction against the implementation of the said Warrants. Their Petition was docketed as Civil
Case No. T-2170.5

After finding the Petition sufficient in form and substance and considering the extreme urgency of the matter involved,
the RTC issued a 72-hour TRO conditioned upon the filing by Chua and Carillo of a bond in the amount
of P31,450,000.00, representing the value of the goods. After Chua and Carillo posted the required bond, the 35,000
bags of rice were released to them. 6

The Legaspi District Collector held in abeyance the proceedings for the forfeiture of M/V Criston and its cargo under
Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A pending the resolution by the RTC of Civil
Case No. T-2170. When the RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. T-2170 filed by the BOC, the Legaspi
District Collector set the hearing of Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A. A notice
of the scheduled hearing of the aforementioned seizure cases was sent to Glucer Shipping but it failed to appear at the
hearing so set. After a second notice of hearing was ignored by Glucer Shipping, the prosecutor was allowed to present
his witnesses.7

In the meantime, while M/V Criston was berthing at the Port of Tabaco under the custody of the BOC, the Province of
Albay was hit by typhoon "Manang." In order to avert any damage which could be caused by the typhoon, the vessel was
allowed to proceed to another anchorage area to temporarily seek shelter. After typhoon "Manang" had passed through
Albay province, M/V Criston, however, failed to return to the Port of Tabaco and was nowhere to be found.8

Alarmed, the BOC and the Philippine Coast Guard coordinated with the Philippine Air Force to find the missing vessel.
On 8 November 2001, the BOC received information that M/V Criston was found in the waters of Bataan sporting the
name of M/V Neptune Breeze.9

Based on the above information and for failure of M/V Neptune Breeze to present a clearance from its last port of call, a
Warrant of Seizure and Detention under Seizure Identification No. 2001-208 was issued against the vessel by the BOC
District Collector of the Port of Manila. 10

For the same reasons, the Legaspi District Collector rendered a Decision on 27 June 2002 in Seizure Identification No.
06-2001 and Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A ordering the forfeiture of the M/V Criston, also known as M/V Neptune
Breeze, and its cargo, for violating Section 2530 (a), (f) and (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code. 11

In the meantime, El Greco, the duly authorized local agent of the registered owner of M/V Neptune Breeze, Atlantic
Pacific Corporation, Inc. (Atlantic Pacific), filed with the Manila District Collector, in Seizure Identification No. 2001 -208, a
Motion for Intervention and Motion to Quash Warrant of Seizure Detention with Urgent Prayer for the Immediate
Release of M/V Neptune Breeze. El Greco claimed that M/V Neptune Breeze was a foreign registered vessel owned by
Atlantic Pacific, and different from M/V Criston which had been involved in smuggling activities in Legaspi, Albay. 12

Acting favorably on the motion of El Greco, the Manila District Collector issued an Order13 dated 11 March 2002 quashing
the Warrant of Seizure and Detention it issued against M/V Neptune Breeze in Seizure Identification No . 2001-208 for
lack of probable cause that the said vessel was the same one known as M/V Criston which fled from the jurisdiction of
the BOC Legaspi District after being seized and detained therein for allegedly engaging in smuggling activities.
According to the decretal part of the Manila District Collector’s Order:

WHEREFORE, pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, it is hereby ordered and decreed that the Warrant of Seizure
and Detention issued thereof be Quashed for want of factual or legal basis, and that the vessel "M/V Neptune Brreze" be
released to [El Greco] after clearance with the Commissioner of Customs, proper identification and compliance with
existing rules and regulations pertinent in the premises.

On automatic review by BOC Commissioner Antonio Bernardo, the Order dated 11 March 2002 of the District Collector of
the Port of Manila was reversed after finding that M/V Neptune Breeze and M/V Criston were one and the same and that
the Legaspi District Collector had already acquired prior jurisdiction over the vessel. The Decision dated 15 January 2003
of the BOC Commissioner, contained in his 2 nd Indorsement14 to the Manila District Collector, decreed:
Respectfully returned to the District Collector, POM, the within case folders in POM S. I. No. 2001 -208, EL GRECO SHIP
MANNING AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Claimant/Intervenor, with the information that the Decision of that
Port in the aforesaid case is hereby REVERSED in view of the following reasons:

1. Subject vessel MV "NEPTUNE BREEZE" and MV "CRISTON" are one and the same as shown by the vessels documents
retrieved by the elements of the Philippine Coast Guard from MV "CRISTON" during the search conducted on board
thereof when the same was apprehended in Tabaco, Albay, indicating therein the name of the vessel MV "NEPTUNE
BREEZE," the name of the master of the vessel a certain YUSHAWU AWUDU, etc. These facts were corroborated by the
footage of ABS-CBN taken on board the vessel when the same was subjected to search.

2. Hence, prior jurisdiction over the said vessel was already acquired by the Port of Legaspi when the said Port issued
WSD S.I. No. 06-2001-A and therefore, the Decision of the latter Port forfeiting the subject vessel supercedes the
Decision of that Port ordering its release.

Seeking the reversal of the Decision dated 15 January 2003 of the BOC Commissioner, El Greco filed a Petition for Review
with the CTA which was lodged before its Second Division as CTA Case No. 6618. El Greco averred that the BOC
Commissioner committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the forfeiture of the M/V Neptune Breeze in the absence
of proof that M/V Neptune Breeze and M/V Criston were one and the same vessel.15 According to El Greco, it was highly
improbable that M/V Criston was merely assuming the identity of M/V Neptune Breeze in order to evade liabil ity since
these were distinct and separate vessels as evidenced by their Certificates of Registry. While M/V Neptune Breeze was
registered in St. Vincent and the Grenadines 16 as shown in its Certificate of Registry No. 7298/N, M/V Criston was
registered in the Philippines. Additionally, El Greco argued that the Order dated 11 March 2002 of the Manila District
Collector already became final and executory for failure of the BOC Commissioner to act thereon within a period of 30
days in accordance with Section 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code.

On 17 October 2005, the CTA Second Division rendered a Decision 17 in CTA Case No. 6618 sustaining the 15 January 2003
Decision of the BOC Commissioner ordering the forfeiture of M/V Neptune Breeze. Referring to the crime laboratory
report submitted by the Philippine National Police (PNP) stating that the serial numbers of the engines and the
generators of both M/V Criston and M/V Neptune Breeze were identical, the CTA Second Division concluded that both
vessels were indeed one and the same vessel. The CTA Second Division further ruled that nothing in the provisions of
Section 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code could buttress El Greco’s contention that the Order dated 11 March 2002 of
the Manila District Collector already became final and executory. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the CTA
Second Division reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition for Review is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision in the
2nd Indorsement dated January 15, 2003 of then Commissioner Bernardo is hereby AFFIRMED.18

In a Resolution19 dated 7 February 2006, the CTA Second Division denied the Motion for Reconsideration of El Greco for
failure to present issues that had not been previously threshed out in its earlier Decision.

Undaunted, El Greco elevated its case to the CTA En Banc through a Petition for Review, docketed as C.T.A. EB No. 162,
this time lamenting that it was being deprived of its property without due process of law. El Greco asserted that the CTA
Second Division violated its constitutional right to due process when it upheld the forfeiture of M/V Neptune Breeze o n
the basis of the evidence presented before the Legaspi District Collector in Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure
Identification No. 06-2001-A, of which El Greco was not notified and in which it was not able to participate. 20

In its Decision21 promulgated on 14 March 2007, the CTA En Banc declared that the CTA Second Division did not commit
any error in its disquisition, and dismissed the Petition of El Greco in C.T.A. EB No. 162 for lack of merit. According to th e
CTA En Banc, the appreciation and calibration of evidence on appeal (from the ruling of the BOC) lies within the sound
discretion of its Division, and the latter’s findings and conclusions cannot be set aside unless it has been sufficiently
shown that they are not supported by evidence on record. The CTA En Banc thus disposed:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision promulgated on October 17,
2005 and Resolution dated February 7, 2006 of the Second Division of this Court, are hereby AFFIRMED. 22

Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration with the CTA, El Greco already sought recourse before this Court via this
Petition for Review on Certiorari, raising the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT EL GRECO WAS DENIED OF ITS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT M/V NEPTUNE BREEZE AND M/V CRISTON ARE ONE AND THE SAME VESSEL.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT M/V NEPTUNE BREEZE IS QUALIFIED TO BE THE SUBJECT OF FORFEITURE UNDER SECTION 2531 OF
THE TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE.

The primordial issue to be determined by this Court is whether M/V Neptune Breeze is one and the same as M/V Criston
which had been detained at the Port of Tabaco, Albay, for carrying smuggled imported rice and had fled the custody of
the customs authorities to evade its liabilities.

El Greco insists that M/V Neptune Breeze and M/V Criston are not the same vessel. In support of its position, El Greco
again presents the foreign registration of its vessel as opposed to the local registration of M/V Criston.

The CTA En Banc, however, affirming the findings of the CTA Second Division, as well as the Legaspi District Collector,
concluded otherwise.

We sustain the determination of the CTA En Banc on this matter.

Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of facts of the CTA are binding on this Court and can only be disturbed on
appeal if not supported by substantial evidence. 23 Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 24
A review of the records of the present case unveils the overwhelming and utterly significant pieces of evidence that more
than meets the quantum of evidence necessary to establish that M/V Neptune Breeze is the very same vessel as M/V
Criston, which left the anchorage area at Legaspi, Albay, without the consent of the customs authorities therein while
under detention for smuggling 35,000 bags of imported rice.

The crime laboratory report of the PNP shows that the serial numbers of the engines and generators of the two vessels
are identical. El Greco failed to rebut this piece of evidence that decisively identified M/V Neptune Breeze as the same as
M/V Criston. We take judicial notice that along with gross tonnage, net tonnage, length and breadth of the vessel, the
serial numbers of its engine and generator are the necessary information identifying a vessel. In much the same way, the
identity of a land motor vehicle is established by its unique motor and chassis numbers. It is, thus, highly improbable that
two totally different vessels would have engines and generators bearing the very same serial numbers; and the only
logical conclusion is that they must be one and the same vessel.

Equally significant is the finding of the Legaspi District Collector that all the documents submitted by M/V Criston were
spurious, including its supposed registration in the Philippines. In a letter dated 14 March 2002, Marina Administrator
Oscar M. Sevilla attested that M/V Criston was not registered with the Marina.

Finally, Customs Guard Adolfo Capistrano testified that the features of M/V Criston and M/V Neptune Breeze were
similar; while Coast Guard Commander Cirilo Ortiz narrated that he found documents inside M/V Criston bearing the
name M/V Neptune Breeze. These testimonies further fortified the conclusion reached by the Legaspi District Collec tor
that M/V Criston and M/V Neptune Breeze were one and the same.

We also take note that the purported operator of M/V Criston, Glucer Shipping, was a total no-show at the hearings held
in Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A before the Legaspi District Collector.
Despite being sent several notices of hearing to its supposed address, Glucer Shipping still failed to appear in the said
proceedings. It becomes highly unfathomable for an owner to ignore proceedings for the seizure of its vessel, risking the
loss of a property of enormous value.

From the foregoing, we can only deduce that there is actually no Glucer Shipping and no M/V Criston. M/V Criston
appears to be a mere fictional identity assumed by M/V Neptune Breeze so it may conduct its smuggling activities with
little risk of being identified and held liable therefor.

We cannot give much credence to the self-serving denial by El Greco that M/V Neptune Breeze is not the same as M/V
Criston in light of the substantial evidence on record to the contrary. The foreign registration of M/V Neptune Breeze
proves only that it was registered in a foreign country; but it does not render impossible the conclusions consistently
reached by the Legaspi District Collector, the CTA Second Division and the CTA en banc, and presently by this Court, that
M/V Neptune Breeze was the very same vessel used in the conduct of smuggling activities in the name M/V Criston.

Neither can we permit El Greco to evade the forfeiture of its vessel, as a consequence of its being used in smuggling
activities, by decrying denial of due process.

In administrative proceedings, such as those before the BOC, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. 25The essence
of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 26

Although it was not able to participate in the proceedings in Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure Identification
No. 06-2001-A before the Legaspi District Collector, it had ample opportunity to present its side of the controversy in
Seizure Identification No. 2001-208 before the Manila District Collector. To recall, full proceedings were held before the
Manila District Collector in Seizure Identification No. 2001-208. Even the evidence presented by El Greco in the latter
proceedings fails to persuade. The only vital evidence it presented before the Manila District Collector in Seizure
Identification No. 2001-208 was the foreign registration of M/V Neptune Breeze. It was still the same piece of evidence
which El Greco submitted to this Court. Even when taken into consideration and weighed against each other, the
considerably sparse evidence of El Greco in Seizure Identification No. 2001-208 could not successfully refute the
substantial evidence in Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A that M/V Neptune
Breeze is the same as M/V Criston.

Moreover, the claim of El Greco that it was denied due process flounders in light of its ample opportunity to rebut the
findings of the Legaspi District Collector in Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and No. 06-2001-A before the CTA Second
Division in CTA Case No. 6618 and the CTA En Banc in C.T.A. EB No. 162, and now before this Court in the Petition at bar.
Unfortunately, El Greco was unable to make full use to its advantage of these repeated opportunities by offering all
possible evidence in support of its case. For example, evidence that could establish that M/V Neptune Breeze was
somewhere else at the time when M/V Criston was being held by customs authority at the Port of Legaspi, Albay, would
have been helpful to El Greco’s cause and very easy to secure, but is glaringly absent herein.

After having established that M/V Neptune Breeze is one and the same as M/V Criston, we come to another crucial issue
in the case at bar, that is, whether the order of forfeiture of the M/V Neptune Breeze is valid.

The pertinent provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code read:

SEC. 2530. Property Subject to Forfeiture Under Tariff and Customs Law . – Any vehicle, vessel or aircraft, cargo, articles
and other objects shall, under the following conditions, be subject to forfeiture:

a. Any vehicle, vessel or aircraft, including cargo, which shall be used unlawfully in the importation or exportation of
articles or in conveying and/or transporting contraband or smuggled articles in commercial quantities into or from any
Philippine port or place. The mere carrying or holding on board of contraband or smuggled articles in commercial
quantities shall subject such vessel, vehicle, aircraft or any other craft to forfeiture; Provided, That the vessel, or aircraft or
any other craft is not used as duly authorized common carrier and as such a carrier it is not chartered or leased;

xxxx

f. Any article, the importation or exportation of which is effected or attempted contrary to law, or any article of prohibited
importation or exportation, and all other articles which, in the opinion of the Collector, have been used, are or were
intended to be used as instruments in the importation or exportation of the former;

xxxx
k. Any conveyance actually being used for the transport of articles subject to forfeiture under the tariff and customs laws,
with its equipage or trappings, and any vehicle similarly used, together with its equipage and appurtenances including
the beast, steam or other motive power drawing or propelling the same. The mere conveyance of contraband or
smuggled articles by such beast or vehicle shall be sufficient cause for the outright seizure and confiscation of such beast
or vehicle, but the forfeiture shall not be effected if it is established that the owner of the means of conveyance used as
aforesaid, is engaged as common carrier and not chartered or leased, or his agent in charge thereof at the time has no
knowledge of the unlawful act.

The penalty of forfeiture is imposed on any vessel engaged in smuggling, provided that the following conditions are
present:

(1) The vessel is "used unlawfully in the importation or exportation of articles into or from" the Philippines;

(2) The articles are imported to or exported from "any Philippine port or place, except a port of entry"; or

(3) If the vessel has a capacity of less than 30 tons and is "used in the importation of articles into any Philippine port or
place other than a port of the Sulu Sea, where importation in such vessel may be authorized by the Commissioner, with
the approval of the department head." 27

There is no question that M/V Neptune Breeze, then known as M/V Criston, was carrying 35,000 bags of imported rice
without the necessary papers showing that they were entered lawfully through a Philippine port after the payment of
appropriate taxes and duties thereon. This gives rise to the presumption that such importation was illegal. Consequently,
the rice subject of the importation, as well as the vessel M/V Neptune Breeze used in importation are subject to forfeiture.
The burden is on El Greco, as the owner of M/V Neptune Breeze, to show that its conveyance of the rice was actually
legal. Unfortunately, its claim that the cargo was not of foreign origin but was merely loaded at North Harbor, Manila,
was belied by the following evidence - the Incoming Journal of the Philippine Coast Guard, Certification issued by the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) Port State Control Center of Manila, and the letter dated 4
October 2001 issued by the Sub-Port of North Harbor Collector Edward de la Cuesta, confirming that there was no such
loading of rice or calling of vessel occurring at North Harbor, Manila. It is, therefore, uncontroverted that the 35,000 bags
of imported rice were smuggled into the Philippines using M/V Neptune Breeze.

We cannot give credence to the argument of El Greco that the Order dated 11 March 2002 of the Manila District
Collector, finding no probable cause that M/V Neptune Breeze is the same as M/V Criston, has already become final and
executory, thus, irreversible, pursuant to Section 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code. According to said provision:

SEC. 2313. Review of Commissioner. – The person aggrieved by the decision or action of the Collector in any matter
presented upon protest or by his action in any case of seizure may, within fifteen (15) days after notification in writing by
the Collector of his action or decision, file a written notice to the Collector with a copy furnished to the Commissioner of
his intention to appeal the action or decision of the Collector to the Commissioner. Thereupon the Collector shall
forthwith transmit all the records of the proceedings to the Commissioner, who shall approve, modify or reverse the
action or decision of the Collector and take such steps and make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to his
decision: Provided, That when an appeal is filed beyond the period herein prescribed, the same shall be deemed
dismissed.
If in any seizure proceedings, the Collector renders a decision adverse to the Government, such decision shall be
automatically reviewed by the Commissioner and the records of the case elevated within five (5) days from the
promulgation of the decision of the Collector. The Commissioner shall render a decision on the automatic appeal within
thirty (30) days from receipts of the records of the case. If the Collector’s decision is reversed by the Commissioner, the
decision of the Commissioner shall be final and executory. However, if the Collector’s decision is affirmed, or if within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the record of the case by the Commissioner no decision is rendered or the decision
involves imported articles whose published value is five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) or more, such decision shall be
deemed automatically appealed to the Secretary of Finance and the records of the proceedings shall be elevated within
five (5) days from the promulgation of the decision of the Commissioner or of the Collector under appeal, as the case
may be: Provided, further, That if the decision of the Commissioner or of the Collector under appeal as the case may be,
is affirmed by the Secretary of Finance or if within thirty (30) days from receipt of the records of the proceedings by the
Secretary of Finance, no decision is rendered, the decision of the Secretary of Finance, or of the Commissioner, or of the
Collector under appeal, as the case may be, shall become final and executory.

In any seizure proceeding, the release of imported articles shall not be allowed unless and until a decision of the
Collector has been confirmed in writing by the Commissioner of Customs. (Emphasis ours.)

There is nothing in Section 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code to support the position of El Greco. As the CTA en
banc explained, in case the BOC Commissioner fails to decide on the automatic appeal of the Collector’s Decision within
30 days from receipt of the records thereof, the case shall again be deemed automatically appealed to the Secretary of
Finance. Also working against El Greco is the fact that jurisdiction over M/V Neptune Breeze, otherwise known as M/V
Criston, was first acquired by the Legaspi District Collector; thus, the Manila District Collector cannot validly acquire
jurisdiction over the same vessel. Judgment rendered without jurisdiction is null and void, and void judgment cannot be
the source of any right whatsoever. 28

Finally, we strongly condemn the ploy used by M/V Neptune Breeze, assuming a different identity to smuggle goods into
the country in a brazen attempt to defraud the government and the Filipino public and deprive them of much needed
monetary resources. We further laud the efforts of the Commissioner of the Customs Bureau and the other executive
officials in his department to curb the proliferation of smuggling syndicates in the country which deserves no less than
our full support.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 17 October 2005 and
Resolution dated 7 February 2006 of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in CTA EB No. 172 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 201796 January 15, 2013

GOVERNOR SADIKUL A. SAHALI and VICE-GOVERNOR RUBY M. SAHALl, Petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION), RASHIDIN H. MA TBA and JILKASI J. USMAN,Respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules of Court filed by Sadikul A. Sahali (Sadi kul)
and Ruby M. Sahali (Ruby), assailing the Order 1 dated May 3, 2012 issued by the First Division of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in EPC Nos. 2010-76 and 2010-77.

During the May 10, 2010 elections, Sadikul and private respondent Rashidin H. Matba (Matba) were two of the four
candidates who ran for the position of governor in the Province of Tawi-Tawi while Ruby and private respondent Jilkasi J.
Usman (Usman) ran for the position of Vice-Governor.2

On May 14, 2010, the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed petitioners Sadikul and Ruby as the duly elected
governor and vice-governor, respectively, of the province of Tawi-Tawi. In the statement of votes issued by the PBOC,
petitioner Sadikul garnered a total of 59,417 as against private respondent Matba’s 56,013,3 while petitioner Ruby
prevailed over private respondent Usman, with votes of 61,005 and 45,127, respectively. 4

Alleging that the said elections in the Province of Tawi-Tawi were attended by massive and wide-scale irregularities,
Matba filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam 5 with the COMELEC. Matba contested the results in 39 out of 282 clustered
precincts that functioned in the province of Tawi-Tawi. The said election protest filed by Matba was raffled to the First
Division of the COMELEC and was docketed as EPC No. 2010-76.

Usman also filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam 6 with the COMELEC, contesting the results in 39 out of the 282
clustered precincts in the Province of Tawi-Tawi. Usman’s election protest was likewise raffled to the First Division of the
COMELEC and was docketed as EPC No. 2010-77. The respective election protests filed by private respondents Matba
and Usman prayed, inter alia, for the technical examination of the ballots, Election Day Computerized Voters List (EDCVL),
the Voters Registration Record (VRR), and the Book of Voters in all the protested precincts of the province of Tawi-Tawi.7

After Sadikul filed his Answer8 with counter-protest, a preliminary conference was conducted by the COMELEC in EPC No.
2010-76. On November 24, 2011, the COMELEC issued a Preliminary Conference Order 9 in EPC No. 2010-76. Thereafter,
the COMELEC issued an Order10 dated November 23, 2011 which directed the retrieval and delivery of the 39 ballot boxes
containing the ballots in the 39 protested clustered precincts as well as the election paraphernalia therein.
Meanwhile, in EPC No. 2010-77, the COMELEC, after Ruby’s filing of her Answer11 with counter-protest, conducted a
preliminary conference on January 4, 2012. On January 20, 2012, the COMELEC issued its Preliminary Conference
Order12 in the said case.

On January 17, 2012, the COMELEC resolved to consolidate EPC No. 2010-76 and EPC No. 2010-77.

On February 9, 2012, the retrieval and delivery of the ballot boxes and other election documents from the 39 protested
precincts were completed. On February 20, 2012, the COMELEC First Division ordered the recount of the contested
ballots, directing the creation of five recount committees for the said purpose. 13

On February 24, 2012, Matba and Usman filed a Manifestation and Ex-Parte Motion (Re: Order Dated 20 February 2012),
requesting that they be allowed to secure photocopies of the contested ballots. Further, they moved for a technical
examination of the EDCVL, the VRR and the Book of Voters for the contested precincts in the province of Tawi -Tawi by
comparing the signature and the thumbmarks appearing on the EDCVL as against those appearing on the VRRs and the
Book of Voters.14

Private respondents Matba and Usman averred that, instead of recounting the ballots in the pilot pr ecincts constituting
20% of the protested precincts, the COMELEC First Division should order the technical examination of the said election
paraphernalia from the 38 clustered precincts that are the subject of both election protests filed by them.

On March 5, 2012, the COMELEC First Division issued an Order 15 which granted the said ex-parte motion filed by Matba
and Usman. Thus, the COMELEC First Division directed its Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) to conduct
a technical examination of the said election paraphernalia by comparing the signature and thumbmarks appearing on
the EDCVL as against those appearing on the VRRs and the Book of Voters.

On March 9, 2012, Sadikul and Ruby jointly filed with the COMELEC First Division a Strong Manifestation of Grave
Concern and Motion for Reconsideration (Of the Order Dated March 5, 2012) 16. They asserted that the March 5, 2012
Order issued by the COMELEC First Division, insofar as it directed the technical examination of the EDCVL, the VRR and
the Book of Voters, should be reversed on account of the following: first, the said Order was issued without due process
since the COMELEC First Division did not allow them to oppose the said ex-parte motion; second, the COMELEC First
Division cannot just order a technical examination in the absence of published rules on the matter; and third, the
COMELEC First Division could not just examine the said election paraphernalia without violating the Precautionary
Protection Order issued by the Presidential Electoral Tribunal in the protest case between Manuel Roxas and Jejomar
Binay.

On March 15, 2012, Matba and Usman filed with the COMELEC First Division their counter-manifestation17 to the said
manifestation and motion for reconsideration filed by Sadikul and Ruby. They asserted therein that Sadikul and Ruby
were not deprived of due process when the COMELEC First Division issued its March 15, 2012 Order. They averred that
their respective election protests and the Preliminary Conference Orders issued by the COMELEC First Division all
indicated that they would move for the technical examination of the said election paraphernalia. Nonetheless, they
pointed out that Sadikul and Ruby failed to express any objection to their intended motion for technic al examination of
the said election paraphernalia.
Further, Matba and Usman claimed that said motion for technical examination is not a contentious motion since the
intended technical examination would not prejudice the rights of Sadikul and Ruby considering that the same only
included the EDCVL, the VRR and the Book of Voters, and not the ballots.

On March 23, 2012, Sadikul and Ruby then filed with the COMELEC First Division their Reply 18 to the
counter-manifestation filed by Matba and Usman. In turn, Matba and Usman filed with the COMELEC First Division their
Rejoinder19 on March 30, 2012. On May 3, 2012, the COMELEC First Division issued the herein assailed Order 20which
denied the said motion for reconsideration of the March 5, 2012 Order filed by Sadikul and Ruby. The COMELEC First
Division maintained that Sadikul and Ruby were not deprived of due process. It pointed out that the intention of Matba
and Usman to ask for the technical examination of the said election documents had always been apparent from the filing
of their separate election protests, preliminary conference briefs and their intention to offer as evidence all election
documents and paraphernalia such as the EDCVL, VRRs and Book of Voters on the protested precincts.

Further, the COMELEC First Division opined that the insinuation asserted by Sadikul and Ruby that there are no published
rules governing the technical examination of election paraphernalia is untenable. It pointed out that the technical
examination of election paraphernalia is governed by Section 1, Rule 18 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804. As to the
Precautionary Protection Order issued in the protest case between Manuel Roxas and Jejomar Binay, the COMELEC First
Division averred that it would request a clearance from the Presidential Electoral Tribunal for the conduct of said
technical examination.

Hence, petitioners Sadikul and Ruby filed the instant petition with this Court essentially asserting that the COMELEC First
Division committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when: first, it did not give them
the opportunity to oppose the motion for technical examination filed by Matba and Usman; and second, it ordered the
technical examination of the said election paraphernalia despite the lack of sanction and published rules governing such
examination.

The petition is denied.

The petitioners’ resort to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to assail an interlocutory order issued by the COMELEC
First Division is amiss. "A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC in an election
protest may not directly assail the order in this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the
review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division in due course." 21

Under the Constitution, the power of this Court to review election cases falling within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
the COMELEC only extends to final decisions or resolutions of the COMELEC en banc, not to interlocutory orders issued
by a Division thereof. Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution mandates:

Sec. 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within
sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of
a copy thereof. (Emphasis ours)
In Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC,22 this Court elucidated on the import of the said provision in this wise:

We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise
of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." This decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc,
not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has no power to review via
certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections.

The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, now expressly provided in Rule 64, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy provided
by law. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.

In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed by the Comelec en banc via
a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The
pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory. x x x. 23 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)

Here, the Orders dated March 5, 2012 and May 3, 2012 issued by the First Division of the COMELEC were merely
interlocutory orders since they only disposed of an incident in the main case i.e. the propriety of the technica l
examination of the said election paraphernalia. Thus, the proper recourse for the petitioners is to await the decision of
the COMELEC First Division in the election protests filed by Matba and Usman, and should they be aggrieved thereby, to
appeal the same to the COMELEC en banc by filing a motion for reconsideration. 24

The petitioners, citing the case of Kho v. COMELEC, 25 nevertheless insist that this Court may take cognizance of the
instant Petition for Certiorari since the COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in which the said interlocutory orders
issued by the COMELEC First Division can be reviewed.

The petitioners’ reliance on Kho is misplaced. In Kho, the issue was whether a Division of the COMELEC may admit an
answer with counter-protest which was filed beyond the reglementary period. This Court held that the COMELEC First
Division gravely abused its discretion when it admitted the answer with counter-protest that was belatedly filed.

On the propriety of a filing a Petition for Certiorari with this Court sans any motion for reconsideration having been filed
with the COMELEC en banc, it was held therein that, as an exception, direct resort to this Court via certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order may be allowed when a Division of the COMELEC commits grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction. Thus:

As to the issue of whether or not the case should be referred to the COMELEC en banc, this Court finds the respondent
COMELEC First Division correct when it held in its order dated February 28, 1996 that no final decision, resolution or
order has yet been made which will necessitate the elevation of the case and its records to the Commission en banc. No
less than the Constitution requires that the election cases must be heard and decided first in division and any motion for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the commission en banc. Apparently, the orders dated July 26, 1995,
November 15 1995 and February 28, 1996 and the other orders relating to the admission of the answer with
counter-protest are issuances of a Commission in division and are all interlocutory orders because they merely rule upon
an incidental issue regarding the admission of Espinosa’s answer with counter-protest and do not terminate or finally
dispose of the case as they leave something to be done before it is finally decided on the merits. In such a situation, the
rule is clear that the authority to resolve incidental matters of a case pending in a division, like the questioned
interlocutory orders, falls on the division itself, and not on the Commission en banc. x x x

xxxx

Furthermore, a look at Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure confirms that the subject case does not fall
on any of the instances over which the Commission en banc can take cognizance of. It reads as follows:

"Section 2. The Commission en banc. - The Commission shall sit en banc in cases hereinafter specifically provided, or in
pre-proclamation cases upon a vote of a majority of the members of a Commission, or in all other cases where a division
is not authorized to act, or where, upon a unanimous vote of all the members of a Division, an interlocutory matter or
issue relative to an action or proceeding before it is decided to be referred to the Commission en banc." In the instant
case, it does not appear that the subject controversy is one of the cases specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure in which the Commission may sit en banc. Neither is it shown that the present controversy a case where a
division is not authorized to act nor a situation wherein the members of the First Division unanimously voted to refer the
subject case to the Commission en banc. Clearly, the Commission en banc, under the circumstances shown above, can
not be the proper forum which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory orders can be referred to.

In a situation such as this where the Commission in division committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders relative to an action pending before it and the controversy did not
fall under any of the instances mentioned in section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the remedy of the
aggrieved party is not to refer the controversy to the Commission en banc as this is not permissible under its present
rules but to elevate it to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 26(Citations omitted and
emphasis ours)

Thus, exceptionally, this Court may take cognizance of a certiorari action directed against an interlocutory order issued
by a Division of the COMELEC when the following circumstances are present: first, the order was issued without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
second, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the subject of the controversy is a matter which (1) the COMELEC en
banc may not sit and consider or (2) a Division is not authorized to act or (3) the members of the Division unanimously
vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. 27

The exception in Kho does not apply in the instant case since the COMELEC First Division is authorized to act on the
ex-parte motion for the technical examination of the said election paraphernalia. The COMELEC First Division has already
acquired jurisdiction over the election protests filed by Matba and Usman. Concomitant with such acquisition of
jurisdiction is the authority of the COMELEC First Division to rule on the issues raised by the parties and all incidents
arising therefrom, including the authority to act on the ex-parte motion for technical examination of said election
paraphernalia.
In Kho, the COMELEC First Division did not acquire jurisdiction on the answer with counter-protest since it was filed
beyond the reglementary period and, consequently, did not have any authority to act on the issues raised therein and all
incidents arising therefrom. Thus:

It is worthy to note that as early as in the case of Arrieta vs. Rodriguez, this Court had firmly settled the rule that the
counter-protest must be filed within the period provided by law, otherwise, the forum loses its jurisdiction to entertain
the belatedly filed counter-protest. In the case at bar, there is no question that the answer with counter-protest of
Espinosa was filed outside the reglementary period provided for by law. As such, the COMELEC First Division has no
jurisdictional authority to entertain the belated answer with counter-protest much less pass upon and decide the issues
raised therein. It follows therefore that the order of July 26, 1995 which pertains to the admission of the answer with
counter-protest of Espinosa as well as the other consequent orders implementing the order of admission issued by the
COMELEC First Division are void for having been issued without jurisdiction. Even if petitioner Kho did not file a motion
for reconsideration of the order dated July 26, 1995 admitting the answer with counter-protest, the jurisdictional infirmity,
brought about by the late filing of the answer to the protest, persist and can not be cured by the omission on the part of
the protestee-petitioner to seek a reconsideration of the order dated July 26, 1995. 28 (Citation omitted and emphasis
ours)

Even if this Court is to disregard the procedural lapse committed by the petitioners and rule on the issues raised, the
instant petition would still be denied.

The petitioners claim that they were denied due process when the COMELEC granted the motion for technical
examination filed by Matba and Usman without giving them the opportunity to oppose the said motion.

This Court does not agree.

It bears stressing that the COMELEC, in election disputes, is not duty-bound to notify and direct a party therein to file an
opposition to a motion filed by the other party. It is incumbent upon the party concerned, if he/she deems it necessary,
to file an opposition to a motion within five days from receipt of a copy of the same without awaiting for the COMELEC ’
s directive to do so. On this score, Section 3, Rule 9 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 29 clearly provides that:

Sec. 3. No hearings on motions. – Motions shall not be set for hearing unless the Commission directs otherwise. Oral
argument in support thereof shall be allowed only upon the discretion of the Commission. The adverse party may file
opposition five days from receipt of the motion, upon the expiration of which such motion is deemed submitted for
resolution. The Commission shall resolve the motion within five days. (Emphasis ours)

If the party concerned, despite receipt of a copy of the motion that was filed with the COMELEC, did not file an
opposition to the said motion, the motion would be deemed submitted for resolution upon the expiration of the peri od
to file an opposition thereto.

It should be stressed that one of the factors that should be considered in election protests is expediency. Proceedings in
election protests are special and expeditious and the early resolution of such cases should not be hampered by any
unnecessary observance of procedural rules. 30 "The proceedings should not be encumbered by delays. All of these are
because the term of elective office is likewise short. There is the personal stake of the contestants which generates feuds
and discords. Above all is the public interest. Title to public elective office must not be left long under cloud. Efficiency of
public administration should not be impaired. It is thus understandable that pitfalls which may retard the determination
of election contests should be avoided." 31

Here, the petitioners did not file an opposition to the said motion for technical examination that was filed by Matba and
Usman on February 24, 2012. It was only after the COMELEC First Division issued its March 5, 2012 Order that the
petitioners decided to register their opposition to the intended technical examination, albeit in the form of a motion for
reconsideration of the said Order. Contrary to the petitioners’ claim, Section 3, Rule 9 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804
gave them the opportunity to raise their objections to the said motion for technical examination. However, for reasons
known only to them, petitioners did not file any opposition to the said motion. Accordingly, it is the petitioners
themselves and not the COMELEC First Division who should be faulted for their predicament.

Further, this Court cannot see how due process was denied to the petitioners in the issuance of the COMELEC First
Division’s March 5, 2012 Order. The petitioners were able to present their opposition to the said motion for technical
examination in their manifestation and motion for reconsideration which they filed with the COMELEC First Division on
March 9, 2012. Indeed, the petitioners’ objections to the technical examination of the said election paraphernalia were
exhaustively discussed by the COMELEC First Division in its May 3, 2012 Resolution. Having filed a motion for
reconsideration of the COMELEC First Division’s March 5, 2012 Order, the petitioners’ claim of denial of due process is
clearly unfounded.

The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an
opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times
more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party
was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. 32

Anent the issue on the technical examination of election paraphernalia, the petitioners contend that the COMELEC First
Division cannot order a technical examination of the said election paraphernalia since there is as yet no published rule
therefor. They assert that Section 1, Rule 18 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, the rule relied upon by the COMELEC First
Division in ordering a technical examination, is vague as it failed to provide the documents that should be subjected to
technical examination in election protest cases.

At the core of the petitioners’ assertion is the power of the COMELEC First Division to order the technical examination of
the said election paraphernalia. This Court agrees with the petitioners that Section 1, Rule 18 of COMELEC Resolution No.
8804 does not expressly authorize the conduct of technical examination of election paraphernalia as it merely provides
for the procedure to be followed in the presentation and reception of evidence in election protest cases.

Section 1, Rule 18 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, in part, reads:

Sec. 1. Presentation and reception of evidence; order of hearing. - The reception of evidence on all matters or issues
raised in the protest and counter-protests shall be presented and offered in a hearing upon completion of (a) the
recount of ballots, or re-tabulation of election documents, or (b) the technical examination, if warranted.
xxxx

While Section 1, Rule 18 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 does not explicitly provide for the rule on the technical
examination of election paraphernalia, it does not mean, however, that the COMELEC First Division does not have the
power to order the conduct of such technical examination.

The absence of a rule which specifically mandates the technical examination of the said election paraphernalia does not
mean that the COMELEC First Division is barred from issuing an order for the conduct thereof. The power of the
COMELEC First Division to order the technical examination election paraphernalia in election protest cases stems from its
"exclusive original jurisdiction over all contest relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial and city officials".33

Otherwise stated, the express grant of power to the COMELEC to resolve election protests carries with it the grant of all
other powers necessary, proper, or incidental to the effective and efficient exercise of the power expressly granted. Verily,
the exclusive original jurisdiction conferred by the constitution to the COMELEC to settle said election protests includes
the authority to order a technical examination of relevant election paraphernalia, election returns and ballots in order to
determine whether fraud and irregularities attended the canvass of the votes.

There is no gainsaying that the COMELEC is mandated by law to resolve election cases expeditiously and promptly. "For
in this specie of controversies involving the determination of the true will of the electorate, time indeed is of paramount
importance second to none perhaps, except for the genuine will of the majority. To be sure, an election controversy
which by its very nature touches upon the ascertainment of the people’s choice, as gleaned from the medium of the
ballot, should be resolved with utmost dispatch, precedence and regard to due process." 34

Concomitant to the COMELEC’s duty to expeditiously resolve election cases is the authority to resort to every reasonable
and efficient means available to it to settle the controversy. The COMELEC is thus enjoined, "not only to maintain its
sense of urgency in resolving these cases, but also to explore every reasonable and feasible means of ascertaining which
candidate was duly elected."35 Thus, this Court has declared:

An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil action, is clothed with a public interest. The purpose of an election protest is
to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is
sought is the correction of the canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the winning candidate. An
election contest therefore involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates but
paramount to their claims is the deep public concern involved and the need of dispelling the uncertainty over the real
choice of the electorate. And the court has the corresponding duty to ascertain by all means within its command who is
the real candidate elected by the people. 36 (Emphasis ours)

Here, the technical examination ordered by the COMELEC First Division, by comparing the signature and the
thumbmarks appearing on the EDCVL as against those appearing on the VRRs and the Book of Voters, is a reasonable,
efficient and expeditious means of determining the truth or falsity of the allegations of fraud and irregularities in the
canvass of the votes in the province of Tawi-Tawi. Accordingly, the COMELEC First Division did not commit any abuse of
discretion when it allowed the technical examination of the said election paraphernalia.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Order dated May 3,
2012 issued by the First Division of the Commission on Elections in EPC Nos. 2010-76 and 2010-77 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170956 May 12, 2010

FELISA R. FERRER, Petitioner,

vs.
DOMINGO CARGANILLO, SERGIO CARGANILLO, SOLEDAD AGUSTIN AND MARCELINA SOLIS,Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The concept of social function of private property which today is presented as one of the possible justifications for
agrarian and urban land reform has its roots in the cosmogenic and philosophical concept which maintains that man
must answer to the Creator for the use of the resources entrusted to him. It is an old concept and is ultimately related to
the genesis of society itself. Hence, the use, enjoyment, occupation or disposition of private property is not absolute. It i s
predicated on the social functions of property. It is restricted in a sense so as to bring about maximum benefits to all and
not to a few chosen individuals.1

This petition concerns four cases, involving herein petitioner Felisa R. Ferrer, jointly heard by the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and
subsequently further appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), to wit:

1. DARAB Case No. 7862 "Felisa R. Ferrer v. Domingo Carganillo and Sergio Carganillo" for Ejectment and Damages;

2. DARAB Case No. 7863 "Felisa R. Ferrer v. Soledad Agustin" for Ejectment and Damages;

3. DARAB Case No. 7864 "Rosa Pajarito, Elvira Madolora and Anastacia Lagado represented by Felisa R. Ferrer v.
Marcelina Solis" for Ejectment and Damages;

4. DARAB Case No. 7865 "Irene Aguinaldo and Felisa R. Ferrer v. Marcelina Solis" for Ejectment and Damages.
For clarity, each case will be tackled independently as each involved different set of facts.

Factual Antecedents

a) DARAB Case No. 7862

In her Complaint,2 petitioner Felisa R. Ferrer (Felisa) alleged that she is the owner of a 6,000-square meters lot under Tax
Declaration No. 42-06462, situated at Brgy. Legaspi, Tayug, Pangasinan and being tenanted by respondent Domingo
Carganillo (Domingo). Without her knowledge and consent, Domingo subleased the subject landholding to his brother,
herein respondent Sergio Carganillo (Sergio) for ₱15,000.00. Felisa only knew of this fact when she visited the place and
found Sergio in actual possession and cultivation of the landholding in question.

In his Answer,3 Domingo denied that he mortgaged his possessory rights to Sergio and asserted that he is still in actual,
continuous and peaceful possession of subject property.

Meanwhile, upon a verbal complaint lodged by Felisa with the Municipal

Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Tayug, Pangasinan, MARO Legal Officer Dionisio G. Estimada (Estimada) conducted
an investigation on the matter.

In his December 19, 1997 Investigation Report, 4 Estimada stated that based on the testimony he had gathered from other
people, the cultivation and possession of the subject landholding was subleased by Domingo to Sergio as the former
was applying for work abroad. 5 In fact, Domingo admitted the existence of the sublease. 6 Thus, based on the foregoing,
Estimada recommended that Sergio and Domingo be ejected from the subject landholding. 7

The Affidavit of Angela N. Clarion (Clarion) was also submitted to corroborate the Investigation Report. 8 Clarion averred
that Domingo mortgaged his tenancy rights over the subject agricultural land to Sergio, and that the latter is presently
cultivating the said land by virtue of such mortgage. 9

Ruling of the PARAD

In an Order10 dated January 20, 1998, the PARAD required the parties to submit their respective position papers within 20
days from said date. Felisa filed her position paper for all the four cases, attaching thereto the Investigation Report of
Estimada, as well as the corroborating affidavits of Clarion and Gelacio Gano (Gano). Sergio, on the other hand, admitted
that he helps his older brother, Domingo, in cultivating the landholding11 but he denied subleasing the same from
Domingo.12

In addition, respondents presented the affidavits of (1) Mariano Orina

(Mariano), tenant of the adjacent agricultural land, who attested that Domingo is the one who supervises the activities in
his tenanted land;13 (2) Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) Chairman Valentin Costales (Costales), who stated that
he does not know of any violation that Domingo has committed against the landowner; 14and (3) Barangay
Kagawad Arsenio R. Frago (Frago), who maintained that Domingo has not violated any provision of the Land Reform
Code.15
On April 8, 1998, PARAD Rodolfo A. Caddarao (Caddarao) issued a Decision 16 holding that:

In a situation such as this, the complainant has the burden of proof to show by convincing evidence the truth of her
allegations. In the case at bar the complainant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there is subleasing
or mortgage of the property by the respondent tenant. Hence, the herein action must necessarily fail.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint in the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence and merit.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, Felisa appealed to the DARAB.

Ruling of the DARAB

In her appeal memorandum17 dated October 7, 1998, Felisa asserted that the PARAD erred in failing to give credence to
the Investigation Report of the MARO legal officer. She likewise presented for the first time an original copy of
the Katulagan18 (Agreement) to prove that Domingo obtained a loan in the amount of ₱15,000.00 from Sergio. Felisa
argued that she has established, by more than substantial evidence, that Domingo has indeed conveyed his leasehold
rights to Sergio for said amount.

On January 27, 2004, the DARAB rendered its Decision19 affirming the findings of the PARAD that Felisa failed to
substantiate her allegation of subleasing.

Felisa thence elevated the matter to the CA through a Petition for Review20 dated December 6, 2004.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On August 22, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision 21 affirming the DARAB Decision. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated January 27, 2004 and
the Resolution dated October 18, 2004 are hereby AFFIRMED. 22

Our Ruling

a) DARAB Case No. 7862

Petitioner argues that the CA erred in not finding that Domingo subleased or mortgaged his landholding rights to Sergio
which warrants their ejectment from the subject landholding. Petitioner asserts that: (1) the law is explicit that the tenant
and his immediate family must work directly on the land; (2) Sergio cannot pass as Domingo’s immediate family; (3) as
evidenced by the Katulagan, Sergio has been cultivating the land for more than two years prior to the filing of the
complaint; and (4) when Domingo subleased the land to Sergio, he is considered as having abandoned the land as a
tenant.23 She further stresses that respondents’ admission, coupled with the finding of the DARAB that Sergio is tilling
the land, proved subtenancy. Consequently, she prays that the lease tenancy relationship between the contending
parties be declared terminated.

Domingo, on the other hand, denies that he subleased or mortgaged his tenancy rights to anyone. He claims that he
complied with all his obligations under the leasehold agreement over the subject agricultural land, and thus prays for the
dismissal of the case.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The DARAB erred in disregarding the Katulagan (Agreement) as evidence.

The DARAB held that the Katulagan is inadmissible in evidence because it was not formally offered before the PARAD,
citing our ruling in People v. Mongado. 24 On appeal, however, the CA considered the Katulagan, but found the same to
be a mere promissory note tending to prove indebtedness and not as an evidence of mortgage.

We cannot subscribe with the reasoning of the DARAB. The Rules of Court, particularly the Revise d Rules on Evidence,
are specifically applicable to judicial proceedings, to wit:

Section 1. Evidence defined. – Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding
the truth respecting a matter of fact.

Sec. 2. Scope. – The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings except as otherwise
provided by law or these rules.25 (Emphasis supplied)

In quasi judicial proceedings, the said rules shall not apply except "by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient".26 In the instant case, the then prevailing DARAB Rules of Procedures 27provide that:

Section 2. Construction. These Rules shall be liberally construed to carry out the objectives of agrarian reform and to
promote just, expeditious and inexpensive adjudication and settlement of agrarian cases, disputes or controversies.

xxxx

Section 3. Technical Rules Not Applicable . The Board and its Regional and Provincial Adjudicators shall not be bound by
technical rules of procedure and evidence as prescribed in the Rules of Court, but shall proceed to hear and decide all
agrarian cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity.

a) If and when a case comes up for adjudication wherein there is no applicable provision under these rules, the
procedural law and jurisprudence generally applicable to agrarian disputes shall be applied;

b) The Adjudication Board (Board), and its Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicators (RARADs) and Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicators (PARADs) hereinafter referred to as Adjudicators, shall have the authority to adopt any appropriate
measure or procedure in any given situation or matter not covered by these Rules. All such special measures or
procedures and the situations to which they have been applied must be reported to the Board; and
c) The provisions of the Rules of Court shall not apply even in a suppletory character unless adopted herein or by
resolution of the Board. However, due process of the law shall be observed and followed in all instances. (Emphasis
supplied)

The DARAB Rules of Procedures explicitly provides that the Agrarian Reform Adjudicators are not bound by technical
rules of procedure and evidence in the Rules of Court nor shall the latter apply even in a suppletory manner. Thus, we
find that the DARAB erred in holding the Katulagan as inadmissible since it was not formally offered and
admitted.28 Moreover, reliance on our ruling in People v. Mongado, i.e., that "[t]he court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered," is misplaced. We simply cannot find any legal basis for the DARAB to cite our
ruling in a criminal case;29 the fundamental rule found in Rule 132 of the Rules of Court does not find any application in
this agrarian case.

Petitioner has sufficiently proven by clear and convincing evidence the fact of subleasing.

The PARAD summed up the evidence presented by both parties as follows:

In the instant case, the evidence for the complainant are as follows:

1. Exhibit 1 – Photocopy of an Investigation Report dated December 19, 1997 submitted by Legal Officer I Dionisio
Estimada to the Legal Services Division of DAR wherein he stated in his findings that "Verily, the tenants, particularly
Domingo Carganillo, who actually and finally accepted that he subleased the land to another is clear and blatant
violation against the landowner and co-owner for that matter". Hence, he recommended that Domingo Carganillo and
Sergio Carganillo be ejected from the landholding.

2. Exhibit 2 – Affidavit dated January 21, 1998 of one Angela [Clarion] wherein she stated that she knew for a fact that
Domingo Carganillo mortgaged his tenancy rights in 1995 to his brother Sergio Carganillo.

On the part of the respondent Domingo Carganillo, his evidence are:

1. Exhibit 1 – The affidavit of one Sergio Carganillo, the other respondent and brother of respondent Domingo
Carganillo denying that the land was mortgaged by his brother to him and stated that he usually help his brother to do
some works in the landholding.

2. Exhibit 2 – Affidavit dated February 3, 1998 of one Mariano Orina stating that being a tenant in the adjoining
landholding, he knows that Domingo Carganillo is always present doing or supervising the activities in his field.

3. Exhibit 3 – Sworn statement of Valentin Costales, the incumbent Barangay Agrarian Reform Council Chairman of the
place where the property is located attesting that Domingo and Sergio Carganillo never violated any agrarian laws.

4. Exhbit 4 – Sworn statement issued by one of the incumbent Barangay Kagawads having jurisdiction of the land in suit,
stating also to the fact that respondents never violated any agrarian laws.

The PARAD assessed the evidence submitted and held that Felisa failed to discharge the burden of proof of establishing
her allegations, to wit:
After a careful assessment of the facts and evidence presented, the Board is of the view and so holds that there is no
evidence showing that respondent Domingo Carganillo subleased the land to his brother Sergio Carganillo. The
investigation report dated December 19, 1997 of Legal Officer I Dionisio Estimada (Exhibit 1 of complaint) is not
conclusive. His conclusion that Domingo Carganillo accepted to him that he subleased the property could not be
accepted by this Board as fact. There is no evidence showing that Domingo Carganillo accepted said matter to him. The
Board cannot be compelled to accept the report as true since, in the first place it had not ordered such investigation.

On appeal, the DARAB concurred with the findings of the PARAD stating that:

One of the contentions invoked by the complainant-appellant is that the landholding in question was subleased by
herein respondent-appellee to his co-respondent Sergio Carganillo, who is in actual possession and cultivation thereof.
This contention, however, cannot be given due consideration. The Honorable Adjudicator a quo correctly ruled that
there was no subleasing in this case.

At this juncture, it is better to define what a sub-lessee means. In the case of Santiago vs. Rodrigo, et al., CA-G.R. No.
33651-R, June 3, 1965, "sub-tenant or sub-lessee" has been defined as "a person who rents all, or a portion of the leased
premises, from the lessor for a term less than the original one, leaving a reversionary interest in the first lessee."
Sub-leasing therefore, creates a new estate dependent upon, out of, and distinct from, the original leasehold. However,
this is not true in the case at bar. Granting that Sergio Carganillo is working on the land tenanted by
respondent-appellee, such is not in the nature of being a sub-lessee, but is merely helping his brother as an immediate
member of the family to cultivate the land. The employment of respondent-appellee’s brother to cultivate the
landholding in question is not in any way prejudicial to the interest of the landowner. Also, it was ruled that the
employment by the lessee of the members of his immediate farm household does not come within the prohibit ion (De
Guzman v. Santos, 6 SCRA 796, November 30, 1962).

Since the issue of sub-leasing was not properly proved by substantial evidence, the same cannot be given favorable
consideration.

On further appeal, the CA held thus:

Clearly, petitioner’s assertion that respondent Domingo subleased the subject landholding to respondent Sergio cannot
be given weight. She failed to prove with sufficient evidence neither the fact of subleasing the subject landholding nor
the mortgaging of the possessory rights thereof to respondent Sergio. The document belatedly presented by petitioner
and denominated as "Katulagan", is merely a promissory note which is a proof of indebtedness and not as evidence to
prove mortgage.

We disagree with the findings of fact of the CA and the agencies below. The confluence of evidence shows that Felisa has
clearly and convincingly established her allegation that Domingo subleased his landholding to Sergio, to wit:

a) The investigation conducted by MARO Legal Officer Estimada shows that Domingo admitted that the cultivation and
possession of the subject landholding was subleased to Sergio as he was then applying for work abroad. 30
b) In her complaint, Felisa stressed that in one of her visits to the subject landholding prior to the filing of the said
complaint, she discovered that Sergio, the sublessee, was in actual possession and cultivation of the landholding in
question.31 Petitioner further contended that Domingo subleased the said agricultural leasehold to Sergio for the amount
of ₱15,000.00.32

c) The Katulagan or Agreement establishes that indeed Domingo was indebted to Sergio in the amount of ₱15,000.00.

d) The affidavit of Clarion, a resident of the municipality where the subject landholding lies, further corroborates the said
facts when she narrated the series of events leading up to Sergio’s possession of said agricultural land:

xxxx

That I know for a fact that the above-described parcel of land was under cultivation by one RICARDO PADILLO of Brgy.
Amistad, Tayug, Pangasinan, formerly, but when the same went abroad, he transferred his tenancy right to DOMINGO
CARGANILLO, who in the year 1995 mortgaged his tenancy rights to SERGIO CARGANILLO, his own brother;

That at present, the said parcel of land is under the cultivation of said SERGIO CARGANILLO;

xxxx

Domingo did not even affirm or deny in his answer that Estimada conducted an investigation and during such
investigation, he admitted that he subleased subject landholding. It is totally against our human nature to just remain
reticent and say nothing in the face of false accusations. The natural instinct of man impels him to resist an unfounded
imputation. Hence, silence in such cases is almost always construed as implied admission of the truth thereof.

Likewise, the attestations of BARC Chairman Costales and Barangay Kagawad Frago that Domingo never violated his
agreement with Felisa or any provision of the Land Reform Code, are conclusions of law bereft of any factual basis. Time
and again, we have held that general statements, which are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof, are unavailing
and do not suffice.

In view of the sublease, Domingo and Sergio should be dispossessed of the subject agricultural landholding.

Republic Act (RA) No. 3844 or the Agricultural Land Reform Code 33 is the

governing statute in actions involving leasehold of agricultural land. The pertinent provisions thereof state as follows:

Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. — Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender
of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his
dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown
that:

xxxx
(7) the lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section twenty
seven.34 (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 37. Burden of Proof. — The burden of proof to show the existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment of an
agricultural lessee shall rest upon the agricultural lessor.

The prohibition against subleasing an agricultural lease has already been in our statute books even prior to the
enactment of RA 3844. RA 1199, of The Agricultural Tenancy Act enacted in 1954, similarly provides that:

SECTION 24. Prohibitions to Tenant: —

xxxx

(2) It shall be unlawful for a share-tenant to employ a sub-tenant to furnish labor or any phase of the work required of
him under this Act, except in cases of illness or any temporary incapacity on his part, in which eventuality the tenant or
any member of his immediate farm household is under obligation to report such illness or incapacity to the landholder.
Payment to the sub-tenant, in whatever form, for services rendered on the land under this circumstance, shall be for the
account of the tenant. (Emphasis supplied)

However, Section 435 of RA 3844 declared all share tenancy to be contrary to public policy and, in its stead, provided for
the compulsory conversion of the sharing system into leasehold system where the tenant continues in possession of the
land for cultivation.

In this case, Domingo subleased his agricultural landholding to Sergio. It is prohibited, except in the case of illness or
temporary incapacity where he may employ laborers. Domingo does not claim illness or temporary incapacity in his
Answer. Therefore, we hereby declare the dispossession of Domingo and Sergio from the subject agricultural land of the
leaseholder.

b) DARAB Case No. 7863

Felisa is the owner of a parcel of land with an approximate area of 4,667 square meters registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-51201.36 She alleged that the duly instituted lessee of the agricultural land is the late Isabelo
Ramirez (Isabelo).37 During Isabelo’s lifetime, he subleased said landholding to Soledad Agustin (Soledad), without Felisa’
s knowledge and consent.38 She argued that the said act of her now deceased tenant is a ground for ejectment of
Soledad, who is a mere sublessee.39

Ruling of the PARAD

After service of summons, Soledad filed her Answer dated January 20, 1998 affirming that Isabelo was the duly instituted
tenant of the subject landholding. 40
Upon his death, his possessory rights passed on to his surviving spouse, who was
not named in the Answer.41 Soledad likewise alleged that said surviving spouse continues to cultivate the subject
landholding.42
In compliance with the PARAD’s Order dated January 20, 1998 43 requiring the parties to submit their respective position
papers, Felisa filed a position paper for all four cases, 44 attaching thereto a copy of the Investigation Report of
Estimada45 and corroborating affidavit of Gano. 46

The Investigation Report of the MARO Legal Officer Estimada stated that the lawful tenant was the late Isabelo and not
Soledad. Meanwhile, Gano declared in his affidavit that he knew that Isabelo mortgaged his tenancy rights and
possession to Soledad. He further averred that Soledad is presently cultivating said landholding, having acquired her
tenancy rights from Isabelo through the alleged mortgage.

On the other hand, Soledad submitted the following affidavits: (1) her own affidavit wherein she denied that she is Felisa’
s tenant and contended that the true tenant is her sister-in-law Marina O. Ramirez (Marina), the widow of her brother,
the deceased Isabelo; (2) Marina, who affirmed that she is the true tenant of Felisa as evidenced by the renewal of their
leasehold contract dated May 30, 1997 and corroborated Soledad’s statement that the latter does not possess any
landholding owned or administered by Felisa; (3) BARC Chairman Costales, who declared that as per their records,
Soledad is not the registered tenant of the petitioner nor has Soledad managed the activities of the said landholding; (4)
Timoteo Orina, owner of the adjoining agricultural land, who attested that Soledad never became a tenant, tiller or
manager of subject landholding; and (5) Silverio C. Bugayong, incumbent Barangay Kagawad of Brgy. Amistad, who
stated that Marina continued tilling the subject land after the death of her husband. 47 In addition, Soledad submitted the
leasehold contract dated May 30, 1997 ( Tulag ti Panagabang ti Talon ), which showed that the leasehold formerly held by
the deceased Isabelo is now with his widow, Marina.

On April 13, 1998, PARAD Caddarao, dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.48

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal dated April 30, 1998 with the PARAD signifying her intention to elevate the
latter’s April 13, 1998 Decision.49

Ruling of the DARAB

On January 7, 2004, the DARAB promulgated a Decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. 50

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In her Memorandum, petitioner asserted that the DARAB failed to resolve the issue of non-payment of lease raised in the
companion cases.51 The respondents did not file their memorandum.

On August 22, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the DARAB Decision.

Our Ruling

b) DARAB Case No. 7863

Felisa submits that the CA gravely erred in affirming the DARAB Decision dated January 7, 2004 by assuming that the
case against Soledad was already subsumed in the said Decision and in not ordering or remanding the case to the
DARAB for disposition or decision. Hence, Felisa now prays that we take a second "hard look" at the assailed CA Decision
and Resolution in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

The new evidence presented by the petitioner in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation to the
DARAB cannot be admitted.

On March 24, 2004, Felisa filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation with the DARAB, allegedly
as an expanded discussion on what she averred in her Motion for Reconsideration. 52

We note though that aside from amplifying her arguments, petitioner likewise attached and referred to new pieces of
evidence in the form of: (1) affidavit of Rudy O. Tubiera dated September 14, 2001; 53 (2) affidavit of Liberato Cabigas; 54 (3)
affidavit of Alberto A. Millan dated July 26, 2002 55 and (4) survey plan.56

Section 12, Rule VIII of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedures provide that "only one motion for reconsideration shall
be allowed a party which shall be based on the ground that: (a) the findings of facts in the said decision, order or
resolution are not supported by substantial evidence, or (b) the conclusions stated therein are against the law and
jurisprudence". As expressed by the Rule, the office of the Motion for Reconsideration is not for the reception of new
evidence. Hence, when Felisa submitted new pieces of evidence in her Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, she
went beyond the stated purpose of the Motion for Reconsideration. In which case, we rule that the new evidence
presented by Felisa in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation to the DARAB cannot be
admitted.

Petitioner has not established her claim of sublease.

We exhaustively went over the Petition for Review and Felisa’s Memorandum submitted to the CA and found the same
bereft of any issue, whether of fact or law, involving the case against Soledad. In her petition before the CA, Felisa
presented the following arguments: (1) The DARAB erred in holding that there exists no valid ground to warrant the
ejectment of Domingo and Sergio; and (2) The DARAB erred in considering only the issue of subleasing without giving
credence to the issue of non-payment of lease rentals as ground for ejectment. Nowhere in the discussion portion of
either pleadings can the name Soledad be found. Moreover, the issue presented in the case against Soledad is alleged
subleasing and not non-payment of lease rentals. If there is no issue presented, then there is no controversy to resolve.

Similarly, in her appeal by certiorari before this Court, Felisa did not expound specifically on her issues with the decisions
of the agencies below with respect to Soledad. Petitioner, however, questions the CA’s affirmation of the DARAB
Decision dated January 27, 2004.

We reiterate that the petitioner, as agricultural lessor, has the burden of

proof to show the existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee. 57 In support of her allegations,
Felisa presented the Investigation Report of MARO Legal Officer Estimada and an affidavit of a resident of
the barangay where both the original leaseholder Isabelo and the alleged sublessee, Soledad, reside. The full text of the
Investigation Report with respect to his factual findings on the case against Soledad is as follows:
In the dispute against Soledad Agustin, the lawful tenant was Isabelo Ramirez and not Soledad Agustin. In the
conference/mediation that was conducted it was discovered that the cultivator and possessor of the land is actually
Isabelo Ramirez. This is also being covered by an Agricultural leasehold Contract.

The findings of fact as expressed above are not relevant and material to the question of sublease which the petitioner
alleges.

On the other hand, the affidavit of Gano reads as follows:

xxxx

That I know for a fact that the above-described parcel of land was being cultivated formerly by the late, Isabelo Ramirez,
a resident of Brgy. Amistad, Tayug, Pangasinan, Philippines;

That I also have the knowledge that prior to the death of said Isabelo Ramirez, the same mortgaged his tenancy rights
and possession to Soledad Agustin and in fact, said Soledad Agustin is at present cultivating and in possession of the
above-described landholding;

That to the best of my knowledge, the transfer of tenancy rights and possession from Isabelo Ramirez to Soledad
Agustin by way of mortgage was made without the knowledge and consent of the owners thereof;

That I know of the above facts because being a resident of the same barangay with the former tenant and the present
tenant of the said landholding, it is of common knowledge in our community that Soledad Agustin is presently
cultivating the same landholding and that she acquired such tenancy rights from its former tenant by way of mortgage;

xxxx

In contrast to the Carganillo case above, the evidence presented by Felisa with respect to Soledad is uncorroborated and
unsubstantial. Hence, we rule that Felisa has not discharged her burden of establishing her claim of sublease.

c) DARAB Case No. 7864 and d) DARAB Case No. 7865

In DARAB Case No. 7864, the first case against respondent Marcelina Solis (Marcelina), Felisa represented that the tenant
of the landholding, Pedro Solis (Pedro), died in June 1997 and was survived by his wife, Marcelina. 58 She further alleged
that Marcelina took over the cultivation of the 14,000-square meter landholding without her knowledge and consent. 59 In
addition, during the lifetime of Pedro, the latter failed to pay lease rentals for three consecutive years from 1995 to
1997.60 Hence, the case for ejectment against Marcelina. 61

With respect to the second case (DARAB Case No. 7865), Irene Aguinaldo and Felisa co-owned a 6,830.5-square meter
landholding tenanted by Marcelina. 62 Felisa averred that Marcelina has not fully paid the rental for the use of the land on
the third cropping season.63 Hence, the second case for ejectment against Marcelina.64

Ruling of the PARAD

In her Answer, Marcelina specifically denied Felisa’s allegation of arrears in lease rentals from 1995 to 1997.65 With respect
to the second complaint, she admitted that while it is true that there were times that the subject landholding were
planted with palay on third cropping, this is not regular. 66 Moreover, she averred that if ever the said landholding were
planted with palay on third cropping and yields produce, the landowner is given her due share. 67

After submission of their respective position papers, the PARAD promulgated a Decision dated April 14, 1998 dismi ssing
both cases for lack of merit and evidence. 68

Rulings of the DARAB and the Court of Appeals

The DARAB dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the Decision of the PARAD in toto.69 On Petition for
Review under Rule 43 to the CA, the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the DARAB with respect to the i ssue of
non-payment of lease rentals. On which basis, the CA dismissed the petition.

Our Ruling

c) DARAB Case No. 7864 and d) DARAB Case No. 7865

DARAB Case No. 7864 should be dismissed for failure of Felisa to properly indicate the appealing party.

With respect to the first case against Marcelina, we resolve to dismiss the appeal of Felisa. Section 5 of Rule 45 provides
that the failure of the petitioner to comply, among others, with the contents of the petition for review on certiorari shall
be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. Section 4 of the same rule mandates, among others, that the petition
should state the full name of the appealing party as the petitioner. In this case, Felisa indicated in the caption as well as in
the parties portion of the petition that she is the landowner. Even in the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping, Felisa attested that she is the petitioner in the instant case. However, it appears in the PARAD records that the
owners of the subject 14,000-square meter agricultural land are Rosa R. Pajarito (Pajarito), Elvira A. Madolora (Madolora)
and Anastacia F. Lagado (Lagado). 70 Felisa is only the representative of the said landowners with respect to the first case
against Marcelina.71 Thus, for failure of Felisa to indicate the appealing party with respect to the said case, the appeal
must perforce be dismissed. However, such failure does not affect the appeal on the other three cases as Felisa is the
owner/co-owner of the landholdings subject of said three cases.

Procedural lapse aside, DARAB Case No. 7864 should still be dismissed for failure of Felisa to establish her principals’
claim.

In her Complaint dated October 6, 1997, Felisa, in representation of landowners Pajarito, Madolora and Lagado, alleged
that Pedro failed to pay the lease rental for the 14,000-square meter land for agricultural years 1995, 1996 and
1997.72 Subsequently, Pedro died and his widow, Marcelina took over the tenancy and cultivation of the said lan d.73 On
the other hand, Marcelina sufficiently rebutted the allegation of non-payment by presenting evidence to show that the
landowners’ share was received by therein complainants’ administrator, to wit:

Exhibit "1" – Receipt dated March 30, 1995 issued by Irene M. Aguinaldo evidencing receipt of their share of the produce
of the subject land;
Exhibit "4" – Receipt dated October 21, 1995 issued by Irene M. Aguinaldo evidencing receipt of their share of the
produce;

Exhibit "5" – Receipt dated March 23, 1996 issued by Irene M. Aguinaldo evidencing receipt of their share of the
produce;

Exhibit "7" – Receipt dated November 17, 1996 issued by Irene M. Aguinaldo evidencing receipt of their share of the
produce;

Exhibit "8" – Receipt dated April 10, 1997 issued by Irene M. Aguinaldo evidencing receipt of their share of the produce;

We hence agree with the PARAD that therein complainants were unable to produce substantial proof to support their
allegation of non-payment.

DARAB Case No. 7865 should likewise be dismissed for failure of Felisa to establish her claim.

With respect to the second case against Marcelina, Felisa alleged that the landholding in question is principally devoted
to the planting of palay three times a year. 74 However, Marcelina did not deliver her share in the third cropping. 75

In her Answer, Marcelina admitted that she is the tenant of the subject parcel of land co-owned by Felisa and Irene
Aguinaldo.76 Marcelina, however, averred that while it was true that there were times that the landholding was planted
with palay on third cropping, this was not regular. 77 She further asserted that she would give to the landowners their due
shares if ever there was third cropping. 78

In an Order dated January 20, 1998, the PARAD directed the parties to submit their position papers, affidavits of
witnesses and other evidence to support their respective claims. 79

Felisa submitted her position paper 80 for the four cases subject of this Decision, together with the Investigation Report of
Estimada81 and the affidavit of Camilo G. Taganas. 82 The Investigation Report declared that the former tenant who was
the husband of Marcelina did not pay any rental to Felisa 83 because he recognized only the other co-owners of the land,
who among others are the sisters of Felisa. 84 In addition, in the affidavit of Camilo G. Taganas, the authorized
administrator of the subject parcel of land, he declared that Marcelina did not deliver the share of the landowners on the
subject landholding.85

On the other hand, Marcelina filed her individual compliance, supported by the following affidavits and the purposes for
which they were offered:

Exhibit "1" – Notice of threshing and reaping dated March 14, 1995 addressed to Mrs. Irene Aguinaldo, administrator
and landowner of the property in question.

Exhibit "2" -- Receipt dated March 30, 1995 issued by Mrs. Irene Aguinaldo acknowledging that respondent has duly
complied with her obligations for this season.

Exhibit "3" -- Notice of reaping and threshing dated Nov. 6, 1995 to the landowner.
Exhibit "4" – Receipt issued to respondent by Mrs. Irene Aguinaldo dated Nov. 10, 1995 acknowledging the fact that
shares due to them was duly given and delivered.

Exhibit "5" – Receipt dated March 19, 1996 duly issued by Mrs. Irene Aguinaldo, the landowner/administrator of the
subject property.

Exhibit "6" -- Notice of reaping and threshing dated March 5, 1996 to prove that respondent has been religiously fulfilling
her obligations.

Exhibit "7" -- Notice sent to Mrs. Aguinaldo dated Sept. 2, 1996 informing him that since they unreasonably refused to
receive the shares due them, it was sold and the proceeds thereof was deposited in the bank.

Exhibit "8" -- Notice of reaping and threshing dated Nov. 7, 1996 proving that respondent has been faithfully complying
with her obligations.

Exhibit "9" -- Acknowledgment and/or receipt duly issued by the landowner/administrator, Mrs. Irene Aguinaldo dated
November 17, 1996 to prove that the obligations of the respondent for this date has been faithfully complied with.

Exhibit "10" -- Receipt dated April 4, 1997 issued and signed by the landowner/administrator, Mrs. Irene Aguinaldo,
acknowledging the delivery of the legal shares due them;

Exhibit "11" -- Notice of threshing and reaping dated March 26, 1997 showing that obligations to do so was [sic]complied
with.

Exhibit "12" -- Notice of reaping and threshing dated Oct. 14, 1997 to prove that landowner of the landholding in
question was duly notified.

Exhibit "13" -- Certification from the office of the BARC and issued by the BARC Chairman himself attesting to the fact
that shares due to landowners for Oct., 1997 was sold and deposited because of the unjustified refusal to receive them.

Exhibit "14" -- Receipt bearing the amount which represents the legal shares of the landowners and deposited in the
bank.

Exhibit "15" -- The name of the bank "ROSBANK" from which the proceeds of the sold shares due to the landowner was
deposited and it was deposited by Pedro Solis and/or Marcelina Solis in the name of Irene Aguinaldo.

Exhibit "16" -- The passbook with account no. T-01689-5, containing the amount deposited due to the landowners for
those years stated therein.

Exhibit "17" -- Leasehold contract or Tulag ti Panagabang ti Talon, executed by and between Irene Aguinaldo and Pedro
Solis, landowner and tenant, respectively. The purpose is to prove that tenancy relationships exists and the same passes
to respondent Marclina Solis, the surviving spouse of Pedro Solis upon his death.
Exhibit "18" -- Investigation report conducted by the office of the BARC. The purpose of which is to show that the then
tenant and now succeeded by his wife Marcelina Solis, has been duly complying with their obligations as bonafide tenant
thereof.

Exhibit "19" -- A sworn statement made by one Herminigildo P. Vinluan, a resident and landowner of the lot adjacent or
adjoining to the subject property, attesting to the fact that the then tenant and now succeeded by herein respondent
never failed to comply with their obligations.1avvphi1

Exhibit "20" -- A sworn statement made by one Arsenio B. Orina, incumbent Brgy. Kgd. of the barangay where the
property is located attesting that respondent is indeed the bonafide tenant of Mrs. Irene Aguinaldo.

Exhibit "21" -- Affidavit of Valentine O. Costales, the incumbent BARC Chairman of Brgy. Amistad, Tayug, Pangasinan,
proving and attesting the fact that Pedro Solis and now succeeded by his wife Marcelina Solis is the bonafide tenant of
the subject landholding and that they are complying faithfully and religiously with their obligations as such.

Exhibit "22" -- The sworn statement of Marcelina Solis, the respondent and successor of the former tenant, swearing to
the Hon. Board and to the public, that she never failed or neglected any of the obligations imposed by law.

As held earlier, the petitioner, as agricultural lessor, has the burden of proof to show the existence of a lawful cause for
the ejectment of an agricultural lessee. In the instant case, we have carefully studied the evidence presented by the
petitioner and found the same wanting on the matter of third cropping over the subject land. Other than the bare
allegations in her complaint before the PARAD, Felisa did not present any evidence to establish her claim that the subject
agricultural land can regularly support a third cropping. Neither did she present evidence to establish that their leasehold
agreement includes a provision on third cropping. Hence, her allegation of non-payment of the leasehold rentals for the
third cropping likewise finds no support in evidence.

In addition, we find that the evidence presented by Felisa is inconsistent on major points. In her Complaint dated
October 3, 1997, Felisa alleged that Marcelina is not delivering the shares of the land with respect to the third
cropping.86 However, the said statement is contradicted in the Estimada Investigation Report where it was indicated that
Marcelina is not giving any rentals/shares to Felisa.

The contention of non-payment of the leasehold shares of the landowner has been effectively rebutted by the evidence
presented by Marcelina. Through Marcelina’s evidence, we have established that she had regularly complied with the
leasehold contract, as supported by:

1. Notice of Reaping dated March 14, 1995

Receipt of Rental dated March 30, 1995 for 2nd crop 94-95

2. Notice of Reaping dated Nov. 6, 1995

Receipt of Rental dated November 10, 1995 for 1st crop 95

3. Notice of Reaping dated March 5, 1996

Receipt of Rental dated March 19, 1996 for 2nd crop 95-96
4. Notice of Reaping dated November 7, 1996
Receipt of Rental dated November 17, 1996 for 1st crop 96

5. Notice of Reaping dated March 26, 1997

Receipt of Rental dated April 5, 1997 for 2nd crop 96-97

6. Notice of Reaping dated October 14, 1997

Rental for 1st crop 1997 deposited in bank in land co-owner Irene Aguinaldo’s name, as per BARC Certification dated
October 27, 1997.

In addition, we have held earlier that the additional pieces of evidence Felisa attached and referred to in her
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation cannot be admitted as reception of new evidence is not
within the office of a Motion for Reconsideration.

On the basis of the evidence presented, we cannot find sufficient evidence to support Felisa’s claims. Hence, we agree
with the factual findings of the CA and the agrarian tribunals that Felisa failed to discharge the burden of proving her
claim with the necessary quantum of proof.

With respect to all four cases, petitioner further alleges that (1) the Decision of the DARAB dated January 27, 2004 and of
the CA dated August 22, 2005 only disposed of the first case; and (2) the DARAB failed to issue a consolidation order
informing the parties of the consolidation of the four appealed cases considering that these four cases have different
parties and causes of action.87

Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution states that "no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based". Petitioner argues that the CA "practically closed its eyes"
in affirming the Board’s Decision.881avvphi1

We do not agree. The Decision of the CA detailed the evidence presented by the parties. Thereafter, it weighed the
respective pieces of evidence submitted by the petitioner and the respondent and chose the one that to its mind,
deserved credence. Said Decision contained findings of facts as well as an application of case law. The Decision states,
thus:

With respect to the issue of non-payment of lease rentals, We affirm the ruling of the DARAB as follows:

With respect to Case No. 01-1567, we find [that] the allegations of complainant that respondent’s husband, Pedro Solis,
deliberately failed to pay lease rentals for the crop years 1995, 1996 and 1997 bereft of any evidence. The compl ainants
were unable to produce any proof to prove their accusations.

On the other hand, respondent has shown (be) substantial evidence that she or her husband have complied with the
duties of lawful tenant. The evidence submitted by respondents (Exhibits "1" to "10") duly show that the representatives of
the complainants, Mrs. Irene R. Aguinaldo, received the landowner’s share for agricultural year 1995 to 1997. This is
shown specifically by Exhibits "1", "4", "5", "7" and "8". Moreover, the complainants were informed of the date of reaping
and threshing as shown by other evidence.
As to case No. 01-1568, the Board again fails to find any evidence showing that respondent Marcelina Solis deliberately
failed to deliver the produce for the third cropping. The bare allegations of the complainant are insufficient to prove that
the said tenants have been remiss [sic] in her duties.

Respondent Marcelina Solis, on the other hand, has substantially proven by her evidence her compliance with her
obligation as a tenant. She has informed the complainants through their administrator, Mrs. Irene Aguinaldo, the date of
threshing and reaping (Exhibits "1", "3", "6", "8", "11" and "12"). She also submitted evidence to show that the landowner’s
share is received by complainant’s administrator (Exhibit "2", "4", "5", "9" and "10"). Other evidence submitted by
respondent is Exh. "7", wherein she informed Mrs. Aguinaldo that she deposited the proceeds of the landowner ’s share
with the bank because she (Mrs. Aguinaldo) refused to received (sic) it (Decision dated April 14, 1998, pp. 4-5, Rollo pp.
61-62).

In appeals of agrarian cases, this Court cannot make its own factual findings and substitute the same for that of the
DARAB, as the only function of this Court is to determine whether the DARAB’s findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence (Reyes vs. Reyes, 388 SCRA 471). Substantial Evidence is that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion (Resngit-Marquez vs. Llamas, Jr., 385 SCRA 6). 89

In any event, there was an earlier statement of the facts and the law involved in the decisions rendered by the PARAD
dated April 8, 1998, April 13, 1998 and April 14, 1998. In these decisions, the facts and the law on which they were based
were clearly and distinctly stated. Furthermore, in this case, the Court has exhaustively gone through the records and
made its own findings of facts, rather than further delay the disposition of the case by remanding the records for further
proceedings.

With regard to the issue of consolidation, we find in the records that although petitioner filed separate notices of appeal
for the four cases, she but filed one consolidated Appeal Memorandum dated October 7, 1998 to the DARAB, putting
into the caption all the appealed cases. 90 She persisted in consolidating the said cases in her Motion for Reconsideration
of the DARAB Decision, Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation dated March 24, 2004, 91 Petition
for Review dated December 6, 2004 to the CA, 92 Motion for Reconsideration ( ad cautelam) dated September 13
200593 and the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated January 20, 2006 to this Court. 94 In all of these pleadings where
petitioner consolidated the said four cases, petitioner sought the jurisdiction of this Court and the agencies below for
relief. Gainsaid on equitable ground of estoppel, she cannot now come to this Court assailing the consolidation of said
cases, which was brought about by her own acts.

WHEREFORE, we partially GRANT the petition.

1. In DARAB Case No. 7862, we hereby AUTHORIZE THE DISPOSSESSION of respondents Domingo and Sergio Carganillo
from the subject landholding.

2. In DARAB Case No. 7863, we AFFIRM the dismissal of the complaint against respondent Soledad Agustin for failure of
the petition to establish her claim.
3. In DARAB Case No. 7864, we AFFIRM the dismissal of the complaint against respondent Marcelina Solis for failure of
the petitioner to establish her claim and to properly indicate the appealing party in violation of Section 4 in relation to
Section 5 Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

4. In DARAB Case No. 7865, we AFFIRM the dismissal of the complaint against respondent Marcelina Solis for failure of
the petitioner to establish her claim.

G.R. No. 207264 October 22, 2013

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Bane Resolution of 25 June 2013 which stated that: IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on
Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC
First Division is upheld."

In her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner summarizes her submission, thus:

"81. Stated differently, the Petitioner x x x is not asking the Honorable Court to make a determination as regards her
qualifications, she is merely asking the Honorable Court to affirm the jurisdiction of the HRET to solely and exclusively
pass upon such qualifications and to set aside the COMELEC Resolutions for having denied Petitioner her right to due
process and for unconstitutionally adding a qualification not otherwise required by the constitution." 1(as originally
underscored)

The first part of the summary refers to the issue raised in the petition, which is:

"31. Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and who
has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone
congressional district of Marinduque." 2

Tied up and neatened the propositions on the COMELEC-or-HRET jurisdiction go thus: petitioner is a duly proclaimed
winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the House of Representatives, all questions regarding her
qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.

The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's submission. The crucial question is
whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation of
petitioner on 18 May 2013?
Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013. Without the
proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent oath of office, there ca n be no
valid and effective assumption of office.

We have clearly stated in our Resolution of 5 June 2013 that:

"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy – that before the proclamation of petitioner on
18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner's lack of Filipino citizenship
and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any
pending case on petitioner's qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives. x x x As
the point has obviously been missed by the petitioner who continues to argue on the basis of her due proclamation, the
instant motion gives us the opportunity to highlight the undeniable fact we here repeat that the proclamation which
petitioner secured on 18 May 2013 was WITHOUT ANY BASIS.

1. Four (4) days BEFORE the 18 May 2013 proclamation, or on 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc has already denied for
lack o merit the petitioner's motion to reconsider the decision o the COMELEC First Division that CANCELLED petitioner's
certificate of candidacy.

2. On 18 May 2013, there was already a standing and unquestioned cancellation of petitioner's certificate o candidacy
which cancellation is a definite bar to her proclamation. On 18 May 2003, that bar has not been removed, there was not
even any attempt to remove it.

3. The COMELEC Rules indicate the manner by which the impediment to proclamation may be removed. Rule 18, Section
13 (b) provides:

"(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission En Bane shall become final and
executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court."

Within that five (5 days, petitioner had the opportunity to go to the Supreme Court for a restraining order that will
remove the immediate effect of the En Banc cancellation of her certificate of candidacy. Within the five (5) days the
Supreme Court may remove the barrier to, and thus allow, the proclamation of petitioner. That did not happen.
Petitioner did not move to have it happen.

It is error to argue that the five days should pass before the petitioner is barred from being proclaimed. Petitioner lost in
the COMELEC as of respondent. Her certificate of candidacy has been ordered cancelled. She could not be proclaimed
because there was a final finding against her by the COMELEC. 3 She needed a restraining order from the Supreme Court
to avoid the final finding. After the five days when the decision adverse to her became executory, the need for Supreme
Court intervention became even more imperative. She would have to base her recourse on the position th at the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling her certificate of candidacy and that a restraining order,
which would allow her proclamation, will have to be based on irreparable injury and demonstrated possibility of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. In this case, before and after the 18 May 2013 proclamation, there was
not even an attempt at the legal remedy, clearly available to her, to permit her proclamation. What petitioner did was to
"take the law into her hands" and secure a proclamation in complete disregard of the COMELEC En Bane decision that
was final on 14 May 2013 and final and executory five days thereafter.

4. There is a reason why no mention about notice was made in Section 13(b) of Rule 18 in the provision that the
COMELEC En Bane or decision "SHALL become FINAL AND EXECUTORY after five days from its promulgation unless
restrained by the Supreme Court." On its own the COMELEC En Bane decision, unrestrained, moves from promulgation
into becoming final and executory. This is so because in Section 5 of Rule 18 it is stated:

Section 5. Promulgation. -The promulgation of a decision or resolutions of the Commission or a division shall be made
on a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by
registered mail or by telegram.

5. Apart from the presumed notice of the COMELEC En Bane decision on the very date of its promulgation on 14 May
2013, petitioner admitted in her petition before us that she in fact received a copy of the decision on 16 May 20 13. 4 On
that date, she had absolutely no reason why she would disregard the available legal way to remove the restraint on her
proclamation, and, more than that, to in fact secure a proclamation two days thereafter. The utter disregard of a final
COMELEC En Bane decision and of the Rule stating that her proclamation at that point MUST be on permission by t he
Supreme Court is even indicative of bad faith on the part of the petitioner.

6. The indicant is magnified by the fact that petitioner would use her tainted proclamation as the very reason to support
her argument that she could no longer be reached by the jurisdiction of the COMELEC; and that it is the HRET that has
exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of her qualifications for office.

7. The suggestions of bad faith aside, petitioner is in error in the conclusion at which she directs, as well as in her
objective quite obvious from such conclusion. It is with her procured proclamation that petitioner nullifies the
COMELEC's decision, by Division and then En Banc and pre-empts any Supreme Court action on the COMELEC decision.
In other words, petitioner repudiates by her proclamation all administrative and judicial actions thereon, past and present.
And by her proclamation, she claims as acquired the congressional seat that she sought to be a candidate for. As already
shown, the reasons that lead to the impermissibility of the objective are clear. She cannot sit as Member of the House of
Representatives by virtue of a baseless proclamation knowingly taken, with knowledge of the existing legal impediment.

8. Petitioner, therefore, is in error when she posits that at present it is the HRET which has exclusive jurisdiction over her
qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives. That the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives is a written constitutional provision.
It is, however unavailable to petitioner because she is NOT a Member of the House at present. The COMELEC never
ordered her proclamation as the rightful winner in the election for such membership.5 Indeed, the action for cancellation
of petitioner's certificate of candidacy, the decision in which is the indispensable determinant of the right of petitioner to
proclamation, was correctly lodged in the COMELEC, was completely and fully litigated in the COMELEC and was finally
decided by the COMELEC. On and after 14 May 2013, there was nothing left for the COMELEC to do to decide the case.
The decision sealed the proceedings in the COMELEC regarding petitioner's ineligibility as a candidate for Representative
of Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to petitioner's proclamation. The bar remained when no restraining order
was obtained by petitioner from the Supreme Court within five days from 14 May 2013.
9. When petitioner finally went to the Supreme Court on 10 June 2013 questioning the COMELEC First Division ruling and
the 14 May 2013 COMELEC En Bane decision, her baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of
promulgation alone become valid and legal. A decision favorable to her by the Supreme Court regarding the decision of
the COMELEC En Bane on her certificate of candidacy was indispensably needed, not to legalize her proclamation on 18
May 2013 but to authorize a proclamation with the Supreme Court decision as basis.

10. The recourse taken on 25 June 2013 in the form of an original and special civil action for a writ of Certiorari through
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is circumscribed by set rules and principles.

a) The special action before the COMELEC which was a Petition to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy was a SUMMARY
PROCEEDING or one heard summarily. The nature of the proceedings is best indicated by the COMELEC Rule on Special
Actions, Rule 23, Section 4 of which states that the Commission may designate any of its officials who are members of
the Philippine Bar to hear the case and to receive evidence. COMELEC Rule 17 further provides in Section 3 that when the
proceedings are authorized to be summary, in lieu of oral testimonies, the parties may, after due notice, be required to
submit their position paper together with affidavits, counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence; x x x and that
this provision shall likewise apply to cases where the hearing and reception of evidence are delegated by the
Commission or the Division to any of its officials x x x.

b) The special and civil action of Certiorari is defined in the Rules of Court thus:

When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.

The accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion is: a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility. 6

It is the category of the special action below providing the procedural leeway in the exercise of the COMELEC summary
jurisdiction over the case, in conjunction with the limits of the Supreme Court's authority over the FINAL COMELEC ruling
that is brought before it, that defines the way petitioner's submission before the Court should be adjudicated. Thus
further explained, the disposition of 25 June 2013 is here repeated for affirmation:

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of "newly-discovered
evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of
the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. Sh e
likewise contends that there was a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity
to question and present controverting evidence.

Her contentions are incorrect.

It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the
presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I the COMELEC Rules of Procedure shall be liberally construed in order
x x x to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought
before the Commission. In view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate
of candidacy are summary in nature, then the newly discovered evidence was properly admitted by respondent
COMELEC.

Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every opportunity to argue
her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the F irst
Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not
avail herself of the opportunity given her.

Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the opportunity or right
to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC:

The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an
opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times
more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party
was given the chance to be he rd on his motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)

As to the ruling that petitioner s ineligible to run for office on the ground of citizenship, the COMELEC First Division,
discoursed as follows:

"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office the law requires that she
must have accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the
Consul-General of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

In the case at bar, there s no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid requirements. Early on in the
proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner's lack of proof regarding her American citizenship, contending that it is
petitioner's burden to present a case. She, however, specifically denied that she has become either a permanent resident
or naturalized citizen of the USA.

Due to petitioner's submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation dated February 7, 2013, however,
establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of an American passport which she continues to use until June 30 2012
petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The burden now shifts to respondent to present substantial evidence
to prove otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely
misrepresented in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish that she had
availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and
hold any elective public office in the Philippines." (Emphasis in the original.)
Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent
submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status
is that of a balikbayan. At this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that
she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with
the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner
submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No.
9225 to her.

Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Bane, petitioner admitted that she is a holder of a
US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual Filipino-American citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do
not apply to her. Still, attached to the said motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24
September 2012. Petitioner explains that she attached said Affidavit if only to show her desire and zeal to serve the
people and to comply with rules, even as a superfluity. We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner's explanation. If
petitioner executed said Affidavit if only to comply with the rules, then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her.
Petitioner cannot claim that she executed it to address the observations by the COMELEC as the assailed Resolutions
were promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was executed in September 2012.1âwphi1

Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office as Provincial Administrator, to this
effect: This does not mean that Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her oath of office as Provincial Administrator, take
her oath of allegiance for purposes of re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status, which she reserves to present in the
proper proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath of office is in order to make reference to what is already part of
the records and evidence in the present case and to avoid injecting into the records evidence on matters of fact that was
not previously passed upon by Respondent COMELEC. This statement raises a lot of questions -Did petitioner execute an
oath of allegiance for re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why did she not present it at the earliest
opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an admission that she has indeed lost her natural-born Filipino status?

To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner contends that, since she
took her oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment as Provincial Administrator of Marinduque, she is
deemed to have reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time before this Court, as it was never
raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath of allegiance cannot be considered compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A. No.
9225 as certain requirements have to be met as prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise known as
the Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002 (Revised
Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration. Thus, petitioner s oath of
office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.

These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on petitioner s citizenship. Petitioner, however,
failed to clear such doubt.7

11. It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC and the HRET insofar as the petitioner s
being a Representative of Marinduque is concerned. The COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner s certificate of
candidacy, and its due course or its cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions that determines who can be lega lly
proclaimed. The matter can go to the Supreme Court but not as a continuation of the proceedings in the COMELEC,
which has in fact ended, but on an original action before the Court grounded on more than mere error of judgment but
on error of jurisdiction for grave abuse of discretion. At and after the COMELEC En Bane decision, there is no longer any
certificate cancellation matter than can go to the HRET. In that sense, the HRET s constitutional authority opens, over the
qualification of its MEMBER, who becomes so only upon a duly and legally based proclamation, the first and unavoidable
step towards such membership. The HRET jurisdiction over the qualification of the Member of the House of
Representatives is original and exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by the proceedings in the
COMELEC which, as just stated has been terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular, not summary, proceeding. It will
determine who should be the Member of the House. It must be made clear though, at the risk of repetitiveness, that no
hiatus occurs in the representation of Marinduque in the House because there is such a representative who shall sit as
the HRET proceedings are had till termination. Such representative is the duly proclaimed winner resulting from the
terminated case of cancellation of certificate of candidacy of petitioner. The petitioner is not, cannot, be that
representative. And this, all in all, is the crux of the dispute between the parties: who shall sit in the House in
representation of Marinduque, while there is yet no HRET decision on the qualifications of the Member.

12. As finale, and as explained in the discussion just done, no unwarranted haste can be attributed, as the dissent does so,
to the resolution of this petition promulgated on 25 June 2013. It was not done to prevent the exercise by the HRET of its
constitutional duty. Quite the contrary, the speedy resolution of the petition was done to pave the way for the
unimpeded performance by the HRET of its constitutional role. The petitioner can very well invoke the authority of the
HRET, but not as a sitting member of the House of Representatives. 8

The inhibition of this ponente was moved for. The reason for the denial of the motion was contained in a letter to the
members of the Court on the understanding that the matter was internal to the Court. The ponente now seeks the
Courts approval to have the explanation published as it is now appended to this Resolution.

The motion to withdraw petition filed AFTER the Court has acted thereon, is noted. It may well be in order to remind
petitioner that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties, but continues until the c ase is
terminated.9 When petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari jurisdiction vested in the Court and, in fact, the Court
exercised such jurisdiction when it acted on the petition. Such jurisdiction cannot be lost by the unilateral withdrawal of
the petition by petitioner.

More importantly, the Resolution dated 25 June 2013, being a valid court issuance, undoubtedly has legal consequences.
Petitioner cannot, by the mere expediency of withdrawing the petition, negative and nullify the Court's Resolution and its
legal effects. At this point, we counsel petitioner against trifling with court processes. Having sought the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, petitioner cannot withdraw her petition to erase the ruling adverse to her interests. Obviously, she
cannot, as she designed below, subject to her predilections the supremacy of the law.

WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the petition is affirmed. Entry of Judgment is
ordered.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 216914, December 06, 2016

SUBIDO PAGENTE CERTEZA MENDOZA AND BINAY LAW OFFICES, Petitioner,

v.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS, AND THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL, REPRESENTED BY ITS MEMBERS, HON. AMANDO M.
TETANGCO, JR., GOVERNOR OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, HON. TERESITA J. HERBOSA, CHAIRPERSON OF
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, AND HON. EMMANUEL F. DOOC, INSURANCE COMMISSIONER OF
THE INSURANCE COMMISSION, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Challenged in this petition for certiorari1 and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the constitutionality of
Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9160, the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended, specifically the Anti-Money
Laundering Council's authority to file with the Court of Appeals (CA) in this case, an ex-parte application for inquiry into
certain bank deposits and investments, including related accounts based on probable cause.

In 2015, a year before the 2016 presidential elections, reports abounded on the supposed disproportionate wealth of
then Vice President Jejomar Binay and the rest of his family, some of whom were likewise elected public officers. The
Office of the Ombudsman and the Senate conducted investigations 2 and inquiries3 thereon ostensibly based on their
respective powers delineated in the Constitution.
From various news reports announcing the inquiry into then Vice President Binay's bank accounts, including accounts of
members of his family, petitioner Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza & Binay Law Firm (SPCMB) was most concerned with
the article published in the Manila Times on 25 February 2015 entitled "Inspect Binay Bank Accounts" which read, in
pertinent part:

xxx The Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) asked the Court of Appeals (CA) to allow the [C]ouncil
to peek into the bank accounts of the Binays, their corporations, and a law office where a family
member was once a partner.

xxxx

Also the bank accounts of the law office linked to the family, the Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza &
Binay Law Firm, where the Vice President's daughter Abigail was a former partner. 4

The following day, 26 February 2015, SPCMB wrote public respondent, Presiding Justice of the CA, Andres B. Reyes, Jr.:

The law firm of Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay was surprised to receive a call from Manila
Times requesting for a comment regarding a [supposed petition] filed by the Republic of the Philippines
represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council before the Court of Appeals seeking to examine the
law office's bank accounts.

To verify the said matter, the law office is authorizing its associate Atty. Jose Julius R. Castro to inquire on
the veracity of said report with the Court of Appeals. He is likewise authorized to secure copies of the
relevant documents of the case, such as the petition and orders issued, if such a case exists.

As this is a matter demanding serious and immediate attention, the Firm respectfully manifests that if no
written response is received within 24-hours from receipt of this letter, we shall be at liberty to assume
that such a case exists and we shall act accordingly.

Hoping for your immediate action.

Respectfully yours,
For the Firm

CLARO F. CERTEZA5

Within twenty four (24) hours, Presiding Justice Reyes wrote SPCMB denying its request, thus:

Anent your request for a comment on a supposed petition to inquire into your law office's bank
accounts, please be informed that a petition of this nature is strictly confidential in that when processing
the same, not even the handling staff members of the Office of the Presiding Justice know or have any
knowledge who the subject bank account holders are, as well as the bank accounts involved.
 Please be informed further that clearly under the rules, the Office of the Presiding Justice is strictly
mandated not to disclose, divulge, or communicate to anyone directly or indirectly, in any manner or by
any means, the fact of the filing of any petition brought before this Court by the Anti-Money Laundering
Council, its contents and even its entry in the logbook.

Trusting that you find satisfactory the foregoing explanation. 6

By 8 March 2015, the Manila Times published another article entitled, "CA orders probe of Binay's assets" reporting that
the appellate court had issued a Resolution granting the ex-parte application of the AMLC to examine the bank accounts
of SPCMB:

The Court of Appeals (CA) has officially issued an order for examination of Vice President Jejomar
Binay's bank accounts.

In granting the petition of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), the CA also ordered the
inspection of the bank deposits of Binay's wife, children, and a law office connected to him.

xxx xxx xxx

The bank accounts of the law office linked to Binay - the Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza &
Binay where Binay's daughter, Makati City (Metro Manila) Rep. Mar-len Abigail Binay was a partner, are
also included in the probe, the sources said.7

Forestalled in the CA thus alleging that it had no ordinary, plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to protect its rights and
interests in the purported ongoing unconstitutional examination of its bank accounts by public respondent Anti -Money
Laundering Council (AMLC), SPCMB undertook direct resort to this Court via this petition for certiorari and prohibition
on the following grounds:

1. THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL INSOFAR AS IT ALLOWS THE

EXAMINATION OF A BANK ACCOUNT WITHOUT ANY NOTICE TO THE AFFECTED
PARTY:cralawlawlibrary

1. IT VIOLATES THE PERSON'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS; AND

2. IT VIOLATES THE PERSON'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY.

2.
3. EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL, THE
RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION CONSIDERING THAT:cralawlawlibrary
 THE REFUSAL OF RESPONDENT PRESIDING JUSTICE TO PROVIDE PETITIONER WITH A COPY OF
THE EX-PARTE APPLICATION FOR BANK EXAMINATION FILED BY RESPONDENT AMLC AND ALL OTHER
1.
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, ORDERS, RESOLUTIONS, AND PROCESSES ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS IN RELATION THERETO VIOLATES PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS;

A CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO EXAMINE ANY AND ALL TRANSACTIONS PERTAINING TO PETITIONER'S BANK
2.
ACCOUNTS VIOLATES THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE WHICH IS SACROSANCT IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION;

A BLANKET AUTHORITY TO EXAMINE PETITIONER'S BANK ACCOUNTS, INCLUDING ANY AND ALL TRANSACTIONS
3. THEREIN FROM ITS OPENING UP TO THE PRESENT, PARTAKES THE NATURE OF A GENERAL WARRANT THAT IS
CLEARLY INTENDED TO AID A MERE FISHING EXPEDITION;

THERE IS NOTHING IN THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ACT THAT ALLOWS OR JUSTIFIES THE WITHHOLDING OF
INFORMATION AND/OR ANY COURT RECORDS OR PROCEEDINGS PERTAINING TO AN EXAMINATION OF A BANK
4.
ACCOUNT, ESPECIALLY IF THE COURT HAS ALREADY GRANTED THE AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT THE
EXAMINATION;

THE PETITIONER DID NOT COMMIT, NOR HAS THE PETITIONER BEEN IMPLEADED IN ANY COMPLAINT
5.
INVOLVING ANY PREDICATE CRIME THAT WOULD JUSTIFY AN INQUIRY INTO ITS BANK ACCOUNTS; AND

THE EXAMINATION OF THE PETITIONER'S BANK ACCOUNTS IS A FORM OF POLITICAL PERSECUTION OR

7.
HARASSMENT.8

4.

In their Comment, the AMLC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), points out a supposed jurisdictional
defect of the instant petition, i.e., SPCMB failed to implead the House of Representatives which enacted the AMLA and its
amendments. In all, the OSG argues for the dismissal of the present petition, highlighting that the AMLC's inquiry into
bank deposits does not violate due process nor the right to privacy:
1. Section 11's allowance for AMLC's ex-parte application for an inquiry into particular bank deposits and investments is
investigative, not adjudicatory;

2. The text of Section 11 itself provides safeguards and limitations on the allowance to the AMLC to inquire into bank
deposits: (a) issued by the CA based on probable cause; and (b) specific compliance to the requirements of Sections 2
and 3, Article III of the Constitution;

3. The ex-parte procedure for investigating bank accounts is necessary to achieve a legitimate state objective;

4. There is no legitimate expectation of privacy as to the bank records of a depositor;

5. The examination of, and inquiry, into SPCMB's bank accounts does not violate Attorney-Client Privilege; and

6. A criminal complaint is not a pre-requisite to a bank inquiry order.

In their Reply, SPCMB maintains that the ex-parte proceedings authorizing inquiry of the AMLC into certain bank
deposits and investments is unconstitutional, violating its rights to due process and privacy.

Before anything else, we here have an original action turning on three crucial matters: (1) the petition reaches us from a
letter of the Presiding Justice of the CA in response to a letter written by SPCMB; (2) SPCMB's bank account has been
reported to be a related account to Vice President Binay's investigated by the AMLC for anti-money laundering activities;
and (3) the constitutionality of Section 11 of the AMLA at its recent amendment has not been squarely raised and
addressed.

To obviate confusion, we act on this petition given that SPCMB directly assails the constitutionality of Section 11 of the
AMLA where it has been widely reported that Vice President Binay's bank accounts and all related accounts therewith are
subject of an investigation by the AMLC. In fact, subsequent events from the filing of this petition have shown that these
same bank accounts (including related accounts) were investigated by the Ombudsman and both Houses of the
Legislature. However, at the time of the filing of this petition, SPCMB alleged that its accounts have been inquired into
but not subjected to a freeze order under Section 10 of the AMLA. Thus, as previously noted, with its preclusion of legal
remedies before the CA which under the AMLA issues the ex-parte bank inquiry and freeze orders, Sections 10 and 11,
respectively, SPCMB establishes that it has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of l aw to
protect its rights and interests from the purported unconstitutional intrusion by the AMLC into its bank accounts.

