Unson v. Abella, et. al.
Note: only the two witnesses namely Gonzalo Avaya and Eugenio Zalamea
1. WILLS; NON-PRODUCTION OF ONE ATTESTING WITNESS. —
Though the general rule is that, if opposition is presented to the probate of a
will, all the attesting witnesses must be produced; nevertheless, there are
exceptions to this rule, to wit: When one of the witnesses dead, or cannot be
served with process of the court, or his reputation for truth is questioned, or
he appears to be hostile to the cause of the parties seeking the probate of the
will. In such cases the will may be admitted to probate, if upon the evidence
actually introduced the court is satisfied of the due execution of the will,
inasmuch as even if said witness had been produced and had testified against
the application, the result would not have been changed, if the court was
satisfied upon the evidence adduced that the will has been executed in the
manner prescribed by the law.
2. ID.; INVENTORY MADE PART OF A WILL; ATTESTATION CLAUSE. —
When in a will reference is made to an inventory of the properties of the
testator, which has thus been made a part of the will, if the will has an
attestation clause that meets the requirements of the law, no other attestation
clause is necessary for the said inventory, but that of the will be sufficient for
the validity both of the will and the inventory.
3. ID.; PAGING IN ARABIC NUMERALS. — Paging in inventory with
Arabic numerals is in compliance with the spirit of the law, requiring that the
paging of a will be made letters, and is just as valid as paging with letters A, B,
C, etc., under the circumstances stated in the case of Aldaba vs. Roque (43 phil
378).
FACTS
• Pedro Unson, executor of Dona Josefa Zalamea’s last will, filed a petition for the
probate of the will of the latter. Attached on the said will is an inventory of all the
properties of Dona Josefa.
• Opposition was made thereto by Antonio, Ignacia
and Avivencia Abella and Santiago Vito on the ff. grounds:-will is not paged
correlatively in letters rather it is in Arabic numerals- There is no attestation
clause in the inventory attached to the will-Will was not signed by the testatrix
and the witnesses in the presence of each other.
testified as to the authenticity of the will. The third witness, Pedro de
Jesus, was not presented because he was hostile with Unson and has
been meeting with depositors since the filing of the petition for the probate of
the will of Josefa.
ISSUE: WON the will is valid?
HELD: YES!
1.As to the paging of the will, the SC cited the case of Aldaba v. Roque
Thus:
It was held that this way of numbering the pages of a will is in compliance with
the spirit of the law, inasmuch as either one of these methods indicates
the correlation of the pages and serves to prevent the abstraction of any of them.
In the course of the decision, we said: "It might be said that the object of the law
in requiring that the paging be made in letters is to make falsification more
difficult, but it should be noted that since all the pages of the testament
are signed at the margin by the testatrix and the witnesses, the difficulty of forging
the signatures in either case remains the same. In other words the more or less
degree of facility to imitate the writing of the letters A, B, C, etc., does not make for
the easiness to forge the signatures.
2.The inventory is referred to in the will as an “integral part” of it so
the inventory need not have an additional attestation clause at the end.
3. The actuation of the proponents in NOT bringing to court Pedro de Jesus does
not render the will invalid. As announced in Cabang vs. Delfinado, the general
rule is that, where opposition is made to the probate of a will, the
attesting witnesses must be produced.
Exceptions:
a. when a witness is dead, or
b. Cannot be served with process of the court, or
c. his reputation for truth has been questioned or
d. He appears hostile to the cause of the proponent.
In the aforementioned cases, the will may be admitted to probate
without the testimony of said witness, if, upon the other proofs adduced in the
case, the court is satisfied that the will has been duly executed.
But supposing that de Jesus, when cited, had testified adversely to the application,
this would not by itself have change the result reached by the court a
q u o , f o r section 632 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a will can be
admitted to probate, notwithstanding that one or more witnesses
do not remember having attested it, provided the court is satisfied upon the
evidence adduced that the will has been executed and signed in the manner
prescribed by the law
Maloto v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988
1. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; WILLS; REVOCATION THEREOF; PHYSICAL ACT OF
DESTRUCTION; ANIMUS REVOCANDI, A NECESSARY ELEMENT. — The physical
act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an
effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on
the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done
by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person but under
the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without
saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself. In this case,
while animus revocandi, or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a
state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only
one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and
testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act
of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator
or by another person in his presence and under his express direction.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL ACTIONS; RES JUDICATA; ELEMENTS. — For a
judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur:
(1) the presence of a final former judgment; (2) the former judgment was
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is, between the
first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of
action. We do not find here the presence of all the enumerated requisites.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — There is yet,
strictly speaking, no final judgment rendered insofar as the probate of Adriana
Maloto's will is concerned. The decision of the trial court in Special Proceeding No.
1736, although final, involved only the intestate settlement of the estate of
Adriana. As such, that judgment could not in any manner be construed to be final
with respect to the probate of the subsequently discovered will of the decedent.
Neither is it a judgment on the merits of the action for probate. This is
understandably so because the trial court, in the intestate proceeding, was
without jurisdiction to rule on the probate of the contested will. After all, an action
for probate, as it implies, is founded on the presence of a will and with the
objective of proving its due execution and validity, something which can not be
properly done in an intestate settlement of estate proceeding which is predicated
on the assumption that the decedent left no will. Thus, there is likewise no identity
between the cause of action in intestate proceeding and that in an action for
probate. Be that as it may, it would be remembered that it was precisely because
of our ruling in G.R. No. L-30479 that the petitioners instituted this separate action
for the probate of the late Adriana Maloto's will. Hence, on these grounds alone,
the position of the private respondents on this score can not be sustained.
Facts:
1. Petitioners and respondents are the neices/nephews or Adriana Maloto who
died in 1963. The four heirs believed that the deceased did not leave a will, hesnce
they filed an intestate proceeding. However, the parties executed an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate dividing it into four equal parts.
2. In 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, ex-associate of the deceased's counsel allegedly
discovered her last will which was purportedly dated 1940, inside a cabinet.
Hence the annulment of the proceedings and a probate petition was filed by the
devisees and legatees. The said will was allegedly burned by the househelp under
the instruction of the deceased
3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the animus revocandi in
the burning of the will was sufficiently proven.
Issue: Whether or not there was valid revocation of the will
RULING: No, there was no revocation. For a valid revocation to
occur,the 'corpus' and 'animus' must concur, one without the other will not
produce a valid revocation. The physical act of destruction of a will must come
with an intention to revoke (animus revocandi). In this case, there's paucity of
evidence to comply with the said requirement. The paper burned was not
established to be the will and the burning though done under her express
direction was not done in her presence.
Under Art. 830, the physical act of destruction, in this case the burning of the will,
does not constitute an effective revocation, unless it is coupled with animus
revocandi on the part of the testator. Since animus is a state of mind, it has to be
accompanied by an overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating or
cancelling done by the testator himself or by another under his express direction
and presence.
Molo vs. Molo
G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
Bautista Angelo, J. (Ponente)
1. WILLS; REVOCATION BY SUBSEQUENT WILL; EFFECT OF VOID
REVOCATORY CLAUSE. — A subsequent will containing a clause revoking a
previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not executed
in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure
as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annuling the previous
will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void (Samson vs. Naval, 41 Phil.,
838).
2. ID.; PROBATE; DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION. — Even in the
supposition that the destruction of the original will by the testator could be
presumed from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in court, such
destruction cannot have the effect of defeating the prior will where it is
founded on the mistaken belief that the later will has been validly executed
and would be given due effect. The earlier will can still be admitted to probate
under the principle of "dependent relative revocation". The theory on which
this principle is predicated is that the testator did not intend to die intestate.
And this intention is clearly manifest where he executed two wills on two
different occasions and instituted his wife as his universal heir.
Facts:
1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939.
The latter will contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in
1918. He died without any forced heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein
petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and nieces.
2. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for
the probate of the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside
on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its due execution.
3. As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will
this time. Again the oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked
under the 1939 will. They contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939
will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified the 1918 will.
Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation
in the subsequent disallowed 1939 will
RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a
subsequent will,containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been
disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in accordance with law cannot
produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory
clause is void.
There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the
testator deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of
the revocatory clause contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will can
still be probated under the principle of dependent relative revocation.The
doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an
instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new
testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition
fails of effect for some reason.
Mercado v. Santos
1. WILLS; CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE DUE EXECUTION OF A
PROBATED WILL. — Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure is explicit as
to the conclusiveness of the due execution of a probated will. It provides: "No
will shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed
in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the
allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive
as to its due execution."
 2. ID.; ID. — The probate of a will by the probate court having
jurisdiction thereof is considered as conclusive as to its due execution and
validity, and is also conclusive that the testator was of sound and disposing
mind at the time when he executed the will, and was not acting under duress,
menace, fraud, or undue influence, and that the will is genuine and not a
forgery.
3. ID.; ID.; PROCEEDING "IN REM". — The probate of a will in this
jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision of notice by publication as a
prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive notice to the whole
world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon
everybody, even against the State.
4. ID.; ID.; CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION. — Conclusive presumptions
are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that it will not allow them
to be overturned by any contrary proof however strong. The will in question
having been probated by a competent court, the law will not admit any proof
to overthrow the legal presumption that it is genuine and not a forgery.
5. ID.; ID.; CRIMINAL ACTION AGAINST FORGER OF A DULY
PROBATED WILL. — Upon the facts stated in the opinion of the court, it
was held: That in view of the provisions of sections 306, 333 and 625 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction against
the forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate by a court of
competent jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Facts re: probate proceedings in blue. Facts re: criminal case for
forgery/falsification in red.
 [May 28, 1931] Petitioner Antilano Mercado filed a petition for the probate of
the will of his deceased wife, Ines Basa, with the Pampanga CFI.
 [June 31, 1931] The will was admitted to probate.
 [October 27, 1932] Intervenor Rosario Basa de Leon filed with the justice of the
peace court of San Fernando, Pampanga, a complaint against Mercado for
falsification/forgery of the will probated. Mercado was arrested. The complaint
was subsequently dismissed at the instance of de Leon herself.
 [March 2, 1933] Same intervenor charged Mercado with the same offense, this
time in the justice of the peace court of Mexico, Pampanga. Mercado was
arrested again. The complaint was likewise dismissed, again at de Leon’s
instance.
 [February 2, 1934] Same banana as on March 2, 1933. Upon due investigation,
the case was dismissed on the ground that the will alleged to have been falsified
has already been probated and that there was no evidence that Mercado had
forged the signature of the testatrix but that, on the contrary, satisfactory
evidence was presented that established the authenticity of said signature.
 [April 11, 1934] Rosario Basa de Leon and other intervenors moved ex parte to
reopen the probate proceedings, alleging lack of jurisdiction to probate the will
and to close the proceedings. This motion was denied, having been filed ex
parte.
 [May 9, 1934] The provincial fiscal moved for reinvestigation of the criminal
case for forgery before the Pampanga CFI. The motion was granted, and for the
fourth time, Mercado was arrested. The reinvestigation dragged on for almost
a year…
 [May 24, 1934] A second motion to reopen and close probate proceedings was
filed, this time with notice to the adverse party. Same was denied.
 [February 18, 1935] … until the CFI ordered the forgery case to be tried on the
merits.
 [July 26, 1935] Intervenors’ motion was appealed to the Supreme Court, which
affirmed the probate court’s order of denial.
 [c. 1936~37] Mercado moved to dismiss the case, claiming again that the will
alleged to have been forged had already been probated and, further, that the
order probating the will is conclusive as to the authenticity and due execution
thereof. The CFI overruled the motion. Mercado thus filed a petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals, which
promptly denied same.
 HENCE, THIS PETITION.
ISSUE: WON the probate of Ines Basa’s will is a bar to Mercado’s criminal
prosecution for the alleged forgery of said will.
RULING: Applicable law: Code of Civil Procedure (then governing the law on
wills)
  Sec. 306 provides, as re: the effect of judgments: in case of a judgment/order
in respect to the probate of a will, such judgment/order is conclusive upon
the the will.
 Sec. 333 establishes an incontrovertible presumption in favor of judgments
declared by the Code to be conclusive.
 Sec. 625 provides, as re: conclusiveness of the due execution of a probate
will: “… the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall
be conclusive as to its due execution.”
 Basis for PH law on wills (particularly Sec. 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure)
— Statutes of [the US state of] Vermont.
 Decisions of the Supreme Court of Vermont re: effect of probate of a will are
of persuasive authority in PH.
 Says the Vermont SC in Missionary Society vs. Eells: “The probate of a will
by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof, upon the due notice, is
conclusive as to its due execution against the whole world.”
 In view of the provisions of Secs. 306, 333 and 625 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, a criminal action will not lie against the forger of a will which
had been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Disposition: Mercado is entitled to have the criminal proceedings against
him quashed; CA judgment is reversed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Revilla v CA (G.R. No. 95329)
Facts:
Don Cayetano Revilla, a bachelor, owned 2 pieces of land with buildings in Manila
and 6 parcels of land in his hometown in Bulacan. These properties are worth
P30M. In 1978, he executed a 13-page last will and testament, bequeathing all his
properties to his 9 nephews and nieces including petitioner, Heracio Revilla. To
each, he gave 1/10 of his estate reserving the last tenth for masses to be said after
his death and for the care of religious images he kept in a chapel in Bulacan.
During his lifetime, Don Cayetano sought the probate of his will to which the CFI
Manila admitted. However, the City Hall of Manila was burned by fire where the
records were also burned. A petition for reconstitution of the records was filed
and it was granted.
After Don Cayetano died, Heracio Revilla filed another petition of a will wherein
he instituted Heracio as sole heir of his uncle’s estate and executor of the will
allegedly executed in 1982. The probate was opposed by Heracio’s 8 brothers and
sisters on the grounds that:
- Since 1978 up to Cayetano’s death, he never informed that he revoked the will
executed in 1978
- The 1982 will was not executed in accordance with law and the signature of
Cayetano was different from his usual and customary signature
- Cayetano was of unsound mind when he executed the will
- That the alleged will was executed with undue pressure and influence
- That the 1978 will is void for the reason that it was executed under duress or the
influence of fear or threats
- Cayetano acted by mistake and the signatures in the alleged will were procured
by fraud and he did not intend that the instrument be his will at the time of fixing
his signature
The trial court disallowed the second will. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial
court.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in disallowing the second will.
Held:
When Don Cayetano testified in the reconstitution proceedings, he was unaware
of the second will which he supposedly made. He identified his first will and
declared that it was his true and only will. He could not have executed a second
will because he was sick in the hospital during that time (he stayed there for 2
months) and he could not sign any papers while he was confined in the hospital.
During the reconstitution proceedings, the will was produced. It was placed in a
browned envelope stating “Buksan ito pagkalibing ko” to which Cayetano agreed
to open. He recognized the original will and acknowledged that he signed it. In the
court records, Cayetano declared that he did not execute another last will and
testament after the original will had been probated.
Significantly, although the petitioner opposed the reconstitution of Don
Cayetano's first will, he did not reveal the second will which Don Cayetano
supposedly made only 2months before he testified in the reconstitution
proceeding. If the second will already existed on November 27, 1982, it would
have been Heracio's strongest argument against the reconstitution of the probate
of the first will.
Since the execution of the second will could not have occurred on the alleged date
(September 13, 1982) appearing therein (for Don Cayetano was admittedly sick
in the hospital then) it must have been procured at the time when the testator was
a virtual prisoner, held incommunicado, in his house. Judge Eduardo Bengson had
to issue an order commanding the petitioner to allow his 8 brothers and sisters to
visit Don Cayetano. Only then were they able to penetrate the iron curtain that
Heracio had placed around their uncle. A videotape, taken during their visit and
shown in court, belied Heracio's allegation that Don Cayetano was displeased with
his said nephews and nieces, that was why he left them out of his second will.
