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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

ART. II: POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES

Q1: Can the COMELEC disqualify candidates who cannot wage a nationwide campaign
and are not nominated by a political party as candidates jn elections?

Yes. The Constitutional privilege of
subjected to limitations. The rationale
the disqualification of candidates who
to ensure that electoral exercises are
G.R. No, 161872, 2004)
equal access to opportunities to public office may be
behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and
have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office, is
rational, objective, and orderly. (Pamatong v. COMELEC,

Q2: A telephone company applied for authorization frem the NTC to lay a cable under the
sea for transmission .of signals. A group of ttsnermen opposed on the ground that It
would adversely affect the fish in the area. A marine biology expert gave an opinion that
this was a new field and that there is no definitive proof of harm to the fish. Can a Wlrit of
Kalikasan be issued?

Yes, In accordance with the precautionary principle, taking action before the risk becomes
known is the, more prudent approach to environmental protection. (Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases)

ART. III: BILL OF RIGHTS

Q3: Does RA 9262 (An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children) vtolate
equal protection? •

No, The unequal power relationship between men and women; the fact that women are more
likely to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women
make for real differences justifying the classification. The distinction is germane to the purpose
of the law which is to address violence committed against women and children (Garcia v. Han
Driton, G.R. No. 179267, 2013) ,

Q4: Two police officers flagged down AA for driving a motorcycle without wearing a
helmet ..They asked him to go with them to their sub-station. While a traffic citation tlcket
was being filled up, AA kept getting something from his pocket. One of the police officers
asked him to take out the contents of his pocket. AA pulled out a metal container. The
police officer asked him to open it. The metal contained sachets of shabu. Can the
prosecution claim that the search was valid under the atop-and-frisk rule?

No, The search does not qualify under it. It is a limited protective search of outer clothing for
self-protectlcn of law enforcers, (Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788, 2012).

Q5: Somebody published an .advertlsement stating the records of a criminal case filed
~Igainst a broadcast journalist. The latter filed a case for libel on the ground that he has
already been acquitted. Is. the action tenable?

No. In the absence of proof that the defendant knew that the statement was false or published
with reckless disregard of whether or not it was true, the defendant cannot be held liable for
libel. A broadcast journalist is a public figure (other public fi~lures: Enrile, OIC-Mayor, executive
director of government agency, candidates in election, counsel in a high-profile case invclvinq a
matter of public concern), as his broadcasting has thrust him in the public sphere. (Guinggufng
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128959, 2005),

Q6: How is the "Conscientious Objector iest" applied in Philippine cases?

The RH Law - compelling practitioners, under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other
institutions despite their conscientious objections - violates the religious beliefs of a
conscientious objector. Once the medical pr~ner, agaInst his will, refers a patient seeKing

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information on modern reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his
conscience is immediately burdened as he has been cornpelled to perform an act against his
beliefs. (/mbong v. Ochoa, G.R. 204819, 2014)

07: Does State-sponsored procurement of contraceptlves violate the guarantee of

. religious freedom just because contraceptives contravene certain religious beliefs?

'. No. While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of
contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives
is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be
respected,

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with
religion, it also limits what religiOUS sects can or cannot do with the government. They can
neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can
they not cause the government to restrict other groups, To do so, in simple terms, would cause
the State to adhere to a particular religion and, rhus, establishing a state religion.

Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance
its population control program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of
contraceptive use ,is contrary to their reliqious beliefs, Indeed, the State is not precluded to
pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the pollcles of an}' one
religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it clouds his conscience. (/mbong v.
Ochoa, G.R. 204819, 2014) .

QS: The Food and Drug Authority included in the ESHential Drug List a pharmaceutical
preparation which prevents ovulation. AA questioned its constitutionality on the ground
that it violated Sec. 12, Article II of the Constitution. Is he right?

No, The Constitution protects the life of the unborn from conception. Human life begins upon
fertilization by the sperm of the ovum, It does not prohibit the prevention of the union of the
sperm and the ovum. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. 204819, 2014)

p9: What is the principle of relative constitutionality? .

A statute valid at one time as applied to a set of facts may become, void at another time because
of altered circumstances. This case involved RA 7653, which started as a valid measure of
legislative power applicable to Central Bank employees but, with the enactment of subsequent
laws exempting rank and file employees of all other GFls from the Salary Standardization Law,
was rendered void on account of a violation of the equal protection clause, (Central Bank
Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Piiipinas, G.R. No. 148208, 2004).

010: What does being released on recognizance mean?

Recognizance is a mode of securing the release of any person in custody or detention who is
unable to post bail due to abject poverty. The court where the case of such person has been
filed shall allow the release of the accused on recognizance, to the custody of a qual'ified
member of the barangay, city or municipality where the accused resides. (Sec. 3, RA 10389,
e.k.e. The Recognizance Act) The release on recognizance of ,allY person is a matter of right
when the offense is not punishable by oeatbrectusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, provided
that the accused or any person on his behalf files the applic:ation for such. Moreover, Sec. 12 of
the Act provides that the release on recognizance shall not be allowed in favor of the accused
after the judgment has become final or when the accused ras started serving sentence. (Soc. 5
and 12, RA 10389)

0.11; Is the mandatory drug testing of senatorial candidates, students of secondary and
tertiary schools, public and private employees, and persons charged before the
prosecutor's office, constitutional?

(a) Candidates for Constitutional Offices - Unconstitutional. A law cannot provide additional
qualifications other than those outlined in th~titution. Legislative power remains limited in
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the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both
the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects Of legislation.

(b) Employees - Constitutional. So long as the random drug testing is undertaken in such a
manner as to protect the privacy of the employees involved; the right to privacy must yield to the
necessary and reasonable requirements of police power.

(c) Students - Constitutional. Schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for
. admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.

(d) Persons charged before the public prosecutor's office - Unconstitutional. When
persons suspected of committing a crime are charqed, they are singled out and are
impleaded against their will. (SJS v. Dangerous Drugs Board, GR. No. 157870, 200cl)

Q12: What is the "Compelling State Interest" test as it relates to free exercise of religic1n?

The state has the burden of satisfying the "Compelling State Interest" test to justify any inhibition
of the free exercise of religion, This involves three steps: 1) ThE! courts should look into the
sincerity of the religious belief without inquiring -into the truth ot.the belief; 2) the State has to
establish that .its purposes are legitimate and compelling; and 3) the State used the least
intrusive means possible. (Estrada v. Escriior, A.M. No. P-0'12-165", 2006)

G113:What is the "knock and announce" principle in the service of a search warrant?
State its exceptions.' .

Police officers are obliged to give notice, show their authority, and demand that they be allowed
entry, They may only break open any outer or inner door or window of a house to execute the
search warrant if, after such notice and demand, such officers are refused entry to the place of
ciirected search.

Unannounced intrusion into the premises is permissible when (a) a party whose prernlses or
who is entitled to the possession thereof refuses, upon demand, to open it; (b) when such
person in the premises already knew of the identity of the officers and of their authority and
persons; (c) when the officers are justified in the honest belief that there is an imminent peril to
life or limb; and (.d) when those in the premises, aware of the presence of someone outside
(l1ecause, for example, there has been a knock at the door), are then engaged in activity which
justifies the officers to· believe that an escape or the destruction of 'evidence is being attempted.
Suspects have no constitutional right to destroy evidence or dispose of evidence. However, the
exceptions above are not exclusive or conclusive" Indeed, there is no formula for determination
of reasonableness, Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. (People v,
!--Iuang Zhen Hua and Jogy Lee, G.R. No, 129301,2004).