The foregoing shall be addressed specifically and bears directly on the disposition of the decision herein.

Additionally, we note that the OSG did not question how this petition reaches us from a letter of the appellate court's
Presiding Justice, only that, procedurally, SPCMB should have impleaded Congress.

On the sole procedural issue of whether SPCMB ought to have impleaded Congress, the contention of the OSG though
novel is untenable. All cases questioning the constitutionality of a law does not require that Congress be impleaded for
their resolution. The requisites of a judicial inquiry are elementary:

1. There must be an actual case or controversy; party;

 2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;

3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and

4. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.9

The complexity of the issues involved herein require us to examine the assailed provision vis-a-vis the constitutional
proscription against violation of due process. The statute reads:

SEC. 11. Authority to Inquire into Bank Deposits. - Notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No.
1405, as amended; Republic Act No. 6426, as amended; Republic Act No. 8791; and other laws, the
AMLC may inquire into or examine any particular deposit or investment, including related accounts, with
any banking institution or non-bank financial institution upon order of any competent court based on
an ex parte application in cases of violations of this Act, when it has been established that there is
probable cause that the deposits or investments, including related accounts involved, are related to an
unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof or a money laundering offense under Section 4 hereof;
except that no court order shall be required in cases involving activities defined in Section 3(i)(1), (2), and
(12) hereof, and felonies or offenses of a nature similar to those mentioned in Section 3(i)(1), (2), and (12),
which are punishable under the penal laws of other countries, and terrorism and conspiracy to commit
terrorism as defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 9372.

The Court of Appeals shall act on the application to inquire into or examine any deposit or investment
with any banking institution or non-bank financial institution within twenty-four (24) hours from filing of
the application.

To ensure compliance with this Act, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas may, in the course of a periodic or
special examination, check the compliance of a covered institution with the requirements of the AMLA
and its implementing rules and regulations.

For purposes of this section, 'related accounts' shall refer to accounts, the funds and sources of which
originated from and/or are materially linked to the monetary instrument(s) or property(ies) subject of
the freeze order(s).

A court order ex parte must first be obtained before the AMLC can inquire into these related
Accounts: Provided, That the procedure for the ex parte application of the ex partecourt order for the
principal account shall be the same with that of the related accounts.

The authority to inquire into or examine the main account and the related accounts shall comply with
the requirements of Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the 1987 Constitution, which are hereby incorporated
by reference.10

The due process clause of the Constitution reads:

 SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. 11

The right to due process has two aspects: (1) substantive which deals with the extrinsic and intrinsic validity of the law;
and (2) procedural which delves into the rules government must follow before it deprives a person of its life, liberty or
property.12

As presently worded, Section 11 of the AMLA has three elements: (1) ex-parte application by the AMLC; (2) determination
of probable cause by the CA; and (3) exception of court order in cases involving unlawful activities defined in Sections
3(i)(1), (2), and (12).

As a brief backgrounder to the amendment to Section 11 of the AMLA, the text originally did not specify for
an ex-parte application by the AMLC for authority to inquire into or examine certain bank accounts or investments. The
extent of this authority was the topic of Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Judge Eugenio, Jr., et al. (Eugenio)13 where the petitioner
therein, Republic of the Philippines, asseverated that the application for that kind of order under the questioned section
of the AMLA did not require notice and hearing. Eugenio schooled us on the AMLA, specifically on the provisional
remedies provided therein to aid the AMLC in enforcing the law:

It is evident that Section 11 does not specifically authorize, as a general rule, the issuanceex-parte of the
bank inquiry order. We quote the provision in full:

SEC. 11. Authority to Inquire into Bank Deposits. — Notwithstanding the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1405, as amended, Republic Act No. 6426, as amended, Republic Act
No. 8791, and other laws, the AMLC may inquire into or examine any particular deposit
or investment with any banking institution or non bank financial institution upon order
of any competent court in cases of violation of this Act, when it has been established
that there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful
activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof or a money laundering offense under Section 4
hereof, except that no court order shall be required in cases involving unlawful activities
defined in Sections 3(i)1, (2) and (12).

To ensure compliance with this Act, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) may inquire
into or examine any deposit of investment with any banking institution or non bank
financial institution when the examination is made in the course of a periodic or special
examination, in accordance with the rules of examination of the BSP. (Emphasis
supplied)

Of course, Section 11 also allows the AMLC to inquire into bank accounts without having to obtain a
judicial order in cases where there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to
kidnapping for ransom, certain violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, hijacking
and other violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and murder. Since such special
circumstances do not apply in this case, there is no need for us to pass comment on this proviso. Suffice
it to say, the proviso contemplates a situation distinct from that which presently confronts us, and for
purposes of the succeeding discussion, our reference to Section 11 of the AMLA excludes said proviso.

In the instances where a court order is required for the issuance of the bank inquiry order, nothing in
Section 11 specifically authorizes that such court order may be issued ex parte. It might be argued that
this silence does not preclude the ex parte issuance of the bank inquiry order since the same is not
prohibited under Section 11. Yet this argument falls when the immediately preceding provision, Section
10, is examined.

SEC 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property. — The Court of Appeals, upon
application ex parte by the AMLC and after determination that probable cause exists
that any monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an unlawful activity as
defined in Section 3(i) hereof, may issue a freeze order which shall be effective
immediately. The freeze order shall be for a period of twenty (20) days unless extended
by the court.

Although oriented towards different purposes, the freeze order under Section 10 and the bank inquiry
order under Section 11 are similar in that they are extraordinary provisional reliefs which the AMLC may
avail of to effectively combat and prosecute money laundering offenses. Crucially, Section 10 uses
specific language to authorize an ex parte application for the provisional relief therein, a circumstance
absent in Section 11. If indeed the legislature had intended to authorize ex parte proceedings for the
issuance of the bank inquiry order, then it could have easily expressed such intent in the law, as it did
with the freeze order under Section 10.

Even more tellingly, the current language of Sections 10 and 11 of the AMLA was crafted at the same
time, through the passage of R.A. No. 9194. Prior to the amendatory law, it was the AMLC, not the Court
of Appeals, which had authority to issue a freeze order, whereas a bank inquiry order always then
required, without exception, an order from a competent court. It was through the same enactment
that ex parte proceedings were introduced for the first time into the AMLA, in the case of the freeze
order which now can only be issued by the Court of Appeals. It certainly would have been convenient,
through the same amendatory law, to allow a similar ex parte procedure in the case of a bank inquiry
order had Congress been so minded. Yet nothing in the provision itself, or even the available legislative
record, explicitly points to an ex parte judicial procedure in the application for a bank inquiry order,
unlike in the case of the freeze order.

That the AMLA does not contemplate ex parte proceedings in applications for bank inquiry orders is
confirmed by the present implementing rules and regulations of the AMLA, promulgated upon the
passage of R.A. No. 9194. With respect to freeze orders under Section 10, the implementing rules do
expressly provide that the applications for freeze orders be filed ex parte, but no similar clearance is
granted in the case of inquiry orders under Section 11. These implementing rules were promulgated by
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Insurance Commission and the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and if it was the true belief of these institutions that inquiry orders could be issued ex
 parte similar to freeze orders, language to that effect would have been incorporated in the said Rules.
This is stressed not because the implementing rules could authorize ex parte applications for inquiry
orders despite the absence of statutory basis, but rather because the framers of the law had no intention
to allow such ex parte applications.

Even the Rules of Procedure adopted by this Court in A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC to enforce the provisions of
the AMLA specifically authorize ex parte applications with respect to freeze orders under Section 10 but
make no similar authorization with respect to bank inquiry orders under Section 11.

The Court could divine the sense in allowing ex parte proceedings under Section 10 and in proscribing
the same under Section 11. A freeze order under Section 10 on the one hand is aimed at preserving
monetary instruments or property in any way deemed related to unlawful activities as defined in Section
3(i) of the AMLA. The owner of such monetary instruments or property would thus be inhibited from
utilizing the same for the duration of the freeze order. To make such freeze order anteceded by a
judicial proceeding with notice to the account holder would allow for or lead to the dissipation of such
funds even before the order could be issued. (Citations omitted.)

Quite apparent from the foregoing is that absent a specific wording in the AMLA allowing for ex-parteproceedings in
orders authorizing inquiry and examination by the AMLC into certain bank deposits or investments, notice to the
affected party is required.

Heeding the Court's observance in Eugenio that the remedy of the Republic then lay with the legislative, Congress
enacted Republic Act No. 10167 amending Section 11 of the AMLA and specifically inserted the word ex-parte appositive
of the nature of this provisional remedy available to the AMLC thereunder.

It is this current wording of Section 11 which SPCMB posits as unconstitutional and purportedly actually proscribed
in Eugenio.

We do not subscribe to SPCMB's position.

Succinctly, Section 11 of the AMLA providing for ex-parte application and inquiry by the AMLC into certain bank deposits
and investments does not violate substantive due process, there being no physical seizure of property involved at that
stage. It is the preliminary and actual seizure of the bank deposits or investments in question which brings these within
reach of the judicial process, specifically a determination that the seizure violated due process. 14 In
fact, Eugenio delineates a bank inquiry order under Section 11 from a freeze order under Section 10 on both remedies'
effect on the direct objects, i.e. the bank deposits and investments:

On the other hand, a bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not necessitate any form of physical
seizure of property of the account holder. What the bank inquiry order authorizes is the examination of
the particular deposits or investments in banking institutions or non-bank financial institutions. The
monetary instruments or property deposited with such banks or financial institutions are not seized in a
physical sense, but are examined on particular details such as the account holder's record of deposits
and transactions. Unlike the assets subject of the freeze order, the records to be inspected under a bank
 inquiry order cannot be physically seized or hidden by the account holder. Said records are in the
possession of the bank and therefore cannot be destroyed at the instance of the account holder alone
as that would require the extraordinary cooperation and devotion of the bank. 15

At the stage in which the petition was filed before us, the inquiry into certain bank deposits and investments by the
AMLC still does not contemplate any form of physical seizure of the targeted corporeal property. From this cite, we
proceed to examine whether Section 11 of the law violates procedural due process.

As previously stated, the AMLA now specifically provides for an ex-parte application for an order authorizing inquiry or
examination into bank deposits or investments which continues to pass constitutional muster.

Procedural due process is essentially the opportunity to be heard. 16 In this case, at the investigation stage by the AMLC
into possible money laundering offenses, SPCMB demands that it have notice and hearing of AMLC's investigation into
its bank accounts.

We are not unaware of the obiter in Eugenio17 and cited by SPCMB, voicing misgivings on an interpretation of the former
Section 11 of the AMLA allowing for ex-parte proceedings in bank inquiry orders, to wit:

There certainly is fertile ground to contest the issuance of an ex-parte order. Section 11 itself requires
that it be established that "there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to
unlawful activities," and it obviously is the court which stands as arbiter whether there is indeed such
probable cause. The process of inquiring into the existence of probable cause would involve the
function of determination reposed on the trial court. Determination clearly implies a function of
adjudication on the part of the trial court, and not a mechanical application of a standard
pre-determination by some other body. The word "determination" implies deliberation and is, in normal
legal contemplation, equivalent to "the decision of a court of justice."

The court receiving the application for inquiry order cannot simply take the AMLC's word that probable
cause exists that the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful activity. It will have to exercise its
own determinative function in order to be convinced of such fact. The account holder would be certainly
capable of contesting such probable cause if given the opportunity to be apprised of the pending
application to inquire into his account; hence a notice requirement would not be an empty spectacle. It
may be so that the process of obtaining the inquiry order may become more cumbersome or
prolonged because of the notice requirement, yet we fail to see any unreasonable burden cast by such
circumstance. After all, as earlier stated, requiring notice to the account holder should not, in any way,
compromise the integrity of the bank records subject of the inquiry which remain in the possession and
control of the bank. (Emphasis supplied)

On that score, the SPCMB points out that the AMLC 's bank inquiry is preliminary to the seizure and deprivation of its
property as in a freeze order under Section 10 of the AMLA which peculiarity lends itself to a sui generis proceeding akin
to the evaluation process in extradition proceedings pronounced in Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Lantion.18 Under the
extradition law, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs is bound to make a finding that the extradition request and its supporting
documents are sufficient and complete in form and substance before delivering the same to the Secretary of Justice. We
ruled:

[L]ooking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that there was failure to abide by
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true that the extradition request was
delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours
later, the Department of Justice received the request, apparently without the Department of Foreign
affairs discharging its duty thoroughly evaluating the same and its accompanying documents. xxx.

xxxx

[T]he record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the Department of Foreign Affairs
thoroughly reviewed the extradition request and supporting documents and that it arrived at a
well-founded judgment that the request and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law.
XXX.

The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings, proper belongs to a class by itself. It is sui
generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of
ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the power: (a) to make a technical
assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the
request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not
extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that
the offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation. Hence, said
process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding
conducted in the exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial power.

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b)
determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported
by the facts proved. Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is one
of the determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it to exercise its
quasi-judicial authority. This power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and premises,
and investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction, or to require disclosure
of information by means of accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents,
or otherwise.

The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a useful
aid or tool in an administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions.
Notably, investigation is indispensable to prosecution.19 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The submission of AMLC requires a determination whether the AMLC is an administrative body with quasi-judicial
powers; corollary thereto, a determination of the jurisdiction of the AMLC.
Lim v. Gamosa20 is enlightening on jurisdiction and the requirement of a specific grant thereof in the enabling law. We
declared that the creation of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) by the Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act (IPRA) did not confer it exclusive and original, nor primary jurisdiction, in all claims and disputes involving rights of IPs
and ICCs where no such specific grant is bestowed.

In this instance, the grant of jurisdiction over cases involving money laundering offences is b estowed on the Regional
Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan as the case may be. In fact, Rule 5 of the IRR is entitled Jurisdiction of Money
Laundering Cases and Money Laundering Investigation Procedures:

Rule 5.a. Jurisdiction of Money Laundering Cases. The Regional Trial Courts shall have the jurisdiction to
try all cases on money laundering. Those committed by public officers and private persons who are in
conspiracy with such public officers shall be under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Rule 5.b. Investigation of Money Laundering Offenses. - The AMLC shall investigate:

(1) suspicious transactions;

(2) covered transactions deemed suspicious after an investigation conducted by the
AMLC;
(3) money laundering activities; and
(4) other violations of the AMLA, as amended.

The confusion on the scope and parameters of the AMLC's investigatory powers and whether such seeps into and
approximates a quasi-judicial agency's inquisitorial powers lies in the AMLC's investigation and consequent initial
determination of whether certain activities are constitutive of anti-money laundering offenses.

The enabling law itself, the AMLA, specifies the jurisdiction of the trial courts, RTC and Sandiganbayan, over money
laundering cases, and delineates the investigative powers of the AMLC.

Textually, the AMLA is the first line of defense against money laundering in compliance with our international obligation.
There are three (3) stages of determination, two (2) levels of investigation, falling under three (3) jurisdictions:

1. The AMLC investigates possible money laundering offences and initially determines whether there is probable cause to
charge any person with a money laundering offence under Section 4 of the AMLA, resulting in the filing of a complaint
with the Department of Justice or the Office of the Ombudsman; 21

2. The DOJ or the Ombudsman conducts the preliminary investigation proceeding and if after due notice and hearing
finds probable cause for money laundering offences, shall file the necessary information before the Regional Trial Courts
or the Sandiganbayan;22

3. The RTCs or the Sandiganbayan shall try all cases on money laundering, as may be applicable. 23

Nowhere from the text of the law nor its Implementing Rules and Regulations can we glean that the AMLC exercises
quasi-judicial functions whether the actual preliminary investigation is done simply at its behest or conducted by the
Department of Justice and the Ombudsman.
Again, we hark back to Lantion citing Ruperto v. Torres,23-a where the Court had occasion to rule on the functions of an
investigatory body with the sole power of investigation:

[Such a body] does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating facts and
making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining whether an
administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication
signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties
before it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based
on the facts and Circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final
pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.

adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective
extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the law
and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus
merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine whether or not the extradition should
be effected. That is the role of the court. The body's power is limited to an initial finding of whether or
not the extradition petition can be filed in court.

It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation procedure is

characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of the extradition process.
Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can
be effected at two stages: First, the provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the
submission of the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting
party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the request
(Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he shall be automatically discharged after 60
days if no request is submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period
of 20 days after which the arrested person could be discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically, although th e
Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the provisions only mean that once a request is forwarded to the
Requested State, the prospective extraditee may be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently
rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be discharged if no
request is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight from the
Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the
extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069).

Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as during the
evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one.

Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an
administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are
essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and
ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee, As described by petitioner himself, this
is a "tool" for criminal law enforcement. In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of t he
 nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to make available to a
respondent in an administrative case or investigation certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily
available only in criminal prosecutions. Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral
arguments, there are rights formerly available only at the trial stage that had been advanced to an
earlier stage in the proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right against
self-incrimination.24 (Citations omitted)

In contrast to the disposition in Lantion that the evaluation process before the Department of Foreign Affairs is akin to an
administrative agency conducting investigative proceedings with implications on the consequences of criminal
liability, i.e., deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee, the sole investigative functions of the AMLC finds more
resonance with the investigative functions of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

That the AMLC does not exercise quasi-judicial powers and is simply an investigatory body finds support in our ruling
in Shu v. Dee.25 In that case, petitioner Shu had filed a complaint before the NBI charging respondents therein with
falsification of two (2) deeds of real estate mortgage submitted to the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(Metrobank). After its investigation, the NBI came up with a Questioned Documents Report No. 746-1098 finding that the
signatures of petitioner therein which appear on the questioned deeds are not the same as the standard sample
signatures he submitted to the NBI. Ruling on the specific issue raised by respondent therein that they had been denied
due process during the NBI investigation, we stressed that the functions of this agency are merely investigatory and
informational in nature:

[The NBI] has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to any party. It
cannot even determine probable cause. The NBI is an investigative agency whose findings are merely
recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative or as public welfare may
require in accordance with its mandate. It also renders assistance when requested in the investigation or
detection of crimes in order to prosecute the persons responsible.

Since the NBI's findings were merely recommendatory, we find that no denial of the respondent's due
process right could have taken place; the NBI's findings were still subject to the prosecutor's and the
Secretary of Justice's actions for purposes of finding the existence of probable cause. We find it
significant that the specimen signatures in the possession of Metrobank were submitted by the
respondents for the consideration of the city prosecutor and eventually of the Secretary of Justice
during the preliminary investigation proceedings. Thus, these officers had the opportunity to examine
these signatures.

The respondents were not likewise denied their right to due process when the NBI issued the
questioned documents report. We note that this report merely stated that the signatures appearing on
the two deeds and in the petitioner's submitted sample signatures were not written by one and the
same person. Notably, there was no categorical finding in the questioned documents report that the
respondents falsified the documents. This report, too, was procured during the conduct of the NBI's
investigation at the petitioner's request for assistance in the investigation of the alleged crime of
falsification. The report is inconclusive and does not prevent the respondents from securing a separate
 documents examination by handwriting experts based on their own evidence. On its own, the NBI's
questioned documents report does not directly point to the respondents' involvement in the crime
charged. Its significance is that, taken together with the other pieces of evidence submitted by the
parties during the preliminary investigation, these evidence could be sufficient for purposes of finding
probable cause — the action that the Secretary of Justice undertook in the present case.

As carved out in Shu, the AMLC functions solely as an investigative body in the instances mentioned in Rule
5.b.26 Thereafter, the next step is for the AMLC to file a Complaint with either the DOJ or the Ombudsman pursuant to
Rule 6.b.

Even in the case of Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman,27 where the conflict arose at the preliminary investigation stage
by the Ombudsman, we ruled that the Ombudsman's denial of Senator Estrada's Request to be furnished copies of the
counter-affidavits of his co-respondents did not violate Estrada's constitutional right to due process where the sole issue
is the existence of probable cause for the purpose of determining whether an information should be filed and does not
prevent Estrada from requesting a copy of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents during the pre-trial or even
during trial. We expounded on the nature of preliminary investigation proceedings, thus:

It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of
probable cause, and "probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a
summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an
accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his
accusers to establish his innocence." Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are
limited to those granted by procedural law.

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of

determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a
crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of
evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to
"engender a well founded belief' as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the
respondent's probable guilt thereof A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for
the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such
evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. We are in accord with the
state prosecutor's findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence of
petitioner's involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported
by the evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein.

Likewise devoid of cogency is petitioner's argument that the testimonies of Galarion

and Hanopol are inadmissible as to him since he was not granted the opportunity of
cross-examination.
 It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right
to cross-examine the witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112
of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to
submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant
and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or
their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to
examine or cross-examine. Thus, even if petitioner was not given the opportunity to
cross-examine Galarion and Hanopol at the time they were presented to testify during
the separate trial of the case against Galarion and Roxas, he cannot assert any legal
right to cross-examine them at the preliminary investigation precisely because such
right was never available to him. The admissibility or inadmissibility of said testimonies
should be ventilated before the trial court during the trial proper and not in the
preliminary investigation.

Furthermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has
jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very
nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no
compelling justification for a strict application of the evidentiary rules. In addition,
considering that under Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the record of the
preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case in the Regional
Trial Court, then the testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol may not be admitted by the
trial court if not presented in evidence by the prosecuting fiscal. And, even if the
prosecution does present such testimonies, petitioner can always object thereto and
the trial court can rule on the admissibility thereof; or the petitioner can, during the trial,
petition said court to compel the presentation of Galarion and Hanopol for purposes of
cross-examination. (Citations and emphasis omitted)

Plainly, the AMLC's investigation of money laundering offenses and its determination of possible money laundering
offenses, specifically its inquiry into certain bank accounts allowed by court order, does not transform it into an
investigative body exercising quasi-judicial powers. Hence, Section 11 of the AMLA, authorizing a bank inquiry court
order, cannot be said to violate SPCMB's constitutional right to procedural due process.

We now come to a determination of whether Section 11 is violative of the constitutional right to privac y enshrined in
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. SPCMB is adamant that the CA's denial of its request to be furnished copies of
AMLC's ex-parte application for a bank inquiry order and all subsequent pleadings, documents and orders filed and
issued in relation thereto, constitutes grave abuse of discretion where the purported blanket authority under Section 11:
(1) partakes of a general warrant intended to aid a mere fishing expedition; (2) violates the attorney-client privilege; (3) is
not preceded by predicate crime charging SPCMB of a money laundering offense; and (4) is a form of political
harassment [of SPCMB's] clientele.

We shall discuss these issues jointly since the assailed Section 11 incorporates by reference that "[t]he authority to inq uire
into or examine the main and the related accounts shall comply with the requirements of Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of
the 1987 Constitution." On this point, SPCMB asseverates that "there is nothing in the AMLA that allows or justifies the
withholding of information and/or any court records or proceedings pertaining to an examination of a bank account,
especially if the court has already granted the authority to conduct the examination."

The theme of playing off privacy rights and interest against that of the state's interest in curbing money laundering
offenses is recurring.28

The invoked constitutional provisions read:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.

SEC. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public policy or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

Once again, Eugenio29 offers guidance:

The Court's construction of Section 11 of the AMLA is undoubtedly influenced by right to privacy
considerations. If sustained, petitioner's argument that a bank account may be inspected by the
government following an ex parte proceeding about which the depositor would know nothing would
have significant implications on the right to privacy, a right innately cherished by all notwithstanding the
legally recognized exceptions thereto. The notion that the government could be so empowered is cause
for concern of any individual who values the right to privacy which, after all, embodies even the right to
be "let alone," the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized people.

One might assume that the constitutional dimension of the right to privacy, as applied to bank deposits,
warrants our present inquiry. We decline to do so. Admittedly, that question has proved controversial in
American jurisprudence. Notably, the United States Supreme Court in U.S. v. Miller held that there was
no legitimate expectation of privacy as to the bank records of a depositor. Moreover, the text of our
Constitution has not bothered with the triviality of allocating specific rights peculiar to bank deposits.

However, sufficient for our purposes, we can assert there is a right to privacy governing bank accounts
in the Philippines, and that such right finds application to the case at bar. The source of such right is
statutory, expressed as it is in R.A. No. 1405 otherwise known as the Bank Secrecy Act of 1955. The right
to privacy is enshrined in Section 2 of that law, to wit:
 SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the
Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines,
its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an
absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by
any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of
the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases
of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money
deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.

Because of the Bank Secrecy Act, the confidentiality of bank deposits remains a basic state policy in the
Philippines. Subsequent laws, including the AMLA, may have added exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act,
yet the secrecy of bank deposits still lies as the general rule. It falls within the zones of privacy
recognized by our laws. The framers of the 1987 Constitution likewise recognized that bank accounts are
not covered by either the right to information under Section 7, Article III or under the requirement of full
public disclosure under Section 28, Article II. Unless the Bank Secrecy Act is repealed or amended, the
legal order is obliged to conserve the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank deposits.

Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be specifically legislated. Section 2 of the Bank
Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank accounts may be examined by "any person,
government official, bureau or office"; namely when: (1) upon written permission of the depositor; (2) in
cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in
cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and (4) the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation. Section 8 of R.A. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
has been recognized by this Court as constituting an additional exception to the rule of absolute
confidentiality, and there have been other similar recognitions as well.

The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section 11, the AMLC may inquire
into a bank account upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of the AMLA, it having
been established that there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to unlawful
activities as defined in Section 3(i) of the law, or a money laundering offense under Section 4 thereof.
Further, in instances where there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to
kidnapping for ransom, certain violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, hijacking
and other violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and murder, then there is no need for the
AMLC to obtain a court order before it could inquire into such accounts.

It cannot be successfully argued the proceedings relating to the bank inquiry order under Section 11 of
the AMLA is a "litigation" encompassed in one of the exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act which is when
"the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation." The orientation of the bank
inquiry order is simply to serve as a provisional relief or remedy. As earlier stated, the application for
such does not entail a full-blown trial.
 Nevertheless, just because the AMLA establishes additional exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act it does
not mean that the later law has dispensed with the general principle established in the older law that
"[a]ll deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines x x x are hereby
considered as of an absolutely confidential nature." Indeed, by force of statute, all bank deposits are
absolutely confidential, and that nature is unaltered even by the legislated exceptions referred to above.
There is disfavor towards construing these exceptions in such a manner that would authorize unlimited
discretion on the part of the government or of any party seeking to enforce those exceptions and
inquire into bank deposits. If there are doubts in upholding the absolutely confidential nature of bank
deposits against affirming the authority to inquire into such accounts, then such doubts must be
resolved in favor of the former. Such a stance would persist unless Congress passes a law reversing the
general state policy of preserving the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank accounts.
(Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing disquisition, we extract the following principles:

1. The Constitution did not allocate specific rights peculiar to bank deposits;

2. The general rule of absolute confidentiality is simply statutory, 30i.e. not specified in the Constitution, which has been
affirmed in jurisprudence;31

3. Exceptions to the general rule of absolute confidentiality have been carved out by the Legislature which legislation
have been sustained, albeit subjected to heightened scrutiny by the courts; 32 and

4. One such legislated exception is Section 11 of the AMLA.

The warning in Eugenio that an ex-parte proceeding authorizing the government to inspect certain bank accounts or
investments without notice to the depositor would have significant implications on the right to privacy still does not
preclude such a bank inquiry order to be allowed by specific legislation as an exception to the general rule of absolute
confidentiality of bank deposits.

We thus subjected Section 11 of the AMLA to heightened scrutiny and found nothing arbitrary in the allowance and
authorization to AMLC to undertake an inquiry into certain bank accounts or deposits. Instead, we found that it provides
safeguards before a bank inquiry order is issued, ensuring adherence to the general state policy of preserving the
absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank accounts:

(1) The AMLC is required to establish probable cause as basis for its ex-parte application for bank inquiry order;

(2) The CA, independent of the AMLC's demonstration of probable cause, itself makes a finding of probable cause that
the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful activity under Section 3(i) or a money laundering offense under
Section 4 of the AMLA;
(3) A bank inquiry court order ex-parte for related accounts is preceded by a bank inquiry court order ex-parte for the
principal account which court order ex-parte for related accounts is separately based on probable cause that such
related account is materially linked to the principal account inquired into; and

(4) The authority to inquire into or examine the main or principal account and the related accounts shall comply with the
requirements of Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution.

The foregoing demonstrates that the inquiry and examination into the bank account are not undertaken whimsically and
solely based on the investigative discretion of the AMLC. In particular, the requirement of demonstration by the AMLC,
and determination by the CA, of probable cause emphasizes the limits of such governmental action. We will revert to
these safeguards under Section 11 as we specifically discuss the CA's denial of SPCMB's letter request for information
concerning the purported issuance of a bank inquiry order involving its accounts.

First. The AMLC and the appellate court are respectively required to demonstrate and ascertain probable cause. Ret. Lt.
Gen. Ligot, et al. v. Republic of the Philippines,33 which dealt with the adjunct provisional remedy of freeze order under
Section 10 of the AMLA, defined probable cause, thus:

The probable cause required for the issuance of a freeze order differs from the probable cause required
for the institution of a criminal action, xxx.

As defined in the law, the probable cause required for the issuance of a freeze order refers to "such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet, prudent or cautious man to believe that an
unlawful activity and/or money laundering offence is about to be, is being or has been committed and
that the account or any monetary instrument or property subject thereof sought to be frozen is in any
way related to said unlawful activity and/or money laundering offense."

In other words, in resolving the issue of whether probable cause exits, the CA's statutorily-guided
determination's focus is not on the probable commissions of an unlawful activity (or money laundering)
that the office of the Ombudsman has already determined to exist, but on whether the bank accounts,
assets, or other monetary instruments sought to be frozen are in any way related to any of the illegal
activities enumerated under R.A. 9160, as amended. Otherwise stated, probable cause refers to the
sufficiency of the relation between an unlawful activity and the property or monetary instrument which is
the focal point of Section 10 of RA No. 9160, as amended. xxx. (Emphasis supplied)

Second. As regards SPCMB's contention that the bank inquiry order is in the nature of a general
warrant, Eugenio already declared that Section 11, even with the allowance of an ex parte application therefor, "is not a
search warrant or warrant of arrest as it contemplates a direct object but not the seizure of persons or property." 34 It
bears repeating that the ''bank inquiry order" under Section 11 is a provisional remedy to aid the AMLC in the
enforcement of the AMLA.

Third. Contrary to the stance of SPCMB, the bank inquiry order does not contemplate that SPCMB be first impleaded in a
money laundering case already filed before the courts:
 We are unconvinced by this proposition, and agree instead with the then Solicitor General who
conceded that the use of the phrase "in cases of' was unfortunate, yet submitted that it should be
interpreted to mean "in the event there are violations" of the AMLA, and not that there are already cases
pending in court concerning such violations. If the contrary position is adopted, then the bank inquiry
order would be limited in purpose as a tool in aid of litigation of live cases, and wholly inutile as a means
for the government to ascertain whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain an intended prosecution
of the account holder for violation of the AMLA. Should that be the situation, in all likelihood the AMLC
would be virtually deprived of its character as a discovery tool, and thus would become less circumspect
in filing complaints against suspect account holders. After all, under such set-up the preferred strategy
would be to allow or even encourage the indiscriminate filing of complaints under the AMLA with the
hope or expectation that the evidence of money laundering would somehow .surface during the trial.
Since the AMLC could not make use of the bank inquiry order to determine whether there is evidentiary
basis to prosecute the suspected malefactors, not filing any case at all would not be an alternative. Such
unwholesome set-up should not come to pass. Thus Section 11 cannot be interpreted in a way that
would emasculate the remedy it has established and encourage the unfounded initiation of complaints
for money laundering.35 (Citation omitted)

Guided as we are by prior holdings, and bound as we are by the requirements for issuance of a bank inquiry order under
Section 11 of the AMLA, we are hard pressed to declare that it violates SPCMB's right to privacy.

Nonetheless, although the bank inquiry order ex-parte passes constitutional muster, there is nothing in Section 11 nor
the implementing rules and regulations of the AMLA which prohibits the owner of the bank account, as in his instance
SPCMB, to ascertain from the CA, post issuance of the bank inquiry order ex-parte, if his account is indeed the subject of
an examination. Emphasized by our discussion of the safeguards under Section 11 preceding the issuance of such an
order, we find that there is nothing therein which precludes the owner of the account from challenging the basis for the
issuance thereof.

The present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the appellate court, through the Presiding Justice,
gravely abused its discretion when it effectively denied SPCMB's letter-request for confirmation that the AMLC had
applied (ex-parte) for, and was granted, a bank inquiry order to examine SPCMB's bank accounts relative to the
investigation conducted on Vice-President Binay's accounts.

We recall the Presiding Justice's letter to SPCMB categorically stating that "under the rules, the Office of the Presiding
Justice is strictly mandated not to disclose, divulge, or communicate to anyone directly or indirectly, in any manner or by
any means, the fact of the filing of the petition brought before [the Court of Appeals] by the [AMLC], its contents and
even its entry in the logbook." Note that the letter did not cite the aforementioned rules that were supposedly crystal
clear to foreclose ambiguity. Note further that Rules 10.c.3 and 10.d of the IRR on Authority to File Petitions for Freeze
Order provides that:

Rule 10.c. Duty of Covered Institutions upon receipt thereof. —

 Rule 10.c.1. Upon receipt of the notice of the freeze order, the covered institution concerned shall
immediately freeze the monetary instrument or property and related accounts subject thereof.

Rule 10.c.2. The covered institution shall likewise immediately furnish a copy of the notice of the freeze
order upon the owner or holder of the monetary instrument or property or related accounts subject
thereof.

Rule 10.c.3. Within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the freeze order, the covered institution
concerned shall submit to the Court of Appeals and the AMLC, by personal delivery, a detailed written
return on the freeze order, specifying all the pertinent and relevant information which shall include the
following:

(a) the account numbers;

(b) the names of the account owners or holders;
(c) the amount of the monetary instrument, property or related accounts as of the time
they were frozen;
(d) all relevant information as to the nature of the monetary instrument or property;
(e) any information on the related accounts pertaining to the monetary instrument or
property subject of the freeze order; and
(f) the time when the freeze thereon took effect.

Rule 10.d. Upon receipt of the freeze order issued by the Court of Appeals and upon verification by the
covered institution that the related accounts originated from and/or are materially linked to the
monetary instrument or property subject of the freeze order, the covered institution shall freeze these
related accounts wherever these may be found.

The return of the covered institution as required under Rule 10.c.3 shall include the fact of such freezing
and an explanation as to the grounds for the identification of the related accounts.

If the related accounts cannot be determined within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the freeze
order due to the volume and/or complexity of the transactions or any other justifiable factor(s), the
covered institution shall effect the freezing of the related accounts, monetary instruments and
properties as soon as practicable and shall submit a supplemental return thereof to the Court of Appeals
and the AMLC within twenty-four (24) hours from the freezing of said related accounts, monetary
instruments and properties.

The foregoing rule, in relation to what Section 11 already provides, signifies that ex-parte bank inquiry orders on related
accounts may be questioned alongside, albeit subsequent to, the issuance of the initial freeze order of the subject bank
accounts. The requirements and procedure for the issuance of the order, including the return to be made thereon lay the
grounds for judicial review thereof. We expound.

An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It is well-settled that the abuse of
discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law. 36 In this relation, case law states that not every error in
the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. 37 The degree of
gravity, as above-described, must be met.

That the propriety of the issuance of the bank inquiry order is a justiciable issue brooks no argument. A justiciable
controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is
conjectural or merely anticipatory. 38

As previously adverted to in our discussion on the right to privacy, the clash of privacy rights and interest against that of
the government's is readily apparent. However, the statutorily enshrined general rule on absolute confidentiality of bank
accounts remains. Thus, the safeguards instituted in Section II of the AMLA and heretofore discussed provide for certain
well defined limits, as in the language of Baker v. Carr, "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of
the exercise of such discretion by the appellate court in denying the letter-request of SPCMB.39 In short, Section II itself
provides the basis for the judicial inquiry and which the owner of the bank accounts subject of the AMLC inquiry may
invoke.

Undeniably, there is probable and preliminary governmental action against SPCMB geared towards impl ementation of
the AMLA directed at SPCMB's property, although there is none, as yet, physical seizure thereof, as in freezing of bank
accounts under Section 10 of the AMLA. 40 Note, however, that the allowance to question the bank inquiry order we carve
herein is tied to the appellate court's issuance of a freeze order on the principal accounts. Even in Eugenio, while
declaring that the bank inquiry order under Section II then required prior notice of such to the account owner, we
recognized that the determination of probable cause by the appellate court to issue the bank inquiry order can be
contested. As presently worded and how AMLC functions are designed under the AMLA, the occasion for the issuance of
the freeze order upon the actual physical seizure of the investigated and inquired into bank account, calls into motions
the opportunity for the bank account owner to then question, not just probable cause for the issuance of the freeze
order under Section I 0, but, to begin with, the determination of probable cause for an ex-parte bank inquiry order into a
purported related account under Section II.

In enacting the amendment to Section II of the AMLC, the legislature saw it fit to place requirements before a bank
inquiry order may be issued. We discussed these requirements as basis for a valid exception to the general rule on
absolute confidentiality of bank accounts. However, these very safe guards allow SPCMB, post issuance of
the ex-parte bank inquiry order, legal bases to question the propriety of such issued order, if any. To emphasize, this
allowance to the owner of the bank account to question the bank inquiry order is granted only after issuance of the
freeze order physically seizing the subject bank account. It cannot be undertaken prior to the issuan ce of the freeze
order.

While no grave abuse of discretion could be ascribed on the part of the appellate court when it explained in its letter that
petitions of such nature "is strictly confidential in that when processing the same, not even the handling staff members of
the Office of the Presiding Justice know or have any knowledge who the subject bank account holders are, as well as the
bank accounts involved," it was incorrect when it declared that "under the rules, the Office of the Presiding Justice i s
strictly mandated not to disclose, divulge, or communicate to anyone directly or indirectly, in any manner or by any
means, the fact of the filing of any petition brought before [the Court of Appeals] by the Anti-Money Laundering Council,
its contents and even its entry in the logbook." As a result, the appellate court effectively precluded and prevented
SPCMB of any recourse, amounting to a denial of SPCMB's letter request.

We cannot overemphasize that SPCMB, as the owner of the bank account which may be the subject of inquiry of the
AMLC, ought to have a legal remedy to question the validity and propriety of such an order by the appellate court under
Section 11 of the AMLA even if subsequent to the issuance of a freeze order. Moreover, given the scope of inquiry of the
AMLC, reaching and including even related accounts, which inquiry into specifies a proviso that: "[t]hat the procedure for
the ex-parte application of the ex-partecourt order for the principal account shall be the same with that of the related
accounts," SPCMB should be allowed to question the government intrusion. Plainly, by implication, SPCMB can
demonstrate the absence of probable cause, i.e. that it is not a related account nor are its accounts materially linked to
the principal account being investigated.41

In BSB Group, Inc. v. Go,42 we recounted the objective of the absolute confidentiality rule which is protection from
unwarranted inquiry or investigation if the purpose of such inquiry or investigation is merely to determine the existence
and nature, as well as the amount of the deposit in any given bank account:

xxx. There is, in fact, much disfavor to construing these primary and supplemental exceptions in a
manner that would authorize unbridled discretion, whether governmental or otherwise, in utilizing these
exceptions as authority for unwarranted inquiry into bank accounts. It is then perceivable that the
present legal order is obliged to conserve the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits.

The measure of protection afforded by the law has been explained in China Banking Corporation v.
Ortega. That case principally addressed the issue of whether the prohibition against an examination of
bank deposits precludes garnishment in satisfaction of a judgment. Ruling on that issue in the negative,
the Court found guidance in the relevant portions of the legislative deliberations on Senate Bill No. 351
and House Bill No. 3977, which later became the Bank Secrecy Act, and it held that the absolute
confidentiality rule in R.A. No. 1405 actually aims at protection from unwarranted inquiry or investigation
if the purpose of such inquiry or investigation is merely to determine the existence and nature, as well as
the amount of the deposit in any given bank account. Thus,

x x x The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B&B
Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan
Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the defendant B&B Forest Development
Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of the
garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow
any withdrawal until further order. It will be noted from the discussion of the conference
committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977 which later became
Republic Act No. 1405, that it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place banks
deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment Thus:

x x x Mr. Marcos: Now, for purposes of the record, I should like the
Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means to clarify this further.
 Suppose an individual has a tax case. He is being held liable by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue [(BIR)] or, say, P1,000.00 worth of tax
liability, and because of this the deposit of this individual [has been]
attached by the [BIR].

Mr. Ramos: The attachment will only apply after the court has
pronounced sentence declaring the liability of such person. But where
the primary aim is to determine whether he has a bank deposit in
order to bring about a proper assessment by the [BIR], such inquiry is
not allowed by this proposed law.

Mr. Marcos: But under our rules of procedure and under the Civil Code,
the attachment or garnishment of money deposited is allowed. Let us
assume for instance that there is a preliminary attachment which is for
garnishment or for holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a
certain individual, but such attachment or garnishment will bring out
into the open the value of such deposit. Is that prohibited by... the law?

Mr. Ramos: It is only prohibited to the extent that the inquiry... is made
only for the purpose of satisfying a tax liability already declared for the
protection of the right in favor of the government; but when the object
is merely to inquire whether he has a deposit or not for purposes of
taxation, then this is fully covered by the law. x x x

Mr. Marcos: The law prohibits a mere investigation into the existence
and the amount of the deposit.

Mr. Ramos: Into the very nature of such deposit. x x x (Citations

omitted)

What is reflected by the foregoing disquisition is that the law plainly prohibits a mere investigation into the existence and
the amount of the deposit. We relate the principle to SPCMB's relationship to the reported principal account under
investigation, one of its clients, former Vice President Binay. SPCMB as the owner of one of the bank accounts reported
to be investigated by the AMLC for probable money laundering offenses should be allowed to pursue remedies
therefrom where there are legal implications on the inquiry into its accounts as a law firm. While we do not lapse into
conjecture and cannot take up the lance for SPCMB on probable violation of the attorney-client privilege based on pure
speculation, the extent of information obtained by the AMLC concerning the clients of SPCMB has not been fully drawn
and sufficiently demonstrated. At the same time, the owner of bank accounts that could be potentially affected has the
right to challenge whether the requirements for issuance of the bank inquiry order were indeed complied with given that
such has implications on its property rights. In this regard, SPCMB's obeisance to promulgated rules on the matter could
have afforded it a remedy, even post issuance of the bank inquiry order.
Rule 10.b. of the IRR defines probable cause as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet,
prudent or cautious man to believe that an unlawful activity and/or a money laundering offense is abou t to be, is being
or has been committed and that the account or any monetary instrument or property sought to be frozen is in any way
related to said unlawful activity and/or money laundering offense." Evidently, the provision only refers to probable cause
for freeze orders under Section 10 of the AMLA. From this we note that there is a glaring lacunae in our procedural rules
concerning the bank inquiry order under Section 11. Despite the advent of RA No. 10167, amending Section 11 of the
AMLA, we have yet to draft additional rules corresponding to the ex-parte bank inquiry order under Section 11. A.M. No.
05-11-04-SC entitled "Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, Asset Preservation, and Freezing of Monetary
Instrument, Property, or Proceeds Representing, Involving, or Relating to an Unlawful Activity or Money Laundering
Offense Under Republic Act No. 9160, as Amended," only covers what is already provided in the title. As we have already
noted, the bank inquiry order must likewise be governed by rules specific to its issuance where the AMLC regularly
invokes this provision and which, expectedly clashes with the rights of bank account holders.

Apart from Section 2, Rule IV of the 2009 Internal Rules of the CA (IRCA) reads:

SEC. 2. Action by the Presiding Justice or Executive Justice. — When a petition involves an urgent
matter, such as an application for writ of habeas corpus, amparo or habeas data or for temporary
restraining order, and there is no way of convening the Raffle Committee or calling any of its members,
the Presiding Justice or the Executive Justice, as the case may be, or in his/her absence, the most senior
Justice present, may conduct the raffle or act on the petition, subject to raffle in the latter case on the
next working day in accordance with Rule III hereof.

(AMLA cases are limited to the first three most senior Justices as stated in the law and are raffled by the
Chairmen of the First, Second and Third Divisions to the members of their Divisions only.)

Nothing in the IRCA justifies the disallowance to SPCMB of information and/or court records or proceedings pertaining
to the possible bank inquiry order covering its bank deposits or investment.

We note that the Presiding Justice's reply to the request for comment of SPCMB on the existence of a petition for bank
inquiry order by the AMLC covering the latter's account only contemplates the provisions of Section 10 of the AMLA, its
IRR and the promulgated rules thereon. Such immediate and definitive foreclosure left SPCMB with no recourse on how
to proceed from what it perceived to be violation of its rights as owner of the bank account examined. The reply of the
Presiding Justice failed to take into consideration Section 54 of A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC on Notice of Freeze Order which
reads:

SEC. 54. Notice of freeze order.- The Court shall order that notice of the freeze order be served
personally, in the same manner provided for the service of the asset preservation order in Section 14 of
this Rule, upon the respondent or any person acting in his behalf and such covered institution or
government agency. The court shall notify also such party in interest as may have appeared before the
court. (Emphasis supplied)

We relate this Section 54 to the already cited Rule 10.d of the IRR
 Rule 10.d. Upon receipt of the freeze order issued by the Court of Appeals and upon verification by the
covered institution that the related accounts originated from and/or are materially linked to the
monetary instrument or property subject of the freeze order, the covered institution shall freeze these
related accounts wherever these may be found.

The return of the covered institution as required under Rule 10.c.3 shall include the fact of such freezing
and an explanation as to the grounds for the identification of the related accounts.

If the related accounts cannot be determined within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the freeze
order due to the volume and/or complexity of the transactions or any other justifiable factor(s), the
covered institution shall effect the freezing of the related accounts, monetary instruments and
properties as soon as practicable and shall submit a supplemental return thereof to the Court of
Appeals and the AMLC within twenty-four (24) hours from the freezing of said related accounts,
monetary instruments and properties. (Emphasis supplied)

demonstrating that the return of the Freeze Order must provide an explanation as to the grounds for the identification of
the related accounts, or the requirement of notice to a party in interest affected thereby whose bank accounts were
examined. This necessarily contemplates the procedure for a prior bank inquiry order which we ought to provide for.

For exact reference, we cite A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, Title VIII on Petitions for Freeze Order in the CA which certain
pertinent provisions we adopt and apply suppletorily as a separate Title on Petitions for Bank Inquiry Order:

TITLE VIII
PETITIONS FOR FREEZE ORDER IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

SEC. 43. Applicability. - This Rule shall apply to petitions for freeze order in the Court of Appeals. The
2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, as amended, shall apply suppletorily in all other aspects.

xxxx

SEC. 46. Contents of the petition. - The petition shall contain the following allegations:

(a) The name and address of the respondent;

A specific description with particularity of the monetary instrument, property or proceeds, their location, the name
(b)
of the owner, holder, lienholder or possessor, if known;

(c) The grounds relied upon for the issuance of a freeze order; and

The supporting evidence showing that the subject monetary instrument, property, or proceeds are in any way
(d) related to or involved in an unlawful activity as defined under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 9160, as amende d by
Republic Act No. 9194.
 The petition shall be filed in seven clearly legible copies and shall be accompanied by clearly legible copies of
supporting documents duly subscribed under oath.

xxxx

SEC. 49. Confidentiality; prohibited disclosure. - The logbook and the entries therein shall be kept strictly
confidential and maintained under the responsibility of the Presiding Justice or the Executive Justices, as
the case may be. No person, including Court personnel, shall disclose, divulge or communicate to
anyone directly or indirectly, in any manner or by any means, the fact of the filing of the petition for
freeze order, its contents and its entry in the logbook except to those authorized by the Court. Violation
shall constitute contempt of court.

xxxx

SEC. 51. Action by the Court of Appeals.- All members of the Division of the Court to which the assigned
justice belongs shall act on the petition within twenty-four hours after its filing. However, if one member
of the Division is not available, the assigned justice and the other justice present shall act on the petition.
If only the assigned justice is present, he shall act alone. The action of the two justices or of the assigned
justice alone, as the case may be, shall be forthwith promulgated and thereafter submitted on the next
working day to the absent member or members of the Division for ratification, modification or recall.

If the Court is satisfied from the verified allegations of the petition that there exists probable cause that
the monetary instrument, property, or proceeds are in any way related to or involved in any unlawful
activity as defined in Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 9160, as amended by Republic Act No. 9194, it shall
issue ex parte a freeze order as hereinafter provided.

If the Court finds no substantial merit in the petition, it shall dismiss the petition outright, stating the
specific reasons for such dismissal.

When the unanimous vote of the three justices of the Division cannot be obtained, the Presiding Justice
or the Executive Justice shall designate two justices by raffle from among the other justices of the first
three divisions to sit temporarily with them forming a special division of five justices. The concurrence of
a majority of such special division shall be required for the pronouncement of a judgment or resolution.

SEC. 52. Issuance, form and contents of the freeze order - The freeze order shall:

(a) issue in the name of the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council;

describe with particularity the monetary instrument, property or proceeds frozen, as well as the names of their
(b)
owner or owners; and
 direct the person or covered institution to immediately freeze the subject monetary instrument, property or
(c)
proceeds or its related web of accounts.

SEC. 53. Freeze order.

Effectivity; post issuance hearing. - The freeze order shall be effective immediately for a period of twenty days.
(a) Within the twenty-day period, the court shall conduct a summary hearing, with notice to the parties, to determine
whether or not to modify or lift the freeze order, or extend its effectivity as hereinafter provided.

Extension. - On motion of the petitioner filed before the expiration of twenty days from issuance of a freeze order,
(b)
the court may for good cause extend its effectivity for a period not exceeding six months.

SEC. 54. Notice of freeze order.- The Court shall order that notice of the freeze order be served
personally, in the same manner provided for the service of the asset preservation order in Section 14 of
this Rule, upon the respondent or any person acting in his behalf and such covered institution or
government agency. The court shall notify also such party in interest as may have appeared before the
court.

SEC. 55. Duty of respondent, covered institution or government agency upon receipt of freeze order. -
Upon receipt of a copy of the freeze order, the respondent, covered institution or government agency
shall immediately desist from and not allow any transaction, withdrawal, deposit, transfer, removal,
conversion, other movement or concealment the account representing, involving or relating to the
subject monetary instrument, property, proceeds or its related web of accounts.

SEC. 56. Consolidation with the pending civil forfeiture proceedings - After the post-issuance hearing
required in Section 53, the Court shall forthwith remand the case and transmit the records to the
regional trial court for consolidation with the pending civil forfeiture proceeding.

SEC. 57. Appeal.- Any party aggrieved by the decision or ruling of the court may appeal to the Supreme
Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The appeal shall not stay
the enforcement of the subject decision or final order unless the Supreme Court directs otherwise.

A reverse situation affords us a clearer picture of the arbitrary and total preclusion of SPCMB to question the bank inquiry
order of the appellate court. In particular, in an occasion where the appellate court denies the
AMLC's ex-parte application for a bank inquiry order under Section 11, the AMLC can question this denial and assail such
an order by the appellate court before us on grave abuse of discretion. Among others, the AMLC can demonstrate that it
has established probable cause for its issuance, or if the situation contemplates a denial of an application for a bank
inquiry order into a related account, the AMLC can establish that the account targeted is indeed a related account. The
resolution on these factual and legal issues ought to be reviewable, albeit post issuance of the Freeze Order, akin to the
provision of an Appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 57 of A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC.
Palpably, the requirement to establish probable cause is not a useless supposition. To establish and demonstrate the
required probable cause before issuance of the bank inquiry and the freeze orders is a screw on which the AMLC's
intrusive functions turns. We are hard pressed to justify a disallowance to an aggrieved owner of a bank account to avail
of remedies.

That there are no specific rules governing the bank inquiry order does not signify that the CA cannot confirm to the
actual owner of the bank account reportedly being investigated whether it had in fact issued a bank inquiry order for
covering its accounts, of course after the issuance of the Freeze Order. Even in Ligot,43 we held that by implication, where
the law did not specify, the owner of the "frozen" property may move to lift the freeze order issued under Section 10 of
the AMLA if he can show that no probable cause exists or the 20-day period of the freeze order has already lapsed
without any extension being requested from and granted by the CA. Drawing a parallel, such a showing of the absence
of probable cause ought to be afforded SPCMB.

Ligot clarifies that "probable cause refers to the sufficiency of the relation between an unlawful activity and the property
or monetary instrument which is the focal point of Section 10 of the AMLA, as amended." This same probable caus e is
likewise the focal point in a bank inquiry order to further determine whether the account under investigation is linked to
unlawful activities and/or money laundering offense. Thus, the specific applicability of Sections 52, 53, 54 and 57 Title VIII
of A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC covering the following: (1) Issuance, Form and Content of the Freeze Order; (2) Effectivity of the
Freeze Order and Post Issuance Hearing thereon; (3) Notice of the Freeze Order; and (4) Appeal from the Freeze Order
as separate Rules for Petitions to Question the Bank Inquiry Order. And as held in Eugenio which now applies to the
present Section 11 of the AMLA:

Although oriented towards different purposes, the freeze order under Section 10 and the bank inquiry
order under Section 11 are similar in that they are extraordinary provisional reliefs which the AMLC may
avail of to effectively combat and prosecute money laundering offenses. Crucially, Section 10 uses
specific language to authorize an ex parte application for the provisional relief therein, a circumstance
absent in Section 11. xxx.44

The cited rules cover and approximate the distinction made by Eugenio in declaring that the bank inquiry order is not a
search warrant, and yet there are instituted requirements for the issuance of these orders given that such is now
allowed ex-parte:

The Constitution and the Rules of Court prescribe particular requirements attaching to search warrants
that are not imposed by the AMLA with respect to bank inquiry orders. A constitutional warrant requires
that the judge personally examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, such examination being in the form of searching questions and answers. Those are impositions
which the legislative did not specifically prescribe as to the bank inquiry order under the AMLA and we
cannot find sufficient legal basis to apply them to Section 11 of the AMLA. Simply put, a bank inquiry
order is not a search warrant or warrant of arrest as it contemplates a direct object but not the seizure of
persons or property.
 Even as the Constitution and the Rules of Court impose a high procedural standard for the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of search warrants which Congress chose not to
prescribe for the bank inquiry order under the AMLA, Congress nonetheless disallowed ex
parte applications for the inquiry order. We can discern that in exchange for these procedural standards
normally applied to search warrants, Congress chose instead to legislate a right to notice and a ri ght to
be heard — characteristics of judicial proceedings which are not ex parte. Absent any demonstrable
constitutional infirmity, there is no reason for us to dispute such legislative policy choices. 45

Thus, as an ex-parte bank inquiry order which Congress has now specifically allowed, the owner of a bank account post
issuance of the freeze order has an opportunity under the Rules to contest the establishment of probable cause.

Again, we cannot avoid the requirement-limitation nexus in Section 11. As it affords the government authority to pursue a
legitimate state interest to investigate money laundering offenses, such likewise provides the limits for the authority
given. Moreover, allowance to the owner of the bank account, post issuance of the bank inquiry order and the
corresponding freeze order, of remedies to question the order, will not forestall and waylay the government's pursuit of
money launderers. That the bank inquiry order is a separate from the freeze order does not denote that it cannot be
questioned. The opportunity is still rife for the owner of a bank account to question the basis for its very inclusion into the
investigation and the corresponding freezing of its account in the process.

As noted in Eugenio, such an allowance accorded the account holder who wants to contest the issuance of the order and
the actual investigation by the AMLC, does not cast an unreasonable burden since the bank inquiry order has already
been issued. Further, allowing for notice to the account holder should not, in any way, compromise the integrity of the
bank records subject of the inquiry which remain in the possession and control of the bank. The account holder so
notified remains unable to do anything to conceal or cleanse his bank account records of suspicious or anomalous
transactions, at least not without the whole hearted cooperation of the bank, which inherently has no vested interest to
aid the account holder in such manner. Rule 10.c. 46 of the IRR provides for Duty of the Covered Institution receiving the
Freeze Order. Such can likewise be made applicable to covered institutions notified of a bank inquiry order.

On the other hand, a scenario where SPCMB or any account holder under examination later shows that the bank inquiry
order was without the required probable cause, the information obtained through the account reverts to, and maintains,
its confidentiality. In short, any and all information obtained therein by the AMLC remains confidential, as if no
examination or inquiry on the bank account or investments was undertaken. The foregoing consequence can be added
as a Section in the Rules entitled "Effect of absence of probable cause."

All told, we affirm the constitutionality of Section 11 of the AMLA allowing the ex-parte application by the AMLC for
authority to inquire into, and examine, certain bank deposits and investments.

Section 11 of the AMLA providing for the ex-parte bank deposit inquiry is constitutionally firm for the reasons already
discussed. The ex-parte inquiry shall be upon probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful
activity as defined in Section 3(i) of the law or a money laundering offense under Section 4 of the same law. To effect the
limit on the ex-parte inquiry, the petition under oath for authority to inquire, must, akin to the requirement of a petition
for freeze order enumerated in Title VIII of A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, contain the name and address of the respondent; the
grounds relied upon for the issuance of the order of inquiry; and the supporting evidence that the subject bank deposit
are in any way related to or involved in an unlawful activity.

If the CA finds no substantial merit in the petition, it shall dismiss the petition outright stating the specific reasons for
such denial. If found meritorious and there is a subsequent petition for freeze order, the proceedings shall be governed
by the existing Rules on Petitions for Freeze Order in the CA. From the issuance of a freeze order, the party aggrieved by
the ruling of the court may appeal to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court raising all pertinent questions of law and issues, including the propriety of the issuance of a bank inquiry order. The
appeal shall not stay the enforcement of the subject decision or final order unless the Supreme Court directs otherwise.
The CA is directed to draft rules based on the foregoing discussions to complement the existing A.M. No. 05 -11-04-SC
Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, Asset Preservation, and Freezing of Monetary Instrument, Property, or
Proceeds Representing, Involving, or Relating to an Unlawful Activity or Money Laundering Offense under Republic Act
No. 9160, as Amended for submission to the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court and eventual approval and
promulgation of the Court en banc.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, is
declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.
D. APPLICABILITY OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

G.R. No. 204894 March 10, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
NOEL ENOJAS y HINGPIT, ARNOLD GOMEZ y FABREGAS, FERNANDO SANTOS y DELANTAR, and ROGER JALANDONI y
ARI, Appellants.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

On September 4, 2006 the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas charged appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit (Enojas), Arnold Gomez
y Fabregas (Gomez), Fernando Santos y Delantar (Santos), and Roger Jalandoni y Ari (Jalandoni) with murder before the
Las Pifias Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case 06-0854.1

PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. (P02 Gregorio) testified that at around 10:30 in the evening of August 29, 2006, he and P02
Francisco Pangilinan (PO2 Pangilinan) were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall when they
spotted a taxi that was suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop near the intersection of BF Almanza
and Alabang-Zapote Roads. The officers approached the taxi and asked the driver, later identified as accused Enojas, for
his documents. The latter complied but, having entertained doubts regarding the veracity of documents shown them,
they asked him to come with them to the police station in their mobile car for further questioning. 2
Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers and left his taxi behind. On reaching the 7-11 convenience store
on the Zapote-Alabang Road, however, they stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there. As he
approached the store’s door, however, he came upon two suspected robbers and shot it out with them. PO2 Pangilinan
shot one suspect dead and hit the other who still managed to escape. But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his
death.

On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around and fired at an armed man whom he saw running towards Pilar Village.
He saw another man, who came from the Jollibbee outlet, run towards Alabang-Zapote Road while firing his gun at PO2
Gregorio. The latter returned fire but the men were able to take a taxi and escape. PO2 Gregorio radioed for help and for
an ambulance. On returning to his mobile car, he realized that accused Enojas, the taxi driver they had with them had
fled.

P/Insp. Ferjen Torred (Torred), the Chief of Investigation Division of the Las Piñas Police, testified that he and PO2 Teoson
Rosarito (PO2 Rosarito) immediately responded to PO2 Gregorio’s urgent call. Suspecting that accused Enojas, the taxi
driver who fled, was involved in the attempted robbery, they searched the abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone
that Enojas apparently left behind. P/Ins. Torred instructed PO3 Joel Cambi (PO3 Cambi) to monitor its incoming
messages.3

The police later ascertained that the suspect whom PO2 Pangilinan had killed was someone named Reynaldo Mendoza
who was armed with a .38 caliber revolver. The police found spent 9 mm and M-16 rifle shells at the crime scene.
Follow-up operations at nearby provinces resulted in finding the dead body of one of the suspects, Alex Angeles, at the
Metro South Medical Center along Molino, Bacoor, Cavite.4

PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored the messages in accused Enojas’ mobile phone and, posing
as Enojas, communicated with the other accused. The police then conducted an entrapment operation that resulted in
the arrest of accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently, the police were also able to capture accused Enojas and
Gomez. The prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile phone text messages between Enojas and some of his
co-accused.5

The victim’s father, Ricardo Pangilinan, testified that his son was at the time of his death 28 years old, unmarried, and was
receiving police pay of ₱8,000.00 to ₱10,000.00 per month. Ricardo spent ₱99,999 for burial expense, ₱16,000.00 for
the interment services, and ₱50,000.00 for purchase of the cemetery lot. 6

Manifesting in open court that they did not want to adduce any evidence or testify in the case, 7 the accused opted to
instead file a trial memorandum on March 10, 2008 for their defense. They pointed out that they were entitled to an
acquittal since they were all illegally arrested and since the evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not having
been properly identified.

On June 2, 2008 the RTC rendered judgment, 8 finding all the accused guilty of murder qualified by evident premeditation
and use of armed men with the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms. It thus sentenced them
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without the possibility of parole and to indemnify the heirs of PO2 Pangilinan
with ₱165,999.00 as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱
2,080,000.00 as compensation for loss of earning capacity.
Upon review in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 03377, on June 14, 2012 the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the appeal and affirmed in
toto the conviction of the accused. 9 The CA, however, found the absence of evident premeditation since the prosecution
failed to prove that the several accused planned the crime before committing it. The accused appealed from the CA to
this Court.10

The defense points out that the prosecution failed to present direct evidence that the accused Enojas, Gomez, Santos, or
Jalandoni took part in shooting PO2 Pangilinan dead. 11 This may be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by
circumstantial evidence that meets the evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.12

Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis for the conviction of
all the accused. Thus:

1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojas as the driver of the taxicab suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila
Auto Glass shop. The officers were bringing him with them to the police station because of the questionable documents
he showed upon query. Subsequent inspection of the taxicab yielded Enojas’ mobile phone that contained messages
which led to the entrapment and capture of the other accused who were also taxicab drivers.

2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than remain in the cab to go to the police station where he was about to be
taken for questioning, tending to show that he had something to hide. He certainly did not go to the police afterwards to
clear up the matter and claim his taxi.

3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez as one of the men he saw running away from the scene of the
shooting.

4. The text messages identified "Kua Justin" as one of those who engaged PO2 Pangilinan in the shootout; the messages
also referred to "Kua Justin" as the one who was hit in such shootout and later died in a hospital in Bacoor, Cavite. These
messages linked the other accused.

5. During the follow-up operations, the police investigators succeeded in entrapping accused Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas,
and Gomez, who were all named in the text messages.

6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi driven by Enojas clearly made references to the 7-11
shootout and to the wounding of "Kua Justin," one of the gunmen, and his subsequent death.

7. The context of the messages showed that the accused were members of an organized group of taxicab drivers
engaged in illegal activities.

8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in possession of mobile phones with call numbers that corresponded
to the senders of the messages received on the mobile phone that accused Enojas left in his taxicab. 13
The Court must, however, disagree with the CA’s ruling that the aggravating circumstances of a) aid of armed men and b)
use of unlicensed firearms qualified the killing of PO2 Pangilinan to murder. In "aid of armed men," the men act as
accomplices only. They must not be acting in the commission of the crime under the same purpose as the principal
accused, otherwise they are to be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. The use of unlicensed firearm, on the
other hand, is a special aggravating circumstance that is not among the circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code as qualifying a homicide to murder. 14 Consequently, the accused in this case may be held liable only
for homicide, aggravated by the use of unlicensed firearms, a circumstance alleged in the information.

As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s earlier Resolution
applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. 15 Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a
person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. 16 Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused
Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those
messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages
and was competent to testify on them.

The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest.1âwphi1 But, assuming that this was so, it
cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but for rejecting any evidence that may have been taken
from them after an unauthorized search as an incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue here. At any rate,
a crime had been committed—the killing of PO2 Pangilinan—and the investigating police officers had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest had committed it. 17 The text messages to and from the
mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong leads on the participation and identities of the
accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an entrapment using this knowledge.

The award of damages by the courts below has to be modified to conform to current jurisprudence. 18

WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the Court of Appeals Decision of June 14, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC 03377. The Court
instead FINDS accused-appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit, Arnold Gomez y Fabregas, Fernando Santos y Delantar, and
Roger Jalandoni y Ari GUILTY of the lesser crime of HOMICIDE with the special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearms. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court SENTENCES each of them to 12 years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The Court also MODIFIES the award of exemplary
damages by increasing it to ₱30,000.00, with an additional ₱50,000.00 for civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when a former boyfriend sent to the
girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it.

The Indictment

The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler,
Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an
information that reads:
That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora, Province of Aurora, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless
conduct, sent through the Short Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish
Sagud, who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached to a completely naked body of another
woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture
thereby causing substantial emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud.1

The Facts and the Case

The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at
Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end
of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten
pregnant, Irish broke up with him.

Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that he
did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to
the other woman and their child. Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it
and sent her text messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301 and
0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone.

In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked
woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure (Exhibit A).2 The sender’s cellphone number,
stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the
picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B). 3

After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to
create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet. One of
the messages he sent to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand, read: " Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac
rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter."4

Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under police supervision, Irish
contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked
Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. Af ter
parking it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and
seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being questioned at the police station,
he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"

Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as an expert in information
technology and computer graphics. He said that it was very much possible for one to lift the face of a woman from a
picture and superimpose it on the body of another woman in another picture. Pictures can be manipulated and
enhanced by computer to make it appear that the face and the body belonged to just one person.
Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two distinct irregularities: the face was not proportionate to
the body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was fake and the face on it had been copied from
the picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales explained how this could be done, transferring a picture from a
computer to a cellphone like the Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.

For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began visiting her in Tarlac in October 2003 and their relation
lasted until December of that year. He claimed that after their relation ended, Irish wanted reconciliation. They met in
December 2004 but, after he told her that his girlfriend at that time (later his wife) was already pregnant, Irish walked out
on him.

Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet her at Lorentess Resort as she needed his help
in selling her cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two police officers approached him, seized his cellphone and the
contents of his pockets, and brought him to the police station.

Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to help her identify a prankster who was
sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender’s number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person.
Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone.
This explained, he said, why the obscene messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan
claims that it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture (Exhibit A) to him. He presented six pictures of a woman
whom he identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7). 5

Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent the six pictures. Michelle claims that she
received the pictures and hid the memory card (Exhibit 8) that contained them because she was jealous and angry. She
did not want to see anything of Irish. But, while the woman in the pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear
naked as in Exhibit A. Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not be seen. Irish denied that she was
the woman in those four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7, the woman in the picture was fully dressed.

After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an honest and spontaneous manner. The RTC
observed that she wept while recounting her experience, prompting the court to comment: "Her tears were tangible
expression of pain and anguish for the acts of violence she suffered in the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of
the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity borne out of human nature
and experience."6 Thus, in its Decision dated August 1, 2001, the RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h)
of R.A. 9262.

On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), 7 the latter rendered a decision dated January 31, 2008, 8 affirming the
RTC decision. The CA denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed
the present for review on certiorari.

The Issues Presented

The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture with her face
pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation of
Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
The subordinate issues are:

1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in R.A. 9262;

2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this case, already c onstitutes a
violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262;

3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in violation of his constitutional rights; and

4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case.

The Court’s Rulings

Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of a person against a woman with
whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship,
or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family
abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.

xxxx

Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these include any form of harassment that
causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to a woman. Thus:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. – The crime of violence against women and their children is
committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial
emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

xxxx

5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against women through
harassment are:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.

One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that accused Rustan had a "dating relationship"
with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a "dating relationship" includes a situation where the parties are romantically
involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. Thus:

(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship . A casual
acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship.
(Underscoring supplied.)

Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender and the offended woman have or had
sexual relations. According to him, "romance" implies a sexual act. He cites Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary
Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal meaning to the word "romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to
make love; to make love to" as in "He romanced her."

But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. It did
not say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended woman. Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a
couple’s relationship, i.e., "a love affair."9

R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x x x refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the law itself
distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines "dating relationship"
while Section 3(f) defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the
bearing of a common child." The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual
intercourse taking place between those involved.

Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of the "on-and-off" variety (away-bati), their
romance cannot be regarded as having developed "over time and on a continuing basis." But the tw o of them were
romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits, from October to December of 2003. That would be time enough for
nurturing a relationship of mutual trust and love.

An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean
that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding.
Explaining what "away-bati" meant, Irish explained that at times, when she could not reply to Rustan’s messages, he
would get angry at her. That was all. Indeed, she characterized their three-month romantic relation as continuous. 10

Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be considered a form of harassment. He
claims that such would unduly ruin him personally and set a very dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262
punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment,
which translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only
violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.

Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that her getting one could not
possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or psychological distress. He claims having
previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such that she was already desensitized by them.

But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their testimonies was not impressed with their claim
that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-7). It is doubtful if the woman in the picture was Irish
since her face did not clearly show on them.

Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish sent, except Exhibits 2 to 7. But her
testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not know that Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she deleted
the pictures. Later, however, she said that she did not have time to delete them. 11 And, if she thought that she had
deleted all the pictures from the memory card, then she had no reason at all to keep and hide such memory card. There
would have been nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures remained in the card, there was no reason for
her to keep it for several years, given that as she said she was too jealous to want to see anything connected to Irish.
Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving credence to her testimony.1avvphi1

Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustan’s low regard for the alleged
moral sensibilities of today’s youth. What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be
determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and
bearing Irish’s head and face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any
woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a
picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in th e
internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.

Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him without any warrant, the
evidence presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. But the fact is that the prosecution did not present in
evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the police officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The
prosecution did not need such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the
Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial conference.

Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irish’s testimony that she received the obscene picture
and malicious text messages that the sender’s cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan with whom she had been
previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used
such numbers to summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he did. 12 Consequently, the prosecution did not have to
present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those messages.

Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish.13 His defense was that he himself received
those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing Irish and he merely forwarded the same to her, using his
cellphone. But Rustan never presented the cellphone number of the unidentified person who sent the messages to him
to authenticate the same. The RTC did not give credence to such version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was most
unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the sender.

Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document.
Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time bef ore
this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the
time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection. 14

Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to
civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings. 15

In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567
dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25, 2008.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 172532 172544-45 November 20, 2013

PRIMO C. MIRO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, Petitioner,
vs.
MARILYN MENDOZA VDA. DE EREDEROS, CATALINA ALINGASA and PORFERIO I. MENDOZA,Respondents.

DECISION
BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the decision2 dated November 22 2005 and the
resolution3dated April 21 2006 of the Court of Appeals CA) in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 83149 83150 and 83576.

The CA decision reversed and set aside the joint decision 4 dated January 9 2004 of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas (Deputy Ombudsman), Primo C. Miro in OMB-V-A-02-0414-H finding respondents Marilyn Mendoza Vda. de
Erederos Catalina Alingasa and Porferio I Mendoza guilty of the administrative charge of Grave Misconduct. The Deputy
Ombudsman also found Oscar Peque guilty of Simple Misconduct.

The Factual Antecedents

As culled from the records, the antecedents of the present case are as follows:

Mendoza, Director of the Regional Office VII of the Land Transportation Office, Cebu City (LTO Cebu), Erederos,
Mendoza's niece and secretary, Alingasa, LTO clerk, and Peque, Officer-in-Charge, Operation Division of LTO Cebu, were
administratively charged with Grave Misconduct before the Deputy Ombudsman by private complainants, namely:
Maricar G Huete (Liaison Officer of GCY Parts), Ernesto R Cantillas (Liaison Officer of Isuzu Cebu, Inc.), Leonardo Villaraso
(General Manager of TBS Trading), and Romeo C. Climaco (Corporate Secretary of Penta Star). 5 They were likewise
charged with criminal complaints for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act."

The administrative and criminal charges arose from the alleged anomalies in the distribution at the LTO Cebu of
confirmation certificates, an indispensable requirement in the processing of documents for the registration of motor
vehicle with the LTO.

Specifically, the private complainants accused Alingasa of selling the confirmation certificates, supposed to be issued by
the LTO free of charge. This scheme allegedly existed upon Mendoza's assumption in office as Regional Director of LTO
Cebu. They observed that:

(1) Confirmation certificates were sold for the amount of ₱2,500.00 per pad without official receipt;

(2) Alingasa would usually remit the collections to Erederos who would, in turn, remit all the collections to Mendoza; 6

(3) The official receipt for the processing of the confirmation certificates issued to the private complainants
acknowledged only the amount of ₱ 40.00 which they paid for each engine, chassis or new vehicle, as MR.
(Miscellaneous Receipt-LTO Form 67);

(4) Said amount was separate and distinct from the ₱2,500.00 required to be paid for each pad;

(5) The official receipt also served as the basis for the individual stock/sales reports evaluation of Erederos; 7and

(6) The confirmation certificates processed during the previous administration were no longer honored; thus, the private
complainants were constrained to reprocess the same by purchasing new ones.
The NBI/Progress report submitted to the LTO Manila also revealed that the confirmation certificates were given to the
representatives of car dealers, who were authorized to supply the needed data therein. In the Requisition and Issue
Voucher, it was Roque who received the forms. On August 19, 2002, Cantillas executed an Affidavit of Desi stance on the
ground that he was no longer interested in prosecuting the case.

On September 25, 2002, the Deputy Ombudsman ordered the respondents to file their respective counter-affidavits. The
respondents complied with the order and made the required submission.

On December 12, 2002, the case was called for preliminary conference. At the conference, the respondents, thru their
counsels, manifested their intention to submit the case for decision on the basis of the evidence on record after the
submission of their memoranda/position papers.

In the interim, additional administrative and criminal complaints for the same charges were filed by Rova Carmelotes
(Liaison Officer of ZC Trading Center), Mildred Regidor (Liaison Officer of Grand Ace Commercial), Estrella dela Cerna
(Liaison Officer of JRK Automotive Supply), and Vevencia Pedroza (Liaison Officer of Winstar Motor Sales) against the
respondents. These new complaints were consolidated with the complaints already then pending.

In their complaints, the new complainants commonly alleged that they had to pay ₱2,500.00 per pad to Alingasa before
they could be issued confirmation certificates by the LTO Cebu. Alingasa would give her collections to Erederos and to
Mendoza. When they protested, Erederos and Alingasa pointed to Mendoza as the source of the instructions. They were
also told that the confirmation certificates processed during the previous administration would no longer be honored
under Mendoza s administration; hence, they had to buy new sets of confirmation certificates to process the registration
of their motor vehicles with the LTO.

In his counter-affidavit, Mendoza vehemently denied the accusations. He alleged that the confirmation certificates actual
distribution and processing were assigned to Alingasa; the processing entails the payment of ₱40.00 per confirmation
certificate, as administrative fee; payment is only made when the confirmation certificates are filled up and submitted for
processing with the LTO, not upon issuance; and he did not give any instructions to impose additional fees for their
distribution.

He also alleged that the case against him was instigated by Assistant Secretary Roberto T. Lastimosa of the LTO Head
Office so that a certain Atty. Manuel I way could replace him as Regional Director of the L TO Cebu. 8

Mendoza additionally submitted the affidavits of desistance of Carmelotes and Dela Cerna. Carmelotes testified that she
has no evidence to support her allegations against Mendoza. Dela Cerna, on the other hand, stated that she was merely
told to sign a document which turned out to be an affidavit-complaint against the respondents. Subsequently, however,
Dela Cerna executed a second affidavit, retracting her previous statements and narrating how she was threatened by
Peque to sign an affidavit of desistance (1st affidavit).

Erederos and Alingasa commonly contended that they did not collect, demand and receive any money from the
complainants as payment for the confirmation certificates.
Erederos stated that the case against her was initiated by Huete because she found several discrepancies in the
documents she had processed. According to her, the present case was Huete s ploy to avoid any liability.

For their part, Alingasa stressed that her act of maintaining a control book for the releases of the confirmation certificate
pads negates her liability, while Peque denied any participation in the distribution and sale of the confirmation
certificates.

On January 9, 2004, the Deputy Ombudsman rendered a joint decision on the administrative aspect of the cases filed
against the respondents, and a joint resolution on the criminal aspect of the cases.

The Deputy Ombudsman s Ruling

In its joint decision, the Deputy Ombudsman found Mendoza, Erederos and Alingasa guilty of grave misconduct and
imposed the penalty of dismissal from the service. Peque, on the other hand, was only found guilty of simple misconduct
and was meted the penalty of reprimand.

The Deputy Ombudsman believed the complainants allegations that Alingasa collected ₱2,500.00 for the issuance of
confirmation certificates and, thereafter, remitted the collections to Erederos and to Mendoza. He relied largely on the
affidavits supporting the respondents guilt. He found the affidavits and the NBI/Progress report strong enough to
establish the respondents guilt. The Deputy Ombudsman also explained that while the distribution of confirmation
certificates to authorized car dealers is not prohibited, the demand and the collection of payment during their
distribution are anomalous.

The respondents separately moved for reconsideration, but the Deputy Ombudsman denied their motions on March 5,
2004.9

The respondents separately appealed to the CA to challenge the rulings against them.

The CA’s Ruling

On November 22, 2005, the CA granted the respondents petition and reversed the Deputy Ombudsman s joint decision
in the administrative aspect. The CA ruled that the Deputy Ombudsman s finding of grave misconduct was not
supported by substantial evidence because the affidavits, on which the decision was mainly anchored, were not
corroborated by any other documentary evidence. Additionally, the affiants did not appear during the scheduled
hearings. The CA also found that the affiants failed to categorically specify that the respondents personally demanded
from them the payment of ₱2,500.00 -an allegation that the appellate court deemed material in establishing their
personal knowledge. Without this allegation of personal knowledge, the CA held that the statements in the affidavits
were hearsay and, thus, should not be given any evidentiary weight. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED and accordingly the assailed
Joint Decision dated January 9, 2004 (administrative aspect of the cases filed by the private respondents) is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.

Consequently, the administrative charges against petitioners are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
With respect to the assailed Joint Resolution also dated January 9, 2004 (criminal aspect) issued by the public respondent,
this Court has no jurisdiction to review the same.10

The Deputy Ombudsman moved for the reconsideration of the decision, but the CA denied the motion in its resolution
of April 21, 2006. The denial led to the filing of the present petition.

The Petitioner’s Arguments

The Deputy Ombudsman posits that the evidence adduced by the complainants satisfied the requisite quantum of proof.
He argues that the complainants personal knowledge can be gleaned from the preface of their narration; hence, their
affidavits could not have been hearsay. Their affidavits read:

3. That in doing my job, I have noticed and witnessed the following anomalies concerning the processing of vehicle
registration, x x x, as follows:

a. That in order to secure the forms of Confirmation of Certificates, you have to buy the same at the present price of ₱
2,500.00 per pad from Catalina Alingasa, an L TO personnel, who will remit her collections to a certain Marilyn Mendoza
Vda. de Erederos, a niece and the Secretary of the Regional Director, Porferio Mendoza;

b. That Confirmation Certificates processed during previous administration would not be honored and under such
situations, they would require that the same be reprocessed which means that we have to buy and use the new forms
supplied by the present administration. 11

The Deputy Ombudsman also argues that his joint decision was not solely based on the complainants affidavits since he
also took into account the NBI/Progress report, which uncovered the alleged anomalies. He posits that these pieces of
evidence, taken together, more than satisfy the required quantum of proof to hold the respondents a dministratively
liable for grave misconduct.

The Case for the Respondents

In their respective comments, the respondents separately argue that the complainants statements in their affidavits lack
material details and particulars, particularly on the time, the date, and the specific transactions.

They commonly alleged that the affidavits, which contained general averments, and the NBI/Progress report that was
based on the same affidavits, failed to meet the quantum of proof required to hold them administratively liable.

For his part, Mendoza argues that since the affidavits failed to categorically state that the complainants personally
witnessed the transfer of money from Alingasa to Erederos and eventually to him, his participation in the anomalous
scheme has not been sufficiently shown; hence, he should not have been found liable.

The Issue

The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing the administrative charge
against the respondents.
The Court's Ruling

We deny the petition. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the findings and conclusions of the Deputy
Ombudsman on the ground that they were not supported by substantial evidence.

Doctrine of conclusiveness of administrative findings of fact is not absolute

It is well settled that findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial
evidence.12 Their factual findings are generally accorded with great weight and respect, if not finality by the courts, by
reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction.

This rule was reiterated in Cabalit v. Commission on Audit-Region VII,13 where we held that: When the findings of fact of
the Ombudsman are supported by substantial evidence, it should be considered as conclusive. This Court recognizes the
expertise and independence of the Ombudsman and will avoid interfering with its findings absent a finding of grave
abuse of discretion. Hence, being supported by substantial evidence, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of
the Ombudsman which are affirmed by the CA.

This rule on conclusiveness of factual findings, however, is not an absolute one. Despite the respect given to
administrative findings of fact, the CA may resolve factual issues, review and re-evaluate the evidence on record and
reverse the administrative agency s findings if not supported by substantial evidence. Thus, when the findings of fact by
the administrative or quasi-judicial agencies (like the Office of the Ombudsman/Deputy Ombudsman) are not
adequately supported by substantial evidence, they shall not be binding upon the courts. 14

In the present case, the CA found no substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the respondents are guilty of
the administrative charges against them. Mere allegation and speculation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to
proof.15 Since the Deputy Ombudsman’s findings were found wanting by the CA of substantial evidence, the same shall
not bind this Court.

Parameters of a judicial review under a Rule 45 petition

a. Rule 45 petition is limited to questions of law

Before proceeding to the merits of the case, this Court deems it necessary to emphasize that a petition for review under
Rule 45 is limited only to questions of law. Factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. This
Court will not review facts, as it is not our function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence already considered in the
proceedings below. As held in Diokno v. Hon. Cacdac, 16 a re-examination of factual findings is outside the province of a
petition for review on certiorari to wit:

It is aphoristic that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done through a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because as earlier stated, this Court is not a trier of facts. xxx The Supreme Court is not
duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. This is already outside the
province of the instant Petition for Certiorari.
There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; a question of
fact, on the other hand, exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged
facts.17 Unless the case falls under any of the recognized exceptions, we are limited solely to the review of legal
questions.18

b. Rule 45 petition is limited to errors of the appellate court

Furthermore, the "errors" which we may review in a petition for review on certiorari are those of the CA, and not directly
those of the trial court or the quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, or officer which rendered the decision in the first
instance.19 It is imperative that we refrain from conducting further scrutiny of the findings of fact made by trial courts, lest
we convert this Court into a trier of facts. As held in Reman Recio v. Heirs of the Spouses Agueda and Maria Altamirano
etc. et al.20 our review is limited only to the errors of law committed by the appellate court, to wit:

Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, jurisdiction is generally limited to the review of errors of law committed by the
appellate court. The Supreme Court is not obliged to review all over again the evidence which the parties adduced in the
court a quo. Of course, the general rule admits of exceptions, such as where the factual findings of the CA and the trial
court are conflicting or contradictory.

In Montemayor v. Bundalian,21 this Court laid down the guidelines for the judicial review of decisions rendered by
administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers, as follows:

First, the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. Second, in
reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government, the findings of facts made therein are to
be respected so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the
conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the
administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence.

Third, administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse
of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the power of the reviewing court to re-examine the
sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to
receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned. [emphases ours]

The present petition directly raises, as issue, the propriety of the CA s reversal of the Deputy Ombudsman s decision that
found the respondents guilty of grave misconduct. While this issue may be one of law, its resolution also requires us to
resolve the underlying issue of whether or not substantial evidence exists to hold the respondents liable for the charge of
grave misconduct. The latter question is one of fact, but a review is warranted considering the conflicting findings of fact
of the Deputy Ombudsman and of the CA. Accordingly, we now focus on and assess the findings of fact of the Deputy
Ombudsman and of the CA for their merits.

The Deputy Ombudsman’s appreciation of evidence

The Deputy Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of grave misconduct based on the affidavits submitted by the
complainants and the NBI/Progress report. In giving credence to the affidavits, the Deputy Ombudsman ruled that the
complainants have amply established their accusations by substantial evidence.

The CA’s appreciation of evidence

The CA, on the other hand, reversed the Deputy Ombudsman s findings and ruled that no substantial evidence exists to
support the latter’s decision as the affidavits upon which said decision was based are hearsay evidence. It found that the
affidavits lack the important element of personal knowledge and were not supported by corroborating evidence.

We agree with the CA. The findings of fact of the Deputy Ombudsman are not supported by substantial evidence on
record.

Substantial evidence, quantum of proof in administrative cases

Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere scintilla of evidence.22 The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied
when there is reasonable ground to believe, based on the evidence submitted, that the respondent is responsible for the
misconduct complained of. It need not be overwhelming or preponderant, as is required in an ordinary civil case, 23 or
evidence beyond reasonable doubt, as is required in criminal cases, but the evidence must be enough for a reasonable
mind to support a conclusion.

Section 27 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989 24 provides that:

Findings of fact by the Officer of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order,
directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's
salary shall be final and unappealable. [emphasis ours]

The only pieces of evidence presented by the complainants to establish the respondents' guilt of the act charged are: (1)
their complaint-affidavits and the (2) NBl/Progress report. As correctly found by the CA, these pieces of evidence do not
meet the quantum of proof required in administrative cases.

The Evidence Against Mendoza, Erederos and Alingasa

i. Private complainants affidavits

The affidavits show that the complainants lack personal knowledge of the participation of Mendoza and Erederos in the
allegedly anomalous act. These affidavits indicate that the complainants have commonly noticed and witnessed the
anomalous sale transaction concerning the confirmation certificates. Without going into details, they uniformly allege
that to secure the confirmation certificates, an amount of ₱2,500.00 would be paid to Alingasa, an L TO personnel, "who
will remit her collections to a certain Marilyn Mendoza vda. Erederos, a niece and the Secretary of the Regional Director,
Porferio Mendoza."25 While the payment to Alingasa might be considered based on personal knowledge, the alleged
remittance to Erederos and Mendoza -on its face - is hearsay.
Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of
he witness

It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that he knows of his own Rersonal knowledge, i.e.
those which are derived from his own perception. 26 A witness may not testify on what he merely learned, read or heard
from others because such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has
learned, read or heard.27 Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the witness knows himself but, of what he has heard
from others; it is not only limited to oral testimony or statements but likewise applies to written statements, such as
affidavits.28

The records show that not one of the complainants actually witnessed the transfer of money from Alingasa to Erederos
and Mendoza. Nowhere in their affidavits did they specifically allege that they saw Alingasa remit the collections to
Erederos. In fact, there is no specific allegation that they saw or witnessed Erederos or Mendoza receive money. That the
complainants alleged in the preface of their affidavits that they "noticed and witnessed" the anomalous act complained
of does not take their statements out of the coverage of the hearsay evidence rule. Their testimonies are still "evidence
not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others." 29 Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor
does not constitute substantial evidence. 30

The affidavits also show that the complainants did not allege any specific act of the respondents. All that the affidavits
allege is a description of the allegedly anomalous scheme and the arrangement whereby payments were to be made to
Alingasa. There is no averment relating to any "personal demand" for the amount of ₱2,500.00.

Based on these considerations, we cannot conclude that the complainants have personal knowledge of Erederos' and
Mendoza's participation in the anomalous act. At most, their personal knowledge only extends to the acts of Alingasa
who is the recipient of all payments for the processing of confirmation certificates. This situation, however, is affected by
the complainants' failure to specify Alingasa's act of personally demanding ₱2,500.00 -a crucial element in determining
her guilt or innocence of the grave misconduct charged.

With respect to Pedroza's allegation in her affidavit 31 that Alingasa and Erederos categorically told them that it was
Mendoza who instructed them to collect the ₱2,500.00 for the confirmation certificates, we once again draw a
distinction between utterances or testimonies that are merely hearsay in character or "non-hearsay," and those that are
considered as legal hearsay.

Non-hearsay v. legal hearsay, distinction

To the former belongs the fact that utterances or statements were made; this class of extrajudicial utterances or
statements is offered not s an assertion to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but only as to the fact of the utterance
made. The latter class, on the other hand, consists of the truth of the facts asserted in the statement; this kind pertains t o
extrajudicial utterances and statements that are offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted.

The difference between these two classes of utterances lies in the applicability of the rule on exclusion of hearsay
evidence. The first class, i.e. the fact that the statement was made, is not covered by the hearsay ru le, while the second
class, i.e. the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is covered by the hearsay rule. Pedroza's allegation belongs to
the first class; hence, it is inadmissible to prove the truth of the facts asserted in the statement. The fol lowing discussion,
made m Patula v. People of the Philippines 32 is particularly instructive:

Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact
asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received s
evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial
utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter
asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard
the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was
really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but
is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay
rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies. [citations
omitted]

Failure to identify the affidavits renders them inadmissible under the hearsay evidence rule

We additionally note that the affidavits were never identified by the complainants. All the allegations contained therein
were likewise uncorroborated by evidence, other than the NBI/Progress report.

In Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, 33 we had the occasion to rule on the implications of the affiants' failure to
appear during the preliminary investigation and to identify their respective sworn statements, to wit:

Notably, the instant administrative complaint was resolved by the Ombudsman merely on the basis of the evidence
extant in the record of OMB-ADM-0-94-0983. The preliminary conference required under Republic Act No. 6770 was
dispensed with after the nominal complainant, then BID Resident Ombudsman Ronaldo P. Ledesma, manifested on July
29, 1996 that he was submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the documents on record while the petitioner
agreed to simply file his memorandum. Consequently, the only basis for the questioned resolution of the Ombudsman
dismissing the petitioner from the government service was the unverified complaint-affidavit of Walter H. Beck and that
of his alleged witness, Purisima Terencio.

A thorough review of the records, however, showed that the subject affidavits of Beck and Terencio were not even
identified by the respective affiants during the fact-finding investigation conducted by the BID Resident Ombudsman at
the BID office in Manila. Neither did they appear during the preliminary investigation to identify their respective sworn
statements despite prior notice before the investigating officer who subsequently dismissed the criminal aspect of the
case upon finding that the charge against the petitioner "was not supported by any evidence." Hence, Beck's affidavit is
hearsay and inadmissible in evidence. On this basis alone, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the O ffice of the
Ombudsman should have dismissed the administrative complaint against the petitioner in the first instance. (emphasis
supplied)

For the affiants' failure to identify their sworn statements, and considering the seriousness of the charges filed, their
affidavits must not be accepted at face value and should be treated as inadmissible under the hearsay evidence rule.

ii. NBI/Progress report

With regard to the NBI/Progress report submitted by the complainants as corroborating evidence, the same shou ld not
be given any weight. Contrary to the Ombudsman's assertions, the report cannot help its case under the circumstances
of this case as it is insufficient to serve as substantial basis. The pertinent portion of this report reads:

04. P/Sinsp. JESUS KABIGTING and Senior TRO ALFONSO ALIANZA visited JAGNA District Office at Jagna, Bohol wherein
they were able to conduct interview with MR. RODOLFO SANTOS, Officer-In-Charge who has assumed his new post only
in February 2002. During the conduct of the interview, Mr. SANTOS revealed that the anomalous Dos-por-Dos
transactions have been prevented and eliminated when the previous District Manager in the person of Mr. LEONARDO G.
OLAIVAR, who was transferred to Tagbilaran District Office allegedly on a floating status and under the direct control
and supervision of its District Manager, Mr. GA VINO PADEN, Mr. SANTOS allegations of the existence of "Dos-por-Dos"
transactions were supported by the records/documents gathered of which the signatures of Mr. OLAIVAR affixed thereof.
Copies are hereto attached marked as Annexes D-D-6.

xxxx

06. Submitted Affidavits of Ms. MARICAR G. HUETE, a resident of Lahug, Cebu City and liaison Officer of GCY Parts,
Kabancalan Mandaue City and Mr. ERNESTO R. CARTILLAS a resident of Basak, Mandaue City and liaison Officer of Isuzu
Cebu, Inc. in Jagobiao, Mandaue City stated among others and both attested that: Annexes "E-E-1."

In order to secure the forms of Confirmation of Certificates, you have to buy the same at the present cost of ₱2,500.00
per pad from CATALINA ALINGASA, an LTO Personnel, who will remit her collections to a certain MARILYN MENDOZA V
da De EREDEROS, a niece and secretary of the Regional Director, PORFERIO MENDOZA. 34

This quoted portion shows that it was based on complainant Huete's and Cantillas' affidavits. It constitutes double
hearsay because the material facts recited were not within the personal knowledge of the officer s who conducted the
investigation. As held in Africa, et al. v. Caltex Phil.) Inc., et al., 35 reports of investigations made by law enforcement
officers or other public officials are hearsay unless they fall within the scope of Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
to wit: The first question before Us refers to the admissibility of certain reports on the fire prepared by the Manila Police
and Fire Departments and by a certain Captain Tinio of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. xxx.

xxxx

There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer,
or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of
his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer
or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or
through official information. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1957] p. 383.)

Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be considered here. Obviously the material facts recited in the
reports as to the cause and circumstances of the fire were not within the personal knowledge of the officers who
conducted the investigation. Was knowledge of such facts, however, acquired by them through official information? xxx.
The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule; the facts stated therein were not acquired by
the reporting officers through official information, not having been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do
so. [emphases ours]

The NBI/Progress report, having been submitted by the officials in the performance of their duties not on the basis of
their own personal observation of the facts reported but merely on the basis of the complainants affidavits, is hearsay.
Thus, the Deputy Ombudsman cannot rely on it.

Non-applicability of strict technical rules of procedure in administrative or quasi-judicial bodies is not a license to
disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules

While administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, are not bound by the technical rules
of procedure, this rule cannot be taken as a license to disregard fundamental evidentiary rules; the decision of the
administrative agencies and the evidence it relies upon must, at the very least, be substantial. that:

In Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. Dumapis, 36 we ruled that:

While it is true that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical rules of
procedure in the adjudication of cases, this procedural rule should not be construed as a license to disregard certain
fundamental evidentiary rules. The evidence presented must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to have
probative value. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reason able mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Conclusion

With a portion of the complainants affidavits and the NBI/Progress report being hearsay evidence, the only question that
remains is whether the respondents conduct, based on the evidence on record, amounted to grave misconduct,
warranting their dismissal in office.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by a public officer. 37 The misconduct is considered as grave if it involves additional elements such as
corruption or willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proven by substantial
evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of
an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some b enefit for
himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. 38

Based on these rulings, the Deputy Ombudsman failed to establish the elements of grave misconduct.1âwphi1 To
reiterate, no substantial evidence exists to show that Erederos and Mendoza received collected payments from Alingasa
Their involvement or complicity in the allegedly anomalous scheme cannot be justified under the affidavits of the
complainants and the NBI/Progress report, which are both hearsay.
With respect to Alingasa, in view of the lack of substantial evidence showing that she personally demanded the payment
of ₱2,500.00 – a crucial factor in the wrongdoing alleged – we find that the elements of misconduct, simple or grave,
to be wanting and unproven.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby AFFIRM the assailed decision dated November 22, 2005 and the
resolution dated April 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 83149, 83150 and 83576.

SO ORDERED.

People vs Enojas

Ferrer vs Carganillo

Reyes vs COMELEC

E. CLASSIFICATION OF EVIDENCE

F. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

G. EXCLUSIONARY RULES

Tan v Hosana

[G.R. NO. 146234 : June 29, 2005]

TOLENTINO MENDOZA and SALOME MADAMBA, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review 1 to annul the Decision2 dated 11 December 2000 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
16756. The Sandiganbayan found petitioner Tolentino Mendoza ("Mendoza") and Salome Madamba ("Madamba") guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 ("RA 3019") and sentenced them to suffer
imprisonment for eight years. The Sandiganbayan also perpetually disqualified Mendoza and Madamba from holding
public office and ordered them to solidarily pay the Philippine government P295,597.79, with legal interest from 4 April
1989.

The Antecedent Facts

National Treasurer Rosalina S. Cajucom filed a complaint, docketed as OMB-0-89-01454, before the Ombudsman
charging Mendoza, Madamba, and Marcelina Agustin ("Agustin") with Technical Malversation and violation of RA 3019.
The Ombudsman found probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. Hence, in a Resolution 3 dated 5 February
1990, the Ombudsman ordered the filing of an Information in the Sandiganbayan against Mendoza, Madamba, Agustin,
Jose Cruz ("Cruz"), Anita Lising ("Lising"), and Horacio Alvarez ("Alvarez").

The Information, dated 25 April 1991, alleged:

That on or about the period comprised from 07 February 1989 to 17 February 1989 and/or for sometime thereafter, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused TOLENTINO MENDOZA, JOSE
CRUZ and ANITA LISING, all public officers, being then the National Cashier, COA Vault Auditor and Cashier IV,
respectively, all of the Bureau of Treasury, Palacio del Gobernador, Intramuros, Manila, taking advantage of their public
positions and while in the performance of their official duties as such, conspiring, confederating and conniving with
co-accused private persons SALOME MADAMBA, MARCELINA AGUSTIN and HORACIO ALVAREZ, General Manager,
Executive Care Services, Inc.; Bureau of Treasury Canteen Proprietor; and Proprietor, Triple Crown Services, Inc.,
respectively, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to the government by fraudulently
causing the encashment of four (4) commercial checks at the Cash Division, Bureau of Treasury, Manila, to wit:

RCBC Check No. 031840 dated 07 February 1989 issued by accused Horacio Alvarez in favor of Executive Care Services
with accused Salome Madamba as General Manager in the amount of P150,000.00, Philippine Currency.

RCBC Check No. 031845 dated 09 February 1989 issued by Horacio Alvarez in favor of Executive Ca[r]e Services with
Salome Madamba as General Manager in the amount of P140,000.00, Philippine Currency.

PNB Check Nos. A280215 and A280216 both dated 17 February 1989 issued by accused Salome Madamba in favor of
Triple Crown Services, Inc. owned and operated by accused Horacio Alvarez in the amount of P75,000.00 each,
Philippine Currency.

accused Tolentino Mendoza, knowing fully well that he had no authority, deliberately affixed his initials on the checks to
insure smooth encashments of the same by his subordinate co-accused Anita Lising who paid the amounts
corresponding thereto, and accused Jose Cruz, having the duty to determine [the] legality of enca shment at post-audit,
willfully, unlawfully affixed his initials thereon to insure non-discovery of the fraud after encashment, without obtaining
the signature of the Asst. National Treasurer, Milagros Baltazar, without which, no commercial check could be encashed
by the Cash Division, Bureau of Treasury, in willful violation of the requirements for encashment of commercial checks
imposed by the Bureau of Treasury, which fraudulent acts committed by accused public officers, gave unwarranted
advantage and benefits to their co-accused private persons thru manifest partiality and evident bad faith as the aforesaid
checks were dishonored by the drawee banks for lack of sufficient funds, to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the total amount of P440,000.00, Philippine Currency.4 (Emphasis in the original)
The Sandiganbayan issued warrants of arrest against Mendoza, Madamba, Cruz, Lising, Agustin, and Alvarez. All of them,
except Cruz who has remained at large, surrendered before the Sandiganbayan and posted bail.

Mendoza, Agustin, and Lising filed separate motions for reinvestigation, which the Sandiganbayan denied. However, the
Sandiganbayan granted Alvarez's motion for reinvestigation, and, after reinvestigation, dropped his name from the
Information.

Mendoza, Madamba, Agustin, and Lising entered pleas of "Not Guilty" during their arraignment on 13 September 1991.

Mendoza and Lising filed separate motions to quash the Information. The Sandiganbayan denied their motions in the
Resolution of 4 February 1992.

Trial commenced and the case was submitted for decision on 28 August 1999. The Sandiganbayan established the
following facts:

In February 1989, accused Tolentino Mendoza was the National Cashier and Anita Lising was a paying teller occupying
the position of Cashier IV at the Bureau of Treasury in Manila. Accused Jose Cruz, who has remained at large, was the
COA Vault Auditor assigned at the said Bureau. Accused Salome Madamba was the General Manager of the Executive
Care Services, Inc., a private corporation rendering janitorial services to the Bureau of Treasury; while accused Marcelina
Agustin was a canteen operator at the same bureau.

On February 7, 1989, Horacio Alvarez of Triple Crown Services, Inc., a company engaged in the same business of
providing janitorial services, issued in favor of Executive Care Services RCBC Check No. [031840] (Exhibit D) in the amount
of P150,000.00. On the same date, Madamba and Agustin signed at the dorsal portion of said check as indorsers, Agustin
being the last indorser. Madamba and Agustin brought the check to the office of Mendoza and after obtaining
Mendoza's approval, Agustin presented the check to the paying teller, Anita Lising, for encashment. Lising paid the
amount of P150,000.00 to Agustin who received it. The following day, the check went through the usual clearing
procedure and was returned unpaid on February 9, 1989 for the reason that it was drawn against insufficient f unds. Upon
Mendoza's instructions, the Clearing Officer of the National Treasury, Maria Lourdes Remo, redeposited the check on
February 10, 1989 but it was again returned unpaid on February 13, 1989, this time for the reason "Account Closed."