Despite Judge Bengzon's order, Heracio did not cease his efforts to monopolize
Don Cayetano and his estate. To isolate Don Cayetano and make him inacessible
to the private respondents, Heracio transferred him from his own house in Manila
to Heracio's house in Quezon City.
The execution of the second will in an environment of secrecy and seclusion and
the disinheritance of his 8 other nephews and nieces, justified the trial court's and
the Court of Appeals' belief that undue influence was exercised by Horacio over
Don Cayetano to make him sign the second will (which Don Cayetano did not
know to be such) in order to deprive his brothers and sisters of their rightful share
in their uncle's estate.
There was fraud because Don Cayetano was not apprised that the document he
was signing with Co, Barredo and Lim ( as witnesses) was a second will revoking
the dispositions of property that he made in his first will. Had he been aware that
it was a second will, and if it were prepared at his own behest, he would not have
denied that he made it. He would probably have caused it to be probated while he
was still alive, as he did with his first will. But apparently, the instrument was
foisted on him without his being aware of its true nature which the petitioner
assiduously concealed, not only from the court and the private respondents, but
from Don Cayetano himself.
That the dispositions in the second will were not made by Don Cayetano is proven
by the omission of Don Cayetano's reservation of one-tenth of his properties and
the income thereof to pay for holy masses and to be spent for the maintenance of
his family chapel. That provision in his first will, for his personal benefit, would
not have been deleted by Don Cayetano if his only purpose in making a second will
was to disinherit his nephews and nieces. But Heracio overdid himself. He wanted
everything.
*Assuming for the sake of arguments that the second will was executed, the
testimonies of the notary public, as well as those of the three (3) instrumental
witnesses were not given credit because of major contradictions in testimonies.
[G.R. No. 139587. November 22, 2000.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF DECEASED
ISMAEL REYES, THE HEIRS OF OSCAR R. REYES, petitioners, vs.
CESAR R. REYES, respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Spouses Ismael Reyes and Felisa Revita Reyes are the registered owners of
parcels of land situated in Arayat Street, Cubao, Quezon City covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 4983 and 3598 (39303). The spouses have seven
children. Ismael Reyes died intestate. Prior to his death, Ismael Reyes was notified
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of his income tax deficiency which arose
out of his sale of a parcel land located in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. For failure to
settle his tax liability, the amount increased to about P172,724.40 and since no
payment was made by the heirs of the deceased Ismael Reyes, the property
covered by TCT No. 4983 was levied, sold and eventually forfeited by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue in favor of the government. Sometime in 1976, petitioners'
predecessor, Oscar Reyes, availed of the BIR's tax amnesty and he was able to
redeem the property covered by TCT No. 4983 upon payment of the reduced tax
liability in the amount of about P18,000. On May 10, 1989, private respondent
Cesar Reyes, brother of Oscar Reyes, filed a petition for issuance of letters of
administration with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City praying for his
appointment as administrator of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes, which
included 50% of the Arayat properties covered by TCT Nos. 4983 and 3598. Oscar
Reyes filed his conditional opposition thereto on the ground that the Arayat
properties do not form part of the estate of the deceased as he (Oscar) had
acquired the properties by redemption and/or purchase. The probate court
subsequently issued letters of administration in favor of Cesar Reyes where the
latter was ordered to submit a true and complete inventory of properties
pertaining to the estate of the deceased and the special powers of attorney
executed by the other heirs who reside in the USA and that of Aurora Reyes-Dayot
conforming to his appointment as administrator. Cesar Reyes filed an inventory
of real and personal properties of the deceased, which included the Arayat
properties with a total area of 1,009 square meters. On the other hand, Oscar
Reyes filed his objection to the inventory reiterating that the Arayat properties
had been forfeited in favor of the government and he was the one who
subsequently redeemed the same from the BIR using his own funds. The trial
court, however, included the Arayat properties to the estate of Ismael Reyes, but
made it clear that said determination is provisional in character and shall be
without prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought hereafter in the
proper court on the issue of ownership of the properties. He then appealed to the
respondent Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending, Oscar died and he
was substituted by his heirs, herein petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
inclusion by the probate court of the Arayat properties. Petitioners filed their
motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the present petition for review
on certiorari.
The Supreme Court denied the petition. The Court found no error on the
part of the appellate court in affirming the provisional inclusion of the subject
properties to the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes without prejudice to the
outcome of any action to be brought thereafter in the proper court on the issue of
ownership, considering that the subject properties are still titled under the
torrens system in the names of spouses Ismael and Felisa Revita Reyes which
under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in
the manner indicated in the law. The declaration of the provisional character of
the inclusion of the subject properties in the inventory is within the jurisdiction
of the probate court. The Court also ruled that the Regional Trial Court acting as a
probate court exercises but limited jurisdiction, thus it has no power to take
cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third
person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having
legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of
the question to the probate court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons
are not thereby prejudiced. The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call
for the application of the exception to the rule. It bears stress that the purpose
why the probate court allowed the introduction of evidence on ownership was for
the sole purpose of determining whether the subject properties should be
included in the inventory which is within the probate court's competence.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING WHETHER A CERTAIN PROPERTY
SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF ESTATE
PROCEEDING, THE PROBATE COURT MAY PASS UPON TITLE THERETO, BUT
SUCH DETERMINATION IS PROVISIONAL, NOT CONCLUSIVE, AND SUBJECT TO
THE FINAL DECISION IN A SEPARATE ACTION TO RESOLVE TITLE. — The
jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the
settlement of the estate and the probate of wills of deceased persons, and the
appointment and removal of administrators, executors, guardians and trustees.
The question of ownership is as a rule, an extraneous matter which the Probate
Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether
a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate
proceeding, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in
a separate action to resolve title. We find that the respondent Court did not err in
affirming the provisional inclusion of the subject properties to the estate of the
deceased Ismael Reyes without prejudiced to the outcome of any action to be
brought thereafter in the proper court on the issue of ownership considering that
the subject properties are still titled under the torrens system in the names of
spouses Ismael and Felisa Revita Reyes which under the law is endowed with
incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law.
The declaration of the provisional character of the inclusion of the subject
properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of the
Probate Court.
 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION TO THE RULE ON LIMITED JURISDICTION OF
PROBATE COURTS TO TAKE COGNIZANCE AND DETERMINE ISSUE OF TITLE TO
PROPERTY CLAIMED BY A THIRD PERSON ADVERSELY TO THE DECEDENT; NOT
APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — Settled is the rule that the Regional Trial Court
acting as a probate court exercises but limited jurisdiction, thus it has no power
to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a
third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties
having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the
submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests
of third persons are not thereby prejudiced. The facts obtaining in this case,
however, do not call for the application of the exception to the rule. It bears stress
that the purpose why the probate court allowed the introduction of evidence on
ownership was for the sole purpose of determining whether the subject
properties should be included in the inventory which is within the probate court's
competence. Thus, when private respondent Cesar Reyes was appointed as
administrator of the properties in the court's Order dated July 26, 1989, he was
ordered to submit a true inventory and appraisal of the real and personal
properties of the estate which may come into his possession or knowledge which
private respondent complied with. However, petitioner Oscar Reyes submitted his
objection to the inventory on the ground that it included the subject properties
which had been forfeited in favor of the government on April 21, 1975 and which
he subsequently redeemed on August 19, 1976. Notably, the Probate Court
started, from the start of the hearing, that the hearing was for the merits of
accounting and inventory, thus it had jurisdiction to hear the opposition of Oscar
Reyes to the inventory as well as the respective evidence of the parties to
determine the purpose of inventory alone if they should be included therein or
excluded therefrom. In fact, the probate court in its Order stated that "for
resolution is the matter of the inventory of the estate, mainly to consider what
properties should be included in the inventory and what should not be included."
There was nothing on record that both parties submitted the issue of ownership
for its final resolution. Thus the respondent Court did not err in ruling that the
trial court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of ownership conclusively.
Ortega v. Valmonte
478 SCRA 247
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEAL; PETITION FOR REVIEW;
GENERALLY, ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW MAY BE RAISED THEREIN; EXCEPTION.