Q14: Does the Writ of Amparo cover threats to property"

No. To be entitled to a Writ of Amparo, petitioners must prove that their rights to life, liberty, and
security are being violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission. An allegation that
barangay tanods raided their farm to look for marijuana and that they anticipated the possibility
of harassment cases, false accusation, and violence are not sufficient bases for a grant of the
privilege of the writ. The intrusion into their farm was merely ::I violation of property rights. (Pador
VS, Arcayan, GR. No. 183460, 2013)

Examples of property rights not covered are:

1, Right to be restituted of personal belongings, It is already subsumed under the general rubric
of property rights which are no longer protected by the writ' of amparo. (Roxas v, Arroyo, GR.
No. 189155,2010) .
2. Merely seeking protection of property rights, like land in possession of the petitioners (Castillo

I.
v Cruz, G.R. No. 182165, 2009) .
3, Violent incidents purely property-related such as acts of terrorism in relation to a disputed
land (Tapuz v, Han. Judge del Rosario, G.R. No, 182484, 2008)

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1:l15: What is the strict scrutiny standard?

This presumes as unconstitutional, a legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with

the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect
class. The burden is on the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. As an
expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection, it has been used to assess the
validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, ~ender, or race as well as other
fundamental rights. (Disini v, Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. :?03335, 2014)

Q1~: AA posted a statement on Facebook that BB, a provincial governor, had been
receiving bribes. CC saw AA's post and, decided to share it with twenty of his friends. BB.
flied a criminal case for aiding and abetting in the comrnlsslon of libel against AA and
ee. The lawyer of CC moved that the case against him be dismissed. Should the motion .
be granted?

Yes. Only M, the original author of the statement should be prosecuted for libel. Since CC
merely shared the statement with others, he cannot be held liable, Because of the unique
culture of cyberspace, the inclusion of CC in the case would have a chilling effect upon those
who shared the statement. This is in violation of freedom of expression, This makes the law
overbroad. .

NOTE: But the crime of aiding or abetting the cornrrussion of cybercrimes regarding Illegal
'Access, Illegal Interception, Data Interference, System Inter:'erence, Misuse of Devices, Cyber-
squatting, Computer-related Forgery, on Computer-related Fraud Computer-related Identity
Theft, Cybersex is not overbroad, hence valld. None of these offenses borders on the exercise
of the freedom of expression, (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, 2014)

Q17: Section 19 of the Cybetcrime Prevention Act provides: "When a computer data is
prima facie found to be in violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an
order to restrict or block access to such computer data." Is this constitutional?

No. The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case, Section 19
operates as a restriction on the freedom of expression over cyberspace. Certainly, not all forms
of speech are protected. The Legislature may, within constitutional bounds, declare certain
kinds of expression as illegal. But for an executive officer to seize content alleged to be
unprotected without any judicial warrant, it is not enough for him to be of the opinion that such
content violates some law, for to do so would make him judge, jury, and executioner all rolled
into one, Not only does .section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards
jurisprudential guideli,nes established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech, (Disini
v. Sec. of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, 2014)

Q18: AA was convicted under the Cybercrime Prevention Law tor libel. The penalty
imposed upon him was one degree higher than the penalty in the Revised Penal Code.
He argued that the imposition of the higher penalty violated equal protection. Is he right?

No, There is a substantial distinction which is valid basis for t1e higher penalty. In a cybercrime,
the offender often evades identification, reaches more victtms, and causes greater harm, (Disin!
v, Sec. of Justice, G.H No. 203335, 2014). .

0'19: What constitutional guarantees create "Zones of Privacy"?

1) The right against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let
alone, and 2) the right to privacy of communication and correspondence. In assessing the
challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must
determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so,
whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable novernrnent intrusion,

Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in
accordance with customary legal process. ~eticulous regard we accord to these zones
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arises not only from our conviction that the
right most valued by civilized men," but also
Human Rights which mandates that "no one
privacy" and "everyone has the right to the
attacks," (Oisini v. Secretary ot Justice, G.R.
right to privacy is 'a "constitutional right" and "the
from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
protection of the' law against such interference or
No, 203335, ?014)

020: A student posted photos of herself clad only in her undergarments on Facebook.
The photos are viewable by her Facebook friends. 'The school saw these photos on
Facebook and penalised her for violating the school's student handbook. The student
claims the school violated her right to privacy. Rule on the student's claim.

In the absence of a showing that the student utilised Facebook's privacy settings to make the
photos visible only to her or to a select few, thereby placing the photographs within the ambit of
her protected zone of privacy, she cannot insist that she has an expectation of privacy with
respect to the photos, There must be a manifest intention to keep the photos private, such as
utilising Facebook's privacy settings. (Vivarez v. STC, G.R. No. 202666, 2014)

021: A province filed a case to expropriate the land of AA for a highway. The decision in
favor of the province became final. The lawyer of AA filed a motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution to enforce the decision and thereby obtain just compensation. Should
the motion be granted? .

No. The Commission on Audlt has jurisdiction to settle all claims due fromthe Government and
any of its subsidiaries, agencies, and instrumentalities, AA should file a claim with the
Commission on Audit for payment of the judgment. (Ral/os v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 202651,
W~ ..

Q22: In a corporate rehabilitation case, the RTC ordered that a creditor be paid by deeion
en p.ago, without its approval. Does this, violate the non-impairment clause?

, No. The non-impairment clause may be invoked against a law or executive issuance declaring
the modification of contracts, The non-impairment clause does not apply to court decisions.
Even assuming that the same may be invoked, the non-impairment clause must yield to the
police power of the. State for the common good of the general public, Successful rehabilitation of
a distressed corporation will benefit its debtors, creditors, employees, and the economy in
general. (Pryce Corporation v. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 72302, 2014.)

ART. IV: CITIZENSHIP

Q23: Does continued use pf foreign passport render the renunciation of Ioreign
citizenship nugatory?
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Yes, The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and unequivocal. The
requirement that the renunciation must be made through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty
of the one making the oath of renunciation to remain true to what t1e has sworn to, Allowing the
subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is convenient for. the person to do SQ is
rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an oatil, reducing it to a mere
ceremonial formality, (Maquiling v. COMELEC, GR. 195649, 2013).

Q24: Can an oath of office done in connection with appointment as Pro-';incial

Administrator be an effective act for reacquiring the status of a natural-born Filipino
citizen?

No, Said oath of office cannot be considered compliance of Sec. 3 of RA No. 9225 as certain
requirements have to -be met as prescribed by Memorandum Circulars on Rules Governing
Philippine Citizenship and Administrative Order No. 91 issued b¥ the Bureau of Immigration,
ThUS, oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance
in compliance with RA.9225. (Reyes v. COMELEC, GR. No, 207264, October 2013).

Q25: What are the two types of natural-born Filipinos referred to in R.A. 9225?
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1. Those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign
country who shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upcn takin!j the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines,

2. Those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after RA 9225 took effect, who shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is
required for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign
country, but the terminology used is different, "re-acquired" for the first group, and "retain" for
the second group. (David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113, 2015},

Q26: AA, a natural-born Filipino citizen, immigrated to the US and became a naturalized
American citizen. He decided to return to the PH and settle here permanently. He
repatriated and decided to run for congressman in the, city where he had been residing
for two years. BB, his opponent, filed a petition for his disqualification. BB contended
that since AA had to perform an act to reacquire Filipino citizenship, he was not a
natural-born Filipino citizen. Decide.

Repatriation results in recovery of the original nationality. Since he was originally a natural-born
Filipino citizen, his repatriation restored him to his former status as a natural-born Filipino
citizen, (Bengzon v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, 2001)

\)27: AA was born in the us. His father was an American citizen while his mother was a
Filipino citizen. He would always use an American passport when he would travel. In
2000, he settled in the PH permanently. After two years, he decided to run for
conqressrnan, He renounced his allegiance to the US before filing his CoCo BB, his
opponent, filed· a petition for his disqualification on the ground that since he always used
an American passport, he was not a Flllplno citizen. Decide. .