Meanwhile, on February 9, 1989, Horacio Alvarez of Triple Crown Services again issued another check, RCBC Check No.
[031845] (Exhibit E) for P140,000.00 payable to Executive Care Services. Like the first check, it was signed at the dorsal
portion by Madamba and Agustin, the latter being the last indorser, approved for encashment by Mendoza, paid by
Lising on the same date and dishonored on February 13, 1989 for being drawn against insufficient funds, redeposited on
February 16, 1989, and again dishonored on February 17, 1989 for the reason, "Account Closed."

On February 17, 1989, Executive Care Services issued a check for P150,000.00 in favor of Triple Crown Services. Madamba
instructed her Liaison Officer at the treasury, Raulito Sanchez, to deliver the check to Triple Crown Services in partial
payment of the emergency loan extended by Triple Crown Services to Executive Care Services. When Agustin saw the
check, she asked that it be given to her because she needed money very badly as her nephew was getting married. After
clearing the matter with Madamba, Sanchez gave the check to Agustin who indorsed it, obtained Mendoza's approval
for its encashment, presented it for payment to Lising, and received the amount of P150,000.00. Later that morning,
Mendoza borrowed this encashed check from Lising but afterwards never returned it. (The check has been missing since
then. For easy reference, it will henceforth be called the "missing check").

It should be noted that the missing check for P150,000.00 is different from Exhibit D which is also a check for P150,000.00.

"AJ DEL ROSARIO TO WITNESS:

Q[:] The one that was cashed?cralawlibrary

A[:] That was already encashed, Your Honor.

Q[:] That check is different from the check, marked Exhibit D?cralawlibrary

A[:] Yes, Your Honor."

(Tsn, p. 14, October 28, 1996.)

The missing check was issued on February 17, 1989 by the Executive Care Services, payable to Triple Crown Services. On
the other hand, the check marked Exhibit D is dated February 7, 1989 and was issued by the Triple Crown Services,
payable to Executive Care Services. Both Exhibit D and the missing check were endorsed and encashed by Agustin. Their
total amount (P300,000.00) when added to the P140,000.00 covered by Exhibit E, sums up to P440,000.00, which is the
total amount paid out by the National Treasury.

On the same day, after the missing check had been encashed, the Vault Auditor, Jose Cruz, told Sanchez to replace it
with two checks of P75,000.00 each, because the amount was too big. After a series of phone calls to Madamba, and on
Madamba's instructions, Sanchez went to the accounting office of the Executive Care Services, in Ermita, Manila, got two
company checks, filled them up and waited for Madamba at their office to sign them. Madamba, however, failed to
return to their office, and getting frantic due to the closing of the bank, he again called Madamba on the telephone.
Madamba told him to sign the checks. As instructed, Sanchez signed the checks with Madamba's name and delivered
the checks to Cruz. At the close of banking hours that afternoon, Cruz handed to Lising the two checks, PNB Checks Nos.
A280215 and A280216 (Exhibits B and C) each in the amount of P75,000.00, to replace the missing check for P150,000.00
that Lising had paid in the morning. These two checks were initialed by Cruz and Mendoza, without the endorsement of
Agustin. When Lising confronted them about this, Cruz and Mendoza assured her that they will take care of obtaining
Agustin's indorsement the next day. When these two PNB checks were presented for payment the following day, the
drawee bank (PNB) returned both of them unpaid for the reason that they were drawn against insufficient funds. They
were also presented for payment the second time, but were again dishonored for the same reason. Not one of the
checks (Exhibits B, C, D and E) passed through the Assistant National Treasurer, Milagros Baltazar, for approval prior to
their encashment, as required in a Memorandum dated May 27, 1998, issued by the Assistant National Treasurer,
specifically addressed to Mendoza as National Cashier, and noted by the Treasurer of the Philippines, Rosalina J.
Cajucom.

The clearing Officer, Maria Lourdes Remo then prepared the debit memoranda (Exhibits J, K and L) addressed to Lising,
the paying teller, but Mendoza did not sign any of them. Consequently, the debit memos were never served on Lising.
Formal demands (Exhibits F, G and H) for the restitution of the amounts covered by the dishonored checks not later than
April 14, 1989 were duly made on accused Mendoza who, through counsel, admitted receipt thereof.

A regular audit of the cash accountabilities of accused Mendoza as National Cashier was conducted in July 1989. The
auditors submitted an audit report (Exhibit 3-Lising), disallowing the amount of P440,000.00, representing the total value
of the four dishonored checks, noted the partial payments made thereon in the amounts of P87,239.36 covered by O.R.
No. 7952856L and P57,162.85 under O.R. No. 7953560L, leaving an unpaid balance of P295,597.[79]. The auditors also
recommended the recovery of the balance through criminal or civil actions, if so warranted.

An administrative investigation was also conducted by the Legal Department of the Treasury in connection with the
encashment of the four checks involved in this case. This resulted in the dismissal of accused Mendoza from his position
as National Cashier for dishonesty (Exhibit I). 5

The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan found that all elements of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 were present. Mendoza and Lising were both
public officers. Madamba and Agustin, although private persons, were charged with conspiring with Mendoza and Lising.
The checks subject of the present case bore the signatures, initials, or stamp of all the accused. The checks were also
encashed even if they were drawn against insufficient funds. Moreover, Mendoza facilitated the encashment of the
checks without the approval of the Assistant National Treasurer, violating the Bureau of Treasury's Standard Operating
Procedure 3200. The government suffered the loss of P440,000, of which P144,402.21 was reimbursed, leaving an
outstanding balance of P295,597.79. In convicting Mendoza and Madamba, the Sandiganbayan found that both
engaged in the fraudulent scheme to withdraw government funds through the encashment of the worthless commercial
checks in question with the Bureau of Treasury. Madamba was able to encash her checks at the Bureau of Treasury
because of Mendoza's indispensable aid.

However, the Sandiganbayan acquitted Agustin and Lising. The Sandiganbayan found that Agustin did not know that the
checks had no funds. Agustin was merely financially interested in the proceeds of the checks. Lising, on the other hand,
would not have encashed the checks had Mendoza not reassured her.

The Sandiganbayan ruled thus:

WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered finding accused TOLENTINO MENDOZA and SALOME MADAMBA GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of [v]iolation of Section 3, paragraph (e), of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for a period of EIGHT YEARS; to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office; to pay jointly and
severally, the government of the Republic of the Philippines the amount of P295,597.79, representing the unpaid balance
of the total amount of the dishonored checks, with legal interest thereon from April 4, 1989, the last date for payment
stated in the letters of demand, and to pay the costs.

For insufficiency of evidence and on grounds of reasonable doubt, accused ANITA LISING and MARCELINA AGUSTIN are
found NOT GUILTY of the offense charged and are hereby ACQUITTED.
The cash bond posted by accused Lising and Agustin are hereby cancelled and ordered to be returned to them subject
to accounting and auditing rules and procedures.

SO ORDERED.6

Mendoza timely filed this Petition for Review on 25 January 2001. On the other hand, Madamba filed her petition with the
Court only on 15 March 2001. In a Resolution 7 dated 4 April 2001, the Court denied Madamba's petition for having been
filed late and for failure to state the material dates. The Resolution became final on 19 July 2001 and a partial entry of
judgment was made against Madamba.

The Issue

Mendoza states that the principal issue for resolution is "whether the evidence on record is sufficient to sustain a finding
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt." 8

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

The present case is a Petition for Review under Section 1 9, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure where only
questions of law may be raised. A question of law exists'

[w]hen the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or
when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood
of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts
or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, the e xistence
and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the
probability of the situation.10

As exceptions to this rule, the Court may pass upon questions of fact in a Petition for Review when, among others: (1) the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of
fact are premised on the absence of evidence; and (6) the findings of fact are contradicted by evidence on record. 11

In the present case, Mendoza is asking the Court to reexamine the evidence presented before, and passed upon, by the
Sandiganbayan. However, Mendoza failed to show that the present case falls within any of the above exceptions. Thus,
the petition must fail.

We reiterate that this Court's jurisdiction over the Sandiganbayan's decisions or final orders is limited only to questions of
law. It is not this Court's function to review again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. The policy
of this Court is to sustain the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan since as a trial court it is in a better position to assess
the evidence before it.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

H. RELEVANCY OF EVIDENCE
I. COLLATERAL MATTERS/CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

III. WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED (Rule 129)

A. INTRODUCTION

G.R. No. 189255, June 17, 2015

JESUS G. REYES, Petitioner, v. GLAUCOMA RESEARCH FOUNDATION, INC., EYE REFERRAL CENTER AND MANUEL B.
AGULTO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 and Resolution2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), dated April 20, 2009 and August 25, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 104261. The assailed
CA Decision annulled the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR Case No.
05-0441-05 and reinstated the Decision of the Labor Arbiter (LA) in the same case, while the CA Resolution denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The instant petition arose from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by petitioner against respondents with the NLRC,
National Capital Region, Quezon City. Petitioner alleged that: on August 1, 2003, he was hired by respondent corporation
as administrator of the latter's Eye Referral Center (ERC); he performed his duties as administrator and continuously
received his monthly salary of P20,000.00 until the end of January 2005; beginning February 2005, respondent withheld
petitioner's salary without notice but he still continued to report for work; on April 11, 2005, petitioner wrote a letter to
respondent Manuel Agulto (Agulto), who is the Executive Director of respondent corporation, informing the latter that he
has not been receiving his salaries since February 2005 as well as his 14 th month pay for 2004; petitioner did not receive
any response from Agulto; on April 21, 2005, petitioner was informed by the Assistant to the Executive Director as well as
the Assistant Administrative Officer, that he is no longer the Administrator of the ERC; subsequently, petitioner's office
was padlocked and closed without notice; he still continued to report for work but on April 29, 2005 he was no longer
allowed by the security guard on duty to enter the premises of the ERC.

On their part, respondents contended that: upon petitioner's representation that he is an expert in corporate
organizational structure and management affairs, they engaged his services as a consultant or adviser in the formulation
of an updated organizational set-up and employees' manual which is compatible with their present condition; based on
his claim that there is a need for an administrator for the ERC, he later designated himself as such on a trial basis; there is
no employer-employee relationship between them because respondents had no control over petitioner in terms of
working hours as he reports for work at anytime of the day and leaves as he pleases; respondents also had no control as
to the manner in which he performs his alleged duties as consultant; he became overbearing and his relationship with
the employees and officers of the company soured leading to the filing of three complaints against him; petitioner was
not dismissed as he was the one who voluntarily severed his relations with respondents.

On January 20, 2006, the LA assigned to the case rendered a Decision 3 dismissing petitioner's complaint. The LA held,
among others, that petitioner failed to establish that the elements of an employer-employee relationship existed
between him and respondents because he was unable to show that he was, in fact, appointed as administrator of the
ERC and received salaries as such; he also failed to deny that during his stint with respondents, he was, at the same time,
a consultant of various government agencies such as the Manila International Airport Authority, Manila Intercontinental
Port Authority, Anti-Terrorist Task Force for Aviation and Air Transportation Sector; his actions were neither supervised
nor controlled by the management of the ERC; petitioner, likewise, did not observe working hours by reporting for work
and leaving therefrom as he pleased; and, he was receiving allowances, not salaries, as a consultant.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the Decision of the LA. The NLRC declared petitioner as respondents'
employee, that he was illegally dismissed and ordered respondents to reinstate him to his former position without loss o f
seniority rights and privileges with full backwages. The NLRC held that the basis upon which the conclusion of the LA was
drawn lacked support; that it was incumbent for respondents to discharge the burden of proving that petitioner's
dismissal was for cause and effected after due process was observed; and, that respondents failed to discharge this
burden.4

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution 5 dated May 30, 2008.

Respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari6 with the CA.

In its assailed Decision, the CA annulled and set aside the judgment of the NLRC and reinstated the Decision of the LA.
The CA held that the LA was correct in ruling that, under the control test and the economic reality tes t, no
employer-employee relationship existed between respondents and petitioner.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated August 25, 2009.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari based on the following grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT
DISMISSING RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT
RESPONDENTS SUBMITTED A VERIFICATION THAT FAILS TO COMPLY WITH THE 2004
RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE.cralawlawlibrary

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT NO
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN RESPONDENTS AND
PETITIONER.7cralawlawlibrary

As to the first ground, petitioner contends that respondents' petition for certiorari filed with the CA should have been
dismissed on the ground that it was improperly verified because the jurat portion of the verification states only the
community tax certificate number of the affiant as evidence of her identity. Petitioner argues that under the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice, as amended by a Resolution 8 of this Court, dated February 19, 2008, a community tax certificate is
not among those considered as competent evidence of identity.

The Court does not agree.

This Court has already ruled that competent evidence of identity is not required in cases where the affiant is personally
known to the notary public.9

Thus, in Jandoquile v. Revilla, Jr.,10 this Court held that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

 If the notary public knows the affiants personally, he need not require them to show their valid
identification cards. This rule is supported by the definition of a "jurat" under Section 6, Rule II of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A "jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document; (b) is personally
known to the notary public oridentified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity; (c)
signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation
before the notary public as to such instrument or document. 11cralawlawlibrary

Also, Section 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SEC. 2. Prohibitions -

(a) x x x

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document -

(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

Moreover, Rule II, Section 6 of the same Rules states that:

SEC 6. Jurat. - "Jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single

occasion:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;

(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and

(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or
document.

In legal hermeneutics, "or" is a disjunctive that expresses an alternative or gives a choice of one among two or more
things.12 The word signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another thing in an enumeration. 13

Thus, as earlier stated, if the affiant is personally known to the notary public, the latter need not require the former to
show evidence of identity as required under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, as amended.

Applying the above rule to the instant case, it is undisputed that the attorney-in-fact of respondents who executed the
verification and certificate against forum shopping, which was attached to respondents' petition filed with the CA, is
personally known to the notary public before whom the documents were acknowledged. Both attorney-in-fact and the
notary public hold office at respondents' place of business and the latter is also the legal counsel of respondents.

In any event, this Court's disquisition in the fairly recent case of Heirs of Amada Zaulda v. Isaac Zaulda14regarding the
import of procedural rules vis-a-vis the substantive rights of the parties, is instructive, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

[G]ranting, arguendo, that there was non-compliance with the verification requirement, the rule is that
courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses which do not really impair the proper
administration of justice. After all, the higher objective of procedural rule is to ensure that the
substantive rights of the parties are protected. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on
the merits and not on technicalities. Every party-litigant must be afforded ample opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his case, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities.

In Coca-Cola Bottlers v. De la Cruz, where the verification was marred only by a glitch in the evidence of
the identity of the affiant, the Court was of the considered view that, in the interest of justice, the minor
defect can be overlooked and should not defeat the petition.

The reduction in the number of pending cases is laudable, but if it would be attained by precipitate, if
not preposterous, application of technicalities, justice would not be served. The law abhors technicalities
that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "It is a more
prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the
case on appeal rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties,
giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not
miscarriage of justice."

What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant should be given the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty,
honor, or property on technicalities. The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. At this juncture,
the Court reminds all members of the bench and bar of the admonition in the often-cited case
of Alonso v. Villamor:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it
deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no vested rights in
technicalities.15cralawlawlibrary

Anent the second ground, petitioner insists that, based on evidence on record, an employer-employee relationship exists
between him and respondents.

The Court is not persuaded.

It is a basic rule of evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation. 16 If he claims a right granted by law, he
must prove his claim by competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of
that of his opponent.17 The test for determining on whom the burden of proof lies is found in the result of an inquiry as
to which party would be successful if no evidence of such matters were given. 18 In an illegal dismissal case, the onus
probandi rests on the employer to prove that its dismissal of an employee was for a valid cause. 19 However, before a case
for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-employee relationship must first be established. 20 Thus, in filing a
complaint before the LA for illegal dismissal, based on the premise that he was an employee of respondents, it is
incumbent upon petitioner to prove the employer-employee relationship by substantial evidence. 21

In regard to the above discussion, the issue of whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between
petitioner and respondents is essentially a question of fact. 22 The factors that determine the issue include who has the
power to select the employee, who pays the employee's wages, who has the power to dismiss the employee, and who
exercises control of the methods and results by which the work of the employee is accomplished. 23 Although no
particular form of evidence is required to prove the existence of the relationship, and any competent and releva nt
evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted, a finding that the relationship exists must nonetheless rest on
substantial evidence, which is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion.24

Generally, the Court does not review factual questions, primarily because the Court is not a trier of facts. 25 However,
where, like here, there is a conflict between the factual findings of the LA and the CA, on one hand, and those of the
NLRC, on the other, it becomes proper for the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, to review and re-evaluate
the factual issues and to look into the records of the case and re-examine the questioned findings.26

Etched in an unending stream of cases are four standards in determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, namely: (a) the manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee; (b) the mode of payment of
wages; (c) the presence or absence of power of dismissal; and, (d) the presence or absence of control of the putative
employee's conduct. Most determinative among these factors is the so-called "control test."27

Indeed, the power of the employer to control the work of the employee is considered the most significant determinant of
the existence of an employer-employee relationship.28 This test is premised on whether the person for whom the services
are performed reserves the right to control both the end achieved and the manner and means used to achieve that
end.29

In the present case, petitioner contends that, as evidence of respondents' supposed control over him, the organizational
plans he has drawn were subject to the approval of respondent corporation's Board of Trustees. However, the Court
agrees with the disquisition of the CA on this matter, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

[Respondents'] power to approve or reject the organizational plans drawn by [petitioner] cannot be the
control contemplated in the "control test." It is but logical that one who commissions another to do a
piece of work should have the right to accept or reject the product. The important factor to consider in
 the "control test" is still the element of control over how the work itself is done, not just the end result
thereof.

Well settled is the rule that where a person who works for another performs his job more or less at his
own pleasure, in the manner he sees fit, not subject to definite hours or conditions of work, and is
compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof, no employer-employee
relationship exists.30cralawlawlibrary

What was glaring in the present case is the undisputed fact that petitioner was never subject to definite working hours.
He never denied that he goes to work and leaves therefrom as he pleases.31 In fact, on December 1-31, 2004, he went on
leave without seeking approval from the officers of respondent company. On the contrary, his letter 32 simply informed
respondents that he will be away for a month and even advised them that they have the option of appointing his
replacement during his absence. This Court has held that there is no employer-employee relationship where the
supposed employee is not subject to a set of rules and regulations governing the performance of his duties under the
agreement with the company and is not required to report for work at any time, nor to devote his time exclusively to
working for the company.33

In this regard, this Court also agrees with the ruling of the CA that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Aside from the control test, the Supreme Court has also used the economic reality test in determining
whether an employer-employee relationship exists between the parties. Under this test, the economic
realities prevailing within the activity or between the parties are examined, taking into consideration the
totality of circumstances surrounding the true nature of the relationship between the parties. This is
especially appropriate when, as in this case, there is no written agreement or contract on which to base
the relationship. In our jurisdiction, the benchmark of economic reality in analyzing possible
employment relationships for purposes of applying the Labor Code ought to be the economic
dependence of the worker on his employer.

In the instant case, as shown by the resume of [petitioner], he concurrently held consultancy positions
with the Manila International Airport Authority (from 04 March 2001 to September 2003 and from 01
November 2004 up to the present) and the Anti-Terrorist Task Force for Aviation and Air Transportation
Sector (from 16 April 2004 to 30 June 2004) during his stint with the Eye Referral Center (from 01 August
2003 to 29 April 2005). Accordingly, it cannot be said that the [petitioner] was wholly dependent on
[respondent] company.34cralawlawlibrary

In bolstering his contention that there was an employer-employee relationship, petitioner draws attention to the pay
slips he supposedly received from respondent corporation. However, he does not dispute the findings of the CA that
there are no deductions for SSS and withholding tax from his compensation, which are the usual deductions from
employees' salaries. Thus, the alleged pay slips may not be treated as competent evidence of petitioner's claim that he is
respondents' employee.

In addition, the designation of the payments to petitioner as salaries, is not determinative of the existence of an
employer-employee relationship.35 Salary is a general term defined as a remuneration for services given. 36 Evidence of
this fact, in the instant case, was the cash voucher issued in favor of petitioner where it was stated therein that the
amount of P20,000.00 was given as petitioner's allowance for the month of December 2004, although it appears from
the pay slip that the said amount was his salary for the same period.

Additional evidence of the fact that petitioner was hired as a consultant and not as an employee of respondent
corporation are affidavits to this effect which were executed by Roy Oliveres 37 and Aurea Luz Esteva,38 who are Medical
Records Custodian and Administrative Officer, respectively, of respondent corporation. Petitioner insists in its objection
of the use of these affidavits on the ground that they are, essentially, hearsay. However, this Court has ruled that
although the affiants had not been presented to affirm the contents of their affidavits and be cross-examined, their
affidavits may be given evidentiary value; the argument that such affidavits were hearsay was not persuasive. 39 Likewise,
this Court ruled that it was not necessary for the affiants to appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for the
adverse party.40 To require otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the
proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence.41

These affidavits are corroborated by evidence, as discussed above, showing that petitioner has no definite working hours
and is not subject to the control of respondents.

Lastly, the Court does not agree with petitioner's insistence that his being hired as respondent corporation's
administrator and his designation as such in intra-company correspondence proves that he is an employee of the
corporation. The fact alone that petitioner was designated as an administrator does not necessarily mean that he is an
employee of respondents. Mere title or designation in a corporation will not, by itself, determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship.42 In this regard, even the identification card which was issued to petitioner is not an
adequate proof of petitioner's claim that he is respondents' employee. In addition, petitioner's designation as an
administrator neither disproves respondents' contention that he was engaged only as a consultant.

As a final point, it bears to reiterate that while the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the
protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor
of labor.43 Management also has its rights which are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair
play.44 Out of its concern for the less privileged in life, the Court has inclined, more often than not, toward the worker
and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer.45 Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to the rule
that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law
and doctrine.46

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated April 20, 2009
and August 25, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. SPNo. 104261, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 G.R. No. 175532 April 19, 2010

ROMEO BASAY, JULIAN LITERAL and JULIAN ABUEVA, Petitioners,

vs.
HACIENDA CONSOLACION, and/or BRUNO BOUFFARD III, JOSE RAMON BOUFFARD, MALOT BOUFFARD, SPOUSES
CARMEN and STEVE BUMANLAG, BERNIE BOUFFARD, ANALYN BOUFFARD, and DONA BOUFFARD, as
Owners, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Fair evidentiary rule dictates that before employers are burdened to prove that they did not commit illegal dismissal, it is
incumbent upon the employee to first establish the fact of his or her dismissal.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the Decision2 dated June 7, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 00313, which affirmed the March 22, 2004 Decision 3 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dismissing
the illegal dismissal case filed by petitioners against respondents.

Factual Antecedents

Respondents hired petitioners Romeo Basay (Basay) in 1967 and Julian Literal (Literal) in 1984, as tractor operators, and
petitioner Julian Abueva (Abueva) in 1989, as laborer, in the hacienda devoted for sugar cane plantation.

On August 29, 2001, petitioners filed a complaint 4 for illegal dismissal with monetary claims against respondents. They
alleged that sometime in July 2001, respondents verbally informed them to stop working. Thereafter, they were not given
work assignments despite their status as regular employees. They alleged that their termination was done in violation of
their right to substantive and procedural due process. Petitioners also claimed violation of Minimum Wage Law and
non-payment of overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, five days service incentive leave pay, separation
pay and 13th month pay. They also prayed for damages and attorney’s fees.
Respondents denied petitioners’ allegations. As regards Abueva, respondents averred that he is not an employee but a
mere contractor in the hacienda. According to respondents, Abueva hired other men to perform weeding jobs and even
entered into contract with neighboring haciendas for similar jobs. Respondents alleged that Abueva ’s name does not
appear in the payroll, thus indicating that he is not an employee. As such, there can be no dismissal to speak of, much
less an illegal dismissal.

With regard to petitioners Literal and Basay, respondents admitted that both are regular employees, each receiving ₱
130.00 per day’s work as evidenced by a Master Voucher.5 However, respondents denied having illegally dismissed them
and asserted that they abandoned their jobs.

Respondents alleged that Literal was facing charges of misconduct, insubordination, damaging and taking advantage of
hacienda property, and unauthorized cultivation of a portion of the hacienda. Literal was ordered to explain; instead of
complying, Literal did not anymore report for work. Instead, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

Respondents asserted that they sent a representative to convince petitioners to return but to no avail. Respondents
maintained that they have been religiously giving 13th month pay to their employees as evidenced by a
voucher6corresponding to year 2000.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

On December 19, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision 7 exonerating respondents from the charge of illegal
dismissal as petitioners were the ones who did not report for work despite respondents’ call. The Labor Arbiter, however,
awarded petitioners’ claim of 13th month pay and salary differentials. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter’s
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises being considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the Respondent not
guilty of Illegal Dismissal but is however directed to pay the complainants their 13th Month Pay covering the years 1998
and 1999, and their Salary Differentials for 2 years at 6 months per year of service. The computation of the foregoing
monetary awards are as follows:

13th Month Pay: (For Each Complainant)

1998 & 1999 = 2 years or 12 months @ 6 months per year of service

₱145.00/day x 26 days = P3,770.00/mo.

I -

₱45,240.00 =

₱3,770.00/mo. x 12 mos. = ₱7,540.00

II – Salary Differential:
 Romeo Basay:

Basic Pay = P145.00/day

₱122.00/day
Salary Received =
(a)

Salary Differential = ₱ 23.00/day

1998 & 1999 = 2 years or 312 days

₱23.00/day x 312 days = ₱7,176.00

Julian Literal:

Basic Pay = P145.00/day

P 91.00/day
Salary Received =
(b)

Salary Differential = P 54.00/day

1998 & 1999 = 2 years or 312 days

₱54.00/day x 312 days = ₱16,848.00

Julian Abueva:

Basic Pay = ₱145.00/day

₱ 91.50/day
Salary Received =
(c)

Salary Differential = ₱ 53.50/day

1998 & 1999 = 2 years or 312 days

₱53.50/day x 312 days = ₱16, 692.00

SUMMARY
 ROMEO BASAY:

a) 13th Month Pay = ₱7,540.00

1. ₱7,176.00
Salary Differential =
b)

Total ₱14,716.00

JULIAN LITERAL

a) 13th Month Pay = ₱ 7,540.00

2. P16,848.00
Salary Differential =
b)

Total ₱24,388.00

JULIAN ABUEVA

a) 13th Month Pay = ₱ 7,540.00

₱16,692.00
Salary Differential =

3.

₱24,232.00
b) Total

₱63,336.00
GRAND TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ten Percent (10%) Attorney’s Fees is also adjudicated from the total monetary award.

SO ORDERED.8

Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission

Both parties sought recourse to the NLRC. Petitioners filed a Partial Appeal 9 to the Decision declaring respondents not
guilty of illegal dismissal. They argued that there was no proof of clear and deliberate intent to abandon their wor k. On
the contrary, their filing of an illegal dismissal case negates the intention to abandon. Petitioners likewise alleged that
respondents failed to observe procedural due process.

Respondents, for their part, filed a Memorandum on Appeal 10 with respect to the award of salary differentials and 13th
month pay to petitioners. Respondents averred that the Labor Arbiter erred in finding that petitioners are entit led to
receive a minimum wage of ₱145.00/day instead of ₱130.00/day which is the minimum wage rate for sugarcane workers
in Negros Oriental per Wage Order No. ROVII-07.11 Respondents likewise presented vouchers 12 to prove payment of 13th
month pay for the years 1998 and 1999.

The NLRC, in its Decision13 dated March 22, 2004, found merit in respondents’ appeal. It ruled that respondents have
satisfactorily proven payment of the correct amount of wages and 13th month pay for the years 1998, 1999 and 2000, as
shown in the Master Voucher indicating the workers’ payroll and the various vouchers for 13th month pay. The NLRC
further ruled that Abueva is not an employee of the hacienda but a mere contractor; thus, he is not entitled to any of his
claims. The NLRC thus affirmed with modification the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, viz:

WHEREFORE, finding complainants not illegally dismissed, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter dated December 13, 2001, with the MODIFICATION that complainants Julian Literal and Romeo Basay are
not entitled to their claims for salary differentials and 13th month pay for lack of legal basis. However, respondents are
ordered to pay complainants Julian Literal and Romeo Basay proportionate 13th month pay computed from January 1,
2001 to August 29, 2001.

All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.14

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 15 which was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution 16 dated September 3,
2004.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. On June 7, 2006, however, the CA dismissed the petition
and affirmed the findings of the NLRC. It opined that respondents have manifested their willingness to retain petitioners
but the latter intentionally abandoned their work. The CA also struck down petitioners’ contention that abandonment is
inconsistent with the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal as this rule applies only when a complainant seeks
reinstatement and not when separation pay is instead prayed for, as in the case of petitioners. As to the issue posed by
petitioners assailing the admissibility of the Master Voucher due to lack of petitioners’ authentic signatures, the CA
refrained from resolving the matter since the issue was only raised for the first time on appeal.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but to no avail.

Issue

Hence, this petition raising the issue of whether petitioners were illegally dismissed and are entitled to their money
claims.
Petitioners contend that the CA erred in affirming the findings of the labor tribunals that they deliberately abandoned
their work on the basis of respondents’ self-serving allegation that they sent emissaries to persuade them to return to
work. They maintain that in the absence of competent evidence to show clear intention to sever the employment
relationship and compliance with the two-notice rule, no abandonment can exist. Moreover, the theory that
abandonment of work is inconsistent with the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is applicable in the present case
since what was prayed for in the complaint was reinstatement, contrary to the CA’s finding that they were asking for
separation pay. Petitioners likewise insist that the CA gravely erred in holding that they assailed the admissibility of the
Master Voucher for the first time only during appeal. They claim that such issue was raised in their motion for
reconsideration of the NLRC Decision. Finally, petitioners allege that the fact that they were staying inside the premises of
the hacienda and had been working therein for more than a year is an indication that they are regular employees entitled
to their monetary claims, as correctly found by the Labor Arbiter.

Our Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

There was no illegal dismissal.

We are not unmindful of the rule in labor cases that the employer has the burden of proving that the termination was for
a valid or authorized cause; however, it is likewise incumbent upon the employees that they should first establish by
competent evidence the fact of their dismissal from employment. 17 The one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving
it and the proof should be clear, positive and convincing. 18 In this case, aside from mere allegations, no evidence was
proffered by the petitioners that they were dismissed from employment. The records are bereft of any indication that
petitioners were prevented from returning to work or otherwise deprived of any work assignment by respondents.

The CA, in sustaining the Labor Arbiter and NLRC’s finding that there was no illegal dismissal, ruled that respondents
have manifested their willingness to retain petitioners in their employ. Petitioners, however, complained that this finding
is anchored on mere allegations of respondents.

We do not agree. Respondents presented a declaration 19 made under oath by Leopoldo Utlang, Jr., assistant supervisor
of the hacienda, attesting that petitioners were asked to return to do some work for the hacienda but refused to do so
upon the advice of their lawyer. Interestingly too, as late as November of 2001 or even after almost three months from
the filing of the illegal dismissal case, the names of Literal and Basay were still listed and included in respondents’ payroll
as can be gleaned in the Master Voucher covering the employees’ payroll of November 12 to 16, 2001. While a voucher
does not necessarily prove payment, it is an acceptable documentary record of a business transaction. 20 As such, entries
made therein, being entered in the ordinary or regular course of business, enjoy the presumption of regularity.21 Hence,
on the basis of this material proof evincing respondents’ intention to retain petitioners as employees, we are not
convinced that petitioners were told to stop working or were prevented from working in the hacienda. This may well be
an indication of respondents’ lack of intention to dismiss petitioners from employment since they were still considered
employees as of that time. Records are likewise bereft of any showing that to date, respondents had already terminated
petitioners from employment.
We are not persuaded by petitioners’ contention that nothing was presented to establish their intention of abandoning
their work, or that the fact that they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal negates the theory of abandonment.

It bears emphasizing that this case does not involve termination of employment on the ground of abandonment. As
earlier discussed, there is no evidence showing that petitioners were actually dismissed. Petitioners’ filing of a complaint
for illegal dismissal, irrespective of whether reinstatement or separation pay was prayed for, could not by itself be the
sole consideration in determining whether they have been illegally dismissed. All circumstances surrounding the alleged
termination should also be taken into account.

In Abad v. Roselle Cinema,22 we ruled that the substantial evidence proffered by the employer that it had not terminated
the employee should not be ignored on the pretext that the employee would not have filed the complaint for illegal
dismissal if he had not really been dismissed. We held that such non sequitur reasoning cannot take the place of the
evidence of both the employer and the employee.1avvphi1

Given that there was no dismissal to speak of, there can be no question as to the legality or illegality thereof.

Basay and Literal are entitled to salary differentials for two years and proportionate 13th month pay from January 1-29,
2001. Abueva is not an employee, thus not entitled to his claims.

We agree with the petitioners that the issue on the admissibility of the Master Voucher, which does not s how that they
actually received the amount of salary indicated therein, was raised in their motion for reconsideration of the NLRC
Decision dated March 22, 2004 where the labor tribunal ruled that petitioners were duly compensated for their work on
the basis of such voucher. At any rate, even if its admission as evidence is not put into issue, still, the Master Voucher did
not prove that petitioners were indeed paid the correct amount of wages.

A perusal of the Master Voucher shows that it covers the employees’ payroll for the period of November 12-16, 2001
only. Clearly, the Master Voucher cannot constitute as proof that petitioners were duly paid for other periods not
covered by such voucher. No other pertinent vouchers, payrolls, records or other similar documents have been
presented as proof of payment of the correct amount of salaries paid, particularly, for the years 1998 and 1999. As a
general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. 23 Consequently, respondents failed to discharge
the burden of proving payment thereby making them liable for petitioners’ claim for salary differentials. We thus
reinstate the Labor Arbiter’s award of salary differentials for 1998 and 1999, computed at 6 months per year of service.
However, the Labor Arbiter’s computation must be modified pursuant to Wage Order No. ROVII-07. Under this wage
order, the minimum wage rate of sugarcane plantation workers is at ₱130.00/day. The correct computation for the salary
differentials due to Basay and Literal, who claimed to have received only ₱122.00 and ₱91.00 per day, respectively,
should be as follows:

For ROMEO BASAY:

Basic Pay = ₱130.00/day

Salary Received = ₱122.00/day

Salary Differential = ₱ 8.00/day

₱8.00/day x 312 days (for 1998 & 1999) = ₱2,496.00

For JULIAN LITERAL:

Basic Pay = ₱130.00/day

₱ 91.00/day
Salary Received =

Salary Differential = ₱ 39.00/day

₱39.00/day x 312 days (for 1998 & 1999) = ₱12,168.00

As regards the 13th month pay, respondents were able to adduce evidence that the benefit was given to the employees
for the years 1998, 1999, and 2000. However, for an employee who has been separated from service before the time for
payment of the 13th month pay, he is entitled to this monetary benefit in proportion to the length of time he worked
during the year, reckoned from the time he started working during the calendar year up to the time of his
separation.24 The NLRC’s award of proportionate 13th month pay computed from January 1, 2001 to August 29, 2001 in
favor of Basay and Literal, is therefore proper.

As for petitioner Abueva, he is not entitled to his claims. The NLRC excluded Abueva in its judgment award, ruling that he
is not an employee but a mere contractor. The existence of an employer-employee relationship is ultimately a question
of fact.25 Settled is the rule that only errors of law are generally reviewed by this Court. 26 Factual findings of
administrative and quasi-judicial agencies specializing in their respective fields, especially when affirmed by the CA, must
be accorded high respect, if not finality. 27

The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (1) selection and engagement of the
employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the employer’s power to control the employee’s
conduct.28 In filing a complaint for illegal dismissal, it is incumbent upon Abueva to prove the relationship by substantial
evidence.

In this regard, petitioners claim that Abueva has worked with respondents for more than a year already and was allowed
to stay inside the hacienda. As such, he is a regular employee entitled to monetary claims. However, petitioners have not
presented competent proof that respondents engaged the services of Abueva; that respondents paid his wages or that
respondents could dictate what his conduct should be while at work. In other words, Abueva’s allegations did not
establish that his relationship with respondents has the attributes of employer-employee on the basis of the
above-mentioned four-fold test. Therefore, Abueva was not able to discharge the burden of proving the existence of an
employer-employee relationship. Moreover, Abueva was not able to refute respondents’ assertions that he hires other
men to perform weeding job in the hacienda and that he is not exclusively working for respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00313 dated
June 7, 2006, finding petitioners Romeo Basay, Julian Literal and Julian Abueva not illegally dismissed and awarding
petitioners Romeo Basay and Julian Literal their proportionate 13th month pay computed from January 1, 2001 to August
29, 2001, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the petitioners Romeo Basay and Julian Literal are entitled to receive the
amounts of ₱2,496.00 and ₱12,168.00 as salary differentials, respectively.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177407 February 9, 2011

RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, Petitioner,

vs.
BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA SIOSON, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision 1 dated
September 22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari
filed by petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza (Atienza), which, in turn, assailed the Orders 2 issued by public respondent Board
of Medicine (BOM) in Administrative Case No. 1882.

The facts, fairly summarized by the appellate court, follow.

Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for check-up on February
4, 1995. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly,
ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. The tests revealed that her right kidney is normal. It was ascertained,
however, that her left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. Thus, she underwent kidney operation in
September, 1999.

On February 18, 2000, private respondent’s husband, Romeo Sioson (as complainant), filed a complaint for gross
negligence and/or incompetence before the [BOM] against the doctors who allegedly participated in the fateful kidney
operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel
Atienza.
It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or incompetence committed by the said doctors, including
petitioner, consists of the removal of private respondent’s fully functional right kidney, instead of the left non-functioning
and non-visualizing kidney.

The complaint was heard by the [BOM]. After complainant Romeo Sioson presented his evidence, private respondent
Editha Sioson, also named as complainant there, filed her formal offer of documentary evidence. Attached to the formal
offer of documentary evidence are her Exhibits "A" to "D," which she offered for the purpose of proving that her kidneys
were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated. She described her exhibits, as follows:

"EXHIBIT ‘A’ – the certified photocopy of the X-ray Request form dated December 12, 1996, which is also marked as
Annex ‘2’ as it was actually originally the Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III’s counter affidavit filed with the City
Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the criminal complaint filed by [Romeo Sioson] with the said office, on which
are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results of the ultrasound examination. Incidentally, this exhibit
happens to be the same as or identical to the certified photocopy of the document marked as Annex ‘2’ to the
Counter-Affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board in
answer to this complaint;

"EXHIBIT ‘B’ – the certified photo copy of the X-ray request form dated January 30, 1997, which is also marked as Annex
‘3’ as it was actually likewise originally an Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III’s counter-affidavit filed with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the criminal complaint filed by the herein complainant with the said
office, on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results of the examination. Incidentally, this
exhibit happens to be also the same as or identical to the certified photo copy of the document marked as Annex ‘3’
which is likewise dated January 30, 1997, which is appended as such Annex ‘3’ to the counter-affidavit dated March 15,
2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board in answer to this complaint.

"EXHIBIT ‘C’ – the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated March 16, 1996, which is also marked as Annex
‘4,’ on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results of the examination.

"EXHIBIT ‘D’ – the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated May 20, 1999, which is also marked as Annex
‘16,’ on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results of the examination. Incidentally, this
exhibit appears to be the draft of the typewritten final report of the same examination which is the document appended
as Annexes ‘4’ and ‘1’ respectively to the counter-affidavits filed by x x x Dr. Judd dela Vega and Dr. Pedro Lantin, III in
answer to the complaint. In the case of Dr. dela Vega however, the document which is marked as Annex ‘4’ is not a
certified photocopy, while in the case of Dr. Lantin, the document marked as Annex ‘1’ is a certified photocopy. Both
documents are of the same date and typewritten contents are the same as that which are written on Exhibit ‘D.’

Petitioner filed his comments/objections to private respondent’s [Editha Sioson’s] formal offer of exhibits. He alleged that
said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are mere photocopies, not properly identified and authenticated, and
intended to establish matters which are hearsay. He added that the exhibits are incompetent to prove the purpose for
which they are offered.

Dispositions of the Board of Medicine

The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent [Editha Sioson] was admitted by the [BOM] per its Order
dated May 26, 2004. It reads:

"The Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence of [Romeo Sioson], the Comments/Objections of [herein petitioner] Atienza,
[therein respondents] De la Vega and Lantin, and the Manifestation of [therein] respondent Florendo are hereby
ADMITTED by the [BOM] for whatever purpose they may serve in the resolution of this case.

"Let the hearing be set on July 19, 2004 all at 1:30 p.m. for the reception of the evidence of the respondents.

"SO ORDERED."

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the abovementioned Order basically on the same reasons stated in his
comment/objections to the formal offer of exhibits.

The [BOM] denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in its Order dated October 8, 2004. It concluded that it
should first admit the evidence being offered so that it can determine its probative value when it decides the case.
According to the Board, it can determine whether the evidence is relevant or not if it will take a look at it through the
process of admission. x x x.3

Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously adverted to, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the
BOM’s Orders which admitted Editha Sioson’s (Editha’s) Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence. The CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari for lack of merit.

Hence, this recourse positing the following issues:

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:

WHETHER PETITIONER ATIENZA AVAILED OF THE PROPER REMEDY WHEN HE FILED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
DATED 06 DECEMBER 2004 WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO ASSAIL THE
ORDERS DATED 26 MAY 2004 AND 08 OCTOBER 2004 OF RESPONDENT BOARD.

II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE
COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE ADMISSION OF INCOMPETENT AND INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENT BOARD,
WHICH CAN RESULT IN THE DEPRIVATION OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSE – A PROPERTY RIGHT OR ONE ’ S
LIVELIHOOD.4

We find no reason to depart from the ruling of the CA.

Petitioner is correct when he asserts that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the Orders of the BOM,
admitting in evidence the exhibits of Editha. As the assailed Orders were interlocutory, these cannot be the subject of an
appeal separate from the judgment that completely or finally disposes of the case. 5 At that stage, where there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the only and remaining remedy left to
petitioner is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

However, the writ of certiorari will not issue absent a showing that the BOM has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion. Embedded in the CA’s finding that the BOM did not exceed its jurisdiction or act in
grave abuse of discretion is the issue of whether the exhibits of Editha contained in her Formal Offer of Documentary
Evidence are inadmissible.

Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in evidence by Editha: (1) violate the best evidence rule; (2) have not
been properly identified and authenticated; (3) are completely hearsay; and (4) are incompetent to prove their purpose.
Thus, petitioner contends that the exhibits are inadmissible evidence.

We disagree.

To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before administrative
bodies such as the BOM.6 Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, 7in
connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held
that:

[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless
plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of
the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to
be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them. 8

From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the admissibility of evidence and the probative weight to be
accorded the same pieces of evidence. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals 9 teaches:

Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered at all.
On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue.

Second, petitioner’s insistence that the admission of Editha’s exhibits violated his substantive rights leading to the loss of
his medical license is misplaced. Petitioner mistakenly relies on Section 20, Article I of the Professional Regulation
Commission Rules of Procedure, which reads:

Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be conducted in accordance with these Rules. The Rules of Court shall only
apply in these proceedings by analogy or on a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. Technical
errors in the admission of evidence which do not prejudice the substantive rights of either party shall not vitiate the
proceedings.10

As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner
because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical
locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

xxxx

(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms dated December 12, 1996, January 30, 1997, March 16, 1996,
and May 20, 1999, filed in connection with Editha’s medical case. The documents contain handwritten entries interpreting
the results of the examination. These exhibits were actually attached as annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin III’s counter affidavit
filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, which was investigating the criminal complaint for negligence
filed by Editha against the doctors of Rizal Medical Center (RMC) who handled her surgical procedure. To lay the
predicate for her case, Editha offered the exhibits in evidence to prove that her "kidneys were both in their proper
anatomical locations at the time" of her operation.

The fact sought to be established by the admission of Editha’s exhibits, that her "kidneys were both in their proper
anatomical locations at the time" of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice. 11

Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact. 12Thus,
they likewise provide for some facts which are established and need not be proved, such as those covered by jud icial
notice, both mandatory and discretionary. 13 Laws of nature involving the physical sciences, specifically biology, 14 include
the structural make-up and composition of living things such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice
that Editha’s kidneys before, and at the time of, her operation, as with most human beings, were in their proper
anatomical locations.

Third, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is inapplicable.1awphil Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:

1. Best Evidence Rule

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without
great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for gross negligence in
removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical
locations of Editha’s kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys at the time of
her operation at the RMC may be established not only through the exhibits offered in evidence.

Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys. To further drive
home the point, the anatomical positions, whether left or right, of Editha’s kidneys, and the removal of one or both, may
still be established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.

In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed. 15 Witness Dr. Nancy Aquino
testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the originals of the exhibits "because [it] transferred from the
previous building, x x x to the new building." 16 Ultimately, since the originals cannot be produced, the BOM properly
admitted Editha’s formal offer of evidence and, thereafter, the BOM shall determine the probative value thereof when it
decides the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 175021 June 15, 2011

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Chief of the Philippine National Police, Petitioner,
vs.
THI THU THUY T. DE GUZMAN, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by Republic of the Philippines, as represented by the Chief of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), of the September 27, 2006 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80623,
which affirmed with modification the September 8, 2003 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 222, of
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q99-37717.

Respondent is the proprietress of Montaguz General Merchandise (MGM), 4 a contractor accredited by the PNP for the
supply of office and construction materials and equipment, and for the delivery of various services such as printing and
rental, repair of various equipment, and renovation of buildings, facilities, vehicles, tires, and spare parts. 5
On December 8, 1995, the PNP Engineering Services (PNPES), released a Requisition and Issue Voucher 6 for the
acquisition of various building materials amounting to Two Million Two Hundred Eighty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred
Sixty-Two Pesos and Sixty Centavos (₱2,288,562.60) for the construction of a four-storey condominium building with
roof deck at Camp Crame, Quezon City.7

Respondent averred that on December 11, 1995, MGM and petitioner, represented by the PNP, through its chief,
executed a Contract of Agreement 8 (the Contract) wherein MGM, for the price of ₱2,288,562.60, undertook to procure
and deliver to the PNP the construction materials itemized in the purchase order9 attached to the Contract. Respondent
claimed that after the PNP Chief approved the Contract and purchase order, 10 MGM, on March 1, 1996, proceeded with
the delivery of the construction materials, as evidenced by Delivery Receipt Nos. 151-153,11Sales Invoice Nos. 038 and
041,12 and the "Report of Public Property Purchase" 13 issued by the PNP’s Receiving and Accounting Officers to their
Internal Auditor Chief. Respondent asseverated that following the PNP’s inspection of the delivered materials on March 4,
1996,14 the PNP issued two Disbursement Vouchers; one in the amount of ₱2,226,147.26 in favor of MGM,15 and the
other, 16 in the amount of ₱62,415.34, representing the three percent (3%) withholding tax, in favor of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR).17

On November 5, 1997, the respondent, through counsel, sent a letter dated October 20, 1997 18 to the PNP, demanding
the payment of ₱2,288,562.60 for the construction materials MGM procured for the PNP under their December 1995
Contract.

On November 17, 1997, the PNP, through its Officer-in-Charge, replied19 to respondent’s counsel, informing her of the
payment made to MGM via Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) Check No. 0000530631, 20
as evidenced by Receipt No.
001, 21 issued by the respondent to the PNP on April 23, 1996.22

On November 26, 1997, respondent, through counsel, responded by reiterating her demand 23 and denying having ever
received the LBP check, personally or through an authorized person. She also claimed that Receipt No. 001, a copy of
which was attached to the PNP’s November 17, 1997 letter, could not support the PNP’s claim of payment as the
aforesaid receipt belonged to Montaguz Builders, her other company, which was also doing business with the PNP, and
not to MGM, with which the contract was made.

On May 5, 1999, respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against the petitioner, represented by the Chief of the
PNP, before the RTC, Branch 222 of Quezon City. 24 This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q99-37717.

The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss 25 on July 5, 1999, on the ground that the claim or demand set forth in
respondent’s complaint had already been paid or extinguished, 26 as evidenced by LBP Check No. 0000530631 dated
April 18, 1996, issued by the PNP to MGM, and Receipt No. 001, which the respondent correspondingly issued to the PNP.
The petitioner also argued that aside from the fact that the respondent, in her October 20, 1997 letter, demanded the
incorrect amount since it included the withholding tax paid to the BIR, her delay in making such demand "[did] not speak
well of the worthiness of the cause she espouse[d]." 27

Respondent opposed petitioner ’ s motion to dismiss in her July 12, 1999 Opposition28and September 10, 1999
Supplemental Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. 29 Respondent posited that Receipt No. 001, which the petitioner claimed
was issued by MGM upon respondent’s receipt of the LBP check, was, first, under the business name "Montaguz
Builders," an entity separate from MGM. Next, petitioner’s allegation that she received the LBP check on April 19, 1996
was belied by the fact that Receipt No. 001, which was supposedly issued for the check, was dated four days later, or April
23, 1996. Moreover, respondent averred, the PNP’s own Checking Account Section Logbook or the Warrant Register,
showed that it was one Edgardo Cruz (Cruz) who signed for the check due to MGM, contrary to her usual practice of
30

personally receiving and signing for checks payable to her companies.

After conducting hearings on the Motion to Dismiss, the RTC issued an Order 31 on May 4, 2001, denying the petitioner’s
motion for lack of merit. The petitioner thereafter filed its Answer, 32 wherein it restated the same allegations in its Motion
to Dismiss.

Trial on the merits followed the pre-trial conference, which was terminated on June 25, 2002 when the parties failed to
arrive at an amicable settlement.33

On September 3, 2002, shortly after respondent was sworn in as a witness, and after her counsel formally offered her
testimony in evidence, Atty. Norman Bueno, petitioner’s counsel at that time, made the following stipulations in open
court:

Atty. Bueno (To Court)

Your Honor, in order to expedite the trial, we will admit that this witness was contracted to deliver the construction
supplies or materials. We will admit that she complied, that she actually delivered the materials. We will admit that Land
Bank Corporation check was issued although we will not admit that the check was not released to her, as [a] matter of
fact, we have the copy of the check. We will admit that Warrant Register indicated that the check was released although
we will not admit that the check was not received by the [respondent].

Court (To Atty. Albano)

So, the issues here are whether or not the [respondent] received the check for the payment of the construction materials
or supplies and who received the same. That is all.

Atty. Albano (To Court)

Yes, your Honor.

Court (To Atty. Albano)

I think we have an abbreviated testimony here. Proceed. 34 (Emphasis ours.)

The stipulations made by the petitioner through Atty. Bueno were in consonance with the admissions it had previously
made, also through Atty. Bueno, in its Answer, 35 and pre-trial brief36:

Answer:

IX
It ADMITS the allegation in paragraph 9 of the Complaint that [respondent] delivered to the PNP Engineering Service the
construction materials. It also ADMITS the existence of Receipt Nos. 151, 152 and 153 alleged in the same paragraph,
copies of which are attached to the Complaint as Annexes "G," "G-1" and "G-2."37 (Emphasis ours.)

Pre-trial Brief:

III

ADMISSIONS

3.1. Facts and/or documents admitted

For brevity, [petitioner] admit[s] only the allegations in [respondent’s] Complaint and the annexes thereto that were
admitted in the Answer.38 (Emphases ours.)

With the issue then confined to whether respondent was paid or not, the RTC proceeded with the trial.

Respondent, in her testimony, narrated that on April 18, 1996, she went to the PNP Finance Center to claim a check due
to one of her companies, Montaguz Builders. As the PNP required the issuance of an official receipt upon claiming its
checks, respondent, in preparation for the PNP check she expected, already signed Montaguz Builders Official Receipt
No. 001, albeit the details were still blank. However, upon arriving at the PNP Finance Center, respondent was told that
the check was still with the LBP, which could not yet release it. Respondent then left for the Engineering Services Office to
see Captain Rama, along with Receipt No. 001, which she had not yet issued. 39Respondent claimed that after some time,
she left her belongings, including her receipt booklet, at a bench in Captain Rama’s office when she went around the
Engineering Office to talk to some other people. 40 She reasoned that since she was already familiar and comfortable with
the people in the PNPES Office, she felt no need to ask anyone to look after her belongings, as it was her "normal
practice"41 to leave her belongings in one of the offices there. The next day, respondent alleged that when she returned
for the check due to Montaguz Builders that she was not able to claim the day before, she discovered for the first time
that Receipt No. 001, which was meant for that check, was missing. Since she would not be able to claim her check
without issuing a receipt, she just informed the releaser of the missing receipt and issued Receipt No. 002 in its
place.42 After a few months, respondent inquired with the PNP Finance Center about the payment due to MGM under
the Contract of December 1995 and was surprised to find out that the check payable to MGM had already been released.
Upon making some inquiries, respondent learned that the check, payable to MGM, in the amount of ₱2,226,147.26, was
received by Cruz, who signed the PNP’s Warrant Register. Respondent admitted to knowing Cruz, as he was connected
with Highland Enterprises, a fellow PNP-accredited contractor. However, she denied ever having authorized Cruz or
Highland Enterprises to receive or claim any of the checks due to MGM or Montaguz Builders. 43 When asked why she
had not filed a case against Cruz or Herminio Reyes, the owner of Highland Enterprises, considering the admitted fact
that Cruz claimed the check due to her, respondent declared that there was no reason for her to confront them as it was
the PNP’s fault that the check was released to the wrong person. Thus, it was the PNP’s problem to find out where the
money had gone, while her course of action was to go after the PNP, as the party involved in the Contract. 44

On April 29, 2003, petitioner presented Ms. Jesusa Magtira, who was then the "check releaser"45 of the PNP, to prove that
the respondent received the LBP check due to MGM, and that respondent herself gave the check to Cruz. 46 Ms. Magtira
testified that on April 23, 1996, she released the LBP check payable to the order of MGM, in the amount of ₱2,226,147.26,
to the respondent herein, whom she identified in open court. She claimed that when she released the check to
respondent, she also handed her a voucher, and a logbook also known as the Warrant Register, for signing. 47 When
asked why Cruz was allowed to sign for the check, Ms. Magtira explained that this was allowed since the respondent
already gave her the official receipt for the check, and it was respondent herself who gave the logbook to Cruz for
signing.48

The petitioner next presented Edgardo Cruz for the purpose of proving that the payment respondent was claiming
rightfully belonged to Highland Enterprises. Cruz testified that Highland Enterprises had been an accredited contractor
of the PNP since 1975. In 1995, Cruz claimed that the PNPES was tasked to construct "by administration" a condominium
building. This meant that the PNPES had to do all the work, from the canvassing of the materials to the construction of
the building. The PNPES allegedly lacked the funds to do this and so asked for Highland Enterprises’s help.49 In a meeting
with its accredited contractors, the PNPES asked if the other contractors would agree to the use of their business
name50 for a two percent (2%) commission of the purchase order price to avoid the impression that Highland Enterprises
was monopolizing the supply of labor and materials to the PNP. 51Cruz alleged that on April 23, 1996, he and the
respondent went to the PNP Finance Center to claim the LBP check due to MGM. Cruz said that the respondent handed
him the already signed Receipt No. 001, which he filled up. He claimed that the respondent knew that the LBP check was
really meant for Highland Enterprises as she had already been paid her 2% commission for the use of her business name
in the concerned transaction.52

On September 8, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [respondent] and against [petitioner]
ordering the latter to pay [respondent] the following sums:

(1) ₱2,226,147.26 representing the principal sum plus interest at 14% per annum from April 18, 1996 until the same shall
have been fully paid;

(2) 20% of the sum to be collected as attorney’s fees; and,

(3) Costs of suit.53

The RTC declared that while Cruz’s testimony seemed to offer a plausible explanation on how and why the LBP check
ended up with him, the petitioner, already admitted in its Answer, and Pre-trial Brief, that MGM, did in fact deliver the
construction materials worth ₱2,288,562.60 to the PNP. The RTC also pointed out the fact that the petitioner made the
same admissions in open court to expedite the trial, leaving only one issue to be resolved: whether the respondent had
been paid or not. Since this was the only issue, the RTC said that it had no choice but to go back to the documents and
the "documentary evidence clearly indicates that the check subject of this case was never received by [respondent]."54 In
addition, the PNP’s own Warrant Register showed that it was Edgardo Cruz who received the LBP check, and Receipt No.
001 submitted by the petitioner to support its claim was not issued by MGM, but by Montaguz Builders, a different entity.
Finally, the RTC held that Cruz’s testimony, which appeared to be an afterthought to cover up the PNP’s blunder, were
irreconcilable with the petitioner’s earlier declarations and admissions, hence, not credit-worthy.
The petitioner appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the RTC ’s ruling on
September 27, 2006:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the 14% interest per annum
imposed on the principal amount is ordered reduced to 12%, computed from November 16, 1997 until fully paid. The
order for the payment of attorney’s fees and costs of the suit is DELETED.55

The Court of Appeals, in deciding against the petitioner, held that the petitioner’s admissions and declarations, made in
various stages of the proceedings are express admissions, which cannot be overcome by allegations of respondent’s
implied admissions. Moreover, petitioner cannot controvert its own admissions and it is estopped from denying that it
had a contract with MGM, which MGM duly complied with. The Court of Appeals agreed with the RTC that the real issue
for determination was whether the petitioner was able to discharge its contractual obligation with the respondent. The
Court of Appeals held that while the PNP’s own Warrant Register disclosed that the payment due to MGM was received
by Cruz, on behalf of Highland Enterprises, the PNP’s contract was clearly with MGM, and not with Highland Enterprises.
Thus, in order to extinguish its obligation, the petitioner should have directed its payment to MGM unless MGM
authorized a third person to accept payment on its behalf.

The petitioner is now before this Court, praying for the reversal of the lower courts’ decisions on the ground that "the
Court of Appeals committed a serious error in law by affirming the decision of the trial court."56

THE COURT’S RULING:

This case stemmed from a contract executed between the respondent and the petitioner. While the petitioner, in
proclaiming that the respondent’s claim had already been extinguished, initially insisted on having fulfilled its contractual
obligation, it now contends that the contract it executed with the respondent is actually a fictitious contract to conceal
the fact that only one contractor will be supplying all the materials and labor for the PNP condominium project.

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the contract between the petitioner and the respondent on
the strength of the documentary evidence presented and offered in Court and on petitioner’s own stipulations and
admissions during various stages of the proceedings.

It is worthy to note that while this petition was filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the assertions and arguments
advanced herein are those that will necessarily require this Court to re-evaluate the evidence on record.

It is a well-settled rule that in a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised by the parties and
passed upon by this Court.57

This Court has, on many occasions, distinguished between a question of law and a question of fact. We held that when
there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, then it is a question of law; but when the doubt arises as to
the truth or falsity of the alleged facts, then it is a question of fact. 58 "Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the
question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a question of law." 59To elucidate further, this
Court, in Hko Ah Pao v. Ting60 said:
One test to determine if there exists a question of fact or law in a given case is whether the Court can resolve the issue
that was raised without having to review or evaluate the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it will
be a question of fact. Thus, the petition must not involve the calibration of the probative value of the evidence presented.
In addition, the facts of the case must be undisputed, and the only issue that should be left for the Court to decide is
whether or not the conclusion drawn by the CA from a certain set of facts was appropriate. 61(Emphases ours.)

In this case, the circumstances surrounding the controversial LBP check are central to the issue before us, the resolution
of which, will require a perusal of the entire records of the case including the transcribed testimonies of the witnesses.
Since this is an appeal via certiorari, questions of fact are not reviewable. As a rule, the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are final and conclusive 62 and this Court will only review them under the following recognized exceptions: (1)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3)
when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findi ngs
of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence
and are contradicted by the evidence on record. 63

Although petitioner’s sole ground to support this petition was stated in such a manner as to impress upon this Court that
the Court of Appeals committed an error in law, what the petitioner actually wants us to do is to review and re -examine
the factual findings of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals.

Since the petitioner has not shown this Court that this case falls under any of the enumerated exceptions to the rule, we
are constrained to uphold the facts as established by both the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and, consequently, the
conclusions reached in the appealed decision.

Nonetheless, even if we were to exercise utmost liberality and veer away from the rule, the records will show that the
petitioner had failed to establish its case by a preponderance of evidence.64 Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides the guidelines in determining preponderance of evidence:

SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined.— In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of
evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the
nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of
interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also
consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.

Expounding on the concept of preponderance of evidence, this Court in Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., 65 held:
"Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible
evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. 66

The petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals should not have relied "heavily, if not solely" 67 on the admissions made by
petitioner’s former counsel, thereby losing sight of the "secret agreement" between the respondent and Highland
Enterprises, which explains why all the documentary evidence were in respondent’s name.68

The petitioner relies mainly on Cruz’s testimony to support its allegations. Not only did it not present any other witness to
corroborate Cruz, but it also failed to present any documentation to confirm its story. It is doubtful that the petitioner or
the contractors would enter into any "secret agreement" involving millions of pesos based purely on verbal affirmations.
Meanwhile, the respondent not only presented all the documentary evidence to prove her claims, even the petitioner
repeatedly admitted that respondent had fully complied with her contractual obligations.

The petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals should have appreciated the clear and adequate testimony of Cruz, and
should have given it utmost weight and credit especially since his testimony was a "judicial admission against interest –
a primary evidence which should have been accorded full evidentiary value." 69

The trial court’s appreciation of the witnesses’ testimonies is entitled to the highest respect since it was in a better
position to assess their credibility. 70 The RTC held Cruz’s testimony to be "not credit worthy" 71 for being irreconcilable
with petitioner’s earlier admissions. Contrary to petitioner’s contentions, Cruz’s testimony cannot be considered as a
judicial admission against his interest as he is neither a party to the case nor was his admission against his own interest,
but actually against either the petitioner’s or the respondent’s interest. Petitioner’s statements on the other hand, were
deliberate, clear, and unequivocal and were made in the course of judicial proceedings; thus, they qualify as judicial
admissions.72 In Alfelor v. Halasan,73 this Court held that:

A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof;
production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of
controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such
admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored,
whether objection is interposed by the party or not. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading
are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what
was pleaded.74

The petitioner admitted to the existence and validity of the Contract of Agreement executed between the PNP and MGM,
as represented by the respondent, on December 11, 1995. It likewise admitted that respondent delivered the construction
materials subject of the Contract, not once, but several times during the course of the proceedings. The only matter
petitioner assailed was respondent’s allegation that she had not yet been paid. If Cruz’s testimony were true, the
petitioner should have put respondent in her place the moment she sent a letter to the PNP, demanding payment for the
construction materials she had allegedly delivered. Instead, the petitioner replied that it had already paid respondent as
evidenced by the LBP check and the receipt she supposedly issued. This line of defense continued on, with the petitioner
assailing only the respondent’s claim of nonpayment, and not the rest of respondent’s claims, in its motion to dismiss, its
answer, its pre-trial brief, and even in open court during the respondent’s testimony. Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court states:

SECTION 4. Judicial Admissions.–An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

Petitioner’s admissions were proven to have been made in various stages of the proceedings, and since the petitioner
has not shown us that they were made through palpable mistake, they are conclusive as to the petitioner. Hence, the
only question to be resolved is whether the respondent was paid under the December 1995 Contract of Agreement.

The RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the petitioner’s obligation has not been extinguished. The
petitioner’s obligation consists of payment of a sum of money. In order for petitioner’s payment to be effective in
extinguishing its obligation, it must be made to the proper person. Article 1240 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in
interest, or any person authorized to receive it.

In Cembrano v. City of Butuan,75 this Court elucidated on how payment will effectively extinguish an obligation, to wit:

Payment made by the debtor to the person of the creditor or to one authorized by him or by the law to receive it
extinguishes the obligation. When payment is made to the wrong party, however, the obligation is not extinguished as to
the creditor who is without fault or negligence even if the debtor acted in utmost good faith and by mistake as to the
person of the creditor or through error induced by fraud of a third person.

In general, a payment in order to be effective to discharge an obligation, must be made to the proper person. Thus,
payment must be made to the obligee himself or to an agent having authority, express or implied, to receive the
particular payment. Payment made to one having apparent authority to receive the money will, as a rule, be treated as
though actual authority had been given for its receipt. Likewise, if payment is made to one who by law is authorized to
act for the creditor, it will work a discharge. The receipt of money due on a judgment by an officer authorized by law to
accept it will, therefore, satisfy the debt. 76

The respondent was able to establish that the LBP check was not received by her or by her authorized personnel. The
PNP’s own records show that it was claimed and signed for by Cruz, who is openly known as being connected to
Highland Enterprises, another contractor. Hence, absent any showing that the respondent agreed to the payment of the
contract price to another person, or that she authorized Cruz to claim the check on her behalf, the payment, to be
effective must be made to her.77

The petitioner also challenged the RTC’s findings, on the ground that it "overlooked material fact and circumstance of
significant weight and substance."78 Invoking the doctrine of adoptive admission, the petitioner pointed out that the
respondent’s inaction towards Cruz, whom she has known to have claimed her check as early as 1996, should be taken
against her. Finally, the petitioner contends that Cruz’s testimony should be taken against respondent as well, under Rule
130, Sec. 32 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, since she has not presented any "controverting evidence x x x
notwithstanding that she personally heard it."79

The respondent has explained her inaction towards Cruz and Highland Enterprises. Both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals have found her explanation sufficient and this Court finds no cogent reason to overturn the assessment by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals of the respondent’s testimony. It may be recalled that the respondent argued that
since it was the PNP who owed her money, her actions should be directed towards the PNP and not Cruz or Highland
Enterprises, against whom she has no adequate proof. 80 Respondent has also adequately explained her delay in filing an
action against the petitioner, particularly that she did not want to prejudice her other pending transactions with the
PNP.81

The petitioner claims that the RTC "overlooked material fact and circumstance of significant weight and substance," 82 but
it ignores all the documentary evidence, and even its own admissions, which are evidence of the greater weight and
substance, that support the conclusions reached by both the RTC and the Court of Appeals.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the RTC erred in the interest rate and other monetary sums awarded t o
respondent as baseless. However, we must further modify the interest rate imposed by the Court of Appeals pursuant to
the rule laid down in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 83:

I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the
contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in
determining the measure of recoverable damages.

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of
interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of
money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall
itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be
12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of
damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however,
shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with
reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to
run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be
so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the
judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest,
whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its
satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit. 84

Since the obligation herein is for the payment of a sum of money, the legal interest rate to be imposed, under Article
2209 of the Civil Code is six percent (6%) per annum:

Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for
damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the
absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum.

Following the guidelines above, the legal interest of 6% per annum is to be imposed from November 16, 1997, the date
of the last demand, and 12% in lieu of 6% from the date this decision becomes final until fully paid.lawphi1

Petitioner’s allegations of sham dealings involving our own government agencies are potentially disturbing and alarming.
If Cruz’s testimony were true, this should be a lesson to the PNP not to dabble in spurious transactions. Obviously, if it
can afford to give a 2% commission to other contractors for the mere use of their business names, then the petitioner is
disbursing more money than it normally would in a legitimate transaction. It is recommended that the pro per agency
investigate this matter and hold the involved personnel accountable to avoid any similar occurrence in the future.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 80623 dated
September 27, 2006 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the legal interest to be paid is SIX PERCENT (6%) per
annum on the amount of ₱2,226,147.26, computed from the date of the last demand or on November 16, 1997. A
TWELVE PERCENT (12%) per annum interest in lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%) shall be imposed on such amount upon finality
of this decision until the payment thereof.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 217694, January 27, 2016

FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ARTURO LOO PO, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to reverse and set aside the October 31, 2014 Decision 2and the March 6,
2015 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 134701 which affirmed the September 16, 2013
Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 67 (RTC) in SCA Case No. 3831. The RTC decision, in turn,
sustained the March 21, 2013 Decision5 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig City (MeTC), which dismissed the
unlawful detainer case filed by petitioner Fairland Knitcraft Corporation (Fairland) against respondent Arturo Loo Po (Po)
for failure to prove its case by preponderance of evidence.

The Antecedents

In a complaint6 for unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 19429, filed before the MeTC, Fairland alleged that it
was the owner of Condominium Unit No. 205 in Cedar Mansion II on Ma. Escriba Street, Pasig City. The said unit was
leased by Fairland to Po by verbal agreement, with a rental fee of P20,000.00 a month, to be paid by Po at the beginning
of each month. From March 2011, Po had continuously failed to pay rent. For said reason, Fairland opted not to renew
the lease agreement anymore.

On January 30, 2012, Fairland sent a formal letter 7 to Po demanding that he pay the amount of P220,000.00, representing
the rental arrears, and that he vacate the leased premises within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the letter. Despite
receipt of the demand letter and the lapse of the said 15-day period to comply, Po neither tendered payment for the
unpaid rent nor vacated the premises. Thus, on December 12, 2012, Fairland was constrained to file the complaint for
unlawful detainer before the MeTC. Po had until January 7, 2013 to file his answer but he failed to do so. Hence, on
February 6, 2013, Fairland filed a motion to render judgment. 8

In its February 21, 2013 Order,9 the MeTC considered the case submitted for decision.

On March 1, 2013, Po's counsel filed his Entry of Appearance with Motion for Leave of Court to file Comment/Opposition
to Motion to Render Judgment. 10 In the attached Comment/Opposition, Po denied the allegations against him and
commented that there was no supporting document that would show that Fairland owned the property; that there was
no lease contract between them; that there were no documents attached to the complaint which would show that
previous demands had been made and received by him; that the alleged unpaid rental was P220,000.00, but the amount
of damages being prayed for was P440,000.00; that the issue in the case was one of ownership; and that it was the RTC
which had jurisdiction over the case.

The MeTC treated the comment/opposition as Po's answer to the complaint. Considering, however, that the case fell
under the Rules of Summary Procedure, the same was deemed filed out of time. Hence, the motion was denied. 11
The Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court

In its March 21, 2013 Decision, the MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit due to Fairland's failure to prove its
claim by preponderance of evidence. The MeTC explained that although the complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of
action, Fairland failed to prove that it was entitled to the possession of the subject property. There was no evidence
presented to support its claim against Po either.

Aggrieved, Fairland seasonably filed its appeal before the RTC under Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. Being an appealed
case, the RTC required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

In its memorandum,12 Fairland argued that an unlawful detainer case was a special civil action governed by summary
procedure. In cases where a defendant failed to file his answer, there was no need for a declaration of default. Fairland
claimed that the Rules stated that in such cases, judgment should be based on the "facts alleged in the complaint," 13 and
that there was no requirement that judgment must be based on facts proved by preponderance of evidence.
Considering that the presentation of evidence was not required when a defendant in an ejectment case failed to appear
in a preliminary conference, the same should be applied when no answer had been filed.

Fairland continued that the failure to file an answer in an ejectment case was tantamount to an admission by the
defendant of all the ultimate facts alleged in the complaint. There was no more need for evidence in such a situation as
every allegation of ultimate facts in the complaint was deemed established by the defendant's acquiescence.

On July 18, 2013, Po filed his memorandum14 and countered that there was no merit in Fairland's insistence that evidence
was unnecessary when no answer had been filed. The facts stated in the complaint did not warrant a rendition of
judgment in the plaintiffs favor. The court had the discretion to rule on the pleadings based on its evaluation of the
allegation of facts.

Further, all the statements in the complaint were mere allegations which were not substantiated by any competent
evidence. Po asserted that there was no proof presented to show that the subject property was indeed owned by
Fairland; that there was no lease contract between the parties; that he never received the demand letter, dated January
30, 2012; and that the amount stated in the prayer of the complaint did not coincide with the amount of unpaid rent. Po
also reiterated that the case involved an issue of ownership over the condominium unit he was occupying.

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On September 16, 2013, the RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling and agreed that Fairland failed to establish its case by
preponderance of evidence. There was nothing on record that would establish Fairland's right over the property subject
of the complaint. Though it had been consistently ruled that the only issue for resolution in an ejectment case was the
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the
party-litigants, the court may go beyond the question of physical possession provisionally. The RTC concluded that even
assuming that Po was not the lawful owner, his actual physical possession of the subject property created the
presumption that he was entitled to its possession thereof.

Fairland filed a motion for reconsideration 15 attaching its condominium certificate of title16 over the subject property, but
it was denied by the RTC in its Order,17 dated February 24, 2014.

Undaunted, Fairland filed a petition for review 18 under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the CA.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In the assailed Decision, dated October 31, 2014, the CA dismissed the petition and ruled that an action for unlawful
detainer would not lie against Po. Notwithstanding the abbreviated proceeding it ordained and the limited pleadings it
allowed, the Rules on Summary Procedure did not relax the rules on evidence. In order for an action for recovery of
possession to prosper, it was indispensable that he who brought the action should prove not only his ownership but also
the identity of the property claimed. The CA concluded, however, that Fairland failed to discharge such bounden duty.

Fairland filed its motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its assailed Resolution, dated March 6, 2015.

Hence, this petition.

ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS

IN AN EJECTMENT CASE WHEREIN NO ANSWER WAS SEASONABLY FILED, IT IS AN

ERROR OF LAW TO BASE JUDGMENT ON PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE

II

HOLDING THAT EVIDENCE IN AN EJECTMENT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ATTACHED TO THE
COMPLAINT IS AN ERROR OF LAW.19ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Fairland argues that in ejectment cases, presentation of evidence was undertaken through the submission of position
papers but the same was dispensed with when the defendant failed to file an answer or when either party failed to
appear during the preliminary conference. In an ejectment case, the scope of inquiry should be limited to the sufficiency
of the cause of action stated in the complaint when no seasonable answer was filed. The attachment of documentary
evidence to the Complaint was not a requirement and was even proscribed by law.

In his Comment,20 Po countered that the present petition raised a question of fact. Although couched in different words,
the issues raised here were substantially the same as the issues raised before the CA. There was no legal basis in
Fairland's assertion that evidence was dispensed with when no answer to the complaint had been filed. Such argument
would undermine the inherent authority of the courts to resolve legal issues based on the facts of the case and on the
rules on evidence. Contrary to Fairland's position, the court decided the case on the basis of the complaint which was
found wanting in preponderance of evidence.

In its Reply,21 Fairland posited that the petition did not raise mere questions of fact but one of law as what was being
sought for review was the erroneous dismissal of the ejectment case for lack of preponderance of evidence. Since no
answer was filed and the complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action for unlawful detainer, it became the duty of the
MeTC to decide the case in its favor.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Complaint has a valid cause of action for Unlawful Detainer

Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court lays down the requirements for filing a complaint for unlawful detainer, to wit:

Section 1. - Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the provision of the next succeeding
section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any
land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession,
by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (l) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under
them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.

Stated differently, unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property. This action may
be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person from whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.
The possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an
express or implied contract between them. The defendant's possession, however, became illegal when the plaintiff
demanded that the defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess
under the contract, and the defendant refused to heed such demand. A case for unlawful detainer must be instituted one
year from the unlawful withholding of possession. 22

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1) initially, possessi on of
the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession
became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3)
thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property, and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof;
and (4) within one (1) year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.23
There is no question that the complaint filed by Fairland adequately alleged a cause of action for unlawful detainer. The
pertinent portion of the said complaint reads:

xxx

3. Plaintiff is the owner of, and had been leasing to the defendant, the premises mentioned above as the
residence of the latter;

4. There is no current written lease contract between plaintiff and the defendant, but the latter agreed to
pay the former the amount of Php2o,ooo.oo as rent at the beginning of each month. Thus, the term of
the lease agreement is renewable on a month-to-month basis;

5. Since March 2011, defendant has not been paying the aforesaid rent despite plaintiffs repeated
demands;

6. Due to defendant's continuous failure to pay rent, plaintiff reached a decision not to renew the lease
agreement. It sent a formal letter, x x x demanding defendant to pay the amount of Php220,000.00,
representing defendant's twelve month rental arrears beginning January 2011, and to vacate the leased
premises, both within fifteen (15) days from receipt of said letter;

7. Despite receipt of the aforesaid demand letter and lapse of the fifteen day period given to comply
with plaintiffs demand, defendant neither tendered payment for the unpaid rent nor vacated the leased
premises. Worse, defendant has not been paying rent up to now;

x x x24ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The above-cited portions of the complaint sufficiently alleged that Fairland was the owner of the subject property being
leased to Po by virtue of an oral agreement. There was a demand by Fairland for Po to pay rent and vacate before the
complaint for unlawful detainer was instituted. The complaint was seasonably filed within the one-year period prescribed
by law. With all the elements present, there was clearly a cause of action in the complaint for unlawful detainer.

Under the Rules of Summary Procedure, the weight of evidence is not considered when a judgment is rendered based
on the complaint

The question now is whether the MeTC correctly dismissed the case for lack of preponderance of evidence. Fairland
posits that judgment should have been rendered in its favor on the basis of the complaint itself and no t on its failure to
adduce proof of ownership over the subject property.

The Court agrees with Fairland's position.

The summons, together with the complaint and its annexes, was served upon Po on December 28, 2012. This
presupposes that the MeTC found no ground to dismiss the action for unlawful detainer. 25Nevertheless, Po failed to file
his answer on time and the MeTC had the option to render judgment motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff. In
relation thereto, Sections 5 and 6 of the Rules on Summary Procedure provide:

Sec. 5. Answer. - Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the
complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded
therein shall be deemed waived, except for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Cross-claims and
compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall be considered barred. The answer to
counterclaims or cross-claims shall be filed and served within ten (10) days from service of the answer in
which they are pleaded.

Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. - Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period
above provided, the court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein. The court may
in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorney's fees claimed for being excessive or
otherwise unconscionable, without prejudice to the applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court, if there are two or more defendants.

[Emphasis supplied]

Section 6 is clear that in case the defendant failed to file his answer, the court shall render judgment, either motu
proprio or upon plaintiffs motion, based solely on the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for.
The failure of the defendant to timely file his answer and to controvert the claim against him constitutes his acquiescence
to every allegation stated in the complaint. Logically, there is nothing to be done in this situation 26 except to render
judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint. 27

Similarly, under Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which governs the rules for forcible entry and unlawful detainer,
if the defendant fails to answer the complaint within the period provided, the court has no authority to declare the
defendant in default. Instead, the court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for. 28

This has been enunciated in the case of Don Tino Realty and Development Corporation v. Florentino,29citing Bayog v.
Natino,30 where the Court held that there was no provision for an entry of default under the Rules of Summary Procedure
if the defendant failed to file his answer.

In this case, Po failed to file his answer to the complaint despite proper service of summons. He also failed to provide a
sufficient justification to excuse his lapses. Thus, as no answer was filed, judgment must be rendered by the court as may
be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint.

Failure to attach annexes is not fatal if the complaint alleges a sufficient cause of action; evidence need not be attached
to the complaint

The lower courts erroneously dismissed the complaint of Fairland simply on the ground that it failed to establish by
preponderance of evidence its ownership over the subject property. As can be gleaned above, the rules do not compel
the plaintiff to attach his evidence to the complaint because, at this inception stage, he only has to file his complaint to
establish his cause of action. Here, the court was only tasked to determine whether the complaint of Fairland alleged a
sufficient cause of action and to render judgment thereon.

Also, there was no need to attach proof of ownership in the complaint because the allegations therein constituted a
sufficient cause of action for unlawful detainer. Only when the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to form a
cause of action shall the attachment become material in the determination thereof. Even under Section 4 of the Rules of
Summary Procedure,31 it is not mandatory to attach annexes to the complaint.

In the case of Lazaro v. Brewmaster32 (Lazaro), where judgment was rendered based on the complaint due to the failure
of the defendant to file an answer under the Rules of Summary Procedure, it was written that:

x x x To determine whether the complaint states a cause of action, all documents attached thereto may,
in fact, be considered, particularly when referred to in the complaint. We emphasize, however, that the
inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations in the complaint. Thus,
consideration of the annexed documents should only be taken in the context of ascertaining the
sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint.

[Emphasis supplied]

In Lazaro, the assailed invalid invoices attached to the complaint were not considered because the complaint already
alleged a sufficient cause of action for collection of sum of money. Those assailed documents were not the bases of the
plaintiffs action for sum of money, but were only attached to the complaint to provide evidentiary details on the alleged
transactions.

Similarly, in the case at bench, there was no need for documentary attachments to prove Fairland's ownership over the
subject property. First, the present action is an action for unlawful detainer wherein only de facto or material possession
is required to be alleged. Evidently, the attachment of any deed of ownership to the complaint is not indispensable
because an action for unlawful detainer does not entirely depend on ownership.

Second, Fairland sufficiently alleged ownership and superior right of possession over the subject property. These
allegations were evidently manifest in the complaint as Fairland claimed to have orally agreed to lease the property to Po.
The Court is of the view that these allegations were clear and unequivocal and did not need supporting attachments to
be considered as having sufficiently established its cause of action. Even the MeTC conceded that the complaint of
Fairland stated a valid cause of action for unlawful detainer. 33 It must be stressed that inquiry into the attached
documents in the complaint is for the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations in the complaint.

Third, considering that Po failed to file an answer within the prescribed period, he was deemed t o have admitted all the
allegations in the complaint including Fairland's claim of ownership. To reiterate, the failure of the defendant to timely fi le
his answer and controvert the claim against him constituted his acquiescence to every allegation stated in the complaint.
In the Entry of Appearance with Motion for Leave of Court to file Comment/Opposition to Motion to Render Judgment,
which was belatedly filed and so was denied by the MeTC, Po merely denied the allegations against him without even
bothering to aver why he claimed to have a superior right of possession of the subject property. 34

Fourth, it is only at the later stage of the summary procedure when the affidavits of witnesses and other evidence on
factual issues shall be presented before the court. Sections 8 and 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure state:

Sec. 8. Record of preliminary conference. - Within five (5) days after the termination of the preliminary
conference, the court shall issue an order stating the matters taken up therein, x x x

Sec. 9. Submission of affidavits and position papers. - Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order
mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses and
other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order, together with their position papers setting
forth the law and the facts relied upon by them.

[Emphasis supplied]

Again, it is worth stressing that these provisions are exactly Sections 9 and 10 under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

Accordingly, it is only at this part of the proceedings that the parties will be required to present and offer their evidence
before the court to establish their causes and defenses. Before the issuance of the record of preliminary conference, the
parties are not yet required to present their respective evidence.

These specific provisions under the Rules of Summary Procedure which are also reflected in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
serve their purpose to immediately settle ejectment proceedings. "Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are
summary proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to
possession of the property involved. It does not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. It is a 'time proce dure'
designed to remedy the situation. 35 Thus, as a consequence of the defendant's failure to file an answer, the court is
simply tasked to render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is
prayed for therein.

As the complaint contains a valid cause of action, a judgment can already be rendered

In order to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of unlawful detainer cases, a remand of this case to the
lower courts is no longer necessary and the case can be determined on its merits by the Court.

To recapitulate, as Po failed to file his answer on time, judgment shall be rendered based only on the complaint of
Fairland without the need to consider the weight of evidence. As discussed above, the complaint of Fairland had a valid
cause of action for unlawful detainer.

Consequently, there is no more need to present evidence to establish the allegation of Fairland of its ownership and
superior right of possession over the subject property. Po's failure to file an answer constitutes an admission of his illegal
occupation due to his non-payment of rentals, and of Fairland's rightful claim of material possession. Thus, judgment
must be rendered finding that Fairland has the right to eject Po from the subject property.

The Judicial Affidavit Rule

On a final note, the Court deems it proper to discuss the relevance of the Judicial Affidavit Rule or A.M. No. 12 -8-8-SC,
where documentary or object evidence are required to be attached. To begin with, the rule is not applicable because
such evidence are required to be attached to a judicial affidavit, not to a complaint. Moreover, as the rule took effect only
on January 1, 2013, it cannot be required in this case because this was earlier filed on December 12, 2012.

Granting that it can be applied retroactively, the rule being essentially remedial, still it has no bearing on the ruling of this
Court.

In the Judicial Affidavit Rule, the attachments of documentary or object evidence to the affidavits is required w hen there
would be a pre-trial or preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing. As stated earlier, where a defendant fails to file
an answer, the court shall render judgment, either motu proprio or upon plaintiffs motion, based solely on the facts
alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for. Thus, where there is no answer, there is no need for a pre-trial,
preliminary conference or hearing. Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule reads:

Section 2. Submission of Judicial Affidavits and Exhibits in lieu of direct testimonies. - (a) The parties shall
file with the court and serve on the adverse party, personally or by licensed courier service, not later
than five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing with respect to
motions and incidents, the following:

(1) The judicial affidavits of their witnesses, which shall take the place of such witnesses' direct testimonies; and

The parties' documentary or object evidence, if any, which shall be attached to the judicial affidavits and marked
(2) as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on in the case of the complainant or the plaintiff, and as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on in the
case of the respondent or the defendant.

(b) Should a party or a witness desire to keep the original document or object evidence in his possession,
he may, after the same has been identified, marked as exhibit, and authenticated, warrant in his judicial
affidavit that the copy or reproduction attached to such affidavit is a faithful copy or reproduction o f
that original. In addition, the party or witness shall bring the original document or object evidence for
comparison during the preliminary conference with the attached copy, reproduction, or pictures, failing
which the latter shall not be admitted.

This is without prejudice to the introduction of secondary evidence in place of the original when allowed
by existing rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 31, 2014 Decision and the March 6, 2015 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 134701 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Arturo Loo Po is ORDERED TO
VACATE Condominium Unit No. 205 located in Cedar Mansion II on Ma. Escriba Street, Pasig City.

Respondent Po is further ORDERED TO PAY the rentals-in-arrears, as well as the rentals accruing in the interim until he
vacates the property. The unpaid rentals shall incur a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from January 30, 2012,
when the demand to pay and to vacate was made, up to the finality of this decision. Thereafter, an interest of six percent
(6%) per annum shall be imposed on the total amount due until full payment is made.

SO ORDERED.chanrobl

[G.R. No. 127811. April 29, 1999]

 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs., ISIDRO COMESARIO y DACASIN, accused-appellant.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

On 2 May 1989, at ten in the evening, seven-year old Reynaldo Fernandez was found dead near the bank of Oraan
Creek in Brgy. Lelemaan, Manaoag, Pangasinan. His neck was slashed. He drowned. He had been missing as early as
twelve noon that day. At first his parents thought that he was out playing in his grandmothers house. When dusk came,
however, Reynaldo still could not be found.

Rodolfo and Emilia Fernandez, parents of the victim, could not think of somebody else other than
accused-appellant Isidro Comesario y Dacasin as the perpetrator of the crime. Emilia narrated that sometime in February
1989 accused-appellant paid her a nocturnal visit at their house while her husband was away in the
fields. Accused-appellant allegedly offered to sell rice but when Emilia refused to buy for lack of money,
accused-appellant countered that they could have sex instead.Accused-appellant then shoved his hardened penis
against Emilia. Scared, Emilia jumped out of her house.

On 28 April 1989 or three (3) days before Reynaldo was killed, Rodolfo caught accused-appellant cutting his mongo
plants. An altercation ensued during which accused-appellant got so angry that he ran after Rodolfo with scythe in
hand. Accused-appellant then threatened to kill Rodolfo or any member of his family. In the morning of 2 May 1989
Rodolfo saw accused-appellant Isidro Comesario holding a scythe and walking towards Oraan Creek.

With this backdrop, Emilia and Rodolfo could not help concluded that it was accused-appellant who killed their son
Reynaldo.

Prosecution witness Napoleon Veloria testified that at around ten-thirty in the morning of 2 May 1989, while he was
in the vicinity of Oraan Creek, he saw accused-appellant dragging a boy with his left hand while holding a scythe in his
right. He did not recognized Reynaldo although the boy was wearing a striped t-shirt and blue short
pants. Accused-appellant appeared to be angry while the boy was crying. Napoleon thought that the two (2) were just
siblings. He did not see the actual killing as he only learned about the death of Reynaldo the following day. Nevertheless,
he believe accused-appellant was the killer as he was the last person seen together with the victim.

On 22 November 1989 accused-appellant was charged with murder.

On his part, accused-appellant averred that at the time of the incident, he was helping in the construction of their
house together with his father and brothers. He only left their house to gather grass for their farm animals. He did not go
far though as there was enough supply nearby.

On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the court below found accused-appellant guilty as charged and sentenced
him to reclusion perpetua. In this appeal accused-appellant maintains his innocence and asserts that the circumstantial
evidence proffered by the prosecution was too meager to support his conviction.

Doctrinally, an accused is presumed innocent. This presumption prevails unless overturned by competent and
credible proof. To sustain a conviction, the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Any doubt
must be considered in his favor. Evidence showing a mere possibility of guilt is insufficient to warrant a conviction. [1]
 Accused-appellants conviction by the trial court hinged on circumstantial evidence. To validly invoke circumstantial
evidence, it must be shown that there is more than one circumstance and the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. [2] The
circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain of events that can lead reasonably to the conclusion pointing to the
accused to the exclusion of all others as the author of the crime. Logically, it is where the evidence is purely
circumstantial that there should be an even greater need than usual to apply with vigor the rule that the prosecution
cannot depend on the weakness of the defense and that any conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty
of guilt of the accused.[3] Like a tapestry made of strands which create a pattern when interwoven, a judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken
chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all other, as the
guilty person.[4]

In a nutshell, the evidence for the prosecution is that accused-appellant had motive to kill Reynaldo; he allegedly felt
bad when his advances were spurned by Emilia; three (3) days before the killing, accused-appellant had an altercation
with the father of the victim; and, in the morning of 2 May 1989 accused-appellant was seen dragging a boy with his left
hand while holding a scythe in his right towards Oraan Creek. The lone witness for the prosecution who allegedly saw the
boy dragged could not recognize him. All he could say was that the boy was wearing a striped t-shirt and a pair of blue
short pants.

We believe that under all these circumstances taken together accused-appellant should be acquitted.

First. An accused enjoys the presumption of innocence. He need not proved what is legally presumed. If he so
desires he may present evidence on his behalf, but no matter how weak it is, he still deserves an acquittal. This is because
the prosecution must not rely on the weakness of the evidence for the defense but on the strength of its own
evidence. Unless the prosecution has successfully overturned the presumption of innocence, acquittal is inevitable.

Second. The guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. There must be moral certainty in our
unprejudiced mind that it was accused-appellant who committed the crime. Absent this required quantum of evidence
would mean exoneration for accused-appellant. The conviction of the accused-appellant having been based on very
tenuous grounds, our judicial conscience cannot rest easy if we sustain his conviction by the court below.

Third. Mere proof of motive, no matter how strong, is not sufficient to support a conviction, most especially if there
is no other reliable evidence from which it may reasonably be deduced that the accused was the malefactor. [5] The
elements constituting the crime must be shown.

Fourth. The invocation of circumstantial evidence is misplaced. As already adverted to, for circumstantial evidence
to be validly invoked there must be more than one circumstance. In the instant case, the prosecution only presented a
single circumstance and that was when Napoleon Veloria supposedly saw accused-appellant dragging a boy wearing a
striped t-shirt and a pair of blue short pants towards Oraan Creek. From ten in the morning until ten in the evening of 2
May 1989 when the lifeless body of Reynaldo was found near Oraan Creek, there was a paucity of evidence. We cannot
decipher a pattern out of this single strand of circumstance as to support the conclusion that it was accused -appellant
who killed Reynaldo. From this angle alone, it is already clear that circumstantial evidence cannot be successfully availed
of.
 Last. We are not implying that accused-appellant did not commit the crime. All we are saying is that when
measured against the required quantum of evidence in criminal cases, the case for the prosecution has miserably failed
in all aspects. Simply put, if we are to be guided by the established rules of evidence, we can safely say that the guilt of
accused-appellant was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. We find occasion then to reiterate what we have said
in People v. Masalihit:[6]

Before we condemn x x x the crime must first be positively established and that the accused is guilty sans any scintilla of
doubt. This is elementary and fundamental in our criminal justice systems. Any suspicion or belief that that accused is
guilty no matter how strong cannot substitute for the quantum of evidence that is required to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

Accused-appellant should not be punished for the failure of the prosecution to dispose of its burden to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence and to establish his guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. This Court
has always stood by the rule that it is better to acquit a guilty person than to convict an innocent one.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, finding accused-appellant
ISIDRO COMESARIO Y DACASIN guilty murder is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for gross insufficiency of evidence;
consequently, he is ACQUITTED of the crime charged and is ordered IMMEDIATELY RELEASED FROM CUSTODY unless
lawfully held for another cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to implement this Decisions and to report to this Court the
action taken hereon immediately but not later than five (5) days from receipt hereof.

Cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 142039. May 27, 2004]

MODESTO Moody MABUNGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Court of Appeals having, by Decision of June 30, 1999, [1] affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court of
Romblon[2] convicting appellant Modesto Mabunga of robbery with force upon things under Article 299 of the Revised
Penal Code, he comes to this Court on a petition for review.

In the morning of October 2, 1994, employees of the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) including Davy Villaruel
(Villaruel) discovered that the hasp of the door of the BFP office in Barangay Capaclan, Romblon, Romblon was
destroyed, and that the only typewriter in their office, a Triumph bearing Serial Number 340118640, was missing.

From the testimonies of prosecution witnesses tricycle driver Sixto Bernardo (Bernardo), Diana Malay (Diana),
Villaruel, Sylvia Silverio Comienzo (Sylvia), and SPO2 Eleazar Madali, the prosecution presented its case as follows:

Around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of October 15, 1994, as Diana was in front of her store in Capaclan, Romblon,
Romblon waiting for a tricycle, she saw appellant, a dealer of marble slabs, who was carrying a box which bore the
marking HOPE and tied with gray straw string, board a pedicab driven by Bernardo. Having heard from her husband
Rodolfo Malay who works with the BFP that appellant was the prime suspect of the police for the robbery at the BFP,
Diana immediately informed her husband of what she saw. She was thereupon instructed by her husband to follow
appellant.[3]

As Diana noticed that the pedicab was heading for the pier, she proceeded on foot to the house of Villaruel [4] whom
she informed of what she had witnessed.
 After the lapse of about 5 minutes, [5] Villaruel, on board his scooter, proceeded to the pier. By that time appellant
had reached the pier, alighted from Bernardos tricycle, and unloaded the HOPE box.

In the meantime, Diana contacted Chief of Police Major Ernesto Madrona at his house. [6]

Appellant, not long after alighting from the tricycle at the pier, reboarded the same tricycle[7] driven by Bernardo,
without the box, and headed for his house at Capaclan. Diana, in fact, saw him on board the tricycle on his way home.

Diana later boarded the tricycle of Bernardo after the latter brought home appellant, and repaired to the pier. There,
by the gate, she saw Villaruel who confirmed to her that he had verified from Bernardo, whom he earlier saw by the same
gate, that the latter indeed conveyed appellant to the pier, with a HOPE box.

Diana also learned from Villaruel that he really saw the box brought by [appellant]. She thus returned on foot to the
house of Major Madrona who instructed SPO2 Eleazar Madali and PO2 Eustaquio Rogero to surreptitiously watch a box
of Hope brand cigarettes placed under a bench inside the PPA passengers terminal owned by [appellant] and wait until
somebody gets said box and load it aboard the vessel M/V Peafrancia 8. [8]

On Villaruels entering the terminal [9] he was told by Sylvia, the cashier on duty at the restaurant therein, that a man,
whom she later identified to be appellant through a photograph shown to her that same day, entrusted the box to her,
he telling her that it contained a damaged electric fan. [10]

Villaruel thereupon kept watch over the box, as SPO2 Madali and PO2 Rogero later did discreetly, until M/V
Peafrancia departed for Batangas at 8:00 p.m., with appellant on board the same. About an hour later, PPA officers
Reynaldo Dianco and Leo Vedito Fontellera arrived at the terminal and the box was turned over by them to SPO2 Madali
and PO2 Rogero. The box, when opened, contained the lost BFP typewriter.

On February 7, 1995, appellant was charged with robbery before the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon
under an information reading:

That on or about the 1st day of October, 1994, at around 12:00 midnight, in [B]arangay Capaclan, municipality of Romblon,
province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent [to]
gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the Office of the Bureau of Fire Protection by forcibly
breaking the door hasp of the main door and upon having gained entry therein, take, steal and carry away one (1)
typewriter (Triumph brand) with Serial No. 340118640, valued at P5,894.00, Philippine currency, belonging to and owned
by the government, without its consent, and to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforestated
amount.[11]

On arraignment on February 21, 1995, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty. [12] Thereafter,
trial ensued.

Appellant interposed alibi with respect to the date and place of occurrence of the alleged robbery.While he
admitted bringing to the pier on October 15, 1994 a box, he claimed, however, that it bore the marking CHAMPION, not
HOPE. At the witness stand, he gave the following tale:

He left Romblon on September 24, 1994 and arrived in Manila the next day. After the lapse of 12 hours, he went to
the Cubao station of the Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus (BLTB) Company and boarded a bus bound for Matnog,
Sorsogon. He reached Matnog on the afternoon of September 27, 1994 and stayed there overnight before proceeding
to Allen, Samar which he reached on September 28, 1994. He then boarded a jeep bound for San Jose, Northern Samar
where he stayed for one (1) hour, after which he proceeded to Calbayog City which he reached on September 29,
1994. He transferred to another jeep bound for Tacloban and arrived there on September 30, 1994. For a day he stayed
in Tacloban to rest, after which he proceeded to Palo, Leyte to visit his project. He arrived in Palo on October 1, 1994. The
next day, he went to Tacloban City and purchased materials for polishing marble. He returned to Palo and supervised his
marble project for a week. When the project was finished, he returned to Cebu on October 6, 1994 and the next day
boarded the ferry [Backwagon] Bay for Romblon. He reached Romblon on October 9, 1994. [13]

In support of his alibi, he presented bus tickets and purchase receipts of materials, viz:

Exhibit 1 BLTB ticket No. 60850, dated September 26, 1994, (Cubao to Matnog, Sorsogon)

Exhibit 2 Bus ticket dated September 28, 1994 issued by E. Tabinas Enterprises to Moody Mabunga (Matnog,
Sorsogon, to Allen, Samar).

Exhibit 3 Invoice No. 18639 issued on October 2, 1993 by Terrazzo Construction and Marble Supply to Moody
Mabunga.[14]

Appellant further claimed that on the afternoon of October 15, 1994, he, along with his son, boarded the pedicab of
Bernardo to which they loaded a box marked CHAMPION containing marble novelties to be brought to Manila via Viva
Penafrancia 8; on reaching the pier, he laid down the box at the gate of the PPA and stood beside it as he waited for the
ship to dock; and when he later boarded the ship, he placed the box at the back of his cot.[15]

Finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery, Branch 81 of the RTC Romblon sentenced him to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of from 4 years and 2 months of prison correccional, as minimum to 8 years and 1 day of
prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs. [16]

The Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial court, relied on Section 3(j) Rule 131 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence which reads:

SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted
and overcome by other evidence:

xxx

(j) That a person in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the
whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him;

The appellate court having denied his motion for reconsideration, [17] appellant lodged the present appeal, ascribing
to it the following errors:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE UNIMPUGNED ALIBI OF THE
ACCUSED, NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABSENCE OF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION.

2. THE COURT OF APEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE THE TYPEWRITER, WHICH WAS
SEARCHED WITHOUT WARRANT AND IN THE ABSENCE OF THE ACCUSED.
 3. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT PRESUMED THE ELEMENT OF INTENT TO GAIN, WHEN
THE SUPPOSED ACT OF THE ACCUSED IN LEAVING THE BOX TO A STRANGER AND NEVER COMING
BACK TO CLAIM IT NEGATED THE NOTION OF ANIMUS LUCRANDI.[18] (Underscoring supplied)

The appeal is impressed with merit.

While courts have consistently looked upon alibi with suspicion not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable
as a defense, but because it can easily be fabricated, [19] the basic rule is for the prosecution, upon which lies the onus, to
establish all the elements of a crime to thereby hold him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Such burden does not shift as
it remains with the prosecution. Tasked with the burden of persuasion, the prosecution must thus rely on the strength of
its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. [20]

Admittedly, the evidence for the prosecution is circumstantial. The alleged robbery was discovered when the
employees of the BFP reported for work on October 2, 1994 and noticed that the hasp of the office door was broken and
the typewriter was missing.

On the sole basis of the presumption laid down under above-quoted Section 3(j) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of appellant.

A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from another fact or group of facts found
or otherwise established in the action. [21] It is an inference as to the existence of a fact not actually known, arising from its
usual connection with another which is known, or a conjecture based on past experience as to what course of human
affairs ordinarily take.[22]

A presumption has the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the party who would be disadvantaged by a finding
of the presumed fact. The presumption controls decision on the presumed fact unless there is counterproof that the
presumed fact is not so.[23]

In criminal cases, however, presumptions should be taken with caution especially in light of serious concerns that
they might water down the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. As special considerations must be given to
the right of the accused to be presumed innocent, there should be limits on the use of presumptions against an accused.

Although possession of stolen property within a limited time from the commission of the theft or robbery is not in
itself a crime, it being possible to possess the same and remain innocent, such possession may be sufficient for the
formation of an inference that the possessor is the thief unless the evidence satisfactorily proves that the property wa s
acquired by the accused by legal means.

