1

Cultural appropriation, misrepresentation and power relations.

In the aftermath of the globalization process, old problems related to social

inequalities and unresolved colonial issues seem to re-emerge. In turn, many of these issues

became object of critical study after the 80s. One in particular that I will investigate in this

essay is the phenomenon of cultural appropriation, which has been studied by both

anthropology and philosophy: the former mainly interested in the relationship between

(western) ‘self’ and ‘other’, and how these two exchange symbols and misrepresent each

other; the latter expanding on that to reflect upon the ethical aspects of this phenomenon.

Cultural appropriation has also become something of a hot topic within the public debate in

the midst of the ‘political correctness’ craze, an all encompassing term used to describe the

many policies and language restrictions set in place in order to avoid offending or harming

historically marginalized groups - and that, for these reasons, try to attribute a negative value

to the phenomenon of cultural appropriation. As such, this negative view has been constantly

under attack by the anti-PCs in a way that misunderstands the true nature of the problem, as I

will argue ahead.

For this essay I will consider all of these views while searching for a concise

definition for cultural appropriation. Then, I can start to investigate some of the instances

where this phenomenon occurs and their effects on the groups that have been culturally

appropriated. Negative effects will be understood as the product of misrepresentations that

reinforce certain stereotypes and acts to maintain a given group in its marginalized position.

As such, cultural appropriation will be treated as morally reprehensible.

2

There are two main methodological approaches when searching for the definition of

cultural appropriation: we can either start with a neutral definition or with a normative one -

that is, one that attributes values to it beforehand. Some authors have preferred the first

approach, starting with neutral definition and then analysing its nuances afterwards. For

example: “Cultural appropriation is defined broadly as the use of a culture’s symbols,

artifacts, genres, rituals, or technologies by members of another culture” (Rogers 2006:2).

This definition is interesting because it provide us with some possible objects of

appropriation. But for the argumentation that I intend to construct here, it makes more sense

to define cultural appropriation as something intrinsically negative right from the start: it is

the usage of any traits from a dominated or marginalized culture by an outsider, generally a

member of a dominating culture. When this does not occur we might use other terms such as

cultural exchange or acculturation, but not ‘appropriation’.

From this definition we can already envision some general practices that could be

seen as cultural appropriation. Some appears to be more innocent, like eating food from

another culture’s cuisine. But some are visibly troublesome. Wearing costumes at a

halloween party as a means to exoticize or eroticize another culture. Certain gentrification

processes made to aestheticize the poverty of those who lived in the place before. Sampling

bits of music from records produced as ethnographic research and not sharing royalties.

Emulating certain non-western artistic techniques without properly referencing them.

These are all different examples, varying in intensities and scenarios. But what is

common to all of them is the understanding that we do have two or more somewhat well

defined cultures engaging with each other, and these cultures have enough different traits so

that we can clearly recognize them as different and not the same. Even though the definition

of culture is not an uncontested one, we should still cling to at least one that helps us assess
3

this dynamics of cultural appropriation. One such definition is proposed by Young and Brunk

(2009), tailored for this debate. For these two authors, culture can be better understood as a

‘familiar resemblance’, a concept taken from Wittgenstein. This means that a culture is

defined by a set of specific traits (symbols, rituals, language, religion, way of living, etc),

and that if an individual shares enough of these traits he can be perceived as a member of

this culture. Cultures may be amorphous and its limits dubious, but they are sufficiently

concise for us to perceive them as a unit and to perceive a varied number of its traits within

its members.

From this definition we start to perceive that individual identity and culture are

closely related. I argue that they are formed through the same process. To live in the world is

to constantly engage with all sorts of relations. Some of them happen at the individual level

as interpersonal relations. But some others happen at the collective level: relations between

social classes, nations, tribes, racial groups, north and south, west and east, etc. This

distinction, of course, does not suggest that these two realms exist completely alienated from

each other, because in fact they do feed each other constantly. The main point, though, is to

highlight the importance of these relations to the formation of identities and cultures. One

particular way to look at this is through the classical anthropological distinction between the

“self” and the “other”, which is the basis to any kind of relation. Individual and collective

identities can only be formed in relation to an ‘other’, this almost absolute difference that the

‘self’ craves to resolve its own inner desires or to completely negate it, thus stating his own

position in the world. This otherness acts as a background to our own identities, shaping

them with each encounter or confrontation. So, within the formation of identities lies the

very need to engage with other identities, either through exchange, domination, or

submission.
4

One particular aspect of this dynamic is extremely important to understand why

cultural appropriation can be so problematic: every relation is also a power relation, and as

such they tend to be asymmetrical. This means that the parts involved almost always have

different levels of power. They might be equally balanced, but in this case we would hardly

talk about ‘appropriation’. When they are unbalanced, it might be so because one of the

groups is imposing their own culture upon the other. In this case, even though we do have an

unbalance, I have chosen to not treat this flow of cultural traits as appropriation because it

poses a whole different set of problems. For example, how can we question the morality of