AA is qualified. He possessed dual citizenship, When he used an American passport when he

was still an American citizen, he simply exercised his right:> as an American citizen before the
termination of his American citizenship, (Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, 1999)

ART. VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPAFlTMENT

<:l28: What are the parameters of the party-list elections under Atong Paglaum?

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: 1) national parties or
organizations, 2) regional parties or organizations, and 3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.

3~ Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections; A political party, whether
majority or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
eiectlons only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system,
The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
.through a coalition.

4, Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or

lacking in well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector, The sectors that are "rnarglnallzed
and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, wcmen, and the youth,

I.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or orqanlzations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members .of sectoral parties or orqaruzations
that lack "well-defined political constituencie~st belon~ to the sector they repreeent. The

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nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and

underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies,"
either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be
bona-fide members of such parties or organizations,

6, National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified (Along PaglaUm v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, 2012).

Q29: What is the operative fact doctrine and when is it hot applicable?

The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the
determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fad that produced consequences that
cannot be ignored or disregarded, It nullifies a law or executive act but sustains its effects, It is
applied as a matter of equity to temper the possibly harsh, unjust, and wasteful effects if a
judicial decision were to be given complete retroactive effect. However, the doctrine of operative
fact does not always apply, and is not always the consequence of every declaration of
constitutional invalidity, It can be invoked only in situations where the nullification of the effects
of what used to be a valid law would result in inequity and injustice; but where no such result
would ensue, the general rule that an unconstitutional law is totally ineffective should apply,
(AraulJo VS, Aquino III, GR. No. 209287)

Q30: In the case of BAN AT vs. COMELEC, how shall the seats for the party-list
representatives be allocated?

According to the example provided in BANAT v. COMEl.EC, the allocation of the party-list
representative should be as follows: 1) Rank all party-lis ts according to votes received; 2)
Determine the 2% qualifiers; 3) Determine the additional seats. 4) Deduct the number of
quaranteed seats (2% qualifiers) from the maximum allowed seats, ex. 55 (220 x 20%) - 17 (17
;~% qualifiers in this case) = 38 seats left; 5) Divide the number of votes received by all parties
(qualifiers and non-qualifiers) by the total number of vote'S cast; (6) Distribute the addltlonal
seats (rounded down) in accordance to the ranking. (BANAT v. COMELEC, GR. No. 179~~71,
2009)

(l31: Does the sub judice rule apply in inquiries in aid of legislation?

No. The sub judice rule does not apply in inquiries in aid of legislation, The Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any
proseeulion of criminal or administrative action should not slop or abate any inquiry to carry out
a legislative purpose. Hence, no individual can escape the power of the Senate to investigate,
even if he or she has a pending administrative or criminal case. (Sabio v. Gordon, GR. No.
174340,2006) .

Q32: Distinguish between lnquiries in aid of legislation and "question hour."

. In~uiries in aid of legislation aim to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while
"question hour" pertains to the power to conduct inquiries. the object of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress' oversight function.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the
President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22 of Article VI, in keeping with the
separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless,
when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under
Section 21, Article VI, the appearance is mandatory. (Senate v. Ermita, GR. No. 169777. 2006)

Q33: Is the Congressional.Pork-Barrel constitutional?

No, because it:

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'I. Violates the principle of separation of powers by allowin~l legislators to wield post-enactment
authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional
oversight, and assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution, The
Executive department should exclusively exercise all relies and prerogatives which go into
the implementation of the national budget.
2, Constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it confers post-enacnnent
identification authority to individual iegislators; legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation by being able to dictate how much from such
fund would go to a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. The
power of appropriation is lodged in Congress as a body,
3. Violates the principle of checks and balances; as legislators make intermediate
appropriations only after the GM i~ passed and hence, outside of the law. It necessarily
means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would nQt have been written into the
General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of
lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification bud9\~ting system fosters the creation of
a "budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and
consequently impairs the President's power of item veto.
4. Violates the principle of local autonomy; with PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the
local development council and initiate projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its
execution.. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification has not only
contributed little to the overall development of the district, but has even contributed to
"further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the government."
Individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert
genuine local autonomy. (Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 2013566, 2013).

Q34: The Public Works Act appropriated specific funds for each city and municipality. A
provlslcn authorized the congressman, under whose legislative district the city or the
municipality falls, to suggest the projects to be funded and required that the suggestion
be justified by supporting documents. AA, a taxpayer in one of the cities, questioned the
constitutionality of the provision. How should the case be decided?

The provision is unconstitutional. It violates the separation of powers, because the enforcement
cf the appropriation is a function assigned to the Executive Department. Upon approval of the
law, the law-making role of Congress ends. (Be/gica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, 2013),

035: What are the permissible acts of Congressional Oversight?

1. Scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the budget hearings
conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be
heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation; and

2. Investigation and monitoring of the implernentation of laws pursuant to the power of Conqress
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, (Beigica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, 2013)

The review of implementing rules and regulations is unconstitutional. Any provision that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates separation of powers.
r
q36: Section 8 of PD 910 regarding the Malampaya funds provldes: "all fees, revenues
and receipt ... under the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share ... shall
form part of a special fund to be used to finance energy rE!SOUf'Cedevelopment and
exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter provided by the President." Does this constitute a valid delegation of
h~gislativ~ power? .

No, The provision "and for such other purposes" constitutes an undue delegation of legi~ative
power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of

I.
the President's authority. The provision lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard
of the delegating law and should be stricken down, The rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows the
use of the Malampaya Funds "to finance..-rgy resource development and exploitation

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'flrograms and ;')~~jects of the government," however, remains legally effective
and subsisting.
(Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, 2013)

037: What is an "item" under a revenue/tax bill and under an appropriations bill?

An "item" in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section imposing a particular kind of tax,
but rather to the subject of the tax and the tax rate, (CIR v, CTA, GR. No. L-47421, 1990). On
the other hand, an item in an appropriation bill is a specific appropriation of money, not some
general provision of law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. An item of
appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence, which is an allocation
of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-
item." (Be/gica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, 2013) .

Q38: Mayan appropriation be validly apportioned into component percentages or

values?

Yes, provided that each percentage or value must be allocated 'for its own corresponding
purpose for such component to be considered a proper line-item, (Be/gica v. Ochoa, G.R. No.
208566, 2013)

Q39: Maya valid appropriation have several related purposes'?

Yes. A valid appropriation may have several related purposes that are by accounting and
pudgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.q. maintenance and other operating expenses
(MOOE), in which case, the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the
exercise of the President's item veto power. (Belgica v. OChJ8, GR.. No. 208566, 2013)

Q40: When are savings generated and how must accumulation and utilization of savings
be interpreted?

Savings could be generated only when the purpose of the appropriation is fulfilled, or when the
need for the appropriation being no longer existent. However, since information on actual
revenue collections and targets are made available every quarter or at such time as the DBM
may prescribe, actual revenue surplus may be determined acoordtngly and release from
unprogrammed funds may take plate even before year end, The exercise of the pOWE!r to
auqrnent shall be STRICTLY construed by virtue of its being an exception to the general rule
that the funding of PAPs shall be limited to the amount fixed by Congress for the purpose.
(Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, 2015)

Q41; What activities under the DAP are unconstitutional?

1, The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies and the
declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as
savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and without ccmplying with the statutory definition
of savings contained in the General Appropriations Act;
2. Cross-border transfers of savings of the Executive department to augment appropriations of
offices outside the executive department;
3. FU\lding of projects, activities, programs not covered by any apprcortation in the General
Appropriations Act.

Note: The doctrine of operative fact was applied to sustain the past projects, activities, and
programs, funded by the DAP, (Arau/lo v. Aquino, GR. No. 209287, 2014).

C142: The General Appropriation Act appropriated P500 billion pesos for emergencies.
The General Appropriation Act authorized the President to augment an item in the
appropriation in the Executive Department from savings. The President approved the
transfer of P50 billion pesos of the unobligated allotments in the appropriation for
emergencies to augment the appropriation for schoolhouses. Is the augmentation valid?