How the presumption under Section 3(j) Rule 131 is to be understood, United States v. Catimbang[24] explains:

According to the modern view convictions in cases of this kind are not sustained upon a presumption of law as to the
guilt of the accused. The conviction rests wholly upon an inference of fact as to the guilt of the accused. If as a matter of
probability and reasoning based on the fact of possession of the stolen goods, taken in connection with other evidence,
it may fairly be concluded beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the theft, judgment or conviction may
properly be entered. x x x

The inference of guilt is one of fact and rests upon the common experience of men. But the experience of men has
taught them that an apparently guilty possession may be explained so as to rebut such an inference and an accused
person may therefore put witness on the stand or go to the witness stand himself to explain his possession, and any
reasonable explanation of his possession, inconsistent with his guilty connection with the commission of the crime, will
rebut the inference as to his guilt which the prosecution seeks to have drawn from his guilty possession of the stolen
goods.

It is in this sense that it is sometimes said that the unexplained possession of recently stolen goods will sustain a
conviction of the crime of larceny. [25] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Before an inference of guilt arising from possession of recently stolen goods can be made, however, the following
basic facts need to be proven by the prosecution: (1) that the crime was committed; (2) that the crime was committed
recently; (3) that the stolen property was found in the possession of the defendant; and (4) that the defendant is unable
to explain his possession satisfactorily. [26]

For purposes moreover of conclusively proving possession, the following considerations have to be emphasized: (1)
the possession must be unexplained by any innocent origin; (2) the possession must be fairly recent; and (3) the
possession must be exclusive.[27]

Contrary to the findings of both the trial and appellate courts, the People failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that appellant was caught in exclusive possession of the recently stolen good.

While possession need not mean actual physical control over the thing for it may include constructive possession, it
is still necessary that for possession to be deemed constructive the accused knowingly has the power and the intention
at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person.[28]

The case of U.S. v. Simbahan[29] cited by the appellate court has a different factual setting and is, therefore,
inapplicable to the present case. In Simbahan, the accused, for a consideration of P50.00 pesos, disclosed to the owner
of the missing carabao its precise location. There, this Court held: The word possession as used above can not be limited
to manual touch or personal custody. One who puts or deposits the stolen property in a place of concealment may be
deemed to have such property in his possession. x x x All the facts and circumstances [including the absence of a
satisfactory explanation of his possession] show conclusively that he had possession of said caraballa and fully justify his
conviction.[30]

The accused in Simbahan exercised exclusive dominion and control over the thing lost. Appellant in the present
case did not.

The HOPE box was not concealed and anyone entering and leaving the PPA terminal had access to it, it having been
placed just below one of the benches, around three meters from the cashier, Sylvia.

To assume that in a busy place, such as the PPA terminal, the HOPE box that was opened by the police authorities
and found to contain the missing typewriter is the same box allegedly entrusted by appellant to the cashier is to form an
inference which is, however, doubtful, more than six hours having elapsed from the time the box was allegedly left at
around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon until it was opened by the police authorities at around 9:00 oclock in the evening
after appellant had already boarded the ship.
 A presumption cannot be founded on another presumption. It cannot thus be concluded that from the time the box
was left under the bench, appellant was still in constructive possession thereof, the exercise of exclusive dominion or
control being absent.

Adding serious doubt to the prosecutions claim is that what was allegedly seen being carried by appellant and
entrusted to the cashier was not the stolen typewriter but merely a HOPE box.

A review of the transcript of stenographic notes in fact shows that there are flaws in the prosecutions theory as well
as inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses testimonies that do not warrant appellants conviction.

Why appellant was considered a suspect by the police, no explanation has been proferred. The records, however,
indicate that appellant had previously been indicted before the Municipal Trial Court for theft. [31] On that basis alone, it
is non sequitor to point to him as a suspect.

At all events, apart from appellants supposed possession of the HOPE box on October 15, 1994, no other evidence
was adduced by the prosecution linking him to the robbery. The teaching of Askew v. United States[32] must thus be
heeded:

We have heretofore adverted to the possession of the instruments or of the fruits of a crime as affording ground to
presume the guilt of the possessor; but on this subject no certain rule can be laid down of universal application; the
presumption being not conclusive but disputable, and therefore to be dealt with by the jury alone, as a mere inference of
fact. Its force and value will depend on several considerations. In the first place, if the fact of possession stands alone,
wholly unconnected with any other circumstances, its value or persuasive power is very slight; for the real criminal may
have artfully placed the article in the possession or upon the premises of an innocent person, the better to conceal his
own guilt. It will be necessary, therefore, for the prosecutor to add the proof of other circumstances indicative of guilt, in
order to render the naked possession of the thing available towards a conviction.[33] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

That the fact of possession alone, wholly unconnected with any other circumstances, cannot be relied with
certititude to convict one with robbery is echoed in People v. Geron:[34]

At any rate, the mere possession by the accused of items allegedly stolen, without more, cannot conduce to a single
conclusion that robbery indeed took place or at least was the primary motive for the killings. In the absence of positive
and indubitable evidence showing unlawful taking by the accused by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, the prosecution cannot rely with certitude on the fact of possession alone. The Courts application of the
presumption that a person found in possession of the personal effects belonging to the person robbed and killed is
considered the author of the aggression, the death of the person, as well as the robbery committed, has been
invariably limited to cases where such possession is either unexplained or that the proferred explanation is rendered
implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto.[35] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The appellate court ruled that since it was sufficiently established that appellant was in possession of the typewriter
two weeks after it was stolen, he had the burden of proving that he was not the one responsible for the heist.[36] While a
presumption imposes on a party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut such
presumption, the burden of producing evidence of guilt does not extend to the burden of proving the accuseds
innocence of the crime as the burden of persuasion does not shift and remains throughout the trial upon the
prosecution.

Compounding doubts on the case for the prosecution is its witnesses differing versions on how and where the box
was opened, a fact necessarily important in determining whether its content was indeed the stolen typewriter.

On one hand, a member of the PNP, SPO2 Eleazar Madali, testified during the direct examination by Prosecutor Sy
that the box was opened at the police station:

Q And what time did the M/V P[e]afrancia 8 le[ave]?

A About 8:00 oclock in the evening.

Q And what time was that when you entered the PPA terminal to see the carton?

A May be 3:30 oclock, more or less, the vessel has not arrive[d] yet.

Q - And also because the vessel has left and the carton [w]as not brought out, what did you do?

A We coordinate[d] with the PPA about the box that was not taken and it was turned over to us and we
brought it to the police station.

Q Who was your companion in bringing the box to the police station?

A SPO1 Rogero, our investigator Victor Miano, Fireman Sim, Dave Villaruel then we proceeded to the guard of
the Romblon Police Station.

Q And what was done with the box in the police station?

A When we arrived in the PNP Police Station we have the box opened before the guard and the content of the
box was a typewriter.[37] (Underscoring supplied)

On the other hand, the cashier, Sylvia Silverio Comienzo, testified that the police authorities opened the box inside
her small room in the terminal.

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY PROSECUTOR SY:

Q The day in which you have identified him as Modesto Mabunga, [did he] retrieved (sic) that carton from you
that same day or afternoon?

A No, sir.

Q Who got the carton?

A The policemen, sir.

Q And what did the policemen do when they got the carton?

A They opened it, sir.

Q If you could remember, who were those policemen who got and opened the carton?

A Madrona, Eustaqio and Mike Villaruel.

Q Where did they open that carton?

 A Inside the terminal because I have a small room there.[38] (Underscoring supplied)

On additional direct examination, Sylvia remained adamant in saying that the box was opened in her small room
inside the terminal.

ADDITIONAL DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY PROSECUTOR SY:

Q When the policemen as you said got this carton and opened it, where did the policemen precisely get the
carton, from what place precisely?

A Taken from under the bench.

COURT:

Q Where this Moody placed it?

A Yes, sir.

PROSECUTOR SY CONTINUING:

Q Were you personally present when the policemen got the carton from under the bench where Moody
placed it?

A Yes, sir.

Q And where did the policemen open the carton?

A In our small room.

Q Where you personally present when the policemen go the carton and opened it on that room?

A Yes, sir.

Q Were you personally present when the straw that was used in tying the carton was cut or untie or loosen by
the policemen?

A I was there.

COURT:

Q Why were you there present?

A Because I saw to it what was the content of that box and if it was really an electric fan. [39](Underscoring
supplied)

Without doubt, the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses firsthand and observe their
demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. An examination of the records shows, however, that, as
indicated by the trial judges following comments on prosecution witness Villaruels answers to the quest ions posed to
him during his direct examination, the prosecution evidence leaves much to be desired.

COURT: Very familiar. This witness is a very typical witness. You are just waiting for Atty. Sy to finish his question
for you to say what you have been in your mind regardless of the question but you will just
continue what you have already in your mind without thinking about the question. But remember
 his question, when the question is asked it will appear in your mind, it should be the other way
around, do you understand? You forget what is in your mind, concentrate on the question. You
listen to the question. You are like a tape recorder. You just switch on and then you continue, no
you wait for the question.[40]

Then again, during the cross examination of the same witness, the trial court gave the following observation on his
demeanor:

COURT: The statement of the Court that you are like a fish in outer space is more applicable to you.You are like
a fish in outer space, meaning, you are a police science graduate, meaning, that your career is to be
a policeman and a police officer, an officer of the law. You are now in the court of law, you should
then feel comfortable in a court of law like a fish in the water you should be comfortable in a court
of law because that is part of your career but the way we look at it you are like a lawyer who just
graduated, took the bar and then become an office employee not practicing law in the courtroom
so that when the lawyer comes to Court, he will not come to Court, he is afraid of the courtroom
although he is a lawyer he is afraid of the courtroom. [41] (Underscoring supplied)

Finally, logic, common knowledge and human experience teach that it is unlikely that a robber would represent
himself to be the owner of a stuff which he knows contains stolen property and seek the help of a third person to look
after it.

In fine, the life, liberty and property of a citizen may not be taken away on possibilities, conjectures or even,
generally speaking, a bare probability. [42]

At all events, appellants alibi, for which he submitted documentary evidence, has not been discredited by the
prosecution.

WHEREFORE, the decision on review is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant, Modesto Moody Mabunga,
is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of robbery.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-5371 March 26, 1953

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AQUINO MINGOA, defendant-appellant.

Marcelino Lontok for appellant.

Office of the First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Federico V. Sian for appellee.
REYES, J.:

Found short in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the office of the municipal treasurer of Despujols, Romblon, and
unable to produce the missing fund amounting to P3,938 upon demand by the provincial auditor, the defendant Aquino
Mingoa was prosecuted for the crime of malversation of public funds in the Court of First Instance of Romblon, and
having been found guilty as charged and sentenced to the corresponding penalty, he appealed to the Court of Appeals.
But that court certified the case here on the ground that it involved a constitutional question.

The evidence shows that it is not disputed that upon examination of his books and accounts on September 1, 1949,
defendants, as accountable officer, was found short in the sum above-named and that, required to produce the missing
fund, he was not able to do so. He explained to the examining officer that some days before he had, by mistake, put the
money in a large envelope which he took with him to show and that he forgot it on his seat and it was not there anymore
when he returned. But he did not testify in court and presented no evidence in his favor.

We agree with the trial judge that defendant's explanation is inherently unbelievable and cannot overcome the
presumption of guilt arising from his inability to produce the fund which was found missing. As His Honor observes, if the
money was really lost without defendant's fault, the most natural thing for him to do would be to so inform his superiors
and apply for release from liability. But this he did not do. Instead, he tried to borrow to cover the shortage. And on the
flimsy excuse that he preferred to do his own sleuthing, he even did not report the loss to the police. Considering further
as the prosecution points out in its brief, that defendant had at first tried to avoid meeting the auditor who wanted to
examine his accounts, and that for sometime before the alleged loss many teachers and other employees of the town
had not been paid their salaries, there is good ground to believe that defendant had really malversed the fund in
question and that his story about its loss was pure invention.

It is now contended, however, that lacking direct evidence of actual misappropriation the trial court convicted defendant
on mere presumptions, that is, presumptions of criminal intent in losing the money under the circumstances alleged and
presumptions of guilt from the mere fact that he failed, upon demand to produce the sum lacking. The criticism as to the
first presumption is irrelevant, for the fact is that trial court did not believe defendant's explanation that the money was
lost, considering it mere cloak to cover actual misappropriation. That is why the court said that "whether or not he
(defendant) is guilty of malversation for negligence is of no moment . . . " And as to the other presumption, the same is
authorized by article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to
personal use.

The contention that this legal provision violates the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved cannot be sustained. The question of the constitutionality of the statute not having been raised in the
court below, it may not be considered for the first time on appeal. (Robb vs. People, 68 Phil., 320.)

In many event, the validity of statutes establishing presumptions in criminal cases is now settled matter, Cooley, in his
work on constitutional limitations, 8th ed., Vo. I, pp. 639-641says that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage
of law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by contrary presumption founded upon the
experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumpt ion of
innocence." In line with this view, it is generally held in the United States that the legislature may enact that when certain
facts have been proven they shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the
burden of proof provided there be rational connection between that facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed so that
the inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection
between the two in common experience. (See annotation on constitutionality of statutes or ordinances making one fact
presumptive or prima facie evidence of another, 162 A.L.R. 495-535; also, State vs. Brown, 182 S.E., 838, with reference to
embezzlement.) The same view has been adopted here as may be seen from the decisions of this court in the
U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil., 303; U.S. vs. Luling, 34 Phil., 725; and People vs. Merilo, G.R. No. L-3489, promulgated June 28, 1951.

The statute in the present case creates a presumption of guilt once certain facts are proved. It makes the failure of public
officer to have duly forthcoming, upon proper demaand, any public funds or property with which he is chargeable prima
facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. The ultimate fact presumed is that officer
has malversed the funds or property entrusted to his custody, and the presumption is made to arise from proof that he
has received them and yet he has failed to have them forthcoming upon proper demand. Clearly , the fact presumed is
but a natural inference from the fact proved, so that it cannot be said that there is no rational connection between the
two. Furthermore, the statute establishes only a prima facie presumption, thus giving the accused an opportunity to
present evidence to rebut it. The presumption is reasonable and will stand the test of validity laid down in the above
citations.

There being no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.

G.R. No. 164575 December 6, 2006

ROBERT P. WA-ACON, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks the reversal of the April 22, 2004
Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan convicting petitioner Robert P. Wa-acon of Malversation under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code for misappropriating PhP 92,199.20, which forms part of his accountabilities as Special Collecting Officer of
the National Food Authority (NFA); and the July 23, 2004 Resolution 2 of said graft court denying Wa-acon's plea for
reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 14375.

The Facts

The information against the accused Wa-acon reads as follows:

That on about the period from July 19, 1979 to September 28, 1981, in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Robert P. Wa-acon, a public officer, being a Special Collecting Officer,
National Food Authority (NFA) and stationed at Canonigo, Paco, Manila and as such was accountable and responsible of
rice stocks and empty sacks for which he received and entrusted to him, by reason of his official position, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence, misappropriate, misapply, embezzle and
convert to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid stocks of rice and empty sacks with a total aggregate money
value of P114,303.00, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforementioned amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

The facts of the case as found by the Sandiganbayan are:

On the period from July 19, 1979 to September 28, 1981, accused Robert P. Wa-acon was a Special Collecting Officer of
the National Food Authority (NFA) and was assigned at the Kadiwa Center at Moriones, Tondo, Manila. One of his duties
was to receive grains, consisting of rice and mongo, which shall then be sold to the public on retail. The proceeds of the
sale of the grains shall then be collected by the same accused.

On September 28, 1981, by virtue of a Travel Order, a team of Auditors from the Commission of Audit, composed of
Dionisio A. Nillo, as team leader, Mercedes Punzalan, Audit Examiner II, Herminia Gonzales, Audit Examiner II and Raquel
Cruz, Clerk II, as members, conducted an examination of the accountabilities of various Special Collecting Officers of the
NFA, one of whom was accused Robert P. Wa-acon. The said examination was conducted at the Office of the Regional
Auditor, NFA Metro Manila Office at Paco, Manila. In that office, the audit team asked the presence of accused Robert P.
Wa-acon by virtue of a demand letter dated September 1981, demanding the latter to produce cash, cash items, stocks
and empty sacks and other pertinent papers. As testified by Prosecution witness Dionisio A. Nillo, accused Robert P.
Wa-acon told the audit team that "he has no cash on hand at the time pertaining to his accountability as Special
Collecting Officer. Hence, it was indicated in the Cash Count Sheet that there was no cash counted during the cash
examination.
Based on the examination conducted on the various Warehouse Stock Issues, Empty Sacks Receipts, Official Receipts
submitted and the Certificate of Inventory of Stocks and Empty Sacks dated September 18, 1981, containing the signature
of accused Robert P. Wa-acon and witnessed by Virgilio Cacanendin, Special Investigator, Manolito Diaz, Bookkeeper,
Louie Pastofide, Proceso A. Saavedra, Audit Examiner II and Gloria T. Reyes, Audit Examiner I, the audit team rendered a
Report of Examination, Form 74-A of the Cash and Accounts of accused Robert P. Wa-acon. All of the aforementioned
documents were submitted by Proceso Saavedra, a resident Audit Examiner of the NFA Metro Manila Office, Paco,
Manila, to the Audit team headed by Dionisio A. Nillo. In connection with the Audit conducted, the Audit Team prepared
the following Schedules: Schedule 1: Statement of Rice received by Robert A. Wa-acon, Schedule 1-A: Statement of
Rice/mongo Received by Robert P. Wa-acon, Schedules 2: Statement of Remittances of Proceeds from Sales of Robert P.
Wa-acon, Schedule 3: Statement of Refunds made by Robert P. Wa-acon, Schedule I: Statement of Empty Sacks
Returned by Robert P. Wa-acon, and Summary of Empty Sacks Accountability of Robert P. Wa-acon and the Revised
Summary of Cash Examination of Robert P. Wa-acon.

The Report of the Examination of the Cash and Accountabilities of accused Robert P. Wa-acon shows that the latter
incurred a cash shortage of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand Three Hundred Three Pesos (P114,303.00). In the Revised
Summary of the Cash Examination of accused Robert P. Wa-acon, the cash shortage was changed to One Hundred Two
Thousand and One Hundred Ninety Nine Pesos and Twenty Centavos (P102,199.20) after deducting the cost of sixty (60)
bags of regular milled rice value of Six Thousand Nine Hundred (P6,900.00) and the monetary value of the empty sacks
returned by accused Robert P. Wa-acon, which is Five Thousand Two Hundred Three Pesos and Eighty Centavos
(P5,203.80). However, accused Robert P. Wa-acon made a refund of the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).
Therefore, the total shortage amount[ed] to Ninety Two Thousand One Hundred Ninety Nine Pesos and Twenty
Centavos (P92,199.20).4

During the trial before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner denied that he misapplied and converted for his personal use the
stocks of rice and empty sacks as he had been faithfully remitting all the proceeds of the rice he sold to consumers. 5

Petitioner also contended that the shortage discovered by the Audit Team may be attributed to the discrepancy in the
actual weight of the rice actually delivered to him and that of the weight reflected in the receipts. In other words, he
claimed that the rice delivered to him weighed less than that for which he signed. He alleged that he discovered the
shortage of five (5) to ten (10) kilos per sack only upon delivery of the rice to the station/outlet. Petitioner explained th at
he could not check the weight of the sacks delivered to him as the weighing scale in their office had a maximum capacity
of only twelve (12) kilograms. Petitioner claimed that he informed his superiors of such shortage verbally, but was
unheeded.6

Petitioner further claimed that the only reason he signed for the sacks of rice, despite the shortage, was because he was
told that he would not be paid his salary if he would not sign, added to the fact that he was then hungry —all of which
prompted Wa-acon to sign the audit report of the Audit Team. 7 As to the missing empty sacks, petitioner argued that
those were in the custody of the delivery man who had a logbook where Special Collecting Officers sign as proof that the
delivery man had taken the sacks.8

The Sandiganbayan Ruling

Citing the presumption under the last paragraph of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code that "the failure of the public
officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds which he is chargeable upon demand by any duly authorized officer,
shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use" and the inability of accused
Wa-acon to "rebut the presumption that he had put the rice stocks and the empty sacks to personal use," the
Sandiganbayan found him guilty of malversation of public funds under the Revised Penal Code. In the graft court's April
22, 2004 Decision, the dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Robert P. Wa-acon, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Malversation of Public Funds as defined in and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code and, there
being no modifying circumstance, is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from TWELVE (12) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal minimum, as the minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporalmaximum, as the maximum and to suffer perpetual special disqualification. The
accused Robert P. Wa-acon is likewise ordered to pay a FINE equal to the amount of the funds malversed, which is
Ninety Two Thousand One Hundred Ninety Nine Pesos and Twenty Centavos (P 92,199.20) and to indemnify the
National Food Authority (NFA) the amount of Ninety Two Thousand One Hundred Ninety Nine Pesos and Twenty
Centavos (P92,199.20) with interest thereon.

SO ORDERED.9

Correspondingly, petitioner filed his May 20, 2004 Motion for Reconsideration 10 of the Decision, reiterating his defenses
raised during the trial.

On July 23, 2004, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration on
the ground that accused Wa-acon raised no new substantial issues and cogent reasons to justify the reversal of the April
22, 2004 Decision.

Thus, Wa-acon filed the instant petition.

The Court's Ruling

Petitioner Wa-acon presented a lone issue to be resolved: his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt; thus, the
assailed Decision and Resolution convicting him of malversation must be reversed.

In seeking the recall of his conviction, accused petitioner asserts that the unremitted amounts for the rice stocks and the
money allegedly gained from the empty sacks were not used for his personal use and therefore, the fourth element of
malversation—that the accused appropriated, took, or misappropriated public funds or property for which he was
accountable—was not proven. According to petitioner, while he might have violated certain auditing rules and
regulations, this violation is not tantamount to malversation. He leans on the rulings in Madarang v.
Sandiganbayan,11 and Agullo v. Sandiganbayan12 that "it is essential to prove that there had been a conversion of public
fund to personal use" and that "conversion must be affirmatively proved"; otherwise, the presumption is "deemed never
to have existed at all."

Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code whereas provides:

Malversation of public funds or property. – Presumption of malversation. – Any public officer who, by reason of the
duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such
public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such
funds or property x x x

xxxx

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to
personal uses (emphasis supplied).

The elements to constitute malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows:

The elements common to all acts of malversation – under Article 217 are: (a) that the offender be a public officer; (b)
that he had custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) these funds were public funds
or property for which he was accountable; and (d) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. 13

Accused petitioner has conceded that the first three (3) elements of the crime of malversation exist but asseverates that
the fourth element —that he appropriated, took, or misappropriated the public funds for which he was made
accountable by the Commission on Audit (COA) to his own personal use––was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Unfortunately, petitioner's postulation has no legal mooring. Article 217, as amended by Republic Act 1060, no longer
requires proof by the State that the accused actually appropriated, took, or misappropriated public funds or property.
Instead, a presumption, though disputable and rebuttable, was installed that upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property— with which said officer is
accountable—should be prima facie evidence that he had put such missing funds or properties to personal use. When
these circumstances are present, a "presumption of law" arises that there was malversation of public funds or properties
as decreed by Article 217. A "presumption of law" is sanctioned by a statute prescribing that "a certain inference must be
made whenever facts appear which furnish the basis of the interference." This is to be set apart fr om a "presumption of
fact" which is a "[conclusion] drawn from particular circumstances, the connection between them and the sought for fact
having received such a sanction in experience as to have become recognized as justifying the assumption." 14 When there
is a presumption of law, the onus probandi (burden of proof), generally imposed upon the State, is now shifted to the
party against whom the interference is made to adduce satisfactory evidence to rebut the presumption and hence, to
demolish the prima facie case.

After the government auditors discovered the shortage and demanded an explanation, petitioner Wa-acon was not able
to make money readily available,15 immediately refund the shortage, 16 or explain satisfactorily the cash deficit.17 These
facts or circumstances constitute prima facie evidence that he converted such funds to his personal use.

Prima facie evidence is defined as:

Evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given
fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense, and which if not rebutted or contradicted,
will remain sufficient. Evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain a judgment in favor of the
issue it supports, but which may be contradicted by other evidence (emphasis supplied).18

Neither can accused petitioner claim that such presumption under Article 217 violates the constitutional guarantee of
presumption of innocence for "the establishment of a prima facie case does not take away the presumption of innocence
which may x x x be such as to rebut and control it." 19 Such prima facie evidence, if unexplained or uncontradicted, "can
counterbalance the presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction." 20

Since the facts adduced by the State brought about a prima facie evidence which is considered sufficient to sustain
petitioner's conviction under Article 217, it is incumbent upon petitioner Wa-acon to destroy the presumption of law.

In his quest to exculpate himself from the legal assumption of criminal liability for the missing funds, he i nsisted that: 1)
the sacks of rice were less than that declared in the receipts when they were delivered to him; 2) he sold the rice at the
older and lower prices, as he was not informed of changes in the prices of the rice; and 3) the empty sacks of rice were in
the possession of the delivery men. However, petitioner merely settled for his bare uncorroborated testimony during the
trial before the Sandiganbayan. He never bothered to adduce other pieces of evidence to fortify his defenses. Petitioner
did not produce the delivery men whom he claims had in their possession the empty sacks or any acknowledgement
receipt for said bags. Moreover, petitioner did not bring forward his co-workers to attest to and confirm the practice of,
and substantiate petitioner's story of receiving sacks of rice without weighing them and that the bags received weighed
less than that reflected in the receipt. The established rule is that "[d]enials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are deemed negative and self-serving evidence unworthy of credence." 21 The court a quo is correct in holding
that as compared to credible witnesses like the COA auditors who testified on affirmative matters, the self-serving
negative testimony of accused petitioner Wa-acon has no substantial weight or credit. 22

"Negative testimony" is made clear as testimony that a fact did not exist, that a thing was not done, that no one did not
hear––is admissible and, in the absence of opposing testimony, is usually regarded as of sufficient probative force to
sustain a verdict. It is however, a long recognized general rule of evidence that all other things being equal, positive
evidence is stronger than negative evidence. 23

Since Wa-acon lamentably fell short of adducing the desired quantum of evidence, his weak and unconvincing testimony
standing alone did not overthrow the presumption that he misappropriated public funds.

As a last ditch effort to exonerate himself, petitioner anchored his defense on Madarang24 and Agullo,25 where public
employees charged of malversation were cleared of criminal liability.

In these two (2) cases cited by petitioner, we elucidated the legal presumption of assumed criminal liability for
accountable funds under the last paragraph of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. In Madarang, we explained:

Concededly, the first three elements are present in the case at bar. Lacking any evidence, however, of shortage, or taking,
appropriation, or conversion by petitioner or loss of public funds, there is no malversation ( Narciso vs. Sandiganbayan,
229 SCRA 229 [1994]). True, the law creates a presumption that the mere failure of an accountable officer to produce
public funds which have come into his hand on demand by an officer duly authorized to examine his accounts is prima
facie evidence of conversion. The presumption is, of course, rebuttable. Accordingly, if petitioner is able to present
adequate evidence that can nullify any likelihood that he had put the funds or property to personal use, then that
presumption would be at an end and the prima facie case is effectively negated.26

In Agullo, we amplified that:

Thus, in a string of categorical pronouncements, this Court has consistently and emphatically ruled that the presumption
of conversion incarnated in Article 217, paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal Code is — by its very nature — rebuttable.
To put it differently, the presumption under the law is not conclusive but disputable by satisfactory evidence to the effect
that the accused did not utilize the public funds or property for his personal use, gain or benefit.

Accordingly, if the accused is able to present adequate evidence that can nullify any likelihood that he had put the funds
or property to personal use, then that presumption would be at an end and the prima facie case is effectively negated.
This Court has repeatedly said that when the absence of funds is not due to the personal use thereof by the accused, the
presumption is completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is never deemed to have existed at all. 27

Unfortunately, petitioner's vaunted reliance on Madarang and Agullo does not provide legal relief as the facts in these
cases are not on all fours with his case. The accused parties in said cases were able to produce satisfactory evidence
ample enough to prove that the missing funds were not converted to their personal uses and thus, the legal
presumption was effectively negated.

In Madarang, the accused, based on the COA audit report, was charged with malversation of PhP 20,700.00 representing
advance rental payments for the lease of real property owned by the City of Cebu for which he was respo nsible as a
barangay captain. When the accused was asked to account for such missing funds, he introduced convincing evidence
that the funds were utilized by the barangay for its projects and for the benefit of his constituents, namely: for materials
for the water system of the barangay hall, barangay police uniforms, and payment for medicine. Therefore, the legal
presumption was successfully overturned.

Likewise, in Agullo, the accused, who was the disbursing officer of then Ministry of Public Works and Highways, Regional
Office No. VIII, Candahug, Palo, Leyte, was charged based on audit, with malversation of PhP 26,404.26 representing the
salaries of the personnel in her office. The accused admitted that the funds were lost; however, she was able to prove
that she suffered a stroke while going to her office. This was corroborated by the barangay captain of the place where
she suffered a stroke, as well as medical certificates to prove the illness. She was acquitted because the loss of funds was
not due to malversation.

In contrast, petitioner anchored his defenses solely on his own bare testimony unsubstantiated by other parol,
documentary, or object evidence to prop up such self-serving allegations. Without doubt, the rulings
in Madarangand Agullo cannot be considered precedents to the case at bar because the facts in said cases are not the
same or substantially similar to petitioner Wa-acon's situation.

Without any strong and convincing proof to bring down the disputable presumption of law, the Court is left with no
other option but to sustain petitioner's conviction.
WHEREFORE, We DENY the petition and the assailed April 22, 2004 Decision and the July 23, 2004 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 14375 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

B. KINDS OF JUDICIAL NOTICE

C. MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE

ATIENZA vs BOARD OF MEDICINE

G.R. No. 178830 July 14, 2008

ROLEX SUPLICO, Petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, represented by NEDA SECRETARY ROMULO L. NERI, and the
NEDA-INVESTMENT COORDINATION COMMITTEE, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
(DOTC), represented by DOTC SECRETARY LEANDRO MENDOZA, including the COMMISSION ON INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, headed by its Chairman, RAMON P. SALES, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS OFFICE,
BIDS AND AWARDS FOR INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (ICT), headed by DOTC ASSISTANT
SECRETARY ELMER A. SONEJA as Chairman, and the TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP FOR ICT, AND DOTC ASSISTANT
SECRETARY LORENZO FORMOSO, AND ALL OTHER OPERATING UNITS OF THE DOTC FOR INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and ZTE CORPORATION, AMSTERDAM HOLDINGS, INC., AND ALL PERSONS
ACTING IN THEIR BEHALF, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, R.T., J.:

Under consideration is the Manifestation and Motion 1 dated October 26, 2007 of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
which states:

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) respectfully avers that in an Indorsement dated October 24, 2007, the Legal
Service of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) has informed it of the Philippine Government ’
s decision not to continue with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project (see attachment 2). That said, there is no
more justiciable controversy for this Honorable Court to resolve. WHEREFORE, public respondents respectfully pray that
the present petitions be DISMISSED.

On November 13, 2007, the Court noted the OSG’s manifestation and motion and required petitioners in G.R. Nos.
178830, 179317, and 179613 to comment.
On December 6, 2007, Rolex Suplico, petitioner in G.R. No. 178830, filed his Consolidated Reply and
Opposition,3opposing the aforequoted OSG Manifestation and Motion, arguing that:

66. Aside from the fact that the Notes of the Meeting Between President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Chinese
President Hu Jintao held 2 October 2007 were not attached to the 26 October 2007 Manifestation and Motion – thus
depriving petitioners of the opportunity to comment thereon – a mere verbally requested 1st Indorsement is not
sufficient basis for the conclusion that the ZTE-DOTC NBN deal has been permanently scrapped.

67. Suffice to state, said 1st Indorsement is glaringly self-serving, especially without the Notes of the Meeting Between
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Chinese President Hu Jintao to support its allegations or other proof of the
supposed decision to cancel the ZTE-DOTC NBN deal. Public respondents can certainly do better than that.4

Petitioner Suplico further argues that:

79. Assuming arguendo that some aspects of the present Petition have been rendered moot (which is vehemently
denied), this Honorable Court, consistent with well-entrenched jurisprudence, may still take cognizance thereof. 5

Petitioner Suplico cites this Court’s rulings in Gonzales v. Chavez,6 Rufino v. Endriga,7 and Alunan III v. Mirasol8that
despite their mootness, the Court nevertheless took cognizance of these cases and ruled on the merits due to the Court ’
s symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar by formulating guiding and controlling principles, precepts,
doctrines, and rules.

On January 31, 2008, Amsterdam Holdings, Inc. (AHI) and Nathaniel Sauz, petitioners in G.R. No. 179317, also filed their
comment expressing their sentiments, thus:

3. First of all, the present administration has never been known for candor. The present administration has a very nasty
habit of not keeping its word. It says one thing, but does another.

4. This being the case, herein petitioners are unable to bring themselves to feel even a bit reassured that the government,
in the event that the above-captioned cases are dismissed, will not backtrack, re-transact, or even resurrect the now
infamous NBN-ZTE transaction. This is especially relevant since what was attached to the OSG’s Manifestation and
Motion was a mere one (1) page written communication sent by the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) to the OSG, allegedly relaying that the Philippine Government has decided not to continue with the NBN project
"x x x due to several reasons and constraints."

Petitioners AHI and Sauz further contend that because of the transcendental importance of the issues raised in the
petition, which among others, included the President’s use of the power to borrow, i.e., to enter into foreign loan
agreements, this Court should take cognizance of this case despite its apparent mootness.

On January 15, 2008, the Court required the OSG to file respondents ’ reply to petitioners ’ comments on its
manifestation and motion.

On April 18, 2008, the OSG filed respondents’ reply, reiterating their position that for a court to exercise its power of
adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy – one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal
or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. 9

Respondents also insist that there is no perfected contract in this case that would prejudice the government or public
interest. Explaining the nature of the NBN Project as an executive agreement, respondents stress that it remained in the
negotiation stage. The conditions precedent10 for the agreement to become effective have not yet been complied with.

Respondents further oppose petitioners’ claim of the right to information, which they contend is not an absolute right.
They contend that the matters raised concern executive policy, a political question which the judicial branch of
government would generally hesitate to pass upon.

On July 2, 2008, the OSG filed a Supplemental Manifestation and Motion. Appended to it is the Highlights from the
Notes of Meeting between President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Chinese President Hu Jintao, held in XI Jiao
Guesthouse, Shanghai, China, on October 2, 2007. In the Notes of Meeting, the Philippine Government conveyed its
decision not to continue with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project due to several constraints. The same Notes
likewise contained President Hu Jintao’s expression of understanding of the Philippine Government decision.

We resolve to grant the motion.

Firstly, the Court notes the triple petitions to be for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction. The individual prayers in each of the
three (3) consolidated petitions are:

G.R. No. 178830

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court:

1. Upon the filing of this Petition, pursuant to the second paragraph of Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, issue
forthwith an ex parte temporary restraining order enjoining respondents, their subordinates, agents, representatives and
any and all persons acting on their behalf from pursuing, entering into indebtedness, disbursing funds, and
implementing the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal;

2. Compel respondents, upon Writ of Mandamus, to forthwith produce and furnish petitioner or his undersigned counsel
a certified true copy of the contract or agreement covering the NBN project as agreed upon with ZTE Corporation ;

3. Schedule Oral Arguments in the present case pursuant to Rule 49 in relation to Section 2, Rule 56 of the revised Rules
of Court; and,

4. Annul and set aside the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal, and compel public respondents to forthwith comply
with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of government ICT contracts and public bidding for the NBN
contract.11 (Emphasis supplied)

G.R. No. 179317

WHEREFORE, petitioners Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and Nathaniel Sauz respectfully pray as follows:

A. upon the filing of this Petition for Mandamus and conditioned upon the posting of a bond in such amount as the
Honorable Court may fix, a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued directing the
Department of Transportation and Communication, the Commission on Information and Communications Technology,
all other government agencies and instrumentalities, their officers, employees, and/or other persons acting for and on
their behalf to desist during the pendency of the instant Petition for Mandamus from entering into any other agreements
and from commencing with any kind, sort, or specie of activity in connection with the National Broadband Network
Project;

B. the instant Petition for Mandamus be given due course; and,

C. after due consideration of all relevant issues, judgment be rendered directing respondents to allow herein petitioners
access to all agreements entered into with the Government of China, the ZTE Corporation, and/or other entities,
government instrumentalities, and/or individuals with regard to the National Broadband Network Project. 12 (Emphasis
supplied)

G.R. No. 179613

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to:

1. Compel respondents, upon Writ of Mandamus, to forthwith produce and furnish petitioner or his undersigned counsel
a certified true copy of the contract or agreement covering the NBN project as agreed upon with ZTE Corporation;

2. Schedule Oral Arguments in the present case pursuant to Rule 49 in relation to Section 2, Rule 56 of the Revised Rules
of Court;

3. Annul and set aside the award of the contract for the national broadband network to respondent ZTE Corporation,
upon the ground that said contract, as well as the procedures resorted to preparatory to the execution thereof, is
contrary to the Constitution, to law and to public policy;

4. Compel public respondent to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of government
infrastructure projects, including public bidding for said contract to undertake the construction of the national
broadband network.13 (Emphasis supplied)

On September 11, 2007, the Court issued a TRO 14 in G.R. No. 178830, enjoining the parties from "pursuing, entering into
indebtedness, disbursing funds, and implementing the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal and Project" as prayed for. Pertinent
parts of the said Order read:

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, on 11 September 2007, adopted a resolution in the above-entitled case,
to wit:

"G.R. No. 178830 (Rolex Suplico vs. National Economic and Development Authority, represented by
NEDA Secretary Romulo L. Neri, and the NEDA Investment Coordination Committee, Department of
 Transportation and Communications (DOTC), represented by DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza,
including the Commission on Information and Communications Technology, headed by its Chairman,
Ramon P. Sales, The Telecommunications Office, Bids and Awards for Information and Communications
Technology Committee (ICT), headed by DOTC Assistant Secretary Elmer A. Soneja as Chairman, and
The Technical Working Group for ICT, and DOTC Assistant Secretary Lorenzo Formoso, and All Other
Operating Units of the DOTC for Information and Communications Technology, and ZTE Corporation,
Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and ARESCOM, Inc.—Acting on the instant petition with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the Court Resolved, without giving due course to
the petition, to

xxxx

(d) Issue a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and continuing until further orders
from this Court, enjoining the (i) National Economic and Development Authority, (ii) NEDA-Investment
Coordination Committee, (iii) Department of Transportation and Communications, Commission on
Information and Communications Technology, (iv) Telecommunications Office, Bids and Awards for
Information and Communications Technology Committee (ICT), (v) Technical Working Group for ICT,
and all other Operating Units of the DOTC for Information and Communications Technology, (vi) ZTE
Corporation; (vii) Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and (viii) ARESCOM, Inc., and any and all persons acting on
their behalf from ‘pursuing, entering into indebtedness, disbursing funds, and implementing the
ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal and Project’ as prayed for."

NOW THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, You,
Respondents (i) National Economic and Development Authority, (ii) NEDA-Investment Coordination
Committee, (iii) Department of Transportation and Communications, Commission on Information and
Communications Technology, (iv) Telecommunications Office, Bids and Awards for Information and
Communications Technology Committee (ICT), (v) Technical Working Group for ICT, and all other
Operating Units of the DOTC for Information and Communications Technology, (vi) ZTE Corporation;
(vii) Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and (viii) ARESCOM, Inc., and any and all persons acting on their behalf
are hereby ENJOINED from "pursuing, entering into indebtedness, disbursing funds, and implementing
the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal and Project" as prayed for. 15 (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 178830 and 179613 pray that they be furnished certified true copies of the "contract or agreement
covering the NBN project as agreed upon with ZTE Corporation." It appears that during one of the Senate hearings on
the NBN project, copies of the supply contract 16 were readily made available to petitioners.17Evidently, the said prayer has
been complied with and is, thus, mooted.

When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, acting in her official capacity during the meeting held on October 2, 2007 in
China, informed China’s President Hu Jintao that the Philippine Government had decided not to continue with the
ZTE-National Broadband Network (ZTE-NBN) Project due to several reasons and constraints, there is no doubt that all
the other principal prayers in the three petitions (to annul, set aside, and enjoin the implementation of the ZTE-NBN
Project) had also become moot.
Contrary to petitioners’ contentions that these declarations made by officials belonging to the executive branch on the
Philippine Government’s decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project are self-serving, hence, inadmissible, the
Court has no alternative but to take judicial notice of this official act of the President of the Philippines.

Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Judicial Notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial notice, without introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the rules, it is mandatory and the Court has no alternative but to take judicial notice of the official acts of the
President of the Philippines, who heads the executive branch of our government. It is further provided in the
above-quoted rule that the court shall take judicial notice of the foregoing facts without introduction of evidence. Since
we consider the act of cancellation by President Macapagal-Arroyo of the proposed ZTE-NBN Project during the
meeting of October 2, 2007 with the Chinese President in China as an official act of the executive department, the Court
must take judicial notice of such official act without need of evidence.

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,18 We took judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the President banning all
rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and
General Order No. 5.

In Estrada v. Desierto,19 the Court also resorted to judicial notice in resolving the factual ingredient of the petition.

Moreover, under Section 2, paragraph (m) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the official duty of the executive officials 20 of
informing this Court of the government’s decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project is also presumed to have
been regularly performed, absent proof to the contrary. Other than petitioner AHI’s unsavory insinuation in its comment,
the Court finds no factual or legal basis to disregard this disputable presumption in the present instance.

Concomitant to its fundamental task as the ultimate citadel of justice and legitimacy is the judiciary ’s role of
strengthening political stability indispensable to progress and national development. Pontificating on issues which no
longer legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy will do more harm than good to the nation as a whole. Wise
exercise of judicial discretion militates against resolving the academic issues, as petitioners want this Court to do. This is
especially true where, as will be further discussed, the legal issues raised cannot be resolved without previously
establishing the factual basis or antecedents.

Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of mootness. In the absence of actual justiciable
controversies or disputes, the Court generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues. Where there is no more live
subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render any ruling or make any pronouncement.

Kapag wala nang buhay na kaso, wala nang dahilan para magdesisyon ang Husgado.
In Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. v. Santiago, 21 the lone issue tackled by the Court of Appeals (CA) was
whether the Securities Investigation and Clearing Department (SICD) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) en
banc committed reversible error in issuing and upholding, respectively, the writ of preliminary injunction. The writ
enjoined the execution of the questioned agreements between Qualcomm, Inc. and Republic Telecommunications
Holdings, Inc. (RETELCOM). The implementation of the agreements was restrained through the assailed orders of the
SICD and the SEC en banc which, however, were nullified by the CA decision. Thus, RETELCOM elevated the matter to
this Court praying for the reinstatement of the writ of preliminary injunction of the SICD and the SEC en banc. However,
before the matter was finally resolved, Qualcomm, Inc. withdrew from the negotiating table. Its withdrawal had thwarted
the execution and enforcement of the contracts. Thus, the resolution of whether the implementation of said agreements
should be enjoined became no longer necessary.

Equally applicable to the present case is the Court ruling in the above-cited Republic Telecommunications. There We
held, thus:

Indeed, the instant petition, insofar as it assails the Court of Appeals’ Decision nullifying the orders of the SEC en banc
and the SICD, has been rendered moot and academic. To rule, one way or the other, on the correctness of the
questioned orders of the SEC en banc and the SICD will be indulging in a theoretical exercise that has no practical worth
in view of the supervening event.

The rule is well-settled that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy
– one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial res olution; the
case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of
justice. Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereon
would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly
interest, however intellectually challenging.

In the ultimate analysis, petitioners are seeking the reinstatement of the writ of injunction to prevent the concerned
parties from pushing through with transactions with Qualcomm, Inc. Given that Qualcomm, Inc. is no longer interested in
pursuing the contracts, there is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which wo uld be
negated by the dismissal of the petition.

The Court likewise finds it unnecessary to rule whether the assailed Court of Appeals’ Decision had the effect of
overruling the Court’s Resolution dated 29 January 1999, which set aside the TRO issued by the appellate court.

A ruling on the matter practically partakes of a mere advisory opinion, which falls beyond the realm of judicial review.
The exercise of the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies. Courts have no authority to pass
upon issues through advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems.

While there were occasions when the Court passed upon issues although supervening events had rendered those
petitions moot and academic, the instant case does not fall under the exceptional cases. In those cases, the Court was
persuaded to resolve moot and academic issues to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines or rules for future guidance of both bench and bar.
In the case at bar, the resolution of whether a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to prevent the implementation
of the assailed contracts calls for an appraisal of factual considerations which are peculiar only to the transactions and
parties involved in this controversy. Except for the determination of whether petitioners are entitled to a writ of
preliminary injunction which is now moot, the issues raised in this petition do not call for a clarification of any
constitutional principle or the interpretation of any statutory provision.22

Secondly, even assuming that the Court will choose to disregard the foregoing considerations and brush aside mootness,
the Court cannot completely rule on the merits of the case because the resolution of the three petitions involves settling
factual issues which definitely requires reception of evidence. There is not an iota of doubt that this may not be done by
this Court in the first instance because, as has been stated often enough, this Court is not a trier of facts.

Ang pagpapasiya sa tatlong petisyon ay nangangailangan ng paglilitis na hindi gawain ng Hukumang ito.

Respondent ZTE, in its Comment in G.R. No. 178830, 23 correctly pointed out that since petitioner Suplico filed his petition
directly with this Court, without prior factual findings made by any lower court, a determination of pertinent and relevant
facts is needed. ZTE enumerated some of these factual issues, to wit:

(1) Whether an executive agreement has been reached between the Philippine and Chinese governments over the NBN
Project;

(2) Whether the ZTE Supply Contract was entered into by the Republic of the Philippines, through the DOTC, and ZTE
International pursuant to, and as an integral part of, the executive agreement;

(3) Whether a loan agreement for the NBN Project has actually been executed;

(4) Whether the Philippine government required that the NBN Project be completed under a
Build-Operate-and-Transfer Scheme;

(5) Whether the AHI proposal complied with the requirements for an unsolicited proposal under the BOT Law;

(6) Whether the Philippine government has actually earmarked public finds for disbursement under the ZTE Supply
Contract; and

(7) Whether the coverage of the NBN Project to be supplied under the ZTE Supply Contract is more extensive than that
under the AHI proposal or such other proposal submitted therefor.24

Definitely, some very specific reliefs prayed for in both G.R. Nos. 178830 and 179613 require prior determination of facts
before pertinent legal issues could be resolved and specific reliefs granted.

In G.R. No. 178830, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal and compel
public respondents to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of government ICT
contracts and public bidding for the NBN contract.
In G.R. No. 179613, petitioners also pray that the Court annul and set aside the award of the contract for the national
broadband network to respondent ZTE Corporation, upon the ground that said contract, as well as the procedures
resorted to preparatory to the execution thereof, is contrary to the Constitution, to law and to public policy. They also ask
the Court to compel public respondent to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of
government infrastructure projects, including public bidding for said contract to undertake the construction of the
national broadband network.

It is simply impossible for this Court "to annul and set aside the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal" without any
evidence to support a prior factual finding pointing to any violation of law that could lead to such annulment order. For
sure, the Supreme Court is not the proper venue for this factual matter to be threshed out.

Thirdly, petitioner Suplico in G.R. No. 178830 prayed that this Court order "public respondents to forthwith comply with
pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of government ICT contracts and public bidding for the NBN
contract."25 It would be too presumptuous on the part of the Court to summarily compel public respondents to comply
with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of government infrastructure projects without any factual basis
or prior determination of very particular violations committed by specific government officials of the executive branch.
For the Court to do so would amount to a breach of the norms of comity among co-equal branches of government. A
perceived error cannot be corrected by committing another error. Without proper evidence, the Court cannot just
presume that the executive did not comply with procurement laws. Should the Court allow itself to fall into this trap, it
would plainly commit grave error itself.

Magiging kapangahasan sa Hukumang ito na pilitin ang mga pinipetisyon na tumalima sa batas sa pangongontrata ng
pamahalaan kung wala pang pagtitiyak o angkop na ebidensiya ng nagawang paglabag dito.

Let it be clarified that the Senate investigation in aid of legislation cannot be the basis of Our decision which requires
a judicial finding of facts.

Justice Antonio T. Carpio takes the view that the National Broadband Network Project should be declared null and void .
The foregoing threefold reasons would suffice to address the concern of Our esteemed colleague.

The Court is, therefore, constrained to dismiss the petitions and deny them due course because of mootness and
because their resolution requires reception of evidence which cannot be done in an original petition brought before the
Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on September 11, 2007 is
DISSOLVED.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 142295. May 31, 2001]

VICENTE DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

Petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas appeals via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals [1]affirming with
modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Branch 20, Malolos, and finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of P. D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294 (illegal possession of firearms),
sentencing him to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.

On June 17, 1996, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Eufracio S. Marquez of Bulacan filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Bulacan, Malolos an Information charging petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas with violation of P. D. No. 186 6, as
follows:

That on or about the 15th day of June 1996, in the municipality of Norzagaray, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession under his custody and control, the following, to wit:

a) One (1) pc. Pistol Cal. 45 SN:70G23792 (w/o license)

b) One (1) pc. Revolver Cal. 22 SN:48673 (w/o license)

c) Twenty Seven (27) rds live ammos. For cal. .45

d) Five (5) pcs. Magazines for cal. .45

e) Eight (8) rds live ammunitions for cal. 22

f) Five (5) pcs. Magazines short for cal. 5.56 (M16)

g) Twenty (20) rds live ammunitions for cal 5.56

without first having obtained a proper license therefor.

Contrary to law.[2]

On June 25, 1996, the trial court arraigned the petitioner. He pleaded not guilty.[3] Trial ensued.

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

Sometime in May 1996, the police received a report that accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was in possession of
certain firearms without the necessary licenses. Acting upon the report, P/Sr. Insp. Jerito Adique of the PNP Criminal
Investigation Group at Camp Olivas, Pampanga inquired from the PNP Firearms and Explosive Division wh ether or not
the report was true. On May 10, 1996, P/Sr. Insp. Edwin C. Roque of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Division issued a
certification (Exhibit L) stating that per records in his office, the appellant is not a licensed/registered firearm holder o f
any kind and caliber. Armed with the said certification, P/Sr. Insp. Adique applied for a search warrant to enable his team
to search the house of appellant.

On June 13, 1996, a search warrant (Exhibit A) was issued by Judge Gil Fernandez, Sr. of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 217, authorizing the search of the residence of appellant at Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray,
Bulacan.[4] On June 15, 1996, at about 7:00 oclock in the morning, a team led by P/Sr. Insp. Adique went to Norzagaray to
serve the warrant. Before proceeding to the residence of the appellant, the police officers requested Barangay Chairman
Rogelio de Silva and Barangay Councilman Aurelio Panteleon to accompany them in the implementation of the warrant.
Upon arrival at the house of appellant, the police officers introduced themselves to the wife of appellant. When the
appellant came out, P/Sr. Insp. Adique informed him that they had a search warrant and that they were authorized to
search his house. After appellant gave his permission, the police officers conducted a search of the house. The search
yielded the following items: (a) a caliber .45 pistol with Serial No. 703792 with five magazines of caliber .45 (Exhibits B
and H) found at the masters bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and two radios (Exhibits C to C-4) found in
the room of appellants daughter; and (c) a caliber .22 revolver with Serial No. 48673 (Exhibit F) containing 8 pieces of live
ammunition (Exhibit M) found in the kitchen of the house. When asked about his license to possess the firearms, the
appellant failed to produce any. This prompted the police officers to seize the subject firearms.

SPO2 Marion Montezon, one of the searching officers, prepared three separate inventories of the seized items (Exhibits
H, M and N). The inventories were signed by P/Sr. Insp. Adique, the appellant and the barangay officials who witnessed
the search. Thereafter SPO2 Montezon prepared a certification of orderly search (Exhibit I) which was signed by the
appellant and the barangay officials attesting to the orderly conduct of the search.
For his defense, appellant contends that he had a license for the caliber .45 pistol recovered in his bedroom and that the
other items seized during the search including the caliber .22 revolver, were merely planted by the police
officers. Appellant likewise assails the manner in which the search was carried out, claiming that the police officers just
barged into his house without asking permission. Furthermore, he claimed that the barangay officials arrived only after
the police already had finished the search.

After trial and on July 2, 1998, the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused VICENTE DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of P. D. No. 1866 as charged under the Information dated June 17, 1996.

Conformably with the provisions of said law, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, and pursuant to the provisions of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correctional, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Fifteen Thousand
Pesos (P15,000.00).[5]

On July 20, 1998, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, assailing the decision for being contrary to facts and
the law.[6]

On July 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming with modification the decision of the trial
court as set out in the opening paragraph of this decision. [7]

On August 10, 1999, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. [8] He
contended that the certification issued by the Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, Philippine National Police stating
that the person named therein had not been issued a firearm license referred to a certain Vicente Vic del Rosario of
barangay Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan, not to him. He comes from barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan, and that he has
a valid firearm license.

On February 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. [9]

Hence, this appeal.[10]

Petitioner submits that the search conducted at his residence was illegal as the search warrant was issued in
violation of the Constitution [11] and consequently, the evidence seized was inadmissible. He also submits that he had a
license for the .45 caliber firearm and ammunition seized in his bedroom. The other firearm, a .22 caliber revolver seized
in a drawer at the kitchen of his house, a magazine for 5.56 mm. cal. Armalite rifle, and two 2 -way radios found in his
daughters bedroom, were either planted by the police or illegally seized, as they were not mentioned in the search
warrant.

We find the petition impressed with merit.

We define the issues as follows:

First: whether petitioner had a license for the .45 caliber Colt pistol and ammunition seized in his bedroom; and

Second: whether the .22 caliber revolver seized in a drawer at the kitchen of his house, a magazine for 5.56 mm. cal.
Armalite rifle and two 2-way radios found in his daughters bedroom, were planted by the police or were illegally seized.
 We shall resolve the issues in seriatim.

First: The .45 cal. Colt pistol in question was duly licensed.

Normally, we do not review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial courts. [12] However, this case
comes within the exceptions.[13] The findings of fact by the Court of Appeals will not be disturbed by the Court unless
these findings are not supported by evidence.[14] In this case, the findings of the lower courts even directly contradict the
evidence. Hence, we review the evidence. The trial court held that the copy of the license presented was blurred, and that
in any event, the court could rely on the certification dated May 10, 1996, of P/Sr. Inspector Edwin C. Roque, Chief,
Records Branch, Firearms and Explosives Division, Philippine National Police stating that Vicente Vic del Rosario of
Barangay Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber. [15] As against this,
petitioner submitted that he was not the person referred to in the said certification because he is Vicente del Rosario y
Nicolas from Barangay Tigbe,Norzagaray, Bulacan. The Court takes judicial notice of the existence of both barangay
Tigbe and barangay Bigte, in Norzagaray, Bulacan. [16] In fact, the trial court erred grievously in not taking judicial notice of
the barangays within its territorial jurisdiction, believing the prosecutions submission that there was only barangay Tigbe,
and that barangay Bigte in the certification was a typographical error. [17] Petitioner presented to the head of the raiding
team, Police Senior Inspector Jerito A. Adique, Chief, Operations Branch, PNP Criminal Investigation Command, a valid
firearm license. The court is duty bound to examine the evidence assiduously to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. It is true that the court may rely on the certification of the Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP on the
absence of a firearm license.[18] However, such certification referred to another individual and thus, cannot prevail over a
valid firearm license duly issued to petitioner. In this case, petitioner presented the printed computerized copy of License
No. RCL 1614021915 issued to him on July 13, 1993, expiring in January 1995, by the Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division,
PNP under the signature of Reynaldo V. Velasco, Sr. Supt. (GSC) PNP, Chief, FEO.[19] On the dorsal side of the printed
computerized license, there is stamped the words Validity of computerized license is extended until renewed license is
printed dated January 17, 1995, signed by Police Chief Inspector Franklin S. Alfabeto, Chief, Licence Branch,
FEO.[20] Coupled with this indefinite extension, petitioner paid the license fees for the extension of the license for the next
two-year period.[21]

Consequently, we find that petitioner was the holder of a valid firearm license for the .45 caliber Colt pistol seized in
the bedroom of his house on June 15, 1996. [22] As required, petitioner presented the license to the head of the raiding
team, Police Senior Inspector Jerito A. Adique of the Criminal Investigation Division Group, PNP. [23] As a senior police
officer, Senior Inspector Adique could easily determine the genuineness and authenticity of the computerized printed
license presented. He must know the computerized license printed form. The stamp is clearly visible. He could decipher
the words and the signature of the authorized signing official of the Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP. He belonged
to the same national police organization.

Nevertheless, Senior Insp. Adique rejected the license presented because, according to him, it was expired. However,
assuming that the license presented was expired during the period January 1995 to January 1997, still, possession of the
firearm in question, a .45 caliber Colt pistol with serial No. 70G23792, during that period was not illegal. The firearm was
kept at home, not carried outside residence. On June 15, 1996, at the time of the seizure of the firearm in
question, possession of firearm with an expired license was not considered unlawful,provided that the license had not
been cancelled or revoked. Republic Act No. 8294, providing that possession of a firearm with an expired license was
unlawful took effect only on July 7, 1997. [24] It could not be given retroactive effect. [25]
 According to firearm licensing regulations, the renewal of a firearm license was automatically applied for upon
payment of the license fees for the renewal period. The expired license was not cancelled or revoked. It served as
temporary authority to possess the firearm until the renewed license was issued. Meantime, the applicant may keep the
gun at home pending renewal of the firearm license and issuance of a printed computerized license. He was not obliged
to surrender the weapon. Printed at the dorsal side of the computerized license is a notice reading:

IMPORTANT

1. This firearm license is valid for two (2) years. Exhibit this license whenever demanded by proper authority.

2. Surrender your firearm/s to the nearest PNP Unit upon revocation or termination of this license. Under any
of the following instances, your license shall be revoked for which reason your firearm/s is/are subject to
confiscation and its/their forfeiture in favor of the government.

a. Failure to notify the Chief of PNP in writing of your change of address, and/or qualification.

b. Failure to renew this license by paying annual license, fees, within six (6) months from your birth
month. Renewal of your license can be made within your birth month or month preceding your birth month.
Late renewal shall be penalized with 50% surcharge for the first month (from the first day to the last day of
this month) followed by an additional 25% surcharge for all of the succeeding five (5) months compounded
monthly.

c. Loss of firearm/s through negligence.

d. Carrying of firearm/s outside of residence without appropriate permit and/or carrying firearm/s in
prohibited places.

e. Conviction by competent court for a crime involving moral turpitude or for any offense where the penalty
carries an imprisonment of more than six (6) months or fine of at least P1,000.00.

f. Dismissal for cause from the service.

g. Failure to sign license, or sign ID picture or affix right thumbmark.

3. Unauthorized loan of firearm/s to another person is punishable by permanent disqualification and forfeiture
of the firearm in favor of the government.

4. If termination is due to death, your next of kin should surrender your firearm/s to the nearest PNP Unit. For
those within Metro Manila, surrender should be made with FEO, Camp Crame.

5. When firearms become permanently unserviceable, they should be deposited with the nearest PNP Unit and
ownership should be relinquished in writing so that firearms may be disposed of in accordance with law.

6. Application for the purchase of ammunition should be made in case of a resident of Metro Manila direct to
the Chief, FEO and for residents of a Province to secure recommendation letter to the nearest PNP
 Provincial Command who will thereafter endorse same to CHIEF, FEO for issuance of the permit. License
must be presented before an authority to purchase ammo could be obtained. [26]

Indeed, as heretofore stated, petitioner duly paid the license fees for the automatic renewal of the firearm license
for the next two years upon expiration of the license in January 1995, as evidenced by official receipt No. 7615186, dated
January 17, 1995.[27] The license would be renewed, as it was, because petitioner still possessed the required
qualifications. Meantime, the validity of the license was extended until the renewed computerized license was printed. In
fact, a renewed license was issued on January 17, 1997, for the succeeding two-year period.[28]

Aside from the clearly valid and subsisting license issued to petitioner, on January 25, 1995, the Chief, Philippine
National Police issued to him a permit to carry firearm outside residence valid until January 25, 1996, for the firearm in
question.[29] The Chief, Philippine National Police would not issue a permit to carry firearm outside residence unless
petitioner had a valid and subsisting firearm license. Although the permit to carry firearm outside residence was valid for
only one year, and expired on January 25, 1996, such permit is proof that the regular firearm license was renewed and
subsisting within the two-year term up to January 1997. A Permit to Carry Firearm Outside Residence presupposes that
the party to whom it is issued is duly licensed to possess the firearm in question. [30] Unquestionably, on January 17, 1997,
the Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP renewed petitioners license for the .45 cal. Colt pistol in question. [31]

Clearly then, petitioner had a valid firearm license during the interregnum between January 17, 1995, to the issuance
of his renewed license on January 17, 1997.

Finally, there is no rhyme or reason why the Court of Appeals and the trial court did not accept with alacrity the
certification dated June 25, 1996, of P/Sr. Inspector Edwin C. Roque, [32] Chief, Records Branch, Firearms and Explosives
Division, PNP that Vicente N. del Rosario of Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan is a licensed/registered holder of Pistol,
Colt caliber .45 with serial number 70G23792, covered by computerized license issued dated June 15, 1995, with an expiry
date January 1997.[33] Reinforcing the aforementioned certification, petitioner submitted another certification dated
August 27, 1999, stating that Vicente N. del Rosario of Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan, was issued firearm license
No. RL-C1614021915, for caliber .45 Pistol with Serial Number 70G23792, for the years covering the period from July 13,
1993 to January 1995, and the extension appearing at the back thereof for the years 1995 to 1997. [34] Had the lower courts
given full probative value to these official issuances, petitioner would have been correctly acquitted, thus sparing this
Court of valuable time and effort.

In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof,
viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have
the license or permit to possess the same. [35] The essence of the crime of illegal possession is the possession, whether
actual or constructive, of the subject firearm, without which there can be no conviction for illegal possession. After
possession is established by the prosecution, it would only be a matter of course to determine whether the accused has a
license to possess the firearm.[36] Possession of any firearm becomes unlawful only if the necessary permit or license
therefor is not first obtained. The absence of license and legal authority constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense
of illegal possession of firearm and every ingredient or essential element of an offense must be shown by the
prosecution by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Stated otherwise, the negative fact of lack or absence of licen se
constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense which the prosecution has the duty not only to allege but also to prove
beyond reasonable doubt.[37] To convict an accused for illegal possession of firearms and explosives under P. D. 1866, as
amended, two (2) essential elements must be indubitably established, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm or
explosive which may be proved by the presentation of the subject firearm or explosive or by the testimony of witnesses
who saw accused in possession of the same, and (b) the negative fact that the accused had no license or permit to own
or possess the firearm or explosive which fact may be established by the testimony or certification of a representative of
the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused has no license or permit to possess the subject firearm or
explosive. x x x We stress that the essence of the crime penalized under P. D. 1866 is primarily the accuseds lack of license
or permit to carry or possess the firearm, ammunition or explosive as possession by itself is not prohibited by
law.[38] Illegal possession of firearm is a crime punished by special law, a malum prohibitum, and no malice or intent to
commit a crime need be proved. [39] To support a conviction, however, there must be possession coupled with intent to
possess (animus possidendi) the firearm.[40]

In upholding the prosecution and giving credence to the testimony of police officer Jerito A. Adigue, the trial court
relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by the police officers. [41] This is a flagrant
error because his testimony is directly contradictory to the official records of the Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP,
which must prevail. Morever, the presumption of regularity can not prevail over the Constitutional presumption of
innocence.[42] Right from the start, P/Sr. Insp. Jerito A. Adigue was aware that petitioner possessed a valid license for the
caliber .45 Colt pistol in question. Despite this fact, P/Sr. Insp. Adigue proceeded to detain petitioner and charged him
with illegal possession of firearms. We quote pertinent portions of the testimony of petitioner:

Q: What else did Adigue tell you after showing to him the license of your cal. .45 pistol and the alleged cal. .22 found
in a drawer in your kitchen?

A: He told me that since my firearm is licensed, he will return my firearm, give him ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00)
and for me to tell who among the people in our barangay have unlicensed firearm, sir.

Q: How did he say about the ten thousand pesos?

A: He said palit kalabaw na lang tayo sir.

Q: And what did you answer him?

A: I told him my firearm is licensed and I do not have money, if I have, I will not give him, sir, because he was just
trying to squeeze something from me.

Q: How about the unlicensed firearms in your barangay which he asked from you?

A: I said I do not know any unlicensed firearm in our barangay, sir.

Q: About the .22 cal. pistol, what was your answer to him?

A: I told him that it was not mine, they planted it, sir.

Q: What did he say next?

A: He said that it is your word against mine, the Court will believe me because I am a police officer, sir.

Q: What was your comment to what he said?

A: I said my firearm is licensed and we have Courts of law who do not conform with officials like you and then he
laughed and laughed, sir.[43]
 The trial court was obviously misguided when it held that it is a matter of judicial notice that a caliber .45 firearm can
not be licensed to a private individual. [44] This ruling has no basis either in law or in jurisprudence. [45]

Second issue. The seizure of items not mentioned in the search warrant was illegal.

With respect to the .22 caliber revolver with Serial No. 48673, that the police raiding team found in a drawer at the
kitchen of petitioners house, suffice it to say that the firearm was not mentioned in the search warrant applied for and
issued for the search of petitioners house. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search
and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such search and seizure
becomes unreasonable within the meaning of said constitutional provision. [46]Supporting jurisprudence thus outlined the
following requisites for a search warrants validity, the absence of even one will cause its downright nullification: (1) it must
be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the
applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. [47] Seizure is limited to those items particularly
described in a valid search warrant. Searching officers are without discretion regarding what articles they shall
seize.[48] Evidence seized on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and excluded for being
the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for
any purpose in any proceeding.[49]

In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. It was found as a result of a meticulous search
in the kitchen of petitioners house. This firearm, to emphasize, was not mentioned in the search warrant. Hence, the
seizure was illegal.[50] The seizure without the requisite search warrant was in plain violation of the law and the
Constitution.[51] True that as an exception, the police may seize without warrant illegally possessed firearm or any
contraband for that matter, inadvertently found in plain view. However, [t]he seizure of evidence in plain view applies
only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object.[52] Specifically, seizure of evidence in plain view is justified when there is:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. [53]

Hence, the petitioner rightly rejected the firearm as planted and not belonging to him. The prosecution was not
able to prove that the firearm was in the effective possession or control of the petitioner without a license. In illegal
possession of firearms, the possessor must know of the existence of the subject firearm in his possession or control. In
People v. de Gracia,[54] we clarified the meaning of possession for the purpose of convicting a person under P. D. No.
1866, thus: x x x In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While
mere possession without criminal intent is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be
shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. x x x x Hence, the kind of
possession punishable under P. D. No. 1866 is one where the accused possessed a firearm either p hysically or
constructively with animus possidendi or intention to possess the same. [55] That is the meaning of animus possidendi. In
the absence of animus possidendi, the possessor of a firearm incurs no criminal liability.

The same is true with respect to the 5.56 cal. magazine found in the bedroom of petitioners daughter. The seizure
was invalid and the seized items were inadmissible in evidence. As explained in People v. Doria,[56] the plain view doctrine
applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer is in a position where he has a clear view of
a particular area or has prior justification for an intrusion; (2) said officer inadvertently comes across (or sees in plain view)
a piece of incriminating evidence; and (3) it is immediately apparent to such officer that the item he sees may be
evidence of a crime or a contraband or is otherwise subject to seizure.

With particular reference to the two 2-way radios that the raiding policemen also seized in the bedroom of
petitioners daughter, there was absolutely no reason for the seizure. The radios were not contraband per se. The
National Telecommunications Commission may license two-way radios at its discretion. [57] The burden is on the
prosecution to show that the two-way radios were not licensed. The National Telecommunication Commission is the sole
agency authorized to seize unlicensed two-way radios. More importantly, admittedly, the two-way radios were not
mentioned in the search warrant. We condemn the seizure as illegal and a plain violation of a citizens right. Worse, the
petitioner was not charged with illegal possession of the two-way radios.

Consequently, the confiscation of the two 2-way radios was clearly illegal. The possession of such radios is not even
included in the charge of illegal possession of firearms (violation of P. D. No. 1866, as amended) alleged in the
Information.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CR No. 22255,
promulgated on July 09, 1999.

The Court ACQUITS petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas of the charge of violation of P. D. No. 1866, as amended
by R. A. No. 8294 (illegal possession of firearms and ammunition), in Criminal Case No. 800-M-96, Regional Trial Court,
Bulacan, Branch 20, Malolos.

Costs de oficio.

The Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP shall return to petitioner his caliber .45 Colt pistol, with Serial
Number No. 70G23792, the five (5) extra magazines and twenty seven (27) rounds of live ammunition, and the two
2-way radios confiscated from him. The Chief, Philippine National Police, or his duly authorized representative shall show
to this Court proof of compliance herewith within fifteen (15) days from notice. The .22 caliber revolver with Serial No.
48673, and eight (8) live ammunition and the magazine for 5.56 mm. caliber Armalite rifle are confiscated in favor of the
government.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 161602 July 13, 2010

 ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondents.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the Ombudsman’s authority to conduct preliminary investigation in a forfeiture case where the
petitioner allegedly amassed ill-gotten wealth before February 25, 1986.

The Facts and the Case

On March 6, 1996 respondent Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an action for the forfeiture of alleged unlawfully
acquired property with the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case 0167 against petitioner Alfredo T. Romualdez and his wife Agnes
Sison Romualdez as well as against Romson Realty, Inc., R & S Transport, Inc., Fidelity Management, Inc., and Dio Island
Resort, Inc. (collectively, the Romualdezes) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) 1379.1

On January 16, 2000 the Romualdezes filed a motion to dismiss the action on grounds of a) violation of their right to a
speedy disposition of their case; b) lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the action; c) prematurity; d)
prescription; and e) litis pendentia. On September 11, 2002 the Sandiganbayan denied the motion. It also denied on
March 10, 2003 their subsequent motion for reconsideration.

On March 31, 2003 the Romualdezes next filed a motion for preliminary investigation and to suspend proceedings. 2They
claim that since Civil Case 0167 was a forfeiture proceeding filed under R.A. 1379, the Ombudsman should have first
conducted a "previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases" before the filing of the case pursuant
to Section 2 of the law.3

In its Comment4 on the motion, the Republic pointed out that the Office of the Ombudsman in fact conducted such a
preliminary investigation in 1991 in OMB-0-91-08205 and issued on January 22, 1992 a resolution, recommending the
endorsement of the matter to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for the filing of the forfeiture case.

On August 13, 2003 the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, 6 denying the Romualdezes’ March 31, 2003 motion. It also
denied by resolution on December 3, 2003 their subsequent motion for reconsideration. 7 Thus, the Romualdezes filed
the present petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to annul the Sandiganbayan’s rulings and prevent it from
further proceeding with Civil Case 0167 until another preliminary investigation is conducted in their case.

The Question Presented

The sole question presented in this case is whether or not the preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman conducted
in OMB-0-91-0820 in 1991 satisfied the requirement of the law in forfeiture cases.

The Ruling of the Court

The Romualdezes point out that the Office of the Ombudsman should not have conducted an investigation of their case,
since its authority to investigate ill-gotten or unexplained wealth cases pertained only to wealth amassed after February
25, 1986 and not before that date.8 Since the Romualdezes acquired the allegedly ill-gotten wealth involved in their case
as early as 1970, then the Ombudsman had no authority to conduct the investigation that it did in OMB-0-91-0820. In the
absence of a prior valid preliminary investigation, the forfeiture proceedings in Civil Case 0167 cannot continue.

In addition, the Romualdezes insist that it was improper for the Ombudsman to have conducted its investigation in their
absence. The spouses Alfredo and Agnes Romualdez were in the United States when that investigation took place. They
were thus denied their right to be heard in that investigation.

But, as the Sandiganbayan correctly pointed out, quoting Republic v. Sandiganbayan,9 the Ombudsman has under its
general investigatory powers the authority to investigate forfeiture cases where the alleged ill -gotten wealth had been
amassed before February 25, 1986. Thus:

Nonetheless, while we do not discount the authority of the Ombudsman, we believe and so hold that the exercise of his
correlative powers to both investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained
wealth is restricted only to cases for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth which were amassed after
February 25, 1986. Prior to said date, the Ombudsman is without authority to initiate such forfeiture proceedings. We,
however, uphold his authority to investigate cases for the forfeiture or recovery of such ill-gotten and/or unexplained
wealth amassed even before the aforementioned date, pursuant to his general investigatory power under Section 15(1) of
Republic Act No. 6770.10 (Emphasis supplied)

And, although it was the Ombudsman who conducted the preliminary investigation, it was the OSG that instituted th e
action in Civil Case 0167 in line with the Court’s ruling in the above-cited Republic and other cases that followed.1avvphi1

The Court cannot also subscribe to the Romualdezes’ claim that they are entitled to a new preliminary investigation
since they had no opportunity to take part in the one held in 1991, in OMB-0-91-0820. They admit that the subpoena for
that investigation had been sent to their last known residence at the time it was conducted. 11 The Republic categorically
insists that the appropriate subpoena had been served on the Romualdezes. 12

Actually, the lament of the spouses was that they left the Philippines because of danger to their lives after the EDSA
revolution of February 1986 and so could not take part in the proceedings against them. While it is true that the Court
characterized the departure of the Romualdezes as forced upon them by the uncertainty of the situation in 1986, it also
said that such was the case only until things shall have stabilized. 13 The Court will take judicial notice of the fact that the
people’s ratification of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987 signaled the return to normalcy of the political situation
in the Philippines. Consequently, the Romualdezes had no valid excuse for not responding to the subpoena served on
them at their last known address in 1991, which they do not deny having received.

The Ombudsman could not be faulted for proceeding with the investigation of the Romualdezes’ cases when they did
not show up despite notice being sent to them at their last known residence. As the Court held in a case:

The New Rules on Criminal Procedure "does not require as a condition sine qua non to the validity of the proceedings [in
the preliminary investigation] the presence of the accused for as long as efforts to reach him were made, and an
opportunity to controvert the evidence of the complainant is accorded him. The obvious purpose of the rule is to block
attempts of unscrupulous respondents to thwart the prosecution of offenses by hiding themselves or by employing
dilatory tactics."14

In sum, no reason exists for suspending or interrupting the conduct of the forfeiture proce edings before the
Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 160684, September 02, 2015

CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HI-GRADE FEEDS CORPORATION, REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES (THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL), REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF METRO MANILA, DISTRICT
III, CALOOCAN CITY , AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

The properties in dispute were formerly part of the notorious Maysilo Estate left by Gonzalo Tuason, the vastness of
which measures 1,660.26 hectares, stretching across Caloocan City, Valenzuela, and Malabon, covered by five (5) mother
titles or Original Certificate of Title (OCT). One of the mother titles is OCT No. 994, the mother title in dispute. Later on,
smaller lots forming part of the Maysilo Estate were sold to different persons. Several subsequent subdivisions,
consolidations, and one expropriation of the Estate, spawned numerous legal disputes, living-up to the name "Land of
Caveat Emptor."1 One of these disputed lots was Lot 26, the property subject of this litigation.

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari are the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 53770 dated 18 June 2003 and 28 October 2003, respectively, which annulled petitioner CLT Realty Development
Corporation's (CLT) TCT No. T-177013 and affirmed Hi-Grade Feeds Corporation's (Hi-Grade) TCTs No. 237450 and No.
T-146941.

The conflict arose due to an overlapping of the properties of CLT and Hi-Grade, which prompted CLT to file a case for
Annulment of Transfer Certificates of Title, Recovery of Possession, and Damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Caloocan City, Branch 121, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15463 against Hi-Grade.

Version of Hi-Grade

Respondent Hi-Grade is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 237450 and T-146941,
derived from TCT No. 4211 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal, registered under t he names of Alejandro
Ruiz (Ruiz) and Mariano Leuterio (Leuterio), which is a derivative title of OCT No. 994, the mother title. 4

Tracing the line of transfer that preceded the title of Hi-Grade, it is averred that TCT No. 4211 was registered under the
names of Ruiz and Leuterio on 9 September 1918. Later, Lot 26 was sold to Francisco Gonzalez (Gonzalez), which resulted
in the cancellation of TCT No. 4211 and its replacement by TCT No. 5261, registered under the name of Gonzalez. 5

Upon Gonzalez's death, TCT No. 5261 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 35486, registered under the name of his
surviving spouse Rufina Narciso Vda. De Gonzalez. The land covered by TCT No. 35486 was subdivided into seven (7)
lots under subdivision plan Psd-21154. By virtue of Psd-21154, TCT No. 35486 was cancelled and seven (7) new titles were
issued, TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374, registered under the children of Gonzalez.

In 1947, the Government expropriated the seven lots. 6 By virtue of the expropriation, TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374 were
cancelled and replaced by TCTs No. 12836 to No. 12842. Afterwards, by virtue of Consolidated Subdivision Plan Psd (LRC)
Pcd-1828, the Government consolidated the titles and then further subdivided the property into 77 lots.

One of the 77 lots was registered in the name of Benito Villanueva under TCTs No. 23027 to No. 23028, which was
further subdivided into Lot-A and 17-B, pursuant to subdivision plan Psd-276839. One of the properties in dispute is Lot
17-B, which was later on registered in the name of Jose Madulid, Sr. (Madulid, Sr.), under TCT No. C-32979, which was
later on sold to Hi-Grade.

Another lot resulting from the Government's consolidation and subdivision of the Maysilo Estate into 77 lots, is Lot No.
52, which was registered in the name of Inocencio Alvarez (Alvarez) under TCT No. 7363. Soon after, Alvarez sold Lot No.
52 to Madulid, Sr. TCT No. 7363 was cancelled and TCT No. 7364 was issued to Madulid, Sr. Afterwards, Madulid, Sr. sold
the lot to Hi-Grade. This is another one of the properties in dispute.

As a review, first, Hi-Grade traces its title to TCTs No. 7364 and No. C-32979, which were registered in the name Madulid,
Sr., which in turn stemmed from TCT Nos. 36557-63/T-460.

TCT Nos. 36557-63/T-460 were derived from TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374.

TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374 stemmed from TCT No. 35486, which was subdivided into smaller lots.

TCT No. 35486 was derived from TCT No. 5261. TCT No. 5261 stemmed from TCT No. 4211.

Finally, TCT No. 4211 was derived from OCT No. 994, the mother title.

Version of CLT

CLT is the registered owner of TCT No. T-177013, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale with Real Estate Mortgage dated 10
December 1988, executed by the former registered owner, Estelita I. Hipolito.

CLT argued that Hi-Grade's title is null and void for being fake and spurious based on the following:

1. As shown in the face of TCT No. 4211, it purports to have been derived from OCT No.
994;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

2. The original copy of OCT No. 994, which is existing and in due form, on file with the Registry of Deeds of
Caloocan City, contains dilapidated pages and no longer contains the pages where Lot No. 26 and some other
lots are supposedly inscribed.

3. Upon examination of the original copy of OCT No. 994, it can be seen that the technical descriptions of the lots
and the certificate itself are entirely written in the English language. On the other hand, the technical descriptions
on the alleged TCTs No. 4211, No. 5261, and No. 35486 are still inscribed in the Spanish language.
 4. The dates of the original survey of OCT No. 994, the mother title of TCT No. 4211, i.e., 8-27 September, 4-21
October and 17-18 November 1911, are not indicated on TCTs No. 4211, No. 5261, and No. 35486. Rather, an
entirely different date, 22 December 1917, is indicated at the end of the Spanish technical descriptions on the
alleged TCTs No. 4211, No. 5261, and No. 35486.

5. The parcel of land covered successively by TCTs No. 4211, No. 5261, and No. 35486 is not identified by a lot
number and there is no reference or mention of Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate in the technical description of
said titles.

6. There is no subdivision survey plan number indicated on TCTs No. 4211, No. 5261, and No. 35486 covering the
subdivision of Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate.

7. The plan Psd-21154 which subdivided the lot covered by TCT No. 35486 (formerly covered by TCT No. 4211, then
TCT No. 5261), could not be traced at the official depository of plans, which is the Lands Management Bureau
(LMB). According to the EDPS Listings of the Records Management Division of the LMB, there is no record of
Plan Psd-21154. Said EDPS listings indicate those records which were surveyed after the Second World War. It
appears, from TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374, plan PSD-21154 was done after the war on 15, 21, 29 September and
5-6 October 1946.

8. The technical descriptions inscribed on TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374 show that the tie points deviated from the
mother lot's tie point, which is the Bureau of Lands Location Monument ("BLLM") No. 1, Caloocan. Instead,
different location monuments of the adjoining Piedad Estate were used. The tie point used in TCT No. 1368 is
B.M. 10, Piedad Estate; while TCTs No. 1369 and No. 1470 used B.M. No. 8, Piedad Estate; and TCTs No. 1371, No.
1372, No. 1373, and No. 1374 used B.M. No. 7, Piedad Estate. The changing tie points resulted in the shifting of
the position of the seven lots in relation to the mother lot, using their technical descriptions inscribed on the face
of the titles. Thus, when plotted, the seven lots do not fall exactly inside the boundary of the mother lot. The
same is true when the lots described on the titles of Hi-Grade are plotted on the basis of their technical
descriptions inscribed on the titles.

9. TCT No. 4211 contains patent infirmities, inconsistencies, and irregularities indicating that it is a falsified
document representing a fictitious title and is, therefore, null and void. The fact was confirmed by an
examination by the Forensic Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, which concluded that
TCT No. 4211 was prepared only sometime in the 1940s and not in 1918, as it is made to appear on the face of the
document. Thus, the series of titles from where Hi-Grade's titles were derived, starting from TCTs No. 4211, No.
5261, and No. 35486, and up to and including the titles of Hi-Grade, are also necessarily null and void.

During trial, CLT presented the following witnesses: (1) Ramon Velazquez (Velazquez), Officer-in-Charge of the Survey
Records Section, Records Management Division of the LMB, who testified that the LMB does not have a copy of Psd
21154; (2) Norberto Vasquez, Jr. (Vasquez), Deputy Register of Deeds of Caloocan City, who identified the various titles
relevant to the case; (3) Juanito Bustalino (Bustalino), a licensed Geodetic Engineer, who testified that CLT engaged his
services to survey the subject property and discovered that there was an overlap between CLT's and Hi-Grade's titles; (4)
Atty. Rafael Antonio M. Santos, one of the counsel of CLT; and (5) Aida R. Villora-Magsipoc, a Forensic Chemist of the
Forensic Division, National Bureau of Investigation, who examined the titles as an expert witness.

On the other hand, Hi-Grade presented its sole witness, Atty. Jose Madulid, counsel for and stockholder of Hi-Grade, and
son of Hi-Grade's predecessor, Jose Madulid, Sr., who testified that his family has been occupying the subject properties
under the concept of an owner for more than twenty-seven (27) years, until the properties were transferred to Hi-Grade.

The Ruling of the RTC

After trial, the RTC7 ruled in favor of CLT. According to the RTC, Hi-Grade's title, the older title, cannot prevail over CLT's
title because it suffers from patent defects and infirmities. Although Hi-Grade paid realty taxes on the subject properties,
it is not considered as a conclusive proof of ownership. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the RTC dated 27
December 1995 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered and by preponderance of evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of the plaintiff CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP. and against defendants HI-GRADE FEEDS CORP.
et. al., ordering

1. TCT Nos. 237450 and 146941 in the name of the defendant null and void and accordingly
ordering their cancellation;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

2. defendant to vacate the portion of Lot No. 26 presently occupied by it and turn over possession
of the same to the plaintiff; and

3. defendant to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.8

Aggrieved, Hi-Grade filed a Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration on the grounds of newly discovered evidence
and serious and patent errors in the court's appreciation of evidence and factual findings based on the decision of the
court in Civil Case No. C-15491, entitled "CLT v. Sto. Niño Kapithahayan Association." The RTC denied the motion for utter
lack of merit. According to the RTC, the ruling in favor of Hi-Grade in Sto. Niño is not a newly-discovered evidence, as
Hi-Grade could not have failed to produce such evidence if it exercised reasonable diligence. Hi-Grade's reliance in the
aforesaid case is already moot and academic as the court in Sto. Niño already reconsidered its decision and upheld the
validity of CLT's title.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Impelled by the adverse ruling of the RTC, Hi-Grade elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of
the appeal, Hi-Grade filed a Motion to Admit and Take Judicial Notice of Committee Report on Senate Inquiry into
Maysilo Estate Submitted by the Committees on Justice and Human Rights and on Urban Planning, Housing and
Resettlement (Senate Report) on 1 July 1998. The Court of Appeals granted the motion in a Resolution 9 dated 31 August
1998. Included in the Resolution, however, is a statement that although the Court of Appeals takes judicial notice of the
Senate Report, the Court of Appeals is not bound by the findings and conclusions therein. 10
In the meantime, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Republic and in representation of the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority, filed a Petition for Intervention dated 25 August 1998. The OSG averred
that its intervention is indispensable as it is pursuant to its duty to preserve the integrity of the Torrens system of
registration and to protect the Assurance Fund, in connection with which it can initiate necessary actions for the
annulment of titles irregularly and fraudulently issued. The Court of Appeals granted the OSG motion. The Court of
Appeals resolved the issue on intervention in the appealed Decision dated 18 June 2003. According to the Court of
Appeals, due to the magnitude and significance that will affect the stability and integrity of the Torrens system, the State
has sufficient interest in the case.

Departing from the trial court's findings of fact, the Court of Appeals ruled as baseless the trial court's reliance on the
testimonies of CLT's witnesses, Vasquez and Bustalmo, on the alleged patent infirmities and defects in TCT No. 4211.
According to the Court of Appeals, Vasquez and Bustalino never testified that the issuance of TCT No. 4211 failed to
conform to the registration procedures in 1917, the year it was issued. Also, Vasquez and Bustalino are incompetent to
testify on the customary practices in land registration at that time. Reversing the Decision of the RTC, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered
DISMISSING CLT's complaint a quo and upholding the validity of TCT Nos. 237450 and T-146941 of
appellant Hi-Grade Feeds Corporation.

Appellant CLT is further ordered to surrender its owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-177013 to the
Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City who is hereby directed to effect its cancellation.

The other incidents are resolved as above indicated. No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.11

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. In addition to the factual issues raised in the trial court, the Petition
raised the following arguments:

1. The Court of Appeals went beyond the issues resolved by the trial court and formulated its own issue regarding
the date when OCT No. 994 was originally registered which it resolved on the basis of extraneous purported
evidence not presented before the trial court in the instant case, in violation of petitioner CLT Realty's rights to
due process of law.

2. The Court of Appeals perfunctorily, arbitrarily and blindly disregarded the findings of fact and conclusions of the
trial court arrived at after a careful evaluation of the evidence presented by the parties and established on record
and substituted and supplanted the same with its own conclusions based on extraneous evidence not presented
and admitted in evidence before the trial court.

3. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court despite the fact that respondent Hi-Grade has failed
to present evidence to refute the established fact that the alleged titles from where its alleged titles are derived
 from, i.e., the alleged TCT Nos. 4211, 5261, 35486 and 1368 to 1374, contain patent and inherent technical defects
and infirmities which render them spurious, void and ineffective.

4. The Court of Appeals unjustly made a wholesale rendition in its questioned decision despite the pendency of
important prejudicial motions or incidents which it thereby either peremptorily resolved or rendered moot and
academic, thus, violating petitioner CLT Realty's right to due process of law.

5. The Court of Appeals totally disregarded the rules on evidence and surrendered the independence of the
judiciary by giving full faith and credence to the findings and conclusions contained in the Senate Committee
Report No. 1031 by taking judicial notice of the same, which report was rendered pursuant to proceedings
initiated and conducted without notice to petitioner CLT Realty and thus in gross violation of its right to due
process, and was based on documents that were never authenticated.

6. The Court of Appeals erroneously relied on the allegation raised in the Republic's petitioner for intervention
although the State has no legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation of the instant case and may not
validly intervene in the instant case since the matter in litigation are admittedly privately owned lands which will
not revert to the Republic.

7. The Court of Appeals blindly ignored the fact and worse, failed and refused to rule on the issue that respondent
Hi-Grade is guilty of forum-shopping for which reason the latter's appeal before the Court of Appeals should
have been dismissed.12

Issues

I.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it took judicial notice of the Senate Report

II.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it admitted the Office of the Solicitor General's
Petition for Intervention

III.

Which of the OCTs 994, that dated 19 April 1917 or that dated 3 May 1917, is the valid title?

Our Ruling

First, the incidental matters.

I.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it took judicial notice of the Senate Report

CLT avers that taking judicial notice of the Senate Report is a violation of the Rules of Court and CLT's right to due
process. First, the Senate Report is inadmissible and should not be given any probative value because it was obtained in
violation of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, considering that the Senate Report is unauthenticated and is thus deemed
hearsay evidence. Contrary to the mandatory procedure under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which requires
examination of documentary and testimonial evidence, the Senate Report was not put to proof and CLT was deprived of
the opportunity to conduct a cross-examination on the Senate Report. And it is also contended that the right of CLT to
due process was violated because the proceedings in the Senate were conducted without notice to CLT. Finally, the
admission in evidence of the Senate Report violated the time-honored principle of separation of powers as it is an
encroachment into the jurisdiction exclusive to the courts.

CLT misses the point. Taking judicial notice of acts of the Senate is well within the ambit of the law. Section 1 of Rule 129
of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

SECTION 1 . Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of
government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the
world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of
legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time,
and the geographical divisions, (1a) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof because these
facts are already known to them; 13 it is the duty of the court to assume something as a matter of fact without need of
further evidentiary support.14 Otherwise stated, by the taking of judicial notice, the court dispenses with the traditional
form of presentation of evidence, i.e. the rigorous rules of evidence and court proceedings such as cross-examination.15

The Senate Report, an official act of the legislative department, may be taken judicial notice of.

CLT posits that the Court of Appeals violated the time-honored principle of separation of powers when it took judicial
notice of the Senate Report. This contention is baseless. We adopt the pronouncements of this Court in Angeles v. The
Secretary of Justice:16

To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ and Senate reports regarding OCT No. 994. In the
2007 Manotok case, this Court constituted a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the cases
on remand, declaring as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s], we are not prepared to adopt the findings made by the DOJ and
the Senate, or even consider whether these are admissible as evidence, though such questions may be
considered by the Court of Appeals upon the initiative of the parties, x x x The reports cannot
 conclusively supersede or overturn judicial decisions, but if admissible they may be taken into account
as evidence on the same level as the other pieces of evidence submitted by the parties. The fact that
they were rendered by the DOJ and the Senate should not, in itself, persuade the courts to accept them
without inquiry. The facts and arguments presented in the reports must still undergo judicial scrutiny
and analysis, and certainly the courts will have the discretion to accept or reject them. 17 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Thus, the Senate Report shall not be conclusive upon the courts, but will be examined and evaluated based on its
probative value. The Court of Appeals explained quite pointedly why the taking of judicial notice of the Senate Report
does not violate the republican principle. Thus:

However, the question of the binding effect of that Report upon this Court is altogether a different
matter. Certainly, a determination by any branch of government on a justiciable matter which is properly
before this Court for adjudication does not bind the latter. The finding of the Senate committees may be
the appropriate basis for remedial legislation but when the issue of the validity of a Torrens title is
submitted to a court for resolution, only the latter has the competence to make such a determination
and once final, the same binds not only the parties but all agencies of government. 18

That there is such a document as the Senate Report was all that was conceded by the Court of Appeals. It did not allow
the Senate Report to determine the decision on the case.

II.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it admitted the Office of the Solicito r General's
Petition for Intervention

The Republic maintains that the proliferation of spurious or fake titles covering the infamous Maysilo Estate poses a
serious threat to the integrity of the Torrens system and the Assurance Fund. The Republic asserts that because it is
bound to safeguard and protect the integrity of the Torrens system and Assurance Fund, it is duty-bound to intervene in
the present case. In granting the intervention, the Court of Appeals ruled that considering the magnitude and
significance of the issues spawned by the Maysilo Estate, enough to affect the stability and integrity of the Torrens
system, the Republic is allowed to intervene.

CLT, on the other hand, contends that the Republic's intervention is baseless. According to CLT, the Republic has no legal
interest in the properties as the subject properties are not public lands and as such, will not revert to the Republic.
Further, there is no threat or claim against the Assurance Fund. Anchoring on Presidential Decree No. 478 and
Administrative Code of 1987, CLT claims that the only action which the Office of the Solicitor General may file on behalf
of the Republic in connection with registered lands is an action for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public
domain and improvements thereon, as well as lands held in violation of the Constitution. 19

This time, we agree with CLT.

Intervention is only allowed before or during trial. Citing Sps. Oliva v. CA,20 CLT argues that the Petition for Intervention
was time-barred for having been filed beyond the period prescribed in Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, i.e.,
before rendition of judgment. In Oliva, the Court clarified that intervention is unallowable when the case has already
been submitted for decision, when judgment has been rendered, or when judgment has already became final and
executory. And, intervention is only allowed when the intervenors are indispensable parties.

Although we are cognizant of the exception that the Court may wield its power to suspend its own rules and procedure
in lieu of substantial justice and for compelling reasons, 21 the attendant circumstances are not availing in the present case.

The Republic is not an indispensable party in the instant litigation. An indispensable party is a part y-in-interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. 22 Here,
even without the Republic as participant, a final determination of the issues can be attained.

Anent the opportuness of intervention, the Court held in Cariño v. Ofilada23 that it may be allowed only before or during
trial. The term trial is used in its restricted sense, i.e., the period for the introduction of evidence by both parties. The
period of trial terminates when the judgment begins. As this case was already in its appeal stage when intervention was
sought, it could no longer be allowed.

CLT further avers that because there was no claim against the Assurance Fund, intervention is improper. Section 95 of
P.D. 1529 provides for the grounds when a party can claim against the Assurance Fund:

Section 95. Action for compensation from funds. A person who, without negligence on his part, sustains
loss or damage, or is deprived of land or any estate or interest therein in consequence of the bringing of
the land under the operation of the Torrens system of arising after original registration of land, through
fraud or in consequence of any error, omission, mistake or misdescription in any certificate of title or in
any entry or memorandum in the registration book, and who by the provisions of this Decree is barred
or otherwise precluded under the provision of any law from bringing an action for the recovery of such
land or the estate or interest therein, may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction for the
recovery of damages to be paid out of the Assurance Fund.

Indeed, whatever party is favored in this case, the losing party may file a claim against the Assurance Fund as the present
case involves the operation of the Torrens system. However, the action to claim against the Assurance Fund may be dealt
with in a separate proceeding.

Now, the merits of this case.

Parenthetically, although the general rule is that the factual findings of the trial court are accorded respect and are not
generally disturbed on appeal, the aforesaid rule does not apply in the case at bar, as the findings of the trial court and
the appellate court are contradictory. 24

We shall now discuss the bottom issues.

III.

Which off the OCTs 994, that dated 19 April 1917 or that dated 3 May 1917, is the valid title?

The mother title, OCT 994

The arguments of the parties come from apparently the same document. Notably, however, the parties' OCTs No. 994
contain different dates of registration, namely:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

CLT's OCT No. 994 is dated 19 April 1917

Hi-Grade's OCT No. 994 is dated 3 May 1917

A title can only have one date of registration, as there can only be one title covering the same property. The date of
registration is reckoned from the time of the title's transcription in the record book of the Registry of Deeds. 25 Therefore,
the date appearing on the face of a title refers to the date of issuance of the decree of registration, as provided in
Sections 41 and 42 of the Land Registration Act or Section 40 of the P.D. 1529:

Section 41. Immediately upon the entry of the decree of registration the clerk shall send a certified copy
thereof, under the seal of the court to the register of deeds for the province, or provinces or city in
which the land lies, and the register of deeds shall transcribe the decree in a book to be called the
"Registration Book," in which a leaf, or leaves, in consecutive order, shall be devoted exclusively to each
title. The entry made by the register of deeds in this book in each case shall be the original certificate of
title, and shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal of the court. x x x

Section 42. The certificate first registered in pursuance of the decree of registration in regard to any
parcel of land shall be entitled in the registration book, "original certificate of title, entered pursuant to
decree of the Court of Land Registration, dated at" (stating the time and place of entry of decree and
the number of case). This certificate shall take effect upon the date of the transcription of the
decree. Subsequent certificates relating to the same land shall be in like form, but shall be entitled
"Transfer from number" (the number of the next previous certificate relating to the same land), and also
the words "Originally registered" (date, volume, and page of registration). (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

Based on Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429, the decree registering OCT No. 994, the date of the
issuance is 19 April 1917 while on the other hand, OCT No. 994 was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on
3 May 1917. In this case, the date which should be reckoned as the date of registration of the title is the date when the
mother title was received for transcription, 3 May 1917. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals:

For sure, the very copy of OCT No. 994, presented by Appellee CLT no less and marked as its Exhibit "D",
shows on its face that the date April 19, 1917 refers to the issuance of the decree of registration by the
 Honorable Norberto Romualdez, while May 3, 1917 pertains to the date when the same decree was
Received for transcription in the Office of the Register of Deeds. 26

Therefore, as the date of transcription in the record book of the Registry of Deeds is 3 May 1917, we rule that the genuine
title is the title of Hi-Grade.

The derivative title, TCT No. 4211

As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, CLT failed to prove by preponderance of evidence, the alleged defe cts and
infirmities in TCT No. 4211, the title from whence Hi-Grade's titles were derived.

CLT failed to prove that TCT No. 4211 did not conform to the registration procedures at the time it was prepared.
Contrary to the findings of the trial court, the Court cannot give credence to the testimony of CLT's witnesses,
Vasquez27 and Bustalino.28 Vasquez is the Deputy Register of Deeds of Caloocan City, while Bustalino is a Geodetic
Engineer. For their testimonies to matter, CLT must first establish their competence as regards the registration rules in
land registration in 1918, at the time TCT No. 4211 was prepared. CLT failed to discharge such burden.

On CLT's allegation that the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) has no records of Psd 21154, we note that CLT did not
prove that the LMB indeed has no such records. CLT's witness, Velasquez, merely testified that he cannot ascertain
whether or not Psd 21154 was burned or lost during the world war. 29 Just as important, while Psd 21154 could not be
located, it was not only testified to that it may have been lost or burned during the world war; a blue print copy of the
same is being kept in the vault of the Register of Deeds of Pasig City.

As regards the findings of the NBI Forensic Chemist on the age of TCT No. 4211, the Court of Appeals correctly found
that such findings are inconclusive because the Chemist did not conclusively state that TCT No. 4211 could not have been
prepared in 1918.30 Also, the Chemist, in her cross-examination, admitted that she did not know who supplied her copies
of the TCTs and that she has not seen any standard document dated 1918. 31

On the matter regarding the discrepancy between the dates of survey and issuance, tie points, and language used in TCT
No. 4211 and OCT No. 994, CLT's contention must fail for the obvious reason that the basis of CLT's allegation is the
non-existent mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917. Thus, as OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 has been
established as null and void, it cannot serve as precedent for ascertaining the genuineness of TCT No. 4211.

What matters most in this case is that CLT questioned the title of Hi-Grade for the purpose of having CLT's own title
upheld. Instead of establishing the genuineness of its own title, CLT attacked Hi-Grade's titles. However, CLT failed to
establish the chain of titles linking its TCT No. T-177013 to the mother title, OCT No. 994. It failed to prove the
"circumstances under which its predecessor-in-interest acquired the whole of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate. Ironically, it is
even by CLT's presentation of OCT No. 994 and of the succession of titles previous to those held by appellant Hi -Grade
that the latter's titles [was] established as genuine derivative titles of OCT No. 994." 32

Indeed, CLT's evidence must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the alleged
weakness of the evidence of Hi-Grade. As already shown, such allegation was proven wrong by documents on records.

As opposed to CLT's evidence on the alleged infirmities in Hi-Grade's titles, Hi-Grade presented muniments of title, tax
declarations or realty tax payments, on the subject properties. 33 While tax declarations and receipts are inconclusive
evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land, they are prima facie proof of ownership or possession and may
become the basis of a claim for ownership when it is coupled with proof of actual possession of the property. 34 In the
case at bar, Hi-Grade is the actual possessor of the subject property. 35

To sum up, Hi-Grade was able to establish the chain of titles linking its titles, TCTs No. 237450 and T-14691, to the
derivative title, TCT No. 4211, to the mother title, OCT No. 994. 36 As borne by the records, TCT No. 4211 was registered as
a derivative title of OCT No. 994 on 9 September 1918.37 On the other hand, CLT's title, TCT No. R-17994,38 was registered
also as a derivative title of OCT No. 994 only on 12 September 1978. Thus, the reference of both parties is OCT No. 994,
but with different dates: CLT's OCT No. 994 is dated 19 April 1917, while Hi-Grade's OCT No. 994 is dated 3 May 1917.

This factual issue of which OCT No. 994 is genuine is not a novel matter. This Court, in Angeles v. The Secretary of
Justice,39 citing Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation,40 exhaustively passed upon and ruled that
the true and valid OCT No. 994 was dated 3 May 1917, not 19 April 1917.

In the recent case of Syjuco v. Republic of the Philippines,41 this Court, reiterated the rulings in Angeles v. The Secretary
of Justice42and Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation, that the true and valid OCT No. 994 was
registered on 3 May 1917, not on 19 April 1917, and that any title that traces its source from OCT No. 994 dated 19 April
1917, is deemed void and inexistent.43

As we have priorly pronounced, any title that traces its source to a void title, is also void. The spring cannot rise higher
than its source. Nemo potest plus juris ad alium transferre quam ipse habet. All titles that trace its source to OCT No. 994
dated 19 April 1917, are therefore void, for such mother title is inexistent. 44 CLT so traces its title to OCT No. 994 dated 19
April 1917, the title of CLT is void.45chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
53770, entitled "CLT Realty Development Corporation v. Hi-Grade Feeds Corporation, Register of Deeds of Metro Manila,
District III," dated 18 June 2003 and 28 October 2003, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp.
Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A.
MAGNO, respondents.