submitting to a cultural imposition when it works mainly as a survival strategy? What we are

considering to be cultural appropriation here is specific flow of cultural traits, one that comes

from a marginalized culture toward an outsider, generally a dominant culture.1

These power structures are precisely what most of the anti-PCs ignores when

discussing cultural appropriation. One of their most frequent arguments takes on the example

of the native american halloween costume. They argue that it makes no sense to condemn the

use of these costumes as morally wrong because in a same halloween party you might also

get costumes associated with european cultures such as folk germans, nordic vikings, or

spanish bullfighters. In their line of argumentation, this would mean that both cultures are

being treated equally. But they are not. The power relations established beforehand are

completely different. The one between two western cultures is roughly equally balanced,

while the one between an western culture and the native americans is based on stereotypical

views and old unresolved colonial issues.

They also get wrong the place of personal intention inside this debate. A common

argument is that cultural appropriation is just a form of admiration or appreciation for

1 These ideas on anthropology and power relations are certainly not mine, but I couldn’t find any

specific authors to reference because I was introduced to them through informal conversations.
5

another culture. And it might be. But, when discussing culture and identity, we must assume

that we are talking about a collective process, even though the effects of appropriations are

felt by the individual members of the appropriated culture. It is important then to completely

disregard any consideration of individual intention because it only feeds the debate with

unverifiable claims. One of the most fertile grounds for this discussion it’s the arts and its

relationship with non-western cultures. An artist’s good intention and sincere respect for the

culture being appropriated means nothing because the structure that allows the artist to come

in touch with that culture in the first place is inherently asymmetrical and possibly violent. A

very interesting example of this dynamics can be found in late 19th and early 20th century

art, namely modern european art made under the guise of ‘primitivism’. No one would

question the quality of artworks such as Picasso’s Ladies of Avignon (whose ladies’ faces

were inspired by an african Fang mask) or Gauguin’s paintings made during his trip to

Tahiti, neither their most sincere appreciation for the cultures that they took inspiration from.

And yet the very possibility of getting to know and engage with these cultures was created

by the imperialism of their times. This is an interesting example because violence takes its

most physical form as invasion, looting, and exploiting. Artifacts were brought back to

Europe to constitute museums and private collections, and ethnographic work was done

independently of the wants or needs of the original culture.

So what’s really wrong with cultural appropriation? To pinpoint the problematic

nature of cultural appropriation can be quite uncomfortable, in one hand because it forces us

to look at the dirtiness of our own interactions with other cultures, and at the other hand

because we may realize that many of the things we enjoy doing are the product of unjust

appropriations.
6

Cultural appropriation is morally wrong because it is harmful. It is almost always

followed by a misrepresentation of the appropriated culture because it strips away symbols,

objects or techniques from their original contexts. This can cause offense or, rather, a

‘profound offense’ (FEINBERG apud YOUNG;BRUNK, 2009), one that is so strong that

strikes at the very sense of self and fundamental values of the offended, such as when

religious objects are appropriated. But cultural appropriation can also cause harm in another

way. Misrepresentations of marginalized groups acts in favour of their marginalization

insofar as it undermines this group’s autonomy by reinforcing certain stereotypes. This

means that the group is not seen as an equal, thus demeaning their humanity. More than that,

sometimes even the act of appropriating itself is dehumanizing, for example in instances

when the other is seem simply as a repository of “stuffs” to be taken as one wishes. So the

harm done here is not a physical one, but a harm nevertheless, because dehumanizing the

other can create an environment where the exploitation and the violation of rights may

appear justifiable. I argue that treating any other culture fairly and with respect is a virtue in

itself, therefore any treatment that deviates from this should be seen as morally wrong.

In conclusion, by defining it roughly as the appropriation of a marginalized culture

by an outsider, I aimed at reducing this concept to a very specific type of flow of cultural

traits, one that presupposes an asymmetrical power relation between two cultures. Neither

equally balanced power relations, nor the process of imposing a culture upon a subaltern

group were regarded as appropriation by our definition. After defining it, I tried to set the

basis for an enquiry on the morality of such practice. When a cultural appropriation is made

through an asymmetrical relation, it typically results in a cultural misrepresentation that

reproduces stereotypes and acts in favour of maintaining this asymmetricality - that is, in
7

favour of keeping the marginalized at the margins. Both of these effects actually dehumanize

the marginalized and could, in turn, justify eventual practices of exploitation and violation of

rights. Taking fairness and equality as intrinsically positive values, cultural appropriation and

the dehumanization of marginalized groups can only be seen as morally reprehensible. With

this line of thought I hoped to provide a framework for discussing cultural appropriation.

References:
Young, J. O. and Brunk, C. G. The Ethics of Cultural Appropriation. Wiley-Blackwell. 2009.

Rogers, R. A. From Cultural Exchange to Transculturation: A Review and

Reconceptualization of Cultural Appropriation. In Communication Theory. Volume 16.

2006-11. 474-503.