No, Unobligated allotments cannot be declared 'as savinqs unless the purpose has been
completed or finally abandoned, they arose fJ.fillillllllinpaid compensation for vacant positions and

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leaves without pay, or the required services were delivered to a lesser cost because of
efficiencies, Unprogrammed funds were denominated as "standby appropriations," Hence,
revenue targets should be considered AS A V\[HOLE, not individually; otherwise, we would be
dealing with artificial revenue surpluses, (Araullo v. Aquino, GR. No. 209287, 2015)

ART. VII: EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

043: Gan the appeal from the decision of a Department Secretary to the President
because of his power of control be restricted?

Yes. It may be limited by executive order of the President, a law providing for judicial review,
and a rule of procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court. (Angeles v. Gaite, GR.· No.
165276, 2009)

Q44: When is the President immune from suit?

During tenure, for both official and unofficial acts; after tenure, only for official acts (So/ivan v.
Makasiar, No. L-82585, 1988; Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710, 2001)

645: Who are immune from suits?

Philippine,taw' ,, I ternatioh~J law

State may not be sued without its consent: State, but only as to sovereign or
(Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Philippine governmental activitles: (Holy See v. Rosario,
I Constitution . G.R. No. 101949, 1994;) . . I
Any person whose testimony or whose Heads of state and other state officials, with
possession of documents or other evidence is regard to personal immunity (attached to
necessary or convenient to determine the truth his/her office) and functional immunity (if the
in any investigation conducted by the CHR or acts being challenged are official in character)
under its authority; immunity must be granted in a foreign jurisdiction (Democratic Repub/ic
by the CHR (Art. X/II, Sec. 18 of the 1987 of Congo v. Belgium, 2002; The Pinochet
Ph iii ine Constitution Case, 1~, ~--:-I
President during his or her tenure or actual International Organizations, e.g. United
incumbency; after tenure, only for official acts Nations; Asian Development Bank; World
(Lozada v, Arroyo, G.R. No, 184379-80, 2012) Health Organization (Art. 105 of the UN
Charter; WHO v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-35131,
1972
The general rule is that a public officer is not Diplomatic agents, in all criminal, civil and
liable for damages which a person may suffer administrat.ive cases, except in the case of
arising from the just performance of his official real action relating to private immovable
duties and within the scope of his assigned property located in the Receiving State;
tasks. However, a public officer is by law not succession in which diplomat is involved; and
immune from damages in his personal any professional or commercial activity outside
capacity for acts done in bad faith which, his/her official functions; or when the Sending
being outside the scope of his authority are no State waives. (1961 Vienna Convention on
longer protected by the mantle of immunity for Diplomatic Relations)
official actions.

In Cojuangco v CA, the Court held that a

public office who directly or indirectly violates
the constitutional rights of another, may be
validly sued for damages under Article 32 of
NCC even if his acts were not so tainted with
malice or bad faith,

Thus, the rule is that a public officer may be

validly sued in his'PRIVATE capacity for acts
done in the course of the performance of the
functions of the office, where said public
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officer:
1. acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence;
OR
2. violated the constitutional right of the.
plaintiff, (Art. 32 of the Civil Cotie; Vinzons-
Chato v. Fortune Tobacco, G.R. No. 141309;
2007)
Consular officers and employees, in judicial or
administrative authorities in respect of acts
performed in the exercise of consular
functions, unless Sending State waives. (1967
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations)

Q46: Is the waiv.er of State immunity under VFA absolute?

No, The waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to
special civil actions such as a petition for issuance of a. Writ of Kalikasan. (Arigo v. Swift, G.R,
206510,2014)

1. Commander-in-Chief powers;
i. Appointment and removal power;
3. The power to grant pardons and reprieves;
4. The authority to receive ambassadors and other public officials; an
5. The power to negotiate treaties. (Neri v. Senate, G.R, No. 180643, 2008)

fQ48: Distinguish between the two kinds of executive privilege; l.e., presidential
communications privilege and deliberative process privilege.

. Presidential commUnications privilege' . \', ' Oeliberati I e process privilege ' ,

Pertains to communications, documents or Includes advisory opinions, recommendations
other materials that reflect presidential and deliberations comprising part of a process
decision-making and deliberations and that the by which governmental decisions and policies
President believes should remain confidential are formulated
Applies to decision-making of the President Applies to decision-making
I-: of executiv~ls (and judiciary)
Rooted in the constitutional principle of I Common law privilege
separation of powers and the President's
lInig_ue constitutional role

Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to
documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-
deliberative ones. (Nerf VS. Senate, G.R. No. 180643, 2008) They are presumed privileged
without distinguishing whether or not they involve matters of national security. It bears
emphasis, however, that the privilege accorded to presidential communications is not absolute,
one significant qualification being that the Executive cannot invoke a general confidentiality
privilege to shield its officials and employees from investigations by the proper governmental.
institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing. This qualification applies whether the privilege is
being invoked in the context of a judicial trial or a congressional investigation conducted in aid of
legislation. (Akbayan v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, 2008)

Presidential communications privilege encompass only:

1. those functions that form the core of presidential authority; i.e. quintessentlal and non-
delegable powers; and
2. staff with operational proximity to direct presidential dedsion-making. (Neri v. Senate, G.R.
No. 180643, 2008)

ART. Vlll: JUDICIARY

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Q49: State the rule on locus standi in relation to cases of transcendental importance.

Even in cases which are of transcendental importance, the petitioner must be able to assert
substantial interest, Present substantial interest, which will enable a party to question the validity
of the law, requires that a party sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its
enforcement-it is distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or
inconsequential interest. •

The rule on constitutional questions which are of transcendental importance cannot be invoked
where a party's substantive claim is without merit-a party's standing is determined by the
substantive merit of his case or a preliminary· estimate thereof. (Tondo Medical Center
Employees Association VS. CA,G.R. No. 167324, 2007),

Q50: The NDC, a government corporation, dismissed AA for dishonesty. AA appealed to

esc. The CSC acquitted him. The NDC appealed to the CA, AA moved to dismiss on the
ground that it had no standing to appeal. Is he right?

No. The party adversely affected by the decision has the right to appeal. The NDC is the party
adversely affected. It was the one who prosecuted the case, (LRT Authority. v. Soldano, GR.
No. 163782, 2006)

Q51: Is the creation of the PET violative of Sec. 12, Art VII of the Constitution which
prohibits the members of tlie Supreme Court from being designated to an agency
p~rforming quasi-judicial functions?

No. The Court held that the set up embodied in the. 1987 Constitution characterizes the
resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise ofjudicial power. When the Supreme
Court, as the PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what
is essentially a judicial power. (MacalintaJ VS. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618,
2010),

Q52: When can the issues involved in a case be resolved even when the case has
become moot?

The issue should be resolved in the following cases: 1) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; 2) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest are
involved; 3) there is a need to formulate principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
'and 4) the question is capable of repetition, yet evading review. (David v, Arroyo, GR. No,
171396, 2006)

Q53: A law was passed providing that any civil registrar who refuses to issue a marriage
license to persons who belong to the same sex shall be imprisoned for six years. The
Civil Registrar General was authorized to issue implementing rules and regulations. AA,
a civil registrar, questioned the constitutionality of the law in the Supreme Court by filing
a petition. for certiorari and prohibition, because it is against his religion to have :
something to do with a same sex marriage. The Solicitor Genel'al moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that a facial challenge could not be. made since the law does not
involve freedom of expression and the Civil Registrar General was not performing
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Should the motion be granted?

Sec, 1, Article VIII of the Constitution has expanded the scope of the judicial power of the
Supreme Court, The Supreme Court can take cognizance of the case since it involves an
alleged violation of freedom of religion and even if the respondent is not performing judicial or
quasi-judicial functions.