— At the outset, we stress that only questions of law may be raised in a Petition
for Review under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As an exception,
however, the evidence presented during the trial may be examined and the factual
matters resolved by this Court when, as in the instant case, the findings of fact of
the appellate court differ from those of the trial court.
2. ID.; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; ALLOWANCE
OF WILL; FRAUD IN THE EXECUTION OF A WILL, EXPLAINED; BURDEN OF
PROVING EXISTENCE OF FRAUD LIES ON THE PARTY CHALLENGING THE WILL.
— Fraud "is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the
subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or
deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may
relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the
testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have
made." We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving
the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise
shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of
fraud. Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of
petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OMISSION OF SOME RELATIVES DOES NOT AFFECT THE
DUE EXECUTION OF A WILL. — It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some
relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. That the testator was tricked
into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact that he had instituted his
wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and
disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken "the
cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his twilight years."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONFLICT BETWEEN DATES APPEARING ON THE WILL
DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE DOCUMENT. — Moreover, as correctly ruled by the
appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not
invalidate the document, "because the law does not even require that a [notarial]
will . . . be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion." More important,
the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more credible
witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one
another. Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will
before a notary public. In any event, we agree with the CA that "the variance in the
dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and
persuasively explained by the notary public and the instrumental witnesses."
 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENT ANY SHOWING OF ILL MOTIVES, THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE SUBSCRIBING WITNESSES AND THE NOTARY FAVORING
THE WILL AND THE FINDING OF ITS DUE EXECUTION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. —
Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a "grand conspiracy" in the
commission of a fraud. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent
stood to receive any benefit from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the
three subscribing witnesses and the notary are credible evidence of its due
execution. Their testimony favoring it and the finding that it was executed in
accordance with the formalities required by law should be affirmed, absent any
showing of ill motives.
6. CIVIL LAW; TESTATE SUCCESSION; CAPACITY TO MAKE A WILL; TEST.
— According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability
to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate
to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testator's bounty, and (3) the
character of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find
that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary
capacity at the time of the execution of his will.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INTENT IN DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY IS IRRELEVANT
ABSENT SHOWING OF FRAUD IN THE EXECUTION OF THE WILL. — It must be
noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the
kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their
locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he
identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of
some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no
showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SOUNDNESS OF MIND, ELUCIDATED. — Worth
reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA which held thus:
"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which
unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of
mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless
degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has been held
that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from
age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded
person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory
sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is
disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not
necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or
otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily
require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind."
FACTS:
Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United States and at the age of 80
he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old. But in a little more than two years of
wedded bliss, Placido died. Placido executed a notarial last will and testament
written in English and consisting of 2 pages, and dated 15 June 1983¸but
acknowledged only on 9 August 1983.
The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia, Placido’s sister.
According to the notary public who notarized the testator’s will, after the testator
instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary
public told them to
come back on 15 August 1983 to give him time to prepare. The testator and his
witnessesreturned on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town
so they were instructed by his wife to come back on 9 August 1983. The formal
execution was actually on 9 August 1983. He reasoned he no longer changed the
typewritten date of 15 June1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty.
Petitioner’s argument:
1. At the time of the execution of the notarial will Placido was already 83 years
old and was no longer of sound mind.2. Josefina conspired with the notary public and the
3 attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in
the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the will.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the
will.2. W/N the signature of Placido in the will was procured by fraud or trickery.
HELD:
1.YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds
of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their location. As
regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his
wife as
sole beneficiary. The omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its fo
rmal
validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition
becomes irrelevant.
2. NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or pretense, by which the
subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to
the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic
fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make
a certain will which, but for fraud, he would not have made. The party challenging
the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its
execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only
upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. Omission of some relatives does not affect
the due execution of a will. Moreover, the conflict between the dates appearing on the
will does not invalidate the document, “because the law does not even require that
a notarial will be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion. The variance in the
dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and
persuasively explained by the notary public and instrumental witnesses
Seangio v. Reyes
In Dy Yieng Seangio, et al. v. Hon. Amor Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 140371-72, November
27, 2006, there was a petition for the probate of an alleged holographic will which
was denominated as “Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana.” The private respondents
moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the ground that
the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo did not contain
any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus did not meet the definition
of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the
will only showed an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son,
Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor
instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence there was preterition which would
result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while
procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the
will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and
ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is
clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that:
(1) generally, the authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination
of the extrinsic validity of the will; (2) private respondents question the intrinsic
and not the extrinsic validity of the will; (3) disinheritance constitutes a
disposition of the estate of a decedent; and (4) the rule on preterition did not apply
because Segundo’s will did not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion
of one or more compulsory heirs.
The RTC issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings,
hence, a petition for certiorari was filed where petitioners argued as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of the Rule 76
of the Rules of Court which respectively mandate the court to: (a) fix the time and
place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance
thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be published three weeks
successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of general circulation;
and (b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatee and devisees of the
testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but
rather, as its title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, simply contains a
disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedent’s
will and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and
private respondents alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate.
None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited in the
holographic will since there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is
both intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to
proceed with the hearing of the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work
injustice to petitioners, and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed
by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.
Held: A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject
to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be
witnessed.
The document, although it may initially come across as a mere
disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of the testator
himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa(Article 783) can be clearly deduced
from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative
disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of the son nonetheless, is
an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the
disposition of the property of the testator in favor of those who would succeed in
the absence of the eldest son.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the
testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be
recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are
designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention
of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given
effect.
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not
learned in the law should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an
expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
instrument and the intention of the testator. In this regard, the document, even if
captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, was intended by the testator to be his
last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form
of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be
given effect.
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR., in his Official Capacity as Presiding Judge
of RTC-Makati, Branch 61, and PACITA PHILLIPS as the alleged
executrix of the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo de
Santos, respondents.
Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino, and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition
for probate of his will in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4223. Dr. De Santos alleged that he had no
compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee
the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he had disposed by his will his
properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and
that copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix, private
respondent Pacita delos Reyes Phillips of RTC-Makati, issued an order
granting the petition and allowing the will. Petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II
filed a motion for intervention claiming that as the only child of Alicia de
Santos (testator's sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full
bloodied nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He also prayed for
reconsideration of the order allowing the will and for the issuance of
letters of administration in his name. Private respondent refiled a petition
for the issuance of letters testamentary with the Regional Trial Court,
Makati, Branch 65, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4343. Upon private
respondent's motion, Branch 65 issued an order appointing her as special
administrator of Dr. De Santos' estate. Petitioner sought to intervene in Sp.
Proc. No. M-4343 and to set aside the appointment of private respondent
as special administrator. Branch 65 ordered the transfer of Sp. Proc. No. M-
4343 to Branch 61 on the ground that it is related to the case before said
Branch 61 and later issued another order returning the records of the case
of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 on the ground that there was a pending case
involving the Estate of decedent Arturo de Santos before said court. Branch
65 eventually granted petitioner's motion for intervention. On petition for
certiorari by private respondent, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
setting aside the order of Branch 65 on the ground that petitioner had not
shown any right or interest to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343. Hence,
the present petition. Petitioner contended that the probate proceedings in
Branch 61 did not terminate upon the issuance of the order allowing the
will of Dr. De Santos. He argued that the proceedings must continue until
the estate is fully distributed pursuant to Section l, Rule 73, Rules of Court,
and for such reason Branch 65 could not lawfully act upon private
respondent's petition for issuance of letters testamentary; that as the next
of kin and creditor of the testator, he has the right to intervene in the
probate proceedings. Petitioner also contended that private respondent
committed forum shopping when she filed the petition for issuance of
letters testamentary, while the probate proceedings were still pending.
The Supreme Court ruled that Branch 65 had jurisdiction over Sp. Proc. No.