San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin for Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank.

Manglapus Law Office, Antonio Law Office and Rizal R. Quimpo for private respondents and appellees Avelina A. Magno,
etc., et al.

BARREDO, J.:p

Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction; certiorari to "declare all acts of the respondent court in the Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo) subsequent to the order of
December 14, 1957 as null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction"; prohibition to enjoin the responden t
court from allowing, tolerating, sanctioning, or abetting private respondent Avelina A. Magno to perform or do any acts
of administration, such as those enumerated in the petition, and from exercising any authority or power as Regular
Administratrix of above-named Testate Estate, by entertaining manifestations, motion and pleadings filed by her and
acting on them, and also to enjoin said court from allowing said private respondent to interfere, meddle or take part in
any manner in the administration of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the same court
and branch); with prayer for preliminary injunction, which was issued by this Court on August 8, 1967 upon a bond of
P5,000; the petition being particularly directed against the orders of the respondent court of October 12, 1966 denying
petitioner's motion of April 22, 1966 and its order of July 18, 1967 denying the motion for reconsideration of said order.

Related to and involving basically the same main issue as the foregoing petition, thirty-three (33) appeals from different
orders of the same respondent court approving or otherwise sanctioning the acts of administration of the respondent
Magno on behalf of the testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges.

THE FACTS

On May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City leaving a will executed on November 22, 1952 pertinently
providing as follows:

FIRST: I direct that all my just debts and funeral expenses be first paid out of my estate.

SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real,
wherever situated, or located, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said
husband, during his natural lifetime.

THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the right to manage, control,
use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to make any changes in the physical
properties of said estate, by sale or any part thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any other or additional
property as he may think best; to execute conveyances with or without general or special warranty, conveying in fee
simple or for any other term or time, any property which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real
property for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple title to the
interest so conveyed in such property as he may elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall
belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire. It is
provided herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now owned by us
located at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas, but he shall have the full right to lease, manage and enjoy the same
during his lifetime, above provided. He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein. and may sell
unimproved town lots.

FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue
and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my
brothers and sisters, share and share alike, namely:

Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Saddie Rascoe, Era Roman and Nimroy Higdon.

FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters named in item Fourth, above, prior to the death of m y
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, then it is my will and bequest that the heirs of such deceased brother or sister shall
take jointly the share which would have gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived.

SIXTH: I nominate and appoint my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to be executor of this, my last will and
testament, and direct that no bond or other security be required of him as such executor.

SEVENTH: It is my will and bequest that no action be had in the probate court, in the administration of my estate, other
than that necessary to prove and record this will and to return an inventory and appraisement of my estate and list of
claims. (Pp. 2-4, Petition.)

This will was subsequently probated in aforementioned Special Proceedings No. 1307 of respondent court on June 28,
1957, with the widower Charles Newton Hodges being appointed as Executor, pursuant to the provisions thereof.

Previously, on May 27, 1957, the said widower (hereafter to be referred to as Hodges) had been appointed Special
Administrator, in which capacity he filed a motion on the same date as follows:

URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION TO ALLOW OR AUTHORIZE PETITIONER TO CONTINUE THE BUSINESS IN WHICH HE WAS
ENGAGED AND TO PERFORM ACTS WHICH HE HAD BEEN DOING WHILE DECEASED WAS LIVING

Come petitioner in the above-entitled special proceedings, thru his undersigned attorneys, to the Hon. Court, most
respectfully states:

1. — That Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving her last will and testament, a copy of which is attached to the petitio n for
probate of the same.

2. — That in said last will and testament herein petitioner Charles Newton Hodges is directed to have the right to
manage, control use and enjoy the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in the same way, a provision was placed i n
paragraph two, the following: "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, to my
beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and (to) hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime."
3. — That during the lifetime of Linnie Jane Hodges, herein petitioner was engaged in the business of buying and
selling personal and real properties, and do such acts which petitioner may think best.

4. — That deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants or ascendants, except brothers and sisters and
herein petitioner as executor surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent.

5. — That the present motion is submitted in order not to paralyze the business of petitioner and the deceased,
especially in the purchase and sale of properties. That proper accounting will be had also in all these transactions.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, petitioner C. N. Hodges (Charles Newton Hodges) be allowed or
authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged and to perform acts which he had been doing while
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges was living.

City of Iloilo, May 27, 1957. (Annex "D", Petition.)

which the respondent court immediately granted in the following order:

It appearing in the urgent ex-parte motion filed by petitioner C. N. Hodges, that the business in which said petitioner and
the deceased were engaged will be paralyzed, unless and until the Executor is named and appointed by the Court, the
said petitioner is allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged and to perform acts which he
had been doing while the deceased was living.

SO ORDERED.

City of Iloilo May 27, 1957. (Annex "E", Petition.)

Under date of December 11, 1957, Hodges filed as such Executor another motion thus:

MOTION TO APPROVE ALL SALES, CONVEYANCES, LEASES, MORTGAGES THAT THE EXECUTOR HAD MADE FURTHER
AND SUBSEQUENT TRANSACTIONS WHICH THE EXECUTOR MAY DO IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAST WISH OF THE
DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES.

Comes the Executor in the above-entitled proceedings, thru his undersigned attorney, to the Hon. Court, most
respectfully states:

1. — That according to the last will and testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, the executor as the surviving
spouse and legatee named in the will of the deceased; has the right to dispose of all the properties left by the deceased,
portion of which is quoted as follows:

Second: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real, wherever
situated, or located, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said husband,
during his natural lifetime.
Third: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the right to manage, control, use
and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to make any changes in the physical properties
of said estate, by sale or any part thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any other or additional property
as he may think best; to execute conveyances with or without general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for
any other term or time, any property which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property for oil,
gas and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed
in such property as he may elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him, and he is
further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire. ...

2. — That herein Executor, is not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. That during the lifetime of herein Executor, as Legatee has the right
to sell, convey, lease or dispose of the properties in the Philippines. That inasmuch as C.N. Hodges was and is engaged in
the buy and sell of real and personal properties, even before the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, a motion to authorize said
C.N. Hodges was filed in Court, to allow him to continue in the business of buy and sell, which motion was favorably
granted by the Honorable Court.

3. — That since the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. C.N. Hodges had been buying and selling real and personal
properties, in accordance with the wishes of the late Linnie Jane Hodges.

4. — That the Register of Deeds for Iloilo, had required of late the herein Executor to have all the sales, leases,
conveyances or mortgages made by him, approved by the Hon. Court.

5. — That it is respectfully requested, all the sales, conveyances leases and mortgages executed by the Executor, be
approved by the Hon. Court. and subsequent sales conveyances, leases and mortgages in compliances with the wishes
of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, and within the scope of the terms of the last will and testament, also be approved;

6. — That the Executor is under obligation to submit his yearly accounts, and the properties conveyed can also be
accounted for, especially the amounts received.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, all the sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages executed by the
Executor, be approved by the Hon. Court, and also the subsequent sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages in
consonance with the wishes of the deceased contained in her last will and testament, be with authorization and approval
of the Hon. Court.

City of Iloilo, December 11, 1967.

(Annex "G", Petition.)

which again was promptly granted by the respondent court on December 14, 1957 as follows:

ORDER

As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor for the reasons stated in his motion dated December 11, 1957,
which the Court considers well taken all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor Charles N. Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said Executor is
further authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter.

So ordered.

Iloilo City. December 14, 1957.

(Annex "H", Petition.)

On April 14, 1959, in submitting his first statement of account as Executor for approval, Hodges alleged:

Pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court, herein executor of the deceased, renders the following account of his
administration covering the period from January 1, 1958 to December 31, 1958, which account may be found in detail in
the individual income tax return filed for the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, to wit:

That a certified public accountant has examined the statement of net worth of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, the
assets and liabilities, as well as the income and expenses, copy of which is hereto attached and made integral part of this
statement of account as Annex "A".

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is most respectfully prayed that, the statement of net worth of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, the assets and liabilities, income and expenses as shown in the individual income tax return for the estate of the
deceased and marked as Annex "A", be approved by the Honorable Court, as substantial compliance with the
requirements of the Rules of Court.

That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the herein accounts be given notice, as
herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already
probated by the Honorable court.

City of Iloilo April 14, 1959.

(Annex "I", Petition.)

The respondent court approved this statement of account on April 21, 1959 in its order worded thus:

Upon petition of Atty. Gellada, in representation of the Executor, the statement of net worth of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, assets and liabilities, income and expenses as shown in the individual income tax return for the estate of the
deceased and marked as Annex "A" is approved.

SO ORDERED.

City of Iloilo April 21, 1959.

(Annex "J", Petition.)

His accounts for the periods January 1, 1959 to December 31, 1959 and January 1, 1960 to December 31, 1960 were
submitted likewise accompanied by allegations identical mutatis mutandis to those of April 14, 1959, quoted above; and
the respective orders approving the same, dated July 30, 1960 and May 2, 1961, were substantially identical to the
above-quoted order of April 21, 1959. In connection with the statements of account just mentioned, the following
assertions related thereto made by respondent-appellee Magno in her brief do not appear from all indications
discernible in the record to be disputable:

Under date of April 14, 1959, C.N. Hodges filed his first "Account by the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In
the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1958 annexed
thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P328,402.62, divided evenly
between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for
calendar year 1958 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income
of P164,201.31, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (p. 91, Appellee's Brief.)

xxx xxx xxx

Under date of July 21, 1960, C.N. Hodges filed his second "Annual Statement of Account by the Executor" of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of
December 31, 1959 annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of
P270,623.32, divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual
income tax return" for calendar year 1959 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as
having earned income of P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp. 91-92. Appellee's Brief.)

xxx xxx xxx

Under date of April 20, 1961, C.N. Hodges filed his third "Annual Statement of Account by the Executor for the Year 1960"
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Net Worth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges" as of December 31, 1960 annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a
net income of P314,857.94, divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed
an "individual income tax return" for calendar year 1960 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the
said estate as having earned income of P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets
and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (Pp. 92-93, Appellee's Brief.)

Likewise the following:

In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed the seven brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as her "heirs" (see
p. 2, Green ROA). The order of the court admitting the will to probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy
Higdon (see p. 14, Green ROA). Immediately, C.N. Hodges filed a verified motion to have Roy Higdon's name included as
an heir, stating that he wanted to straighten the records "in order the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or
believe they were omitted, and that they were really and are interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. .
As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the estate he was administering under American law. He did file such
as estate tax return on August 8, 1958. In Schedule "M" of such return, he answered "Yes" to the question as to whether
he was contemplating "renouncing the will". On the question as to what property interests passed to him as the surviving
spouse, he answered:

"None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal charges. It is the intention of
the surviving husband of deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in their
Community estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of
administration are finally determined and paid."

Again, on August 9, 1962, barely four months before his death, he executed an "affidavit" wherein he ratified and
confirmed all that he stated in Schedule "M" of his estate tax returns as to his having renounced what was given him by
his wife's will.1

As appointed executor, C.N. Hodges filed an "Inventory" dated May 12, 1958. He listed all the assets of his conjugal
partnership with Linnie Jane Hodges on a separate balance sheet and then stated expressly that her estate which has
come into his possession as executor was "one-half of all the items" listed in said balance sheet. (Pp. 89-90, Appellee's
Brief.)

Parenthetically, it may be stated, at this juncture, that We are taking pains to quote wholly or at least, extensively from
some of the pleadings and orders whenever We feel that it is necessary to do so for a more comprehensive and clearer
view of the important and decisive issues raised by the parties and a more accurate appraisal of their respective positions
in regard thereto.

The records of these cases do not show that anything else was done in the above-mentioned Special Proceedings No.
1307 until December 26, 1962, when on account of the death of Hodges the day before, the same lawyer, Atty. Leon P.
Gellada, who had been previously acting as counsel for Hodges in his capacity as Executor of his wife's estate, and as
such had filed the aforequoted motions and manifestations, filed the following:

URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A

SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX

COMES the undersigned attorney for the Executor in the above-entitled proceedings, to the Honorable Court, most
respectfully states:

1. That in accordance with the Last Will and Testament of Linnie Jane Hodges (deceased), her husband, Charles Newton
Hodges was to act as Executor, and in fact, in an order issued by this Hon. Court dated June 28, 1957, the said Charles
Newton Hodges was appointed Executor and had performed the duties as such.

2. That last December 22, 1962, the said Charles Newton Hodges was stricken ill, and brought to the Iloilo Mission
Hospital for treatment, but unfortunately, he died on December 25, 1962, as shown by a copy of the death certificate
hereto attached and marked as Annex "A".
3. That in accordance with the provisions of the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges, whatever real and personal
properties that may remain at the death of her husband Charles Newton Hodges, the said properties shall b e equally
divided among their heirs. That there are real and personal properties left by Charles Newton Hodges, which need to be
administered and taken care of.

4. That the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as that of Charles Newton Hodges, have not as yet been
determined or ascertained, and there is necessity for the appointment of a general administrator to liquidate and
distribute the residue of the estate to the heirs and legatees of both spouses. That in accordance with the provisions of
Section 2 of Rule 75 of the Rules of Court, the conjugal partnership of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges
shall be liquidated in the testate proceedings of the wife.

5. That the undersigned counsel, has perfect personal knowledge of the existence of the last will and testament of
Charles Newton Hodges, with similar provisions as that contained in the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges.
However, said last will and testament of Charles Newton Hodges is kept inside the vault or iron safe in his office, and will
be presented in due time before this honorable Court.

6. That in the meantime, it is imperative and indispensable that, an Administratrix be appointed for the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and a Special Administratrix for the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, to perform the duties required by
law, to administer, collect, and take charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of both spouses, Charles
Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, as provided for in Section 1 and 2, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.

7. That there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration, because the last will and testament of
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, is still kept in his safe or vault, and in the meantime, unless an administratrix (and,) at
the same time, a Special Administratrix is appointed, the estate of both spouses are in danger of being lost, damaged or
go to waste.

8. That the most trusted employee of both spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C.N. Hodges, who had been employed for
around thirty (30) years, in the person of Miss Avelina Magno, (should) be appointed Administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and at the same time Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges. That the said
Miss Avelina Magno is of legal age, a resident of the Philippines, the most fit, competent, trustworthy and well-qualified
person to serve the duties of Administratrix and Special Administratrix and is willing to act as such.

9. That Miss Avelina Magno is also willing to file bond in such sum which the Hon. Court believes reasonable.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed that, Miss AVELINA A. MAGNO be immediately
appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles
Newton Hodges, with powers and duties provided for by law. That the Honorable Court fix the reasonable bond of
P1,000.00 to be filed by Avelina A. Magno.

(Annex "O", Petition.)

which respondent court readily acted on in its order of even date thus: .
For the reasons alleged in the Urgent Ex-parte Motion filed by counsel for the Executor dated December 25, 1962, which
the Court finds meritorious, Miss AVELINA A. MAGNO, is hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in the latter case, because the last will of
said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the real and personal properties of both
spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless a Special Administratrix is appointed.

Miss Avelina A. Magno is required to file bond in the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), and after having done
so, let letters of Administration be issued to her." (Annex "P", Petition.)

On December 29, 1962, however, upon urgent ex-parte petition of respondent Magno herself, thru Atty. Gellada, Harold,
R. Davies, "a representative of the heirs of deceased Charles Newton Hodges (who had) arrived from the United State s of
America to help in the administration of the estate of said deceased" was appointed as Co-Special Administrator of the
estate of Hodges, (pp. 29-33, Yellow - Record on Appeal) only to be replaced as such co-special administrator on
January 22, 1963 by Joe Hodges, who, according to the motion of the same attorney, is "the nephew of the deceased
(who had) arrived from the United States with instructions from the other heirs of the deceased to administer the
properties or estate of Charles Newton Hodges in the Philippines, (Pp. 47-50, id.)

Meanwhile, under date of January 9, 1963, the same Atty. Gellada filed in Special Proceedings 1672 a petition for the
probate of the will of Hodges, 2 with a prayer for the issuance of letters of administration to the same Joe Hodges, albeit
the motion was followed on February 22, 1963 by a separate one asking that Atty. Fernando Mirasol be appointed as his
co-administrator. On the same date this latter motion was filed, the court issued the corresponding order of probate and
letters of administration to Joe Hodges and Atty. Mirasol, as prayed for.

At this juncture, again, it may also be explained that just as, in her will, Mrs. Hodges bequeathed her whole estate to her
husband "to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime", she, at the same time or in like
manner, provided that "at the death of my said husband — I give devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers
and sisters, share and share alike —". Accordingly, it became incumbent upon Hodges, as executor of his wife's will, to
duly liquidate the conjugal partnership, half of which constituted her estate, in order that upon the eventuality of his
death, "the rest, residue and remainder" thereof could be determined and correspondingly distributed or divided among
her brothers and sisters. And it was precisely because no such liquidation was done, furthermore, there is the issue of
whether the distribution of her estate should be governed by the laws of the Philippines or those of Texas, of which State
she was a national, and, what is more, as already stated, Hodges made official and sworn statements or manifestations
indicating that as far as he was concerned no "property interests passed to him as surviving spouse — "except for
purposes of administering the estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal charges" and it was the intention of the
surviving husband of the deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in their
Community Estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of
administration are finally determined and paid", that the incidents and controversies now before Us for resolution arose.
As may be observed, the situation that ensued upon the death of Hodges became rather unusual and so, qu ite
understandably, the lower court's actuations presently under review are apparently wanting in consistency and
seemingly lack proper orientation.
Thus, We cannot discern clearly from the record before Us the precise perspective from which the trial cour t proceeded
in issuing its questioned orders. And, regretably, none of the lengthy briefs submitted by the parties is of valuable
assistance in clearing up the matter.

To begin with, We gather from the two records on appeal filed by petitioner, as appellant in the appealed cases, one with
green cover and the other with a yellow cover, that at the outset, a sort of modus operandi had been agreed upon by
the parties under which the respective administrators of the two estates were supposed to act conj ointly, but since no
copy of the said agreement can be found in the record before Us, We have no way of knowing when exactly such
agreement was entered into and under what specific terms. And while reference is made to said modus operandi in the
order of September 11, 1964, on pages 205-206 of the Green Record on Appeal, reading thus:

The present incident is to hear the side of administratrix, Miss Avelina A. Magno, in answer to the charges contained in
the motion filed by Atty. Cesar Tirol on September 3, 1964. In answer to the said charges, Miss Avelina A. Magno,
through her counsel, Atty. Rizal Quimpo, filed a written manifestation.

After reading the manifestation here of Atty. Quimpo, for and in behalf of the administratrix, Miss Avelina A. Magno, the
Court finds that everything that happened before September 3, 1964, which was resolved on September 8, 1964, to the
satisfaction of parties, was simply due to a misunderstanding between the representative of the Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank and Miss Magno and in order to restore the harmonious relations between the parties, the Court
ordered the parties to remain in status quo as to their modus operandi before September 1, 1964, until after the Court
can have a meeting with all the parties and their counsels on October 3, as formerly agreed upon between counsels,
Attys. Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta, Attys. Tirol and Tirol and Atty. Rizal Quimpo.

In the meantime, the prayers of Atty. Quimpo as stated in his manifestation shall not be resolved by this C ourt until
October 3, 1964.

SO ORDERED.

there is nothing in the record indicating whatever happened to it afterwards, except that again, reference thereto was
made in the appealed order of October 27, 1965, on pages 292-295 of the Green Record on Appeal, as follows:

On record is an urgent motion to allow PCIB to open all doors and locks in the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street,
Iloilo City, to take immediate and exclusive possession thereof and to place its own locks and keys for security purposes
of the PCIB dated October 27, 1965 thru Atty. Cesar Tirol. It is alleged in said urgent motion that Administratrix Magno of
the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges refused to open the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City where
PCIB holds office and therefore PCIB is suffering great moral damage and prejudice as a result of said act. It is prayed
that an order be issued authorizing it (PCIB) to open all doors and locks in the said office, to take immediate and
exclusive possession thereof and place thereon its own locks and keys for security purposes; instructing the clerk of court
or any available deputy to witness and supervise the opening of all doors and locks and taking possession of the PCIB.

A written opposition has been filed by Administratrix Magno of even date (Oct. 27) thru counsel Rizal Quimpo stating
therein that she was compelled to close the office for the reason that the PCIB failed to comply with the order of this
Court signed by Judge Anacleto I. Bellosillo dated September 11, 1964 to the effect that both estates should remain
in status quo to their modus operandi as of September 1, 1964.

To arrive at a happy solution of the dispute and in order not to interrupt the operation of the office of both estates, the
Court aside from the reasons stated in the urgent motion and opposition heard the verbal arguments of Atty. Cesar Tirol
for the PCIB and Atty. Rizal Quimpo for Administratix Magno.

After due consideration, the Court hereby orders Magno to open all doors and locks in the Hodge s Office at 206-208
Guanco Street, Iloilo City in the presence of the PCIB or its duly authorized representative and deputy clerk of court Albis
of this branch not later than 7:30 tomorrow morning October 28, 1965 in order that the office of said estates c ould
operate for business.

Pursuant to the order of this Court thru Judge Bellosillo dated September 11, 1964, it is hereby ordered:

(a) That all cash collections should be deposited in the joint account of the estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and estates of
C.N. Hodges;

(b) That whatever cash collections that had been deposited in the account of either of the estates should be withdrawn
and since then deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and the estate of C.N. Hodges;

(c) That the PCIB should countersign the check in the amount of P250 in favor of Administratrix Avelina A. Magno as her
compensation as administratrix of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate chargeable to the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
only;

(d) That Administratrix Magno is hereby directed to allow the PCIB to inspect whatever records, documents and papers
she may have in her possession in the same manner that Administrator PCIB is also directed to allow Administratrix
Magno to inspect whatever records, documents and papers it may have in its possession;

(e) That the accountant of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall have access to all records of the transactions of both
estates for the protection of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges; and in like manner the accountant or any authorized
representative of the estate of C.N. Hodges shall have access to the records of transactions of the Linnie Jane Hodges
estate for the protection of the estate of C.N. Hodges.

Once the estates' office shall have been opened by Administratrix Magno in the presence of the PCIB or its duly
authorized representative and deputy clerk Albis or his duly authorized representative, both estates or any of the estates
should not close it without previous consent and authority from this court.

SO ORDERED.

As may be noted, in this order, the respondent court required that all collections from the properties in the name of
Hodges should be deposited in a joint account of the two estates, which indicates that seemingly the so -called modus
operandi was no longer operative, but again there is nothing to show when this situation started.
Likewise, in paragraph 3 of the petitioner's motion of September 14, 1964, on pages 188-201 of the Green Record on
Appeal, (also found on pp. 83-91 of the Yellow Record on Appeal) it is alleged that:

3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C.N. Hodges, Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol acting as the two
co-administrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges, Avelina A. Magno acting as the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and Messrs. William Brown and Ardell Young acting for all of the Higdon family who claim to be the sole
beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and various legal counsel representing the aforementioned parties
entered into an amicable agreement, which was approved by this Honorable Court, wherein the parties thereto agreed
that certain sums of money were to be paid in settlement of different claims against the two estates and that the assets
(to the extent they existed) of both estates would be administered jointly by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of
C.N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, subject, however, to the
aforesaid October 5, 1963 Motion, namely, the PCIB's claim to exclusive possession and ownership of one hundred
percent (100%) (or, in the alternative, seventy-five percent (75%) of all assets owned by C.N. Hodges or Linnie Jane
Hodges situated in the Philippines. On February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672) this Honorable Court
amended its order of January 24, 1964 but in no way changed its recognition of the afore-described basic demand by
the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges to one hundred percent (100%) of the assets claimed b y both
estates.

but no copy of the mentioned agreement of joint administration of the two estates exists in the record, and so, We are
not informed as to what exactly are the terms of the same which could be relevant in the resolution of the issues herein.

On the other hand, the appealed order of November 3, 1965, on pages 313-320 of the Green Record on Appeal,
authorized payment by respondent Magno of, inter alia, her own fees as administratrix, the attorney's fees of her lawyers,
etc., as follows:

Administratrix Magno thru Attys. Raul S. Manglapus and Rizal. R. Quimpo filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion dated
June 10, 1964 asking for the approval of the Agreement dated June 6, 1964 which Agreement is for the purpose of
retaining their services to protect and defend the interest of the said Administratrix in these proceedings and the same
has been signed by and bears the express conformity of the attorney-in-fact of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. James L.
Sullivan. It is further prayed that the Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges be directed to pay the
retailers fee of said lawyers, said fees made chargeable as expenses for the administration of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges (pp. 1641-1642, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).

An opposition has been filed by the Administrator PCIB thru Atty. Herminio Ozaeta dated July 11, 1964, on the ground
that payment of the retainers fee of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo as prayed for in said Manifestation and Urgent
Motion is prejudicial to the 100% claim of the estate of C. N. Hodges; employment of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo is
premature and/or unnecessary; Attys. Quimpo and Manglapus are representing conflicting interests and the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges should be closed and terminated (pp. 1679-1684, Vol, V, Sp. 1307).

Atty. Leon P. Gellada filed a memorandum dated July 28, 1964 asking that the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by
Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo be denied because no evidence has been presented in support thereof. Atty. Manglapus
filed a reply to the opposition of counsel for the Administrator of the C. N. Hodges estate wherein it is claimed that
expenses of administration include reasonable counsel or attorney's fees for services to the executor or administrator. As
a matter of fact the fee agreement dated February 27, 1964 between the PCIB and the law firm of Ozaeta, Gibbs &
Ozaeta as its counsel (Pp. 1280-1284, Vol. V, Sp. 1307) which stipulates the fees for said law firm has been approved by
the Court in its order dated March 31, 1964. If payment of the fees of the lawyers for the administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges will cause prejudice to the estate of C. N. Hodges, in like manner the very agreement which provides
for the payment of attorney's fees to the counsel for the PCIB will also be prejudicial to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
(pp. 1801-1814, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).

Atty. Herminio Ozaeta filed a rejoinder dated August 10, 1964 to the reply to the opposition to the Manifestation and
Urgent Motion alleging principally that the estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges are not similarly situated for
the reason that C. N. Hodges is an heir of Linnie Jane Hodges whereas the latter is not an heir of the former for the
reason that Linnie Jane Hodges predeceased C. N. Hodges (pp. 1839-1848, Vol. V, Sp. 1307); that Attys. Manglapus and
Quimpo formally entered their appearance in behalf of Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on June 10,
1964 (pp. 1639-1640, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).

Atty. Manglapus filed a manifestation dated December 18, 1964 stating therein that Judge Bellosillo issued an order
requiring the parties to submit memorandum in support of their respective contentions. It is prayed in this manifestation
that the Manifestation and Urgent Motion dated June 10, 1964 be resolved (pp. 6435-6439, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307).

Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a counter- manifestation dated January 5, 1965 asking that after the
consideration by the court of all allegations and arguments and pleadings of the PCIB in connection therewith (1) said
manifestation and urgent motion of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo be denied (pp. 6442-6453, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307). Judge
Querubin issued an order dated January 4, 1965 approving the motion dated June 10, 1964 of the attorneys fo r the
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and agreement annexed to said motion. The said order further states:
"The Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is authorized to issue or sign whatever check or checks may be
necessary for the above purpose and the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges is ordered to countersign the same.
(pp. 6518-6523, Vol VII, Sp. 1307).

Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a manifestation and motion dated January 13, 1965 asking that the o rder of
January 4, 1965 which was issued by Judge Querubin be declared null and void and to enjoin the clerk of court and the
administratrix and administrator in these special proceedings from all proceedings and action to enforce or comply with
the provision of the aforesaid order of January 4, 1965. In support of said manifestation and motion it is alleged that the
order of January 4, 1965 is null and void because the said order was never delivered to the deputy clerk Albis of Branch V
(the sala of Judge Querubin) and the alleged order was found in the drawer of the late Judge Querubin in his office when
said drawer was opened on January 13, 1965 after the death of Judge Querubin by Perfecto Querubin, Jr., the son of the
judge and in the presence of Executive Judge Rovira and deputy clerk Albis (Sec. 1, Rule 36, New Civil Code) (Pp.
6600-6606, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).

Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a motion for reconsideration dated February 23, 1965 asking that the order
dated January 4, 1964 be reversed on the ground that:

1. Attorneys retained must render services to the estate not to the personal heir;
2. If services are rendered to both, fees should be pro-rated between them;

3. Attorneys retained should not represent conflicting interests; to the prejudice of the other heirs not represented by
said attorneys;

4. Fees must be commensurate to the actual services rendered to the estate;

5. There must be assets in the estate to pay for said fees (Pp. 6625-6636, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).

Atty. Quimpo for Administratrix Magno of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges filed a motion to submit dated July 15, 1965
asking that the manifestation and urgent motion dated June 10, 1964 filed by Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo and other
incidents directly appertaining thereto be considered submitted for consideration and approval (pp. 6759-6765, Vol. VIII,
Sp. 1307).

Considering the arguments and reasons in support to the pleadings of both the Administratrix and the PCIB, and of Atty.
Gellada, hereinbefore mentioned, the Court believes that the order of January 4, 1965 is null and void for the reason that
the said order has not been filed with deputy clerk Albis of this court (Branch V) during the lifetime of Judge Querubin
who signed the said order. However, the said manifestation and urgent motion dated June 10, 1964 is being treated and
considered in this instant order. It is worthy to note that in the motion dated January 24, 1964 (Pp. 1149- 1163, Vol. V, Sp.
1307) which has been filed by Atty. Gellada and his associates and Atty. Gibbs and other lawyers in addition to the
stipulated fees for actual services rendered. However, the fee agreement dated February 27, 1964, between the
Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges and Atty. Gibbs which provides for retainer fee of P4,000 monthly in addition
to specific fees for actual appearances, reimbursement for expenditures and contingent fees has also been approved by
the Court and said lawyers have already been paid. (pp. 1273-1279, Vol. V, Sp. Proc. 1307 pp. 1372-1373, Vol. V, Sp. Proc.
1307).

WHEREFORE, the order dated January 4, 1965 is hereby declared null and void.

The manifestation and motion dated June 10, 1964 which was filed by the attorneys for the administratrix of the testate
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is granted and the agreement annexed thereto is hereby approved.

The administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is hereby directed to be needed to implement the approval of the
agreement annexed to the motion and the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges is directed to countersign the said
check or checks as the case may be.

SO ORDERED.

thereby implying somehow that the court assumed the existence of independent but simultaneous administrations.

Be that as it may, again, it appears that on August 6, 1965, the court, acting on a motion of petitioner for the approval of
deeds of sale executed by it as administrator of the estate of Hodges, issued the following order, also on appeal herein:

Acting upon the motion for approval of deeds of sale for registered land of the PCIB, Administrator of the Testate Estate
of C. N. Hodges in Sp. Proc. 1672 (Vol. VII, pp. 2244-2245), dated July 16, 1965, filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol in
representation of the law firms of Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta and Tirol and Tirol and the opposition thereto of Atty. Rizal
R. Quimpo (Vol. VIII, pp. 6811-6813) dated July 22, 1965 and considering the allegations and reasons therein stated, the
court believes that the deeds of sale should be signed jointly by the PCIB, Administrator of the Testate Estate of C. N.
Hodges and Avelina A. Magno, Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and to this effect the PCIB
should take the necessary steps so that Administratrix Avelina A. Magno could sign the deeds of sale.

SO ORDERED. (p. 248, Green Record on Appeal.)

Notably this order required that even the deeds executed by petitioner, as administrator of the Estate of Hodges,
involving properties registered in his name, should be co-signed by respondent Magno.3 And this was not an isolated
instance.

In her brief as appellee, respondent Magno states:

After the lower court had authorized appellee Avelina A. Magno to execute final deeds of sale pursuant to contracts to
sell executed by C. N. Hodges on February 20, 1963 (pp. 45-46, Green ROA), motions for the approval of final deeds of
sale (signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, first Joe Hodges, then
Atty. Fernando Mirasol and later the appellant) were approved by the lower court upon petition of appellee Magno's
counsel, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, on the basis of section 8 of Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court. Subsequently, the
appellant, after it had taken over the bulk of the assets of the two estates, started presenting these motions itself. The
first such attempt was a "Motion for Approval of Deeds of Sale for Registered Land and Cancellations of Mortgages"
dated July 21, 1964 filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol, counsel for the appellant, thereto annexing two (2) final deeds of sale and
two (2) cancellations of mortgages signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino, Assistant Vice-President and
Manager of the appellant (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. V, pp. 1694-1701). This motion was approved by the lower
court on July 27, 1964. It was followed by another motion dated August 4, 1964 for the approval of one final deed of sale
again signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307. Vol. V, pp. 1825-1828),
which was again approved by the lower court on August 7, 1964. The gates having been opened, a flood ensued: the
appellant subsequently filed similar motions for the approval of a multitude of deeds of sales and cancellations of
mortgages signed by both the appellee Avelina A. Magno and the appellant.

A random check of the records of Special Proceeding No. 1307 alone will show Atty. Cesar T. Tirol as having presented
for court approval deeds of sale of real properties signed by both appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino in the
following numbers: (a) motion dated September 21, 1964 — 6 deeds of sale; (b) motion dated November 4, 1964 — 1
deed of sale; (c) motion dated December 1, 1964 — 4 deeds of sale; (d) motion dated February 3, 1965 — 8 deeds of
sale; (f) motion dated May 7, 1965 — 9 deeds of sale. In view of the very extensive landholdings of the Hodges spouses
and the many motions filed concerning deeds of sale of real properties executed by C. N. Hodges the lower court has
had to constitute special separate expedientes in Special Proceedings Nos. 1307 and 1672 to include mere motions for
the approval of deeds of sale of the conjugal properties of the Hodges spouses.

As an example, from among the very many, under date of February 3, 1965, Atty. Cesar T. Tirol, as counsel for the
appellant, filed "Motion for Approval of Deeds of Sale for Registered Land and Cancellations of Mortgages" (CFI Record,
Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. VIII, pp. 6570-6596) the allegations of which read:
"1. In his lifetime, the late C. N. Hodges executed "Contracts to Sell" real property, and the prospective buyers under said
contracts have already paid the price and complied with the terms and conditions thereof;

"2. In the course of administration of both estates, mortgage debtors have already paid their debts secured by chattel
mortgages in favor of the late C. N. Hodges, and are now entitled to release therefrom;

"3. There are attached hereto documents executed jointly by the Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307 and the
Administrator in Sp. Proc. No. 1672, consisting of deeds of sale in favor —

Fernando Cano, Bacolod City, Occ. Negros

Fe Magbanua, Iloilo City
Policarpio M. Pareno, La Paz, Iloilo City
Rosario T. Libre, Jaro, Iloilo City
Federico B. Torres, Iloilo City
Reynaldo T. Lataquin, La Paz, Iloilo City
Anatolio T. Viray, Iloilo City
Benjamin Rolando, Jaro, Iloilo City

and cancellations of mortgages in favor of —

Pablo Manzano, Oton, Iloilo

Ricardo M. Diana, Dao, San Jose, Antique
Simplicio Tingson, Iloilo City
Amado Magbanua, Pototan, Iloilo
Roselia M. Baes, Bolo, Roxas City
William Bayani, Rizal Estanzuela, Iloilo City
Elpidio Villarete, Molo, Iloilo City
Norma T. Ruiz, Jaro, Iloilo City

"4. That the approval of the aforesaid documents will not reduce the assets of the estates so as to prevent any creditor
from receiving his full debt or diminish his dividend."

And the prayer of this motion is indeed very revealing:

"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, under Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, this honorable court approve
the aforesaid deeds of sale and cancellations of mortgages." (Pp. 113-117, Appellee's Brief.)

None of these assertions is denied in Petitioner's reply brief.

Further indicating lack of concrete perspective or orientation on the part of the respondent court and its hesitancy to
clear up matters promptly, in its other appealed order of November 23, 1965, on pages 334-335 of the Green Record on
Appeal, said respondent court allowed the movant Ricardo Salas, President of appellee Western Institute of Technology
(successor of Panay Educational Institutions, Inc.), one of the parties with whom Hodges had contracts that are in
question in the appeals herein, to pay petitioner, as Administrator of the estate of Hodges and/or respondent Magno, as
Administrator of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, thus:

Considering that in both cases there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to whomsoever
are entitled thereto, the Court believes that payment to both the administrator of the testate estate of C. N. Hodges and
the administratrix of the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges or to either one of the two estates is proper and legal.

WHEREFORE, movant Ricardo T. Salas can pay to both estates or either of them.

SO ORDERED.

(Pp. 334-335, Green Record on Appeal.)

On the other hand, as stated earlier, there were instances when respondent Magno was given authority to act alone. For
instance, in the other appealed order of December 19, 1964, on page 221 of the Green Record on Appeal, the respondent
court approved payments made by her of overtime pay to some employees of the court who had helped in gathering
and preparing copies of parts of the records in both estates as follows:

Considering that the expenses subject of the motion to approve payment of overtime pay dated December 10, 1964, are
reasonable and are believed by this Court to be a proper charge of administration chargeable to the testate estate of the
late Linnie Jane Hodges, the said expenses are hereby APPROVED and to be charged against the testate estate of the
late Linnie Jane Hodges. The administrator of the testate estate of the late Charles Newton Hodges is hereby ordered to
countersign the check or checks necessary to pay the said overtime pay as shown by the bills marked Annex "A", "B" and
"C" of the motion.

SO ORDERED.

(Pp. 221-222, Green Record on Appeal.)

Likewise, the respondent court approved deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno alone, as Administratrix of the
estate of Mrs. Hodges, covering properties in the name of Hodges, pursuant to "contracts to sell" executed by Hodges,
irrespective of whether they were executed by him before or after the death of his wife. The orders of this nature which
are also on appeal herein are the following:

1. Order of March 30, 1966, on p. 137 of the Green Record on Appeal, approving the deed of sale executed by
respondent Magno in favor of appellee Lorenzo Carles on February 24, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by
Hodges on June 17, 1958, after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims was cancelled by it for failure of
Carles to pay the installments due on January 7, 1965.

2. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 139-140, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellee Salvador Guzman on February 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on September 13,
1960, after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it cancelled on March 3, 1965 in view o f failure of said
appellee to pay the installments on time.
3. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 167-168, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellee Purificacion Coronado on March 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on August 14, 1961,
after the death of his wife.

4. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 168-169, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellee Florenia Barrido on March 28, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 21, 1958, after
the death of his wife.

5. Order of June 7, 1966, on pp. 184-185, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellee Belcezar Causing on May 2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 10, 1959, after
the death of his wife.

6. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 211-212, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellee Artheo Thomas Jamir on June 3, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on May 26, 1961, after
the death of his wife.

7. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 212-213, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellees Graciano Lucero and Melquiades Batisanan on June 6 and June 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to "contracts to
sell" signed by Hodges on June 9, 1959 and November 27, 1961, respectively, after the death of his wife.

8. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor
of appellees Espiridion Partisala, Winifredo Espada and Rosario Alingasa on September 6, 1966, August 17, 1966 and
August 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to "contracts to sell" signed by Hodges on April 20, 1960, April 18, 1960 and August
25, 1958, respectively, that is, after the death of his wife.

9. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 137-138, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellee Alfredo Catedral on March 2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on May 29, 1954, before
the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it had cancelled on February 16, 1966 for failure of appellee
Catedral to pay the installments due on time.

10. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 138-139, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellee Jose Pablico on March 7, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on March 7, 1950, after the
death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it had cancelled on June 29, 1960, for failure of appellee Pablico to pay
the installments due on time.

11. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., insofar as it approved the deed of sale executed by respondent
Magno in favor of appellee Pepito Iyulores on September 6, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on
February 5, 1951, before the death of his wife.

12. Order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, id., approving three deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno, one in
favor of appellees Santiago Pacaonsis and two in favor of appellee Adelfa Premaylon on December 5, 1966 and
November 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to separate "promises to sell" signed respectively by Hodges on May 26, 1955
and January 30, 1954, before the death of his wife, and October 31, 1959, after her death.
In like manner, there were also instances when respondent court approved deeds of sale executed by petitioner alone
and without the concurrence of respondent Magno, and such approvals have not been the subject of any a ppeal. No
less than petitioner points this out on pages 149-150 of its brief as appellant thus:

The points of fact and law pertaining to the two abovecited assignments of error have already been discussed previously.
In the first abovecited error, the order alluded to was general, and as already explained before, it was, as admitted by the
lower court itself, superseded by the particular orders approving specific final deeds of sale executed by the appellee,
Avelina A. Magno, which are subject of this appeal, as well as the particular orders approving specific final deeds of sale
executed by the appellant, Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, which were never appealed by the appellee,
Avelina A. Magno, nor by any party for that matter, and which are now therefore final.

Now, simultaneously with the foregoing incidents, others of more fundamental and all embracing significance developed.
On October 5, 1963, over the signature of Atty. Allison J. Gibbs in representation of the law firm of Ozaeta, Gibbs &
Ozaeta, as counsel for the co-administrators Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol, the following self-explanatory motion
was filed:

URGENT MOTION FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND DELIVERY TO ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF C. N. HODGES OF
ALL OF THE ASSETS OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES AND C N. HODGES
EXISTING AS OF MAY 23, 1957 PLUS ALL THE RENTS, EMOLUMENTS AND INCOME THEREFROM.

COMES NOW the co-administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, Joe Hodges, through his undersigned attorneys in the
above-entitled proceedings, and to this Honorable Court respectfully alleges:

(1) On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City.

(2) On June 28, 1957 this Honorable Court admitted to probate the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Linni e Jane
Hodges executed November 22, 1952 and appointed C. N. Hodges as Executor of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp.
24-25, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).

(3) On July 1, 1957 this Honorable Court issued Letters Testamentary to C. N. Hodges in the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
(p. 30, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).

(4) On December 14, 1957 this Honorable Court, on the basis of the following allegations in a Motion dated December 11,
1957 filed by Leon P. Gellada as attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges:

"That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges ."

(p. 44, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)

issued the following order:

"As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executory, for the reasons stated in his motion dated December 11,
1957 which the court considers well taken, all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said executor is further authorized to execute subsequent
sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance
with the wishes contained in the last will and testament of the latter."

(p. 46, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)

(5) On April 21, 1959 this Honorable Court approved the inventory and accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges through
his counsel Leon P. Gellada on April 14, 1959 wherein he alleged among other things

"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the herein account, be given notice,
as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already
probated by the Honorable Court."

(pp. 77-78, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.).

(6) On July 30, 1960 this Honorable Court approved the "Annual Statement of Account" submitted by C. N. Hodges
through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein he alleged among other things:

"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the herein account, be given notice
as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges , in accordance with the last will and
testament of the deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court."

(pp. 81-82. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)

(7) On May 2, 1961 this Honorable court approved the "Annual Statement of Account By The Executor for the Year 1960"
submitted through Leon P. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein he alleged:

That no person interested in the Philippines be given notice, of the time and place of examining the herein account,
as herein Executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last will and
testament of the deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court .

(pp. 90-91. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)

(8) On December 25, 1962, C.N. Hodges died.

(9) On December 25, 1962, on the Urgent Ex-parte Motion of Leon P. Gellada filed only in Special Proceeding No. 1307,
this Honorable Court appointed Avelina A. Magno

"Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges,
in the latter case, because the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the real
and personal properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless a Special Administratrix is
appointed."

(p. 100. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)

(10) On December 26, 1962 Letters of Administration were issued to Avelina Magno pursuant to this Honorable Court's
aforesaid Order of December 25, 1962

"With full authority to take possession of all the property of said deceased in any province or provinces in which it may
be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the preservation of said property, said Administratrix and/or
Special Administratrix having filed a bond satisfactory to the Court."

(p. 102, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)

(11) On January 22, 1963 this Honorable Court on petition of Leon P. Gellada of January 21, 1963 issued Letters of
Administration to:

(a) Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;

(b) Avelina A. Magno as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges; and

(c) Joe Hodges as Co-Special Administrator of the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges.

(p. 43, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)

(12) On February 20, 1963 this Honorable Court on the basis of a motion filed by Leon P. Gellada a s legal counsel on
February 16, 1963 for Avelina A. Magno acting as Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (pp. 114-116, Sp.
Proc. 1307) issued the following order:

"... se autoriza a aquella (Avelina A. Magno) a firmar escrituras de venta definitiva de propiedades cubiertas por contratos
para vender, firmados, en vida, por el finado Charles Newton Hodges, cada vez que el precio estipulado en cada
contrato este totalmente pagado. Se autoriza igualmente a la misma a firmar escrituras de cancelacion de hipoteca tanto
de bienes reales como personales cada vez que la consideracion de cada hipoteca este totalmente pagada.

"Cada una de dichas escrituras que se otorguen debe ser sometida para la aprobacion de este Juzgado."

(p. 117, Sp. Proc. 1307).

[Par 1 (c), Reply to Motion For Removal of Joe Hodges]

(13) On September l6, 1963 Leon P. Gellada, acting as attorney for Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, alleges:

3. — That since January, 1963, both estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges have been receiving in
full, payments for those "contracts to sell" entered into by C. N. Hodges during his lifetime, and the purchasers have been
demanding the execution of definite deeds of sale in their favor.

4. — That hereto attached are thirteen (13) copies deeds of sale executed by the Administratrix and by the
co-administrator (Fernando P. Mirasol) of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges respectively, in
compliance with the terms and conditions of the respective "contracts to sell" executed by the parties thereto."
(14) The properties involved in the aforesaid motion of September 16, 1963 are all registered in the name of the deceased
C. N. Hodges.

(15) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and belief, has been advertising in the newspaper in Iloilo thusly:

For Sale

Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges.

All Real Estate or Personal Property will be sold on First Come First Served Basis.

Avelina A. Magno
Administratrix

(16) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and belief, has paid and still is paying sums of money to sundry
persons.

(17) Joe Hodges through the undersigned attorneys manifested during the hearings before this Honorable Court on
September 5 and 6, 1963 that the estate of C. N. Hodges was claiming all of the assets belonging to the deceased
spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges situated in Philippines because of the aforesaid election by C. N. Hodges
wherein he claimed and took possession as sole owner of all of said assets during the administration of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges on the ground that he was the sole devisee and legatee under her Last Will and Testament.

(18) Avelina A. Magno has submitted no inventory and accounting of her administration as Administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and Special Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges. However, from manifestations made by
Avelina A. Magno and her legal counsel, Leon P. Gellada, there is no question she will claim that at least fifty per cent
(50%) of the conjugal assets of the deceased spouses and the rents, emoluments and income therefrom belong to the
Higdon family who are named in paragraphs Fourth and Fifth of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 5, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, movant respectfully prays that this Honorable Court, after due hearing, order:

(1) Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and accounting of all of the funds, properties and assets of any character
belonging to the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have come into her possession, with full details
of what she has done with them;

(2) Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges all of th e funds,
properties and assets of any character remaining in her possession;

(3) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the aforesaid issues, Avelina A. Magno to stop, unless she first secures
the conformity of Joe Hodges (or his duly authorized representative, such as the undersigned attorneys) as the
Co-administrator and attorney-in-fact of a majority of the beneficiaries of the estate of C. N. Hodges:

(a) Advertising the sale and the sale of the properties of the estates:
(b) Employing personnel and paying them any compensation.

(4) Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the premises. (Annex "T", Petition.)

Almost a year thereafter, or on September 14, 1964, after the co-administrators Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol
were replaced by herein petitioner Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank as sole administrator, pursuant to an
agreement of all the heirs of Hodges approved by the court, and because the above motion of October 5, 1963 had not
yet been heard due to the absence from the country of Atty. Gibbs, petitioner filed the following:

MANIFESTATION AND MOTION, INCLUDING MOTION TO SET FOR HEARING AND RESOLVE "URGENT MOTION FOR
AN ACCOUNTING AND DELIVERY TO ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF C. N. HODGES OF ALL THE ASSETS OF THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES AND C. N. HODGES EXISTING AS OF MAY 23, 1957
PLUS ALL OF THE RENTS, EMOLUMENTS AND INCOME THEREFROM OF OCTOBER 5, 1963.

COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter referred to as PCIB), the administrator of the estate
of C. N. Hodges, deceased, in Special Proceedings No. 1672, through its undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable
Court respectfully alleges that:

1. On October 5, 1963, Joe Hodges acting as the co-administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges filed, through the
undersigned attorneys, an "Urgent Motion For An Accounting and Delivery To Administrator of the Estate of C. N.
Hodges of all Of The Assets Of The Conjugal Partnership of The Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges Existing
as Of May, 23, 1957 Plus All Of The Rents, Emoluments and Income Therefrom" (pp. 536-542, CFI Rec. S. P. No. 1672).

2. On January 24, 1964 this Honorable Court, on the basis of an amicable agreement entered into on January 23, 1964 by
the two co-administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges and virtually all of the heirs of C. N. Hodges (p. 912, CFI Rec., S. P.
No. 1672), resolved the dispute over who should act as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges by appointing the
PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges (pp. 905-906, CFI Rec. S. P. No. 1672) and issuing letters of
administration to the PCIB.

3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C. N. Hodges, Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol acting a s the two
co-administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges, Avelina A. Magno acting as the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, and Messrs. William Brown and Ardel Young Acting for all of the Higdon family who claim to be the sole
beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and various legal counsel representing the aforenamed parties entered
into an amicable agreement, which was approved by this Honorable Court, wherein the parties thereto agreed that
certain sums of money were to be paid in settlement of different claims against the two estates and that the assets (to
the extent they existed)of both estates would be administrated jointly by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges , subject, however, to the aforesaid
October 5, 1963 Motion, namely, the PCIB's claim to exclusive possession and ownership of one-hundred percent (10017,)
(or, in the alternative, seventy-five percent [75%] of all assets owned by C. N. Hodges or Linnie Jane Hodges situated in
the Philippines. On February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672) this Honorable Court amended its order of
January 24, 1964 but in no way changes its recognition of the aforedescribed basic demand by the PCIB as administrator
of the estate of C. N. Hodges to one hundred percent (100%) of the assets claimed by both estates.
4. On February 15, 1964 the PCIB filed a "Motion to Resolve" the aforesaid Motion of October 5, 1963. This Honorable
Court set for hearing on June 11, 1964 the Motion of October 5, 1963.

5. On June 11, 1964, because the undersigned Allison J. Gibbs was absent in the United States, this Honorable Court
ordered the indefinite postponement of the hearing of the Motion of October 5, 1963.

6. Since its appointment as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges the PCIB has not been able to properly carry out
its duties and obligations as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges because of the following acts, among others, of
Avelina A. Magno and those who claim to act for her as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges:

(a) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as if she is in exclusive control of all of the assets in the Philippines of both estates
including those claimed by the estate of C. N. Hodges as evidenced in part by her locking the premises at 206-208
Guanco Street, Iloilo City on August 31, 1964 and refusing to reopen same until ordered to do so by this Honorable Court
on September 7, 1964.

(b) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as though she alone may decide how the assets of the estate of C.N. Hodges should
be administered, who the PCIB shall employ and how much they may be paid as evidenced in party by her refusal to sign
checks issued by the PCIB payable to the undersigned counsel pursuant to their fee agreement approved by this
Honorable Court in its order dated March 31, 1964.

(c) Avelina A. Magno illegally gives access to and turns over possession of the records and assets of the estate of C.N.
Hodges to the attorney-in-fact of the Higdon Family, Mr. James L. Sullivan, as evidenced in part by the cashing of his
personal checks.

(d) Avelina A. Magno illegally refuses to execute checks prepared by the PCIB drawn to pay expenses of the estate of C.
N. Hodges as evidenced in part by the check drawn to reimburse the PCIB's advance of P48,445.50 to pay the 1964
income taxes reported due and payable by the estate of C.N. Hodges.

7. Under and pursuant to the orders of this Honorable Court, particularly those of January 24 and February 1, 1964, and
the mandate contained in its Letters of Administration issued on January 24, 1964 to the PCIB, it has

"full authority to take possession of all the property of the deceased C. N. Hodges

"and to perform all other acts necessary for the preservation of said property." (p. 914, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672.)

8. As administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, the PCIB claims the right to the immediate exclusive possession and
control of all of the properties, accounts receivables, court cases, bank accounts and other assets, including the
documentary records evidencing same, which existed in the Philippines on the date of C. N. Hodges' death, December
25, 1962, and were in his possession and registered in his name alone. The PCIB knows of no assets in the Philippines
registered in the name of Linnie Jane Hodges, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, or, C. N. Hodges, Executor of the Estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges on December 25, 1962. All of the assets of which the PCIB has knowledge are either registered in
the name of C. N. Hodges, alone or were derived therefrom since his death on December 25, 1962.
9. The PCIB as the current administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, deceased, succeeded to all of the rights of the
previously duly appointed administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges, to wit:

(a) On December 25, 1962, date of C. N. Hodges' death, this Honorable Court appointed Miss Avelina A. Magno
simultaneously as:

(i) Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 102, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1307) to replace the deceased C. N.
Hodges who on May 28, 1957 was appointed Special Administrator (p. 13. CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1307) and on July 1, 1957
Executor of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 30, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1307).

(ii) Special Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges (p. 102, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1307).

(b) On December 29, 1962 this Honorable Court appointed Harold K. Davies as co-special administrator of the estate of
C.N. Hodges along with Avelina A. Magno (pp. 108-111, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1307).

(c) On January 22, 1963, with the conformity of Avelina A. Magno, Harold K. Davies resigned in favor of Joe Hodges (pp.
35-36, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672) who thereupon was appointed on January 22, 1963 by this Honorable Court as special
co-administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges (pp. 38-40 & 43, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672) along with Miss Magno who at
that time was still acting as special co-administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges.

(d) On February 22, 1963, without objection on the part of Avelina A. Magno, this Honorable Court appointed Joe
Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as co-administrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges (pp. 76-78, 81 & 85, CFI Rec., S.P. No.
1672).

10. Miss Avelina A. Magno, pursuant to the orders of this Honorable Court of December 25, 1962, took possession of all
Philippine Assets now claimed by the two estates. Legally, Miss Magno could take possession of the assets registered in
the name of C. N. Hodges alone only in her capacity as Special Administratrix of the Estate of C.N. Hodges. With the
appointment by this Honorable Court on February 22, 1963 of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as the
co-administrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges, they legally were entitled to take over from Miss Magno the full and
exclusive possession of all of the assets of the estate of C.N. Hodges. With the appointment on January 24, 1964 of the
PCIB as the sole administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges in substitution of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol, the
PCIB legally became the only party entitled to the sole and exclusive possession of all of the assets of the estate of C. N.
Hodges.

11. The PCIB's predecessors submitted their accounting and this Honorable Court approved same, to wit:

(a) The accounting of Harold K. Davies dated January 18, 1963 (pp. 16-33, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672); which shows or its face
the:

(i) Conformity of Avelina A. Magno acting as "Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Special
Administratrix of the Estate of C. N. Hodges";

(ii) Conformity of Leslie Echols, a Texas lawyer acting for the heirs of C.N. Hodges; and
(iii) Conformity of William Brown, a Texas lawyer acting for the Higdon family who claim to be the only heirs of Linnie
Jane Hodges (pp. 18, 25-33, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672).

Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable Court on January 22, 1963 (p. 34, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672).

(b) The accounting of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as of January 23, 1964, filed February 24, 1964 (pp. 990-1000,
CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672 and pp. 1806-1848, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1307).

Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable Court on March 3, 1964.

(c) The PCIB and its undersigned lawyers are aware of no report or accounting submitted by Avelina A. Magno of her
acts as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges or special administratrix of the estate of C.N. Hodges, unless it
is the accounting of Harold K. Davies as special co-administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges dated January 18, 1963 to
which Miss Magno manifested her conformity (supra).

12. In the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964, Miss Avelina A. Magno agreed to receive P10,000.00

"for her services as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges"

and in addition she agreed to be employed, starting February 1, 1964, at

"a monthly salary of P500.00 for her services as an employee of both estates."

24 ems.

13. Under the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964 and the orders of this Honorable Court of same date, the PCIB as
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges is entitled to the exclusive possession of all records, properties and assets in
the name of C. N. Hodges as of the date of his death on December 25, 1962 which were in the possession of the
deceased C. N. Hodges on that date and which then passed to the possession of Miss Magno in her capacity as Special
Co-Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges or the possession of Joe Hodges or Fernando P. Mirasol as
co-administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges.

14. Because of Miss Magno's refusal to comply with the reasonable request of PCIB concerning the assets of the estate of
C. N. Hodges, the PCIB dismissed Miss Magno as an employee of the estate of C. N. Hodges effective August 31, 1964.
On September 1, 1964 Miss Magno locked the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street and denied the PCIB access thereto.
Upon the Urgent Motion of the PCIB dated September 3, 1964, this Honorable Court on September 7, 1964 ordered Miss
Magno to reopen the aforesaid premises at 206-208 Guanco Street and permit the PCIB access thereto no later than
September 8, 1964.

15. The PCIB pursuant to the aforesaid orders of this Honorable Court is again in physical possession of all of the assets of
the estate of C. N. Hodges. However, the PCIB is not in exclusive control of the aforesaid records, properties and assets
because Miss Magno continues to assert the claims hereinabove outlined in paragraph 6, continues to use her own locks
to the doors of the aforesaid premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City and continues to deny the PCIB its right to
know the combinations to the doors of the vault and safes situated within the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street
despite the fact that said combinations were known to only C. N. Hodges during his lifetime.

16. The Philippine estate and inheritance taxes assessed the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges were assessed and paid on the
basis that C. N. Hodges is the sole beneficiary of the assets of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines.
Avelina A. Magno and her legal counsel at no time have questioned the validity of the aforesaid assessment and the
payment of the corresponding Philippine death taxes.

17. Nothing further remains to be done in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges except to resolve the aforesaid Motion of
October 5, 1963 and grant the PCIB the exclusive possession and control of all of the records, properties and assets of
the estate of C. N. Hodges.

18. Such assets as may have existed of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges were ordered by this Honorable Court in special
Proceedings No. 1307 to be turned over and delivered to C. N. Hodges alone. He in fact took possession of them before
his death and asserted and exercised the right of exclusive ownership over the said assets as the sole beneficiary of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PCIB respectfully petitions that this Honorable court:

(1) Set the Motion of October 5, 1963 for hearing at the earliest possible date with notice to all interested parties;

(2) Order Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and accounting as Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
and Co-Administratrix of the Estate of C. N. Hodges of all of the funds, properties and assets of any character belonging
to the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have come into her possession, with full details of what she
has done with them;

(3) Order Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges all of the
funds, properties and assets of any character remaining in her possession;

(4) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the aforesaid issues, order Avelina A. Magno and her representatives
to stop interferring with the administration of the estate of C. N. Hodges by the PCIB and its duly authorized
representatives;

(5) Enjoin Avelina A. Magno from working in the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City as an employee of the
estate of C. N. Hodges and approve her dismissal as such by the PCIB effective August 31, 1964;

(6) Enjoin James L. Sullivan, Attorneys Manglapus and Quimpo and others allegedly representing Miss Magno from
entering the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City or any other properties of C. N. Hodges without the express
permission of the PCIB;

(7) Order such other relief as this Honorable Court finds just and equitable in the premises. (Annex "U" Petition.)

On January 8, 1965, petitioner also filed a motion for "Official Declaration of Heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges Estate" alleging:
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter referred to as PCIB), as administrator of the estate
of the late C. N. Hodges, through the undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable Court respectfully alleges that:

1. During their marriage, spouses Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, American citizens originally from the
State of Texas, U.S.A., acquired and accumulated considerable assets and properties in the Philippines and in the States
of Texas and Oklahoma, United States of America. All said properties constituted their conjugal estate.

2. Although Texas was the domicile of origin of the Hodges spouses, this Honorable Court, in its orders dated March 31
and December 12, 1964 (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. ----; Sp. Proc. No. 1672, p. ----), conclusively found and
categorically ruled that said spouses had lived and worked for more than 50 years in Iloilo City and had, therefore,
acquired a domicile of choice in said city, which they retained until the time of their respective deaths.

3. On November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed in the City of Iloilo her Last Will and Testament, a copy of which
is hereto attached as Annex "A". The bequests in said will pertinent to the present issue are the second, third,
and fourth provisions, which we quote in full hereunder.

SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real,
wherever situated, or located, to my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said husband
during his natural lifetime.

THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the right to manage, control,
use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to make any changes in the physical
properties of said estate by sale of any part thereof which he think best, and the purchase of any other or additional
property as he may think best; to execute conveyances with or without general or special warranty, conveying in fee
simple or for any other term or time, any property which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real
property for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple title to the
interest so conveyed in such property as he may elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall
belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire. It is
provided herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now owned by us
located at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas, but he shall have the full right to lease, manage and enjoy the same
during his lifetime, as above provided. He shall have the right to sub-divide any farmland and sell lots therein, and may
sell unimproved town lots.

FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue
and remainder of my estate both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my
brothers and sisters, share and share alike, namely:

"Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimray Higdon."

4. On November 14, 1953, C. N. Hodges executed in the City of Iloilo his Last Will and Testament, a copy of which is
hereto attached as Annex "B ". In said Will, C. N. Hodges designated his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, as his beneficiary using
the identical language she used in the second and third provisos of her Will, supra.
5. On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City, predeceasing her husband by more than five (5) years. At the
time of her death, she had no forced or compulsory heir, except her husband, C. N. Hodges. She was survived also by
various brothers and sisters mentioned in her Will ( supra), which, for convenience, we shall refer to as the HIGDONS.

6. On June 28, 1957, this Honorable Court admitted to probate the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges (Annex "A"), and appointed C. N. Hodges as executor of her estate without bond. (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307,
pp. 24-25). On July 1, 1957, this Honorable Court issued letters testamentary to C. N. Hodges in the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 30.)

7. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respect to the order of succession, the amount of successional rights, and the
intrinsic of its testamentary provisions, should be governed by Philippine laws because:

(a) The testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, intended Philippine laws to govern her Will;

(b) Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said prope rty may be found", shall
prevail. However, the Conflict of Law of Texas, which is the "national law" of the testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, provide
that the domiciliary law (Philippine law — see paragraph 2, supra) should govern the testamentary dispositions and
successional rights over movables (personal properties), and the law of the situs of the property (also Philippine law as to
properties located in the Philippines) with regards immovable (real properties). Thus applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as
approved and applied by our Supreme Court in the case of "In The Matter Of The Testate Estate of Eduard E.
Christensen", G.R. No.
L-16749, promulgated January 31, 1963, Philippine law should apply to the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges and to the
successional rights to her estate insofar as her movable and immovable assets in the Philippines are concerned. We shall
not, at this stage, discuss what law should govern the assets of Linnie Jane Hodges located in Oklahoma and Texas,
because the only assets in issue in this motion are those within the jurisdiction of this motion Court in the two
above-captioned Special Proceedings.

8. Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or community estate of spouses shall, upon dissolution, be divided
equally between them. Thus, upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957, one-half (1/2) of the entirety of the
assets of the Hodges spouses constituting their conjugal estate pertained automatically to Charles Newton Hodges, not
by way of inheritance, but in his own right as partner in the conjugal partnership . The other one-half (1/2) portion of the
conjugal estate constituted the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. This is the only portion of the conjugal estate capable of
inheritance by her heirs.

9. This one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal assets pertaining to Linnie Jane Hodges cannot, under a clear and specific
provision of her Will, be enhanced or increased by income, earnings, rents, or emoluments accruing after her death on
May 23, 1957. Linnie Jane Hodges' Will provides that "all rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to
him (C. N. Hodges) and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire ."
(Paragraph 3, Annex "A".) Thus, by specific provision of Linnie Jane Hodges' Will, "all rents, emoluments and income"
must be credited to the one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal estate pertaining to C. N. Hodges. Clearly, therefore, the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, capable of inheritance by her heirs, consisted exclusively of no more than one-half (1/2) of
the conjugal estate, computed as of the time of her death on May 23, 1957 .

10. Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code provide that the surviving spouse of a deceased leaving no
ascendants or descendants is entitled, as a matter of right and by way of irrevocable legitime, to at least one-half (1/2) of
the estate of the deceased, and no testamentary disposition by the deceased can legally and validly affect this right of
the surviving spouse. In fact, her husband is entitled to said one-half (1/2) portion of her estate by way of legitime. (Article
886, Civil Code.) Clearly, therefore, immediately upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges was the owner of at
least three-fourths (3/4) or seventy-five (75%) percent of all of the conjugal assets of the spouses, (1/2 or 50% by way of
conjugal partnership share and 1/4 or 25% by way of inheritance and legitime) plus all "rents, emoluments and income"
accruing to said conjugal estate from the moment of Linnie Jane Hodges' death (see paragraph 9, supra).

11. The late Linnie Jane Hodges designated her husband C.N. Hodges as her sole and exclusive heir with full authority to
do what he pleased, as exclusive heir and owner of all the assets constituting her estate, except only with regards certain
properties "owned by us, located at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas". Thus, even without relying on our laws of
succession and legitime, which we have cited above , C. N. Hodges, by specific testamentary designation of his wife, was
entitled to the entirely to his wife's estate in the Philippines .

12. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "the rights of the successor are transmitted from the death of the
decedent". Thus, title to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was transmitted to C. N. Hodges immediately upon her death
on May 23, 1957. For the convenience of this Honorable Court, we attached hereto as Annex "C" a graph of how the
conjugal estate of the spouses Hodges should be divided in accordance with Philippine law and the Will of Linnie Jane
Hodges.

13. In his capacity as sole heir and successor to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges as above-stated, C. N. Hodges, shortly
after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, appropriated to himself the entirety of her estate. He operated all the assets,
engaged in business and performed all acts in connection with the entirety of the conjugal estate, in his own name alone,
just as he had been operating, engaging and doing while the late Linnie Jane Hodges was still alive. Upon his death on
December 25, 1962, therefore, all said conjugal assets were in his sole possession and control, and registered in his name
alone, not as executor, but as exclusive owner of all said assets .

14. All these acts of C. N. Hodges were authorized and sanctioned expressly and impliedly by various orders of this
Honorable Court, as follows:

(a) In an Order dated May 27, 1957, this Honorable Court ruled that C. N. Hodges "is allowed or authorized to continue
the business in which he was engaged, and to perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living." (CFI
Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 11.)

(b) On December 14, 1957, this Honorable Court, on the basis of the following fact, alleged in the verified Motion dated
December 11, 1957 filed by Leon P. Gellada as attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges:

That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.' (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 44; emphasis supplied.)
issued the following order:

"As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor, for the reasons stated in his motion dated December 11,
1957, which the Court considers well taken , all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all the properties left by
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said
Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by
the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and testament of the
latter." (CFI Record. Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 46; emphasis supplied.)

24 ems

(c) On April 21, 1959, this Honorable Court approved the verified inventory and accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges
through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on April 14, 1959 wherein he alleged among other things,

"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the herein account, be given notice, as
herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already
probated by the Honorable Court ." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 77-78; emphasis supplied.)

(d) On July 20, 1960, this Honorable Court approved the verified "Annual Statement of Account" submitted by C. N.
Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein he alleged, among other things.

"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the herein account, be given notice as
herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges , in accordance with the last will and
testament ofthe deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 81-82;
emphasis supplied.)

(e) On May 2, 1961, this Honorable Court approved the verified "Annual Statement of Account By The Executor For the
Year 1960" submitted through Leon P. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein he alleged:

"That no person interested in the Philippines be given notice, ofthe time and place of examining the herein account,
as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the la st will and
testament ofthe deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court ." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 90-91;
emphasis supplied.)

15. Since C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of Linnie Jane Hodges, not only by law, but in accordance with the
dispositions of her will, there was, in fact, no need to liquidate the conjugal estate of the spouses. The entirely of said
conjugal estate pertained to him exclusively, therefore this Honorable Court sanctioned and authorized, as above-stated,
C. N. Hodges to manage, operate and control all the conjugal assets as owner.

16. By expressly authorizing C. N. Hodges to act as he did in connection with the estate of his wife, this Honorable Court
has (1) declared C. N. Hodges as the sole heir of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and (2) delivered and distributed her
estate to C. N. Hodges as sole heir in accordance with the terms and conditions of her Will. Thus, although the "estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges" still exists as a legal and juridical personality, it had no assets or properties located in the Philippines
registered in its name whatsoever at the time of the death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962.

17. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"), fourth paragraph, provides as follows:

"At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers
and sisters, share and share alike, namely:

"Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimray Higdon."

Because of the facts hereinabove set out there is no "rest, residue and remainder", at least to the extent of the Philippine
assets, which remains to vest in the HIGDONS, assuming this proviso in Linnie Jane Hodges' Will is valid and binding
against the estate of C. N. Hodges.

18. Any claims by the HIGDONS under the above-quoted provision of Linnie Jane Hodges' Will is without merit because
said provision is void and invalid at least as to the Philippine assets. It should not, in anyway, affect the rights of the estate
of C. N. Hodges or his heirs to the properties, which C. N. Hodges acquired by way of inheritance from his wife Linnie
Jane Hodges upon her death.

(a) In spite of the above-mentioned provision in the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges acquired, not merely a
usufructuary right, but absolute title and ownership to her estate. In a recent case involving a very similar testamentary
provision, the Supreme Court held that the heir first designated acquired full ownership of the property bequeathed by
the will, not mere usufructuary rights. (Consolacion Florentino de Crisologo, et al., vs. Manuel Singson, G. R. No. L-13876,
February 28, 1962.)

(b) Article 864, 872 and 886 of the New Civil Code clearly provide that no charge, condition or substitution whatsoever
upon the legitime can be imposed by a testator. Thus, under the provisions of Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil
Code, the legitime of a surviving spouse is 1/2 of the estate of the deceased spouse. Consequently, the above-mentioned
provision in the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is clearly invalid insofar as the legitime of C. N. Hodges was concerned, which
consisted of 1/2 of the 1/2 portion of the conjugal estate, or 1/4 of the entire conjugal estate of the deceased.

(c) There are generally only two kinds of substitution provided for and authorized by our Civil Code (Articles 857 -870),
namely, (1) simple or common substitution, sometimes referred to as vulgar substitution (Article 859), and (2)
fideicommissary substitution (Article 863). All other substitutions are merely variations of these. The substitution provided
for by paragraph four of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is not fideicommissary substitution, because there is clearly no
obligation on the part of C. N. Hodges as the first heir designated, to preserve the properties for the substitute heirs.
(Consolacion Florentino de Crisologo et al. vs. Manuel Singson, G. R. No.
L-13876.) At most, it is a vulgar or simple substitution. However, in order that a vulgar or simple substitution can be valid,
three alternative conditions must be present, namely, that the first designated heir (1) should die before the testator; or ( 2)
should not wish to accept the inheritance; or (3) should be incapacitated to do so. None of these conditions apply to C. N.
Hodges, and, therefore, the substitution provided for by the above-quoted provision of the Will is not authorized by the
Code, and, therefore, it is void. Manresa, commenting on these kisses of substitution, meaningfully stated that: "...
cuando el testador instituyeun primer heredero, y por fallecimiento de este nombra otro u otros, ha de entenderse que
estas segundas designaciones solo han de llegar a tener efectividad en el caso de que el primer instituido muera antes
que el testador, fuera o no esta su verdadera intencion. ...". (6 Manresa, 7 a ed., pag. 175.) In other words, when another
heir is designated to inherit upon the death of a first heir, the second designation can have effect only in case the first
instituted heir dies before the testator, whether or not that was the true intention of said testator . Since C. N. Hodges did
not die before Linnie Jane Hodges, the provision for substitution contained in Linnie Jane Hodges' Willis void.

(d) In view of the invalidity of the provision for substitution in the Will, C. N. Hodges' inheritance to the entirety of the
Linnie Jane Hodges estate is irrevocable and final.

19. Be that as it may, at the time of C. N. Hodges' death, the entirety of the conjugal estate appeared and was registered
in him exclusively as owner. Thus, the presumption is that all said assets constituted his estate. Therefore —

(a) If the HIGDONS wish to enforce their dubious rights as substituted heirs to 1/4 of the conjugal estate (the other 1/4 is
covered by the legitime of C. N. Hodges which can not be affected by any testamentary disposition), their remedy, if any,
is to file their claim against the estate of C. N. Hodges, which should be entitled at the present time to full custody and
control of all the conjugal estate of the spouses.

(b) The present proceedings, in which two estates exist under separate administration, where the administratrix of the
Linnie Jane Hodges estate exercises an officious right to object and intervene in matters affecting exclusively the C. N.
Hodges estate, is anomalous.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after trial and reception of evidence, this Honorable Court declare:

1. That the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was and is composed exclusively of one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal estate of
the spouses Hodges, computed as of the date of her death on May 23, 1957;

2. That the other half of the conjugal estate pertained exclusively to C. N. Hodges as his share as partner in the conjugal
partnership;

3. That all "rents, emoluments and income" of the conjugal estate accruing after Linnie Jane Hodges' death pertains to C.
N. Hodges;

4. That C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;

5. That, therefore, the entire conjugal estate of the spouses located in the Philippines, plus all the "rents, emoluments and
income" above-mentioned, now constitutes the estate of C. N. Hodges, capable of distribution to his heirs upon
termination of Special Proceedings No. 1672;

6. That PCIB, as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, is entitled to full and exclusive custody, control and
management of all said properties; and

7. That Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the HIGDONS, has no right to
intervene or participate in the administration of the C. N. Hodges estate.
PCIB further prays for such and other relief as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises."

(Record, pp. 265-277)

Before all of these motions of petitioner could be resolved, however, on December 21, 1965, private respondent Magno
filed her own "Motion for the Official Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as follows:

COMES NOW the Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and, through undersigned counsel, unto this
Honorable Court most respectfully states and manifests:

1. That the spouses Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were American citizens who died at the City of Iloilo
after having amassed and accumulated extensive properties in the Philippines;

2. That on November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed a last will and testament (the original of this will now forms
part of the records of these proceedings as Exhibit "C" and appears as Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 17-18);

3. That on May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died at the City of Iloilo at the time survived by her husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, and several relatives named in her last will and testament;

4. That on June 28, 1957, a petition therefor having been priorly filed and duly heard, this Honorable Court issued an
order admitting to probate the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 24-25,
26-28);

5. That the required notice to creditors and to all others who may have any claims against the decedent, Linnie Jane
Hodges has already been printed, published and posted (Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I. pp. 34-40) and the reglamentary
period for filing such claims has long ago lapsed and expired without any claims having been asserted against the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges, approved by the Administrator/Administratrix of the said estate, nor ratified by this Honorable
Court;

6. That the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges already admitted to probate contains an institution of heirs in
the following words:

"SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real,
wherever situated or located, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges to have and to hold unto him, my said
husband, during his natural lifetime.

THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the right to manage, control,
use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and, he is hereby given the right to make any changes in the physical
properties of said estate, by sale of any part thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any other or additional
property as he may think best; to execute conveyances with or without general or special warranty, conveying in fee
simple or for any other term or time, any property which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real
property for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple title to the
interest so conveyed in such property as he elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong
to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire. It is provided
herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now owned by us located at,
in or near the City of Lubbock Texas, but he shall have the full right to lease, manage and enjoy the same during his
lifetime, above provided. He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein, and may sell
unimproved town lots.

FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue
and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my
brothers and sisters, share and share alike, namely:

Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon.

FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters named in item Fourth, above, prior to the death of my
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, then it is my will and bequest that the heirs of such deceased brother or sister shall
take jointly the share which would have gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived."

7. That under the provisions of the last will and testament already above-quoted, Linnie Jane Hodges gave a life-estate
or a usufruct over all her estate to her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, and a vested remainder -estate or the naked
title over the same estate to her relatives named therein;

8. That after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges and after the admission to probate of her last will and testament, but
during the lifetime of Charles Newton Hodges, the said Charles Newton Hodges with full and complete knowledge of the
life-estate or usufruct conferred upon him by the will since he was then acting as Administrator of the estate and later as
Executor of the will of Linnie Jane Hodges, unequivocably and clearly through oral and written declarations and sworn
public statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate and usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges;

9. That, accordingly, the only heirs left to receive the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges pursuant to her last will and testament,
are her named brothers and sisters, or their heirs, to wit: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Aline Higdon and
David Higdon, the latter two being the wife and son respectively of the deceased Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe Era Boman
and Nimroy Higdon, all of legal ages, American citizens, with residence at the State of Texas, United States of America;

10. That at the time of the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957, she was the co-owner (together with her
husband Charles Newton Hodges) of an undivided one-half interest in their conjugal properties existing as of that date,
May 23, 1957, which properties are now being administered sometimes jointly and sometimes separately by the
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and/or the Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges but all of which
are under the control and supervision of this Honorable Court;

11. That because there was no separation or segregation of the interests of husband and wife in the combined conjugal
estate, as there has been no such separation or segregation up to the present, both interests have continually earned
exactly the same amount of "rents, emoluments and income", the entire estate having been continually devoted to the
business of the spouses as if they were alive;
12. That the one-half interest of Linnie Jane Hodges in the combined conjugal estate was earning "rents, emoluments
and income" until her death on May 23, 1957, when it ceased to be saddled with any more charges or expenditures
which are purely personal to her in nature, and her estate kept on earning such "rents, emoluments and income" by
virtue of their having been expressly renounced, disclaimed and repudiated by Charles Newton Hodges to whom they
were bequeathed for life under the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges;

13. That, on the other hand, the one-half interest of Charles Newton Hodges in the combined conjugal estate existing as
of May 23, 1957, while it may have earned exactly the same amount of "rents, emoluments and income" as that of the
share pertaining to Linnie Jane Hodges, continued to be burdened by charges, expenditures, and other dispositions
which are purely personal to him in nature, until the death of Charles Newton Hodges himself on December 25, 1962;

14. That of all the assets of the combined conjugal estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges as they
exist today, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is clearly entitled to a portion more than fifty percent (50%) as compared to
the portion to which the estate of Charles Newton Hodges may be entitled, which portions can be exactly determined by
the following manner:

a. An inventory must be made of the assets of the combined conjugal estate as they existed on the death of Linnie Jane
Hodges on May 23, 1957 — one-half of these assets belong to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;

b. An accounting must be made of the "rents, emoluments and income" of all these assets — again one-half of these
belong to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;

c. Adjustments must be made, after making a deduction of charges, disbursements and other dispositions made by
Charles Newton Hodges personally and for his own personal account from May 23, 1957 up to December 25, 1962, as
well as other charges, disbursements and other dispositions made for him and in his behalf since December 25, 1962 up
to the present;

15. That there remains no other matter for disposition now insofar as the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is concerned but
to complete the liquidation of her estate, segregate them from the conjugal estate, and distribute them to her heirs
pursuant to her last will and testament.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully moved and prayed that this Honorable Court, after a hearing
on the factual matters raised by this motion, issue an order:

a. Declaring the following persons, to wit: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Aline Higdon, David Higdon,
Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon, as the sole heirs under the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges
and as the only persons entitled to her estate;

b. Determining the exact value of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges in accordance with the system enunciated in
paragraph 14 of this motion;
c. After such determination ordering its segregation from the combined conjugal estate and its delivery to the
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges for distribution to the heirs to whom they p roperly belong and
appertain.

(Green Record on Appeal, pp. 382-391)

whereupon, instead of further pressing on its motion of January 8, 1965 aforequoted, as it had been doing before,
petitioner withdrew the said motion and in addition to opposing the above motion of respondent Magno, filed a motion
on April 22, 1966 alleging in part that:

1. That it has received from the counsel for the administratrix of the supposed estate of Linnie Jane Hodges a notice to
set her "Motion for Official Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges";

2. That before the aforesaid motion could be heard, there are matters pending before this Honorable Court, such as:

a. The examination already ordered by this Honorable Court of documents relating to the allegation of A velina Magno
that Charles Newton Hodges "through ... written declarations and sworn public statements, renounced, disclaimed and
repudiated life-estate and usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges';

b. That "Urgent Motion for An Accounting and Delivery to the Estate of C. N. Hodges of All the Assets of the Conjugal
Partnership of the Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges Existing as of May 23, 1957 Plus All the Rents,
Emoluments and Income Therefrom";

c. Various motions to resolve the aforesaid motion;

d. Manifestation of September 14, 1964, detailing acts of interference of Avelina Magno under color of title as
administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;

which are all prejudicial, and which involve no issues of fact, all facts involved therein being matters of record, and
therefore require only the resolution of questions of law;

3. That whatever claims any alleged heirs or other persons may have could be very easily threshed out in the Testate
Estate of Charles Newton Hodges;

4. That the maintenance of two separate estate proceedings and two administrators only results in confusion and is
unduly burdensome upon the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, particularly because the bond filed by Avelina
Magno is grossly insufficient to answer for the funds and property which she has inofficiously collected and held, as well
as those which she continues to inofficiously collect and hold;

5. That it is a matter of record that such state of affairs affects and inconveniences not only the estat e but also
third-parties dealing with it;" (Annex "V", Petition.)

and then, after further reminding the court, by quoting them, of the relevant allegations of its earlier motion of
September 14, 1964, Annex U, prayed that:
1. Immediately order Avelina Magno to account for and deliver to the administrator of the Estate of C. N. Hodges all the
assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all the rents, emoluments
and income therefrom;

2. Pending the consideration of this motion, immediately order Avelina Magno to turn over all her collections to the
administrator Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank;

3. Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) closed;

4. Defer the hearing and consideration of the motion for declaration of heirs in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
until the matters hereinabove set forth are resolved.
(Prayer, Annex "V" of Petition.)

On October 12, 1966, as already indicated at the outset of this opinion, the respondent court denied the foregoing
motion, holding thus:

ORDER

On record is a motion (Vol. X, Sp. 1672, pp. 4379-4390) dated April 22, 1966 of administrator PCIB praying that (1)
Immediately order Avelina Magno to account for and deliver to the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges all assets
of the conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all the rents, emoluments and
income therefrom; (2) Pending the consideration of this motion, immediately order Avelina Magno to turn over all her
collections to the administrator PCIB; (3) Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) closed;
and (4) Defer the hearing and consideration of the motion for declaration of heirs in the Testate Estat e of Linnie Jane
Hodges until the matters hereinabove set forth are resolved.

This motion is predicated on the fact that there are matters pending before this court such as (a) the examination already
ordered by this Honorable Court of documents relating to the allegation of Avelina Magno that Charles Newton Hodges
thru written declaration and sworn public statements renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his life -estate and usufruct
over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (b) the urgent motion for accounting and delivery to the estate of C. N. Hodges of
all the assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges existing as of May 23,
1957 plus all the rents, emoluments and income therefrom; (c) various motions to resolve the aforesaid motion; and (d)
manifestation of September 14, 1964, detailing acts of interference of Avelina Magno under color of title as administratrix
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.

These matters, according to the instant motion, are all pre-judicial involving no issues of facts and only require the
resolution of question of law; that in the motion of October 5, 1963 it is alleged that in a motion dated December 11, 1957
filed by Atty. Leon Gellada as attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges, the said executor C. N. Hodges is not only part
owner of the properties left as conjugal but also the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges.

Said motion of December 11, 1957 was approved by the Court in consonance with the wishes contained in the last will
and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges.
That on April 21, 1959 this Court approved the inventory and accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges thru counsel Atty.
Leon Gellada in a motion filed on April 14, 1959 stating therein that executor C. N. Hodges is the only devisee or legatee
of Linnie Jane Hodges in accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the Court.

That on July 13, 1960 the Court approved the annual statement of accounts submitted by the executor C. N. Hodges thru
his counsel Atty. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein it is stated that the executor, C. N. Hodges is the only devisee or
legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges; that on May 2, 1961 the Court approved the annual statement of accounts
submitted by executor, C. N. Hodges for the year 1960 which was submitted by Atty. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein it
is stated that executor Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges;

That during the hearing on September 5 and 6, 1963 the estate of C. N. Hodges claimed all the assets belonging to the
deceased spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges situated in the Philippines; that administratrix Magno has
executed illegal acts to the prejudice of the testate estate of C. N. Hodges.

An opposition (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4415-4421) dated April 27, 1966 of administratrix Magno has been filed asking that
the motion be denied for lack of merit and that the motion for the official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges be set for presentation and reception of evidence.

It is alleged in the aforesaid opposition that the examination of documents which are in the possession of administratrix
Magno can be made prior to the hearing of the motion for the official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, during said hearing.

That the matters raised in the PCIB's motion of October 5, 1963 (as well as the other motion) dated September 14, 1964
have been consolidated for the purpose of presentation and reception of evidence with the hearing on the
determination of the heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. It is further alleged in the opposition that the motion for
the official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is the one that constitutes a prejudicial question to the
motions dated October 5 and September 14, 1964 because if said motion is found meritorious and granted by the Court,
the PCIB's motions of October 5, 1963 and September 14, 1964 will become moot and academic since they are premised
on the assumption and claim that the only heir of Linnie Jane Hodges was C. N. Hodges.

That the PCIB and counsel are estopped from further questioning the determination of heirs in the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges at this stage since it was PCIB as early as January 8, 1965 which filed a motion for official declaration of heirs of
Linnie Jane Hodges that the claim of any heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges can be determined only in the administration
proceedings over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and not that of C. N. Hodges, since the heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges
are claiming her estate and not the estate of C. N. Hodges.

A reply (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4436-4444) dated May 11, 1966 of the PCIB has been filed alleging that the motion dated
April 22, 1966 of the PCIB is not to seek deferment of the hearing and consideration of the motion for official declaration
of heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges but to declare the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges closed and for administratrix
Magno to account for and deliver to the PCIB all assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses which has
come to her possession plus all rents and income.
A rejoinder (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4458-4462) of administratrix Magno dated May 19, 1966 has been filed alleging that the
motion dated December 11, 1957 only sought the approval of all conveyances made by C. N. Hodges and requested the
Court authority for all subsequent conveyances that will be executed by C. N. Hodges; that the order dated December 14,
1957 only approved the conveyances made by C. N. Hodges; that C. N. Hodges represented by counsel never made any
claim in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and never filed a motion to declare himself as the heir of the said Linnie Jane
Hodges despite the lapse of more than five (5) years after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges; that it is further alleged in the
rejoinder that there can be no order of adjudication of the estate unless there has been a prior express declaration of
heirs and so far no declaration of heirs in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. 1307) has been made.

Considering the allegations and arguments in the motion and of the PCIB as well as those in the opposition and
rejoinder of administratrix Magno, the Court finds the opposition and rejoinder to be well taken for the reason that so far
there has been no official declaration of heirs in the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and therefore no disposition of
her estate.

WHEREFORE, the motion of the PCIB dated April 22, 1966 is hereby DENIED.
(Annex "W", Petition)

In its motion dated November 24, 1966 for the reconsideration of this order, petitioner alleged inter alia that:

It cannot be over-stressed that the motion of December 11, 1957 was based on the fact that:

a. Under the last will and testament of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, the late Charles Newton Hodges was the sole
heir instituted insofar as her properties in the Philippines are concerned;

b. Said last will and testament vested upon the said late Charles Newton Hodges rights over said properties w hich, in
sum, spell ownership, absolute and in fee simple;

c. Said late Charles Newton Hodges was, therefore, "not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the
successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.

Likewise, it cannot be over-stressed that the aforesaid motion was granted by this Honorable Court "for the reasons
stated" therein.

Again, the motion of December 11, 1957 prayed that not only "all the sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages executed
by" the late Charles Newton Hodges, but also all "the subsequent sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages ..." be
approved and authorized. This Honorable Court, in its order of December 14, 1957, "for the reasons stated" in the
aforesaid motion, granted the same, and not only approved all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the late Charles Newton Hodges, but also authorized "all
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.
(Annex "X", Petition)

and reiterated its fundamental pose that the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges had already been factually, although
not legally, closed with the virtual declaration of Hodges and adjudication to him, as sole universal heir of all the
properties of the estate of his wife, in the order of December 14, 1957, Annex G. Still unpersuaded, on July 18, 1967,
respondent court denied said motion for reconsideration and held that "the court believes that there is no justification
why the order of October 12, 1966 should be considered or modified", and, on July 19, 1967, the motion of respondent
Magno "for official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", already referred to above, was set for
hearing.

In consequence of all these developments, the present petition was filed on August 1, 1967 (albeit petitioner had to pay
another docketing fee on August 9, 1967, since the orders in question were issued in two separate testate estate
proceedings, Nos. 1307 and 1672, in the court below).

Together with such petition, there are now pending before Us for resolution herein, appeals from the following:

1. The order of December 19, 1964 authorizing payment by respondent Magno of overtime pay, (pp. 221, Green Record
on Appeal) together with the subsequent orders of January 9, 1965, (pp. 231-232,id.) October 27, 1965, (pp. 227, id.) and
February 15, 1966 (pp. 455-456, id.) repeatedly denying motions for reconsideration thereof.

2. The order of August 6, 1965 (pp. 248, id.) requiring that deeds executed by petitioner to be co-signed by respondent
Magno, as well as the order of October 27, 1965 (pp. 276-277) denying reconsideration.

3. The order of October 27, 1965 (pp. 292-295, id.) enjoining the deposit of all collections in a joint account and the same
order of February 15, 1966 mentioned in No. 1 above which included the denial of the reconsideration of this order of
October 27, 1965.

4. The order of November 3, 1965 (pp. 313-320, id.) directing the payment of attorney's fees, fees of the respondent
administratrix, etc. and the order of February 16, 1966 denying reconsideration thereof.

5. The order of November 23, 1965 (pp. 334-335, id.) allowing appellee Western Institute of Technology to make
payments to either one or both of the administrators of the two estates as well as the order of March 7, 1966 (p. 462, id.)
denying reconsideration.

6. The various orders hereinabove earlier enumerated approving deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor
of appellees Carles, Catedral, Pablito, Guzman, Coronado, Barrido, Causing, Javier, Lucero and Batisanan, (see pp. 35 to
37 of this opinion), together with the two separate orders both dated December 2, 1966 (pp. 306 -308, and pp. 308-309,
Yellow Record on Appeal) denying reconsideration of said approval.

7. The order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, Yellow Record on Appeal, approving similar deeds of sale executed by
respondent Magno, as those in No. 6, in favor of appellees Pacaonsis and Premaylon, as to which no motion for
reconsideration was filed.

8. Lastly, the order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 305-306, Yellow Record on Appeal, directing petitioner to surrender to
appellees Lucero, Batisanan, Javier, Pablito, Barrido, Catedral, Causing, Guzman, and Coronado, the certificates of title
covering the lands involved in the approved sales, as to which no motion for reconsideration was filed either.
Strictly speaking, and considering that the above orders deal with different matters, just as they affect distinctly different
individuals or persons, as outlined by petitioner in its brief as appellant on pp. 12-20 thereof, there are, therefore,
thirty-three (33) appeals before Us, for which reason, petitioner has to pay also thirty-one (31) more docket fees.

It is as well perhaps to state here as elsewhere in this opinion that in connection with these appeals, petitioner has
assigned a total of seventy-eight (LXXVIII) alleged errors, the respective discussions and arguments under all of them
covering also the fundamental issues raised in respect to the petition for certiorari and prohibition, thus making it
feasible and more practical for the Court to dispose of all these cases together. 4

The assignments of error read thus:

I to IV

THE ORDER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G.
IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE,
AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND
THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.

V to VIII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES,
ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR WHICH
THEY HAVE NEVER PAID IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS TO SELL.

IX to XII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES,
PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, WHILE ACTING AS A
PROBATE COURT.

XIII to XV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA
PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104), EXECUTED BY THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.

XVI to XVIII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON
(LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104) COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR
WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER PAID IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS TO SELL.

XIX to XXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES
ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104) WHILE ACTING
AS A PROBATE COURT.

XXII to XXV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES LORENZO
CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A.
MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE
CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.

XXVI to XXIX

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED OF SALE EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES,
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S. GUZMAN PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO
SPELL WHICH WERE CANCELLED AND RESCINDED.

XXX to XXXIV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE LORENZO
CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.

XXXV to XXXVI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA
BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS
OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING
WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.

XXXVII to XXXVIII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO
AND PURIFICACION CORONADO, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE IN ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN THE
ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH THEY EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE
AMOUNT OF P10,680.00 and P4,428.90, RESPECTIVELY.

XXXIX to XL

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, OF THE CONTRACTUAL
RIGHT, EXERCISED THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATOR, THE INSTANT APPELLANT, TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO SELL
OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO.

XLI to XLIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO
LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO
SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.

XLIV to XLVI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO
LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL EXECUTED BY
THEM WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF WHICH THEY HAVE
NEVER COMPLIED WITH.

XLVII to XLIX

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, OF HIS RIGHT, EXERCISED
THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATION, THE INSTANT APPELLANT, TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO SELL OF THE
APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN, AND IN DETERMINING THE
RIGHTS OF THE SAID APPELLEES OVER REAL PROPERTY WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR
CAUSING, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM
DURING HIS LIFETIME.

LI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING,
ALTHOUGH HE WAS IN ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH HE
EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE AMOUNT OF P2,337.50.

LII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING,
ALTHOUGH THE SAME WAS NOT EXECUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES OF COURT.

LIII to LXI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK TO
SURRENDER THE OWNER'S DUPLICATE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OVER THE RESPECTIVE LOTS COVERED BY THE DEEDS
OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, IN FAVOR OF THE OTHER APPELLEES, JOSE PABLICO,
ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, FLRENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO, BELCESAR CAUSING,
ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MAXIMA BATISANAN AND GRACIANO L. LUCERO.
LXII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RESOLVING THE MOTION OF THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,
DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1965, WITHOUT ANY COPY THEREOF HAVING BEEN SERVED UPON THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK.

LXIII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HEARING AND CONSIDERING THE MOTION OF THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, DATED NOVEMBER 3rd, 1965, ON NOVEMBER 23, 1965, WHEN THE NOTICE FOR THE HEARING
THEREOF WAS FOR NOVEMBER 20, 1965.

LXIV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY A RELIEF OTHER
THAN THAT PRAYED FOR IN ITS MOTION, DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1965, IN THE ABSENCE OF A PRAYER FOR GENERAL
RELIEF CONTAINED THEREIN.

LXV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, TO CONTINUE
PAYMENTS UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF WHICH IT HAS FAILED TO FULFILL.

LXVI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
OVER THE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CONTRACT TO SELL IT EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.

LXVII

LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE CONTINUATION OF PAYMENTS BY THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL EXECUTED BY IT AND THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, TO A
PERSON OTHER THAN HIS LAWFULLY APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR.

LXVIII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF RETAINER'S FEES FROM THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.

LXIX

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF RETAINER'S FEES OF LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE
SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES.
LXX

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPLEMENTING THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE HEIRS OF THE SUPPOSED
ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, AND THEIR LAWYERS.

LXXI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR
BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF RETAINER'S FEES.

LXXII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT ALL FINAL DEEDS OF SALE EXECUTED PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO
SELL ENTERED INTO BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, DURING HIS LIFETIME, BE SIGNED JOINTLY BY
THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, AND THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, AND
NOT BY THE LATTER ONLY AS THE LAWFULLY APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF HIS ESTATE.

LXXIII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL EXPENSES FROM THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.

LXXIV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL EXPENSES OF LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO
THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES.

LXXV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR
BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF LEGAL EXPENSES.

LXXVI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION TO THE PURPORTED ADMINISTRATRIX
OF THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, THE INSTANT APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
WHEN THERE IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.

LXXVII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE FUNDS OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, BE PLACED IN A JOINT ACCOUNT OF THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND
INDUSTRIAL BANK, AND THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, WHO IS A COMPLETE STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID
ESTATE.
LXXVIII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, BE GIVEN EQUAL ACCESS TO THE
RECORDS OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, WHEN SHE IS A COMPLETE
STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE. (Pp. 73-83, Appellant's Brief.)

To complete this rather elaborate, and unavoidably extended narration of the factual setting of these cases, it may also
be mentioned that an attempt was made by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges to have respondent Magno removed as
administratrix, with the proposed appointment of Benito J. Lopez in her place, and that responden t court did actually
order such proposed replacement, but the Court declared the said order of respondent court violative of its injunction of
August 8, 1967, hence without force and effect (see Resolution of September 8, 1972 and February 1, 1973). Subsequently,
Atty. Efrain B. Trenas, one of the lawyers of said heirs, appeared no longer for the proposed administrator Lopez but for
the heirs themselves, and in a motion dated October 26, 1972 informed the Court that a motion had been filed with
respondent court for the removal of petitioner PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges in Special Proceedings
1672, which removal motion alleged that 22.968149% of the share of C. N. Hodges had already been acquired by the
heirs of Mrs. Hodges from certain heirs of her husband. Further, in this connection, in the answer of PCIB to the motion
of respondent Magno to have it declared in contempt for disregarding the Court's resolution of September 8, 1972
modifying the injunction of August 8, 1967, said petitioner annexed thereto a joint manifestation and motion, appearing
to have been filed with respondent court, informing said court that in addition to the fact that 22% of the share of C. N.
Hodges had already been bought by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as already stated, certain other heirs of Hodges
representing 17.343750% of his estate were joining cause with the heirs of Mrs. Hodges as against PCIB, thereby making
somewhat precarious, if not possibly untenable, petitioners' continuation as administrator of the Hodges estate.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUES IN THE CERTIORARI AND

PROHIBITION CASES

As to the Alleged Tardiness

of the Present Appeals

The priority question raised by respondent Magno relates to the alleged tardiness of all the aforementioned thirty -three
appeals of PCIB. Considering, however, that these appeals revolve around practically the same main issues and that it is
admitted that some of them have been timely taken, and, moreover, their final results hereinbelow to be stated and
explained make it of no consequence whether or not the orders concerned have become final by the lapsing of the
respective periods to appeal them, We do not deem it necessary to pass upon the timeliness of any of said appeals.

II

The Propriety Here of Certiorari and

Prohibition instead of Appeal
The other preliminary point of the same respondent is alleged impropriety of the special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition in view of the existence of the remedy of appeal which it claims is proven by the very appeals now before Us.
Such contention fails to take into account that there is a common thread among the basic issues involved in all these
thirty-three appeals which, unless resolved in one single proceeding, will inevitably cause the proliferation of more or less
similar or closely related incidents and consequent eventual appeals. If for this consideration alone, and without taking
account anymore of the unnecessary additional effort, expense and time which would be involved in as many individual
appeals as the number of such incidents, it is logical and proper to hold, as We do hold, that the remedy of appeal is not
adequate in the present cases. In determining whether or not a special civil action of certiorari or prohibition may be
resorted to in lieu of appeal, in instances wherein lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion is alleged, it is
not enough that the remedy of appeal exists or is possible. It is indispensable that taking all the relevant circumstances of
the given case, appeal would better serve the interests of justice. Obviously, the longer delay, augmented expense and
trouble and unnecessary repetition of the same work attendant to the present multiple appeals, which, after all, deal with
practically the same basic issues that can be more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single special civil action,
make the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, pursued by petitioner, preferable, for purposes of resolving the
common basic issues raised in all of them, despite the conceded availability of appeal. Besides, the settling of such
common fundamental issues would naturally minimize the areas of conflict between the parties and render more simple
the determination of the secondary issues in each of them. Accordingly, respondent Magno's objection to the present
remedy of certiorariand prohibition must be overruled.

We come now to the errors assigned by petitioner-appellant, Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank, (PCIB, for short) in
the petition as well as in its main brief as appellant.

III

On Whether or Not There is Still Any Part of the Testate

Estate Mrs. Hodges that may be Adjudicated to her brothers
and sisters as her estate, of which respondent Magno is the
unquestioned Administratrix in special Proceedings 1307.

In the petition, it is the position of PCIB that the respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely abused its
discretion in further recognizing after December 14, 1957 the existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and in
sanctioning purported acts of administration therein of respondent Magno. Main ground for such posture is that by the
aforequoted order of respondent court of said date, Hodges was already allowed to assert and exercise all his rights as
universal heir of his wife pursuant to the provisions of her will, quoted earlier, hence, nothing else remains to be done in
Special Proceedings 1307 except to formally close it. In other words, the contention of PCIB is that in view of said order,
nothing more than a formal declaration of Hodges as sole and exclusive heir of his wife and the consequent formal
unqualified adjudication to him of all her estate remain to be done to completely close Special Proceedings 1307, hence
respondent Magno should be considered as having ceased to be Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges
since then.

After carefully going over the record, We feel constrained to hold that such pose is patently untenable from whatever
angle it is examined.
To start with, We cannot find anywhere in respondent Order of December 14, 1957 the sense being read into it by PCIB.
The tenor of said order bears no suggestion at all to such effect. The declaration of heirs and distribution by the probate
court of the estate of a decedent is its most important function, and this Court is not disposed to encourage judges of
probate proceedings to be less than definite, plain and specific in making orders in such regard, if for no other reason
than that all parties concerned, like the heirs, the creditors, and most of all the government, th e devisees and legatees,
should know with certainty what are and when their respective rights and obligations ensuing from the inheritance or in
relation thereto would begin or cease, as the case may be, thereby avoiding precisely the legal complications a nd
consequent litigations similar to those that have developed unnecessarily in the present cases. While it is true that in
instances wherein all the parties interested in the estate of a deceased person have already actually distributed among
themselves their respective shares therein to the satisfaction of everyone concerned and no rights of creditors or third
parties are adversely affected, it would naturally be almost ministerial for the court to issue the final order of declaratio n
and distribution, still it is inconceivable that the special proceeding instituted for the purpose may be considered
terminated, the respective rights of all the parties concerned be deemed definitely settled, and the executor or
administrator thereof be regarded as automatically discharged and relieved already of all functions and responsibilities
without the corresponding definite orders of the probate court to such effect.