054: AA's lawyer applied for a barangay protection order' from the Punong Barangay for
her and her children under the VAWG Law. The petition was granted. The lawyer of the
husband argued that the grant of the power to the Barangay Chairman was,
unconstitutional, because it granted judicial power. Decide.
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The mere fact that the Punong Barangay has to inquire into the existence of facts to determine
what his official conduct should be, does not constitute exercise of judicial power. His
assistance is consistent with his duty to enforce the laws and maintain peace and order. (Garcia
v, Han Drilon, G. R. No, 179267, 2013)

ART. IX: CONSTITUTIONAL COI\IIMISSIONS

Q55: The Civil Service CommisSion took back-up files in the eomputer.of an employee to
determine if he was acting as counsel for employees with cases before the Commission.
Did the Commission violate the employee's right to privacy?

No, To determine whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy, the following
factors should be considered: 1) The Employee's relationship to the item seized; 2) Whether the
item was in the immediate control of the' employee; 3) Whether the employee took action to
maintain his privacy in the item.

The Supreme Court declared that Polio did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy over
the computer files in view of the following facts: 1) Polio's computer was issued by the
government, and could be used only for government business, 2) There was a memo policy
restricting use of the computer, expressly stating that the use of a password does not imply
privacy, and 3) she allowed other people to access the computer; and 4) There is reasonable
ground for suspecting the computer files will produce evidence of the misconduct of the
employee, (Pallo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No, 181881, 2011)

ART.X:lOCAGGOVERNMENT
,"
056: Can local government units exercise police power?

Yes. The .State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to LGUs, as
agencies of the State. This delegation known as the General Welfare Clause is embodied in
Section 16 of the 1991 local Government Code, (Fernando v St. Scho/astica's College, GR.
No. 161107, 2013),

Q57: Congress passed a law creating a new province, Province A, composed of more
than 1 Island. Under the LGC, all new provinces must have either at least 2,000 sq. km. in
territory or a population of at least 250,000. The LGC further provides that only
municipalities and cities composed of one or more islands are exempt from the land area
requirement. Province A contains only 800 sq. km. and a population of 100,000. Is the law
constitutional?

Yes, There appears neither rhyme nor reason why the exemption for land area requirement
should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. It is, therefore, logical to infer that
the exemption was inadvertently omitted for provinces. Allowing provinces this exemption is
consistent with the declared policy of. decentralization and to provide local government units
genuine and meaningfullocai autonomy, (Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. No, 180050, 2011)

Q58: A person who was convicted of a crime applied for probation. His application was
approved. Can he immediately run for local elective office?

Yes. As a rule, a person who was convicted of a crime is disqualified to run for local elective
office within. two years from the time he completed service of his sentence. Since he. did not
serve his sentence, he is qualified to run. (Moreno v. Commission 011 Elections, G.R, No.
168550, 2006)

Q59: Are coterminous appointive officials who were administratively charged along with
the reelected official/appointing authority covered by the doctrine of condonation?

No, The reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officers' previous misconduct but
only with respect to his or her administrative liability. (Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva
Ecija, 106 Phil. 406, 1959), The principle of condonation cannot be extended to reappointed
coterminous employees, the underlying bas~e rule being to uphold the ,will of the people
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expressed through election. There is no subversion of the sovereign will of the people in the
case of reappointed coterminous employees, (Salumbides v. Ombudsman, GR. No, 180917,
2010)

Q60: A provincial governor entered into a contract without the authority of the provincial
board. Is the contract void?

No, It is merely unenforceable under Article 1403 of the Civil Code, It may be ratified expressly
O(impliedly. (Ocampo v. People, G.R. No. 163705, 2007)

Q61: .When are municipal contracts void "for being ultra vires and when are they
ratifiable? .

VOID when: a) LGU does not have the express, implied, or inherent power to enter into the
contract; b) Substantive requirements are not met (such as
a lack of actual appropriation).

RATIFIABLE/UNENFORCEABLE when: a) contract has been entered into by local chief

executive without authority from the local sanggunian; b) contract did not comply with the formal
requisites. (Nachura, 2009)

Q62: What is a plebiscite and what are its requirements?

Plebiscite is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or

rejected by the people. It is also the term used in determining the creation .of barangays,
municipalities; cities, provinces and autonomous regions.

Fpr a constitutional plebiscite, 12% of all registered voters is needed, with 3% for all legislative
districts, and may be exercised five years after its ratification on February 2, 1987, and once
every five years after each plebiscite,

Furthermore, the Local Government Code Sec. 10 provides that "No creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect
unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the
political unit or units directly affected, Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC
within 120 days from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecttnq such action, unless
said law or ordinance fixes another date," •

063: Does the authorization of the Mayor to enter into a contract have to be in the form of
an ordinance?

No, a mere resolution by the council is sufficient. However, tne obligation to enter into a contract
must be pursuant to a law or ordinance. '(Land Bank v, Cacayuran, G.R. No. 191667,2013)

Q64: Who may impose preventive suspension?

(1) by the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or
an independent component city;
(2) by the governor, if the respondent is an elective official of a component city or municipality;
(3) by the mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of the baranqay. (Sec. 63; LGC)

Q65: Can the President dismiss a mayor?

No, If the penalty. is removal, a case must be filed with the RTG because only the courts can
remove elective officials. .

ART. Xl: ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Q66: When is there a presumption that a public officer unlawfully acquired his/her
properties?
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The elements that must concur for this prima facie presumption to arise are the following: (1) the
offender is a public officer or employee; (2) he must have acquired a considerable amount of
money or property during his incumbency; and (3) said amount is manifestly out of proportion to
his salary as such public officer or employee and to his either lawful income and income from
legitimatelyacquired property, (Marcos v. Republic, G.R. No. 189434, 20'12; Sec. 2 of RA 1379)

067: Does the right of the State to recover illegally acquired wealth prescribe?

No, The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials and
employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription,
laches, or estoppel. (Section 15, Art. 11, 1987 Const; Arl. 1144-6, Civil Code)

Q68: What is the nature of the coconut levy funds?

Coconut levy funds partake of the nature of taxes which, in general, are enforced proportional
contributions from persons and properties, exacted by the State by virtue of its sovereignty for
the support of government and for all public needs. Hence, they cannot go into private hands.
(Republic v. COCOFED, G.R. No. 147062-64, 2001)

Q69: A complaint for impeachment was filed on June 2, 1.003. It was referred to the
Committee on Justice on April 5, 2003. On Oct. 23, 2003, a second complaint for
impeachment was filed against the same public officer. Can the second complaint be
entertained?

No. Under sec. 3 (5), Article XI of the Constitution, no impeachment proceedinq shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year. The intention of the
framers of the Constitution was that the proceeding is considered initiated when a verified
complaint is filed and referred (0 the Committee on Justice for action within a period of one year.
~Franc;sco v. House of Representatives,GR 160261, 2003)

Q70: Does the Sandiganbayan have the authority to suspend a Senator charged with
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?

Yes, The Court upheld the authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension
of an incumbent Senator charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. (Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No, 128055, 2001)

Q71: Can the Ombudsman take over an investigation, of the Department of Justice any
time? .

Yes, The Ombudsman can take over any investigation of the DOJ at any stage by virtue of Sec
15, Par, 1 of the Ombudsman Act which mandates the Ombudsman to: investigate and
prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears.to be illegal, unjust, improper,
or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the
exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of Government, the investigations of such cases,

Q72: Over the course of an impeachment hearing, can the Senate, sitting as an
impeachment court, inquire into the contents of the. accused official's foreign currency
deposits?