M-4343 and there was no basis for the ruling of Branch 65 that the probate
proceedings did not cease upon the allowance or disallowance of a will but
continues up to such time that the entire estate of the testator had been
partitioned and distributed. The Court also ruled that even if petitioner is the next
of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered as an "heir" because Dr. De Santos
has no compulsory or forced heirs so he may legally dispose his entire estate by
will. Petitioner's contention that private respondent committed forum shopping
was also found by the Court unmeritorious. There was no identity between the
two petitions nor was the petition for probate filed during the pendency of the
petition for issuance of letters testamentary. The petition for probate filed by Dr.
De Santos, the testator, was solely for the purpose of authenticating his will and
upon allowance thereof, the proceeding was considered terminated. However, the
petition for issuance of letters testamentary was filed by private respondent for
the purpose of securing authority from the court to administer the estate and put
into effect the will of the testator. Said proceeding, on the other hand, terminated
upon the distribution and delivery of the legacies and devises named in the will.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES
OF DECEASED PERSONS; VENUE; INSOFAR AS THE VENUE OF PETITIONS FOR
PROBATE OF WILLS IS CONCERNED, IT DOES NOT BAR OTHER BRANCHES OF
THE SAME COURT FROM TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE SETTLEMENT OF THE
ESTATE OF THE TESTATOR AFTER HIS DEATH. — The jurisdiction over probate
proceedings and settlement of estates with approximate value of over
P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in Metro Manila) belongs to
the regional trial courts under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. The different branches
comprising each court in one judicial region do not possess jurisdictions
independent of and incompatible with each other. It is noteworthy that, although
Rule 73, §1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition for probate of the will of
Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar other branches of the same court from
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator after his death. As
held in the leading case of Bacalso v. Ramolote: The various branches of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu under the Fourteenth Judicial District, are a coordinate
and co-equal courts, and the totality of which is only one Court of First Instance.
The jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges. And when a case is filed
in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the branch or judge
alone, to the exclusion of the other branches. Trial may be held or proceedings
continue by and before another branch or judge. It is for this reason that Section
57 of the Judiciary Act expressly grants to the Secretary of Justice, the
administrative right or power to apportion the cases among the different
branches, both for the convenience of the parties and for the coordination of the
work by the different branches of the same court. The apportionment and
distribution of cases does not involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction, the
jurisdiction attaches and continues to be vested in the Court of First Instance of
the province, and the trials may be held by any branch or judge of the court.
Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over
Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.
2. ID.; ID.; PETITIONER HAS NO RIGHT TO INTERVENE AND OPPOSE
PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY BASED ON HIS
ALLEGATION THAT HE IS A CREDITOR OF DECEASED, SINCE TESTATOR
INSTITUTED OR NAMED AN EXECUTOR IN HIS WILL AND IT IS INCUMBENT
UPON COURT TO RESPECT DESIRES OF TESTATOR. — Under Rule 79, Section 1,
it has been held that an "interested person" is one who would be benefited by the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor,
and whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or contingent.
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be
considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary
succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his
entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides: One who has no
compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of
any person having capacity to succeed. One who has compulsory heirs may
dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code
with regard to the legitimate of said heirs. Compulsory heirs are limited to the
testator's — (1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants; (2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate
parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants; (3) The widow or widower; (4) Acknowledged natural children, and
natural children by legal fiction; (5) Other illegitimate children referred to in
Article 287 of the Civil Code. Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a
compulsory heir who may have been preterited in the testator's will. Nor does he
have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his allegation
that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an
executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the
testator. As we stated in Ozaeta v. Pecson: The choice of his executor is a precious
prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his
property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to
appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in
the disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this right may be considered a
curtailment of the right to dispose. Only if the appointed executor is incompetent,
refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the court appoint other persons to
administer the estate. None of these circumstances is present in this case. HaSEcA
3. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; FORUM SHOPPING; NOT COMMITTED BY
PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S ACT OF FILING THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
LETTERS TESTAMENTARY WHILE THE PROBATE PROCEEDINGS WERE STILL
PENDING IN ANOTHER COURT; THERE IS NO IDENTITY BETWEEN THE TWO
PETITIONS, NOR WAS THE LATTER FILED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE
FORMER. — Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of forum
shopping when she filed the petition for issuance of letters testamentary (Sp. Proc.
No. M-4343) while the probate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-4223) were still
pending. According to petitioner, there is identity of parties, rights asserted, and
reliefs prayed for in the two actions which are founded on the same facts, and a
judgment in either will result in res judicata in the other. This contention has no
merit. As stated earlier, the petition for probate was filed by Dr. De Santos, the
testator, solely for the purpose of authenticating his will. Upon the allowance of
his will, the proceedings were terminated. On the other hand, the petition for
issuance of letters testamentary was filed by private respondent, as executor of
the estate of Dr. De Santos, for the purpose of securing authority from the Court
to administer the estate and put into effect the will of the testator. The estate
settlement proceedings commenced by the filing of the petition terminates upon
the distribution and delivery of the legacies and devises to the persons named in
the will. Clearly, there is no identity between the two petitions, nor was the latter
filed during the pendency of the former. There was, consequently, no forum
shopping.
PECSON vs. CORONEL 45 Phil 216
1. WILLS; FREEDOM TO MAKE A WILL. — Although family ties in this
country are very strongly knit, the exclusion of relatives, who are not forced
heirs, from the inheritance is not an exceptional case. The inhabitants of the
Archipelago do not appear to be averse to the freedom to make a will
enshrined by article 783 of the Civil Code, which has been in force in the
Philippines since the year 1889. But even if the appointment of a beneficiary
do not seem to be the most usual and ordinary because the beneficiary is not
a relative of the testatrix who has relatives by blood, this alone will not render
the appointment void per se.
2. ID.; CONTEST OF; BURDEN OF PROOF. — Where the will is contested
on the ground that the person who read the will to the testator, following
instructions from the heir named therein, read one thing for another, the party
alleging such a fraud is bound to present said person as witness for the
purpose of proving the alleged fraud, and the omission not accounted for of
said proof gives rise to a presumption that, if it were presented, it would have
been adverse to said proof gives rise to a presumption that, if it were
presented, it would have been adverse to said party.
3. ID.; NAMING OF HEIR; HIS APPOINTMENT AS EXECUTOR;
FUNCTIONS OF EXECUTOR. — The fact that the only heir named in the will is
appointed executor is no proof that the testator's intention was that said
executor should distribute the estate among the relatives of the testator, and
not that said executor, named as sole heir, should get all the estate; for to be
an heir is not incompatible with being an executor, inasmuch as the function
of an executor is not limited merely to distributing the inheritance, but he has
other duties and powers, such as to preserve, defend, and liquidate the
inheritance until it is delivered to the person entitled to it.
4. ID.; ATTESTATION CLAUSE; CLERICAL OR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS;
THE EVIDENT INTENTION PREVAILS. — Clerical or grammatical errors are
ordinarily not considered of vital importance where the intention is manifest.
Thus the expression "cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos en presencia de otros"
(each of us signed in the presence of others), which appears to be ambiguous
 on account of the article "los" (the) being lacking before "otros" (others), will
not vitiate the attestation clause where it is evident that its omission was due
to carelessness of the clerk or to lack of mastery of the language, and that what
was meant is that the witnesses signed in the presence of each other.
In re will of Dolores Coronel, deceased. LORENZO PECSON, applicant and
appellee, vs. AGUSTIN CORONEL ET AL., opponents and appellants.
FACTS: On November 28, 1922, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
probated as the last will and testament of Dolores Coronel (testatrix) who named
as her sole heir Lorenzo Pecson, the husband of her niece. The relatives of testatrix
by consanguinity questioned the genuineness of the will on the following grounds:
First, that it was improbable and exceptional that Dolores Coronel should dispose
of her estate by excluding her blood relatives; and second, that if such will was not
expressed in fact, it was due to extraneous illegal influence.
ISSUE: Whether the decedent can exclude her blood relatives in the
disposition of her estate.
HELD: YES. It is true that the ties of relationship in the Philippines are very
strong but we understand that cases of preterition of relatives from the
inheritance are not rare. The liberty to dispose of one’s estate by will when there
are no forced (compulsory) heirs is rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in
the Philippines since 1989.