Indeed, the law on the matter is specific, categorical and unequivocal. Section 1 of Rule 90 provides:

SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made . — When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
administration, the allowance to the widow and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law
have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and
after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and
the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares
from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy
before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each
person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for,
unless the distributees, or any of them give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of
said obligations within such time as the court directs.

These provisions cannot mean anything less than that in order that a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased may be deemed ready for final closure, (1) there should have been issued already an order of distribution or
assignment of the estate of the decedent among or to those entitled thereto by will or by law, but (2) such order shall not
be issued until after it is shown that the "debts, funeral expenses, expenses of administration, allowances, taxes, etc.
chargeable to the estate" have been paid, which is but logical and proper. (3) Besides, such an order is usually issued
upon proper and specific application for the purpose of the interested party or parties, and not of the court.

... it is only after, and not before, the payment of all debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the
widow, and inheritance tax shall have been effected that the court should make a declaration of heirs or of such persons
as are entitled by law to the residue. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p. 397, citing Capistrano
vs. Nadurata, 49 Phil., 726; Lopez vs. Lopez, 37 Off. Gaz., 3091.) (JIMOGA-ON v. BELMONTE, 84 Phil. 545, 548) (p. 86,
Appellee's Brief)

xxx xxx xxx

Under Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (corresponding to Section 1, Rule 90) what brings an intestate (or
testate) proceeding to a close is the order of distribution directing delivery of the residue to the persons entitled thereto
after paying the indebtedness, if any, left by the deceased. (Santiesteban vs. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, 370.)

In the cases at bar, We cannot discern from the voluminous and varied facts, pleadings and orders before Us that the
above indispensable prerequisites for the declaration of heirs and the adjudication of the estate of Mrs. Hodges had
already been complied with when the order of December 14, 1957 was issued. As already stated, We are not persuaded
that the proceedings leading to the issuance of said order, constituting barely of the motion of May 27, 1957, Annex D of
the petition, the order of even date, Annex E, and the motion of December 11, 1957, Annex H, all aforequoted, are what
the law contemplates. We cannot see in the order of December 14, 1957, so much relied upon by the petitioner, anything
more than an explicit approval of "all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all the properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor Charles N. Hodges" (after the death of his wife and prior to the
date of the motion), plus a general advance authorization to enable said "Executor — to execute subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with
wishes conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter", which, certainly, cannot amount to the order of adjudication
of the estate of the decedent to Hodges contemplated in the law. In fact, the motion of December 11, 1957 on which the
court predicated the order in question did not pray for any such adjudication at all. What is more, although said motion
did allege that "herein Executor (Hodges) is not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor
to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", it significantly added that "herein Executor, as Legatee (sic),
has the right to sell, convey, lease or dispose of the properties in the Philippines — during his lifetime", thereby
indicating that what said motion contemplated was nothing more than either the enjoyment by Hodges of his rights
under the particular portion of the dispositions of his wife's will which were to be operative only during his lifetime or the
use of his own share of the conjugal estate, pending the termination of the proceedings. In other words, the authority
referred to in said motions and orders is in the nature of that contemplated either in Section 2 of Rule 109 which permits,
in appropriate cases, advance or partial implementation of the terms of a duly probated will before final adjudication or
distribution when the rights of third parties would not be adversely affected thereby or in the established practice of
allowing the surviving spouse to dispose of his own share of he conjugal estate, pending its final liquidation, when it
appears that no creditors of the conjugal partnership would be prejudiced thereby, (see the Revised Rules of Court by
Francisco, Vol. V-B, 1970 ed. p. 887) albeit, from the tenor of said motions, We are more inclined to believe that Hodges
meant to refer to the former. In any event, We are fully persuaded that the quoted allegations of said motions read
together cannot be construed as a repudiation of the rights unequivocally established in the will in favor of Mrs. Hodges'
brothers and sisters to whatever have not been disposed of by him up to his death.

Indeed, nowhere in the record does it appear that the trial court subsequently acted upon the premise suggested by
petitioner. On the contrary, on November 23, 1965, when the court resolved the motion of appellee Western Institute of
Technology by its order We have quoted earlier, it categorically held that as of said date, November 23, 1965, "in both
cases (Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to
whomsoever are entitled thereto." In this connection, it may be stated further against petitioner, by way of some kind of
estoppel, that in its own motion of January 8, 1965, already quoted in full on pages 54-67 of this decision, it prayed inter
alia that the court declare that "C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", which
it would not have done if it were really convinced that the order of December 14, 1957 was already the order of
adjudication and distribution of her estate. That said motion was later withdrawn when Magno filed her own motion for
determination and adjudication of what should correspond to the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges does not alter the
indubitable implication of the prayer of the withdrawn motion.

It must be borne in mind that while it is true that Mrs. Hodges bequeathed her whole estate to her husband and gave
him what amounts to full powers of dominion over the same during his lifetime, she imposed at the same time the
condition that whatever should remain thereof upon his death should go to her brothers and sisters. In effect, therefore,
what was absolutely given to Hodges was only so much of his wife's estate as he might possibly dispose of during his
lifetime; hence, even assuming that by the allegations in his motion, he did intend to adjudicate the whole estate to
himself, as suggested by petitioner, such unilateral act could not have affected or diminished in any degree or manner
the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law over what would remain thereof upon his death, for surely, no one can rightly
contend that the testamentary provision in question allowed him to so adjudicate any part of the estate to himself as to
prejudice them. In other words, irrespective of whatever might have been Hodges' intention in his motions, as Executor,
of May 27, 1957 and December 11, 1957, the trial court's orders granting said motions, even in the terms in which they
have been worded, could not have had the effect of an absolute and unconditional adjudication unto Hodges of the
whole estate of his wife. None of them could have deprived his brothers and sisters-in-law of their rights under said will.
And it may be added here that the fact that no one appeared to oppose the motions in question may only be attributed,
firstly, to the failure of Hodges to send notices to any of them, as admitted in the motion itself, and, secondly, to the fact
that even if they had been notified, they could not have taken said motions to be for the final distribution and
adjudication of the estate, but merely for him to be able, pending such final distribution and adjudication, to either
exercise during his lifetime rights of dominion over his wife's estate in accordance with the bequest in his favor, which, as
already observed, may be allowed under the broad terms of Section 2 of Rule 109, or make use of his own share of the
conjugal estate. In any event, We do not believe that the trial court could have acted in the sense pretended by
petitioner, not only because of the clear language of the will but also because none of the i nterested parties had been
duly notified of the motion and hearing thereof. Stated differently, if the orders of May 27, 1957 and December 4, 1957
were really intended to be read in the sense contended by petitioner, We would have no hesitancy in declaring them null
and void.

Petitioner cites the case of Austria vs. Ventenilla, G. R. No. L-10018, September 19, 1956, (unreported but a partial digest
thereof appears in 99 Phil. 1069) in support of its insistence that with the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957, the
closure of Mrs. Hodges' estate has become a mere formality, inasmuch as said orders amounted to the order of
adjudication and distribution ordained by Section 1 of Rule 90. But the parallel attempted to be drawn between that case
and the present one does not hold. There the trial court had in fact issued a clear, distinct and express order of
adjudication and distribution more than twenty years before the other heirs of the deceased filed their motion asking
that the administratrix be removed, etc. As quoted in that decision, the order of the lower court in that respect read as
follows:
En orden a la mocion de la administradora, el juzgado la encuentra procedente bajo la condicion de que no se hara
entrega ni adjudicacion de los bienes a los herederos antes de que estos presten la fianza correspondiente y de acuerdo
con lo prescrito en el Art. 754 del Codigo de Procedimientos: pues, en autos no aparece que hayan sido nombrados
comisionados de avaluo y reclamaciones. Dicha fianza podra ser por un valor igual al de los bienes que correspondan a
cada heredero segun el testamento. Creo que no es obice para la terminacion del expediente el hecho de que la
administradora no ha presentado hasta ahora el inventario de los bienes; pues, segun la ley, estan exentos de esta
formalidad os administradores que son legatarios del residuo o remanente de los bienes y hayan prestado fianza para
responder de las gestiones de su cargo, y aparece en el testamento que la administradora Alejandra Austria reune dicha
condicion.

POR TODO LO EXPUESTO, el juzgado declara, 1.o: no haber lugar a la mocion de Ramon Ventenilla y otros; 2.o, declara
asimismo que los unicos herederos del finado Antonio Ventenilla son su esposa Alejandra Austria, Maria Ventenilla,
hermana del testador, y Ramon Ventenilla, Maria Ventenilla, Ramon Soriano, Eulalio Soriano, Jose Soriano, Gabriela
Ventenilla, Lorenzo Ventenilla, Felicitas Ventenilla, Eugenio Ventenilla y Alejandra Ventenilla, en representacion de los
difuntos Juan, Tomas, Catalino y Froilan, hermanos del testador, declarando, ademas que la heredera Alejandra Austria
tiene derecho al remanente de todos los bienes dejados por el finado, despues de deducir de ellos la porcion que
corresponde a cada uno de sus coherederos, conforme esta mandado en las clausulas 8.a, 9.a, 10.a, 11.a, 12.a y 13.a del
testamento; 3.o, se aprueba el pago hecho por la administradora de los gastos de la ultima enfermedad y funerales del
testador, de la donacion hecha por el testador a favor de la Escuela a Publica del Municipio de Mangatarem, y de las
misas en sufragio del alma del finado; 4.o, que una vez prestada la fianza mencionada al principio de este auto, se haga
la entrega y adjudicacion de los bienes, conforme se dispone en el testamento y se acaba de declarar en este auto; 5.o, y,
finalmente, que verificada la adjudicacion, se dara por terminada la administracion, revelandole toda responsabilidad a la
administradora, y cancelando su fianza.

ASI SE ORDENA.

Undoubtedly, after the issuance of an order of such tenor, the closure of any proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of a deceased person cannot be but perfunctory.

In the case at bar, as already pointed out above, the two orders relied upon by petitioner do not appear ex-facie to be of
the same tenor and nature as the order just quoted, and, what is more, the circumstances attendant to its issuance do
not suggest that such was the intention of the court, for nothing could have been more violative of the will of Mrs.
Hodges.

Indeed, to infer from Hodges' said motions and from his statements of accounts for the years 1958, 1959 and 1960, A
Annexes I, K and M, respectively, wherein he repeatedly claimed that "herein executor (being) the only devisee or legatee
of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already probated," there is "no (other) person interested
in the Philippines of the time and place of examining herein account to be given notice", an intent to adjudicate unto
himself the whole of his wife's estate in an absolute manner and without regard to the contingent interests of her
brothers and sisters, is to impute bad faith to him, an imputation which is not legally permissible, much less warranted by
the facts of record herein. Hodges knew or ought to have known that, legally speaking, the terms of his wife's will did not
give him such a right. Factually, there are enough circumstances extant in the records of these cases indicating that he
had no such intention to ignore the rights of his co-heirs. In his very motions in question, Hodges alleged, thru counsel,
that the "deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants and ascendants, except brothers and sisters and
herein petitioner, as surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent ", and even promised that "proper
accounting will be had — in all these transactions" which he had submitted for approval and authorization by the court,
thereby implying that he was aware of his responsibilities vis-a-vis his co-heirs. As alleged by respondent Magno in her
brief as appellee:

Under date of April 14, 1959, C. N. Hodges filed his first "Account by the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In
the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1958 annexed
thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P328,402.62, divided evenly
between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for
calendar year 1958 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income
of P164,201.31, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (p. 91, Appellee's Brief.)

Under date of July 21, 1960, C. N. Hodges filed his second "Annual Statement of Account by the Executor" of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of
December 31, 1959 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of
P270,623.32, divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual
income tax return" for calendar year 1959 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as
having earned income of P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp. 91-92, id.)

Under date of April 20, 1961, C. N. Hodges filed his third "Annual Statement of Account by the Executor for the year 1960"
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Net Worth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges" as of December 31, 1960 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a
net income of P314,857.94, divided of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual evenly between him
and the estate income tax return" for calendar year 1960 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the
said estate as having earned income of P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets
and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp. 92-93, id.)

In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed the seven brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as her "heirs" (see
p. 2, Green ROA). The order of the court admitting the will to probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy
Higdon (see p. 14, Green ROA). Immediately, C. N. Hodges filed a verified motion to have Roy Higdon's name included as
an heir, stating that he wanted to straighten the records "in order (that) the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think
or believe they were omitted, and that they were really and are interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges".

Thus, he recognized, if in his own way, the separate identity of his wife's estate from his own share of the conjugal
partnership up to the time of his death, more than five years after that of his wife. He never considered the whole estate
as a single one belonging exclusively to himself. The only conclusion one can gather from this is that he could have been
preparing the basis for the eventual transmission of his wife's estate, or, at least, so much thereof as he would not have
been able to dispose of during his lifetime, to her brothers and sisters in accordance with her expressed desire, as
intimated in his tax return in the United States to be more extensively referred to anon. And assuming that he did pay the
corresponding estate and inheritance taxes in the Philippines on the basis of his being sole heir, such payment is not
necessarily inconsistent with his recognition of the rights of his co-heirs. Without purporting to rule definitely on the
matter in these proceedings, We might say here that We are inclined to the view that under the peculiar provisions of his
wife's will, and for purposes of the applicable inheritance tax laws, Hodges had to be considered as her sole heir, pending
the actual transmission of the remaining portion of her estate to her other heirs, upon the eventuality of his death, and
whatever adjustment might be warranted should there be any such remainder then is a matter that could well be taken
care of by the internal revenue authorities in due time.

It is to be noted that the lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who signed the motions of May 27, 1957 and December 11, 1957
and the aforementioned statements of account was the very same one who also subsequently signed and filed the
motion of December 26, 1962 for the appointment of respondent Magno as "Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Linnie
Jane Hodges" wherein it was alleged that "in accordance with the provisions of the last will and testament of Linnie Jane
Hodges, whatever real properties that may remain at the death of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, the said
properties shall be equally divided among their heirs." And it appearing that said attorney was Hodges' lawyer as
Executor of the estate of his wife, it stands to reason that his understanding of the situation, implicit in his allegations just
quoted, could somehow be reflective of Hodges' own understanding thereof.

As a matter of fact, the allegations in the motion of the same Atty. Gellada dated July 1, 1957, a "Request for Inclusion of
the Name of Roy Higdon in the Order of the Court dated July 19, 1957, etc.", reference to which is made in the above
quotation from respondent Magno's brief, are over the oath of Hodges himself, who verified the motion. Said allegations
read:

1. — That the Hon. Court issued orders dated June 29, 1957, ordering the probate of the will.

2. — That in said order of the Hon. Court, the relatives of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges were enumerated. However,
in the petition as well as in the testimony of Executor during the hearing, the name Roy Higdon was mentioned, but
deceased. It was unintentionally omitted the heirs of said Roy Higdon who are his wife Aline Higdon and son David
Higdon, all of age, and residents of Quinlan, Texas, U.S.A.

3. — That to straighten the records, and in order the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were
omitted, and that they were really and are interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges , it is requested of the
Hon. Court to insert the names of Aline Higdon and David Higdon, wife and son of deceased Roy Higdon in the said
order of the Hon. Court dated June 29, 1957. (pars. 1 to 3, Annex 2 of Magno's Answer — Record, p. 260)

As can be seen, these italicized allegations indicate, more or less, the real attitude of Hodges in regard to the
testamentary dispositions of his wife.

In connection with this point of Hodges' intent, We note that there are documents, copies of which are annexed to
respondent Magno's answer, which purportedly contain Hodges' own solemn declarations recognizing the right of his
co-heirs, such as the alleged tax return he filed with the United States Taxation authorities, identified as Schedule M,
(Annex 4 of her answer) and his supposed affidavit of renunciation, Annex 5. In said Schedule M, Hodges appears to
have answered the pertinent question thus:
2a. Had the surviving spouse the right to declare an election between (1) the provisions made in his or her favor by the
will and (11) dower, curtesy or a statutory interest? (X) Yes ( ) No

2d. Does the surviving spouse contemplate renouncing the will and electing to take dower, curtesy, or a statutory interest?
(X) Yes ( ) No

3. According to the information and belief of the person or persons filing the return, is any action described under
question 1 designed or contemplated? ( ) Yes (X) No (Annex 4, Answer — Record, p. 263)

and to have further stated under the item, "Description of property interests passing to surviving spouse" the following:

None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal charges. It is the intention of
the surviving husband of deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in their
Community Estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of
administration are finally determined and paid . (Annex 4, Answer — Record, p. 263)

In addition, in the supposed affidavit of Hodges, Annex 5, it is stated:

I, C. N. Hodges, being duly sworn, on oath affirm that at the time the United States Estate Tax Return was filed in the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on August 8, 1958, I renounced and disclaimed any and all right to receive the rents,
emoluments and income from said estate, as shown by the statement contained in Schedule M at page 29 of said return,
a copy of which schedule is attached to this affidavit and made a part hereof.

The purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm, and I do hereby ratify and confirm, the declaration made in Schedule
M of said return and hereby formally disclaim and renounce any right on my part to receive any of the said rents,
emoluments and income from the estate of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. This affidavit is made to absolve me
or my estate from any liability for the payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges since the death of the said Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957. (Annex 5, Answer — Record, p. 264)

Although it appears that said documents were not duly presented as evidence in the court below, and We cannot,
therefore, rely on them for the purpose of the present proceedings, still, We cannot close our eyes to their existence in
the record nor fail to note that their tenor jibes with Our conclusion discussed above from the circumstances related to
the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957. 5 Somehow, these documents, considering they are supposed to be copies
of their originals found in the official files of the governments of the United States and of the Philippines, serve to lessen
any possible apprehension that Our conclusion from the other evidence of Hodges' manifest intent vis-a-vis the rights of
his co-heirs is without basis in fact.

Verily, with such eloquent manifestations of his good intentions towards the other heirs of his wife, We find it very hard
to believe that Hodges did ask the court and that the latter agreed that he be declared her sole heir and that her whole
estate be adjudicated to him without so much as just annotating the contingent interest of her brothers and sisters in
what would remain thereof upon his demise. On the contrary, it seems to us more factual and fairer to assume that
Hodges was well aware of his position as executor of the will of his wife and, as such, had in mind the following
admonition made by the Court in Pamittan vs. Lasam, et al., 60 Phil., 908, at pp. 913-914:
Upon the death of Bernarda in September, 1908, said lands continued to be conjugal property in the hands of the
defendant Lasam. It is provided in article 1418 of the Civil Code that upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, an
inventory shall immediately be made and this court in construing this provision in connection with section 685 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (prior to its amendment by Act No. 3176 of November 24, 1924) has repeatedly held that in the
event of the death of the wife, the law imposes upon the husband the duty of liquidating the affairs of the partnership
without delay (desde luego) (Alfonso vs. Natividad, 6 Phil., 240; Prado vs. Lagera, 7 Phil., 395; De la Rama vs. De la Rama,
7 Phil., 745; Enriquez vs. Victoria, 10 Phil., 10; Amancio vs. Pardo, 13 Phil., 297; Rojas vs. Singson Tongson, 17 Phil., 476 ;
Sochayseng vs. Trujillo, 31 Phil., 153; Molera vs. Molera, 40 Phil., 566; Nable Jose vs. Nable Jose, 41 Phil., 713.)

In the last mentioned case this court quoted with approval the case of Leatherwood vs. Arnold (66 Texas, 414, 416, 417),
in which that court discussed the powers of the surviving spouse in the administration of the community property.
Attention was called to the fact that the surviving husband, in the management of the conjugal property after the death
of the wife, was a trustee of unique character who is liable for any fraud committed by him with relation to the property
while he is charged with its administration. In the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, he had wide powers (as the law
stood prior to Act No. 3176) and the high degree of trust reposed in him stands out more clearly in view of the fact that
he was the owner of a half interest in his own right of the conjugal estate which he was charged to administer. He could
therefore no more acquire a title by prescription against those for whom he was administering the conjugal estate than
could a guardian against his ward or a judicial administrator against the heirs of estate. Section 38 of Chapter III of the
Code of Civil Procedure, with relation to prescription, provides that "this chapter shall not apply ... in the case of a
continuing and subsisting trust." The surviving husband in the administration and liquidation of the conjugal estate
occupies the position of a trustee of the highest order and is not permitted by the law to hold that estate or any portion
thereof adversely to those for whose benefit the law imposes upon him the duty of administration and liquidation. No
liquidation was ever made by Lasam — hence, the conjugal property which came into his possession on the death of his
wife in September, 1908, still remains conjugal property, a continuing and subsisting trust. He should have made a
liquidation immediately (desde luego). He cannot now be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. One of the
conditions of title by prescription (section 41, Code of Civil Procedure) is possession "under a claim of title exclusive of
any other right". For a trustee to make such a claim would be a manifest fraud.

And knowing thus his responsibilities in the premises, We are not convinced that Hodges arrogated every thing unto
himself leaving nothing at all to be inherited by his wife's brothers and sisters.

PCIB insists, however, that to read the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957, not as adjudicatory, but merely as
approving past and authorizing future dispositions made by Hodges in a wholesale and general manner, would
necessarily render the said orders void for being violative of the provisions of Rule 89 governing the manner in which
such dispositions may be made and how the authority therefor and approval thereof by the probate court may be
secured. If We sustained such a view, the result would only be that the said orders should be declared ineffective either
way they are understood, considering We have already seen it is legally impossible to consider them as adjudicatory. As
a matter of fact, however, what surges immediately to the surface, relative to PCIB's observations based on Rule 89, is
that from such point of view, the supposed irregularity would involve no more than some non-jurisdictional technicalities
of procedure, which have for their evident fundamental purpose the protection of parties interested in the estate, such as
the heirs, its creditors, particularly the government on account of the taxes due it; and since it is apparent here that none
of such parties are objecting to said orders or would be prejudiced by the unobservance by the trial court of the
procedure pointed out by PCIB, We find no legal inconvenience in nor impediment to Our giving sanction to the blanket
approval and authority contained in said orders. This solution is definitely preferable in law and in equity, for to view said
orders in the sense suggested by PCIB would result in the deprivation of substantive rights to the brothers and sisters of
Mrs. Hodges, whereas reading them the other way will not cause any prejudice to anyone, and, withal, will give peace of
mind and stability of rights to the innocent parties who relied on them in good faith, in the light of the peculiar pertinent
provisions of the will of said decedent.

Now, the inventory submitted by Hodges on May 12, 1958 referred to the estate of his wife as consisting of "One -half of
all the items designated in the balance sheet, copy of which is hereto attached and marked as "Annex A"." Although,
regrettably, no copy of said Annex A appears in the records before Us, We take judicial notice, on the basis of the
undisputed facts in these cases, that the same consists of considerable real and other personal kinds of properties. And
since, according to her will, her husband was to be the sole owner thereof during his lifetime, with full power and
authority to dispose of any of them, provided that should there be any remainder upon his death, such remainder would
go to her brothers and sisters, and furthermore, there is no pretension, much less any proof that Hodges had in fact
disposed of all of them, and, on the contrary, the indications are rather to the effect that he had kept them more or less
intact, it cannot truthfully be said that, upon the death of Hodges, there was no more estate of Mrs. Hodges to speak of.
It is Our conclusion, therefore, that properties do exist which constitute such estate, hence Special Proceedings 1307
should not yet be closed.

Neither is there basis for holding that respondent Magno has ceased to be the Administratrix in said proceeding. There is
no showing that she has ever been legally removed as such, the attempt to replace her with Mr. Benito Lopez without
authority from the Court having been expressly held ineffective by Our resolution of September 8, 1972. Parenthetically,
on this last point, PCIB itself is very emphatic in stressing that it is not questioning said respondent's status as such
administratrix. Indeed, it is not clear that PCIB has any standing to raise any objection thereto, considering it is a
complete stranger insofar as the estate of Mrs. Hodges is concerned.

It is the contention of PCIB, however, that as things actually stood at the time of Hodges' death, their conjugal
partnership had not yet been liquidated and, inasmuch as the properties composing the same were thus commingled
pro indiviso and, consequently, the properties pertaining to the estate of each of the spouses are not yet identifiable, it is
PCIB alone, as administrator of the estate of Hodges, who should administer everything, and all that respondent Magno
can do for the time being is to wait until the properties constituting the remaining estate of Mrs. Hodges have been duly
segregated and delivered to her for her own administration. Seemingly, PCIB would liken the Testate Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges to a party having a claim of ownership to some properties included in the inventory of an administrator of
the estate of a decedent, (here that of Hodges) and who normally has no right to take part in the proceedings pending
the establishment of his right or title; for which as a rule it is required that an ordinary action should be filed, since th e
probate court is without jurisdiction to pass with finality on questions of title between the estate of the d eceased, on the
one hand, and a third party or even an heir claiming adversely against the estate, on the other.

We do not find such contention sufficiently persuasive. As We see it, the situation obtaining herein cannot be compared
with the claim of a third party the basis of which is alien to the pending probate proceedings. In the present cases what
gave rise to the claim of PCIB of exclusive ownership by the estate of Hodges over all the properties of the Hodges
spouses, including the share of Mrs. Hodges in the community properties, were the orders of the trial court issued in the
course of the very settlement proceedings themselves, more specifically, the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 so
often mentioned above. In other words, the root of the issue of title between the parties is something that the court itself
has done in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction. And since in the ultimate analysis, the question of whether or not all
the properties herein involved pertain exclusively to the estate of Hodges depends on the legal meaning and effect of
said orders, the claim that respondent court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the said issue is
incorrect. If it was within the competence of the court to issue the root orders, why should it not be within its authority to
declare their true significance and intent, to the end that the parties may know whether or not the estate of Mrs. Hodges
had already been adjudicated by the court, upon the initiative of Hodges, in his favor, to the exclusion of the other heirs
of his wife instituted in her will?

At this point, it bears emphasis again that the main cause of all the present problems confronting the courts and the
parties in these cases was the failure of Hodges to secure, as executor of his wife's estate, from May, 1957 up to the time
of his death in December, 1962, a period of more than five years, the final adjudication of her estate and the closure of
the proceedings. The record is bare of any showing that he ever exerted any effort towards the early settlement of said
estate. While, on the one hand, there are enough indications, as already discuss that he had intentions of leaving intact
her share of the conjugal properties so that it may pass wholly to his co-heirs upon his death, pursuant to her will, on the
other hand, by not terminating the proceedings, his interests in his own half of the conjugal properties remained
commingled pro-indiviso with those of his co-heirs in the other half. Obviously, such a situation could not be conducive
to ready ascertainment of the portion of the inheritance that should appertain to his co-heirs upon his death. Having
these considerations in mind, it would be giving a premium for such procrastination and rather unfair to his co -heirs, if
the administrator of his estate were to be given exclusive administration of all the properties in question, which would
necessarily include the function of promptly liquidating the conjugal partnership, thereby identifying and segregating
without unnecessary loss of time which properties should be considered as constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges, the
remainder of which her brothers and sisters are supposed to inherit equally among themselves.

To be sure, an administrator is not supposed to represent the interests of any particular party and his acts are deemed to
be objectively for the protection of the rights of everybody concerned with the estate of the decedent, and from this
point of view, it maybe said that even if PCIB were to act alone, there should be no fear of undue disadvantage to anyone.
On the other hand, however, it is evidently implicit in section 6 of Rule 78 fixing the priority among those to whom letters
of administration should be granted that the criterion in the selection of the administrator is not his impartiality alone but,
more importantly, the extent of his interest in the estate, so much so that the one assumed to have greater interest is
preferred to another who has less. Taking both of these considerations into account, inasmuch as, according to Hodges'
own inventory submitted by him as Executor of the estate of his wife, practically all their properties were conjugal which
means that the spouses have equal shares therein, it is but logical that both estates should be administered j ointly by
representatives of both, pending their segregation from each other. Particularly is such an arrangement warranted
because the actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs.
Hodges from their inheritance. Besides, to allow PCIB, the administrator of his estate, to perform now what Hodges was
duty bound to do as executor is to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of Section 2 of Rule 78 which expressly provides that
"The executor of an executor shall not, as such, administer the estate of the first testator." It goes without saying that this
provision refers also to the administrator of an executor like PCIB here.
We are not unmindful of the fact that under Section 2 of Rule 73, "When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the
husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid,
in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall
be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either." Indeed, it is true that the last sentence of this provision
allows or permits the conjugal partnership of spouses who are both deceased to be settled or liquidated in the testate or
intestate proceedings of either, but precisely because said sentence allows or permits that the liquidation be made in
either proceeding, it is a matter of sound judicial discretion in which one it should be made. After all, the former rule
referring to the administrator of the husband's estate in respect to such liquidation was done away with by Act 3176, the
pertinent provisions of which are now embodied in the rule just cited.

Thus, it can be seen that at the time of the death of Hodges, there was already the pending judicial settlement
proceeding of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and, more importantly, that the former was the executor of the latter's will who
had, as such, failed for more than five years to see to it that the same was terminated earliest, which was not difficult to
do, since from ought that appears in the record, there were no serious obstacles on the way, the estate not being
indebted and there being no immediate heirs other than Hodges himself. Such dilatory or indifferent attitude could only
spell possible prejudice of his co-heirs, whose rights to inheritance depend entirely on the existence of any remainder of
Mrs. Hodges' share in the community properties, and who are now faced with the pose of PCIB that there is no such
remainder. Had Hodges secured as early as possible the settlement of his wife's estate, this problem would not arisen. All
things considered, We are fully convinced that the interests of justice will be better served by not permitting or allowing
PCIB or any administrator of the estate of Hodges exclusive administration of all the properties in question. We are of the
considered opinion and so hold that what would be just and proper is for both administrators of the two estates to act
conjointly until after said estates have been segregated from each other.

At this juncture, it may be stated that we are not overlooking the fact that it is PCIB's contention that, viewed as a
substitution, the testamentary disposition in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters may not be given effect. To a
certain extent, this contention is correct. Indeed, legally speaking, Mrs. Hodges' will provides neither for a simple or
vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 thereof.
There is no vulgar substitution therein because there is no provision for either (1) predecease of the testator by the
designated heir or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, as required by Articl e 859; and
neither is there a fideicommissary substitution therein because no obligation is imposed thereby upon Hodges to
preserve the estate or any part thereof for anyone else. But from these premises, it is not correct to jump to the
conclusion, as PCIB does, that the testamentary dispositions in question are therefore inoperative and invalid.

The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the said disposition exclusively in the light of substitut ions
covered by the Civil Code section on that subject, (Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book III) when it is obvious that
substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a will "so that he may enter into inheritance in default of the
heir originally instituted," (Article 857, id.) and, in the present case, no such possible default is contemplated. The
brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges because, under her will, they are not to inherit what
Hodges cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he would not dispose of from his inheritance; rather, therefore,
they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory
insofar as Hodges was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law. It is
partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as universal
and sole heir with absolute dominion over them 6 only during his lifetime, which means that while he could completely
and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis
causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that
contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested already upon
the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the
event of actual existence of any remainder of her estate then.

Contrary to the view of respondent Magno, however, it was not the usufruct alone of her estate, as contemplated in
Article 869 of the Civil Code, that she bequeathed to Hodges during his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although
the same was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there was no restriction whatsoever against his disposing or
conveying the whole or any portion thereof to anybody other than himself. The Court sees no legal impediment to this
kind of institution, in this jurisdiction or under Philippine law, except that it cannot apply to the legitime of Hodges as t he
surviving spouse, consisting of one-half of the estate, considering that Mrs. Hodges had no surviving ascendants nor
descendants. (Arts. 872, 900, and 904, New Civil Code.)

But relative precisely to the question of how much of Mrs. Hodges' share of the conjugal partnership properties may be
considered as her estate, the parties are in disagreement as to how Article 16 of the Civil Code 7 should be applied. On
the one hand, petitioner claims that inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges was a resident of the Philippines at the time of her death,
under said Article 16, construed in relation to the pertinent laws of Texas and the principle of renvoi, what should be
applied here should be the rules of succession under the Civil Code of the Philippines, and, therefore, her estate could
consist of no more than one-fourth of the said conjugal properties, the other fourth being, as already explained, the
legitime of her husband (Art. 900, Civil Code) which she could not have disposed of nor burdened with any condition (Art.
872, Civil Code). On the other hand, respondent Magno denies that Mrs. Hodges died a resident of the Philippines, since
allegedly she never changed nor intended to change her original residence of birth in Texas, United States of America,
and contends that, anyway, regardless of the question of her residence, she being indisputably a citizen of Texas, under
said Article 16 of the Civil Code, the distribution of her estate is subject to the laws of said State which, according to her,
do not provide for any legitime, hence, the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are entitled to the remainder of the
whole of her share of the conjugal partnership properties consisting of one-half thereof. Respondent Magno further
maintains that, in any event, Hodges had renounced his rights under the will in favor of his co-heirs, as allegedly proven
by the documents touching on the point already mentioned earlier, the genuineness and legal significance of which
petitioner seemingly questions. Besides, the parties are disagreed as to what the pertinent laws of Texas provide. In the
interest of settling the estates herein involved soonest, it would be best, indeed, if these conflicting claims of the partie s
were determined in these proceedings. The Court regrets, however, that it cannot do so, for the simple reason that
neither the evidence submitted by the parties in the court below nor their discussion, in their respective briefs and
memoranda before Us, of their respective contentions on the pertinent legal issues, of grave importance as they are,
appear to Us to be adequate enough to enable Us to render an intelligent comprehensive and just resolution. For one
thing, there is no clear and reliable proof of what in fact the possibly applicable laws of Texas are. 7* Then also, the
genuineness of documents relied upon by respondent Magno is disputed. And there are a number of stil l other
conceivable related issues which the parties may wish to raise but which it is not proper to mention here. In Justice,
therefore, to all the parties concerned, these and all other relevant matters should first be threshed out fully in the trial
court in the proceedings hereafter to be held therein for the purpose of ascertaining and adjudicating and/or
distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her duly probated will.

To be more explicit, all that We can and do decide in connection with the petition for certiorari and prohibition are: (1)
that regardless of which corresponding laws are applied, whether of the Philippines or of Texas, and taking for granted
either of the respective contentions of the parties as to provisions of the latter,8 and regardless also of whether or not it
can be proven by competent evidence that Hodges renounced his inheritance in any degree, it is easil y and definitely
discernible from the inventory submitted by Hodges himself, as Executor of his wife's estate, that there are properties
which should constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges and ought to be disposed of or distributed among her heirs pursuant
to her will in said Special Proceedings 1307; (2) that, more specifically, inasmuch as the question of what are the pertinent
laws of Texas applicable to the situation herein is basically one of fact, and, considering that the sole difference in the
positions of the parties as to the effect of said laws has reference to the supposed legitime of Hodges — it being the
stand of PCIB that Hodges had such a legitime whereas Magno claims the negative - it is now beyond controversy for all
future purposes of these proceedings that whatever be the provisions actually of the laws of Texas applicable hereto, the
estate of Mrs. Hodges is at least, one-fourth of the conjugal estate of the spouses; the existence and effects of foreign
laws being questions of fact, and it being the position now of PCIB that the estate of Mrs. Hodges, pursuant to the laws
of Texas, should only be one-fourth of the conjugal estate, such contention constitutes an admission of fact, and
consequently, it would be in estoppel in any further proceedings in these cases to claim that said estate could be less,
irrespective of what might be proven later to be actually the provisions of the applicable laws of Texas; (3) that Special
Proceedings 1307 for the settlement of the testate estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be closed at this stage and should
proceed to its logical conclusion, there having been no proper and legal adjudication or distribution yet of the estate
therein involved; and (4) that respondent Magno remains and continues to be the Administratrix therein. Hence, nothing
in the foregoing opinion is intended to resolve the issues which, as already stated, are not properly before the Court now,
namely, (1) whether or not Hodges had in fact and in law waived or renounced his inheritance from Mrs. H odges, in
whole or in part, and (2) assuming there had been no such waiver, whether or not, by the application of Article 16 of the
Civil Code, and in the light of what might be the applicable laws of Texas on the matter, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is
more than the one-fourth declared above. As a matter of fact, even our finding above about the existence of properties
constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges rests largely on a general appraisal of the size and extent of the conjugal
partnership gathered from reference made thereto by both parties in their briefs as well as in their pleadings included in
the records on appeal, and it should accordingly yield, as to which exactly those properties are, to the more concrete and
specific evidence which the parties are supposed to present in support of their respective positions in regard to the
foregoing main legal and factual issues. In the interest of justice, the parties should be allowed to present such further
evidence in relation to all these issues in a joint hearing of the two probate proceedings herein involved. After all, the
court a quo has not yet passed squarely on these issues, and it is best for all concerned that it should do so in the first
instance.

Relative to Our holding above that the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than the remainder of one-fourth of the
conjugal partnership properties, it may be mentioned here that during the deliberations, the point was raised as to
whether or not said holding might be inconsistent with Our other ruling here also that, since there is no reliable evidence
as to what are the applicable laws of Texas, U.S.A. "with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights" that may be willed by a testator which, under Article 16 of the Civil Code, are controlling in the instant
cases, in view of the undisputed Texan nationality of the deceased Mrs. Hodges, these cases should be returned to the
court a quo, so that the parties may prove what said law provides, it is premature for Us to make any specific ruling now
on either the validity of the testamentary dispositions herein involved or the amount of inheritance to which the brothers
and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are entitled. After nature reflection, We are of the considered view that, at this st age and in
the state of the records before Us, the feared inconsistency is more apparent than real. Withal, it no longer lies in the lips
of petitioner PCIB to make any claim that under the laws of Texas, the estate of Mrs. Hodges could in any event be les s
than that We have fixed above.

It should be borne in mind that as above-indicated, the question of what are the laws of Texas governing the matters
herein issue is, in the first instance, one of fact, not of law. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken
judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with the
rare exception in instances when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge of the court, such as when they
are well and generally known or they have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the parties
concerned do not claim otherwise. (5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p. 41, 1970 ed.) In Fluemer vs. Hix, 54 Phil.
610, it was held:

It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix
who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Virginia govern. To this end, there was submitted a
copy of section 3868 of Acts 1882, c. 84 as found in West Virginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p.
1960, and as certified to by the Director of the National Library. But this was far from a compliance with the law. The laws
of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to
take judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re
Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no showing that the
book from which an extract was taken was printed or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as
provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the
officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the
time the alleged will was executed."

No evidence of the nature thus suggested by the Court may be found in the records of the cases at bar. Quite to the
contrary, the parties herein have presented opposing versions in their respective pleadings and memoranda regarding
the matter. And even if We took into account that in Aznar vs. Garcia, the Court did make reference to certain provisions
regarding succession in the laws of Texas, the disparity in the material dates of that case and the present ones would not
permit Us to indulge in the hazardous conjecture that said provisions have not been amended or changed in the
meantime.

On the other hand, in In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, We held:

Upon the other point — as to whether the will was executed in conformity with the statutes of the State of Illinois —
we note that it does not affirmatively appear from the transcription of the testimony adduced in the trial court that any
witness was examined with reference to the law of Illinois on the subject of the execution of will. The trial judge no doubt
was satisfied that the will was properly executed by examining section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois, as exhibited
in volume 3 of Starr & Curtis's Annotated Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 426; and he may have assumed that he could take
judicial notice of the laws of Illinois under section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If so, he was in our opinion
mistaken. That section authorizes the courts here to take judicial notice, among other things, of the acts of the legislative
department of the United States. These words clearly have reference to Acts of the Congress of the United States; and we
would hesitate to hold that our courts can, under this provision, take judicial notice of the multifarious laws of the various
American States. Nor do we think that any such authority can be derived from the broader language, used in the same
section, where it is said that our courts may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge "similar" to those therein
enumerated. The proper rule we think is to require proof of the statutes of the States of the American Union whenever
their provisions are determinative of the issues in any action litigated in the Philippine courts.

Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in taking judicial notice of the law of Illinois on the point
in question, such error is not now available to the petitioner, first, because the petition does not state any fact from which
it would appear that the law of Illinois is different from what the court found, and, secondly, because the assignment of
error and argument for the appellant in this court raises no question based on such supposed error. Though the t rial
court may have acted upon pure conjecture as to the law prevailing in the State of Illinois, its judgment could not be set
aside, even upon application made within six months under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless it should
be made to appear affirmatively that the conjecture was wrong. The petitioner, it is true, states in general terms that the
will in question is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in the State of Illinois, but this is merely a
conclusion of law. The affidavits by which the petition is accompanied contain no reference to the subject, and we are
cited to no authority in the appellant's brief which might tend to raise a doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion of
the trial court. It is very clear, therefore, that this point cannot be urged as of serious moment.

It is implicit in the above ruling that when, with respect to certain aspects of the foreign laws concerned, the parties in a
given case do not have any controversy or are more or less in agreement, the Court may take it for granted for the
purposes of the particular case before it that the said laws are as such virtual agreement indicates, without the need of
requiring the presentation of what otherwise would be the competent evidence on the point. Thus, in the instant cases
wherein it results from the respective contentions of both parties that even if the pertinent laws of Texas were known and
to be applied, the amount of the inheritance pertaining to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges is as We have fixed above, the
absence of evidence to the effect that, actually and in fact, under said laws, it could be otherwise is of no longer of any
consequence, unless the purpose is to show that it could be more. In other words, since PCIB, the petitioner -appellant,
concedes that upon application of Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, the amount of the estate in
controversy is just as We have determined it to be, and respondent-appellee is only claiming, on her part, that it could be
more, PCIB may not now or later pretend differently.

To be more concrete, on pages 20-21 of its petition herein, dated July 31, 1967, PCIB states categorically:

Inasmuch as Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "intestate and testamentary successions both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall
be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found", while the law of Texas (the Hodges
spouses being nationals of U.S.A., State of Texas), in its conflicts of law rules, provides that the domiciliary law (in this case
Philippine law) governs the testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables or personal properties,
while the law of the situs (in this case also Philippine law with respect to all Hodges properties located in the Philippines),
governs with respect to immovable properties, and applying therefore the 'renvoi doctrine' as enunciated and applied by
this Honorable Court in the case of In re Estate of Christensen (G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there can be no question
that Philippine law governs the testamentary dispositions contained in the Last Will and Testament of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the successional rights to her estate, both with respect to movables, as well as to
immovables situated in the Philippines.

In its main brief dated February 26, 1968, PCIB asserts:

The law governing successional rights.

As recited above, there is no question that the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, was an American citizen. There is also no
question that she was a national of the State of Texas, U.S.A. Again, there is likewise no question that she had her
domicile of choice in the City of Iloilo, Philippines, as this has already been pronounced by the above-cited orders of the
lower court, pronouncements which are by now res adjudicata (par. [a], See. 49, Rule 39, Rules of Court; In re Estate of
Johnson, 39 Phil. 156).

Article 16 of the Civil Code provides:

"Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found."

Thus the aforecited provision of the Civil Code points towards the national law of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges,
which is the law of Texas, as governing succession "both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions ...". But the law of Texas, in its conflicts of law
rules, provides that the domiciliary law governs the testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables or
personal property, while the law of the situs governs with respect to immovable property. Such that with respect to both
movable property, as well as immovable property situated in the Philippines, the law of Texas points to the law of the
Philippines.

Applying, therefore, the so-called "renvoi doctrine", as enunciated and applied by this Honorable Court in the case of "In
re Christensen" (G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there can be no question that Philippine law governs the testamentary
provisions in the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the successional rights to her
estate, both with respect to movables, as well as immovables situated in the Philippines.

The subject of successional rights.

Under Philippine law, as it is under the law of Texas, the conjugal or community property of the spouses, Charles Newton
Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, upon the death of the latter, is to be divided into two, one-half pertaining to each of
the spouses, as his or her own property. Thus, upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, one-half of the conjugal
partnership property immediately pertained to Charles Newton Hodges as his own share, and not by virtue of any
successional rights. There can be no question about this.

Again, Philippine law, or more specifically, Article 900 of the Civil Code provides:

If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate of the
deceased spouse, and the testator may freely dispose of the other half.

If the marriage between the surviving spouse and the testator was solemnized in articulo mortis, and the testator died
within three months from the time of the marriage, the legitime of the surviving spouse as the sole heir shall be one-third
of the hereditary estate, except when they have been living as husband and wife for more than five years. In the latter
case, the legitime of the surviving spouse shall be that specified in the preceding paragraph.

This legitime of the surviving spouse cannot be burdened by a fideicommisary substitution (Art. 864, Civil code), nor by
any charge, condition, or substitution (Art, 872, Civil code). It is clear, therefore, that in addition t o one-half of the
conjugal partnership property as his own conjugal share, Charles Newton Hodges was also immediately entitled to
one-half of the half conjugal share of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, or one-fourth of the entire conjugal property, as
his legitime.

One-fourth of the conjugal property therefore remains at issue.

In the summary of its arguments in its memorandum dated April 30, 1968, the following appears:

Briefly, the position advanced by the petitioner is:

a. That the Hodges spouses were domiciled legally in the Philippines (pp. 19-20, petition). This is now a matter of res
adjudicata (p. 20, petition).

b. That under Philippine law, Texas law, and the renvoi doctrine, Philippine law governs the successional rights over the
properties left by the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 20-21, petition).

c. That under Philippine as well as Texas law, one-half of the Hodges properties pertains to the deceased, Charles
Newton Hodges (p. 21, petition). This is not questioned by the respondents.

d. That under Philippine law, the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, automatically inherited one-half of the remaining
one-half of the Hodges properties as his legitime (p. 21, petition).

e. That the remaining 25% of the Hodges properties was inherited by the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, under the
will of his deceased spouse (pp. 22-23, petition). Upon the death of Charles Newton Hodges, the substitution 'provision
of the will of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, did not operate because the same is void (pp. 23-25, petition).
f. That the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, asserted his sole ownership of the Hodges properties and the probate
court sanctioned such assertion (pp. 25-29, petition). He in fact assumed such ownership and such was the status of the
properties as of the time of his death (pp. 29-34, petition).

Of similar tenor are the allegations of PCIB in some of its pleadings quoted in the earlier part of this option.

On her part, it is respondent-appellee Magno's posture that under the laws of Texas, there is no system of legitime,
hence the estate of Mrs. Hodges should be one-half of all the conjugal properties.

It is thus unquestionable that as far as PCIB is concerned, the application to these cases of Article 16 of the Civil Code in
relation to the corresponding laws of Texas would result in that the Philippine laws on succession should control. On that
basis, as We have already explained above, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is the remainder of one-fourth of the conjugal
partnership properties, considering that We have found that there is no legal impediment to the kind of disposition
ordered by Mrs. Hodges in her will in favor of her brothers and sisters and, further, that the contention of PCIB that the
same constitutes an inoperative testamentary substitution is untenable. As will be recalled, PCIB's position that there is
no such estate of Mrs. Hodges is predicated exclusively on two propositions, namely: (1) that the provision in question in
Mrs. Hodges' testament violates the rules on substitution of heirs under the Civil Code and (2) that, in any event, by the
orders of the trial court of May 27, and December 14, 1957, the trial court had already finally and irrevocably adjudicated
to her husband the whole free portion of her estate to the exclusion of her brothers and sisters, both of which poses, We
have overruled. Nowhere in its pleadings, briefs and memoranda does PCIB maintain that the application of the laws of
Texas would result in the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything under her will. And since PCIB's
representations in regard to the laws of Texas virtually constitute admissions of fact which the other parties and the Court
are being made to rely and act upon, PCIB is "not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a positi on
contradictory to or inconsistent with them." (5 Moran, id, p. 65, citing Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Sta. Ana vs.
Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018).

Accordingly, the only question that remains to be settled in the further proceedings hereby ordered to be held in the
court below is how much more than as fixed above is the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and this would depend on (1) whether
or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more, such as, when there is no legitime provided therein, and
(2) whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges.

In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some members of the Court that to avoid or, at least, minimize
further protracted legal controversies between the respective heirs of the Hodges spouses, it is imperative to elucidate
on the possible consequences of dispositions made by Hodges after the death of his wife from the mass of the
unpartitioned estates without any express indication in the pertinent documents as to whether his intention is to dispose
of part of his inheritance from his wife or part of his own share of the conjugal estate as well as of those made by PCIB
after the death of Hodges. After a long discussion, the consensus arrived at was as follows: (1) any such dispositions
made gratuitously in favor of third parties, whether these be individuals, corporations or foundations, shall be considered
as intended to be of properties constituting part of Hodges' inheritance from his wife, it appearing from the tenor of his
motions of May 27 and December 11, 1957 that in asking for general authority to make sales or other disposals of
properties under the jurisdiction of the court, which include his own share of the conjugal estate, he w as not invoking
particularly his right over his own share, but rather his right to dispose of any part of his inheritance pursuant to the wil l
of his wife; (2) as regards sales, exchanges or other remunerative transfers, the proceeds of such sales or the properties
taken in by virtue of such exchanges, shall be considered as merely the products of "physical changes" of the properties
of her estate which the will expressly authorizes Hodges to make, provided that whatever of said products should remain
with the estate at the time of the death of Hodges should go to her brothers and sisters; (3) the dispositions made by
PCIB after the death of Hodges must naturally be deemed as covering only the properties belonging to his estate
considering that being only the administrator of the estate of Hodges, PCIB could not have disposed of properties
belonging to the estate of his wife. Neither could such dispositions be considered as involving conjugal properties, for
the simple reason that the conjugal partnership automatically ceased when Mrs. Hodges died, and by the peculiar
provision of her will, under discussion, the remainder of her share descended also automatically upon the death of
Hodges to her brothers and sisters, thus outside of the scope of PCIB's administration. Accordingly, these construction of
the will of Mrs. Hodges should be adhered to by the trial court in its final order of adjudication and distribution and/or
partition of the two estates in question.

THE APPEALS

A cursory examination of the seventy-eight assignments of error in appellant PCIB's brief would readily reveal that all of
them are predicated mainly on the contention that inasmuch as Hodges had already adjudicated unto himself all the
properties constituting his wife's share of the conjugal partnership, allegedly with the sanction of the trial court per its
order of December 14, 1957, there has been, since said date, no longer any estate of Mrs. Hodges of which appellee
Magno could be administratrix, hence the various assailed orders sanctioning her actuations as such are not in
accordance with law. Such being the case, with the foregoing resolution holding such posture to be untenable in fact and
in law and that it is in the best interest of justice that for the time being the two estates should be administered conjointly
by the respective administrators of the two estates, it should follow that said assignments of error have lost their
fundamental reasons for being. There are certain matters, however, relating peculiarly to the respective o rders in
question, if commonly among some of them, which need further clarification. For instance, some of them authorized
respondent Magno to act alone or without concurrence of PCIB. And with respect to many of said orders, PCIB further
claims that either the matters involved were not properly within the probate jurisdiction of the trial court or that the
procedure followed was not in accordance with the rules. Hence, the necessity of dealing separately with the merits of
each of the appeals.

Indeed, inasmuch as the said two estates have until now remained commingled pro-indiviso, due to the failure of
Hodges and the lower court to liquidate the conjugal partnership, to recognize appellee Magno as Administratrix of the
Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges which is still unsegregated from that of Hodges is not to say, without any qualification, that
she was therefore authorized to do and perform all her acts complained of in these appeals, sanctioned though they
might have been by the trial court. As a matter of fact, it is such commingling pro-indiviso of the two estates that should
deprive appellee of freedom to act independently from PCIB, as administrator of the estate of Hodges, just as, for the
same reason, the latter should not have authority to act independently from her. And considering that the lower court
failed to adhere consistently to this basic point of view, by allowing the two administrators to act independently of each
other, in the various instances already noted in the narration of facts above, the Court has to look into the attendant
circumstances of each of the appealed orders to be able to determine whether any of them has to be set aside or they
may all be legally maintained notwithstanding the failure of the court a quo to observe the pertinent procedural
technicalities, to the end only that graver injury to the substantive rights of the parties concerned and unnecessary and
undesirable proliferation of incidents in the subject proceedings may be forestalled. In other words, We have to
determine, whether or not, in the light of the unusual circumstances extant in the record, there is need to be more
pragmatic and to adopt a rather unorthodox approach, so as to cause the least disturbance in rights already being
exercised by numerous innocent third parties, even if to do so may not appear to be strictly in accordance with the letter
of the applicable purely adjective rules.

Incidentally, it may be mentioned, at this point, that it was principally on account of the confusion that might result later
from PCIB's continuing to administer all the community properties, notwithstanding the certainty of the existence of the
separate estate of Mrs. Hodges, and to enable both estates to function in the meantime with a relative degree of
regularity, that the Court ordered in the resolution of September 8, 1972 the modification of the injunction issued
pursuant to the resolutions of August 8, October 4 and December 6, 1967, by virtue of which respondent Magno was
completely barred from any participation in the administration of the properties herein involved. In the September 8
resolution, We ordered that, pending this decision, Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672 should proceed jointly and that
the respective administrators therein "act conjointly — none of them to act singly and independently of each other for
any purpose." Upon mature deliberation, We felt that to allow PCIB to continue managing or administering all the said
properties to the exclusion of the administratrix of Mrs. Hodges' estate might place the heirs of Hodges at an unduly
advantageous position which could result in considerable, if not irreparable, damage or injury to the other parties
concerned. It is indeed to be regretted that apparently, up to this date, more than a year after said resoluti on, the same
has not been given due regard, as may be gleaned from the fact that recently, respondent Magno has filed in these
proceedings a motion to declare PCIB in contempt for alleged failure to abide therewith, notwithstanding that its
repeated motions for reconsideration thereof have all been denied soon after they were filed. 9

Going back to the appeals, it is perhaps best to begin first with what appears to Our mind to be the simplest, and then
proceed to the more complicated ones in that order, without regard to the numerical sequence of the assignments of
error in appellant's brief or to the order of the discussion thereof by counsel.

Assignments of error numbers

LXXII, LXXVII and LXXVIII.

These assignments of error relate to (1) the order of the trial court of August 6, 1965 providing that "the deeds of sale
(therein referred to involving properties in the name of Hodges) should be signed jointly by the PCIB, as Administrator of
Testate Estate of C.N. Hodges, and Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and
to this effect, the PCIB should take the necessary steps so that Administratrix Avelina A. Magno could sign th e deeds of
sale," (p. 248, Green Rec. on Appeal) (2) the order of October 27, 1965 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
foregoing order, (pp. 276-277, id.) (3) the other order also dated October 27, 1965 enjoining inter alia, that "(a) all cash
collections should be deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and estate of C. N. Hodges, (b)
that whatever cash collections (that) had been deposited in the account of either of the estates should be withdrawn and
since then (sic) deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and the estate of C. N. Hodges; ... (d)
(that) Administratrix Magno — allow the PCIB to inspect whatever records, documents and papers she may have in her
possession, in the same manner that Administrator PCIB is also directed to allow Administratrix Magno to inspect
whatever records, documents and papers it may have in its possession" and "(e) that the accountant of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges shall have access to all records of the transactions of both estates for the protection of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges; and in like manner, the accountant or any authorized representative of the estate of C. N. Hodges
shall have access to the records of transactions of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate for the protection of the estate of C. N.
Hodges", (pp. 292-295, id.) and (4) the order of February 15, 1966, denying, among others, the motion for
reconsideration of the order of October 27, 1965 last referred to. (pp. 455-456, id.)

As may be readily seen, the thrust of all these four impugned orders is in line with the Court's above-mentioned
resolution of September 8, 1972 modifying the injunction previously issued on August 8, 1967, and, more importantly,
with what We have said the trial court should have always done pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of
the Hodges spouses. In fact, as already stated, that is the arrangement We are ordering, by this decision, to be followed.
Stated differently, since the questioned orders provide for joint action by the two administrators, and that is precisely
what We are holding out to have been done and should be done until the two estates are separated from each other,
the said orders must be affirmed. Accordingly the foregoing assignments of error must be, as they are hereby overruled.

Assignments of error Numbers LXVIII

to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI.

The orders complained of under these assignments of error commonly deal with expenditures made by appellee Magno,
as Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Hodges, in connection with her administration thereof, albeit additionally,
assignments of error Numbers LXIX to LXXI put into question the payment of attorneys fees provided for in the contract
for the purpose, as constituting, in effect, premature advances to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges.

More specifically, assignment Number LXXIII refers to reimbursement of overtime pay paid to six employees of the court
and three other persons for services in copying the court records to enable the lawyers of the ad ministration to be fully
informed of all the incidents in the proceedings. The reimbursement was approved as proper legal expenses of
administration per the order of December 19, 1964, (pp. 221-222, id.) and repeated motions for reconsideration thereof
were denied by the orders of January 9, 1965, (pp. 231-232, id.) October 27, 1965, (p. 277, id.) and February 15, 1966. (pp.
455-456, id.) On the other hand, Assignments Numbers LXVIII to LXXI, LXXIV and LXXV question the trial court's order of
November 3, 1965 approving the agreement of June 6, 1964 between Administratrix Magno and James L. Sullivan,
attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as Parties of the First Part, and Attorneys Raul Manglapus and Rizal R.
Quimpo, as Parties of the Second Part, regarding attorneys fees for said counsel who had agreed "to prosecute and
defend their interests (of the Parties of the First Part) in certain cases now pending litigation in the Court of First Insta nce
of Iloilo —, more specifically in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672 —" (pp. 126-129, id.) and directing Administratrix
Magno "to issue and sign whatever check or checks maybe needed to implement the approval of the agreement
annexed to the motion" as well as the "administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges — to countersign the said check or
checks as the case maybe." (pp. 313-320, id.), reconsideration of which order of approval was denied in the order of
February 16, 1966, (p. 456, id.) Assignment Number LXXVI imputes error to the lower court's order of October 27, 1965,
already referred to above, insofar as it orders that "PCIB should counter sign the check in the amount of P250 in favor of
Administratrix Avelina A. Magno as her compensation as administratrix of Linnie Jane Hodges estate chargeable to the
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges only." (p. 294, id.)

Main contention again of appellant PCIB in regard to these eight assigned errors is that there is no such estate as the
estate of Mrs. Hodges for which the questioned expenditures were made, hence what were authorized were in effect
expenditures from the estate of Hodges. As We have already demonstrated in Our resolution above of the petition
for certiorari and prohibition, this posture is incorrect. Indeed, in whichever way the remaining issues between the parties
in these cases are ultimately resolved, 10
the final result will surely be that there are properties constituting the estate of
Mrs. Hodges of which Magno is the current administratrix. It follows, therefore, that said appellee had the right, as such
administratrix, to hire the persons whom she paid overtime pay and to be paid for her own services as administratrix.
That she has not yet collected and is not collecting amounts as substantial as that paid to or due appellant PCIB is to her
credit.

Of course, she is also entitled to the services of counsel and to that end had the authority to enter into contracts for
attorney's fees in the manner she had done in the agreement of June 6, 1964. And as regards to the reasonableness of
the amount therein stipulated, We see no reason to disturb the discretion exercised by the probate court in determining
the same. We have gone over the agreement, and considering the obvious size of the estate in question and the nature
of the issues between the parties as well as the professional standing of counsel, We cannot say that the fees agreed
upon require the exercise by the Court of its inherent power to reduce it.

PCIB insists, however, that said agreement of June 6, 1964 is not for legal services to the estate but to the heirs of Mrs.
Hodges, or, at most, to both of them, and such being the case, any payment under it, insofar as counsels' services would
redound to the benefit of the heirs, would be in the nature of advances to such heirs and a premature distribution of the
estate. Again, We hold that such posture cannot prevail.

Upon the premise We have found plausible that there is an existing estate of Mrs. Hodges, it results that juridically and
factually the interests involved in her estate are distinct and different from those involved in her estate of Hodges and
vice versa. Insofar as the matters related exclusively to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB, as administrator of the estate of
Hodges, is a complete stranger and it is without personality to question the actuations of the administratrix thereof
regarding matters not affecting the estate of Hodges. Actually, considering the obviously considerable size of the estate
of Mrs. Hodges, We see no possible cause for apprehension that when the two estates are segregated from each other,
the amount of attorney's fees stipulated in the agreement in question will prejudice any portion that would correspond
to Hodges' estate.

And as regards the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges who ought to be the ones who should have a say on the attorney's fees
and other expenses of administration assailed by PCIB, suffice it to say that they appear to have been duly represented in
the agreement itself by their attorney-in-fact, James L. Sullivan and have not otherwise interposed any objection to any
of the expenses incurred by Magno questioned by PCIB in these appeals. As a matter of fact, as ordered by the trial court,
all the expenses in question, including the attorney's fees, may be paid without awaiting the determination and
segregation of the estate of Mrs. Hodges.

Withal, the weightiest consideration in connection with the point under discussion is that at this stage of the controversy
among the parties herein, the vital issue refers to the existence or non-existence of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. In this
respect, the interest of respondent Magno, as the appointed administratrix of the said estate, is to maintain that it exists,
which is naturally common and identical with and inseparable from the interest of the brothers and sisters of Mrs.
Hodges. Thus, it should not be wondered why both Magno and these heirs have seemingly agreed to retain but one
counsel. In fact, such an arrangement should be more convenient and economical to both. The possibility of conflict of
interest between Magno and the heirs of Mrs. Hodges would be, at this stage, quite remote and, in any event, rather
insubstantial. Besides, should any substantial conflict of interest between them arise in the future, the same would be a
matter that the probate court can very well take care of in the course of the independent proceedings in Case No. 1307
after the corresponding segregation of the two subject estates. We cannot perceive any cogent reason why, at this stage,
the estate and the heirs of Mrs. Hodges cannot be represented by a common counsel.

Now, as to whether or not the portion of the fees in question that should correspond to the heirs constitutes premature
partial distribution of the estate of Mrs. Hodges is also a matter in which neither PCIB nor the heirs of Hodges have any
interest. In any event, since, as far as the records show, the estate has no creditors and the corresponding estate and
inheritance taxes, except those of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, have already been paid, 11
no prejudice can
caused to anyone by the comparatively small amount of attorney's fees in question. And in this connection, it may be
added that, although strictly speaking, the attorney's fees of the counsel of an administrator is in the first instance his
personal responsibility, reimbursable later on by the estate, in the final analysis, when, as in the situation on hand, the
attorney-in-fact of the heirs has given his conformity thereto, it would be idle effort to inquire whether or not the
sanction given to said fees by the probate court is proper.

For the foregoing reasons, Assignments of Error LXVIII to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI should be as they are hereby
overruled.

Assignments of error I to IV,

XIII to XV, XXII to XXV, XXXV
to XXX VI, XLI to XLIII and L.

These assignments of error deal with the approval by the trial court of various deeds of sale of real properties registered
in the name of Hodges but executed by appellee Magno, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Hodges, purportedly in
implementation of corresponding supposed written "Contracts to Sell" previously executed by Hodges during the interim
between May 23, 1957, when his wife died, and December 25, 1962, the day he died. As stated on pp. 118-120 of
appellant's main brief, "These are: the, contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee,
Pepito G. Iyulores executed on February 5, 1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and
the appellant Esperidion Partisala, executed on April 20, 1960; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton
Hodges, and the appellee, Winifredo C. Espada, executed on April 18, 1960; the contract to sell between the deceased,
Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Rosario Alingasa, executed on August 25, 1958; the contract to sell between
the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Lorenzo Carles, executed on June 17, 1958; the contract to sell
between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Salvador S. Guzman, executed on September 13, 1960;
the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Florenia Barrido, executed on
February 21, 1958; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Purificacion
Coronado, executed on August 14, 1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the
appellee, Graciano Lucero, executed on November 27, 1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton
Hodges, and the appellee, Ariteo Thomas Jamir, executed on May 26, 1961; the contract to sell between the deceased,
Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Melquiades Batisanan, executed on June 9, 1959; the contract to sell between
the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Belcezar Causing, executed on February 10, 1959 and the
contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Adelfa Premaylon, executed on
October 31, 1959, re Title No. 13815."

Relative to these sales, it is the position of appellant PCIB that, inasmuch as pursuant to the will of Mrs. Hodges, he r
husband was to have dominion over all her estate during his lifetime, it was as absolute owner of the properties
respectively covered by said sales that he executed the aforementioned contracts to sell, and consequently, upon his
death, the implementation of said contracts may be undertaken only by the administrator of his estate and not by the
administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. Basically, the same theory is invoked with particular reference to five other
sales, in which the respective "contracts to sell" in favor of these appellees were executed by Hodges before the death of
his wife, namely, those in favor of appellee Santiago Pacaonsis, Alfredo Catedral, Jose Pablico, Western Institute of
Technology and Adelfa Premaylon.

Anent those deeds of sale based on promises or contracts to sell executed by Hodges after the death of his wife, those
enumerated in the quotation in the immediately preceding paragraph, it is quite obvious that PCIB's contention cannot
be sustained. As already explained earlier, 11* all proceeds of remunerative transfers or dispositions made by Hodges
after the death of his wife should be deemed as continuing to be parts of her estate and, therefore, subject to the terms
of her will in favor of her brothers and sisters, in the sense that should there be no showing that such proceeds, whether
in cash or property have been subsequently conveyed or assigned subsequently by Hodges to any third party by acts
inter vivos with the result that they could not thereby belong to him anymore at the time of his death, they automatically
became part of the inheritance of said brothers and sisters. The deeds here in question involve transactions which are
exactly of this nature. Consequently, the payments made by the appellees should be considered as payments to the
estate of Mrs. Hodges which is to be distributed and partitioned among her heirs specified in the will.

The five deeds of sale predicated on contracts to sell executed Hodges during the lifetime of his wife, present a different
situation. At first blush, it would appear that as to them, PCIB's position has some degree of plausibility. Considering,
however, that the adoption of PCIB's theory would necessarily have tremendous repercussions and would bring about
considerable disturbance of property rights that have somehow accrued already in favor of innocent third parties, the
five purchasers aforenamed, the Court is inclined to take a pragmatic and practical view of the legal situation involving
them by overlooking the possible technicalities in the way, the non-observance of which would not, after all, detract
materially from what should substantially correspond to each and all of the parties concerned.

To start with, these contracts can hardly be ignored. Bona fide third parties are involved; as much as possible, they
should not be made to suffer any prejudice on account of judicial controversies not of their own making. What is more,
the transactions they rely on were submitted by them to the probate court for approval, and from already known and
recorded actuations of said court then, they had reason to believe that it had authority to act on their motions, since
appellee Magno had, from time to time prior to their transactions with her, been allowed to act in her capacity as
administratrix of one of the subject estates either alone or conjointly with PCIB. All the sales in question were executed by
Magno in 1966 already, but before that, the court had previously authorized or otherwise sanctioned expressly many of
her act as administratrix involving expenditures from the estate made by her either conjointly with or independently from
PCIB, as Administrator of the Estate of Hodges. Thus, it may be said that said buyers-appellees merely followed
precedents in previous orders of the court. Accordingly, unless the impugned orders approving those sales indubitably
suffer from some clearly fatal infirmity the Court would rather affirm them.
It is quite apparent from the record that the properties covered by said sales are equivalent only to a fraction of what
should constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges, even if it is assumed that the same would finally be held to be only
one-fourth of the conjugal properties of the spouses as of the time of her death or, to be more exact, one-half of her
estate as per the inventory submitted by Hodges as executor, on May 12, 1958. In none of its numerous, varied and
voluminous pleadings, motions and manifestations has PCIB claimed any possibility otherwise. Such being the case, to
avoid any conflict with the heirs of Hodges, the said properties covered by the questioned deeds of sale executed by
appellee Magno may be treated as among those corresponding to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, which would have been
actually under her control and administration had Hodges complied with his duty to liquidate the conjugal partnership.
Viewing the situation in that manner, the only ones who could stand to be prejudiced by the appealed orders referred to
in the assignment of errors under discussion and who could, therefore, have the requisite interest to question them
would be only the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, definitely not PCIB.

It is of no moment in what capacity Hodges made the "contracts to sell' after the death of his wife. Even if he had acted
as executor of the will of his wife, he did not have to submit those contracts to the court nor follow the provisions of the
rules, (Sections 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 of Rule 89 quoted by appellant on pp. 125 to 127 of its brief) for the simple reason that
by the very orders, much relied upon by appellant for other purposes, of May 27, 1957 and December 14, 1957, Hodges
was "allowed or authorized" by the trial court "to continue the business in which he was engaged and to perform acts
which he had been doing while the deceased was living", (Order of May 27) which according to the motion on which the
court acted was "of buying and selling personal and real properties", and "to execute subsequent s ales, conveyances,
leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes
conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter." (Order of December 14) In other words, if Hodges acted then as
executor, it can be said that he had authority to do so by virtue of these blanket orders, and PCIB does not question the
legality of such grant of authority; on the contrary, it is relying on the terms of the order itself for its main contention in
these cases. On the other hand, if, as PCIB contends, he acted as heir-adjudicatee, the authority given to him by the
aforementioned orders would still suffice.

As can be seen, therefore, it is of no moment whether the "contracts to sell" upon which the deeds in que stion were
based were executed by Hodges before or after the death of his wife. In a word, We hold, for the reasons already stated,
that the properties covered by the deeds being assailed pertain or should be deemed as pertaining to the estate of Mrs.
Hodges; hence, any supposed irregularity attending the actuations of the trial court may be invoked only by her heirs,
not by PCIB, and since the said heirs are not objecting, and the defects pointed out not being strictly jurisdictional in
nature, all things considered, particularly the unnecessary disturbance of rights already created in favor of innocent third
parties, it is best that the impugned orders are not disturbed.

In view of these considerations, We do not find sufficient merit in the assignments of error under discussion.

Assignments of error V to VIII,

XVI to XVIII, XXVI to XXIX, XXXVII
to XXXVIII, XLIV to XLVI and LI.

All these assignments of error commonly deal with alleged non-fulfillment by the respective vendees, appellees herein,
of the terms and conditions embodied in the deeds of sale referred to in the assignments of error just discussed. It is
claimed that some of them never made full payments in accordance with the respective contracts to sell, while in the
cases of the others, like Lorenzo Carles, Jose Pablico, Alfredo Catedral and Salvador S. Guzman, the contracts with them
had already been unilaterally cancelled by PCIB pursuant to automatic rescission clauses contained in them, in view of
the failure of said buyers to pay arrearages long overdue. But PCIB's posture is again premised on its assumption that the
properties covered by the deeds in question could not pertain to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. We have already held above
that, it being evident that a considerable portion of the conjugal properties, much more than the properties covered by
said deeds, would inevitably constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges, to avoid unnecessary legal complications, it can be
assumed that said properties form part of such estate. From this point of view, it is apparent again that the questions,
whether or not it was proper for appellee Magno to have disregarded the cancellations made by PCIB, thereby reviving
the rights of the respective buyers-appellees, and, whether or not the rules governing new dispositions of properties of
the estate were strictly followed, may not be raised by PCIB but only by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges as the persons
designated to inherit the same, or perhaps the government because of the still unpaid inheritance taxes. But, again, since
there is no pretense that any objections were raised by said parties or that they would necessarily be prejudiced, the
contentions of PCIB under the instant assignments of error hardly merit any consideration.

Assignments of error IX to XII, XIX

to XXI, XXX to XXIV, XXXIX to XL,
XLVII to XLIX, LII and LIII to LXI.

PCIB raises under these assignments of error two issues which according to it are fundamental, namely: (1) that in
approving the deeds executed by Magno pursuant to contracts to sell already cancelled by it in the performance of its
functions as administrator of the estate of Hodges, the trial court deprived the said estate of the right to invoke such
cancellations it (PCIB) had made and (2) that in so acting, the court "arrogated unto itself, while acting as a probate court,
the power to determine the contending claims of third parties against the estate of Hodges over real property," since it
has in effect determined whether or not all the terms and conditions of the respective contracts to sell executed by
Hodges in favor of the buyers-appellees concerned were complied with by the latter. What is worse, in the view of PCIB,
is that the court has taken the word of the appellee Magno, "a total stranger to his estate as determinative of the issu e".

Actually, contrary to the stand of PCIB, it is this last point regarding appellee Magno's having agreed to ignore the
cancellations made by PCIB and allowed the buyers-appellees to consummate the sales in their favor that is decisive.
Since We have already held that the properties covered by the contracts in question should be deemed to be portions of
the estate of Mrs. Hodges and not that of Hodges, it is PCIB that is a complete stranger in these incidents. Considering,
therefore, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges and her heirs who are the real parties in interest having the right to oppose the
consummation of the impugned sales are not objecting, and that they are the ones who are precisely urging that said
sales be sanctioned, the assignments of error under discussion have no basis and must accordingly be as they are hereby
overruled.

With particular reference to assignments LIII to LXI, assailing the orders of the trial court requiring PCIB to surrender the
respective owner's duplicate certificates of title over the properties covered by the sales in question and otherwise
directing the Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel said certificates and to issue new transfer certificates of title in favo r of
the buyers-appellees, suffice it to say that in the light of the above discussion, the trial court was within its rights to so
require and direct, PCIB having refused to give way, by withholding said owners' duplicate certificates, of the
corresponding registration of the transfers duly and legally approved by the court.

Assignments of error LXII to LXVII

All these assignments of error commonly deal with the appeal against orders favoring appellee Western Institute of
Technology. As will be recalled, said institute is one of the buyers of real property covered by a contract to sell executed
by Hodges prior to the death of his wife. As of October, 1965, it was in arrears in the total amount of P92,691.00 in the
payment of its installments on account of its purchase, hence it received under date of October 4, 1965 and October 20,
1965, letters of collection, separately and respectively, from PCIB and appellee Magno, in their respective capacities as
administrators of the distinct estates of the Hodges spouses, albeit, while in the case of PCIB it made known that "n o
other arrangement can be accepted except by paying all your past due account", on the other hand, Magno merely said
she would "appreciate very much if you can make some remittance to bring this account up-to-date and to reduce the
amount of the obligation." (See pp. 295-311, Green R. on A.) On November 3, 1965, the Institute filed a motion which,
after alleging that it was ready and willing to pay P20,000 on account of its overdue installments but uncertain whether it
should pay PCIB or Magno, it prayed that it be "allowed to deposit the aforesaid amount with the court pending
resolution of the conflicting claims of the administrators." Acting on this motion, on November 23, 1965, the trial court
issued an order, already quoted in the narration of facts in this opinion, holding that payment to both or either of the two
administrators is "proper and legal", and so "movant — can pay to both estates or either of them", considering that "in
both cases (Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of
properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto."

The arguments under the instant assignments of error revolve around said order. From the procedural standpoint, it is
claimed that PCIB was not served with a copy of the Institute's motion, that said motion was heard, considered and
resolved on November 23, 1965, whereas the date set for its hearing was November 20, 1965, and that what the order
grants is different from what is prayed for in the motion. As to the substantive aspect, it is contended that the matter
treated in the motion is beyond the jurisdiction of the probate court and that the order authorized payment to a person
other than the administrator of the estate of Hodges with whom the Institute had contracted.

The procedural points urged by appellant deserve scant consideration. We must assume, absent any clear proof to the
contrary, that the lower court had acted regularly by seeing to it that appellant was duly notified. On the other hand,
there is nothing irregular in the court's having resolved the motion three days after the date set for hearing the same.
Moreover, the record reveals that appellants' motion for reconsideration wherein it raised the same points was denied by
the trial court on March 7, 1966 (p. 462, Green R. on A.) Withal, We are not convinced that the relief granted is not within
the general intent of the Institute's motion.

Insofar as the substantive issues are concerned, all that need be said at this point is that they are mere r eiterations of
contentions We have already resolved above adversely to appellants' position. Incidentally, We may add, perhaps, to
erase all doubts as to the propriety of not disturbing the lower court's orders sanctioning the sales questioned in all these
appeal s by PCIB, that it is only when one of the parties to a contract to convey property executed by a deceased person
raises substantial objections to its being implemented by the executor or administrator of the decedent's estate that
Section 8 of Rule 89 may not apply and, consequently, the matter has, to be taken up in a separate action outside of the
probate court; but where, as in the cases of the sales herein involved, the interested parties are in agreement that the
conveyance be made, it is properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court to give its sanction thereto pursuant to the
provisions of the rule just mentioned. And with respect to the supposed automatic rescission clauses contained in the
contracts to sell executed by Hodges in favor of herein appellees, the effect of said clauses depend on the true nature of
the said contracts, despite the nomenclature appearing therein, which is not controlling, for if they amount to actual
contracts of sale instead of being mere unilateral accepted "promises to sell", (Art. 1479, Civil Code of the Philippines, 2nd
paragraph) thepactum commissorium or the automatic rescission provision would not operate, as a matter of public
policy, unless there has been a previous notarial or judicial demand by the seller (10 Manresa 263, 2nd ed.) neither of
which have been shown to have been made in connection with the transactions herein involved.

Consequently, We find no merit in the assignments of error

Number LXII to LXVII.

SUMMARY

Considering the fact that this decision is unusually extensive and that the issues herein taken up and resolved are rather
numerous and varied, what with appellant making seventy-eight assignments of error affecting no less than thirty
separate orders of the court a quo, if only to facilitate proper understanding of the import and extent of our rulings
herein contained, it is perhaps desirable that a brief restatement of the whole situation be made together with our
conclusions in regard to its various factual and legal aspects. .

The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles Newton Hodges as well as that of his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges,
who predeceased him by about five years and a half. In their respective wills which were executed on different occasions,
each one of them provided mutually as follows: "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder (after
funeral and administration expenses, taxes and debts) of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located,
to my beloved (spouse) to have and to hold unto (him/her) — during (his/her) natural lifetime", subject to the condition
that upon the death of whoever of them survived the other, the remainder of what he or she would inherit from the
other is "give(n), devise(d) and bequeath(ed)" to the brothers and sisters of the latter.

Mrs. Hodges died first, on May 23, 1957. Four days later, on May 27, Hodges was appointed special administrator of her
estate, and in a separate order of the same date, he was "allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was
engaged, (buying and selling personal and real properties) and to perform acts which he had been doing while the
deceased was living." Subsequently, on December 14, 1957, after Mrs. Hodges' will had been probated and Hodges had
been appointed and had qualified as Executor thereof, upon his motion in which he asserted that he was "not only part
owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges", the trial court ordered that "for the reasons stated in his motion dated December 11, 1957, which the Court
considers well taken, ... all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges executed by the Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said Executor is further
authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and testament of the latter."
Annually thereafter, Hodges submitted to the court the corresponding statements of account of his administration, with
the particularity that in all his motions, he always made it point to urge the that "no person interested in the Philippines
of the time and place of examining the herein accounts be given notice as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee
of the deceased in accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the Honorable Court." All said
accounts approved as prayed for.

Nothing else appears to have been done either by the court a quo or Hodges until December 25, 1962. Importantly to be
the provision in the will of Mrs. Hodges that her share of the conjugal partnership was to be inherited by her husband "to
have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime" and that "at the death of my said husband, I
give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or
located, to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike", which provision naturally made it
imperative that the conjugal partnership be promptly liquidated, in order that the "rest, residue and remainder" of his
wife's share thereof, as of the time of Hodges' own death, may be readily known and identified, no such liquidation was
ever undertaken. The record gives no indication of the reason for such omission, although relatedly, it appears therein:

1. That in his annual statement submitted to the court of the net worth of C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, Hodges repeatedly and consistently reported the combined income of the conjugal partnership and then
merely divided the same equally between himself and the estate of the deceased wife, and, more importantly, he also, as
consistently, filed corresponding separate income tax returns for each calendar year for each resulting half of such
combined income, thus reporting that the estate of Mrs. Hodges had its own income distinct from his own.

2. That when the court a quo happened to inadvertently omit in its order probating the will of Mrs. Hodges, the name of
one of her brothers, Roy Higdon then already deceased, Hodges lost no time in asking for the proper correction "in
order that the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were omitted, and that they were really
interested in the estate of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges".

3. That in his aforementioned motion of December 11, 1957, he expressly stated that "deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died
leaving no descendants or ascendants except brothers and sisters and herein petitioner as the surviving spouse, to
inherit the properties of the decedent", thereby indicating that he was not excluding his wife's brothers and sisters from
the inheritance.

4. That Hodges allegedly made statements and manifestations to the United States inheritance tax authorities indicating
that he had renounced his inheritance from his wife in favor of her other heirs, which attitude he is supposed to have
reiterated or ratified in an alleged affidavit subscribed and sworn to here in the Philippines and in which he even
purportedly stated that his reason for so disclaiming and renouncing his rights under his wife's will was to "absolve (him)
or (his) estate from any liability for the payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges", his wife, since her death.

On said date, December 25, 1962, Hodges died. The very next day, upon motion of herein respondent and appellee,
Avelina A. Magno, she was appointed by the trial court as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in
Special Proceedings No. 1307 and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, "in the latter case,
because the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the real and personal
properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless Special Administratrix is appoin ted," (Order of
December 26, 1962, p. 27, Yellow R. on A.) although, soon enough, on December 29, 1962, a certain Harold K. Davies was
appointed as her Co-Special Administrator, and when Special Proceedings No. 1672, Testate Estate of Charles Newton
Hodges, was opened, Joe Hodges, as next of kin of the deceased, was in due time appointed as Co-Administrator of said
estate together with Atty. Fernando P. Mirasol, to replace Magno and Davies, only to be in turn replaced eventually by
petitioner PCIB alone.

At the outset, the two probate proceedings appear to have been proceeding jointly, with each administrator acting
together with the other, under a sort of modus operandi. PCIB used to secure at the beginning the conformity to and
signature of Magno in transactions it wanted to enter into and submitted the same to the court for approval as their joint
acts. So did Magno do likewise. Somehow, however, differences seem to have arisen, for which reason, each of them
began acting later on separately and independently of each other, with apparent sanction of the trial court. Thus, PCIB
had its own lawyers whom it contracted and paid handsomely, conducted the business of the estate independently of
Magno and otherwise acted as if all the properties appearing in the name of Charles Newton Hodges belonged solely
and only to his estate, to the exclusion of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, without considering whether or not in
fact any of said properties corresponded to the portion of the conjugal partnership pertaining to the estate of Mrs.
Hodges. On the other hand, Magno made her own expenditures, hired her own lawyers, on the premise that there is
such an estate of Mrs. Hodges, and dealth with some of the properties, appearing in the name of Hodges, on the
assumption that they actually correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. All of these independent and separate actuations
of the two administrators were invariably approved by the trial court upon submission. Eventually, the differences
reached a point wherein Magno, who was more cognizant than anyone else about the ins and outs of the businesses and
properties of the deceased spouses because of her long and intimate association with them, made it difficult for PCIB to
perform normally its functions as administrator separately from her. Thus, legal complications arose and the present
judicial controversies came about.

Predicating its position on the tenor of the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 as well as the approval by the
court a quo of the annual statements of account of Hodges, PCIB holds to the view that the estate of Mrs. Hodges has
already been in effect closed with the virtual adjudication in the mentioned orders of her whole estate to Hodges, and
that, therefore, Magno had already ceased since then to have any estate to administer and the brothers and sisters of
Mrs. Hodges have no interests whatsoever in the estate left by Hodges. Mainly upon such theory, PCIB has come to this
Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the lower court's orders allowing respondent Magno to
continue acting as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges in Special Proceedings 1307 in the manner she has been
doing, as detailed earlier above, be set aside. Additionally, PCIB maintains that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will
instituting her brothers and sisters in the manner therein specified is in the nature of a testamentary substitution, but
inasmuch as the purported substitution is not, in its view, in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, it
is ineffective and may not be enforced. It is further contended that, in any event, inasmuch as the Hodges spouses were
both residents of the Philippines, following the decision of this Court in Aznar vs. Garcia, or the case of Christense n, 7
SCRA 95, the estate left by Mrs. Hodges could not be more than one-half of her share of the conjugal partnership,
notwithstanding the fact that she was citizen of Texas, U.S.A., in accordance with Article 16 in relation to Articles 900 and
872 of the Civil Code. Initially, We issued a preliminary injunction against Magno and allowed PCIB to act alone.
At the same time PCIB has appealed several separate orders of the trial court approving individual acts of appellee
Magno in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, such as, hiring of lawyers for specified fees and
incurring expenses of administration for different purposes and executing deeds of sale in favor of her co -appellees
covering properties which are still registered in the name of Hodges, purportedly pursuant to corresponding "contracts
to sell" executed by Hodges. The said orders are being questioned on jurisdictional and procedural grounds directly or
indirectly predicated on the principal theory of appellant that all the properties of the two estates belong already to the
estate of Hodges exclusively.

On the other hand, respondent-appellee Magno denies that the trial court's orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957
were meant to be finally adjudicatory of the hereditary rights of Hodges and contends that they were no more than the
court's general sanction of past and future acts of Hodges as executor of the will of his wife in due course of
administration. As to the point regarding substitution, her position is that what was given by Mrs. Hodges to her husband
under the provision in question was a lifetime usufruct of her share of the conjugal partnership, with the naked
ownership passing directly to her brothers and sisters. Anent the application of Article 16 of the Civil Code , she claims
that the applicable law to the will of Mrs. Hodges is that of Texas under which, she alleges, there is no system of legitime,
hence, the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than her share or one-half of the conjugal partnership properties. She
further maintains that, in any event, Hodges had as a matter of fact and of law renounced his inheritance from his wife
and, therefore, her whole estate passed directly to her brothers and sisters effective at the latest upon the death of
Hodges.

In this decision, for the reasons discussed above, and upon the issues just summarized, We overrule PCIB's contention
that the orders of May 27, 1957 and December 14, 1957 amount to an adjudication to Hodges of the estate of his wife,
and We recognize the present existence of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, as consisting of properties, which, while registered
in that name of Hodges, do actually correspond to the remainder of the share of Mrs. Hodges in the conjugal
partnership, it appearing that pursuant to the pertinent provisions of her will, any portion of said share still existing and
undisposed of by her husband at the time of his death should go to her brothers and sisters share and share alike.
Factually, We find that the proven circumstances relevant to the said orders do not warrant the conclusion that the court
intended to make thereby such alleged final adjudication. Legally, We hold that the tenor of said orders furnish no basis
for such a conclusion, and what is more, at the time said orders were issued, the proceedings had not yet reached the
point when a final distribution and adjudication could be made. Moreover, the interested parties were not duly notified
that such disposition of the estate would be done. At best, therefore, said orders merely allowed H odges to dispose of
portions of his inheritance in advance of final adjudication, which is implicitly permitted under Section 2 of Rule 109, there
being no possible prejudice to third parties, inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges had no creditors and all pertinent taxes have been
paid.

More specifically, We hold that, on the basis of circumstances presently extant in the record, and on the assumption that
Hodges' purported renunciation should not be upheld, the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters
consists of one-fourth of the community estate of the spouses at the time of her death, minus whatever Hodges had
gratuitously disposed of therefrom during the period from, May 23, 1957, when she died, to December 25, 1962, when he
died provided, that with regard to remunerative dispositions made by him during the same period, the proceeds thereof,
whether in cash or property, should be deemed as continuing to be part of his wife's estate, unless it can be shown that
he had subsequently disposed of them gratuitously.
At this juncture, it may be reiterated that the question of what are the pertinent laws of Texas and what would be the
estate of Mrs. Hodges under them is basically one of fact, and considering the respective positions of the parties in
regard to said factual issue, it can already be deemed as settled for the purposes of these cases that, indeed, the free
portion of said estate that could possibly descend to her brothers and sisters by virtue of her will may not be less than
one-fourth of the conjugal estate, it appearing that the difference in the stands of the parties has reference solely to the
legitime of Hodges, PCIB being of the view that under the laws of Texas, there is such a legitime of one -fourth of said
conjugal estate and Magno contending, on the other hand, that there is none. In other words, hereafter, whatever might
ultimately appear, at the subsequent proceedings, to be actually the laws of Texas on the matter would no longer be of
any consequence, since PCIB would anyway be in estoppel already to claim that the estate of Mrs. Hodges should be less
than as contended by it now, for admissions by a party related to the effects of foreign laws, which have to be proven in
our courts like any other controverted fact, create estoppel.

In the process, We overrule PCIB's contention that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will in favor of her brothers and sisters
constitutes ineffective hereditary substitutions. But neither are We sustaining, on the other hand, Magno's pose that it
gave Hodges only a lifetime usufruct. We hold that by said provision, Mrs. Hodges simultaneously instituted her brothers
and sisters as co-heirs with her husband, with the condition, however, that the latter would have complete rights of
dominion over the whole estate during his lifetime and what would go to the former would be only the remainder
thereof at the time of Hodges' death. In other words, whereas they are not to inherit only in case of default of Hodges,
on the other hand, Hodges was not obliged to preserve anything for them. Clearly then, the essential elements of
testamentary substitution are absent; the provision in question is a simple case of conditional simultaneous institution of
heirs, whereby the institution of Hodges is subject to a partial resolutory condition the operative contingency of which is
coincidental with that of the suspensive condition of the institution of his brothers and sisters-in-law, which manner of
institution is not prohibited by law.

We also hold, however, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters could be more than just
stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon the proper application of the principle of renvoi in relation to Article
16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended by Magno,
and (2) whether or not it can be held that Hodges had legally and effectively renounced his inheritance from his wife.
Under the circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of the record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a
position to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issues, and We, therefore, reserve said
issues for further proceedings and resolution in the first instance by the court a quo, as hereinabove indicated. We
reiterate, however, that pending such further proceedings, as matters stand at this stage, Our considered opinion is that
it is beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband could not have anyway l egally
adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole share of their conjugal partnership, albeit he could have
disposed any part thereof during his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the uncontested
administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus
what, as explained earlier, have been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third persons since then,
for even if it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Code and applying renvoi the laws of
the Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would be her free disposable portion, taking
into account already the legitime of her husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code.
The foregoing considerations leave the Court with no alternative than to conclude that in predicating its orders on the
assumption, albeit unexpressed therein, that there is an estate of Mrs. Hodges to be distributed among her brothers and
sisters and that respondent Magno is the legal administratrix thereof, the trial court acted correctly and within its
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari and prohibition has to be denied. The Court feels however, that
pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership and the determination of the specific properties constituting her
estate, the two administrators should act conjointly as ordered in the Court's resolution of September 8, 1972 and as
further clarified in the dispositive portion of its decision.

Anent the appeals from the orders of the lower court sanctioning payment by appellee Magno, as administratrix, of
expenses of administration and attorney's fees, it is obvious that, with Our holding that there is such an estate of Mrs.
Hodges, and for the reasons stated in the body of this opinion, the said orders should be affirmed. This We do on the
assumption We find justified by the evidence of record, and seemingly agreed to by appellant PCIB, that the size and
value of the properties that should correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges far exceed the total of the attorney's fees
and administration expenses in question.

With respect to the appeals from the orders approving transactions made by appellee Magno, as administratrix, covering
properties registered in the name of Hodges, the details of which are related earlier above, a distinction must be made
between those predicated on contracts to sell executed by Hodges before the death of his wife, on the one hand, and
those premised on contracts to sell entered into by him after her death. As regards the latter, We hold that inasmuch as
the payments made by appellees constitute proceeds of sales of properties belonging to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, as
may be implied from the tenor of the motions of May 27 and December 14, 1957, said payments continue to pertain to
said estate, pursuant to her intent obviously reflected in the relevant provisions of her will, on the assumption that the
size and value of the properties to correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges would exceed the total value of all the
properties covered by the impugned deeds of sale, for which reason, said properties may be deemed as pertaining to
the estate of Mrs. Hodges. And there being no showing that thus viewing the situation, there would be prejudice to
anyone, including the government, the Court also holds that, disregarding procedural technicalities in favor of a
pragmatic and practical approach as discussed above, the assailed orders should be affirmed. Being a stranger to the
estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB has no personality to raise the procedural and jurisdictional issues raised by it. And inasmuch
as it does not appear that any of the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges or the government ha s objected to any of the orders
under appeal, even as to these parties, there exists no reason for said orders to be set aside.

DISPOSITIVE PART

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition in G. R. Nos.
L-27860 and L-27896, and AFFIRMING, in G. R. Nos. L-27936-37 and the other thirty-one numbers hereunder ordered to
be added after payment of the corresponding docket fees, all the orders of the trial court under appeal enumerated in
detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this decision; the existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, with
respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix thereof is recognized, and it is declared that, until final
judgment is ultimately rendered regarding (1) the manner of applying Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines to the
situation obtaining in these cases and (2) the factual and legal issue of whether or not Charles Newton Hodges had
effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under the will of Linnie Jane Hodges, the said estate consists of
one-fourth of the community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the wife on May 23, 1957,
minus whatever the husband had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until his death,
provided, first, that with respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue to be part of the wife's
estate, unless subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third parties by the husband, and second, that should the
purported renunciation be declared legally effective, no deductions whatsoever are to be made from said estate; in
consequence, the preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967, as amended on October 4 and December 6, 1967, is lifted,
and the resolution of September 8, 1972, directing that petitioner-appellant PCIB, as Administrator of the Testate Estate
of Charles Newton Hodges, in Special Proceedings 1672, and respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix
of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings 1307, should act thenceforth always conjointly, never
independently from each other, as such administrators, is reiterated, and the same is made part of this judgment and
shall continue in force, pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses and the
determination and segregation from each other of their respective estates, provided, that upon the finality of this
judgment, the trial court should immediately proceed to the partition of the presently combined estates of the spouses,
to the end that the one-half share thereof of Mrs. Hodges may be properly and clearly identified; thereafter, the trial
court should forthwith segregate the remainder of the one-fourth herein adjudged to be her estate and cause the same
to be turned over or delivered to respondent for her exclusive administration in Special Proceedings 1307, while the
other one-fourth shall remain under the joint administration of said respondent and petitioner under a joint proceedings
in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, whereas the half unquestionably pertaining to Hodges shall be administered by
petitioner exclusively in Special Proceedings 1672, without prejudice to the resolution by the trial court of the pending
motions for its removal as administrator12; and this arrangement shall be maintained until the final resolution of the two
issues of renvoi and renunciation hereby reserved for further hearing and determination, and the corresponding
complete segregation and partition of the two estates in the proportions that may result from the said resolution.

Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo are directed to adhere henceforth, in all their
actuations in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to the views passed and ruled upon by the Court in the foregoing
opinion.

Appellant PCIB is ordered to pay, within five (5) days from notice hereof, thirty-one additional appeal docket fees, but
this decision shall nevertheless become final as to each of the parties herein after fifteen (15) days from the respective
notices to them hereof in accordance with the rules.

Costs against petitioner-appellant PCIB.

G.R. No. 177809 October 16, 2009

 SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP, Petitioners,
vs.
ROSALIE PALAÑA CHUA, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300:1(1)
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 274, Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 04-0052;2 and (2)
reinstating and affirming in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 78, of the same city in Civil
Case No. 2001-315.3

First, we sift through the varying facts found by the different lower courts.

The facts parleyed by the MeTC show that respondent Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane Building, a
commercial building, located at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Parañaque City.

On July 6, 2001, Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against petitioners, Spouses Omar and
Moshiera Latip (Spouses Latip). Rosalie attached to the complaint a contract of lease over two cubicles in Roferxane Bldg.,
signed by Rosalie, as lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as lessees thereof.1 a vv p h ! 1

The contract of lease reads:

CONTRACT OF LEASE

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

This Contract of Lease is entered into by and between:

ROSALIE PALAÑA CHUA, Filipino, of legal age, married with office at 2/F JOFERXAN Building, F.B.
Harrison St., Brgy. Baclaran, Parañaque City, and hereinafter referred to as the LESSOR,

- and -

OMAR LATIEF marriage to MOSHIERA LATIEF, also both Filipino, of legal age with address at 24 Anahan
St. RGV Homes Parañaque City, and hereinafter referred to as the LESSEES.

WITNESSETH

1. That the LESSOR is the owner of the commercial building erected at the lot of the Toribio G. Reyes
Realty, Inc. situated at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran in Parañaque Ctiy;

2. That LESSOR hereby leases two (2) cubicles located at the 1st & 2nd Floor, of said building with an
area of 56 square meters under the following terms and conditions, to wit:
 a. That the monthly rental of the two (2) cubicles in PESOS, SIXTY THOUSAND (₱60,000.00), Philippine
Currency. However, due to unstable power of the peso LESSEES agrees to a yearly increase of ten (10%)
percent of the monthly rental;

b. That any rental in-arrears shall be paid before the expiration of the contract to the LESSOR;

c. That LESSEES agree to pay their own water and electric consumptions in the said premises;

d. That the LESSEES shall not sub-let or make any alteration in the cubicles without a written permission
from the LESSOR. Provided, however, that at the termination of the Contract, the lessee shall return the
two cubicles in its original conditions at their expenses;

e. That the LESSEES agree to keep the cubicles in a safe and sanitary conditions, and shall not keep any
kinds of flammable or combustible materials.

f. That in case the LESSEES fail to pay the monthly rental every time it falls due or violate any of the
above conditions shall be enough ground to terminate this Contract of Lease. Provided, further, that, if
the LESSEES pre-terminate this Contract they shall pay the rentals for the unused month or period by
way of liquidated damages in favor of the LESSOR.

3. That this Contract of Lease is for six (6) yrs. only starting from December _____, 1999 or up to
December ______, 2005.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed their hands this ___th day of December, 1999
at City of Manila, Philippines.

(sgd.) (sgd.)
ROSALIE PALAÑA-CHUA MOSHIERA LATIEF
LESSOR LESSEE

(sgd.)
OMAR LATIEF
LESSEE

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

(sgd.) (sgd.)
1. Daisy C. Ramos 2. Ferdinand C. Chua

Republic of the Philippines)

City of Manila)s.s.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City of Manila personally appeared the following persons:

Rosalie P. Chua with CTC No. 05769706 at Parañaque City on 2/1/99; Moshiera Latief with CTC No.
12885654 at Parañaque City on 11/11/99; Omar Latief with CTC No. 12885653 Parañaque City on Nov. 11,
1999.

known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed this instrument consisting of two
(2) pages duly signed by them and the two (2) instrumental witnesses and acknowledged to me that the
same is their free and voluntarily acts and deeds.

IN FAITH AND TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my hand and Notarial Seal this ____th day
of December, 1999 at the City of Manila, Philippines.

ATTY. CALIXTRO B. RAMOS

Doc. No. _____
NOTARY PUBLIC
Page No. _____
Until December 31, 2000
Book No. LXV
PTR # 374145-1/11/99/-Mla.
Series of 1999
IBP # 00262-Life Member4

A year after the commencement of the lease and with Spouses Latip already occupying the leased
cubicles, Rosalie, through counsel, sent the spouses a letter demanding payment of back rentals and
should they fail to do so, to vacate the leased cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not heed Rosalie’s
demand, she instituted the aforesaid complaint.

In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted Rosalie’s claims. They averred that the lease of the two (2)
cubicles had already been paid in full as evidenced by receipts showing payment to Rosalie of the total
amount of ₱2,570,000.00. The three (3) receipts, in Rosalie’s handwriting, read:

1. I received the amount of ₱2,000,000.00 (two million pesos) from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for
the payment of 2 cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[arañ ]aque
City. ROFERLAND5 Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs. Contract.

(sgd.)
____________________
Rosalie Chua
₱2,000,000.00
CHECK # 3767924
FAR EAST BANK
(sgd.)
____________________
Ferdinand Chua
 2. Received cash
₱500,000.00
From Moshiera Latip

(sgd.)
Rosalie Chua
12/10/99
____________________
Received by

3. Received cash
₱70,000.00 from
Moshiera Latip

(sgd.)
12-11-99 ____________________
Received by:6

Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over two (2) cubicles in
Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale of goods during the Christmas season, they readily accepted Rosalie’s offer
to purchase lease rights in Roferxane Bldg., which was still under construction at the time. According to Spouses Latip,
the immediate payment of ₱2,570,000.00 would be used to finish construction of the building giving them first priority in
the occupation of the finished cubicles.

Thereafter, in December 1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles were finished, Spouses Latip occupied them without waiting for
the completion of five (5) other stalls. Spouses Latip averred that the contract of lease they signed had been novated by
their purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they were surprised to receive a demand letter from Rosalie ’s
counsel and the subsequent filing of a complaint against them.

The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie, viz.:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [Spouses Latip] and all persons claiming rights under them are hereby ordered to
VACATE the property subject of this case located at the 1st and 2nd floors of a Roferxane Building situated at No. 158
Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Parañaque City. The [Spouses Latip] are also ordered to
PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱720,000.00) as rent arrearages for the
period of December 1999 to December 2000 and thereafter to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND
PESOS (₱72,000.00) per month from January 2001 to December 2002, plus ten percent (10%) increase for each and every
succeeding years thereafter as stipulated in paragraph 2(a) of the Contract of Lease x x x, until the [Spouses Latip] have
completely vacated the leased premises subject of this lease. Finally[,] the [Spouses Latip] are hereby ordered to PAY
[Rosalie] the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00) as attorney’s fees and TWO THOUSAND PESOS (₱
2,000.00) per [Rosalie’s] appearance in Court as appearance fee and to PAY the cost of this suit.
[Spouses Latip’s] counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.7

In stark contrast, the RTC reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Latip. The RTC did not give credence to the
contract of lease, ruling that it was not notarized and, in all other substantial aspects, incomplete. Further on this point,
the RTC noted that the contract of lease lacked: (1) the signature of Ferdinand Chua, Rosalie’s husband; (2) the signatures
of Spouses Latip on the first page thereof; (3) the specific dates for the term of the contract which only stated that the
lease is for "six (6) y[ea]rs only starting from December 1999 or up to December 2005"; (4) the exact date of execution of
the document, albeit the month of December and year 1999 are indicated therein; and (5) the provision for payment of
deposit or advance rental which is supposedly uncommon in big commercial lease contracts.