No, foreign currency deposits are completely confidential and eire exempt from attachment,
garnishment or any order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body Whatsoever, The only exception to this rule is when prior written permission
has been obtained from the depositor.( Sec. 8, RA 6426)

Q73: Distinguish between the kinds of penalties that the Ombudsman can impose upon
elective as against appointive officials with respect to suspension and dismissal in
administrative proceedings.
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Under Sec.' 25 of the Ombudsman Act, the Ombudsman may impose the penalty of suspension
and dismissal on non-impeachable officers in administrative proceedings, except court
personnel.

ART. XII: NATIONAL ECONOMY ANI) PATRIMONY

Q74: Maya foreign corporation enter into a financial and technical assistance agreement
with the government involving the management and operation of a mining enterprise?

Yes. Section 2, Article 12 of the Constitution allows other forms of assistance or activities
having to do with technical or financial assistance and it will not prohibit the involvement of
foreign corporations in the management of mining ventures, The policy recognizes that foreign
corporations who will invest in mining will require that they be given a say in the management to
ensure its success. The Constitutional Commission understood technical or financial
agreements as interchangeable with service contracts. (La Buga/-8'/aan Tribal Association, Inc.
v. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, 2004)

ART. XVI: GENERAL PROVISIONS

Q75: Does the Vice-President enjoy immunity from suit?

No precedent as to this. But commentators, including Fr. Bernas, conclude that a VP does not
Emjoy immunity from suit. The intent of the law granting such immunity to the President is due to
the singular importance of the President's duties, Diversion of his energies to private lawsuits
would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of government (Nixon vs. Fitzgerald, 457 US
731, 1981), The VP is not vested with the same level of responsibilities that requires utmost
undivided attention, unlike the President.

LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS

076: There were 14 members of the provincial board; one of them was abroad. Seven
members attended a session of the provincial board. As the vice-governor was absent,
one of the members presided. The provincial board took up a proposal to enter into a
contract. The 6 members approved it. The member who was presiding relinquished the
chair to another member and then voted to approve the proposal. Thereafter, he then
resumed the chair. Was the proposal validly approved?

No. Since Section 53 of the Local Government Code provides that· a majority of all the members
of the provincial board constitute a quorum, the entire membership must be considered in
computing the quorum. The quorum should be eight. A presiding officer cannot vote except to
break a tie. The temporary officer cannot have greater pOWE'rthan the regular presiding officer,
(Zamora v. Cabal/ero, GR. No. 147767,2004)

Q77: What is the rule on liability for injury by reason of defective conditions of public
works?

For liability to arise under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, ownership of the (pads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works is not a controlling factor, it being sufficient that
a province, city. or municipality has control or supervision thereof. (Municipality of San Juan v.
CA, G.R. No. 125183, 1997)

Q7B: X questioned in court the validity of a regulation issued by the Philippine Coconut
Authority on the ground that it is contrary to law. The Philippine Coconut Authority
moved to dismiss the case for failure of X to exhaust administrative remedies. Decide.

The motion should be denied. The rule on exhaustion ot administrative remedies has no
application to the exercise of the rule-making power of an administrative agency. Only the
exercise of its quasi-judicial function is subject to the doctrine. (ASSOCiation of the Philippines
Coconut Dessicators v. Philippine Coconut Al.JIJilii/;itV.G.R. No. 110526 February 10, 1998)
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Q79: The decision of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government on appeal reversed
the decision dismissing a police officer. The decision was appealed to the Civil Service
Commission. It was argued that because of the prlnctple of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, the appeal should have been made to the Office of tile President. Decide.

The contention is wrong. This doctrine precludes premature resort to courts. It does not deal
with intra-administrative relations (Montejo v. Vari/la, 579 Phil. 531, 2008).

Q80: Enumerate the exceptions to the rule that a regulation should be published.

(1) It is interpretative;
(2) It is merely for the internal administration of an agency; and
(3) It was issued by a superior to prescribe guidelines to be observed by his
subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Q81: What is the 'doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and what are its
exceptions?

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where a remedy before an
administrative agency is provided and can still be resorted to, relief must first be sought by
exhausting this remedy before bringing an action before the courts of justice.

Exceptions:
1. private land
2. purely questions of law
3. Quo warranto
4, denial of due process
~ 5. patently illegal action
" 6. irreparable injury
7. estoppel
8. futility of resort to administrative remedies
9. decision of Department Secretaries (alter ego)
10. recovery of possession of public lands
11, unreasonable delay
12, poverty
1, public interest
2, requirement by law of immediate resort to judicial review

Q82: What is the doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction?

If the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills, and
knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions
of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a
remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of
a court. (Industrial Enterprise Inc vs. CA, G.R. No. 88550, 1990)

PUBLIC OFFICERS

Q83: X was holding the position of a Cabinet Secretary. He was subsequently appointed
in an acting capacity as the head of a government instrumentality. The SC held that this
was in violation of Sec. 13, Art. VII of the Constitution and ordered him to vacate the
second position. Can X keep the compensation thus far received?

Yes, during his tenure in the questioned position, a respondent may be considered de facto
officer and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. It has been held that in
cases where there is no de jure officer, a de liIiIii..officer, who, in food faith has had possession
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of the office and has discharged the duties pertaininq thereto, is legally entitled to the
emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other
compensations attached to the office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable
founds since it seems unjust that the public should benefit by ther services of an officer de facto
and then be freed from all liability to pay anyone for such services. Any per diem, allowances or
other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the
questioned positions may therefore be retained by them, (CLU II. Exec. Sec, GR. No. 83896,
February 22, 1991)

ELECTION LAW

Q84: Distinguish between Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy.

Q85: Can a person seeking elective office be charged of premature campaigning before
the start of the campaign period?
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Misrepresentation of any of the (1) possession of a permanent resident

material qualifications required
for the elective office aspired for
(age, residency, cltizenship).
NOTE: Cancellation is not due to
lack of qualification, rather on the
act of rnisreoresentati
status in a foreign country;
(2) his or her commission of certain acts
of disqualification,
. (a)vote-buying
(b)terrorism
(c) over -spendi

No, A person who files his certificate of candidacy is considered a candidate only at the start of
the campaign period, and unlawful acts applicable to such candidate take effect only at the start
of such campaign period. A candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during
the campaign period, not before. Before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses
cannot be committed and any partisan political activity is lawful. (Section 15 of Republic Act
8436, as amended by Republic Act9369; Penera VS. COMELEC, G.R. 181613,2009)

Q86: In Estrada's pardon, the Whereas Clause provided that .Estrada has publicly
committed to no longer seek any elective position or office. In the text, it was stated that
he was restored to his civil and political rights. Is Estrada's right to run for public office
restored considering Articles 36 and 41 of RPC which require that pardon of specific
rights be expressly stated for it to be effective?

Yes. The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by leqtslatlve action, Estrada was
granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil. and political rights. which naturally
includes, the right to seek public elective office, The pardon is complete, unambiguous, and
unqualified.

The Whereas Clause or preambular paragraph does not have any legal or binding effect on the
absolute nature of the pardon extended, It is merely an introduction to show its intent or
purposes. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither
expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text, If the pardon was intended to be
conditional on the promise never to seek a public office again, it ought to have been explicitly
stated in the text of the pardon itself. (Risos-Vida/ II, COMELEC, GR. No. 206666, 2015).
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Q87: AA was convicted of murder. After serving six ye,ars of his. sentence, the President
issued an order pardoning him. AA decided to run for municipal mayor pursuant to LGC.
BB, his opponent, filed a petition to disqualify him on the ground that the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification was still in force. Decide.

Since the pardon did not. expressly include the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification, it is not deemed included in the pardon. (Ja/osjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
205033, 2013)

088: Are appointive officials considered ipso facto resigned once they have filed their
certificates of candidacy?