The SC held that nothing is strange in the preterition made by Dolores Coronel of
her blood relatives, nor in the designation of Lorenzo Pecson as her sole
beneficiary. Furthermore, although the institution of the beneficiary here would
not seem the most usual and customary, still this would not be null per se.
“In the absence of any statutory restriction every person possesses absolute
dominion over his property, and may bestow it upon whomsoever he pleases
without regard to natural or legal claim upon his bounty. If the testator possesses
the requisite capacity to make a will, and the disposition of his property is not
affected by fraud or undue influence, the will is not rendered invalid by the fact
that it is unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust. Nothing can prevent the testator from
making a will as eccentric, as injudicious, or as unjust as caprice, frivolity, or
revenge can dictate. X X X ” (40 Cyc., 1079.)
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR. THE
PARISH PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA,
TARLAC, petitioner-appellant, vs. BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR,
FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR and JOVITA ESCOBAR DE
FAUSTO, respondents-appellees.
SYNOPSIS
In his will, the late Father Pascual Rigor of Victoria, Tarlac, devised forty-four
hectares of ricelands to his nearest male relative who would study for the
priesthood and provided that the administration of the ricelands would be under
the responsibility of the parish priest of Victoria during the time that there is no
qualified devisee as contemplated in the will. During the testate proceedings, the
trial court approved the project of partition and directed the administratrix to
deliver to the devisees their respective shares. Inasmuch as no nearest male
relative of the testator claimed the devise and as the administratrix and the legal
heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer the
ricelands, the same were not delivered to him. The latter, however, petitioned for
delivery of the ricelands to the church. The lower court, after first declaring the
bequest inoperative, later reconsidered its findings in an order, on the ground that
the testator had a grandnephew (born after the testator's death), who was a
seminarian, and directed the administrator of the estate to deliver the ricelands
to the parish priest of Victoria as trustee. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed
the order.
The Supreme Court ruled that the will referred to the nearest male relative of the
testator who was living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time
thereafter, because in order to be capacitated to inherit, the devisee must be living
at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is
proper.
Decision affirmed.
SYLLABUS
1. TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION; TESTATOR'S INTENT IS THE LAW OF THE
CASE. — In testamentary succession cases, as in cases involving the law of
contracts and statutory construction, where the intention of the contracting
parties or of the lawmaking body is to be ascertained, the primary issue is the
determination of the testator's intention which is the law of the case (dicat estor
et eirt lex). The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments. When his intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any
interpretation must be in accord with the plain and literal meaning of his words,
except when it may certainly appear that his intention was different from that
literally expressed.
2. ID.; CAPACITY TO INHERIT. — In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir,
devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in
case of representation, when it is proper (Art. 1025, Civil Code).
3. ID.; WHERE BEQUEST IS INOPERATIVE. — If the bequest for any reason should
be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution
and those in which the right of accretion exists (Art. 956, New Civil Code). The
Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or
that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the
testator's will is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take effect,
there will be intestate succession as to the property covered by the said legacy.
4. ID.; WHERE WILL DOES NOT DIPOSE OF ALL PROPERTIES. — Legal succession
takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator (Art.
960(2), New Civil Code).
||| (Testate Estate of Rigor v. Rigor, G.R. No. L-22036, [April 30, 1979], 178 PHIL 400-
411)
Austria v. Reyes
31 SCRA 754
1. CIVIL LAW; TESTATE SUCCESSION; REQUISITES TO ANNUL INSTITUTION OF
HEIRS. — Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the
Civil Code, the following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution
of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false;
and third, it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have
made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.
2. ID.; ID.; CAUSE FOR ANNULMENT OF INSTITUTION OF HEIRS MUST BE CLEAR;
CASE AT BAR. — If the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the
respondents as her heirs was the testatrix's belief that under the law she could
not do otherwise, she did not make it known in her will. Surely if she was aware
that succession to the legitime takes place by operation of law, independent of her
own wishes, she would not have found it convenient to name her supposed
compulsory heirs to their legitimes. Her express adoption of the rules on legitimes
should very well indicate her complete agreement with that statutory scheme. But
even this, like the petitioners' own proposition, is highly speculative of what was
in the mind of the testatrix when she executed her will. One fact prevails, however,
and it is the decedent's will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the
cause for such institution of heirs. We cannot annul the same on the basis of
guesswork or uncertain implications.
3. ID.; ID.; TESTACY FAVORED AND WISHES OF TESTATOR MUST PREVAIL. —
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will
evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole
estate, as was done in this case. Moreover, so compelling is the principle that
intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed to prevail, that
we could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect. As
in one case where the probate court has found, by final judgment, that the testator
was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will executed free from
falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence this Court held, it is its duty to give
full expression to her will.
4. ID.; ID.; LEGALITY OF ADOPTION APART FROM CASE OF TESTATE
SUCCESSION, ADOPTION NOT SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK. — The legality
of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can be assailed only in a
separate action brought for that purpose, and cannot be the subject of a collateral
attack.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; INHERENT POWER OF COURT. — Every court has
the inherent power to amend and control its processes and orders so as to make
them conformable to law and justice. That the court a quo has limited the extent
of the petitioners' intervention is also within its powers as articulated by the Rules
of Court.
||| (Austria v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-23079, [February 27, 1970], 142 PHIL 646-655)
FACTS:
Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for probate, ante
mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the present
petitioners, who are nephews and nieces of Basilia. The will was subsequently
allowed with the bulk of her estate designated for respondents, all of whom were
Basilia’s legally adopted children. The petitioners, claiming to be the nearest of kin
of Basilia, assert that the respondents had not in fact been adopted by the
decedent in accordance with law, thereby making them mere strangers to the
decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs. Petitioners argue that this
circumstance should have left the whole estate of Basilia open to intestacy with
petitioners being the compulsory heirs.
It is alleged by petitioners that the language used imply that Basilia was deceived
into believing that she was legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire estate
to the respondents as the latter’s legitime, with the inference that respondents
would not have instituted the respondents as heirs had the fact of spurious
adoption been known to her. The petitioners inferred that from the use of the
terms, “sapilitang tagapagmana” (compulsory heirs) and “sapilitang mana”
(legitime), the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents
was the testatrix’s belief that under the law she could not do otherwise. Thus
Article 850 of the Civil Code applies whereby, “the statement of a false cause for
the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from
the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known
the falsity of such cause.”
ISSUE:
W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in barring the
petitioners nephews and niece from registering their claim even to properties
adjudicated by the decedent in her will.
HELD:
No. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil
Code, the following requisites must concur: First, the cause for
the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown
to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will that the testator
would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause. The
decedent’s will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for
such institution of heirs. Absent such we look at other considerations. The
decedent’s disposition of the free portion of her estate, which largely favored the
respondents, compared with the relatively small devise of land which the
decedent left for her blood relatives, shows a perceptible inclination on her part
to give the respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give
to them. Excluding the respondents from the inheritance, considering that
petitioner nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate by virtue
of intestacy, would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will
evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole
estate, as was done in this case. Intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the
testator should be allowed to prevail. Granted that a probate court has found, by
final judgment, that the decedent possessed testamentary capacity and her last
will was executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence, it
follows that giving full expression to her will must be in order.
NUGUID VS NUGUID
1. PROBATE OF WILL; COURT'S AREA OF INQUIRY LIMITED TO
EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF WILL; WHEN COURT MAY RULE ON INTRINSIC
VALIDITY; CASE AT BAR. — In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the
court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the
extrinsic validity of the will; the due execution thereof; the testatrix's
testamentary capacity; and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities
prescribed the by law. In the case at bar, however, a peculiar situation exists.
The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will should be
allowed probate. They questioned the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally,
this comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. But if the case were to be remanded for probate of the will,
nothing will be gained. In the event of probate or if the court rejects the will,
probability exists that the case will come up once again before this Court on
the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. The result would
be waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These practical
considerations induce this Court to meet head-on the issue of the nullity of the
provisions of the will in question, there being a justiciable controversy
awaiting solution.
