Introduction to HAZID

What is HAZID?
Definition of HAZID Terminology
Risk Level Factors Based on Frequency
Risk Level Factors Based on Severity
Definition of Risk
Risk Matrix
HAZID

Interpretation of Risk Matrix Regions

Application of HAZID
Execution of a HAZID Study
Example
HAZID Methodology
Team Selection
Drawings and Documents
Execution of a HAZID Study
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 What is HAZID?
• HAZID (Hazard Identification) is a technique which allows early
identification of potential hazards and threats in industrial design,
products development and activity planning.

• HAZID provides input to projects development decisions. This

leads to safer and more cost-effective designs and minimises future
design changes and cost penalties.
HAZID

• HAZID uses a guideword approach like HAZOP but covers a wider

scope of activities.

• HAZOP is generally focused on deviations arising within process

equipment whereas HAZID seeks to address hazards outside the
envelope of process equipment.

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 Definition of HAZID Terminology
• Hazard: potential source of harm
• hazardous event: incident which occurs when a hazard is
realized. Example : release of gas, fire
• Incident: event or chain of events which cause, or could have
caused, injury, illness and/or damage (loss) to assets, the
environment or third parties
HAZID

• Mitigation: limitation of the undesirable effects of a

particular event
• Risk: combination of the probability of an event and the
consequences of the event
• Risk analysis: use of available information to identify hazards
and to estimate risk
• Tolerable risk: risk which is accepted in a given context based
on the current values of society 3
 Risk Level Factors Based on Frequency
RISK LEVEL DESCRIPTIVE WORD FREQUENCY OF
OCCURRENCE

5 Frequent One per year

HAZID

4 Probable One per 10 years

3 Occasional One per 100 years

2 Remote One per 1,000 years

1 Improbable One per 10,000 years

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 Risk Level Factors Based on Severity
RISK LEVEL DESCRIPTIVE WORD POTENTIAL
CONSEQUENCES TO
PERSONNEL
5 Catastrophic Multiple deaths
HAZID

4 Severe Death

3 Serious Lost time accident

2 Minor Medical treatment

1 Negligible No injury

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 Definition of Risk
Risk = Frequency × Severity
or
Risk = Probability × Consequence

• The total overall risk is determined by multiplying the Risk Level

HAZID

factors from the above tables together to obtain a number from 1 to

25.

• If this product falls between 15 and 25, the risk is considered high.

• For a product between 6 and 15, the risk is considered moderate.

• If the product falls between 1 and 6, the risk is considered low.

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 Risk Matrix

Severity 1 2 3 4 5
Negligible Minor Serious Severe Catastrophic
Frequency

5 Frequent

4 Probable
HAZID

3 Occasional

2 Remote

1 Improbable

Intolerable region
Tolerable region if ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable)
Broadly acceptable region 7
 Interpretation of Risk Matrix Regions
• Risks in the “intolerable” region cannot be justified except in
extraordinary circumstances.

• Risks in the “tolerable if ALARP” region are tolerable only if risks

are ALARP i.e. if further risk reduction is impracticable or the
cost of improvements is grossly disproportionate to the
improvement gained.
HAZID

• Within the “broadly acceptable” risk region, risks are judged to

be low and no further formal ALARP assessment is required.

• All major accident hazards that are ranked as either “intolerable”

or “tolerable if ALARP” should be assessed using LOPA (Layer
of Protection Analysis).

• Any fault sequences which include a safety-instrumented

function should be subject to SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
assessment.
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 Application of HAZID
• HAZID is designed to identify the mechanisms by which safety
objectives may be violated.

• Violations may be hardware, such as mechanical failure, or

software, such as Management Systems or Procedures.

• For example, a safety objective could be the containment of fluids

HAZID

and a violation could be caused by impact, corrosion, fatigue or

other cause.

• HAZOP is cause driven whereas HAZID is consequence driven.

• HAZOP may accept a conclusion that an event cannot occur but

HAZID assumes that if it is credible it will occur and requires the
analyses of the sequence of events required to cause that event.
 Execution of a HAZID Study

• For a given system, identify relevant hazards and their

causes and potential consequences

• Document any existing safeguards (i.e. preventing the

hazard and/or consequences from the hazard)
HAZID

• Assess the risk (i.e. assess the probability/frequency and

consequences) associated with the identified hazards
•
Make recommendations and assign actions to eliminate,
prevent, control or mitigate the identified hazards

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 Example
• The following example of car brakes is an attempt to illustrate the
differences between consequence and cause driven studies.

• The analysis of the P & I Diagram of a car's braking system in a

HAZOP could produce the following results:

System: Hydraulic Piping

Safety Objective: To carry pressurised fluid to the brake cylinder
HAZID

• A simplified HAZOP worksheet might look as follows:

Parameter Deviation Cause Effect Recommendation

Pressure None Corrosion Loss of Install a separate

braking braking system
potential,
car crash

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 • The analysis of the same system using HAZID which uses a guideword
approach could produce the following results:

System: Car braking system

Safety objective: To arrest the car in a controlled manner

Guide Event Cause Consequence Control of Hazard Index Action

Word Nature / Escalation Mitigating Required/
Factors Comments
Cons. Freq.