Yes. Appointive officials are not supposed to engage in partisan politics. Applying the four
requisites of the equal protection, the Supreme Court finds that the differential treatment of
persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is germane to the
purposes of the law: efficient civil service faithful to the government and the people rather than
to party and avoidance of the danger of a powerful political machine, among others. (Art.
IX(B), (2),(4); Quinto V. GOMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, 2010)

Q89: The-Bar, a political party, "fielded person A as its candidate for president in the
national elections. The day after the deadline for filing the COC, person A withdrew his
candidacy. The-Bar selected person B as its substitute candidate. Is the substitution
valid?

Yes. Pursuant to Sec, 77 ,of the Omnibus' Election Code, However if the ballots have already
been printed. pursuant to COMELEC Resolution 9518, the substitute must have the same
, surname with the original candidate.

Q90: The-Bar, a political party, fielded Person A as its candidate for congressman.
However, the Comelec cancelled Person A's COC because Person A misrepresented that
he satisfied the 1-year residency requirement when in fact he did not. The-Bar selected
Person 8 as its substitute candidate. Is this valid?
No. Substitution is valid for a disqualified CDC but not for a cancelled CoC. A disqualified
candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a candidate for all intents and
purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or
cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all (Tagolino vs. HRt=T,
G:R. 202202; 2013).

Q91: AA was elected for two consecutive terms as member of the provincial board
coming from the second legislative district of a province with four legislative districts. In
a reapportionmerit law, the second legislative district became the third legislative district
and retained eight of the ten municipalities of the second district. AA ran again as
member of the provincial board coming from the third legislative district and was elected.
In the immediately following election, he filed his certificate of candidacy as member of
the provincial board coming from the third legislative district. His opponent fited a
petition for disqualification. Is AA qualified to run?

No. The legislative district which elected AA as member of the provincial board for three
consecutive terms was the same, He is disqualified to run again because of the three-term limit.
(Naval v. COMELEC, G.R, No. 207851, 2014)

092: What conditions are required for the declaration of failure. of elections?

(4) No voting took place on the date fixed by law or the election resulted in failure to elect;
(2) The votes cast will affect the result of the election. In turn, there are three instances of failure
of ,electi on :
1, the election was not held on the date fixed by law
2. the election was suspended .
3, during the preparation and transmission of the election return or in their custody or
canvass, the election results in the failure to elect (Macabago v. COMELEC, GR. No,
152163,2002)
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Q93: Bishop AA placed beside his church, which was adjoining the national highway, a
huge tarpaulin which listed the names of all the candidates for, public office who received
money from the Disbursement Acceleration Program. 88, one of the candidates who was
named, filed a case with the COMELEC to order its removal, because it favored his
opponents and its size exceeded the size of election propaganda allowed by the
COMELEC. Decide. .

The size of the tarpaulin makes it easier for people to view the message. Every expression of a
citizen with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection. The tarpaulin was not
posted in return for any consideration from any candidate or party. It is not covered by the
regulation of the COMELEC. (Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
205728, 2015)

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Q94: What is the nature of an act establishing a diplomatic mission, its upkeep, and its
maintenance?

The establishment of a diplomatic mission as well as its upkeep and maintenance are acts jure
imperii. The establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep.
Hence, the State may enter into contracts with private entities. to rnalntain the premises,
furnishings, and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials,
(Rep. oflndonesia v. Vinzon, G.R. No. 154705, 2003) .

095: What is the principle of command rasponslblllty under lnternatlonal law?

Command responsibility means the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by

subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflicts.

Its elements are:

(i) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship;
(ii) that the superior knew or had reason to know that the crirninal act WaS about to be or had
been committed; and
(iii) that the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal act or punish the perpetrator (Article 7(3) of the Statute of the International
Criminal Tribuna! for the former Yugoslavia)

Since it is a well-established norm of customary and conventional law, it forms part of Philippine
law via the doctrine of incorporation in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution.

Q96: Distinguish Straight Baselines from Normal Baselines.

Normal baseline method - follows "the low-water line" along the coast as marked in large-scale
charts officially recognized by the coastal state. This line follows the sinuosities of the coast and
therefore would normally not consist of straight lines. •

Straight baseline method - straight lines are drawn connecting selected points on the coast
without appreciable departure from the general shape of the coast The drawing of straight
baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast, and
the sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be
subject to the regime of internal waters, •

Straight baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless lighthouses or
similar installations which are permanently above sea level nave been built on them or except in
instances where the drawing of baselines to and from such elevations has received' general
international recognition.

Q97: Scalzo was an agent of the US Drug Enforcement Agency who was allowed by the
Philippine Government to conduct surve~ activities in the country to help contain
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the problem of drug trafficking. A complaint

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was filed
•

against him for allegedly filing

trumped up charges of drug trafficking. Is Scalzo liabltl?

No. He is not liable under the doctrine of state immunity from suit. A foreign agent, operating
within a territory, carr be cloaked with immunity from suit if he is'acting within the directives of
the sending state, provided that the consent of the host state is obtained. Scalzo was allowed
by the Philippine Government to conduct activities in the. country to help contain the problem of
drug trafficking. Hence, he is immune from suit under the doctrine of state immunity from suit.
(Minucher v. CA, GR. No. 142396, 2003)

098: How are disputes settled under UNCLOS?

It may be settled by peaceful means chosen by the parties or under compulsory procedures
where a state party may go before the:
(a) ITLOS;
(b) Arbitral Tribunal;
(c) ICJ; and
(d) Special Arbitral Tribunal [disputes relating to fisheries, protection and preservation of the
marine environment, marine scientific research, or navigation, including pollution from vessels
and by dumping]. (UNCLOS)

Q99: Can a state choose not to be bound in the compulsory procedure under UNCLOS?

Yes, if the state makes a declaration that it does not accept any compulsory procedure with
respect to the following:
1. Sea boundary delimitations or those which involve historic bays or titles;
2, Military activities
3. Dispute over which the Security Cquncil exercises its functions under the UN Charter

Q1 00: What is the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea?

. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal comprises all disputes and all applicatons submitted to it in
accordance with the Convention, It also includes all matters specifically provided for in any other
agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal (Statute, Arlic/e 21). It has jurisdiction to
deal with disputes (contentious jurisdiction) and legal questions (advisory jurisdiction) submitted
to it. (UNCLOS Ill) .

Q101: What is the difference between Archipelagic Waters and internal Waters?

Arphipelagic waters are the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance
with the Article 47 UNCLOS. On the other hand, internal waters are those waters around,
between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions. (UNCLOS III)

Q102: What is the extent of maritime zones under UNCLOS?

Maritime .Zones ~! Nauticall1lliles from baseline

Territorial Waters 12
Contiguous Zones 24
Exclusive Economic Zones 200
(UNCLOS Iff)

Q103: Whatare the rights under different maritime zones?

(1) Archipelagic Waters (UNCLOS: Internal waters are Archipelaqic waters) - limited
sovereignty (subject to the right of Archipelagic Sealanes Passage, Innocent Passage, and
Right,to Fish. by Traditional Foreigners)
(2) Territorial Sea - Subject to the right of innocent passage. Submarines and other
underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface to show their flag.
(3) Contiguous Zone - Limited jurisdiction over,customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws
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(4) Exclusive Economic Zone - limited sovereignty over exploration, exploitation, conservation
and management of natural resources, whether living or non-livlnq, Surplus catch goes to other
states '
(5) Continental Shelf - limited sovereignty over shelf for exploration and exploitation of natural
resources
(6) Extended Continental Shelf - limited sovereignty over the shelf for exploration and
exploitation of natural resources. Surplus catch goes to other state (UNCLOS /II).

0104: What are the freedoms enjoyed by States on high seas?

(1) Freedom of navigation;

(2) Freedom of overflight;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations;
(5) Freedom of fishing; and .
(6) Freedom of scientific research. (Art. 86, Sec. 1, UNCLOS)

Q105: What are the rules in drawing the baselines under UNCL,OS?