2. SUCCESSION; PRETERITION; OMISSION OF NAMES OF FORCED
HEIRS. — The deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she
left forced heirs in the direct ascending time — her parents. Her will does not
explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether. Said will
rather than he labelled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the
said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
3. ID.; ID.; PRETERITION DISTINGUISHED FROM DISINHERITANCE. —
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because the are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited."
(Neri, et al. vs. Akutin, at al., 72 Phil., p. 325.) Disinheritance; in turn, "is a
testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of heir share in the
legitime for a cause authorized by law." (Justice J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, "An
Outline of Philippine Civil Law," 1956 ed., Vol. III, p. 8, citing cases.)
Disinheritance is always "voluntary"; preterition upon the other hand, is
presumed to be "involuntary." (Sanchez Roman, Estudios de Derecho Civil,
2nd edition, Volume 20, p. 1131.)
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECTS FLOWING FROM PRETERITION AND
DISINHERITANCE. — The effects flowing from preterition are totally different
from those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil
Code "shall annul the institution of heir. "This annulment is in toto, unless in
the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises
or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code,
such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs," but only "insofar
as it may prejudice the person disinherited," which last phrase was omitted in
the case of preterition. (III Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1961.
Edition, p. 172.) Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that
portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally
deprived.
6. ID.; ID.; WHEN LEGACIES AND DEVISES MERIT CONSIDERATION. —
Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly
given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 of the Civil Code suggests that
the mere institution of a universal heir in a will — void because of preterition
— would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the
will is inexistent. There must he, in addition to such institution, a testamentary
disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the
nullified institution of heir.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTITUTION OF HEIRS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED
LEGACY. — Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively
disinherited are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the institution of
heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is
reduced to the extent of said legitimes. This theory, if adopted, will result in a
complete abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code.If every case of
institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and
betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles
814 and 851 regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would be
absolutely meaningless and will never have any application at all. And the
remaining provisions contained in said articles concerning the reduction of
inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would
be absorbed by Article 817 of the same code.
||| (Nuguid v. Nuguid, G.R. No. L-23445, [June 23, 1966], 123 PHIL 1305-1317)
FACTS:
Rosario Nuguid , single, died in December 30, 1962.She was without descendants
but was survived by her parents and siblings. On May 18, 1963, Remedios Nuguid,
her sister filed in CFI a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario on
November 17, 1951 or 11 years ago, said will instituted Remedios as the universal
heir thereby, compulsory heirs, the ascendants of the decedent, filed their
opposition to the probate proceeding. They contend that they were illegally
preterited and as a consequence, the institution is void. The court’s order held that
“the will in question is a complete nullity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the compulsory heirs were preterited , thereby rendering the
holographic will void.
Whether the court may rule on the intrinsic validity of the will.
RULING:
The statute we are called upon to apply in article 854 of the civil code which states:
“The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct time, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the d and legacies shall
be valid insofar as they are not inofficious
The forced heirs, parents of the deceased, were received nothing by the testament.
The one-sentence will institutes petitioner as the universal heir. No specific
legacies or bequest are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that
the nullity is complete.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited as
heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heir his/her share in the legitime for a cause authorized
by law.
On the second issue, the case is for the probate of the will and the court’s area of
inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity of the will comes after the will has been
duly authenticated. However if the case is to be remanded for probate of the will,
nothing will be gained. The practical conditions: time, effort, expenses and added
anxiety, induced us to a belief that we might as well meat head-on the issue of the
validity of the provisions of the will in question.
ACAIN vs. IAC
October 27, 1987
FACTS:
Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late
Nemesio. The will provided that all his shares from properties he earned with his
wife shall be given to his brother Segundo (father of Constantino). In case
Segundo dies, all such property shall be given to Segundo’s children. Segundo pre-
deceased Nemesio.
The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased, and the
latter's widow Rosa filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;
(2) he is merely a universal heir and
(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.
ISSUE:
Was there preterition?
HELD:
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs
or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as
she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory
heir. Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition
even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.
The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia, whose legal
adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives
to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate
child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the
adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the
will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of
at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly
disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
 Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to
intestate succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not
result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should
stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters
to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will
because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs - without any other
testamentary disposition in the will - amounts to a declaration that nothing at all
was written.
In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding
he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be
affected by it. Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a
legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an
individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive. At the
outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir. However, intestacy
having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the
universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He
has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased.
NERI v. AKUTIN
GR No.L-47799, May 21, 1943
74 PHIL 185
1. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; EFFECT OF PRETERITION. —
According to the findings of fact in this case, the testator left all his property
by universal title to the children by his second marriage, and that without
expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage, he left nothing to
them or, at least, some of them. Held: That this is a case of preterition governed
by article 814 of the Civil Code, which provides that the institution of heirs
shall be annulled and intestate succession should be declared open.
2. ID.; ID.; RESPECTIVE SCOPE OF ARTICLES 814, 817, AND 851 OF THE
CIVIL CODE. — The following example will make the question clearer: The
testator has two legitimate sons, A and B, and in his will he leaves all his
property to A, with total preterition of B. Upon these facts, shall the court annul
entirely the institution of heir in favor of A and declare a total intestacy, or
shall it merely refuse the bequest left to A, giving him two-thirds, that is, one-
third of free disposal and one-third of betterments, plus one-half of the other
third as strict legitime, and awarding B only the remaining one-half of the strict
legitime? If the court does the first, it applies article 814; if the second, it
applies articles 851 or 817. But article 851 applies only in cases of unfounded
disinheritance, and all are agreed that the present case is not one of
disinheritance but of preterition. Article 817 is merely a general rule
inapplicable to specific cases provided by law, such as that of preterition or
disinheritance.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGACIES AND BETTERMENTS SHOULD BE RESPECTED
IN SO FAR AS THEY ARE NOT INOFFICIOUS OR EXCESSIVE. — The annulment
of the institution of heirs in cases of preterition does not always carry with it
the ineffectiveness of the whole will. Neither Manresa nor Sanchez Roman nor
this court has ever said so. If, aside from the institution of heirs, there are in
the will provisions leaving to the heirs so instituted or to other persons some
specific properties in the form of legacies or mejoras, such testamentary
provisions shall be effective and the legacies and mejoras shall be respected in
so far as they are not inofficious or excessive, according to article 814. In the
instant case, however, no legacies or mejoras are provided in the will, the
whole property of the deceased having been left by universal title to the
children of the second marriage. The effect, therefore, of annulling the
institution of heirs will be necessarily the opening of a total intestacy.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTITUTION OF HEIRS DISTINGUISHED FROM
LEGACIES AND BETTERMENTS. — The theory is advanced that the bequest
made by universal title in favor of the children by the second marriage should
be treated as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely
annulled but merely reduced. This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete
abrogation of articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of institution
of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments
reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of articles 814 and 851
regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would be absolutely
meaningless and will never have any application at all. And the remaining
provisions contained in said articles concerning the reduction of inofficious
legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be
absorbed by article 817. This, instead of construing, this court would be
destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced
is due mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of heirs from legacies and
betterments, and a general from a special provision. With reference to article
814, which is the only provision material to the disposition of this case, it must
be observed that the institution of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing
separate and distinct from legacies or betterment. And they are separate and
distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately treated in said
article but because they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a
bequest by universal title of property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to
specific property bequeathed by a particular or special title. The first is also
different from a betterment which should be made expressly as such (article
828). The only instance of implied betterment recognized by law is where
legacies are made which cannot be included in the free portion (article 828).