Failure of Leaking Seal Loss of Likely to be H L Review the

HAZID

the master failure brakes / car progressive reliability of

brakes cylinder crash if corrosion the braking
& injury system
Failure of Leaking Corrosion Loss of Could use H M-H Consider
the hydraulic or impact brakes / car hand brake fitting a
brakes line crash and segregated
injury braking
system

• The logical end point of this analysis shows that the solution is not always the
addition of hardware and in this example it is the desirability of a diagonal
braking system as fitted on most, if not all, modern cars.
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 HAZID Methodology
• HAZID is a qualitative method which depends on the outcome of
guidewords, integration and motivation of participants.

• HAZID should be implemented as soon as preliminary plot plans,

environmental conditions, process flow diagrams and utility flow
diagrams are available.

• A HAZID study requires a considerable degree of preparation.

HAZID

• The first step of the study is to define the safety objectives and
safety/hazard issues for each section of the installation.
• To define the objectives accurately, it is usually necessary to have a
pre-meeting between the Facilitator and the client representative,
who should have a very good all round understanding of the
installation.

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 Team Selection
• Typically a HAZID team should include, but not be limited to:

- A Team Leader (or Facilitator);

- A Project representative (Client);
- A Process representative (Design engineer);
- A representative from Operations and Maintenance;
- A Technical Secretary (Scribe);
- Other Technical specialist(s) (depending on project requirements
HAZID

• In order to keep a HAZID session manageable it is recommended to

limit the HAZID team composition to a maximum 8 people around the
table at any time.

• The balance of the team, its experience and commitment are possibly
the second most important feature after the definition of the guide
words.

• If the team is unbalanced the study may not be objective and of

course there may be no self-catalysis or creative thinking. 14
 Drawings and Documents
• The main drawings used in a HAZID study are Plot Plans, Escape
Route Drawings, Process Flow Diagrams, drawings depicting the
location of emergency systems such as Emergency Shutdown Valves,
Relief/Blow down Valves, Deluge Valves and Fire Extinguishers etc…

• During the study process the layout diagrams will be used to define
the interactions and as a result they must show all equipment with
significant inventory and be sufficiently “uncluttered” such that process
HAZID

data like
• Pressure
• Temperature
• Flow
• Capacity
• Composition
• Can be added to the drawing.

• Once again, the data and drawings should be sufficiently detailed as

to allow all possible interactions to be explored.
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 Execution of a HAZID Study 1
• The study is potentially more mentally tiring than a HAZOP
study due to the need for intense lateral thought. A study period
of 3 hours is typical.

• Two sessions a day (6 hours) is the suggested limit but external

pressures may require greater effort.

• The study starts with a brief overview of the installation followed

by a detailed description of the equipment and its layout. The
HAZID

layout (plant) drawings are used and marked with key

equipment data. The object is to show the potential for
interaction. This part of the study will take typically one hour and
is a "settling in period" when an enhanced understanding of the
installation is generated.

• The Facilitator uses the guidewords to formulate scenarios

where the design intent may be violated and therefore centres
on the lateral thought processes.
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 Execution of a HAZID Study 2
• The objective is to define how an event could happen and what
would then be the consequence; the "causes" could be hardware or
software failure. The investigation of how it can occur will not allow
a statement such as "it can not occur!" Usually, during this period of
time, three thought processes are occurring:-

1. The potential for interaction is being fully appreciated.

2. The lateral thinking process is being developed.
3. The objectives and HAZID study techniques are being fully
HAZID

understood

• The process flows through the use of guidewords and the

Facilitator constructs scenarios for the team to explore. These
naturally lead on to other scenarios and the Facilitator has then only
to direct the team away from trivia. As each potential guideword is
exhausted the Facilitator moves on to a new guide work.

• While HAZOP examines a line at a time, HAZID examines a unit

operation or part of the process at a time.
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 Execution of a HAZID Study 3
• The final part of the study is to itemise the mitigations or controls in place.

• All recording is done on a pro-forma record sheet whose headings are

typically as shown below.

Ref No Guide Event Cause Consequence Control of Hazard Index Action

Word Nature / Escalation Mitigating Required
Factors on and any
Comments
Consequence
HAZID

an frequency

• After the sessions it will be necessary to quantify the various events

as to their Magnitude (consequence) and Frequency. The final
Magnitude and Frequency values must then be ranked against pre-
determined criteria and prioritised.

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 Selection of guide-words
• the installations are divided into homogeneous sections, called “areas”.
• For each area a list of guide-words is systematically applied to identify
potential hazards,
• for each hazard, the team determines its potential causes, consequences
and safeguards,
• the team concludes on the scenario acceptability or proposes actions for
improvement or investigation.
HAZID

• Example: HAZID of a piping installation

- Safety objective: no leakage of process lines. i.e., no loss of
containment. The guide-words could be:
- Corrosion
- Erosion
- Mechanical Impact
- Fatigue
- Overstress / load
- Rapid depressurisation of line
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HAZID
Basis of Safety and Layers of Protection

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 Next time

More HAZID examples

HAZID

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