The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip that the contract of lease was modified and supplemented; and t he entire
lease rentals for the two (2) cubicles for six (6) years had already been paid by Spouses Latip in the amount of ₱
2,570,000.00. As to Rosalie’s claim that her receipt of ₱2,570,000.00 was simply goodwill payment by prospective lessees
to their lessor, and not payment for the purchase of lease rights, the RTC shot this down and pointed out that, apart from
her bare allegations, Rosalie did not adduce evidence to substantiate this claim. On the whole, the RTC declared an
existent lease between the parties for a period of six (6) years, and already fully paid for by Spouses Latip. Thus, Spouses
Latip could not be ejected from the leased premises until expiration of the lease period.

The RTC disposed of the appeal, viz.:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the appealed decision of the [MeTC] dated January 13, 2004 is reversed as
judgment is hereby rendered for the [Spouses Latip] and against [Rosalie], ordering the latter to pay the former –

(1) the sum of PhP1,000,000.00 as moral damages;

(2) the sum of PhP500,000.00 as exemplary damages;

(3) the sum of PhP250,000.00 plus PhP3,000.00 per court appearance as and for attorney’s fees; and

(4) costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.8

In yet another turn of events, the CA, as previously mentioned, reversed the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MeTC.
The CA ruled that the contract of lease, albeit lacking the signature of Ferdinand and not notarized, remained a complete
and valid contract. As the MeTC had, the CA likewise found that the alleged defects in the contract of lease did not
render the contract ineffective. On the issue of whether the amount of ₱2,570,000.00 merely constituted payment of
goodwill money, the CA took judicial notice of this common practice in the area of Baclaran, especially around the
Redemptorist Church. According to the appellate court, this judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration
of the stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid goodwill money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls
thereat. Thus, ruling on Rosalie’s appeal, the CA disposed of the case:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of RTC
Parañaque City Branch 274 dated September 24, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the January 13, 2004
decision of the MeTC is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED en toto.

SO ORDERED.9

Not surprisingly, Spouses Latip filed the present appeal.

The singular issue for our resolution is whether Spouses Latip should be ejected from the leased cubicles.

As previously adverted to, the CA, in ruling for Rosalie and upholding the ejectment of Spouses Latip, took judicial notice
of the alleged practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to the lessor.

We disagree.

Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary
on the courts, thus:

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of
the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the
law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. – A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge,
or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.

On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro 10 is instructive:

I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to
be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt
on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and
general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known
to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to
be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public
records and facts of general notoriety.

To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be
dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is
so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of
the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact,
not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are
"commonly" known.

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by
mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and
which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such
universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge
of every person.11

We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in the recent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,12 which cited State Prosecutors:

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and
general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known
to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to
be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public
records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable
dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate
and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by
mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and
which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are such of
universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the com mon knowledge
of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been
judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in
part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.1avvphi1

From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is apparent that the matter which the appellate court
took judicial notice of does not meet the requisite of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this
supposed practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the
former even ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was of "common knowledge" or notoriously known.

We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation, adduced no evidence to prove her
claim that the amount of ₱2,570,000.00 simply constituted the payment of goodwill money. Subsequently, Rosalie
attached an annex to her petition for review before the CA, containing a joint declaration under oath by other
stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid goodwill money to Rosalie as their lessor. On this score, we emphasize
that the reason why our rules on evidence provide for matters that need not be proved under Rule 129, specifically on
judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking of the usual form of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known , it
will not be disputed by the parties.
However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the
Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalie’s appeal before the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by
Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court – What need not be proved.

Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill money in the Baclaran
area. As was held in State Prosecutors, justices and judges alike ought to be reminded that the power to take judicial
notice must be exercised with caution and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be ample reason for the claim
of judicial notice to be promptly resolved in the negative.

Ultimately, on the issue of whether Spouses Latip ought to be ejected from the leased cubicles, what remains in evidence
is the documentary evidence signed by both parties – the contract of lease and the receipts evidencing payment of ₱
2,570,000.00.

We need not be unduly detained by the issue of which documents were executed first or if there was a novation of the
contract of lease. As had been found by the RTC, the lease contract and the receipts for the amount of ₱2,570,000.00
can be reconciled or harmonized. The RTC declared:

Definitely, the parties entered into a lease agreement over two (2) cubicles of the 1st and 2nd floors of Roferxane
(Roferland) Building, a commercial building located at 158 Quirino Avenue, corner Redemptorist Road, Baclaran,
Parañaque City and belonging to [Rosalie]. The lease agreement is for a term of six (6) years commencing in December
1999 up to December 2005. This agreement was embodied in a Contract of Lease x x x. The terms of this le ase contract,
however, are modified or supplemented by another agreement between the parties executed and or entered into in or
about the time of execution of the lease contract, which exact date of execution of the latter is unclear. 13

We agree with the RTC’s holding only up to that point. There exists a lease agreement between the parties as set forth in
the contract of lease which is a complete document. It need not be signed by Ferdinand Chua as he likewise did not sign
the other two receipts for ₱500,000.00 and ₱70,000.00, respectively, which contained only the signature of Rosalie.
Besides, it is undisputed that Rosalie owns and leases the stalls in Roferxane Bldg.; thus, doing away with the need for her
husband’s consent. The findings of the three lower courts concur on this fact.

The contract of lease has a period of six (6) years commencing in December 1999. This fact is again buttressed by
Spouses Latip’s admission that they occupied the property forthwith in December 1999, bearing in mind the brisk sales
during the holiday season.

On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the receipts amounting to ₱2,570,000.00, we hold that the
practice of payment of goodwill money in the Baclaran area is an inadequate subject of judicial notice. Neither was
Rosalie able to provide sufficient evidence that, apart from the belatedly submitted Joint Affidavit of the stallholders of
Roferxane Bldg., the said amount was simply for the payment of goodwill money, and not payment for advance rentals
by Spouses Latip.

In interpreting the evidence before us, we are guided by the Civil Code provisions on interpretation of contracts, to wit:
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be
principally considered.

Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are
distinct and cases that are different from those which the parties intended to agree.

Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that
import which is most adequate to render it effectual.

The RTC was already on the right track when it declared that the receipts for ₱2,570,000.00 modified or supplemented
the contract of lease. However, it made a quantum leap when it ruled that the amount was payment for rentals of the
two (2) cubicles for the entire six-year period. We cannot subscribe to this finding. To obviate confusion and for clarity,
the contents of the receipts, already set forth above, are again reproduced:

1. I received the amount of ₱2,000,000.00 (two million pesos) from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for the payment of 2
cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[arañ]que City. ROFERLAND Bldg. with the
terms 6 yrs. Contract.

(sgd.)
____________________
Rosalie Chua
₱2,000,000.00
CHECK # 3767924
FAR EAST BANK
(sgd.)
____________________
Ferdinand Chua

2. Received cash
₱500,000.00
From Moshiera Latip

(sgd.)
Rosalie Chua
12/10/99
____________________
Received by

3. Received cash
₱70,000.00 from
Moshiera Latip

12-11-99 (sgd.)
 ____________________
Received by:14

There is nothing on the receipts and on record that the payment and receipt of ₱2,570,000.00 referred to full payment
of rentals for the whole period of the lease. All three receipts state Rosalie’s receipt of cash in varying amounts. The first
receipt for ₱2,000,000.00 did state payment for two (2) cubicles, but this cannot mean full payment of rentals for the
entire lease period when there are no words to that effect. Further, two receipts were subsequently executed pointing to
the obvious fact that the ₱2,000,000.00 is not for full payment of rentals. Thus, since the contract of lease remained
operative, we find that Rosalie’s receipt of the monies should be considered as advanced rentals on the leased cubicles.
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Rosalie demanded payment of the lease rentals only in 2000, a full year after
the commencement of the lease.

Finally, we note that the lease ended in 2005. Consequently, Spouses Latip can be ejected from the leased premises.
They are liable to Rosalie for unpaid rentals on the lease of the two (2) cubicles in accordance with the stipulations on
rentals in the Contract of Lease. However, the amount of ₱2,570,000.00, covering advance rentals, must be deducted
from this liability of Spouses Latip to Rosalie.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 89300 is REVERSED. The petitioners, spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip, are liable to respondent Rosalie Chua for
unpaid rentals minus the amount of ₱2,570,000.00 already received by her as advance rentals. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 156686 July 27, 2011

NEW SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY, Barangay Sun Valley, Parañaque City, Roberto Guevarra IN HIS CAPACITY AS Punong
Barangay and MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court against the Decision 1 dated October 16, 2002
in CA-G.R. CV No. 65559 and the Resolution 2 dated January 17, 2003, both of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are as follows:

The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley (the "BSV Sangguniang Barangay") issued BSV Resolution No.
98-0963 on October 13, 1998, entitled "Directing the New Sun Valley Homeowners Association to Open Rosemallow and
Aster Streets to Vehicular and Pedestrian Traffic," the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved as it is hereby resolved by the Sangguniang Barangay in session assembled that –

1. Pursuant to its power and authority under the Local Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act No. 7160), the New Sun Valley
Homeowners Association (NSVHA) is hereby directed to open Rosemallow and Aster Sts. to vehicular (private cars only)
and pedestrian traffic at all hours daily except from 11 p.m. to 5 a.m. at which time the said streets may be closed for the
sake of the security of the residents therein.

2. The Barangay government take steps to address the security concerns of the residents of the area concerned,
including the possible assignment of a barangay tanod or traffic enforcer therein, within the limits of the authority and
financial capability of the Barangay.

3. This Resolution shall become executory within 72 hours upon receipt hereof by the Association or any of its members. 4

The New Sun Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. (NSVHAI), represented by its President, Marita Cortez, filed a
Petition5 for a "Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Permanent Injunction with prayer for issuance of TRO" with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0420. NSVHAI claimed therein that the
implementation of BSV Resolution No. 98-096 would "cause grave injustice and irreparable injury" as "[the] affected
homeowners acquired their properties for strictly residential purposes"; 6 that the subdivision is a place that the
homeowners envisioned would provide them privacy and "a peaceful neighborhood, free from the hassles of public
places";7 and that the passage of the Resolution would destroy the character of the subdivision. NSVHAI averred that
contrary to what was stated in the BSV Resolution, the opening of the gates of the subdivision would not in any manner
ease the traffic congestion in the area, and that there were alternative routes available. According to NSVHAI, the
opening of the proposed route to all kinds of vehicles would result in contributing to the traffic build -up on Doña
Soledad Avenue, and that instead of easing the traffic flow, it would generate a heavier volume of vehicles in an already
congested choke point. NSVHAI went on to state that a deterioration of the peace and order condition inside the
subdivision would be inevitable; that the maintenance of peace and order in the residential area was one of the reasons
why entry and exit to the subdivision was regulated by the Association and why the passing through of vehicles was
controlled and limited; and that criminal elements would take advantage of the opening to public use of the roads in
question.8

NSVHAI further contested the BSV Resolution by submitting the following arguments to the RTC:

12. The road network inside the subdivision and drainage system is not designed to withstand the entry of a heavy
volume of vehicles especially delivery vans and trucks. Thus, destruction of the roads and drainage system will result. The
safety, health and well-being of the residents will face continuous danger to their detriment and prejudice;

13. When the residents bought their residential properties, they also paid proportionately for the roads and the park in
then subdivision. They have therefore an existing equity on these roads. To open the roads to public use is a violation of
the rights and interests to a secure, peaceful and healthful environment;

14. Aside from the availability of a better route to be opened, there are other ways to ease traffic flow. The continuous
presence of traffic enforcers on all identified traffic choke points will prevent snarls which impede smooth travel. The
strict enforcement of traffic rules and regulations should be done;
15. There are a lot of undisciplined drivers of tricycles, jeepneys, trucks and delivery [vans], which contribute to the traffic
congestion. The barangay should require these drivers to observe road courtesy and obedience to traffic rules[.] 9

Executive Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort of the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order 10 (TRO) in Civil Case No.
98-0420 on October 30, 1998. Said Order provides:

Acting on the Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction/ Permanent Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order, filed by plaintiff and considering that there is extreme urgency, such that unless the same
is issued, plaintiff would suffer grave injustice and/or irreparable injury, let a Temporary Restraining Order issue directin g
the Sangguniang Barangay as represented by Punong Barangay Roberto Guevarra to cease an d desist from the
implementation of Resolution No. 98-096 or otherwise maintain the status quo until further Orders of this Court.

This Temporary Restraining Order shall be effective for seventy two (72) hours from issuance hereof, unless extended by
another Order of this Court.

Let this case be set for special raffle and conference on November 3, 1998 at 10:30 in the morning.

On November 3, 1998, the RTC issued another Order 11 stating that, by agreement of the parties, the status quo shall be
maintained for seventeen (17) more days, and that the case was set for hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction on November 20, 1998 at 8:30 a.m.

NSVHAI submitted an Amended Petition 12 on November 13, 1998, at about 11:10 a.m., wherein it claimed that the BSV
Sangguniang Barangay had no jurisdiction over the opening of Rosemallow and Aster Streets (the "subject roads").
NSVHAI likewise attached to its Amended Petition its Position Paper 13 dated July 21, 1998, which set forth its objection to
the opening of the subject roads for public use and argued that a Barangay Resolution cannot validly cause the opening
of the subject roads because under the law, an ordinance is required to effect such an act. 14

The BSV Sangguniang Barangay filed its Motion to Dismiss 15 likewise on November 13, 1998. The copy provided by
petitioner to the Court indicates the time of receipt by NSVHAI as 11:00 a.m. 16

The RTC heard the case on November 20, 1998, as scheduled, and thereafter submitted the matter for decision. 17On the
same date, the RTC issued the following Order 18:

Acting on the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioner, it appearing that petitioner
may suffer grave injustice or irreparable injury, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue prohibiting the Sangguniang
Barangay represented by Punong Barangay Roberto Guevarra from implementing Resolution no. 98 -096 until further
orders from this Court.

Petitioner is directed to file a bond in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱100,000.00) PESOS (sic) to answer for
damages to defendants in the event the Court finds petitioner is not entitled to said injunction.

The BSV Sangguniang Barangay filed on December 4, 1998 a Motion for Reconsideration and to Disso lve Preliminary
Injunction (with Memorandum of Authorities). 19
NSVHAI then filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Expunge on December 10, 1998, moving to declare the above motion of
the BSV Sangguniang Barangay as a mere scrap of paper for being filed out of time and for failure to serve a copy
thereof to the counsel of petitioner.

The RTC subsequently dismissed the case in an Order 20 dated August 17, 1999, stating as follows:

Defendant Barangay Sun Valley moves to dismiss the instant case on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of
action and the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. In summary, defendant alleges that the subject streets
Aster and Rosemallow inside Sun Valley Subdivision are owned by the local government. Such streets have long been
part of the public domain and beyond the commerce of man. In support of this, defendant cited the case of White Plains
Association, Inc. vs. Legaspi, 193 SCRA 765 wherein it was held that road lots of subdivisions constitute a part of the
mandatory open space reserved for public use; ownership of which is automatically vested in the Republic of the
Philippines although it is still registered in the name of the developer/owner, its donation to the government is a mere
formality." The power or authority to close or open the said streets is vested in the local government units and not on
homeowner’s associations, pursuant to Section 21 of the local Government Code (RA 7160) quoted as follows: "Section 21.
Closure and Opening of Roads. (a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or tem porarily
close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction x x x." In view thereof, Resolution No.
98-096 was passed by the Sangguniang Barangay. Hence there is no right whatsoever on the part of Plaintiff NSVHA
entitled to the protection of the law. Further, defendant contends that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative
remedies as ordained in Sections 32 and 57 of the Local Government Code giving the city mayor the supervisory power,
and the power of review by the Sangguniang Panlungsod, respectively.

No opposition to the motion to dismiss was filed by the Plaintiff.

Same defendant seeks to reconsider the order granting the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction alleging that
there is a pending motion to dismiss and Plaintiff has not been able to establish an actually existing right.

Plaintiff has not filed an opposition thereto, instead it filed an urgent ex-parte motion to expunge the motion for
reconsideration on the ground that its counsel has not been furnished with a copy of the motion for reconsideration, but
the record shows that Maria Cortez (plaintiff’s representative) has received a copy of said motion.

After considering the arguments of the parties in their respective pleadings, this court hereby resolves as follows:

1. The "Motion for Reconsideration" and the "Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Expunge (motion for reconsideration)" are
Denied being devoid of merit; and

2. The "Motion to Dismiss" is hereby Granted for failure of the plaintiff to exhaust the administrative remedies under
Sections 32 and 57 of the Local Government Code.

WHEREFORE, let this case be as it is hereby ordered Dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction is hereby lifted. 21

NSVHAI filed a Motion for Reconsideration 22 of the above-quoted Order but this was denied by the RTC for lack of merit
in an Order23 dated September 21, 1999.
NSVHAI raised the matter to the Court of Appeals and the case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 65559. NSVHAI alleged
that "despite the lack of the required hearing" 24
and without any order requiring it to submit its Comment/Opposition to
the BSV Sangguniang Barangay ’ s Motion to Dismiss or that of submitting said Motion for resolution, Judge
Bautista-Ricafort issued an Order which, to NSVHAI’s complete surprise, granted the Motion. NSVHAI argued that the
RTC gravely erred in taking cognizance of, and thereafter ruling on, said Motion and refusing to exercise jurisdiction over
the subject matter of Civil Case No. 98-0420. Petitioner likewise argued that the RTC committed serious errors which, if
not corrected, would cause grave or irreparable injury to petitioner and cause a violation of law.25

The BSV Sangguniang Barangay, Roberto Guevarra in his capacity as Punong Barangay, and members of the
Sangguniang Barangay (hereinafter, "respondents"), in their Appellees’ Brief, argued as follows:

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES’ MOTION TO DISMISS DUE TO LACK OF
CAUSE OF ACTION AND JURISPRUDENCE OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER AND APPELLANT’S FAILURE TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. AS NOTED BY THE COURT, NO OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION TO DISMISS WAS EVER
FILED BY APPELLANT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT’S DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION ASSAILING ITS SUBJECT-MATTER, BARANGAY RESOLUTION NO.
98-096, CONSISTING OF A DIRECTIVE OF AN LGU TO A DEFIANT PRIVATE ORGANIZATION WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION,
IS JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE SOLE COMPETENCE AND WISE DISCRETION OF THE BARANGAY OVER A LOCAL
TRAFFIC PROBLEM.

III

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ANY SERIOUS ERROR, PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE, AS FOUND BY
THE COURT A QUO. IT IS APPELLANT THAT HAS COMMITTED THE ERROR OF NOT EXHAUSTING ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES. HENCE, NO GRAVE OR IRREPARABLE INJURY CAN BE CAUSED TO APPELLANT FOR IT HAS NO RIGHT TO
PROTECT.26

Respondents claimed that Barangay Resolution No. 98-096 was simply a directive to petitioner, "a private aggrupation of
some self-seeking homeowners,"27 and was just a measure of internal policy among residents; that the opening of roads
for traffic reasons was "within the sole competence of the barangay to determine"; 28 and the Mayor could have chosen,
as it was within his power to do so, to cause the demolition of the gates, which were illegally built by petitioner and
therefore were obstructions on the road, even without a Barangay resolution. Respondents likewise claimed that the BSV’
s action could be considered a political question, which should be essentially withdrawn from judicial cognizance, and
constitutional law doctrine provides that the courts would not interfere with political issues unless grave abuse of
discretion is shown, of which there was none on the part of the Barangay. Respondents argued that petitioner did not
have any actual legal right entitled to the protection of the law. 29
Respondents attached to their Appellees’ Brief six documents, labeled as Annexes "2" to "7," all stamped "Certified True
Copy" by a certain Roman E. Loreto, Legal Officer II of Legal Department.30 The detailed information contained in each of
the documents that comprise respondents’ Annexes "2" to "7" is copied below:

1. 1st Indorsement31 from the Office of the Mayor of Parañaque dated May 20, 1988, signed by Luzviminda A. Concepcion,
Administrative Officer II, stating as follows:

Respectfully indorsed to Atty. Antonio G. Cruz, Municipal Attorney, of this municipality the herein attached "Original
Copies of Transfer Certificate of Title for Sun Valley Open Space and Road Lots" with TCT Nos. 133552, 119836, and
122443 for your appropriate actions.

2. Letter32 dated December 27, 1990 from Francisco B. Jose, Jr., Municipal Attorney of Parañaque, addressed to the
Municipal Council Secretary, which reads:

This has reference to your request dated December 18, 1990 relative to the letter of inquiry of the Barangay Captain of
Barangay Sun Valley dated December 13, 1990.

We wish to inform you that based on the available records of our office the open space and ro ad lots of Sun Valley
Subdivision is already owned by the Municipal Government of Parañaque as evidenced by TCT NOS. 133552, 119836, and
122443. Copies of which are hereto attached for your ready reference.

Considering that the Municipality of Parañaque is the registered owner of the road lots of Sun Valley Subdivision, we are
of the opinion that the roads become public in use and ownership, and therefore, use of the roads by persons other than
residents of the Subdivision can no longer be curtailed. However, should the Municipal Government decides to delegate
its right to regulate the use of the said roads to the Sun Valley Homeowner’s Association or Sun Valley Barangay Council,
such right may be exercise[d] by said association or council.

3. Certification33 dated October 8, 1990 issued by Francisco B. Jose, Jr. under the letterhead of the Office of the Municipal
Attorney of Parañaque, which reads:

This is to certify that based on the available records of this Office, the open space and road lots of Sun Valley Subdivision
has been donated and now owned by the Municipality of Paranaque, as evidenced by TCT Nos. 133552, 119836, and
122443 copies of which are hereto attached.

This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. Mario Cortez, President of Sun Valley Homeowners Association.

4. Certification34 dated June 13, 1994, again signed by Francisco B. Jose, Jr., of the Office of the Municipal Attorney,
providing as follows:

This is to certify that based on the available records of this Office, the only road lots in Sun Valley Subdivision titled in the
name of the Municipality of Parañaque are those covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 133552 and 122443.

This certification is being issued upon the request of Coun. Manuel T. De Guia.
5. Certification35 dated March 2, 1995 issued by Rodolfo O. Alora, OIC, Asst. Municipal Legal Officer, which reads:

This is to certify that based on the available records of this Office, the open space within Sun Valley Subdivision has
already been donated to the Municipality as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119836, copy of which is hereto
attached.

This certification is being issued upon the request of Atty. Rex G. Rico.

6. Certification36 dated October 26, 1998 issued by Ma. Riza Pureza Manalese, Legal Researcher, Office of the Municipal
Attorney, Parañaque City, which reads:

This is to certify that based on the available records of this Office, road lots of Sun Valley Subdivision have already been
donated to the Municipality of Paranaque as evidenced by TCT NO. 133552, 119836, and 122443.

This certification is being issued upon the request of MR. WILLIAM UY.

The Court of Appeals issued a Decision dated October 16, 2002 denying the appeal and affirming the Orders of the RTC
dated August 17, 1999 and September 21, 1999. The Court of Appeals likewise denied NSVHAI’s Motion for Partial
Reconsideration in its Resolution promulgated on January 17, 2003, stating that after a thorough study of the Motion for
Reconsideration, it found no sufficient reason to deviate from its findings and conclusion reached in its decision.

Thus, NSVHAI (hereinafter, "petitioner") went to this Court.

Arguments of Petitioner

Petitioner alleges that the decision of the Court of Appeals was based on "facts that [were] outside of the original Petition
and Amended Petition and on supposed findings of facts that are not even evidence offered before the court a
quo."37 Petitioner likewise alleges that the facts used by the Court of Appeals in dismissing the case were contrary to the
records of Civil Case No. 98-0420.

Petitioner lists the following as its Questions of Law:

In sustaining the dismissal of Civil Case No. 98-0420, the Honorable Court of Appeals sanctioned the departure of the
Regional Trial Court from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings

Whether or not the issuance of the Resolution promulgated January 17, 2003 and the Decision promulgated October 16,
2002 by the Former 4th Division and the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals sustaining the validity of dismissal of Civil
Case No. 98-0420 is not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court

C
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals, with due respect, departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings by making findings of fact not supported by evidence of record 38

Petitioner avers that the hearing for the respondents’ Motion to Dismiss was set on November 20, 1998, without
indication as to time and that during the hearing on such date, counsel for respondents moved that their Motion to
Dismiss be heard over the objection of counsel for petitioner, who explained that there was an urgency in ruling on the
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in view of the expiration of the temporary restraining order
(TRO).39

Petitioner quotes the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) from the November 20, 1998 hearing before the RTC in the
following manner:

Atty. Herrera:

Then, Your Honor, I files [sic] a motion petitioning to dismiss this instant case, which should be resolved first before
hearing this case.

Atty. Nuñez:

Your Honor, please, with due respect to the opposing counsel, the hearing today is supposed to be on the presentation
of petitioner’s evidence in support of its prayer for preliminary injunction. In connection with the amended complaint, I
guess it is a matter of right to amend its pleading. What happened here, the amended petition was filed before this
Honorable Court on November 13 at 11:10 a.m. but I think the motion to dismiss was filed by the respondent on
November 13 at 11:20 a.m.. Therefore, it is the right of the petitioner insofar as the case is concerned.

And therefore, this Court should proceed with the hearing on the preliminary injunction instead of entertaining this
matter. The temporary restraining order will expire today and we have the right to be heard.

Court:

We will proceed first with the hearing (referring to the scheduled hearing of the prayer for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction). (Transcript of Stenographic Notes, November 20, 1998) (Underscoring and explanation petitioner’
s.)40

Petitioner claims that the RTC proceeded to hear the prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and no hearing
was conducted on the Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner reiterates its earlier claim that it did not receive an order requiring it
to submit its Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss or informing it that said Motion had been submitted for
resolution.41

Petitioner alleges that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 98-0420 arose from the grant of respondents’ Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner claims that it filed its Amended Petition on November 13, 1998 at 11:10 a.m., or before respondents served any
responsive pleading, or before they had filed their Motion to Dismiss on the same date at about 11:20 a.m. 42 Petitioner
avers that the filing of said Amended Petition was a matter of right under Section 2, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and had the effect of superseding the original petition dated October 28, 1998. Petitioner concludes that the
Motion to Dismiss was therefore directed against a non-existing Petition.43

Petitioner argues that the RTC’s ruling on the Motion to Dismiss is contrary to procedural law because no hearing was
conducted on said Motion to Dismiss; that said motion violated Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for
failing to set the time of hearing thereof; and that instead of being resolved, said motion should have been declared as a
mere scrap of worthless paper.44

Petitioner claims that during the proceedings before the RTC on November 20, 1998, both parties manifested that the
Motion to Dismiss was never set for hearing, and that when Judge Bautista-Ricafort said, "We will proceed first with the
hearing,"45 she was referring to the scheduled hearing of the prayer for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioner claims that it is crystal clear that it was deprived due process when a ruling was had on the Motion to Dismiss
despite the clear absence of a hearing. Petitioner concludes that the Court of Appeals was manifestly mistaken when it
ruled that due process was observed in the issuance of the assailed Orders of Judge Bautista-Ricafort, despite the lack of
opportunity to submit a comment or opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and the lack of issuance of an order submitting
said motion for resolution. Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals sanctioned the ruling of the RTC that violated
both substantial and procedural law. 46

Moreover, petitioner avers that contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the RTC had jurisdiction to hear and
decide the Amended Petition, and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not applicable. This is
because, according to petitioner, such doctrine "requires that were a remedy before an administrative agency is provided,
relief must first be sought from the administrative agencies prior to bringing an action before courts of
justice."47 Petitioner claims that when it filed Civil Case No. 98-08420, it did not have the luxury of time to elevate the
matter to the higher authorities under Sections 32 and 57 of the Local Government Code. Petitioner alleges that the
tenor of BSV Resolution No. 98-096 necessitated the immediate filing of the injunction case on October 29, 1998, to
forestall the prejudicial effect of said resolution that was to take effect two days later. Thus, petitioner claims that it h ad
no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy except to file the case. 48

Anent the question of whether the Sangguniang Barangay should have passed an ordinance instead of a resolution to
open the subject roads, petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals should not have relied on respondents’ claim of
ownership, as this led to the erroneous conclusion that there was no need to pass an ordinance. Petitioner insists that the
supposed titles to the subject roads were never submitted to the RTC, and the respondents merely attached certifications
that the ownership of the subject roads was already vested in the City Government of Parañaque City as Annexes to their
Appellees’ Brief before the Court of Appeals. Those annexes, according to petitioner, were not formally offered as
evidence.49

Petitioner avers that the records of Civil Case No. 98-0420 clearly show that there was no proof or evidence on record to
support the findings of the Court of Appeals. This is because, allegedly, the dismissal of said case was due to the grant of
a motion to dismiss, and the case did not go to trial to receive evidence. 50 Petitioner avers that a motion to dismiss
hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 51 In adopting the annexes as basis for its findings of
fact, the Court of Appeals allegedly disregarded the rules on Evidence.
Petitioner raises the following grounds for the issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction:

Sangguniang Barangay Resolution No. 98-096 is repugnant to the proprietary rights of the affected homeowners who
are members of petitioner NSVHAI, such rights undoubtedly protected by the Constitution.

As there is no proof otherwise (except the baseless findings of fact by the Honorable Court of Appeals) that the streets
encompassed by the concerned subdivision, Sun Valley Subdivision, are all private properties. As such, the residents of
Sun Valley Subdivision have all the right to regulate the roads and open spaces within their territorial jurisdiction.

This Honorable Supreme Court can take judicial knowledge that criminal activities such as robbery and kidnappings are
becoming daily fares in Philippine society. Residents have invested their lifetime’s savings in private subdivision since
subdivision living afford them privacy, exclusivity and foremost of all, safety. Living in a subdivision has a premium and
such premium translates into a comparatively more expensive lot because of the safety, among others, that subd ivision
lifestyle offers.

But, with the enactment and intended implementation of Sangguniang Barangay Resolution No. 98-096 to open
Rosemallow and Aster Streets for public use, it is indubitable that, instead of promoting the safety of resident of Sun
Valley Subdivision, respondents are endangering the life and property of the residents of the said subdivision as they will
now be exposed to criminal and lawless elements.

It is respectfully submitted that Sangguniang Barangay Resolution No. 98-096 has a place only in an authoritarian
government where proprietary rights and privacy are alien concepts. Lest it be forgotten, ours is a democratic society
and therefore, it should not be ruled in a manner befitting of a despotic government.

Petitioner NSVHAI, in protection of the rights and interest of the residents of Sun Valley Subdivision and in order to
ensure that public officials will not abuse governmental powers and use them in an oppressive and arbitrary manner,
invokes the judicial power of this Honorable Supreme Court and pray that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued and,
after hearing, be declared permanent. 52

A perusal of the documents attached by petitioner as Annexes revealed to the Court the following, which were not
discussed in the body of the petition:

1. A letter53 dated January 25, 2003 signed by Sonia G. Sison, President of NSVHAI, to Mayor Joey P. Marquez, the
pertinent portions of which provide:

We admit that we erred in not going to you directly because at that time, the NSVHA received the letter -order of Brgy.
Capt. Guevara two days before the effectivity of the order. Aside from this, there was a long holiday (long weekend prior
to November 1). Thus, the Board of Governors had no other recourse but to seek a TRO and thereafter a permanent
injunction.

We now would like to seek your assistance concerning this urgent problem. For your information there are already two (2)
gates in and out of Sun Valley Subdivision.
Under P.D. 957, the Homeowners Association is mandated to protect the interest of the homeowners and residents
especially in so far as it affects the security, comfort and the general welfare of the homeowners.

Thank you and because of the urgency of the matter, we anticipate your prompt and favorable action. (Emphasis ours.)

2. A letter54 signed by Parañaque City Mayor Joey Marquez dated January 27, 2003, addressed to Mr. Roberto Guevara,
Office of the Barangay Captain, Barangay Sun Valley, which reads in part:

This refers to your intended implementation of Barangay Sun Valley Resolution No. 98-096 entitled, "A RESOLUTION
DIRECTING THE NEW SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION TO OPEN ROSEMALLOW AND ASTER STREETS TO
VEHICULAR AND PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC."

In this regard and pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 32 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which vests upon the city
mayor the right to exercise general supervision over component barangays, to ensure that said barangays act within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions, you are hereby directed to defer your implementation of the subject
ordinance based on the following grounds:

1. The roads subject of your resolution is a municipal road and not a barangay road;

2. The opening or closure of any local road may be undertaken by a local government unit pursuant to an ordinance and
not through a mere resolution as provided under Sec. 21 of the Local Government Code of 1991;

3. There is no more need to order the opening of the aforementioned roads in view of the fact that Gelia and State Ave.,
have already been opened by the subdivision to the general public to accommodate vehicular and pedestrian traffic in
the area;

4. There is a need to conduct public hearings, as in fact we shall be conducting public hearings, on the matter to enable
us to arrive at an intelligent resolution of the issues involved.

3. A letter55 dated January 31, 2003 addressed to Mayor Joey Marquez, signed by counsel for respondents, wherein the
latter wrote:

We regret to observe that all the reasons that you have cited in your letter as grounds for your order of
non-implementation of the Barangay Resolution have been passed upon and decided by the Court of Appeals, which
lately denied the NSVHA Motion for Reconsideration x x x.

xxxx

The Decision of the Court of Appeals is now the subject of an appeal taken by the NSVHA to the Supreme Court. In
deference to the high Court, you would do well to reconsider your order to the Barangay and not pre-empt the high
Court on its decision. x x x.

Arguments of Respondents
Respondents filed their Comment 56 on July 17, 2003. They manifest that the petition is substantially a reproduction of
petitioner’s brief filed with the Court of Appeals, and consists of almost identical issues which have already been
ventilated and decided upon by the said court.

Respondents claim that the hearing held on November 20, 1998, as found by the Court of Appeals, covered both the
injunction and dismissal incidents, and that the motion to dismiss on issues of jurisdiction was a prejudicial matter.
Respondents confirm that the RTC said it will proceed first with the hearing, but the lower court did not specify if the
hearing was going to take up the prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction or the motion to dismiss. Respondents
further claim that by the end of the hearing, after Atty. Florencio R. Herrera’s manifestation on the donated public roads,
counsels for both parties were asked by the court if they were submitting, and both of them answered in the
affirmative. 57 Respondents aver that petitioner’s reply to its charge of misleading the Court was an admission that
counsel had tampered without authority with the TSN, and that the phrase "referring to the scheduled hearing of the
prayer for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction"58 was said counsel’s own mere footnote.

Respondents allege that the issuance of the titles in favor of Parañaque over all the roads in Sun Valley Subdivision was
an official act by the land registration office of the City of Parañaque, and was perfectly within the judicial notice of the
Courts, pursuant to Rule 129, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. 59 Respondents likewise allege that the gates were earlier
built illegally on the roads by the Association, and while petitioner may lend a helping hand to the barangay, it cannot
control the latter’s discretion as to the wisdom of its traffic policies within the barangay. They maintain that petitioner had
no business putting up road blocks in the first place; that this matter is purely a local government determination; and that
it is even doubtful if courts would encroach upon this autonomous determination for local constituents of the Barangay
in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers.

Respondents claim that since the subject matter of the case is a directive of the Barangay to the petitioner, the
requirement for an ordinance would not be necessary, as there was no legislative determination in the Barangay
resolution regarding what class of roads to open or what to close by way of general policy. 60

Respondents contend that the Barangay Resolution was internal and temporary, passed to solve a traffic problem. They
propose a reason why petitioner allegedly wants to control the subject roads, as follows:

The directive of the Barangay is certainly a declaration of an intention expressed by resolution on complaints of residents
for a convenient outlet of cars and pedestrians during certain hours of the [day] or night. This need not be the subj ect of
an ordinance. It is addressed to a special group of residents, and not to the general community. It refers to particular
roads and at certain hours only, not to all the roads and at all hours.

Hence, the Barangay Resolutions (sic) is but temporary in character, being a solution to a momentary traffic problem
then visualized by the Barangay and encouraged by the MMDA. There is no legal question involved that is of any
concern to the NSVHA. The prevailing reason why the NSVHA desires to control the roads is the monetary consideration
it gains by its unilateral requirement of car stickers and of substantial fees exacted from delivery vans and trucks for
bringing in cargo into the subdivision. And yet, the residents who, never gave their consent to this activities (sic), are busy
people and have merely tolerated this for a long time now. This tolerance did not of course give legality to the illegal act.
x x x.61
As regards petitioner’s argument that the BSV Sangguniang Barangay should have passed an ordinance instead of a
resolution, respondents present their counter-argument as follows:

Hence, even assuming for the sake of argument that a legal question exists on whether it be a resolution or ordinance
that should contain the Barangay directive, such an issue is of no moment as plaintiff-appellant failed to exhaust the
necessary administrative remedies before resorting to court action, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Section 32, R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) provides for a remedy from Barangay actions to the Mayor under
the latter’s power of general supervision.62

With regard to the Mayor’s involvement in this case, respondents have this to say:

The Mayor’s act of interfering in Barangay Sun Valley affairs stemmed out of a long-standing political feud of the Mayor
with the Punong Barangay. Its general supervision did not extend to pure Barangay matters, which the Barangay would
be x x x in a better position to determine.

Furthermore, the general supervision of the Mayor is limited to the overseeing authority that the Barangays act withi n
the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. Sadly, there is nothing in this Mayor’s letter x x x that would as much
as show a deviation by the Barangay Sun Valley from any prescribed powers or function. The Mayor ’s directive to the
Barangay is of doubtful legality.

It was mainly the mounting traffic problem progressively experienced through the years that prompted the Barangay to
resolve to open Rosemallow and Aster Streets in accordance with its power under Section 21 of R.A. 7160 to "temporarily
open or close any local road falling within its jurisdiction". This Resolution x x x was decided upon after the Barangay
Council made the necessary investigation and conducted hearings in consultation with affected residents. In order to
maintain some kind of cordial relationship with the NSVHA, the Barangay by its resolution, opted to give the NSVHA the
chance to open the roads, which it earlier closed by means of arbitrarily putting up steel gates without any apparent
authority.63

Furthermore, respondents aver that the trial court and the appellate court have ruled that only a local government unit
(LGU), in this case the Barangay, can open or close roads, whether they be public or private, in accordance with Section
21 of the Local Government Code. Respondents contend that Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air
Village Association, Inc.,64 wherein the Court discussed the power of LGUs to open and close roads, is substantially in
point.65

After the submission of the parties’ respective memoranda,66 this case was submitted for decision.

The issues before us are:

1. Whether or not petitioner has a right to the protection of the law that would entitle it to injunctive relief against the
implementation of BSV Resolution No. 98-096; and

2. Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court of Appeals passed upon petitioner’s claims as to the validity of the dismissal in this wise:

We do not agree. Although the Motion to Dismiss was filed on the same day, but after, the Amended Petition was filed,
the same cannot be considered as directed merely against the original petition which Appellant already considers as
non-existing. The records will show that Appellant’s Amended Petition contained no material amendments to the
original petition. Both allege the same factual circumstances or events that constitute the Appellant’s cause of action
anent the Appellee’s alleged violation of Appellant’s propriety rights over the subdivision roads in question. Corollarily,
the allegations in Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss, as well as the grounds therefore predicated on lack of cause of action
and jurisdiction, could very well be considered as likewise addressed to Appellant’s Amended Petition.

xxxx

It bears stressing that due process simply means giving every contending party the opportunity to be heard and the
court to consider every piece of evidence presented in their favor (Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company versus
Benjamin Bitanga, G.R. Nos. 137934 & 137936[)]. In the instant case, Appellant cannot be said to have been denied of due
process. As borne by the records, while Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss did not set the time for the hearing of the motion,
the day set therefore was the same date set for the hearing of Appellant’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction – that is, November 20, 1998, with the precise purpose of presenting evidence in support of the motion to
dismiss on the same said scheduled hearing date and time when Appellant and its counsel would be present. Moreover,
Appellant’s predication of lack of due hearing is belied by the fact that the hearing held on November 20, 1999 took up
not only the matter of whether or not to grant the injunction, but also tackled the jurisdictional issue raised in Appellees’
Motion to Dismiss, which issues were intertwined in both incidents. 67

We see no reason to depart from these findings by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner’s recourse in questioning BSV
Resolution No. 98-096 should have been with the Mayor of Parañaque City, as clearly stated in Section 32 of the Local
Government Code, which provides:

Section 32. City and Municipal Supervision over Their Respective Barangays. - The city or municipality, through the city or
municipal mayor concerned, shall exercise general supervision over component barangays to ensure that said barangays
act within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

We do not see how petitioner’s act could qualify as an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. We have emphasized the importance of applying this doctrine in a recent case, wherein we held:

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that
courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and
provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away
from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed. 68

It is the Mayor who can best review the Sangguniang Barangay’s actions to see if it acted within the scope of its
prescribed powers and functions. Indeed, this is a local problem to be resolved within the local government. Thus, the
Court of Appeals correctly found that the trial court committed no reversible error in dismissing the case for petitioner’s
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as the requirement under the Local Government Code that the closure and
opening of roads be made pursuant to an ordinance, instead of a resolution, is not applicable in this case because the
subject roads belong to the City Government of Parañaque.

Moreover, being the party asking for injunctive relief, the burden of proof was on petitioner to show ownership over th e
subject roads. This, petitioner failed to do.

In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of
evidence. Parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense offered by
their opponent.69

Petitioner dared to question the barangay’s ownership over the subject roads when it should have been the one to
adduce evidence to support its broad claims of exclusivity and privacy. Petitioner did not submit an iota of proof to
support its acts of ownership, which, as pointed out by respondents, consisted of closing the subject roads that belonged
to the then Municipality of Parañaque and were already being used by the public, limiting their use exclusively to the
subdivision’s homeowners, and collecting fees from delivery vans that would pass through the gates that they
themselves had built. It is petitioner’s authority to put up the road blocks in the first place that becomes highly
questionable absent any proof of ownership.

On the other hand, the local government unit’s power to close and open roads within its jurisdiction is clear under the
Local Government Code, Section 21 of which provides:

Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. – (a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance,permanently or
temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in
case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the
sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure is provided.

We quote with approval the ruling of the Court of Appeals in this regard, as follows:

Contrary, however, to Appellant’s position, the above-quoted provision, which requires the passage of an ordinance by a
local government unit to effect the opening of a local road, can have no applicability to the instant case since the
subdivision road lots sought to be opened to decongest traffic in the area - namely Rosemallow and Aster Streets –
have already been donated by the Sun Valley Subdivision to, and the titles thereto already issued in the name of, the City
Government of Parañaque since the year 1964 (Annexes "2" to "7" of Appellees’ Brief). This fact has not even been
denied by the Appellant in the proceedings below nor in the present recourse. Having been already donated or turned
over to the City Government of Parañaque, the road lots in question have since then taken the nature of public roads
which are withdrawn from the commerce of man, and hence placed beyond the private rights or claims of herein
Appellant. Accordingly, the Appellant was not in the lawful exercise of its predicated rights when it built obstructing
structures closing the road lots in question to vehicular traffic for the use of the general Public. Consequently, Appellees’
act of passing the disputed barangay resolution, the implementation of which is sought to be restrained by Appellant,
had for its purpose not the opening of a private road but may be considered merely as a directive or reminder to the
Appellant to cause the opening of a public road which should rightfully be open for use to the general public. 70
Petitioner wants this Court to recognize the rights and interests of the residents of Sun Valley Subdivision but it miserably
failed to establish the legal basis, such as its ownership of the subject roads, which entitles petitioner to the remedy
prayed for. It even wants this Court to take "judicial knowledge that criminal activities such as robbery and kidnappings
are becoming daily fares in Philippine society." 71 This is absurd. The Rules of Court provide which matters constitute
judicial notice, to wit:

Rule 129
WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. —A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of
the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the
law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions.(1a)1avvphi1

The activities claimed by petitioner to be part of judicial knowledge are not found in the rule quoted above and do not
support its petition for injunctive relief in any way.

As petitioner has failed to establish that it has any right entitled to the protection of the law, and it also failed to exha ust
administrative remedies by applying for injunctive relief instead of going to the Mayor as provided by the Local
Government Code, the petition must be denied.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ DECISION dated October 16,
2002 and its RESOLUTION dated January 17, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 65559 are both AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
D. DISCRETIONARY JUDICIAL NOTICE

E. JUDICIAL NOTICE, when hearing necessary

A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994

STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants,

vs.
JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Manila, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In assaying the requisite norms for qualifications and eminence of a magistrate, legal authorities place a premium on
how he has complied with his continuing duty to know the law. A quality thus considered essential to the judicial
character is that of "a man of learning who spends tirelessly the weary hours after midnight acquainting himself with the
great body of traditions and the learning of the law; is profoundly learned in all the learning of the law; and knows how
to use that learning." 1

Obviously, it is the primary duty of a judge, which he owes to the public and to the legal profession, to know the very law
he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
the statutes and procedural rules. Party litigants will have great faith in the administration of justice if judges cannot ju stly
be accused of apparent deficiency in their grasp of the legal principles. For, service in the judiciary means a continuous
study and research on the law from beginning to end. 2

In a letter-complaint 3 dated August 19, 1992, respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 54, was charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno V. Tac-an with
ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
committed as follows:

1. That on August 13, 1992, respondent judge issued an Order dismissing eleven (11) cases (docketed as Crim. Cases Nos.
92-101959 to 92- 101969, inclusive) filed by the undersigned complainant prosecutors (members of the DOJ Panel of
Prosecutors) against the accused Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange
Restrictions, as consolidated in CB Circular No. 960, in relation to the penal provisions of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as
amended, . . .;

2. That respondent Judge issued his Order solely on the basis of newspaper reports (August 11, 1992 issues of the
Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Daily Globe) concerning the announcement on August 10, 1992 by the President of the
Philippines of the lifting by the government of all foreign exchange restrictions and the arrival at such decision by the
Monetary Board as per statement of Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia;
3. That claiming that the reported announcement of the Executive Department on the lifting of foreign exchange
restrictions by two newspapers which are reputable and of national circulation had the effect of repealing Central Bank
Circular No. 960, as allegedly supported by Supreme Court decisions . . ., the Court contended that it was deprived of
jurisdiction, and, therefore, motu, prop(r)io had to dismiss all the eleven cases aforementione d "for not to do so opens
this Court to charges of trying cases over which it has no more jurisdiction;"

4. That in dismissing aforecited cases on August 13, 1992 on the basis of a Central Bank Circular or Monetary Board
Resolution which as of date hereof, has not even been officially issued, and basing his Order/decision on a mere
newspaper account of the advance announcement made by the President of the said fact of lifting or liberalizing foreign
exchange controls, respondent judge acted prematurely and in indecent haste, as he had no way of determining the full
intent of the new CB Circular or Monetary Board resolution, and whether the same provided for exception, as in the case
of persons who had pending criminal cases before the courts for violations of Central Bank Circulars and/or regulations
previously issued on the matter;

5. That respondent Judge's arrogant and cavalier posture in taking judicial notice purportedly as a matter of public
knowledge a mere newspaper account that the President had announced the lifting of foreign exchange restrictions as
basis for his assailed order of dismissal is highly irregular, erroneous and misplaced. For the respondent judge to take
judicial notice thereof even before it is officially released by the Central Bank and its full text published as required by law
to be effective shows his precipitate action in utter disregard of the fundamental precept of due process which the
People is also entitled to and exposes his gross ignorance of the law, thereby tarnishing public confidence in the integrity
of the judiciary. How can the Honorable Judge take judicial notice of something which has not yet come into force and
the contents, shape and tenor of which have not yet been published and ascertained to be the basis of jud icial action?
The Honorable Judge had miserably failed to "endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts" in the case at bar contrary to
Rule 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct constituting Grave Misconduct;

6. That respondent Judge did not even ha(ve) the prudence of requiring first the comment of the prosecution on the
effect of aforesaid Central Bank Circular/Monetary Board resolution on the pending cases before dismissing the same,
thereby denying the Government of its right to due process;

7. That the lightning speed with which respondent Judge acted to dismiss the cases may be gleaned from the fact that
such precipitate action was undertaken despite already scheduled continuation of trial dates set in the order of the court
(the prosecution having started presenting its evidence . . .) dated August 11, 1992 to wit: August 31, September 3, 10, 21,
& 23 and October 1, 1992, all at 9:30 o'clock in the morning, in brazen disregard of all notions of fair play, thereby
depriving the Government of its right to be heard, and clearly exposing his bias and partiality; and

8. That, in fact, the motive of respondent Judge in dismissing the case without even waiting for a motion to quash filed
by the counsel for accused has even placed his dismissal Order suspect.

Pursuant to a resolution of this Court dated September 8, 1992, respondent judge filed his comment, 4
contending, inter
alia, that there was no need to await publication of the Central Bank (CB) circular repealing the existing law on foreign
exchange controls for the simple reason that the public announcement made by the President in several newspapers of
general circulation lifting foreign exchange controls was total, absolute, without qualification, and was immediately
effective; that having acted only on the basis of such announcement, he cannot be blamed for relying on the erroneous
statement of the President that the new foreign exchange rules rendered moot and academic the cases filed against Mrs.
Marcos, and which was corrected only on August 17, 1992 but published in the newspapers on August 18, 1992, and only
after respondent judge had issued his order of dismissal dated August 13, 1992; that the Preside nt was ill-advised by his
advisers and, instead of rescuing the Chief Executive from embarrassment by assuming responsibility for errors in the
latter's announcement, they chose to toss the blame for the consequence of their failures to respondent judge wh o
merely acted on the basis of the announcements of the President which had become of public knowledge; that the
"saving clause" under CB Circular No. 1353 specifically refers only to pending actions or investigations involving violations
of CB Circular No. 1318, whereas the eleven cases dismissed involved charges for violations of CB Circular No. 960, hence
the accused cannot be tried and convicted under a law different from that under which she was charged; that assuming
that respondent judge erred in issuing the order of dismissal, the proper remedy should have been an appeal therefrom
but definitely not an administrative complaint for his dismissal; that a mistake committed by a judge should not
necessarily be imputed as ignorance of the law; and that a "court can reverse or modify a doctrine but it does not show
ignorance of the justices or judges whose decisions were reversed or modified" because "even doctrines initiated by the
Supreme Court are later reversed, so how much more for the lower courts?"

He further argued that no hearing was necessary since the prosecution had nothing to explain because, as he theorized,
"What explanation could have been given? That the President was talking 'through his hat' (to use a colloquialism) and
should not be believed? That I should wait for the publication (as now alleged by complainants), of a still then
non-existent CB circular? . . . As it turned out, CB Circular No. 3153 (sic) does not affect my dismissal order because the
said circular's so-called saving clause does not refer to CB Circular 960 under which the charges in the dismissed cases
were based;" that it was discretionary on him to take judicial notice of the facts which are of public knowledge, pursuant
to Section 2 of Rule 129; that the contention of complainants that he acted prematurely and in indecent haste for basing
his order of dismissal on a mere newspaper account is contrary to the wordings of the newspaper report wherein the
President announced the lifting of controls as an accomplished fact, not as an intention to be effected in the future,
because of the use of the present perfect tense or past tense "has lifted," not that he "intends to lift," foreign exchange
controls.

Finally, respondent judge asseverates that complainants who are officers of the Department of Justice, violated Section 6,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court which provides that "proceedings against judges of first instance shall be private and
confidential" when they caused to be published in the newspapers the filing of the present administrative case against
him; and he emphasizes the fact that he had to immediately resolve a simple and pure legal matter in consonance with
the admonition of the Supreme Court for speedy disposition of cases.

In their reply 5 and supplemental reply, 6 complainants aver that although the saving clause under Section 16 of CB
Circular No. 1353 made specific reference to CB Circular No. 1318, it will be noted that Section 111 of Circular No. 1318,
which contains a saving clause substantially similar to that of the new circular, in turn refers to and includes Circular No.
960. Hence, whether under Circular No. 1318 or Circular No. 1353, pending cases involving violations of Circular No. 960
are excepted from the coverage thereof. Further, it is alleged that the precipitate dismissal of the eleven cases, withou t
according the prosecution the opportunity to file a motion to quash or a comment, or even to show cause why the cases
against accused Imelda R. Marcos should not be dismissed, is clearly reflective of respondent's partiality and bad faith. In
effect, respondent judge acted as if he were the advocate of the accused.
On December 9, 1993, this Court issued a resolution referring the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as revised, there being no
factual issues involved. The corresponding report and recommendation, 7 dated February 14, 1994, was submitted by
Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad, with the approval of Court Administrator Ernani Cruz-Paño.

The questioned order 8 of respondent judge reads as follows:

These eleven (11) cases are for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions as consolidated in CB Circular No.
960 in relation to the penal provision of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as amended.

The accused Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos pleaded not guilty to all these cases; apparently the other accused in some of these
cases, Roberto S. Benedicto, was not arrested and therefore the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person; trial
was commenced as against Mrs. Marcos.

His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, announced on August 10, 1992 that the government has lifted all foreign
exchange restrictions and it is also reported that Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia said that the Monetary Board arrived
at such decision (issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 11, 1992 and issue of the Daily Globe of the same date). The
Court has to give full confidence and credit to the reported announcement of the Executive Department, specially from
the highest official of that department; the Courts are charged with judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, without introduction of proof, the announcement published in at least the two newspapers cited above
which are reputable and of national circulation.

Per several cases decided by the Supreme Court (People vs. Alcaras, 56 Phil. 520, People vs. Francisco, 56 Phil. 572,
People vs. Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000, People vs. Crisanto Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225), among others, it was held that the repeal of a
penal law without re-enactment extinguishes the right to prosecute or punish the offense committed under the old law
and if the law repealing the prior penal law fails to penalize the acts which constituted the offense defined and penalized
in the repealed law, the repealed law carries with it the deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and
sentence persons charged with violations of the old law prior to its repeal. Under the aforecited decisions this doctrine
applies to special laws and not only to the crimes punishable in the Revised Penal Code, such as the Import Control Law.
The Central Bank Circular No. 960 under which the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged is considered as a penal law because
violation thereof is penalized with specific reference to the provision of Section 34 of Republic Act 265, which penalizes
violations of Central Bank Circular No. 960, produces the effect cited in the Supreme Court decisions and since according
to the decisions that repeal deprives the Court of jurisdiction, this Court motu proprio dismisses all the eleven (11) cases
as a forestated in the caption, for not to do so opens this Court to charges of trying cases over which it has no more
jurisdiction.

This order was subsequently assailed in a petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Hon. Manuel T. Muro, Judge, RTC of Manila, Br. 54 and Imelda R. Marcos," docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
29349. When required to file her comment, private respondent Marcos failed to file any. Likewise, after t he appellate
court gave due course to the petition, private respondent was ordered, but again failed despite notice, to file an answer
to the petition and to show cause why no writ of preliminary injunction should issue. Eventually, on April 29, 1993, the
Court of Appeals rendered a decision 9 setting aside the order of August 13, 1992, and reinstating Criminal Cases Nos.
92-101959 to 92-101969.

In finding that respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of
dismissal, the appellate court held that:

The order was issued motu proprio, i.e., without any motion to dismiss filed by counsel for the accused, without giving an
opportunity for the prosecution to be heard, and solely on the basis of newspaper reports announcing that the President
has lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.

The newspaper report is not the publication required by law in order that the enactment can become effective and
binding. Laws take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation unless it is otherwise provided (Section 1, Executive Order No. 200). The full text of CB
Circular 1353, series of 1992, entitled "Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulation" was published in the August 27,
1992 issue of the Manila Chronicle, the Philippine Star and the Manila Bulletin. Per certification of the CB Corporate
Affairs Office, CB Circular No. 1353 took effect on September 2 . . . .

Considering that respondent judge admittedly had not seen the official text of CB Circular No. 1353, he was in no
position to rule judiciously on whether CB Circular No. 960, under which the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged, was already
repealed by CB Circular No. 1353. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

A cursory reading of the . . . provision would have readily shown that the repeal of the regulations on non -trade foreign
exchange transactions is not absolute, as there is a provision that with respect to violations of former regulations that are
the subject of pending actions or investigations, they shall be governed by the regulations existing at the time the cause
of action (arose). Thus his conclusion that he has lost jurisdiction over the criminal cases is precipitate and hasty. Had he
awaited the filing of a motion to dismiss by the accused, and given opportunity for the prosecution to comment/oppose
the same, his resolution would have been the result of deliberation, not speculation.

I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to
be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt
on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. 10

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and
general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known
to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. 11
The provincial guide in determining what facts may be assumed
to be judicially known is that of notoriety. 12
Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by
public records and facts of general notoriety. 13

To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be
dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. 14
This is because the court assumes that the matter is
so notorious that it will not be disputed. 15
But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of
the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact,
not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are
"commonly" known. 16

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by
mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. 17
Thus, facts which are universally known,
and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided the y are of
such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common
knowledge of every person. 18

Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a mere newspaper account which is
sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice removed, took judicial notice of the supposed lifting of foreign
exchange controls, a matter which was not and cannot be considered of common knowledge or of general notoriety.
Worse, he took cognizance of an administrative regulation which was not yet in force when the order of dismissal was
issued. Jurisprudence dictates that judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective. 19
The reason
is simple. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready
and unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a fact.

Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not proper for him, to have taken cogn izance of
CB Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet in force at the time the improvident order of dismissal was issued.

II. Central Bank Circular No. 1353, which took effect on September 1, 1992, further liberalized the foreign exchange
regulations on receipts and disbursements of residents arising from non-trade and trade transactions. Section 16 thereof
provides for a saving clause, thus:

Sec. 16. Final Provisions of CB Circular No. 1318 . - All the provisions in Chapter X of CB Circular No. 1318 insofar as they
are not inconsistent with, or contrary to the provisions of this Circular, shall remain in full force and effect: Provided,
however, that any regulation on non-trade foreign exchange transactions which has been repealed, amended or
modified by this Circular, violations of which are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall not be considered
repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to such pending
actions or investigations, the regulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern.

Respondent judge contends that the saving clause refers only to the provisions of Circular No. 1318, whereas the eleven
criminal cases he dismissed involve a violation of CB Circular No. 960. Hence, he insists, Circular No. 960 is deemed
repealed by the new circular and since the former is not covered by the saving clause in the latter, there is no more basis
for the charges involved in the criminal cases which therefore warrant a dismissal of the same. The contention is patently
unmeritorious.

Firstly, the second part of the saving clause in Circular No. 1353 explicitly provides that " any regulation on non-trade
foreign transactions which has been repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, violations of which are the subject
of pending actions or investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations
are concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, the regulations existing at the time
the cause of action accrued shall govern ." The terms of the circular are clear and unambiguous and leave no room for
interpretation. In the case at bar, the accused in the eleven cases had already been arraigned, had pleaded not guilty to
the charges of violations of Circular No. 960, and said cases had already been set for trial when Circular No. 1353 took
effect. Consequently, the trial court was and is supposed to proceed with the hearing of the cases in spite o f the
existence of Circular No. 1353.

Secondly, had respondent judge only bothered to read a little more carefully the texts of the circulars involved, he would
have readily perceived and known that Circular No. 1318 also contains a substantially similar saving clause as that found
in Circular No. 1353, since Section 111 of the former provides:

Sec. 111. Repealing clause. - All existing provisions of Circulars 365, 960 and 1028, including amendments thereto, with
the exception of the second paragraph of Section 68 of Circular 1028, as well as all other existing Central Bank rules and
regulations or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this Circular, are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly: Provided, however, that regulations, violations of which are the subject of pending actions or
investigations, shall be considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being
understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, the regulations existing at the time the cause of action
accrued shall govern.

It unequivocally appears from the section above quoted that although Circular No. 1318 repealed Circular No. 960, the
former specifically excepted from its purview all cases covered by the old regulations which were then pending at the
time of the passage of the new regulations. Thus, any reference made to Circular No. 1318 necessarily involves and
affects Circular No. 960.

III. It has been said that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a
manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge. 20
This means that a judge should not only
render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its
fairness and impartiality and as to his integrity. While a judge should possess proficiency in law in or der that he can
competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that he should act and behave in such a manner that the
parties before him should have confidence in his impartiality. Thus, it is not enough that he decides cases without bias
and favoritism. Nor is it sufficient that he in fact rids himself of prepossessions. His actuations should moreover inspire
that belief. Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. 21

Moreover, it has always heretofore been the rule that in disposing of controverted cases, judges should show their full
understanding of the case, avoid the suspicion of arbitrary conclusion, promote confidence in their intellectual integrity
and contribute useful precedents to the growth of the law. 22
A judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of
general law to particular instances, that ours is a government of laws and not of men, and that he violates his duty as a
minister of justice under such a system if he seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a
particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding on him. Such action may have detrimental
consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the
system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of
the law. 23 These are immutable principles that go into the very essence of the task of dispensing justice and we see no
reason why they should not be duly considered in the present case.
The assertion of respondent judge that there was no need to await publication of Circular No. 1353 for the reason that
the public announcement made by the President in several newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign exchange
controls is total, absolute, without qualification, and immediately effective, is beyond comprehension. As a judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, respondent is supposed to be well-versed in the elementary legal mandates on the
publication of laws before they take effect. It is inconceivable that respondent should insist on an altogether different and
illogical interpretation of an established and well-entrenched rule if only to suit his own personal opinion and, as it were,
to defend his indefensible action. It was not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at -times
human failing of yielding to first impressions. 24
He having done so, in the face of the foregoing premises, this Court is
hard put to believe that he indeed acted in good faith.

IV. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of respondent judge
in altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the
accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written
comment or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but is palpably
indicative of bad faith and partiality.

The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the cases as early as possible is no license for abuse of
judicial power and discretion, 25
nor does such professed objective, even if true, justify a deprivation of the prosecution's
right to be heard and a violation of its right to due process of
law. 26

The lightning speed, to borrow the words of complainants, with which respondent judge resolved to dismiss the cases
without the benefit of a hearing and without reasonable notice to the prosecution inevitably opened him to suspicion of
having acted out of partiality for the accused. Regardless of how carefully he may have evaluated changes in the factual
situation and legal standing of the cases, as a result of the newspaper report, the fact remains that he gave the
prosecution no chance whatsoever to show or prove that it had strong evidence of the guilt of the accused. To repeat, he
thereby effectively deprived the prosecution of its right to due process. 27
More importantly, notwithstanding the fact
that respondent was not sure of the effects and implications of the President's announcement, as by his own admission
he was in doubt whether or not he should dismiss the cases, 28
he nonetheless deliberately refrained from requiring the
prosecution to comment thereon. In a puerile defense of his action, respondent judge can but rhetorically ask: "What
explanation could have been given? That the President was talking 'through his hat' and should not be believed? That I
should wait for the publication of a still then non- existent CB Circular?" The pretended cogency of this ratiocination
cannot stand even the minutest legal scrutiny.

In order that bias may not be imputed to a judge, he should have the patience and circumspection to give the opposing
party a chance to present his evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's proofs might not be adequate to overthrow
the case for the other party. A display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of the trial is a norm of conduct which
is inconsistent with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 29
At the very least, respondent judge acted injudiciously
and with unjustified haste in the outright dismissal of the eleven cases, and thereby rendered his actuation highly
dubious.
V. It bears stressing that the questioned order of respondent judge could have seriously and substantially affected the
rights of the prosecution had the accused invoked the defense of double jeopardy, considering that the dismissal was
ordered after arraignment and without the consent of said accused. This could have spawned legal complications and
inevitable delay in the criminal proceedings, were it not for the holding of the Court of Appeals that respondent judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. This saved the day for the People since in the
absence of jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not set in. To stress this point, and as a caveat to trial courts against falling
into the same judicial error, we reiterate what we have heretofore declared:

It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial court's
judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is
denied due process. . . . .

Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is
thereby violated.

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdicti on.
Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue . . . which cannot be glossed o ver
or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in
disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction . . . . 30

It is also significant that accused Marcos, despite due notice, never submitted either her comment on or an answer to the
petition for certiorari as required by the Court of Appeals, nor was double jeopardy invoked in her defense. This serves to
further underscore the fact that the order of dismissal was clearly unjustified and erroneous. Furthermore , considering
that the accused is a prominent public figure with a record of influence and power, it is not easy to allay public skepticism
and suspicions on how said dismissal order came to be, to the consequent although undeserved discredit of the entire
judiciary.

VI. To hold a judge liable for rendering a manifestly unjust order through inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be
clearly shown that although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his duty that
diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of any public service. Negligence and
ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation,
and even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied, it nevertheless results logically and reasonably,
and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the legal precept. 31

In the present case, a cursory perusal of the comment filed by respondent judge reveals that no substantial argument
has been advanced in plausible justification of his act. He utterly failed to show any legal, factual, or even equitable
justification for the dismissal of the eleven criminal cases. The explanation given is no explanation at all. The strained an d
fallacious submissions therein do not speak well of respondent and cannot but further depreciate his probit y as a judge.
On this point, it is best that pertinent unedited excerpts from his comment 32
be quoted by way of graphic illustration
and emphasis:

On the alleged ignorance of the law imputed to me, it is said that I issued the Order dismissing the eleven (11) cases
against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos on the basis of newspaper reports referred to in paragraph 2 of the letter complaint
without awaiting the official publication of the Central Bank Circular. Ordinarily a Central Bank Circular/Resolution must
be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, but the lifting of "all foreign exchange
controls" was announced by the President of the Philippines WITHOUT QUALIFICATIONS; as published in the Daily
Globe, August 11, 1992" the government has lifted ALL foreign exchange controls," and in the words of the Philippine
Daily Inquirer report of the same date "The government yesterday LIFTED the LAST remaining restrictions on foreign
exchange transactions, . . ." (emphasis in both quotations supplied) not only the President made the announcement but
also the Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia joined in the announcement by saying that "the Mone tary Board arrived at
the decision after noting how the "partial liberalization" initiated early this year worked."

Therefore, because of the ABSOLUTE lifting of ALL restrictions on foreign exchange transactions, there was no need to
await the publication of the repealing circular of the Central Bank. The purpose of requiring publication of laws and
administrative rules affecting the public is to inform the latter as to how they will conduct their affairs and how they will
conform to the laws or the rules. In this particular case, with the total lifting of the controls, there is no need to await
publication. It would have been different if the circular that in effect repealed Central Bank Circular No. 960, under which
the accused was charged in the cases dismissed by me, had provided for penalties and/or modified the provisions of said
Circular No. 960.

The Complainants state that the lifting of controls was not yet in force when I dismissed the cases but it should be noted
that in the report of the two (2) newspapers aforequoted, the President's announcement of the lifting of controls was
stated in the present perfect tense (Globe) or past tense (Inquirer). In other words, it has already been lifted; the
announcement did not say that the government INTENDS to lift all foreign exchange restrictions but instead says that the
government "has LIFTED all foreign exchange controls," and in the other newspaper cited above, that "The government
yesterday lifted the last remaining restrictions on foreign exchange transactions". The lifting of the last remaining
exchange regulations effectively cancelled or repealed Circular No. 960.

The President, who is the Chief Executive, publicly announced the lifting of all foreign exchange regulations. The
President has within his control directly or indirectly the Central Bank of the Philippines, the Secretary of Finance being
the Chairman of the Monetary Board which decides the policies of the Central Bank.

No official bothered to correct or qualify the President's announcement of August 10, published the following day, nor
made an announcement that the lifting of the controls do not apply to cases already pending, not until August 17 (the
fourth day after my Order, and the third day after report of said order was published) and a fter the President said on
August 17, reported in the INQUIRER's issue of August 18, 1992, that the "new foreign exchange rules have nullified
government cases against Imelda R. Marcos, telling reporters that the charges against the widow of former Preside nt
Marcos "have become moot and academic" because of new ruling(s) which allow free flow of currency in and out of the
country" (Note, parenthetically, the reference to "new rules" not to "rules still to be drafted"). The INQUIRER report
continues: "A few hours later, presidential spokeswoman Annabelle Abaya said, RAMOS (sic) had "corrected himself'."
"He had been belatedly advised by the Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia and Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon that the
Monetary Board Regulation excluded from its coverage all criminal cases pending in court and such a position shall stand
legal scrutiny', Mrs. Abaya, said."

I will elaborate on two points:

1. If the President was wrong in making the August 10 announcement (published in August 11, 1992, newspapers) and in
the August 17 announcement, SUPRA, and thus I should have relied on the Presidential announcements, and there is
basis to conclude that the President was at the very least ILL-SERVED by his financial and legal advisers, because no one
bothered to advise the President to correct his announcements, not until August 17, 1992, a few hours after the President
had made another announcement as to the charges against Imelda Marcos having been rendered moot and academic.
The President has a lot of work to do, and is not, to my knowledge, a financier, economist, banker or lawyer. It therefore
behooved his subalterns to give him timely (not "belated") advice, and brief him on matters of immediate and
far-reaching concerns (such as the lifting of foreign exchange controls, designed, among others to encourage the entry
of foreign investments). Instead of rescuing the Chief Executive from embarrassment by assuming responsibility for
errors in the latter's announcement, these advisers have chosen to toss the blame for the consequence of their failing to
me, who only acted on the basis of announcements of their Chief, which had become of public knowledge.

xxx xxx xxx

The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume and expect that respondent judge is possessed with more than
ordinary credentials and qualifications to merit his appointment as a presiding judge in the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region, stationed in the City of Manila itself. It is, accordingly, disheartening and regrettable to
note the nature of the arguments and the kind of logic that respondent judge would want to impose on this Court
notwithstanding the manifest lack of cogency thereof. This calls to mind similar scenarios and how this Court reacted
thereto.

In one case, an RTC Judge was administratively charged for acquitting the accused of a violation of CB Circular No. 960
despite the fact that the accused was apprehended with US$355,349.00 while boarding a plane for Hongkong,
erroneously ruling that the State must first prove criminal intent to violate the law and benefit from the illegal act, and
further ordering the return of US$3,000.00 out of the total amount seized, on the mistaken interpretation that the CB
circular exempts such amount from seizure. Respondent judge therein was ordered dismissed from the government
service for gross incompetence and ignorance of the law. 33

Subsequently, the Court dismissed another RTC judge, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, for gross ignorance of the
law and for knowingly rendering an unjust order or judgment when he granted bail to an accused charged with raping
an 11-year old girl, despite the contrary recommendation of the investigating judge, and thereafter granted the motion
to dismiss the case allegedly executed by the complainant. 34

Similarly, an RTC judge who was described by this Court as one "who is ignorant of fairly elementary and quite familiar
legal principles and administrative regulations, has a marked penchant for applying unorthodox, even strange theories
and concepts in the adjudication of controversies, exhibits indifference to and even disdain for due process and the rule
of law, applies the law whimsically, capriciously and oppressively, and displays bias and impartiality," was dismissed from
the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government
or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. 35
Still in another administrative case, an RTJ judge was also dismissed by this Court for gross ignorance of the law after she
ordered, in a probate proceeding, the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of the complainant,
without affording due process to the latter and other interested parties. 36

Only recently, an RTC judge who had been reinstated in the service was dismissed after he acquitted all the accused in
four criminal cases for illegal possession of firearms, on the ground that there was no proof of malice or deliberate intent
on the part of the accused to violate the law. The Court found him guilty of gross ignorance of the la w, his error of
judgment being almost deliberate and tantamount to knowingly rendering an incorrect and unjust judgment. 37

ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court finds respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro guilty
of gross ignorance of the law. He is hereby DISMISSED from the service, such dismissal to carry with it cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from reemployment in the government
service. 38

Respondent is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST immediately from rendering any judgment or order, or continuing
any judicial action or proceeding whatsoever, effective upon receipt of this decision.

SO ORDERED.

**

G. R. No. 171701 February 8, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioner,

vs.
MA. IMELDA "IMEE" R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND "BONGBONG" R. MARCOS, JR., GREGORIO MA. ARANETA III,
IRENE R. MARCOS-ARANETA, YEUNG CHUN FAN, YEUNG CHUN HO, YEUNG CHUN KAM, and PANTRANCO
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review filed by the Republic of the Philippines assailing the Resolutions 1 issued by the
Sandiganbayan in connection with an alleged portion of the Marcoses’ supposed ill-gotten wealth.
This case involves ₱200 billion of the Marcoses’ alleged accumulated ill-gotten wealth. It also includes the alleged use of
the media networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9 for the Marcos family’s personal benefit; the alleged use of De Soleil
Apparel for dollar salting; and the alleged illegal acquisition and operation of the bus company Pantranco North Express,
Inc. (Pantranco).

The Facts

After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986, the first executive act of then President Corazon C. Aquino was to
create the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Pursuant to Executive Order No. 1, the PCGG was
given the following mandate:

Sec. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the following matters:

(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or
through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influ ence,
connections or relationship.

(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the Commission from time to
time.

(c) The adoption of safeguards to ensure that the above practices shall not be repeated in any m anner under the new
government, and the institution of adequate measures to prevent the occurrence of corruption.

Sec. 3. The Commission shall have the power and authority:

(a) To conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order.

(b) To sequester or place or cause to be placed under its control or possession any building or office wherein any
ill-gotten wealth or properties may be found, and any records pertaining thereto, in order to prevent their de struction,
concealment or disappearance which would frustrate or hamper the investigation or otherwise prevent the Commission
from accomplishing its task.

(c) To provisionally take over in the public interest or to prevent its disposal or dissipation, business enterprises and
properties taken over by the government of the Marcos Administration or by entities or persons close to former
President Marcos, until the transactions leading to such acquisition by the latter can be disposed of by the appropriate
authorities.

(d) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of facts by any person or entity that may render moot and
academic, or frustrate, or otherwise make ineffectual the efforts of the Commission to carry out its tasks under this order.
(e) To administer oaths, and issue subpoena requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and/or the production
of such books, papers, contracts, records, statement of accounts and other documents as may be material to the
investigation conducted by the Commission.

(f) To hold any person in direct or indirect contempt and impose the appropriate penalties, following the same
procedures and penalties provided in the Rules of Court.

(g) To seek and secure the assistance of any office, agency or instrumentality of the government.

(h) To promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order.

Thus, numerous civil and criminal cases were subsequently filed. One of the civil cases filed before the Sandiganbayan to
recover the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth was Civil Case No. 0002, now subject of this Petition.

On 16 July 1987, the PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic and assisted by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
a Complaint for Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages against Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was
later substituted by his estate upon his death; Imelda R. Marcos; and herein respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Irene
Marcos-Araneta, Bongbong Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III.

On 1 October 1987, the PCGG filed an amended Complaint to add Constante Rubio as defendant.

Again on 9 February 1988, it amended the Complaint, this time to include as defendants Nemesio G. Co and herein
respondents Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho, and Yeung Chun Fan.

For the third time, on 23 April 1990, the PCGG amended its Complaint, adding to its growing list of defendants Imelda
Cojuangco, the estate of Ramon Cojuangco, and Prime Holdings, Inc. 2

The PCGG filed a fourth amended Complaint, which was later denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated 2
September 1998.

The allegations contained in the Complaint specific to herein respondents are the following:3

29. Defendants Imelda (IMEE) R. Marcos-Manotoc, Tomas Manotoc, Irene R. Manotoc (sic) Araneta, Gregorio Ma.
Araneta III, and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., actively collaborated, with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos among others, in confiscating and/or unlawfully appropriating funds and other property, and in concealing the
same as described above. In addition, each of the said Defendants, either by taking undue advantage of their
relationship with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, or by reason of the above-described active
collaboration, unlawfully acquired or received property, shares of stocks in corporations, illegal payments such as
commissions, bribes or kickbacks, and other forms of improper privileges, income, revenues and benefits. Defendant
Araneta in particular made use of Asialand Development Corporation which is included in Annex "A" hereof as corporate
vehicle to benefit in the manner stated above.

31. Defendants Nemesio G. Co, Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung Chun Fan are the controlling stockholders
of Glorious Sun Fashion Manufacturing Corporation (Phils.). Through Glorious Sun (Phils.), they acted as fronts or
dummies, cronies or otherwise willing tools of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and/or the family, particularly of
Defendant Imelda (Imee) Marcos-Manotoc, in the illegal salting of foreign exchange 4 by importing denim fabrics from
only one supplier – a Hong Kong based corporation which was also owned and controlled by defendant Hong Kong
investors, at prices much higher than those being paid by other users of similar materials to the grave and irreparable
damage of Plaintiff.

Thus, petitioner set forth the following causes of action in its Complaint: 5

32. First Cause of Action: BREACH OF PUBLIC TRUST – A public office is a public trust.1avvphi1 By committing all the acts
described above, Defendants repeatedly breached public trust and the law, making them liable solidarily to Plaintiff. The
funds and other property acquired by Defendants following, or as a result of, their breach of public trust, some of which
are mentioned or described above, estimated to amount to ₱ 200 billion are deemed to have been acquired for the
benefit of Plaintiff and are, therefore, impressed with constructive trust in favor of Plaintiff and the Filipino people.
Consequently, Defendants are solidarily liable to restore or reconvey to Plaintiff all such funds and property thus
impressed with constructive trust for the benefit of Plaintiff and the Filipino people.

33. Second Cause of Action: ABUSE OF RIGHT AND POWER –

(a) Defendants, in perpetrating the unlawful acts described above, committed abuse of right and power which caused
untold misery, sufferings and damages to Plaintiff. Defendants violated, among others Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines;

(b) As a result of the foregoing acts, Defendants acquired the title to the beneficial interest in funds and other property
and concealed such title, funds and interest through the use of relatives, business associates, nominees, agents, or
dummies. Defendants are, therefore, solidarily liable to Plaintiff to return and reconvey all such funds and other property
unlawfully acquired by them estimated at TWO HUNDRED BILLION PESOS, or alternatively, to pay Plaintiff, solidarily, by
way of indemnity, the damage caused to Plaintiff equivalent to the amount of such funds or the value of other property
not returned or restored to Plaintiff, plus interest thereon from the date of unlawful acquisition until full payment thereof.

34. Third Cause of Action: UNJUST ENRICHMENT –

Defendants illegally accumulated funds and other property whose estimated value is ₱ 200 billion in violation of the
laws of the Philippines and in breach of their official functions and fiduciary obligations. Defendants, therefore, have
unjustly enriched themselves to the grave and irreparable damage and prejudice of Plaintiff. Defendants have an
obligation at law, independently of breach of trust and abuse of right and power, and as an alternative, to solidarily
return to Plaintiff such funds and other property with which Defendants, in gross evident bad faith, have unjustly
enriched themselves or, in default thereof, restore to Plaintiff the amount of such funds and the value of the other
property including those which may have been wasted, and/or lost estimated at ₱ 200 billion with interest thereon from
the date of unlawful acquisition until full payment thereof.

35. Fourth Cause of Action: ACCOUNTING –

The Commission, acting pursuant to the provisions of the applicable law, believe that Defendants, acting singly or
collectively, in unlawful concert with one another, and with the active collaboration of third persons, subje ct of separate
suits, acquired funds, assets and property during the incumbency of Defendant public officers, manifestly out of
proportion to their salaries, to their other lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property. Consequently,
they are required to show to the satisfaction of this Honorable Court that they have lawfully acquired all such funds,
assets and property which are in excess of their legal net income, and for this Honorable Court to decree that the
Defendants are under obligation to account to Plaintiff with respect to all legal or beneficial interests in funds, properties
and assets of whatever kind and wherever located in excess of the lawful earnings or lawful income from legitimately
acquired property.

36. Fifth Cause of Action – LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES –

(a) By reason of the unlawful acts set forth above, Plaintiff and the Filipino people have suffered actual damages in an
amount representing the pecuniary loss sustained by the latter as a result of the Defendants ’ unlawful acts, the
approximate value and interest of which, from the time of their wrongful acquisition, are estimated at ₱ 200 billion plus
expenses which Plaintiff has been compelled to incur and shall continue to incur in its effort to recover Defendants’
ill-gotten wealth all over the world, which expenses are reasonably estimated at ₱ 250 million. Defendants are, therefore,
jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff for actual damages in an amount reasonably estimated at ₱ 200 Billion Pesos and
to reimburse expenses for recovery of Defendants’ ill-gotten wealth estimated to cost ₱ 250 million or in such amount
as are proven during the trial.

(b) As a result of Defendants’ acts described above, Plaintiff and the Filipino people had painfully endured and suffered
moral damages for more than twenty long years, anguish, fright, sleepless nights, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and
moral shock as well as besmirched reputation and social humiliation before the international community.

(c) In addition, Plaintiff and the Filipino people are entitled to temperate damages for their sufferings which, by their very
nature are incapable of pecuniary estimation, but which this Honorable Court may determine in the exercise of its sound
discretion.

(d) Defendants, by reason of the above described unlawful acts, have violated and invaded the inalienable right of
Plaintiff and the Filipino people to a fair and decent way of life befitting a Nation with rich natural and human resources.
This basic and fundamental right of Plaintiff and the Filipino people should be recognized and vindicated by awarding
nominal damages in an amount to be determined by the Honorable Court in the exercise of its sound discretion.

(e) By way of example and correction for the public good and in order to ensure that Defendants’ unlawful, malicious,
immoral and wanton acts are not repeated, said Defendants are solidarily liable to Plaintiff for exemplary damages.

In the meantime, the Pantranco Employees Association-PTGWO (PEA-PTGWO), a union of Pantranco employees, moved
to intervene before the Sandiganbayan. The former alleged that the trust funds in the account of Pantranco North
Express, Inc. (Pantranco) amounting to ₱ 55 million rightfully belonged to the Pantranco employees, pursuant to the
money judgment the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) awarded in favor of the employees and against
Pantranco. Thus, PEA-PTGWO contested the allegation of petitioner that the assets of Pantranco were ill-gotten because,
otherwise, these assets would be returned to the government and not to the employees.
Thereafter, petitioner presented and formally offered its evidence against herein respondents. However, the latter
objected to the offer primarily on the ground that the documents violated the best evidence rule of the Rules of Court, as
these documents were unauthenticated; moreover, petitioner had not provided any reason for its failure to present the
originals.

On 11 March 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution 6 admitting the pieces of evidence while expressing some
reservation, to wit:

WHEREFORE, taking note of the objections of accused Marcoses and the reply thereto by the plaintiff, all the
documentary exhibits formally offered by the prosecution are hereby admitted in evidence; however, their evidentiary
value shall be left to the determination of the Court.

SO ORDERED.

Imelda R. Marcos; Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr.; Irene Marcos-Araneta and Gregorio Ma. Araneta III;
Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung Chun Fan; and the PEA-PTGWO subsequently filed their respective
Demurrers to Evidence.

On 6 December 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution, 7 which granted all the Demurrers to Evidence
except the one filed by Imelda R. Marcos. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Demurrer to Evidence filed by defendant Imelda R. Marcos is hereby DENIED.
The Demurrer to Evidence filed by defendants Maria Imelda Marcos Manotoc, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., Irene Marcos
Araneta, Gregorio Maria Araneta III, Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Fan, Yeung Chun Ho, and intervenor PEA-PTGWO,
are hereby GRANTED. The sequestration orders on the properties in the name of defendant Gregorio Maria Araneta III,
are accordingly ordered lifted.

SO ORDERED.

The Sandiganbayan denied Imelda R. Marcos’ Demurrer primarily because she had categorically admitted that she and
her husband owned properties enumerated in the Complaint, while stating that these properties had been lawfully
acquired. The court held that the evidence presented by petitioner constituted a prima facie case against her,
considering that the value of the properties involved was grossly disproportionate to the Marcos spouses’ lawful income.
Thus, this admission and the fact that Imelda R. Marcos was the compulsory heir and administratrix of the Marcos estate
were the primary reasons why the court held that she was responsible for accounting for the funds and properties
alleged to be ill-gotten.

Secondly, the court pointed out that Rolando Gapud, whose deposition was taken in Hong Kong, referred to her as o ne
directly involved in amassing ill-gotten wealth. The court also considered the compromise agreement between petitioner
and Antonio O. Floirendo, who disclosed that he had performed several business transactions upon the instructions of
the Marcos spouses.
With regard to the siblings Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr., the court noted that their involvement in
the alleged illegal activities was never established. In fact, they were never mentioned by any of the witnesses presented.
Neither did the documentary evidence pinpoint any specific involvement of the Marcos children.

Moreover, the court held that the evidence, in particular, exhibits "P," 8 "Q,"9 "R,"10 "S,"11 and "T,"12 were considered
hearsay, because their originals were not presented in court, nor were they authenticated by the persons who executed
them. Furthermore, the court pointed out that petitioner failed to provide any valid reason why it did not present the
originals in court. These exhibits were supposed to show the interests of Imee Marcos-Manotok in the media networks
IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9, all three of which she had allegedly acquired illegally. These exhibits also sought to prove her
alleged participation in dollar salting through De Soleil Apparel.

Finally, the court held that the relationship of respondents to the Marcos spouses was not enough reason to hold the
former liable.

In the matter of the spouses Irene Marcos and Gregorio Araneta III, the court similarly held that there was no testimonial
or documentary evidence that supported petitioner’s allegations against the couple. Again, petitioner failed to present
the original documents that supposedly supported the allegations against them. Instead, it merely presented
photocopies of documents that sought to prove how the Marcoses used the Potencianos13 as dummies in acquiring and
operating the bus company Pantranco.

Meanwhile, as far as the Yeungs were concerned, the court found the allegations against them baseless. Petitioner failed
to demonstrate how their business, Glorious Sun Fashion Garments Manufacturing, Co. Phils. (Glorious Sun), was used as
a vehicle for dollar salting; or to show that they themselves were dummies of the Marcoses. Again, the court held that the
documentary evidence relevant to this allegation was inadmissible for being mere photocopies, and that the affiants had
not been presented as witnesses.

Finally, the court also granted the Demurrer filed by PEA-PTGWO. While the court held that there was no evidence to
show that Pantranco was illegally acquired, the former nevertheless held that there was a need to first determine the
ownership of the disputed funds before they could be ordered released to the rightful owner.

On 20 December 2005, petitioner filed its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, insisting that there was a preponderance of
evidence to show that respondents Marcos siblings and Gregorio Araneta III had connived with their parents in acquiring
ill-gotten wealth. It pointed out that respondents were compulsory heirs to the deposed President and were thus obliged
to render an accounting and to return the ill-gotten wealth.

Moreover, petitioner asserted that the evidence established that the Yeungs were dummies of the Marcoses, and that
the Pantranco assets were part of the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth.

Finally, petitioner questioned the court’s ruling that the evidence previously admitted was later held to be inadmissible in
evidence against respondents, thus, depriving the former of due process.

Inadvertently, petitioner was not able to serve a copy of the motion on respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc and
Bongbong Marcos, Jr. But upon realizing the oversight, it immediately did so and filed the corresponding Manifestation
and Motion before the court. Nonetheless, this inadvertence prompted Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr.
to file their Motion for Entry of Judgment.

On 2 March 2006, the court issued the second assailed Resolution, 14 denying petitioner’s Motion. The court pointed out
its reservation in its Resolution dated 12 March 2002, wherein it said that it would still assess and weigh the evidentiary
value of the admitted evidence. Furthermore, it said that even if it included the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses,
these were not substantial to hold respondents liable. Thus, the court said:

WHEREFORE, there being no sufficient reason to set aside the resolution dated December 6, 2005, the plaintiff’s Motion
for Partial Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. The plaintiff ’ s Motion and Manifestation dated January 18, 2006
is GRANTED in the interest of justice. The Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by defendants Imee Marcos and Bongbong
Marcos is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioner raises the same issues it raised in its Motion for Reconsideration filed before the Sandiganbayan, to wit: 15

I. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE FILED BY RESPONDENTS MA. IMELDA
(IMEE) R. MARCOS AND FERDINAND (BONGBONG) R. MARCOS, JR., CONSIDERING THAT MORE THAN
PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE ON RECORD CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES THEIR CONNIVANCE WITH FORMER PRESIDENT
FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND OTHER MARCOS DUMMIES AND ABUSED THEIR POWER AND INFLUENCE IN
UNLAWFULLY AMASSING FUNDS FROM THE NATIONAL TREASURY.

II. PETITION PROVED, BY MORE THAN PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE, THAT RESPONDENT-SPOUSES GREGORIO
ARANETA III AND IRENE MARCOS ARANETA CONNIVED WITH FORMER PRESIDENT MARCOS IN UNLAWFULLY
ACQUIRING BUSINESS INTERESTS WHICH ARE GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT, AND IN A
MANNER PROHIBITED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND ANTI-GRAFT STATUTES.

III. RESPONDENTS IMEE, BONGBONG, AND IRENE MARCOS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF FORMER PRESIDENT
MARCOS AND ARE EQUALLY OBLIGED TO RENDER AN ACCOUNTING AND RETURN THE ALLEGED ILL-GOTTEN
WEALTH OF THE MARCOSES.

IV. THERE EXISTS CONCRETE EVIDENCE PROVING THAT RESPONDENTS YEUNG CHUN KAM, YEUNG CHUN FAN, AND
YEUNG CHUN HO ACTED AS DUMMIES FOR THE MARCOSES, AND USED THE CORPORATION, GLORIOUS SUN, AS A
CONDUIT IN AMASSING THE ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH. ACCORDINGLY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN GRANTING
THEIR DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.

V. THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE FILED BY INTERVENOR PEA-PTGWO WITH RESPECT TO THE PANTRANCO ASSETS
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED SINCE AMPLE EVIDENCE PROVES THAT THE SAID ASSETS INDUBITABLY FORM
PART OF THE MARCOS ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH, AS BUTTRESSED BY THE FACT THAT NO JUDICIAL DETERMINATION HAS
BEEN MADE AS TO WHOM THESE ASSETS RIGHTFULLY BELONG.
VI. THE SANDIGANBAYAN’S RULING WHICH REJECTED PEITITONER’S DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS ALLEGEDLY FOR BEING
"INADMISSIBLE" DIRECTLY CONTRADICTS ITS EARLIER RULING ADMITTING ALL SAID DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND
WAS RENDERED IN A MANNER THAT DEPRIVED PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

There is some merit in petitioner’s contention.

The Marcos Siblings and

Gregorio Araneta III

Closely analyzing petitioner’s Complaint and the present Petition for Review, it is clear that the Marcos siblings are being
sued in two capacities: first, as co-conspirators in the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth; and second, as the
compulsory heirs of their father, Ferdinand E. Marcos.16

With regard to the first allegation, as contained in paragraph 29 of its Third Amended Complaint quoted above,
petitioner accused the Marcos siblings of having collaborated with, participated in, and/or benefitted from their parents’
alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth. In particular, as far as Imee Marcos-Manotoc was concerned, she was accused
of dollar salting by using Glorious Sun to import denim fabrics from one supplier at prices much higher than those paid
by other users of similar materials. It was also alleged that the Marcoses personally benefitted from the sequestered
media networks IBC-13, BBC-2, and RPN-9, in which Imee Marcos had a substantial interest.

Irene Marcos-Araneta, on the other hand, was accused of having conspired with her husband, respondent Gregorio
Araneta III, in his being President Marcos’ conduit to Pantranco, thereby paving the way for the President’s ownership of
the company in violation of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 2 of the 1973 Constitution. 17

To prove the general allegations against the Marcos siblings, petitioner primarily relied on the Sworn Statement 18and the
Deposition19 of one of the financial advisors of President Marcos, Rolando C. Gapud, taken in Hong Kong on various
dates.

Meanwhile, to prove the participation and interests of Imee Marcos-Manotoc in De Soleil Apparel and the media
networks, petitioner relied on the Affidavits of Ramon S. Monzon, 20 Yeung Kwok Ying,21 and Rodolfo V. Puno;22 and the
transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) taken during the PCGG hearing held on 8 June 1987. 23

As to spouses Irene Marcos-Araneta and Gregorio Araneta III, petitioner submitted the Articles of Incorporation of
Northern Express Transport, Inc.; 24 the Memorandum of Agreement25 and the Purchase Agreement26 between
Pantranco and Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, Inc. (BLTBCo.); the Confidential Memorandum regarding the
sale of the Pantranco assets;27 the Affidavit28 and the letter to the PCGG29 of Dolores A. Potenciano, owner of BLTBCo.;
the Affidavit30 and the Memorandum31 of Eduardo Fajardo, who was then the Senior Vice-President of the Account
Management Group of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), which was in turn the creditor for the Pantranco sale; and the
Affidavit of Florencio P. Lucio, who was the Senior Account Specialist of the National Investment and Development
Corporation.32

Petitioner contends that these documents fall under the Rule’s third exception, that is, these documents are public
records in the custody of a public officer or are recorded in a public office. It is its theory that since these documents
were collected by the PCGG, then, necessarily, the conditions for the exception to apply had been met. Alternatively, it
asserts that the "documents were offered to prove not only the truth of the recitals of the documents, but also of other
external or collateral facts."33

The Court’s Ruling

Petitioner failed to observe the

best evidence rule.

It is petitioner’s burden to prove the allegations in its Complaint. For relief to be granted, the operative act on how and in
what manner the Marcos siblings participated in and/or benefitted from the acts of the Marcos couple must be clearly
shown through a preponderance of evidence. Should petitioner fail to discharge this burden, the Court is constrained
and is left with no choice but to uphold the Demurrer to Evidence filed by respondents.

First, petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents of the documents themselves. It is imperative,
therefore, to submit the original documents that could prove petitioner’s allegations.

Thus, the photocopied documents are in violation Rule 130, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best
evidence rule, which mandates that the evidence must be the original document itself. The origin of the best evidence
rule can be found and traced to as early as the 18th century in Omychund v. Barker, 34 wherein the Court of Chancery
said:

The judges and sages of the law have laid it down that there is but one general rule of evidence, the best that the nature
of the case will admit.

The rule is, that if the writings have subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by those witnesses.

The first ground judges have gone upon in departing from strict rules, is an absolute strict necessity. Secondly, a
presumed necessity. In the case of writings, subscribed by witnesses, if all are dead, the proof of one of their hands is
sufficient to establish the deed: where an original is lost, a copy may be admitted; if no copy, then a proof by witnesses
who have heard the deed, and yet it is a thing the law abhors to admit the memory of man for evidence.

Petitioner did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason why the originals were not presented, or any compelling
ground why the court should admit these documents as secondary evidence absent the testimony of the witnesses who
had executed them.

In particular, it may not insist that the photocopies of the documents fall under Sec. 7 of Rule 130, which states:

Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. ─ When the original of a document is in the custody of
a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved be a certified copy issued by the public officer
in custody thereof.

Secs. 19 and 20 of Rule 132 provide:

SECTION 19. Classes of documents. ─ For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or
private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tr ibunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

All other writings are private.

SECTION 20. Proof of private document . — Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence,
its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigations does not make them per se
public records referred to in the quoted rule.

Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno, who testified that these public and private
documents had been gathered by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in the course of the Commission ’s
investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. However, given the purposes for which these documents
were submitted, Magno was not a credible witness who could testify as to their contents. To reiterate, "[i]f the writings
have subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by those witnesses." Witnesses can testify only to those facts
which are of their personal knowledge; that is, those derived from their own perception.35 Thus, Magno could only testify
as to how she obtained custody of these documents, but not as to the contents of the documents themselves.

Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits or Memoranda submitted to the court. Basic is
the rule that, while affidavits may be considered as public documents if they are acknowledged before a notary public,
these Affidavits are still classified as hearsay evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not generally prepared by
the affiant, but by another one who uses his or her own language in writing the affiant's statements, parts of which may
thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the
affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.36

As to the copy of the TSN of the proceedings before the PCGG, while it may be considered as a public document since it
was taken in the course of the PCGG’s exercise of its mandate, it was not attested to by the legal custodian to be a
correct copy of the original. This omission falls short of the requirement of Rule 132, Secs. 24 and 25 of the Rules of
Court.37

In summary, we adopt the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, to wit:

Further, again contrary to the theory of the plaintiff, the presentation of the originals of the aforesaid exhibits is not
validly excepted under Rule 130, Section 3 (a), (b), and (d) of the Rules of Court. Under paragraph (d), when ‘the original
document is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office,’ presentation of the
original thereof is excepted. However, as earlier observed, all except one of the exhibits introduced by the plaintiff were
not necessarily public documents. The transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) of the proceedings purportedly before the
PCGG, the plaintiff’s exhibit "Q", may be a public document, but what was presented by the plaintiff was a mere
photocopy of the purported TSN. The Rules provide that when the original document is in the custody of a public officer
or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof. Exhibit "Q" was not a certified copy and it was not even signed by the stenographer who supposedly took down
the proceedings.

The rest of the above-mentioned exhibits cannot likewise be excepted under paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 3. Section
5 of the same Rule provides that ‘when the original documents has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part,
may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated.’ Thus, in order that secondary evidence may be admissible, there must be proof by
satisfactory evidence of (1) due execution of the original; (2) loss, destruction or unavailability of all such originals and (3)
reasonable diligence and good faith in the search for or attempt to produce the original. Non e of these requirements
were complied with by the plaintiff. Similar to exhibit ‘Q’, exhibits ‘P’, ‘R’, ‘S’, and ‘T’ were all photocopies. ‘P’, ‘R’, and
‘T’ were affidavits of persons who did not testify before the Court. Exhibit ‘S’ is a letter which is clearly a private
document. Not only does it not fall within the exceptions of Section 3, it is also a mere photocopy. As We previously
emphasized, even if originals of these affidavits were presented, they would still be considered hearsay evidence if the
affiants do not testify and identify them. 38

Thus, absent any convincing evidence to hold otherwise, it follows that petitioner failed to prove that the Marcos siblings
and Gregorio Araneta III collaborated with former President Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos and participated in the first
couple’s alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth insofar as the specific allegations herein were concerned.

The Marcos siblings are compulsory heirs.

To reiterate, in its third Amended Complaint, petitioner prays that the Marcos respondents be made to (1) pay for the
value of the alleged ill-gotten wealth with interest from the date of acquisition; (2) render a complete accounting and
inventory of all funds and other pieces of property legally or beneficially held and/or controlled by them, as well as their
legal and beneficial interest therein; (3) pay actual damages estimated at ₱200 billion and additional actual damages to
reimburse expenses for the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth estimated at ₱250 million or in such amount as may
be proven during trial; (4) pay moral damages amounting to ₱50 billion; (5) pay temperate and nominal damages, as
well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses in an amount to be proven during the trial; (6) pay exemplary damages in
the amount of ₱1 billion; and (7) pay treble judicial costs. 39

It must be stressed that we are faced with exceptional circumstances, given the nature and the extent of the properties
involved in the case pending with the Sandiganbayan. It bears emphasis that the Complaint is one for the reversion, the
reconveyance, the restitution and the accounting of alleged ill-gotten wealth and the payment of damages. Based on the
allegations of the Complaint, the court is charged with the task of (1) determining the properties in the Marcos estate that
constitute the alleged ill-gotten wealth; (2) tracing where these properties are; (3) issuing the appropriate orders for the
accounting, the recovery, and the payment of these properties; and, finally, (4) determining if the award of damages is
proper.

Since the pending case before the Sandiganbayan survives the death of Ferdinand E. Marcos, it is imperative therefore
that the estate be duly represented. The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due process of every
party to a litigation who may be affected by the intervening death. The deceased litigant is himself protected, as he
continues to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. 40 On that
note, we take judicial notice of the probate proceedings regarding the will of Ferdinand E. Marcos. In Republic of the
Philippines v. Marcos II,41 we upheld the grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of letters testamentary in solidum to
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. and Imelda Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand
E. Marcos.

Unless the executors of the Marcos estate or the heirs are ready to waive in favor of the state their right to defend or
protect the estate or those properties found to be ill-gotten in their possession, control or ownership, then they may not
be dropped as defendants in the civil case pending before the Sandiganbayan.

Rule 3, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as those parties-in-interest without whom there can be
no final determination of an action. They are those parties who possess such an interest in the controversy that a final
decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. Parties are
indispensable if their interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined with that
of the other parties.42

In order to reach a final determination of the matters concerning the estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos – that is, the
accounting and the recovery of ill-gotten wealth – the present case must be maintained against Imelda Marcos and
herein respondent Ferdinand "Bongbong" R. Marcos, Jr., as executors of the Marcos estate pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 87
of the Rules of Court. According to this provision, actions may be commenced to recover from the estate, real or
personal property, or an interest therein, or to enforce a lien thereon; and actions to recover damages for an injury to
person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executors.

We also hold that the action must likewise be maintained against Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Irene Marcos-Araneta on
the basis of the non-exhaustive list attached as Annex "A" to the Third Amended Complaint, which states that the listed
properties therein were owned by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and their immediate family. 43 It is only during the trial of
Civil Case No. 0002 before the Sandiganbayan that there could be a determination of whether these properties are
indeed ill-gotten or were legitimately acquired by respondents and their predecessors. Thus, while it was not proven that
respondents conspired in accumulating ill-gotten wealth, they may be in possession, ownership or control of such
ill-gotten properties or the proceeds thereof as heirs of the Marcos couple. Thus, their lack of participation in any illegal
act does not remove the character of the property as ill-gotten and, therefore, as rightfully belonging to the State.