But again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a legacy.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — It is clear, therefore, that article 814 refers to two
different things which are the two different objects of its two different
provisions. One of these objects cannot be made to merge in the other without
mutilating the whole article with all its multifarious connections with a great
number of provisions spread throughout the Civil Code on the matter of
succession. It should be borne in mind, further, that although article 814
contains two different provisions, its special purpose is to establish a specific
rule concerning a specific testamentary provision; namely, the institution of
heirs in a case of preterition. Its other provision regarding the validity of
legacies and betterments if not inofficious is a mere reiteration of the general
rule contained in other provisions (articles 815 and 817) and signifies merely
that it also applies in cases of preterition.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. — As regards
testamentary dispositions in general, the general rule is that all "testamentary
dispositions which diminish the legitime of the forced heirs shall be reduced
on petition of the same in so far as they are inofficious or excessive" (article
817). But this general rule does not apply to the specific instance of a
testamentary disposition containing an institution of heirs in a case of
preterition, which is made the main and specific subject of article 814. In such
instance, according to article 814, the testamentary disposition containing the
institution of heirs should be not only reduced but annulled in its entirety and
all the forced heirs, including the omitted ones, are entitled to inherit in
accordance with the law of intestate succession. It is thus evident that, if, in
construing article 814, the institution of heirs therein dealt with is to be
treated as legacies or betterments, the special object of said article would be
destroyed, its specific purpose completely defeated, and in that wise the
special rule therein established would be rendered nugatory. And this is
contrary to the most elementary rule of statutory construction. In construing
several provisions of a particular statute, such construction shall be adopted
as will give effect to all, and when general and particular provisions are
inconsistent, the latter shall prevail over the former. (Act No. 190, secs. 287
and 288.)
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "HEREDERO" UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND
"HEIR" UNDER THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. — It is maintained that the
word "heredero" under the Civil Code, is not synonymous with the term "heir"
under the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the "heir" under the latter Code is
no longer personally liable for the debts of the deceased as was the "heredero"
under the Civil Code, should his acceptance be pure and simple, and from all
these the conclusion is drawn that the provisions of article 814 of the Civil
Code regarding the total nullity of the institution of heirs has become obsolete.
This conclusion is erroneous. It confuses form with substance. It must be
observed, in this connection, that in construing and applying a provision of the
Civil Code, such meaning of its words and phrases as has been intended by the
framers thereof shall be adopted. If thus construed it is inconsistent with the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, then it shall be deemed repealed;
otherwise it is in force. Repeals by implication are not favored by the courts
and when there are two acts upon the same subject, effect should be given to
both if possible (Posadas vs. National City Bank, 296 U. S., 497).
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The word "heir" as used in article 814 of
the Civil Code may not have the meaning that it has under the Code of Civil
Procedure, but this in no wise can prevent a bequest from being made by
universal title as is in substance the subject matter of article 814 of the Civil
Code. Again, it may also be true that heirs under the Code of Civil
Procedure may receive the bequest only after payment of debts left by the
deceased and not before as under the Civil Code, but this may have a bearing
only upon the question as to when succession becomes effective and can in no
way destroy the fact that succession may still be by universal or special title.
Since a bequest may still be made by universal title and with preterition of
 forced heirs, its nullity as provided in article 814 still applies there being
nothing inconsistent with it in the Code of Civil Procedure. What is important
and is the basis for its nullity is the nature and effect of the bequest and not its
possible name nor the moment of its effectiveness under the Code of Civil
Procedure.
||| (Neri v. Akutin, G.R. No. 47799, [May 21, 1943], 74 PHIL 185-208)
FACTS: This is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in his will left all his
property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, the herein
respondents, with omission of the children by his first marriage, the herein
petitioner. The omission of the heirs in the will was contemplated by the testator
with the belief that he had already given each of the children portion of the
inheritance, particularly a land he had abandoned was occupied by the
respondents over which registration was denied for it turned out to be a public
land, and an aggregate amount of money which the respondents were indebted to
their father.
ISSUE: Should there be cancellation of the will, in view of the omission of heirs? Is
there disinheritance in this case?
HELD: Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total
intestacy on the ground that testator left all his property by universal title to the
children by his second marriage, without expressly disinheriting the children by
his first marriage but upon the erroneous belief that he had given them already
more shares in his property than those given to the children by his second
marriage. Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, if contested,
shall annul the institution of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited
person. This is but a case of preterition which annuls the institution of heirs.
REBECCA VIADO NON, JOSE A. NON and DELIA VIADO, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIA N. VIADO, CHERRI
VIADO and FE FIDES VIADO, respondents.
Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977 a common residence at the Isarog
property. Soon, tension appeared to have escalated between petitioner Rebecca
Viado and respondent Alicia Viado after the former had asked that the property
be equally divided between the two families to make room for the growing
children. Respondents claimed absolute ownership over the entire property and
demanded that petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the latter. On February
1, 1988 petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the property in question, filed a
case of partition before the RTC of Quezon City. Respondents predicated their
claim of absolute ownership over the subject property on the deed of donation
executed by the late Julian Viado covering his 1/2 share in favor of respondent's
husband, Nilo Viado, and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian Viado,
Leah Viado Jacobs and petitioner Rebecca Viado waived their rights and interests
in favor of Nilo Viado. The trial court found for respondents and adjudged Alicia
Viado and her children as being the true owners of the disputed property. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, but ordered
the remand of the records of the case to the court a quo for further proceedings to
determine the value of the property and the amount respondents should pay to
petitioner Delia Viado for having been preterited in the deed of extrajudicial
settlement. Dissatisfied therewith, petitioners filed the petition seeking the
reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals. cHDEaC
The Supreme Court found the appellate court to have ruled correctly. The
evidence submitted by petitioners were utterly wanting, consisting of, by and
large, self-serving testimonies. While asserting that Nilo Viado employed fraud,
forgery and undue influence in procuring the signatures of the parties to the deed
of donation and of the extrajudicial settlement, petitioners are vague on how and
in what manner those supposed vices occurred. With regard to the issue of
preterition, the Court ruled that the exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to
be a retardate, from the deed of the extrajudicial settlement verily has had the
effect of preterition. Thus, the appellate court acted properly in ordering the
remand of the case for further proceedings to make the proper valuation of the
property and determination of the amount due to petitioner Delia Viado.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACT; FRAUD, FORGERY AND
UNDUE INFLUENCE; NOT PROVEN IN CASE AT BAR. — The Court of Appeals, in
sustaining the court a quo, has found the evidence submitted by petitioners to be
utterly wanting, consisting of, by and large, self-serving testimonies. While
asserting that Nilo Viado employed fraud, forgery and undue influence in
procuring the signatures of the parties to the deeds of donation and of
extrajudicial settlement, petitioners are vague, however, on how and in what
manner those supposed vices occurred. Neither have petitioners shown proof
why Julian Viado should be held incapable of exercising sufficient judgment in
ceding his rights and interest over the property to Nilo Viado. The asseveration of
petitioner Rebecca Viado that she has signed the deed of extrajudicial settlement
on the mistaken belief that the instrument merely pertained to the administration
of the property is too tenuous to accept. It is also quite difficult to believe that
Rebecca Viado, a teacher by profession, could have misunderstood the tenor of
the assailed document.
2. ID.; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; REGISTRATION OF DOCUMENTS WAS A
MINISTERIAL ACT WHICH MERELY CREATED A CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF ITS
CONTENTS AGAINST ALL THIRD PERSONS. — The fact alone that the two deeds
were registered five years after the date of their execution did not adversely affect
their validity nor would such circumstance alone be indicative of fraud. The
registration of the documents was a ministerial act and merely created a
constructive notice of its contents against all third persons. Among the parties, the
instruments remained completely valid and binding.
3. ID.; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; PRETERITION; WHERE THE
PRETERITION IS NOT ATTENDED BY BAD FAITH AND FRAUD, THE PARTITION
SHALL NOT BE RESCINDED BUT THE PRETERITED HEIR SHALL BE PAID THE
VALUE OF THE SHARE PERTAINING TO HER. — The exclusion of petitioner Delia
Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial settlement verily
has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the absence
of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 373646. The relief, as so correctly pointed out by the Court
of Appeals, instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where
the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be
rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to
her. Again, the appellate court has thus acted properly in ordering the remand of
the case for further proceedings to make the proper valuation of the Isarog
property and ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia Viado.
||| (Non v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137287, [February 15, 2000], 382 PHIL 538-
544)