(1) 1 to 1 and 9 to 1 ratio of area of water to area of land:

(2) Length of baseline should not exceed 100 nautical miles except that up to 3% of total
number of baselines can reach up to 125 nautical miles;
(3) Baselines should not depart from general configuration of archipelago;
(4) Baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless lighthouses or similar
installations which are permanently above sea level have been built on them;
(5) Not cut off from the high seas or the EEZ the territorial sea of another State
(6) Existing rights and ali other legitimate. interests which the latter State has traditionally
exercised shall continue and be respected;
(7) For the purpose of computing the ratio of water to land under paragraph I, land areas may
include waters lying within the fringing reefs of islands and atolls, including that part of a steep-
sided oceanic plateau which is enclosed or nearly enclosed by a chain of limestone islands and
drying reefs lying on the perimeter of the plateau;
(8) Baselines shall be shown on charts of a scale or scates adequate for ascertaining their
position. Alternatively, lists of geographical coordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum,
may be substituted. (Arlicle 47, UNCLOScited in Magel/ana v Ertniie, G.R. No 187167, 2011).

Q106: AA filed a case in which he questioned the constitutionality of RA 9522, which

defined the archipelagic nasennes of the Philippines. He contended that the laws
excluded the Kalayaan Islands and its Scarborough Shoals from the Philippine
archipelago baseline, declared them as a regime of lands, and thereby reduced the
territory of the Philippines. Is h.eright?

N~. The UNCLOS has nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of territory. It merely regulated
sea-use rights over maritime zones, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, and
continental shelves. The Inclusion of the Kalayaan Islands and the Scarborough Shoals as part
of the Philippine Archipelago would have violated the UNCLOS Ill, which provides that the
drawing of baselines should not depart appreciably from the gemeral configuration of the
archipelago and the length of the baselines should not exceed 100 nautical miles for 30% of the
baselines, they are instead treated as "regime of islands" under Philippine control (Maga/lona v.
Ermita G.R. No 187167, 2011),

0107: Is there a right of innocent passage in the territorial wat~rs of another State?

Yes, ships of all states, whether coastal or landlocked, enjoy the right of innocent passage
through the territorial sea of another state.

For the passage to be innocent, Article 1-9of the Law of the Sea Convention requires that the
passage should not be prejudicial to the peace, good order, at' security of the coastal state,

O'WS: As a rule, islands can create their own territorial, contiguous Exclusive Economic
Zone, and continental shelf. What is the e~ion?
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Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall ~ave no
exclusive economic zone or continental shelt. (Article 121[3] UNCLOS)

Q109: What are the basic principles of International Humanit.arian Law (IHL)?

• Distinction between civilians and combatants;

• prohibition to attack those hors. de combat;
• prohibition to inflict unnecessary suffering;
• principle of necessity; and
•. principle of proportionality,

Q110: Does IHL concern itself with the legality of the commencement of hostilities or
justification of war or of the armed conflict?

No. The legality of the war or the justification of the commencement of the hostilities is irrelevant
in IHL. IHL deals with jus in bello (laws of war), not with jus ad bellum (laws on use of force),
The Preamble of Protocol I states that "the provisions of the Geneva conventions and of this
Protocol must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protected by those
instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict
or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the conflict."

0111: Distinguish IHL from International Human Right:> Law (IHRL).

International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rigl1tS Law· are two distinct but
complementary bodies of law, Both seek to protect the individual from arbitrary action and
abuse, with a view to safeguarding the fundamental rights of the individual.

IHRL achieves this objective in a comprehensive way insofar as it covers almost all aspects of
life. Its rules must be applied to all persons and be respected in all circumstances, except in
emergency cases where derogation from rights is allowed,

IHL, however, is a specialized body of human rights law, fine tuned for times of armed conflict.
Its provisions .are formulated in such a way as to take into account the special circumstances of
warfare, They may not be abrogated under any circumstances. Usually, they apply "across the
front line", i.e. the armed forces have to respect humanitarian law in their dealings with the
enemy (and not. in the relations with their own nationals), Some of its provislons have no
equivalent in human rights law, particularly the rules on the conduct of hostilities or on the use of
weapons.

Q112: Explain the concepts:

1. Pacta Sunt Servetuie ~ A party must comply with its treaty obligations (Aritc/e 26,
VCL T),
2. Most Favoured Nation Clause - a clause in the treaty that grants to the other party equal
treatment (not less favorable) that has been granted or may be granted to the most
favored other country, which is common in treaties of commercial nature, like the TRIPS
. Agreement on intellectual property rights appended to the treaty creating the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and the GATT,
3, Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus - A party to a treaty is discharged in the event a change
of circumstance occurs which renders the fulfilment of the treaty grossly unjust,
oppressive and iniquitous. •
4, Jus Cogens - peremptory norm of international 'law; means "a norm accepted and
recognized by the international, community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character. (Article 53, VCL T)
5. Double Criminality - is a requirement in extradition cases that the crime for which the
extradition is sought be a crime in both the extraditing State and the State to which the
individual is to be extradited, •
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6. Opinio Juris - the common belief among states and actors that a certain practice is
obligatory. This is the subjective or psychological requirement of customary law that
makes state practice a binding rule customary international law,

0113: Is there a ,right to unilateral secession or external self-determination under

International Law?

As a rule, the people's right to self-determination should not be understood as extending to a

unilateral right of secession, International law, at best, only recognizes the right to external self-
determination in situations of (1) fonner colonies; (2) where 8J people is oppressed, as for
example under foreign military occupation; or (3) where a definable group is denied meaningful
access to government to pursue their political, economic, social and cultural development (North
Cotabato V. GRP, citing In Reference to the Secession of Quebec).

In any event, the unilateral declaratlon of independence or secession is neither prohibited nor
expressly allowed under international law (Advisory Opinion on Kosovo; In reference to the
Secession of Quebec). Hence, unilateral secession, per se, is not prohibited,

0114: Differentiate annexation and secession.

Annexation is an appropriation of territory of one state by another. This is different from

secession in that secession is a withdrawal of a people from an existing state. (In reference to
the Secession of Quebec).

0115: What is a refugee; internally displaced person; asylum seeker~.:

A refugee is one who is: (1) outside his/her country of origin or outside the country of his/her
former habitual residence; (2) unable or unwilling to avail him/herself of the protection of that
country owing to a well-founded tear of being persecuted; and (3) persecution feared is based
on at least one of five grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
:;:Jroup,or political opinion. (1951 Refugee Convention)

Internally displaced. person (IDP) is a person who has been forced to flee his or her home for
the same reason as a refugee, but remains in his or her own country and has not crossed an
international border. (UN Refugee Agency) ,

Asylum seeker refers to a person who has applied for asylum, but whose refugee status has not
yet been determined, (1951 Refugee Convention)

Q116: The Philippines took in ABC refugees who were persecuted in Country X because
of their race, but then negotiated with Country Y that the latter would take them in. If Y
also persecutes ABC's people because of their race, would this violate the principle of
non-refoulement?

Yes, Article 33 of the Refugee Convention provides that no Contracting State shall expel or
return (Principle of Non-Refoulement) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. It does not distinguish
between returning them to the state from which they might have come or to one that will also
maltreat them,

0117: Does the Refugee Convention apply to all persons seeking refuge?

The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person witl, respect to whom there are
serious reasons for considering that: -

(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, ora crime against humanity,
as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such
crimes;
(b) he has committed a serious non-politicai crime outside the country of refuge prior to
his admission to that country as a -- C - -' •
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(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations. (1951 Refugee Convention)

Q118: Can foreign warships causing damage in the territorialsea, such as the Tubbataha
Reefs, of a coastal State be held liable for damages?

Yes, under Article 31 ofUNCLOS. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships
from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter's territorial sea, the flag States
shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of
the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other
government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31. Even non-parties to
the treaty are bound by this obligatian considered as customary international. law, (Adgo v.
Swift, G.R. 206510, 2014)