Secondly, under the rules of succession, the heirs instantaneously became co-owners of the Marcos properties upon the
death of the President. The property rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted to another through the decedent’s death.44 In this concept, nothing prevents the heirs from exercising their
right to transfer or dispose of the properties that constitute their legitimes, even absent their declaration or absent the
partition or the distribution of the estate. In Jakosalem v. Rafols, 45 we said:

Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that "the possession of hereditary property is deemed to be transmitted to the heir
without interruption from the instant of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance be accepted." And Manresa
with reason states that upon the death of a person, each of his heirs "becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate
left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed
among the coowners of the estate while it remains undivided." (3 Manresa, 357; Alcala vs. Alcala, 35 Phil. 679.) And
according to article 399 of the Civil Code, every part owner may assign or mortgage his part in the common property,
and the effect of such assignment or mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted him in the partition
upon the dissolution of the community. Hence, in the case of Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528, where some of the heirs,
without the concurrence of the others, sold a property left by their deceased father, this Court, speaking thru its then
Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, said that the sale was valid, but that the effect thereof was limited to the share which
may be allotted to the vendors upon the partition of the estate. (Emphasis supplied)

Lastly, petitioner’s prayer in its Third Amended Complaint directly refers to herein respondents, to wit:

1. AS TO THE FIRST SECOND AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION – To return and reconvey to Plaintiff all funds and other
property acquired by Defendants during their incumbency as public officers, which funds and other property are
manifestly out of proportion to their salaries, other lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property which
Defendants have failed to establish as having been, in fact, lawfully acquired by them, alternatively, to solidarily pay
Plaintiff the value thereof with interest thereon from the date of acquisition until full payment.

2. AS TO THE FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION – to individually render to this Honorable Court a complete accounting and
inventory, subject to evaluation of Court-appointed assessors, of all funds and other property legally or beneficially held
and/or controlled by them, as well as their legal and beneficial interest in such funds and other property. (Emphasis
supplied)

In sum, the Marcos siblings are maintained as respondents, because (1) the action pending before the Sandiganbayan is
one that survives death, and, therefore, the rights to the estate must be duly protected; (2) they allegedly control,
possess or own ill-gotten wealth, though their direct involvement in accumulating or acquiring such wealth may not have
been proven.

Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun

Ho And Yeung Chun Fan
It is worthy to note that respondents draw our attention to American Inter-Fashion Corporation v. Office of the
President46 in which they contend that this Court considered the allegation of dollar salting as baseless. The cited case,
however, finds no application herein as the former merely ruled that Glorious Sun was denied due process when it was
not furnished by the Garments and Textile Export Board (GTEB) any basis for the cancellation of the export quota
because of allegations of dollar salting. That Decision did not prevent petitioner from adducing evidence to support its
allegation in Civil Case No. 0002 before the Sandiganbayan under a different cause of action.

Nevertheless, the allegations against Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung Chun Fan in the case at bar were also
proved to be baseless. Again, petitioner failed to illustrate how respondents herein acted as dummies of the Marcoses in
acquiring ill-gotten wealth. This Court notes that the Complaint against the Yeungs alleges that the Marcoses used
Glorious Sun – the garment company in which the Yeungs are controlling stockholders – for illegal dollar salting
through the company’s importation of denim fabrics from only one supplier at prices much higher than those being paid
by other users of similar materials. Notably, no mention of De Soleil Apparel was made.

To prove its allegations, petitioner submitted the controverted Exhibits "P," "Q," "R," "S," and "T." As earlier di scussed in
detail, these pieces of evidence were mere photocopies of the originals and were unauthenticated by the persons who
executed them; thus, they have no probative value. Even the allegations of petitioner itself in its Petition for Review are
bereft of any factual basis for holding that these documents undoubtedly show respondents’ participation in the alleged
dollar salting. The pertinent portion of the Petition reads:

To illustrate, the Affidavit dated May 29, 1987 executed by Mr. Ramon Monzon which was submitted as Exhibit P, showed
that respondent Imee Marcos-Manotoc owns and controls IBC-13, BBC-2 and (R)PN-9, and has interest in the De Soleil
Apparel. The testimony of Mr. Ramon Monzon during the hearing on June 8, 1987 before the Presidential Commission
on Good Government as shown in the Transcript of Stenographic Notes also affirmed his declarations in the Affidavit
dated May 29, 1987. The Transcript of Stenographic Notes dated June 8, 1987 was presented as Exhibit Q. Moreover, the
Affidavit dated March 21, 1986 of Yeung Kwok Ying which was presented as Exhibit R disclosed that Imee
Marcos-Manotoc is the owner of 67% equity of De Soleil Apparel. The letter dated July 17, 1984 signed by seven (7)
incorporators of De Soleil Apparel, addressed to Hongkong investors which was presented as Exhibit S confirmed that
the signatories hold or own 67% equity of the corporation in behalf of the beneficial owners previously disclosed to the
addressees. In addition to the foregoing documents, petitioner presented the Affidavit of Rodolfo V. Puno, Chairman of
the Garments and Textile Export Group (GTEB) as Exhibit T wherein he categorically declared that the majority of De
Soleil Apparel was actually owned by respondent Imee Marcos-Manotoc.47

The foregoing quotation from the Petition is bereft of any factual matter that warrants a consideration by the Court.
Straight from the horse’s mouth, these documents are only meant to show the ownership and interest of Imee Marcos
Manotoc in De Soleil – and not how respondent supposedly participated in dollar salting or in the accumulation of
ill-gotten wealth.

PEA-PTGWO
The PEA-PTGWO Demurrer to Evidence was granted primarily as a consequence of the prosecution’s failure to establish
that the assets of Pantranco were ill-gotten, as discussed earlier. Thus, we find no error in the assailed Order of the
Sandiganbayan.

A Final Note

As earlier adverted to, the best evidence rule has been recognized as an evidentiary standard since the 18th century. For
three centuries, it has been practiced as one of the most basic rules in law. It is difficult to conceive that one could have
finished law school and passed the bar examinations without knowing such elementary rule. Thus, it is deeply disturbing
that the PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) – the very agencies sworn to protect the interest of the state
and its people – could conduct their prosecution in the manner that they did. To emphasize, the PCGG is a highly
specialized office focused on the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, while the OSG is the principal legal defender of the
government. The lawyers of these government agencies are expected to be the best in the legal profession.

However, despite having the expansive resources of government, the members of the prosecution did not even bother
to provide any reason whatsoever for their failure to present the original documents or the witnesses to support the
government’s claims. Even worse was presenting in evidence a photocopy of the TSN of the PCGG proceedings instead
of the original, or a certified true copy of the original, which the prosecutors themselves should have had in their custody.
Such manner of legal practice deserves the reproof of this Court. We are constrained to call attention to this apparently
serious failure to follow a most basic rule in law, given the special circumstances surrounding this case.

The public prosecutors should employ and use all government resources and powers efficiently, effectively, honestly and
economically, particularly to avoid wastage of public funds and revenues. They should perform and discharge their
duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill.48

The basic ideal of the legal profession is to render service and secure justice for those seeking its aid. 49 In order to do this,
lawyers are required to observe and adhere to the highest ethical and professional standards. The legal profession is so
imbued with public interest that its practitioners are accountable not only to their clients, but to the public as well.

The public prosecutors, aside from being representatives of the government and the state, are, first and foremost,
officers of the court. They took the oath to exert every effort and to consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.50 Lawyers owe fidelity to the cause of the client and should be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in them.51 Hence, should serve with competence and diligence.52

We note that there are instances when this Court may overturn the dismissal of the lower courts in instances when it is
shown that the prosecution has deprived the parties their due process of law. In Merciales v. Court of Appeals,53we
reversed the Decision of the RTC in dismissing the criminal case for rape with homicide. In that case, it was very apparent
that the public prosecutor violated the due process rights of the private complainant owing to its blatant disregard of
procedural rules and the failure to present available crucial evidence, which would tend to prove the guilt or innocence
of the accused therein. Moreover, we likewise found that the trial court was gravely remiss in its duty to ferret out the
truth and, instead, just "passively watched as the public prosecutor bungled the case."
However, it must be emphasized that Merciales was filed exactly to determine whether the prosecution and the trial
court gravely abused their discretion in the proceedings of the case, thus resulting in the denial of the offended party ’s
due process. Meanwhile, the present case merely alleges that there was an error in the Sandiganbayan’s consideration of
the probative value of evidence. We also note that in Merciales, both the prosecution and the trial court were found to
be equally guilty of serious nonfeasance, which prompted us to remand the case to the trial court for further procee dings
and reception of evidence. Merciales is thus inapplicable to the case at bar.

Nevertheless, given the particular context of this case, the failure of the prosecution to adhere to something as basic as
the best evidence rule raises serious doubts on the level and quality of effort given to the government’s cause. Thus, we
highly encourage the Office of the President, the OSG, and the PCGG to conduct the appropriate investigation and
consequent action on this matter.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution
dated 6 December 2005 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. For the reasons stated herein, respondents Imelda
Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. shall be maintained as defendants in Civil Case No.
0002 pending before the Sandiganbayan.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the President so that it may look into the circumstances of this
case and determine the liability, if any, of the lawyers of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Presidential
Commission on Good Government in the manner by which this case was handled in the Sandiganbayan.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 200792 November 14, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
NEIL B. COLORADO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

For the Court's review is the Decision 1 dated August 19,2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03767,
which affirmed with modification the Decision 2 dated June 19, 2008 in Criminal Case No. 8-390 of the Regional Trial
Court ( RTC), Burgos, Pangasinan, Branch 70 finding herein accused-appellant Neil B. Colorado (Colorado) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

The Facts

Accused-appellant Colorado was charged with the crime of rape in an Information that reads:

That sometime in December, 2002 in the evening in Sitio x x x, Brgy. Iliw-Iliw, Burgos, Pangasinan, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the brother of AAA, 3 inside their house, by
means of force, threats and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with AAA, a twelve (12) years (sic) old girl, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice. 4

Colorado pleaded "not guilty" upon arraignment. During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following: (1) the
existence of the Medico Legal Certificate and the Birth Certificate of AAA; (2) that Colorado is a full-blood brother of AAA;
and (3) that Colorado and AAA lived under the same roof. 5 After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.

Records indicate that AAA was born on October 10, 1990. She was the second to the youngest in a family of twelve
siblings. Colorado was an older brother who lived with her, their parents and two other brothers, BBB and CCC, in Burgos,
Pangasinan.

AAA testified that sometime in December 2002, her parents attended a wedding celebration somewhere in Hermosa,
Dasol, Pangasinan, leaving behind AAA, Colorado and their two other brothers in the house. When their parents had not
yet arrived in the evening, Colorado committed the dastardly act against AAA. She was twelve (12) years old at that time,
while Colorado was already twenty-four (24) years old. He approached AAA, held her two hands, even threatened her
with a knife and covered her mouth with a handkerchief. He then removed AAA’s shorts and panty, inserted his penis
into the young girl’s vagina, then made a push and pull movement. AAA tried to resist her brother’s sexual aggression,
but miserably failed despite her efforts because of her brother’s greater strength. Colorado later left AAA, who put back
her shorts and underwear, but remained awake because of fear and trauma with what she had gone through.

On that same night, Colorado raped AAA twice more, unmindful of the presence of their two other brothers who were
then sleeping inside the room where Colorado ravished AAA. In both instances, Colorado still threatened AAA with a
knife, removed her shorts and panty, inserted his penis into his sister’s vagina, then performed the push and pull
movement. Colorado warned AAA that he would stab her should she report to anyone what he had done. AAA then did
not dare reveal these incidents to anybody, until she had the courage to report them to their mother.

Also in her testimony before the trial court, AAA disclosed that she had been raped by Colorado when she was just nine
(9) years old. She also revealed having been ravished on different dates by another brother, DDD, and a brother-in-law.

A Medico-Legal Certificate6 prepared by Dr. Ma. Teresa Sanchez (Dr. Sanchez), Medical Officer III of the Western
Pangasinan District Hospital who examined AAA on January 10, 2003, contained the following findings:

=INTERNAL EXAM FINDINGS:

-Nonparous Introitus-

-Hymenal laceration at 6 o’clock position with bleeding-

-Vagina admits 2 fingers with slight resistance-

-Uterus small-

-(+) bleeding-
x x x x7

Colorado testified for his defense. He denied having raped AAA, arguing that he was not living with AAA in their parents’
house in December 2002. Allegedly, he was at that time staying with an older sister in Osmeña, Dasol. Colorado claimed
that on the night of the alleged incident, he was fishing with his brother-in-law, and that they returned to Osmeña, Dasol
in the morning of the following day.

The Ruling of the RTC

On June 19, 2008, the RTC rendered its decision finding Colorado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to pay AAA the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 as civil indemnity. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused NEIL B. COLORADO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape. In view of the enactment of Republic Act [No.] 9346 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty –
this Court sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.

Further, accused shall indemnify [AAA] the amount of Php 50,000.00 as moral damages and Php 75,000.00 as civil
indemnity. (People vs. Ambray, 303 SCRA 709).

SO ORDERED.8

Feeling aggrieved, Colorado appealed from the RTC’s decision to the CA, reiterating in his appeal the defenses of denial
and alibi. He further sought his acquittal by arguing that the hymenal lacerations discovered by AAA’s examining doctor,
and considered by the trial court in determining his culpability, could have been caused not by him, but by the sexual
aggressions committed by their brother DDD or their brother-in-law unto AAA.

The Ruling of the CA

The CA affirmed Colorado’s conviction, but modified his civil liability. The decretal portion of its Decision dated August 19,
2011 reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan (Branch 70), dated 19 June 2008,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that, in addition to the civil indemnity of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00), appellant is ordered to pay the victim moral damages of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) instead
of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), and to pay exemplary damages of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).

SO ORDERED.9

Hence, this appeal. Both Colorado and the Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for plaintiff -appellee People of the
Philippines, dispensed with the filing with the Court of supplemental briefs, and adopted instea d their respective briefs
with the CA.

This Court’s Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

Colorado was charged with the crime of rape, qualified by the victim’s minority and her relationship to her ravisher, as
defined and penalized under Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as follows:

Art. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though non e of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.

xxxx

Art. 266-B. Penalties. – x x x.

xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;

xxxx

Both the RTC and the CA correctly ruled on the concurrence of the following elements of qualified rape, as defined in the
aforequoted provisions of the RPC: (1) that the victim is a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age; (2) that the
offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian or relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree,
or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and (3) that the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim
either through force, threat or intimidation; or when she is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means
of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority. 10

The age of the victim at the time of the crime’s commission is undisputed. During the pre-trial, the parties agreed on the
existence of AAA’s Certificate of Live Birth,11 a "certified true/xerox copy" of which forms part of the records and provides
that AAA was born on October 10, 1990. AAA was then only 12 years old in December 2002, a significant fact that was
sufficiently alleged in the Information. In People v. Pruna, 12 we held that the best evidence to prove the age of the
offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
As to the second element, there is no dispute that Colorado is a full-blood brother of AAA, as this was also among the
parties’ stipulated facts during the case’s pre-trial.

The grounds now being raised by Colorado to justify his exoneration delve mainly on the alleged absence of the crime’s
third element. He denies AAA’s claim that he had ravished her, raising the defense of alibi and the alleged doubt and
suspicion that should be ascribed to AAA’s accusations. On this matter, settled is the rule that the findings of the trial
court on the credibility of a witness deserve great weight, given the clear advantage of a trial judge in the appreciation of
testimonial evidence. We have repeatedly recognized that the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies, because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and to note their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of
witnesses, in the process of unearthing the truth. The rule finds even more stringent application where the said findings
are sustained by the CA. Thus, except for compelling reasons, we are doctrinally bound by the trial court’s assessment of
the credibility of witnesses.13

We then take due consideration of the trial court’s findings of fact, its assessment of AAA’s credibility, her testimony and
the manner by which her statements were relayed, as discussed in the RTC’s Decision convicting Colorado and which
reads in part:

AAA testified directly and categorically how she was raped by the accused Neil Colorado who is her full -blood brother
sometime in the night of December 2002.

That while AAA was sleeping with her older brother BBB and her younger brother CCC, accused went near her and held
her two (2) hands, covered her mouth with handkerchief. Thereafter, accused removed her short pants and underwear,
and inserted his penis into her vagina. After removing his penis, accused went back to sleep.

AAA however could no longer sleep because she was already afraid that the accused will return which the accused did.
For the second time, accused raped AAA. Accused covered her mouth with a handkerchief, inserted his penis into her
vagina and accused did the push and pull movement.

xxxx

When AAA declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that would be necessary to show that rape did take
place (PP. vs. Maglantay, 304 SCRA 272), for as long as the testimony of AAA is free from serious or major incongruence
and unbridled by suspicion or doubt. The testimony of AAA is simple, candid, straightforward and consistent on material
points detailing every single bestial act of her brother in ravishing her. Moreover, AAA on several occasions (August 1,
2006 and September 19, 2006) was on the verge of crying and in fact shed tears during her direct examination. Crying of
the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape charge with the verity born out of human nature
and experience (PP. vs. Agustin, 365 SCRA 167; PP vs. Garcia, supra). Though a medical certificate is not necessary to
prove the commission of rape (PP. vs. Bares, 355 SCRA 435), but when the victim’s testimony is corroborated by the
physician’s findings of penetration (Exh. "A") or hymenal laceration as when the hymen is no longer intact, there is
sufficient foundation to find the existence of the essential requisite of carnal knowledge (PP. vs. Montejo, 355 SCRA 210;
PP. vs. Bation, 305 SCRA 253). Further, no young and decent woman in her right mind especially of tender age as that of
AAA who is fifteen (15) years old would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and
thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by her desire to obtain
justice for the wrong committed against her. (PP. vs. Albior, 352 SCRA 35; PP. vs. Vidal, 353 SCRA 194) 14 (Emphasis ours)

These observations were affirmed by the CA on appeal, as it held:

A conscientious review of the records shows that AAA’s testimonies in this case bear the marks of truthfulness,
spontaneity and sincerity. She was crying while answering questions about the rape incident. Obviously, the process
called to her mind not only the mere details of the sexual abuse but the lingering hurt and pain that come with it. Her
tears were unimpeachable testaments to the truth of her allegations.

xxxx

During cross-examination, AAA remained steadfast, unwavering and spontaneous. Significantly also, her testimony is
supported by the medical evidence on record, which showed that she had a laceration in her hymen and was thus in a
non-virgin state.15 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

The Court finds no cogent reasons to overturn these findings. Indeed, it was established that Colorado succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of the victim, employing force, threat and intimidation that allowed him to consummate his
bestial act. AAA had positively identified Colorado as her rapist. Such identification of Colorado could not have been
difficult for AAA considering that Colorado was a brother who lived with her in their parents’ house. Even the failure of
AAA to identify the exact date of the crime’s commission is inconsequential to Colorado’s conviction. In rape cases, the
date of commission is not an essential element of the offense; what is material is its occurrence, 16 a fact that was
sufficiently established given AAA’s and her testimony’s credibility.

Contrary to Colorado’s contention, AAA’s claim that two other siblings were sleeping in the same room where she was
raped did not render her statements incredible. Time and again, we have taken into consideration how rapists are not
deterred by the presence of people nearby, such as the members of their own family inside the same room, with the
likelihood of being discovered, since lust respects no time, locale or circumstance. 17

As against AAA’s credible testimony, Colorado ’s defenses lack persuasion.1âwphi1 While Colorado denied in his
testimony that he lived with AAA, such fact was already admitted by the parties during the pre-trial. His defense that he
was in Osmeña, Dasol at the time of the crime’s commission was even uncorroborated by any other witness. By
jurisprudence, denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to
merit credibility. Mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration
by the child-victim of the identity of the appellant and his involvement in the crime attributed to him. 18Moreover, for the
defense of alibi to prosper, two requisites must concur: first, the appellant was at a different place at the time the crime
was committed; and second, it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of its commission. 19
The defense failed to establish these requisites. On the contrary, Colorado testified that from Osmeña, where he claimed
to have lived with an older sister, he could normally reach his parents’ house by a three-hour walk. There were also other
means of transportation in these two places, 20 which then could have allowed Colorado to travel the distance over a
shorter period of time.
Colorado also questions the weight of Dr. Sanchez’s medico-legal certificate, arguing that AAA’s hymenal lacerations
could have resulted from the sexual aggressions allegedly committed against her by DDD and their brother-in-law. Such
contention, however, deserves no consideration, given that results of an offended party’s medical examination are
merely corroborative in character. As explained by the Court in People v. Balonzo, 21 a medical certificate is not necessary
to prove the commission of rape, as even a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for
rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative in character and not essential to conviction. An accused can still be
convicted of rape on the basis of the sole testimony of the private complainant. 22 Furthermore, laceration of the hymen,
even if considered the most telling and irrefutable physical evidence of sexual assault, is not always essential to establish
the consummation of the crime of rape. In the context that is used in the RPC, "carnal knowledge," unlike its ordinary
connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be
ruptured.23 Thus, even granting that AAA’s lacerations were not caused by Colorado, the latter could still be declared
guilty of rape, after it was established that he succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the victim.

Given the foregoing, the CA did not err in affirming the trial court's conviction of Colorado. The crime is qualified by the
victim's minority and her relationship to Colorado, yet the appellate court correctly explained that the imposable penalty
is reclusion pe1petua, in lieu of death, taking into account the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346 that prohibit the
imposition of death penalty in criminal cases. We however clarify that Colorado shall be ineligible for parole, a
requirement under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 that was not mentioned in the assailed CA decision and which, must then
be rectified by this Decision.24 The civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages, as modified and awarded by
the CA, conform to prevailing jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated August 19, 2011 of the Com1 of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
03767 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant Neil B. Colorado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion pe1petua, without eligibility for parole. The accused is likewise ordered to pay legal intere st on all damages
awarded at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision until fully satisfied.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 192221 November 13, 2012

CASIMIRA S. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOHN LLOYD M. PACETE, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

With the adoption of automated election system in our country, one of the emerging concerns is the application of the
law on nuisance candidates under a new voting system wherein voters indicate their choice of candidates by shading the
oval corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate printed on the ballots, instead of writing the candidate's name
on the appropriate space provided in the ballots as in previous manual elections. If the name of a nuisance candidate
whose certificate of candidacy had been cancelled by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) was still included or
printed in the official ballots on election day,should the votes cast for such nuisance candidate be considered stray or
counted in favor of the bona fide candidate?

The Case

In this petition for certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief/s under Rule 65 in conjunction with Section 2, Rule 64 of t he
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, filed on May 31, 2010, Casimira S. Dela Cruz (petitioner) assails COMELEC
Resolution No. 88441 considering as stray the votes cast in favor of certain candidates who were either disqualified or
whose COCs had been cancelled/denied due course but whose names still appeared in the official ballots or certified lists
of candidates for the May 10, 2010 elections.

Petitioner prays for the following reliefs:

1. Upon the filing of the instant Petition, a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued
enjoining the taking of oath and assumption into office of Private Respondent John Lloyd Pacete as Vice -Mayor of the
Municipality of Bugasong;

2. After the Petition is submitted for resolution, a decision be rendered granting the instant Petition and:

(a) declaring as null and void the portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 8844 considering as stray the votes cast in favor of
the disqualified nuisance candidate Aurelio N. Dela Cruz;

(b) ordering that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio N. Dela Cruz be counted and tallied in favor of Petitioner Casimira S.
Dela Cruz pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 4116; and

(c) requiring the Regional Trial Court of the Province of Antique where the Petitioner’s Election Protest is pending to
proclaim as Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes after
the votes in favor of nuisance candidate Aurelio N. Dela Cruz is counted and tallied to the votes garnered by Petitioner
Casimira S. Dela Cruz.

3. Permanently enjoining the taking of oath and assumption into office of Private Respondent if Petitioner is proclaimed
as the Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of Antique.

Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for. 2

Factual Antecedents

In the 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections, petitioner ran for and was elected member of the Sangguniang Bayan(SB) of
Bugasong, Antique. On November 28, 2009, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy 3 for the position of Vice-Mayor
of the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of Antique under the ticket of the National People ’s Coalition (NPC).
Subsequently, Aurelio N. Dela Cruz (Aurelio) also filed a certificate of candidacy 4 for the same position.

On December 6, 2009, petitioner filed a petition 5 to declare Aurelio a nuisance candidate on the ground that he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the vice-mayoralty position to put the election process in mockery and to cause confusion
among voters due to the similarity of his surname with petitioner ’s surname. Petitioner emphasized that she is
considered a very strong candidate for the said position having been elected as member of the SB for three consecutive
terms under the ticket of the NPC and obtained the fifth (2001), fourth (2004) and third (2007) highest number of votes.
In contrast, Aurelio is an unknown in the political scene with no prior political experience as an elective official and no
political party membership. Being a retiree and having no known business, Aurelio has no sufficient source of income but
since the 2007 elections petitioner’s opponents have been prodding him to run for the same position as petitioner in
order to sow confusion and thwart the will of the voters of Bugasong. Petitioner further cited Aurelio’s miserable showing
in the previous local elections when he ran and garnered only 126 and 6 votes forthe positionsof SB member (May 2007)
and barangay captain of Barangay Maray, Bugasong (November 2007), respectively. Citing Bautista v. COMELEC, 6
petitioner asserted that these circumstances clearly demonstrate Aurelio’s lack of a bona fide intention and capability to
run for the position of Vice-Mayor, thus preventing a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.

On January 29, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution 7 declaring Aurelio as a nuisance candidate and
cancelling his certificate of candidacy for the vice-mayoralty position in Bugasong.

Despite the declaration of Aurelio as a nuisance candidate, however, his name was not deleted in the Certified List of
Candidates8 and Official Sample Ballot9 issued by the COMELEC. The names of the candidates for Vice-Mayor, including
Aurelio and respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete, appeared on the Official Sample Ballot as follows:

VICE-MAYOR
Vote for not more than 1

O 1. DELA CRUZ, Aurelio N. O 2. DELA CRUZ, Casimira O 3. PACETE, John Lloyd M.

"REL" (IND.) S. "MIRAY" (NPC) "BINGBING" (NP)

Consequently, petitioner filed on March 23, 2010, an Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion10 praying, among other things,
that COMELEC issue an order directing the deletion of Aurelio’s name from the Official List of Candidates for the position
of Vice-Mayor, the Official Ballots, and other election paraphernalia to be used in Bugasong for the May 2010 elections.
She also prayed that in the event Aurelio’s name can no longer be deleted in time for the May 10, 2010 elections, the
COMELEC issue an order directing that all votes cast in favor of Aurelio be credited in her favor, in accordance with
COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 dated May 7, 2001.

On May 1, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 8844 11 listing the names of disqualified candidates,
including Aurelio, and disposing as follows:

NOW THEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, as follows:

1. to delete the names of the foregoing candidates from the certified list of candidates; and

2. to consider stray the votes of said candidates, if voted upon. 12 (Emphasis supplied)

On May 10, 2010, the first automated national and local elections proceeded as scheduled. Aurelio’s name remained in
the official ballots.
During the canvassing of the votes by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) of Bugasong on May 13, 2010,
petitioner insisted that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio be counted in her favor. However, the MBOC refused, citing
Resolution No. 8844. The Statement of Votes by Precinct for Vice-Mayor of Antique-Bugasong13 showed the following
results of the voting:

TOTAL RANK

DELA CRUZ, AURELIO N. 532 3

DELA CRUZ, CASIMIRA S. 6389 2

PACETE, JOHN LLOYD M. 6428 1

Consequently, on May 13, 2010, private respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete was proclaimed Vice-Mayor of Bugasong by
the MBOC of Bugasong.14

On May 21, 2010, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of the Province of Antique an election protest praying for (1)
the tallying in her favor of the 532 votes cast for Aurelio; (2) the annulment of respondent Pacete’s proclamation as
Vice-Mayor of Bugasong; and (3) her proclamation as winning candidate for the position of Vice-Mayor of Bugasong.

Petitioner’s Arguments

Considering that private respondent won by a margin of only thirty-nine (39) votes over petitioner’s 6,389 votes,
petitioner contends that she would have clearly won the elections for Vice-Mayor of Bugasong had the MBOC properly
tallied or added the votes cast for Aurelio to her votes. Thus, petitioner insists she would have garnered a total of 6,921
votes as against the 6,428 votes of private respondent. By issuing a directive to consider the votes cast for Aurelio as
stray votes instead of counting the same in favor of petitioner in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, the
COMELEC’s First Division gravely abused its discretion.

Petitioner argues that Resolution No. 8844 violates her constitutional right to equal protection of the laws because there
is no substantial difference between the previous manual elections and the automated elections conducted in 2010 to
justify non-observance of Resolution No. 4116 issued in 2001,particularly on the matter of votes cast for a candidate who
was declared a nuisance candidate in a final judgment where such nuisance candidate has the same name with that of
the bona fide candidate. Moreover, in contrast to the assailed resolution, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 properly
recognized the substantial distinctions between and among (a) disqualified candidates, (b) nuisance candidates whose
names are similar to those of the bona fide candidates, (c) nuisance candidates who do not have similar names with
those of the bona fide candidates, and (d) candidates who had voluntarily withdrawn their certificates of candidacy. As a
result of the failure of the COMELEC’s First Division to make these important distinctions when it issued Resolution No.
8844 that applies to disqualified candidates, nuisance candidates and all other candidates whose certificates of
candidacy had been cancelled or denied course, petitioner’s right to due process was clearly violated, and only made
possible the very evil that is sought to be corrected by the former rule not to consider the votes cast for the nuisance
candidate as stray but count them in favor of the bona fide candidate.
Respondents’ Arguments

COMELEC maintains that there is a presumption of validity with respect to its exercise of supervisory or regulatory
authority in the conduct of elections. Also, the time-honored rule is that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and
that the party assailing it must discharge the burden of clearly and convincingly proving its invalidity. Thus, to strike down
a law as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the law prohibits, the statute permits.
In this case, petitioner miserably failed to prove a clear breach of the Constitution; she merely invokes a violation of the
equal protection clause and due process of law without any basis.

On the claim of equal protection violation, COMELEC contends that there is a substantial distinction between a manual
election where Resolution No. 4116 applies, and an automated election governed by Resolution No. 8844. While the
votes for the nuisance candidate were not considered stray but counted in favor of the bona fide candidate, this is no
longer the rule for automated elections. COMELEC cites the following factors which changed the previous rule: (1) the
official ballots in automated elections now contain the full names of the official candidates so that when a voter shaded
an oval, it was presumed that he carefully read the name adjacent to it and voted for that candidate, regardless of
whether said candidate was later declared disqualified or nuisance; (2) since the names of the candidates are clearly
printed on the ballots, unlike in manual elections when these were only listed in a separate sheet of paper attached to the
ballot secrecy folder, the voter’s intention is clearly to vote for the candidate corresponding to the shaded oval; (3) the
rules on appreciation of ballots under Section 211, Article XVIII of the Omnibus Election Code apply only to elections
where the names of candidates are handwritten in the ballots; and (4) with the use of the automated election system
where the counting of votes is delegated to the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines, pre-proclamation
controversies, including complaints regarding the appreciation of ballots and allegations of misreading the names of the
candidates written, were flaws which the automation rectified. Aside from being germane to the purpose of our election
laws, Resolution No. 8844 is not limited to existing conditions as it is applicable to all persons of the same class even in
succeeding elections, and covered all disqualified and nuisance candidates without distinction.

Lastly, COMELEC asserts there is no violation of the right to due process. For public office is not a property right and no
one has a vested right to any public office.

On his part, private respondent Pacete asserts that petitioner cannot validly claim the votes cast for Aurelio in view of the
rule provided in Section 211 (24) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, which cannot be supplanted by Resolution No. 4116. He also
cites an annotation on election law, 15 invoking this Court’s ruling in Kare v. COMELEC16 that the aforesaid provision when
read together with Section 72, are understood to mean that "any vote cast in favor of a candidate, whose disqualification
has already been declared final regardless of the ground therefor, shall be considered stray."

Private respondent also points out the fact that on May 4, 2010, COMELEC caused the publication of Resolution No. 8844
in two newspapers of general circulation in the country. There was thus an earnest effort on the part of COMELEC to
disseminate the information, especially to the voters in Bugasong, Antique, that the name of Aurelio was printed on the
official ballots as one of the candidates for Vice-Mayor. Said voters were amply forewarned about the status of Aurelio’s
candidacy and the consequences that will obtain should he still be voted for. Additionally, the petitioner and Aurelio bear
different first names, female and male, respectively; petitioner and her political party engaged in a massive voter
education during the campaign period, emphasizing to her supporters that she was given the corresponding number
("2") in the official ballots, and the voters should be very circumspect in filling up their ballots because in case of error in
filling up the same, they will not be given replacement ballots. As to the Judicial Affidavits of those who voted for
petitioner attesting to the fact of mistakenly shading the oval beside the name of Aurelio in the ballots, wh ich was
attached to the petition, petitioner in effect would want this Court to sit in judgment as trier of facts.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

The only question that may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Section 2, Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court is
whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 17 For a
petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.
There is also grave abuse of discretion when there is a contravention of the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence.18

COMELEC being a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country, its factual findings,
conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by this
Court in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law. 19 In this case, Resolution
No. 8844 issued by COMELEC clearly contravened existing law and jurisprudence on the legal effect of declaration of a
candidate as a nuisance candidate, especially in the case of nuisance candidates who have the same surnames as those
of bona fide candidates.

Private respondent argues that no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed on COMELEC when it issued Resolution No.
8844 which is simply consistent with the rule laid down in Section 211 (24), Article XVIII and Section 72, Article IX of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). Said provisions state:

SEC. 72. Effects of Disqualification cases and priority. -- The Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of
disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven
days before the election in which the disqualification is sought.Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his
proclamation and assumption of office.

SEC. 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. – In the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be
presumed to be valid unless there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection. The board of election inspectors shall
observe the following rules, bearing in mind that the object of the election is to obtain the expression of the voter ’s will:

xxxx

24. Any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been disqualified by final judgment shall be considered as stray and
shall not be counted but it shall not invalidate the ballot.
Private respondent cites the case of Kare v. COMELEC 20 where this Court, construing the above provisions, stated:

According to the Comelec, Section 211 (24) of the OEC is a clear legislative policy that is contrary to the rule that the
second placer cannot be declared winner.

We disagree.

The provision that served as the basis of Comelec’s Decision to declare the second placer as winner in the mayoral race
should be read in relation with other provisions of the OEC. Section 72 thereof, as amended by RA 6646, provides as
follows:

xxxx

When read together,these provisions are understood to mean that any vote cast in favor of a candidate, whose
disqualification has already been declared final regardless of the ground therefor, shall be considered stray. The Comelec
misconstrued this provision by limiting it only to disqualification by conviction in a final judgment.

Obviously, the disqualification of a candidate is not only by conviction in a final judgment; the law lists other grounds for
disqualification. It escapes us why the Comelec insists that Section 211(24) of the OEC is strictly for those convicted by a
final judgment. Such an interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the other provisions of the election code. 21 (Emphasis
supplied; italics not ours)

Private respondent thus suggests that regardless of the ground for disqualification, the votes cast for the disqualified
candidate should result in considering the votes cast for him as stray as explicitly mandated by Section 211(24) in relation
to Section 72 of the OEC.

We disagree.

It bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all disqualification cases and not to petitions to canc el or deny
due course to a certificate of candidacy such as Sections 69 (nuisance candidates) and 78 (material representation shown
to be false). Notably, such facts indicating that a certificate of candidacy has been filed "to put the election process in
mockery or disrepute, or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates,
or other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the
office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the
electorate" are not among those grounds enumerated in Section 68 (giving money or material consideration to influence
or corrupt voters or public officials performing electoral functions, election campaign overspending and soliciting,
receiving or making prohibited contributions) of the OEC or Section 40 22 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government
Code of 1991).

In Fermin v. COMELEC,23 this Court distinguished a petition for disqualification under Section 68 and a petition to cancel
or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy (COC) under Section 78. Said proceedings are governed by different
rules and have distinct outcomes.
At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be interchanged or confused with a "Section 68"
petition. They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in different eventualities. Private
respondent’s insistence, therefore, that the petition it filed before the COMELEC in SPA No. 07-372 is in the nature of a
disqualification case under Section 68, as it is in fact captioned a "Petition for Disqualification," does not persuade the
Court.

xxxx

To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or
Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a
statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different eff ects. While a
person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate
is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
Thus, in Miranda v. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can
validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person
whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never
considered a candidate.24 (Additional emphasis supplied)

Clearly, a petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC under Section 69 as in Section 78 cannot be treated in the
same manner as a petition to disqualify under Section 68 as what COMELEC did when it applied the rule provided in
Section 72 that the votes cast for a disqualified candidate be considered stray, to those registered candidates whose
COC’s had been cancelled or denied due course. Strictly speaking, a cancelled certificate cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Said votes cannot be counted in favor of the candidate whose COC was
cancelled as he/she is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a COC. But should these votes cast for the
candidate whose COC was cancelled or denied due course be considered stray?

COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 issued in relation to the finality of resolutions or decisions in special action cases,
provides:

This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the commission en banc or division, particularly on special
actions (disqualification cases).

special action cases refer to the following:

(a) petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;

(b) petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;

(c) petition to disqualify a candidate; and

(d) petition to postpone or suspend an election.

Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions or resolutions on special action
cases (disqualification cases) the Commission, RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:
(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on disqualification cases shall become final and executory
after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court;

xxx

(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates, particularly whether the nuisance candidate has the
same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory;

(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where the nuisance candidate h as the
same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for
reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not be considered stray but shall be counted and
tallied for the bona fide candidate.

All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or repealed. (Emphasis supplied) 25

The foregoing rule regarding the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such under a final judgment was
applied by this Court in Bautista v. COMELEC 26 where the name of the nuisance candidate Edwin Bautista (having the
same surname with the bona fide candidate) still appeared on the ballots on election day because while the COMELEC
rendered its decision to cancel Edwin Bautista’s COC on April 30, 1998, it denied his motion for reconsideration only on
May 13, 1998 or three days after the election. We said that the votes for candidates for mayor separately tallied on orders
of the COMELEC Chairman was for the purpose of later counting the votes and hence are not really str ay votes. These
separate tallies actually made the will of the electorate determinable despite the apparent confusion caused by a
potential nuisance candidate.

But since the COMELEC decision declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was not yet final on electionday, this
Court also considered those factual circumstances showing that the votes mistakenly deemed as "stray votes" refer to
only the legitimate candidate (petitioner Efren Bautista) and could not have been intended for Edwin Bautista. We furth er
noted that the voters had constructive as well as actual knowledge of the action of the COMELEC delisting Edwin Bautista
as a candidate for mayor.

A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention of the voter. This is, however, not the
situation in the case at bar. Significantly, it has also been established that by virtue of newspaper releases and other
forms of notification, the voters were informed of the COMELEC’s decision to declare Edwin Bautista a nuisance
candidate.27

In the more recent case of Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 28 this Court likewise applied the
rule in COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 not to consider the votes cast for a nuisance candidate stray but to count them in
favor of the bona fide candidate notwithstanding that the decision to declare him as such was issued only after the
elections.

As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings against a nuisance candidate on election day inevitably exposes
the bona fide candidate to the confusion over the similarity of names that affects the voter’s will and frustrates the same.
It may be that the factual scenario in Bautista is not exactly the same as in this case, mainly because the Comelec
resolution declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was issued before and not after the elections, with the
electorate having been informed thereof through newspaper releases and other forms of notification on the day of
election. Undeniably, however, the adverse effect on the voter’s will was similarly present in this case, if not worse,
considering the substantial number of ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or

"C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative - over five thousand - which have been declared as stray votes, the
invalidated ballots being more than sufficient to overcome private respondent’s lead of only 453 votes after the
recount.29

Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before the May 10, 2010 elections. On the basis o f Resolution No.
4116, the votes cast for him should not have been considered stray but counted in favor of petitioner. COMELEC ’s
changing of the rule on votes cast for nuisance candidates resulted in the invalidation of significant number of votes and
the loss of petitioner to private respondent by a slim margin. We observed in Martinez:

Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, th e
will of the voter. The inclusion of nuisance candidates turns the electoral exercise into an uneven playing field where the
bona fide candidate is faced with the prospect of having a significant number of votes cast for him invalidated as stray
votes by the mere presence of another candidate with a similar surname. Any delay on the part of the COMELEC
increases the probability of votes lost in this manner. While political campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising
the electorate to write the full name of their candidate on the ballot, still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates
persist.

The Court will not speculate on whether the new automated voting system to be implemented in the May 2010 elections
will lessen the possibility of confusion over the names of candidates. What needs to be stressed at this point is the
apparent failure of the HRET to give weight to relevant circumstances that make the will of the electorate determinable,
following the precedent in Bautista. x x x 30

COMELEC justified the issuance of Resolution No. 8844 to amend the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 by enumerating
those changes brought about by the new automated election system to the form of official ballots, manner of voting and
counting of votes. It said that the substantial distinctions between manual and automated elections validly altered the
rules on considering the votes cast for the disqualified or nuisance candidates. As to the rulings in Bautista and Martinez
III, COMELEC opines that these find no application in the case at bar because the rules on appreciation of ballotsapply
only to elections where the names of candidates are handwritten in the ballots.

The Court is not persuaded.

In Martinez III, we took judicial notice of the reality that, especially in local elections, political rivals or operators benefited
from the usually belated decisions by COMELEC on petitions to cancel or deny due course to COCs of potential nuisance
candidates. In such instances, political campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write the full
name of their candidate on the ballot, but still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist. 31

As far as COMELEC is concerned, the confusion caused by similarity of surnames of candidates for the same position and
putting the electoral process in mockery or disrepute, had already been rectified by the new voting system where the
voter simply shades the oval corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate. However, as shown in this case,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8844 on May 1, 2010, nine days before the elections, with sufficient time to delete the
names of disqualified candidates not just from the Certified List of Candidates but also from the Official Ballot. Indeed,
what use will it serve if COMELEC orders the names of disqualified candidates to be deleted from list of official
candidates if the official ballots still carry their names?

We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a
final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate,
notstray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law. As earlier discussed, a petition to cancel or deny a COC
under Section 69 of the OEC should be distinguished from a petition to disqualify under Section 68. Hence, t he legal
effect of such cancellation of a COC of a nuisance candidate cannot be equated with a candidate disqualified on grounds
provided in the OEC and Local Government Code.

Moreover, private respondent admits that the voters were properly informed of the cancellation of COC of Aurelio
because COMELEC published the same before election day. As we pronounced in Bautista, the voters’ constructive
knowledge of such cancelled candidacy made their will more determinable, as it is then more logical to conclude that the
votes cast for Aurelio could have been intended only for the legitimate candidate, petitioner. The possibility of confusion
in names of candidates if the names of nuisance candidates remained on the ballots on election day, cannot be
discounted or eliminated, even under the automated voting system especially considering that voters who mistakenly
shaded the oval beside the name of the nuisance candidate instead of the bona fide candidate they intended to vote for
could no longer ask for replacement ballots to correct the same.1âwphi1

Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 is more consistent with the rule well-ensconced in our
jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must b e liberally
construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical
infirmities.32 Indeed, as our electoral experience had demonstrated, such infirmities and delays in the delisting of
nuisance candidates from both the Certified List of Candidates and Official Ballots only made possible the very evil
sought to be prevented by the exclusion of nuisance candidates during elections.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed for, accordingly GRANTED. COMELEC
Resolution No. 8844 dated May 1, 2010 insofar as it orders that the votes cast for candidates listed therein, who were
declared nuisance candidates and whose certificates of candidacy have been either cancelled or set aside, be considered
stray, is hereby declared NULL and VOID. Consequently, the 532 votes cast for Aurelio N. Del a Cruz during the elections
of May 10, 2010 should have been counted in favor of Casimira S. Dela Cruz and not considered stray votes, making her
total garnered votes 6,921 as against the 6,428 votes of private respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete who was the declared
winner.

Petitioner Casimira S. Dela Cruz is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong,
Province of Antique in the May 10, 2010 elections.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.
F. DOCTRINE OF PRESUMED-IDENTITY APPROACH OR PROCESSUALL PRESUMPTION

G.R. No. 178551 October 11, 2010

ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAITPetitioners,

vs.
MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal -co-petitioner,
the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of medical technologist under a two-year contract,
denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00.

Under the MOA,1 all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one (1) year and are covered by Kuwait’s
Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.

Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on February 11, 2001, she not
having allegedly passed the probationary period.

As the Ministry denied respondent’s request for reconsideration, she returned to the Philippines on March 17, 2001,
shouldering her own air fare.

On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint2 for illegal dismissal
against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represented by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry,
as the foreign principal.

By Decision3 of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding that petitioners neither showed that there was just cause
to warrant respondent’s dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a regular employee, held that respondent was illegally
dismissed and accordingly ordered petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three months
unexpired portion of her contract.

On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision by Resolution4 of January 26,
2004. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution 5 of April 22, 2004, they appealed to the
Court of Appeals, contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a foreign government agency, is immune from suit
and, as such, the immunity extended to them; and that respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the
performance rating within the one-year period as required under Kuwait’s Civil Service Laws. Petitioners further
contended that Ikdal should not be liable as an officer of petitioner ATCI.

By Decision6 of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC Resolution.
In brushing aside petitioners’ contention that they only acted as agent of the Ministry and that they cannot be held
jointly and solidarily liable with it, the appellate court noted that under the law, a private employment agency shall
assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas worker, hence, it can be
sued jointly and severally with the foreign principal for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of
employment.

As to Ikdal’s liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the "Migrant and Overseas
Filipinos’ Act of 1995," corporate officers, directors and partners of a recruitment agency may themselves be jointly and
solidarily liable with the recruitment agency for money claims and damages awarded to overseas workers.

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution 7 of June 27, 2007, the
present petition for review on certiorari was filed.

Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because respondent’s employment contract specifically stipulates
that her employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait. They thus conclude that it
was patent error for the labor tribunals and the appellate court to apply the Labor Code provisions governing
probationary employment in deciding the present case.

Further, petitioners argue that even the Philippine Overseas Employment Act (POEA) Rules relative to master
employment contracts (Part III, Sec. 2 of the POEA Rules and Regulations) accord respect to the "customs, practices,
company policies and labor laws and legislation of the host country."

Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws are applicable, given that the foreign principal
is a government agency which is immune from suit, as in fact it did not sign any document agreeing to be held jointly
and solidarily liable, petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be held liable, more so since the Ministry ’s liability had not been
judicially determined as jurisdiction was not acquired over it.

The petition fails.

Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the money claims of Overseas Filipino
workers (OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that its foreign pri ncipal is a government
agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that such foreign principal’s liability must first be established before it, as
agent, can be held jointly and solidarily liable.

In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment agencies with their foreign principals, Republic Act
No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs with a recourse and assures them of immediate and sufficient payment of what is
due them. Skippers United Pacific v. Maguad 8 explains:

. . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by and between the local agent and its
foreign principal are not coterminous with the term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to
end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not
at all end, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited
and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very purpose for
which the law governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted. (emphasis supplied)

The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to protect and alleviate the plight of the
working class.9 Verily, to allow petitioners to simply invoke the immunity from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for
the judicial determination of the foreign principal’s liability before petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint
and solidary liability inutile.

As to petitioners’ contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not applicable since it was
expressly provided in respondent’s employment contract, which she voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her
engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord
respect to such rules, customs and practices of the host country, the same was not substantiated.

Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who can establish stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, including the laws which they wish to govern their respective
obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the
law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to discharge. The Court ’s ruling
in EDI-Staffbuilders Int’l., v. NLRC10 illuminates:

In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters
not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law
intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating
to the termination of the employment of Gran.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the
foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor
arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.

Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine
of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even
if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in
determining the issues presented before us. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven.
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132
of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent
or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)

SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose
of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he
be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: MOA between respondent and the Ministry, as
represented by ATCI, which provides that the employee is subject to a probationary period of one (1) year and that the
host country’s Civil Service Laws and Regulations apply; a translated copy 11 (Arabic to English) of the termination letter to
respondent stating that she did not pass the probation terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated
copy of the certificate of termination,12 both of which documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of the
Department of Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification and Translation Unit; and respondent’s
letter13 of reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted that in her first eight (8) months of employment, she was
given a rating of "Excellent" albeit it changed due to changes in her shift of work schedule.

These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove that respondent was validly terminated as
a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws
duly authenticated and translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required under the Rules, what petitioners submitted
were mere certifications attesting only to the correctness of the translations of the MOA and the termination letter which
does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti laws,
respondent was validly terminated. Thus the subject certifications read:

xxxx

This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to English/Tagalog and or vice versa was/were
presented to this Office for review and certification and the same was/were found to be in order. This Office, however,
assumes no responsibility as to the contents of the document/s.

This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for whatever legal purpose it may serve. (emphasis
supplied)1avvphi1

Respecting Ikdal’s joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the same is in order too following the express
provision of R.A. 8042 on money claims, viz:

SEC. 10. Money Claims.—Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90)
calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue
of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual moral, exemplary
and other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section
shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a
condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as
provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the
recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be,
shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012

MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, Petitioner,

vs.
LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 and Resolution2 regarding the issuance of
letters of administration of the intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

The facts are as follows:

Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United States from his
first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein.

On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.

Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. The case
was docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.

On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of
Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232.

The two cases were subsequently consolidated.

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis pendentia, considering that Spec. Proc.
No. 228 covering the same estate was already pending.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified to file a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent alleged
that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and
docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.

Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracted a second marriage to
Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959.

On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy. 3 The trial court ruled that since the deceased was a
divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between
him and petitioner was not valid.

Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the trial court in Dagupan City
filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending action to be a prejudicial question
in determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never been married to Eusebio Bristol.

On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No.
2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she
married Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal in the previous bigamy case was fatal to her
cause. Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration.4

After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to t he Court of Appeals
(CA) via her Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing her Petition fo r
the issuance of letters of administration.

Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent should have been dismissed on the ground of
litis pendentia. She also insisted that, while a petition for letters of administration may have been filed by an
"uninterested person," the defect was cured by the appearance of a real party-in-interest. Thus, she insisted that, to
determine who has a better right to administer the decedent’s properties, the RTC should have first required the parties
to present their evidence before it ruled on the matter.

On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held that petitioner undertook the wrong remedy.
She should have instead filed a petition for review rather than a petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, since the Petition f or
Certiorari was filed within the fifteen-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the
CA allowed the Petition and continued to decide on the merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise:

As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the case. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal
of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts, and (c) the identity in the two
cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the other. A petition for letters of administration is a special proceeding. A special proceeding is
an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. And, in contrast to an ordina ry
civil action, a special proceeding involves no defendant or respondent. The only party in this kind of proceeding is the
petitioner of the applicant. Considering its nature, a subsequent petition for letters of administration can hardly be
barred by a similar pending petition involving the estate of the same decedent unless both petitions are filed b y the
same person. In the case at bar, the petitioner was not a party to the petition filed by the private respondent, in the same
manner that the latter was not made a party to the petition filed by the former. The first element of litis pendentia is
wanting. The contention of the petitioner must perforce fail.

Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render nugatory the provision of the Rules requiring a
petitioner for letters of administration to be an "interested party," inasmuch as any person, for that matter, regardless of
whether he has valid interest in the estate sought to be administered, could be appointed as administrator for as long as
he files his petition ahead of any other person, in derogation of the rights of those specifically mentioned in the order of
preference in the appointment of administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters of administration. As a spouse, the
petitioner would have been preferred to administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a marriage certificate, like
any other public document, is only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The fact that the petitioner had been
charged with bigamy and was acquitted has not been disputed by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage
committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been dissolved or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in a proper proceedings. The deduction
of the trial court that the acquittal of the petitioner in the said case negates the validity of her subsequent marriage with
Orlando B. Catalan has not been disproved by her. There was not even an attempt from the petitioner to deny the
findings of the trial court. There is therefore no basis for us to make a contrary finding. Thus, not being an interested
party and a stranger to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by the
trial court is in place.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision. 6 She alleged that the reasoning of the CA was illogical in stating,
on the one hand, that she was acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other hand, still holding that her marriage with Orlando
was invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of the crime of bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.

On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.

Hence, this Petition.

At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case
No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court concluded that, because petitioner
was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing to take note of
the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that
petitioner was not an interested party in the estate of Orlando.

Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was dismissed, we had already
ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign
nationality. This doctrine was established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.7 wherein we said:

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx

We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 8 to wit:

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided
they are valid according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that respondent was no longer a
Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and
petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold that the divorce
obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of
comity. xxx

Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio, 9 to wit:

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document
must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself.
Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act
of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian
family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for
petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Regist ry
of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was
admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the
divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound
by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an
alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the
protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party
challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce
decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a
long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial
notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in
the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of
the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations
in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.1âwphi1 Like any other facts,
they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to
know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. (Emphasis supplied)
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce under the laws of
the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the
proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.

Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the preferential right to be
issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to respondent,
who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis, 10 in which we said:

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In
Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments.
It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution
must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies
of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their
marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party t o be
issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated 18 October 2007
and the Resolution dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case
be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance
with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
G. JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

G.R. No. 159328 October 5, 2011

Heirs of ANTONIO FERAREN, represented by ANTONIO FERAREN, JR., JUSTINA FERAREN-TABORA, LEAH
FERAREN-HONASAN, ELIZABETH MARIE CLAIRE FERAREN-ARRASTIA, MA. TERESA FERAREN-GONZALES, JOHANNA
MICHELYNNE FERAREN YABUT, SCHELMA ANTONETTE FERAREN-MENDOZA and JUAN MIGUEL FERAREN
YABUT, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Former 12th Division) and CECILIA TADIAR, Respondents.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal and setting
aside of the May 21, 2003 Decision 1 and the July 17, 2003 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
71372. The assailed CA Decision reversed and set aside the Decisions of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Fernando
City, La Union, Branch 2 in Civil Case No. 34633 and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando City, La Union,
Branch 26 in Civil Case No. 6617,4 while the questioned CA Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

On May 25, 1999, herein private respondent Celia Tadiar (Celia) filed with the MTC of San Fernando, La Union a
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against herein petitioners Heirs of Antonio Feraren. In said Complaint, Celia alleged that
she and her three brothers are co-owners of a 1,200 square meter parcel of land located in the poblacion of San
Fernando City in La Union; that on September 21, 1960, the said lot was sold by their father to the spouses Antonio and
Justina Feraren (Spouses Feraren) on pacto de retro; it was stipulated that the right to repurchase may be exercised
within ten years; on August 31, 1970, Celia and her co-heirs re-acquired the subject property; thereafter, the lot was
leased on a month-to-month basis to the Spouses Feraren who have constructed a residential house thereon; that
sometime in March 1992, Celia and her co-heirs informed the Spouses Feraren of their intention to terminate their lease
contract; the Spouses Feraren, in turn, offered to sell them their house or buy the subject lot, which offers were declined
by Celia and her co-heirs and, instead, allowed the Spouses Feraren to continue renting the property; after the death of
Antonio in 1995, herein petitioners requested Celia and her co-heirs to extend the lease until June 30, 1997 and even
volunteered to temporarily vacate the said property; Celia and her co-heirs agreed and they did not even increase the
rentals; nonetheless, petitioners failed to comply with their commitment to temporarily vacate; they continued to stay
within the premises of the subject property and refused to vacate the same notwithstanding repeated demands from
Celia and her co-heirs.5

In their Answer, herein petitioners contended that a 128-square-meter portion of the lot being claimed by private
respondent is their property; even before the Spouses Feraren entered into a contract of sale with pacto de retrowith the
father of Celia, the former were already in possession of the remaining portion of the subject property on the strength of
a lease contract executed in their favor by the latter in 1949; their construction of a residential house on the subject
property was by virtue of a right granted under the said contract of lease; petitioners were very much willing to vacate
the disputed lot but only upon payment of the value of all the improvements that they have legally introduced as
builders in good faith on the said lot, which includes the house presently standing thereon as well as the concrete fence
surrounding the said house; in the alternative, they offered to buy the parcel of land subject of the complaint. 6

For failure of the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement, the MTC, in its Order7 dated November 3, 2000, directed
them to submit their position papers and other evidence within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of the said Order.

Private respondent did not file a position paper.

On the other hand, petitioners filed their Position Paper 8 on March 15, 2001. Petitioners alleged therein that their parents
are builders in good faith having built their house on the lot in question during the time that they were the owners of the
disputed lot.
On June 15, 2001, the MTC rendered its Decision dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer. The trial court gave
credence to petitioners' contention that their parents built the house in controversy on the subject lot while they were
the owners of the said lot. As such, the MTC held that as long as private respondent refuses to reimburs e petitioners of
the value of the improvements they have introduced on the lot in question, they (petitioners) may not be compelled to
vacate the same.

On appeal, the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union, in its Decision dated January 28, 2002, affirmed in toto the judgment
of the MTC.

Private respondent then filed a petition for review with the CA.

On May 21, 2003, the CA promulgated its presently assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of San Fernando City, La Union
in Civil Case No. 3463 and the Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of La Union in the same case are
both REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the respondents not entitled to reimbursement for the cost of their residential house built on the land owned
by the petitioner; and

2. Directing the respondents to vacate the premises and restore possession thereof to the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.9

The CA based its Decision on its finding that the subject residential house was built during the time petitioners' parents
were lessees of the lot in question.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA via its Resolution dated July 17, 2003.

Hence, the present petition with the following assignment of errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS ADMITTED IN THEIR ANSWER
THAT THEIR RESIDENTIAL HOUSE WAS CONSTRUCTED DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE LEASE CONTRACT AND NOT
DURING THE 10-YEAR PERIOD WHEN THE LOT WHERE IT STOOD WAS SOLD UNDER PACTO DE RETRO TO THE
PETITIONERS' PARENTS AS SHOWN BY UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE.

II

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE D E C I S I O NS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF SAN FERNANDO CITY, LA UNION. 10

Petitioners allege in the instant petition that the house presently standing on the subject parcel of land is different from
the house built on the same lot in 1949. Petitioners insist on their claim that the house built at the time that their parents
were lessees of the subject property in 1949 was demolished to give way to the construction of the present house which
was erected sometime in the late 1960's when the said lot was then owned by their parents by virtue of the pacto de
retro sale executed in the latter's favor on September 21, 1960.

The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.

At the outset, the Court notes that the issues raised in the present petition are essentially questions of fact. It is
fundamental that a petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court shall, as a
general rule, raise only questions of law and that this Court is not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the evidence
introduced in and considered by the tribunals below. 11 However, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, to wit:

(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;

(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;

(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;

(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions
of both the appellant and the appellee;

(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;

(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent;

(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; or

(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion. 12

In the present case, the findings of the MTC and the RTC are contrary to those made by the CA. The RTC affirmed the
findings of the MTC that the subject house which is presently standing on the disputed parcel of land was built at the
time that the ownership of the said lot was in the name of petitioners' parents. The CA, on the other hand, ruled that the
abovementioned house was constructed when petitioners' parents were in possession of the lot in question as lessees.
Thus, this Court's review of such findings is warranted.

A careful review of the records and the evidence presented in the instant case shows that the CA did not commit error in
finding that the house in question was built at the time petitioners' parents possessed the subject lot as lessees.
Firstly, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners' Position Paper and the affidavits of its witnesses should not have
been considered by the trial courts since these were filed beyond the 10-day reglementary period required under Section
10, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and Section 9 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. 13Petitioners do not dispute
the appellate court's finding that they submitted their position paper and affidavits more than three months after the
deadline set by the abovementioned rules. In this regard, this Court, in Teraña v. De Sagun,14 held as follows:

x x x By its express terms, the purpose of the RSP [Revised Rule on Summary Procedure] is to "achieve an expeditious and
inexpensive determination" of the cases they cover, among them, forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases. To achieve
this objective, the RSP expressly prohibit[s] certain motions and pleadings that could cause delay, among them, a motion
for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper. If the extension for the filing of these submissions
cannot be allowed, we believe it illogical and incongruous to admit a pleading that is already filed late. Effectively, we
would then allow indirectly what we prohibit to be done directly. It is for this reason that in Don Tino Realty Development
Corporation v. Florentino [G.R. No. 134222, September 10, 1999, 314 SCRA 197], albeit on the issue of late filing of an
answer in a summary proceeding, we stated that "[t]o admit a late answer is to put a premium on dilatory measures, the
very mischief that the rules seek to redress."

The strict adherence to the reglementary period prescribed by the RSP is due to the essence and purpose of these rules.
The law looks with compassion upon a party who has been illegally dispossessed of his property. Due to the urgency
presented by this situation, the RSP provides for an expeditious and inexpensive means of reinstating the rightful
possessor to the enjoyment of the subject property. This fulfills the need to resolve the ejectment case quickly. x x x15

As noted by the CA, petitioners did not even bother to file a motion asking the trial court to admit their position paper
which was belatedly filed. Indeed, the record is barren of any evidence to show that petitioners, at least, tried to offer any
explanation or justification for such delay. They simply ignored the Rules. This Court has previously held that technical
rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving. 16 Moreover, rules of procedure do
not exist for the convenience of the litigants.17 These rules are established to provide order to and enhance the efficiency
of our judicial system.18 They are not to be trifled with lightly or overlooked by the mere expedience of invoking
"substantial justice."19 In a long line of decisions, this Court has repeatedly held that, while the rules of procedure are
liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the
prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. 20 In the instant
case, petitioners' complete disregard of the Rules of Court and of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure only shows
that they are not deserving of their relaxation. Hence, the MTC erred in admitting petitioners' position paper and taking
the same into consideration in rendering its judgment.

In any case, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that petitioners' statement in their Answer, that their parents
built the subject residential house as lessees under the authority given to them by private respondent's father in their
contract of lease executed in 1949, is a judicial admission. Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, 21 petitioners
may not contradict this judicial admission unless they are able to show that it was made through palpable mistake or that
no such admission was made. In the instant case, petitioners' subsequent claim in their Position Paper that their house
was built during the time that their parents were the owners of the disputed lot is a direct contradiction of t heir judicial
admission in their Answer. However, petitioners failed to prove that such admission was made through palpable mistake
or that no such admission was made. Hence, they may not contradict the same.
Aside from the abovementioned admission made by petitioners in their Answer, there is nothing in the said Answer
which claims that the subject house was constructed when petitioners' parents were the owners of the disputed lot.
Neither was there any allegation nor even a hint that a house was first built on the lot in question in 1949 and that the
same was demolished in the late 1960s to give way to the construction of the house which is presently standing on the
disputed lot.1avvphi1

Thus, it appears from all indications that petitioners' claims and allegations in their Position Paper contradicting their
admission in their Answer are mere afterthought subsequent to realizing that they could not recover the full value of the
house based on their acknowledgment that the same was erected at the time that their parents were lessees of the
disputed parcel of land.

At this juncture, it would not be amiss to reiterate that the rights of a lessee, like petitioners in the present case, are
governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is
intended, without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease
shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said
amount, the lessee may remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall
not, however, cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.

With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any reimbursement, but he may remove the
ornamental objects, provided no damage is caused to the principal thing, and the lessor does not choose to retain them
by paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished.

Hence, under Article 1678, the lessor has the option of paying one-half of the value of the improvements that the lessee
made in good faith, which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, and which have not altered the form
and substance of the land. On the other hand, the lessee may remove the improvements should the lessor refuse to
reimburse.22

It appears, nonetheless, that in her Complaint, private respondent prayed for the demolition of petitioners' residential
house constructed on the subject lot. It is, thus, clear that private respondent does not want to appropriate the
improvements. As such, petitioners cannot compel her to reimburse to them one-half of the value of their house. The
sole right of petitioners under Article 1678 then is to remove the improvements without causing any more damage upon
the property leased than is necessary.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 183446 NOVEMBER 13, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

VS.

ESTATE OF HANS MENZI

PEREZ, J.:
In this petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (the Republic) primarily assails the 17 January 2008 Resolution[1] issued by public respondent Sandiganbayan,
Fourth Division, in Civil Case No. 0022,[2] the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff Republic's motion for execution is GRANTED [IN PART]. The Court hereby
ORDERS:

(a) PHILTRUST BANK to deliver to plaintiff Republic of the Philippines the proceeds from the sale of the
198,052.5 Bulletin shares sold by defendant HMHMI to Bulletin Publishing Corporation that is now under
Philtrust Bank Time Deposit Certificate No. 136301, in the amount of P19,390,156.68, plus interest earned;

(b) Defendant Estate of Hans Menzi, through its executor Manuel G. Montecillo, to surrender for
cancellation the original eight (8) Bulletin Certificates of Stock in his possession, i.e., Certificates Nos. 312,
292, 314, 131, 132, 293, and 313, which are part of the 212,425.5 Bulletin shares subject of the Supreme
Court's Decision in G.R. No. 79126 dated April 15, 1988; and

(c) Plaintiff Republic of the Philippines, with respect to the 46,626 Bulletin shares in the name of Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr. and pursuant to Alternative 'A' provided for in the Resolution of the Supreme Court
dated April 15, 1988, in G.R. No. 79126, to execute the necessary documents in order to effect the
transfer of the ownership over these shares to the Bulletin Publishing Corporation in accordance with
the agreement it entered into with the latter on June 9, 1998.

Defendants Estate of Hans Menzi and HMHMI's motion is GRANTED. The Court hereby ORDERS
PHILTRUST BANK:

To pay the Estate of Hans Menzi, through its Executor, Manuel G. Montecillo and Hans Menzi Holdings
and Management, Inc., the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY
SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN PESOS and 76/100 interests thereon from said date of
February 28, 2002, until the whole amount is paid.

SO ORDERED.[3]

The Facts

On 22 April 1986, the Presidential Commission on Good Government ( PCGG) issued a Writ of Sequestration over the
shares of former President Ferdinand Marcos, Emilio Yap (Yap) and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. (Cojuangco) in the Bulletin
Publishing Corporation (Bulletin), together with those of their nominees or agents, among them, Ceasar Zalamea
(Zalamea) and Jose Campos (Campos). On 12 February 1987, the PCGG also issued a Writ of Sequestration and Freeze
Order over the shares of the U.S. Automotive Co., Inc. (US Automotive) and its officers in Liwayway Publishing, Inc.
(Liwayway) as well as the shares of stock, assets, properties, records and documents of Hans Menzi Holdings and
Management, Inc. (HMHMI), the corporation organized by Menzi, Campos, Cojuangco, Zalamea and Rolando Gapud, to
serve as holding company for their shares of stock in Liwayway, Menzi and Company, Inc., Menzi Agricultural, Inc., Menzi
Development Corporation and M and M Consolidated, Inc. The Writs of Sequestration issued against the Liwayway and
Bulletin shares as well as the PCGG's then declared intent to vote the sequestered shares in Bulletin were challenged by
Liwayway, US Automotive and Bulletin in the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus docketed before this
Court as G.R. Nos. 77422 and 79126.[4]

Following Campos' lead in waiving his rights over 46,620 Bulletin shares in favor of the Republic, Zalamea also waived his
rights over 121,178 Bulletin shares in favor of the Republic on 15 October 1987. PCGG then sold the shares of Zalamea
and Campos in favor of Bulletin, which thereafter appears to have offered a cash deposit in the sum of P8,174,470.32 for
Cojuangco's remaining 46,626 Bulletin shares.[5] Together with the interests thereon, the amount was proposed to
either: (a) standby as full payment of Cojuangco's shares upon a final judgment declaring the Republic the owner of said
shares; or, (b) be returned to Bulletin upon a final judgment declaring Cojuangco as true owner thereof . In the 15 April
1988 Decision in G.R. Nos. 77422 and 79126, this Court directed, among others, the PCGG to accept the cash deposit
offered by Bulletin for Cojuangco's shares, subject to the foregoing alternative conditions.[6]

On 29 July 1987, in the meantime, the Republic instituted a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution
and damages against President Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Yap, Cojuangco, Zalamea and Atty. Manuel Montecillo
(Montecillo). Docketed as Civil Case No. 0022 before the Sandiganbayan, the complaint essentially alleged that Yap
acted as the Marcos Spouses' dummy, nominee or agent in the appropriation and concealment of shares of stock of
domestic corporations like Bulletin. Cojuangco and Zalamea were likewise alleged to have acted as the Marcos
Spouses' dummies, nominees or agents in illegally acquiring Bulletin shares to prevent their disclosure and recovery. In
the amended complaint the Republic filed on 10 March 1988, Cojuangco was joined as an actor instead of a mere
collaborator of Zalamea who was later dropped as defendant from the case in view of his assignment of his 121,178
Bulletin shares in favor of the Republic as aforesaid. The Republic went on to amend its complaint for a second time on
17 October 1990, to implead as defendant respondent Estate of Hans Menzi (the Estate), through its Executor,
Montecillo.[7]

On 2 April 1992 the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution[8] lifting the writ of sequestration issued by the PCGG. This was
questioned by the Republic through a petition for certiorari docketed before this Court as G.R. No. 107377. In a
Resolution dated 16 July 1996, the Court reversed and set aside the assailed resolution and referred the case back to the
Sandiganbayan "for resolution of the preliminary question of whether there is prima facie factual basis for PCGG's
sequestration order."[9] It was pursuant to the foregoing resolution that the Sandiganbayan went on to conduct
hearings on the matter and, later, to issue the Resolution dated 13 April 1998, discounting the factual bases for PCGG's
sequestration order and granting the Estate's motion to lift the writ of sequestration over the shares of stock, assets,
properties, records and documents of HMHMI.[10] Dissatisfied with the Resolution and the Sandiganbayan's 26 August
1998 denial of its motion for reconsideration,[11] the Republic filed the petition for certiorari docketed before this Court
as G.R. No. 135789.[12]

On 31 January 2002, the Court rendered a decision in G.R. No. 135789, dismissing the Republic's petition on the ground
that the Sandiganbayan had the authority to resolve all incidents relative to cases involving ill-gotten wealth and that the
court's appellate jurisdiction over the graft court's decisions or final orders is limited to questions of law.[13] On 4 March
2002, Philtrust Bank (Philtrust) filed a motion to intervene in G.R. No. 135789, alleging that the writ of sequestration,
which was the subject matter of the case, covered the following time deposits maintained with it by HMHMI, to wit:

Time Deposit Certificate Date of Certificate Original Deposit

136301 3/03/86 P19,390,156.68

162828 4/18/88 24,102,443.85

162829 4/18/88 5,826,683.26

In addition to its being allowed to intervene in the case, Philtrust prayed for the consignation of the proceeds and
interests of the foregoing TDCs as well as its release from its obligation pertaining thereto.[14] Alongside the Republic's
motion for reconsideration of the 31 January 2002 Decision in G.R. No. 135789, Philtrust's motions were, however, denied
for lack of merit in the 20 November 2002 Resolution the Court issued in the case.[15] The motions subsequently filed
by the Republic as well as the Estate and HMHMI for the deposit of the Philtrust-tendered sums with, respectively, a
government bank or their own account were noted without action in the Court's Resolution dated 22 January 2003. [16]

In the meantime, the following issues were identified for resolution at the pre-trial conducted in Civil Case No. 0022, to
wit: (a) whether or not Menzi's sale of his 154,470 Bulletin shares in favor of US Automotive was valid and legal; and, (b)
whether or not the Bulletin shares registered in the names of Yap, Cojuangco, Zalamea, Menzi, his Estate or HMHMI were
ill-gotten.[17] After a protracted litigation, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision dated 14 March 2002,[18] the
decretal portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring that the following Bulletin shares are the ill-gotten wealth of the defendant Marcos
spouses:

1. The 46,626 Bulletin shares [part of the 214 block] in the name of defendant Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr., subject of the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated April 15, 1988 in
G.R. No. 79126.

Pursuant to alternative "A" mentioned therein, plaintiff Republic of the Philippines through the
PCGG is hereby declared the legal owner of these shares, and is further directed to execute, in
accordance with the Agreement which is entered into with Bulletin Publishing Corporation on
June 9, 1988, the necessary documents in order to effect transfer of ownership over these shares
to the Bulletin Publishing Corporation.

1. The 198,052.5 Bulletin shares [198 block] in the names of:

 No. of Shares

Jose Y. Campos 90,866.5

Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. 90,877

Cesar C. Zalamea 16,309

Total 198,052.5

which they transferred to HM Holdings and Management, Inc. on August 17, 1983, and which
the latter sold to Bulletin Publishing Corporation on February 21, 1986. The proceeds from this
sale are frozen pursuant to PCGG's Writ of Sequestration dated February 12, 1987, and this writ
is the subject of the Decision of the Supreme Court dated January 31, 2002 in G.R. No.135789.

Accordingly, the proceeds from the sale of these 198,052.5 Bulletin shares, under Philtrust Bank
Time Deposit Certificate No. 136301 dated March 3, 1986 in the amount of P19,390,156.68 plus
interest earned, in the amount of P104,967,112.62 as of February 28, 2002, per Philtrust Bank's
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Consign the Proceeds of Time Deposits of HMHMI, filed
on February 28, 2002 with the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 135789, are hereby declared forfeited
in favor of the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines.

2. Ordering the defendant Estate of Hans M. Menzi through its Executor, Manuel G. Montecillo, to
surrender for cancellation the original eight Bulletin certificates of stock in its possession, which
were presented in court as Exhibits 1 to 3 and 21 to 25 (Certificate Nos. 312, 292, 314, 131, 132,
291, 293, 313, respectively), which are part of the 214,424.5 Bulletin shares subject of the
Resolution of the Supreme Court dated April 15, 1988 in G.R. No. 79126.

3. Declaring that the following Bulletin shares are not the ill-gotten wealth of the defendant
Marcos spouses:

a. The 154,472 Bulletin shares [154 block] sold by the late Hans M. Menzi to U.S. Automotive Co.,
Inc., the sale thereof being valid and legal;

b. The 2,617 Bulletin shares in the name of defendant Emilio T. Yap which he owns in his own
right; and

c. The 1 Bulletin share in the name of the Estate of Hans M. Menzi which it owns in its own right.

4. Dismissing, for lack of sufficient evidence, plaintiff's claim for damages, and defendants'
respective counterclaims.
 SO ORDERED.[19]

Dissatisfied with the foregoing decision, the Republic, Cojuangco and the Estate filed the petitions for review
on certiorari which were respectively docketed and consolidated before this Court as G.R. Nos. 152578, 154487 and
154518. In the 23 November 2005 Decision rendered in said consolidated cases, however, the Court affirmed the
Sandiganbayan's 14 March 2002 Decision, upon the following findings and conclusions: (a) as the proven owner thereof,
the Estate validly sold the 154 block of Bulletin shares to US Automotive, with the indorsement an d delivery of the stock
certificate covering the same; and, (b) the evidence on record shows that the 198 block of Bulletin shares as well as the
46,626 shares registered in the name of Cojuangco which formed part of the 214 block of Bulletin shares were
ill-gotten.[20] Subsequent to the 24 January 2006 denial of its motion for partial reconsideration of the foregoing
decision,[21] the Estate, alongside HMHMI, filed a Joint Manifestation dated 28 February 2006. The Joint Manifestation
called the Court's attention to the fact, among others, that the motion for the release of the proceeds of the TDCs they
filed in G.R. No. 135789 was merely noted without action, on the ground that the matter would be better ventilated and
addressed in the consolidated cases. In view of the fact that the issues pertaining to the TDCs were not addressed in the
Court's 23 November 2005 Decision,[22] the Estate and HMHMI sought the grant of the following reliefs:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that:

1. The Clerk of Court be instructed to cause the delivery of the three (3) Certificates of Time Deposit with
the attached allonge, on file with the docket of G.R. No. 135789 to the Philtrust Bank or to its counsel of
record;

2. An order be issued requiring the Philtrust Bank to pay to herein Joint Movants the proceeds of the
sale in 1984 of 154,472 Bulletin shares to the U.S. Automotive Co., Inc. deposited with the Philtrust
Bank admitted to be due as of February 28, 2002 and the proceeds of the sale of Menzi shares in the
Liwayway Publishing, Inc. to the Bulletin Publishing Corporation, both covered by Certificates of Time
Deposits admitted to be due as of February 28, 2002, plus legal interest thereon from March 1, 2002
until paid.

3. It is further prayed that such other reliefs be granted as to this Honorable Court may seem just and
equitable.[23] (Underscoring supplied)

The Joint Manifestation filed by the Estate and HMHMI was not, however, acted upon by this Court which went on to
issue an Entry of Judgment certifying the finality of the 23 November 2005 Decision in G.R. Nos. 152578, 154487 and
154518.[24] On 29 November 2006, the Republic filed its motion for the execution of the Sandiganbayan's 14 March
2002 Decision and prayed for Philtrust's delivery of the sums covered by the decision as well as the PCGG's 12 February
1987 Freeze Order which included the sums covered by TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829.[25] Claiming that only the
proceeds of TDC No. 136301 were declared forfeited in favor of the Republic in the decision sought to be executed, the
Estate and HMHMI also filed their motion for execution dated 5 December 2006, praying that Philtrust be ordered to
render an accounting of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 and, thereafter, to deliver in their favor the principal thereof,
together with the stipulated and legal interests they have, in the meantime, earned.[26]

On 16 January 2007, the Republic filed its Comment on the motion for execution filed by the Estate and HMHMI, arguing
that said movants' claim of entitlement to the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 was bereft of any basis. Calling
attention to the 28 February 2006 Joint Manifestation that the Estate and HMHMI filed in G.R. No. 135789, the Republic
maintained that said TDCs could not have covered the proceeds of the sale of 154,472 Bulletin shares to US Automotive
since the same had been already received by the Estate and, per the testimony elicited from Montecillo, were deposited
with the Equitable Bank and used to pay estate taxes due the Estate.[27] On 25 January 2007, the Estate and HMHMI
also filed their Manifestation with Comment, asserting that only the proceeds of TDC No. 136301 were declared ill-gotten
in the decision sought to be executed; hence, it necessarily followed that all the other sequestered HMHMI assets
including the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 were not ill-gotten.[28]

On 26 January 2007, Yap filed his comment on the motions for execution filed by the Republic as well as the Estate and
HMHMI. Maintaining that the Republic had yet to effect the transfer of ownership of the 46,626 shares in favor of
Bulletin pursuant to the 14 March 2002 Decision in Civil Case No. 0022, Yap also averred that the Estate had not yet
surrendered for cancellation the original Bulletin certificates of stock in its possession which formed part of the 214 block
of Bulletin shares subject of this Court's 15 April 1988 Decision in G.R. Nos. 77422 and 79126. Likewise claiming that TDC
Nos. 162828 and 162829 were not covered by the decision sought to be executed, Yap insisted that the Estate had
already received the proceeds of TDC No. 130052 covering the sale of the 154 block of Bulletin shares to US
Automotive.[29] In support of this assertion, Yap submitted copies of TDC No. 130052 in the sum of P24,969,200.09,
Montecillo's offer of surrender of said TDC in exchange for full payment of said principal and the interests thereon, as
well as the manager checks and vouchers purportedly evidencing Philtrust's payment thereof in April 1989.[30]

In its 21 February 2007 Reply to Yap's Comment on its Motion for Execution, on the other hand, the Estate disavowed
receiving payment of the proceeds of TDC No. 130052 on the ground that, at the time of the supposed payment in April
1989, the assets of HMHMI which consisted of TDC Nos. 136301, 162828 and 162829 had already been
frozen. Contending that its continued possession of the original of TDC No. 130052 was ineluctable proof of the
non-payment of the proceeds thereof, the Estate argued that Philtrust's attempt to consign the proceeds of TDC Nos.
136301, 162828 and 162829 with this Court in G.R. No. 135789 was an admission that its liability therefor remained valid,
subsisting and enforceable. While conceding that the delivery of the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 was not
covered in the decision sought to be executed, the Estate asserted that the Sandiganbayan's 18 April 1995 Resolution
invalidating the PCGG's Freeze Order of HMHMI's assets was affirmed by this Court in the 31 January 2002 Decision in
G.R. No. 135789.[31]

On 17 January 2008, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution, partially granting the Republic's motion for
execution by ordering Philtrust's delivery of the proceeds of TDC No. 136301 and the Estate's surrender of the original 8
Bulletin certificates of stock which were part of the 212,425.5 shares subject of this Court's 15 April 1988 Decision in G.R.
Nos. 77422 and 79126. In accordance with the same decision, the Republic was additionally ordered to effect the
transfer of Cojuangco's 46,626 shares in favor of Bulletin, subject to Alternative "A" stated therein. Likewise granting the
motion for execution filed by the Estate and HMHMI, the Sandiganbayan directed Philtrust to pay in their favor the
proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829. Brushing aside the documents attached to Yap's comment for lack of proper
authentication and non-presentation at the trial of the case on the merits,[32] the Sandiganbayan ruled as follows:

x x x. While it is appropriate to order Philtrust Bank to deliver all amounts covered by this Court's March
14, 2002 [D]ecision, the same cannot be said of those covered by the February 12, 1987 sequestration
order of the PCGG. The records of this case reveal that the said sequestration was already lifted by this
Court on April 13, 1998. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court on January 31, 2002. Plaintiff
Republic's motion for reconsideration was denied on the ground that it had been mooted by the
Sandiganbayan's decision of March 14, 2002 that declared certain shares as ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses.

As correctly argued by defendants Estate and HMHMI, the issue of the propriety of the sequestration
order was already subsumed in the said Sandiganbayan decision. While it is true that neither the
Sandiganbayan decision nor the Supreme Court's of November 23, 2005, affirming this Court's verdict
categorically declared the proceeds of CTD Nos. 162828 and 162829 as not ill-gotten, the only logical
and, to stress, legal conclusion is that said assets came to exist as a result of a legitimate activity or
enterprise and, therefore, not ill-gotten at all. Putting it differently, the lifting of the sequestration or
freeze order confirmed the legitimacy of these assets.

The presumption of law, albeit disputable, include[s] regularity and fairness of private transactions;
adherence to the ordinary course of business; and compliance with pertinent laws. The prosecution
had the burden to introduce evidence to overturn said legal presumptions and to prove that the asse ts
under consideration originated from some illicit source if only to sustain the government's claim
therefor. This Court and the Supreme Court found the prosecution miserably failed to do so, and their
respective rulings, having attained final and executory status, are now, under well-established
jurisprudence, "immutable and unalterable." Hence, the assets could not possibly be legally awarded to
the State. It is but just then that the funds covered by CTD Nos. 162828 and 162829 be returned to
HMHMI under whose name they were deposited. There subsists no rational, legal or equitable basis to
further withhold said assets from the evident owner thereof.[33]

Dissatisfied with the foregoing disposition, the Republic filed its motion for partial reconsideration, insisting that the sums
covered by TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 could not have referred to the proceeds of the sale of the 154 block of Bulletin
shares which, at the trial of the case on the merits, Montecillo admitted to have deposited with the Equit able Bank and
used to pay the estate taxes due from the Estate. The Republic argued that this Court's affirmance of the lifting of the
writ of sequestration ordered by the Sandiganbayan was not fatal to its cause and could not be construed as justification
for the release of the proceeds of the TDCs to the Estate and HMHMI.[34] Maintaining that the Republic's motion for
partial reconsideration was pro-forma, the Estate and HMHMI also filed their opposition, on the ground that a forfeiture
of the proceeds of the subject TDCs in favor of the former would be tantamount to an alteration of a decision that has
long attained finality.[35]

In compliance with the Sandiganbayan's 17 January 2008 Resolution, on the other hand, Philtrust filed a manifestation,
alleging that, upon the Republic's surrender of the original of TDC No. 136301, it was ready to release three manager's
checks in the aggregate sum of P162,245,963.71 representing the principal and interests for said TDC.[36] With respect
to the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829, however, Philtrust invoked Article 1256 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and filed a motion to consign the six manager's checks it issued to cover said TDCs' principals and interests in
the aggregate sum of P199,391,416.51. Against Philtrust's allegation that it had the original copies of TDC No. 130052,
Montecillo's letter and the check vouchers evidencing the payment Yap earlier asserted in his comment on their motion
for execution,[37] the Estate and HMHMI filed their comment, contending that said documents were irrelevant and
inappropriate to the resolution of the pending motions and incidents. Aside from the fact that Philtrust was not a party
to the action, the Estate and HMHMI argued that the bank had already recognized them as the payees of the subject
TDCs in the motion to intervene it earlier filed in G.R. No. 135789.[38]

While the Republic interposed no objection thereto,[39] Philtrust's motion for consignation was opposed by Montecillo,
in view of the fact that the Sandiganbayan's 17 January 2008 Resolution had already directed the payment of the
proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 in favor of the Estate and HMHMI.[40] On 22 May 2008, the Sandiganbayan
issued the second assailed Resolution, denying the Republic's motion for partial reconsideration for lack of merit, on the
ground that the argument raised in support thereof had already been weighed and passed upon in its Resolution of 17
January 2008. Absent any finding that the proceeds of the subject TDCs were ill-gotten, the Sandiganbayan ruled that
the lifting of the sequestration or freeze order over the same confirmed the legality of the provenance thereof. [41]

The Issue

On 21 July 2008, the Republic filed the petition at bench[42] which it subsequently amended, in view of Philtrust's 9 July
2009 release of the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 in favor of the Estate and HMHMI at the instance of
respondents Sandiganbayan Sheriffs Reynaldo Melquiades and Albert dela Cruz. In urging the nullification of the
assailed Resolutions dated 17 January 2008 and 22 May 2008,[43]the Republic argues that:

THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ORDERING
PHILTRUST BANK TO PAY THE ESTATE OF HANS MENZI, THROUGH ITS EXECUTOR[,]
MANUEL G. MONTECILLO[,] AND HANS MENZI HOLDINGS AND MANAGEMENT, INC.,
THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED FIFTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY SIX
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN AND 76/100 (P156,826,937.76) PESOS,
REPRESENTING THE PROCEEDS OF THE TIME DEPOSIT CERTIFICATE NOS. 162828 AND
162829 AND ALL ACCRUED LEGAL INTEREST THEREON.[44]

On 2 September 2008, this Court issued a Resolution, requiring the Estate and HMHMI as well as the Sandiganbayan and
respondent Sheriffs to file their comment on the amended petition. In said resolution, the Court also granted the
Republic's application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return and re-deposit of the proceeds of
TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 which had, in the meantime, been released by Philtrust to the Estate and HMHMI.[45]

The Court's Ruling

We find the petition bereft of merit.

In seeking the reversal of the assailed resolutions, the Republic argues that the Estate and HMHMI's claim of entitlement
to the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 is bereft of factual and legal bases. In support thereof, the Republic
once again calls attention to the 28 February 2006 Joint Manifestation filed in G.R. Nos. 152578, 154487 and 154518 in
which the Estate and HMHMI supposedly asserted that the proceeds of the subject TDCs were those of "the sale in 1984
of 154,472 Bulletin shares to the U.S. Automotive Co., Inc. deposited with the Philtrust Bank admitted to be due as of
February 28, 2002." It is argued that the falsity of this claim is evident from: (a) Montecillo's testimony on record that the
proceeds of said sale were deposited with Equitable Bank and used to pay the estate taxes due from the Estate; and (b)
Yap's 19 January 2007 Comment on the motions for execution filed a quo which showed that the proceeds of the same
sale were deposited with Philtrust under TDC No. 130052 which had, in turn, been already paid in April 1989. The
Republic ultimately argues that the lifting of the writ of sequestration over HMHMI's assets does not automatically mean
that the Estate and HMHMI are entitled to the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 since the provenance thereof
has yet to be actually litigated before and submitted for judgment by the Sandiganbayan.[46]

At the outset, it bears pointing out that the 28 February 2006 Joint Manifestation the Estate and HMHMI filed in G.R. Nos.
152578, 154487 and 154518 prayed that Philtrust be required to pay them not only the proceeds of the sale of 154,472
Bulletin shares to the US Automotive but also "the proceeds of the sale of Menzi shares in the Liwayway Publishing, Inc.
to the Bulletin Publishing Corporation, both covered by the Certificates of Time Deposits admitted to be due as of
February 28, 2002, plus legal interest thereon from March 1, 2002 until paid."[47] This Court's 23 November 2005
Decision in G.R. Nos. 152578, 154487 and 154518 affirmed the validity of the sale of said 154,472 Bulletin shares to US
Automotive in the following wise:

x x x. Atty. Montecillo's authority to negotiate the transfer and execute the necessary documents for the
sale of the 154 block is found in the General Power of Attorney executed by Menzi on May 23, 1984
which specifically authorizes Atty. Montecillo "[T]o sell, assign, transfer, convey and set over upon such
consideration and under such terms and conditions as he may deem proper, any and all stocks or shares
of stock, now standing or which may thereafter stand in my name on the books of any and all company
or corporation, and for that purpose to make, sign and execute all necessary instruments, contracts,
documents or acts of assignment or transfer."

Atty. Montecillo's authority to accept payment of the purchase price for the 154 block sold to US
Automotive after Menzi's death springs from the latter's Last will and Testament and the Order of the
probate court confirming the sale and authorizing Atty. Montecillo to accept payment therefor. Hence,
before and after Menzi's death, Atty. Montecillo was vested with ample authority to effect the sale of the
154 block to US Automotive.

That the 154 block was not included in the inventory is plausibly explained by the fact that at the time
the inventory of the assets of Menzi's estate was taken, the sale of the 154 block had already been
 consummated. Besides, the non-inclusion of the proceeds of the sale in the inventory does not affect
the validity of the legality of the sale itself.[48]

Despite the validity of the sale, however, the Republic correctly argues that the funds deposited under TDC Nos. 162828
and 162829 could not have been sourced from the 1984 sale of 154,472 Bulletin shares to US Automotive, considering
that the evidence on record indicates that the proceeds thereof had not been deposited with Philtrust and had already
been expended for the estate taxes due from the Estate. No less than its Executor, Montecillo, made the following
admissions during the trial of the case on the merits:

ATTY. JASO:

q. And also Atty. Montecillo you sold to U.S. Automotive the 154,472 shares of the Bulletin am I correct?

a. Of the Bulletin, it is owned by Hans M. Menzi and registered in his name.

Showing to you a document which is a Re[ceipt] dated May 15, 1985, can you tell the Honorable Court if you
q.
had issued that document before?

a. Yes is this Exhibit 1, Yap in the preliminary hearing dated May 15, 1985 I signed for the estate as its executor.

AJ DE LEON:

xxxx

q. W[ere] the proceeds of that also deposited in the Phil[t]rust account you just mentioned?

a. No Your Honor that is an estate.

q. No the proceed[s] of the sale of 154,000?

a. No Your Honor that was sold in 1985. The account with Phil[t]rust was opened in 1986.

q. The purchase price of 154,476 shares of Hans Menzi sold to U.S. Automotive where was it deposited?

As I remember correctly, it was deposited to Equitable Bank Corporation because that was the depository
a.
bank of the [E]state, Your Honor.

xxxx

AJ DE LEON:

You are saying that the deposit of this purchase price of 154,476 shares of Hans Menzi to U.S. Automotive
was deposited at Equitable Bank and was also subject of sequestration?

a. No sir, it was use[d] to pay the estate tax.[49]

Having been made by their executor during the trial of the case on the merits, these declarations are binding, at least
insofar as the Estate is concerned. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, an admission,
verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof. It may be
made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the parties; (b) in the course of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or
stipulations; or (c) in other stages of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case.[50] When made in the same
case in which it is offered,[51] "no evidence is needed to prove the same and it cannot be contradicted unless it is shown
to have been made through palpable mistake or when no such admission was made."[52] The admission becomes
conclusive on him, and all proofs submitted contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether an
objection is interposed by the adverse party or not.[53] Absent any showing in the record that the above-quoted
declarations were made by Montecillo through palpable mistake, the Republic correctly argues that they are binding
upon the Estate which, for said reason, is precluded from claiming that the funds deposited under TDC Nos. 162828 and
162829 came from the 1984 sale of Bulletin shares to US Automotive.

At any rate, it further appears that part of the proceeds of the sale of the subject Bulletin shares to US Automotive which
had been deposited with Philtrust, had also been maintained by the Estate under TDC No. 130052 and not TDC Nos.
162828 and 162829. In his Comment on the motions for execution filed a quo by the Republic as well as the Estate and
HMHMI, Yap claimed as much and submitted copies of: (a) TDC No. 130052; (b) Montecillo's 6 March 1989 letter offering
the surrender of said TDC in exchange for the full payment of its principal and interest; and (c) the 7 April 1989 manager's
checks issued by Philtrust in payment of the TDC's P24,969,200.09 principal and P1,776,788.90 interest, the receipt of
which was duly acknowledged by Montecillo.[54] Yap's claim, as well as the existence of the foregoing documents was
significantly affirmed by Philtrust in its 17 March 2008 motion to consign the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and
162829.[55] Considering that TDC No. 130052 was issued in its name,[56] the Estate was clearly out on a limb in claiming
that the payment of the proceeds thereof in 1989 was not possible since supposedly, at the time, HMHMI's assets had
already been frozen pursuant to the writ of sequestration issued by the PCGG.[57]

While they could not have come from the proceeds of the 1984 sale of 154,472 Bulletin shares to US Automotive, there is,
on the other hand, ample showing in the record that the deposits under TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 were sourced
from sale by the Estate and HMHMI of their Liwayway shares. In the amended petition at bench, the Republic very
distinctly asserted that the funds covered by the subject TDCs are actually the proceeds from the sale of shares of stock
of Liwayway and not of Bulletin.[58] Aside from the proceeds of the sale of 154,472 Bulletin shares to US Automotive, as
earlier noted, the Estate and HMHMI had, in turn, prayed for the payment of the proceeds of the Estate's sale of Menzi's
shares in Liwayway in the Joint Manifestation they filed in G.R. Nos. 152578, 154487 and 154518.[59] In his 17 July 2006
Comment on the foregoing Joint Manifestation, Yap likewise maintained that TDC No. 162828 covers the proceeds of the
sale by HMHMI of its shares in Liwayway in favor of US Automotive and that TDC No. 162829 covers about half of the
proceeds of the Estate's sale of its Liwayway shares in favor of Liwayway itself.[60] With Menzi's sale of his Bulletin
shares to US Automative already discounted as the origin of the funds deposited under the subject TDCs, this confluence
of the parties' assertions and/or admissions lends credence to the Republic's position that they were sourced from the
sale by the Estate and HMHMI of their Liwayway shares.

The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, we find that no grave abuse of discretion is imputable a gainst the
Sandiganbayan for denying the Republic's motion for execution, insofar as it related to the delivery in its favor of the
proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829. By the Republic's own admission, after all, the validity of the transfer and/or
legality of ownership of Liwayway shares was not litigated in Civil Case No. 0022[61]since the issues identified for
resolution at the pre-trial of the case only included the ownership and transfer of the Bulletin shares therein
identified.[62] Not having been litigated upon, factual and legal issues concerning said Liwayway shares were, therefore,
understandably not determined in the 14 March 2002 Decision subsequently rendered in the case by the Sandiganbayan
and, for that matter, in the 23 November 2005 Decision this Court rendered in G.R. Nos. 152578, 154487 and
154518. Unsuccessful in seeking the release of said funds in G.R. No. 135789 after this Court rendered the 31 January
2002 Decision affirming the Sandiganbayan's dissolution of the writ of sequestration issued by the PCGG,[63] the Estate
and HMHMI had, in fact, revived the issue of their entitlement to the proceeds of the subject TDCs when they filed their
28 February 2006 Joint Manifestation in said consolidated cases.

Considering the finality of this Court's 23 November 2005 Decision affirming the Sandiganbayan's 14 March 2002
Decision in Civil Case No. 0022, we find that the Estate and HMHMI correctly argue against the disposition of the
proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 in favor of the Republic by means of the writ of execution the latter sought a
quo. Having been sourced from the disposition of said Liwayway shares, the proceeds of the subject TDCs cannot be
released in favor of the Republic without varying the decision sought to be executed which, as admitted, did not make
any determination regarding the validity of the ownership of the same shares and/or the legality of the transfer
thereof. It is a matter of settled legal principle that a writ of execution must adhere to every essen tial particular of the
judgment sought to be executed.[64] The writ cannot vary or go beyond the terms of the judgment and must conform
to the dispositive portion thereof.[65] Time and again, it has been ruled that an order of execution which varies the
tenor of the judgment or, for that matter, exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity.[66]

Even more fundamentally, the award of the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 sought by the Republic would be
tantamount to an alteration of the decisions rendered by the Sandiganbayan and this Court, which have already attained
finality. Except for clerical errors and in cases of void judgments and nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to
any party,[67] nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes
immutable and unalterable.[68] It cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that such a judgment may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous co nclusion of fact or law,
and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of
the land.[69] The reason is grounded on the fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the
risk of occasional error, the judgments or orders of courts must be final at some definite date fixed by
law.[70] "Otherwise, there will be no end to litigations, thus negating the main role of courts of justice to assist in the
enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with
finality."[71]

Gauged from the procedural antecedents of the case, however, the above-discussed principles do not apply to the
Sandiganbayan's grant of the release of the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 in favor of the Estate and
HMHMI. While it is true that the latter filed a motion for execution ostensibly seeking the enforcement of the 14 March
2002 Decision rendered in the case, the release of the proceeds of the subject TDCs in their favor is clearly justified by
the earlier lifting of the writ of sequestration issued by the PCGG over the shares of stock, assets, properties, records and
documents of HMHMI. In compliance with this Court's 16 July 1996 Resolution in G.R. No. 107377 requiring the
determination of the factual basis for the same writ of sequestration,[72] the record shows that the Sandiganbayan
conducted hearings on the matter and, based on the evidence presented, issued a Resolution dated 13 April 1998, lifting
the writ of sequestration thus issued for lack of factual basis.[73] Together with the 21 August 1998 Resolution denying
the Republic's motion for reconsideration thereof, the lifting of the writ of sequestration ordered by the Sandiganbayan
was affirmed in the 31 January 2002 Decision rendered by this Court in G.R. No. 135789.[74]

Over the years, the Estate and HMHMI had, of course, unsuccessfully prayed for the release of the proceeds of the
subject TDCs in their favor. Pursuant to the 24 March 2003 Resolution issued in G.R. No. 135789, HMHMI's motion for
the release of the checks Philtrust issued for the principals of and interests on TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 was noted
without action on the ground that the matter "should be ventilated and addressed in G.R. Nos. 152578, 154487 and
154518.[75] Acting on the Urgent Motion and Manifestation to the same effect filed by the Estate and HMHMI in the
same case, the Court issued an extended Resolution dated 6 October 2003, reiterating its earlier action on the ground
that the resolution of said consolidated cases was "intimately related to the propriety of any disbursement of the funds in
the hands of Philtrust Bank."[76] The 3 November 2003 Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution/Delivery of Properties
Subject of Sequestration which the Estate filed with the Sandiganbayan[77] was, on the other hand, noted without action
in said court's Resolution dated 9 March 2004 on the ground of loss of jurisdiction, in view of the pendency of sai d
appeal before this Court.[78]

Despite this Court's 31 January 2002 affirmance of the lifting of the writ of execution of the PCGG's sequestration order,
the record shows that the Republic made no move towards the inclusion in Civil Case No. 0022 of the issues pertaining
to the legality of the ownership of the Liwayway shares and/or the validity of the transfers thereof. Not having been
addressed in the 14 March 2002 Decision rendered in the case, said issues were, consequently, not likewise tackled when
said decision was affirmed in the 23 November 2005 Decision this Court subsequently rendered in G.R. Nos. 152578,
154487 and 154518. With the issuance of an entry of judgment in said consolidated cases,[79] it further appears that the
Court no longer acted on the 28 February 2006 Joint Manifestation filed by the Estate and HMHMI, for the purpose of
seeking the release of the proceeds of, among others, TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829.[80] Be that as it may, however, it
cannot be gainsaid that, by the time the Republic commenced the petition at bench on 21 July 2008, more than five years
had already elapsed since the decision in G.R. No. 135789 attained finality on 13 December 2002.[81]

Given the finality of the lifting of the writ of sequestration issued by the PCGG and the long-standing failure of the
Republic to allege and prove the illegality of the ownership of the Liwayway shares and the invalidity of the transfers
thereof, we find and so hold that the Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted for ordering the release of TDC Nos. 162828 and
162829 in favor of the Estate and HMHMI. An extraordinary measure in the form of a provisional remedy, sequestration
is merely "intended to prevent the destruction, concealment or dissipation of sequestered properties and, thereb y, to
conserve and preserve them, pending the judicial determination in the appropriate proceeding of whether the property
was in truth ill-gotten."[82] While it is true that the lifting of a writ of sequestration will not necessarily be fatal to the
main case, as it does not ipso facto mean that the sequestered property is not ill-gotten,[83] it cannot be
over-emphasized that there has never been a main case against the Liwayway shares as would justify the Republic's
continued claim on the subject TDCs and, for that matter, the prolonged withholding of the proceeds thereof from the
Estate and HMHMI. Although jurisprudence recognizes the possibility of a resort to other ancillary remedies since the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over sequestration cases demands that it should also have the authority to preserve the
subject matter of the cases or put the same in custodia legis,[84] this is unavailing to the Republic since, by its own
admission, the Liwayway shares were not litigated in Civil Case No. 0022.
Like the remedies of "freeze order" and "provisional takeover" with which the PCGG has been equipped, sequestration is
not meant to deprive the owner or possessor of his title or any right to his property and vest the same in the
sequestering agency, the Government or any other person, as these can be done only for the causes and by the
processes laid down by law.[85] These remedies "are severe, radical measures taken against apparent, ostensible owners
of property, or parties against whom, at the worst, there are merely prima facie indications of having amassed 'ill-gotten
wealth,' indications which must still be shown to lead towards actual facts in accordance with the judicial procedures of
the land."[86] Considering that sequestration is not meant to create a permanent situation as regards the property
subject thereof and subsists only until ownership is finally judicially determined,[87] it stands to reason that, upon its
dissolution, the property sequestered should likewise be returned to its owner/s. Indeed, sequestration cannot be
allowed interminably and forever, if it is to adhere to constitutional due process.[88]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the Sandiganbayan's assailed Resolutions dated 17 January
2008 and 22 May 2008 are, accordingly, AFFIRMED in toto. The 2 September 2008 writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction issued in the case is likewise DISSOLVED.

SO ORDERED.

ATCI OVERSEAS CORP. V. ECHIN