G.R. No.
L-24693 July 31, 1967 require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL
MAR INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for
prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process
clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null
and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such judgment must be reversed,
there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the
petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel
del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the
second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his
capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City
of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such
ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to
the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels
and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city
authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500
person and representing an investment of more than P3 million." 1 (par. 2). It was then
alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance
No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at
the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was
the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to
enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the
City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the
challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due
process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and
P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the provision in the same section which would
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lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any
room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a
lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name
and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the
length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name,
relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence
certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person
signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and
records kept and bound together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities of
such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City
Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and
void again on due process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive
but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the
right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged
ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain
minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or,
restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary,
unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance
requiring second class motels to have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the
challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such
hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a
lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice
every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided
for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the
automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction
of the business and loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the due
process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring
the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued
a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said
Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal
circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to
engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited
Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds.
After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged
ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a
valid and proper exercise of the police power and that only the guests or customers not
before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the
guaranty against self incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary
injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the
dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts
dated September 28, 1964, which reads:
1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and
Hotel del Mar Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines,
both with offices in the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin is the president
and general manager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a
resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;
2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief
executive of the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful
execution and enforcement of such ordinances;
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating
hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio
Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent
regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the
compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three
new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor
(Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement dated February 15, 1963
(Annex B);
5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was
submitted with the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal
Board, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C;
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from
license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners)
operating in the City of Manila.1äwphï1.ñët
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Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was
laid on the presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its
lack of conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S.
v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise
refuted point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity. Then barely
two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating
in detail what was set forth in the petition, with citations of what they considered to be
applicable American authorities and praying for a judgment declaring the challenged
ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association,
and referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court
observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with
the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for
decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by
the parties, the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the
challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper the untenable objection
on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and came to the
conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction
issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from enforcing the
ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional
doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such
a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to
stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional
adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset
the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was
expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x .
The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The
councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their
particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject
and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect
given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x . The
Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of
personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation. 2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for
evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is
not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case
of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the American Supreme Court
through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here
questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to
declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is
unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions
of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the
lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the
presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective
as being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection
associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular
manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals
is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by
anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope
of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and
the least limitable of powers,4 extending as it does "to all the great public needs." 5 It would
be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it
could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health,
public morals, public safety and the genera welfare. 6 Negatively put, police power is "that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the
comfort, safety, and welfare of society.7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio
Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the
rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence
of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit"
and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged
ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these
establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form,
prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing
several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the
registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was
intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than
legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would
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appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the
validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval,
ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant; 8 provide a
license tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of public dance halls; 9 prohibiting
gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and monte;12 prohibiting playing of panguingui on days
other than Sundays or legal holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines;14 and
prohibiting any person from keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a
place where opium is smoked or otherwise used,15 all of which are intended to protect public
morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the
exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other
applicable constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it
may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such
exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional
guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is
raised to the question of due process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It furnishes though a standard to which the governmental action should conform in
order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What
then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive
requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from
the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the
supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is
ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to
paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression.
Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly
it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting
idea of fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of
officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness
that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought." 18 It is not a narrow or
"technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances,"19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry
into fundamental principles of our society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated
narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet
what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary
and capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be deemed
unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in
the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more specific, the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It provided it with
the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in the records, and,
as has been set forth, none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such
character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor
does it lend any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of
Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such features as the increased fees
for motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain
particulars, its alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the
challenged ordinance for hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the
latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels,
P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922 that municipal
license fees could be classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or regular
enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for
revenue purposes only.22 As was explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2)
Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to
exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of
the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class
of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that
municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint
upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of
course, generally an important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of
license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have
frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter
cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable. 23
Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine
earlier announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement
the state's police power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad
taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is
sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so
levied is for public purposes, just and uniform. 25
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As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila
in imposing licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion
is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee of the
operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure. 26 The
discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation from another
decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement
of the ordinance could deprive them of their lawful occupation and means of livelihood
because they can not rent stalls in the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also
dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under
certain conditions is permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the
community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living
cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a case, persons licensed to
pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of
the police power embark in these occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result
from the legal exercise of that power."27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance
makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any
hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or portion
thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be
charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a
transgression against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which
such premises could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How
could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the
undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to
curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus:
"One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent.
It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.'
Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good
of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he
pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily
subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good x x x The liberty of the
citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and
safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power." 28
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of
the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons
and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state x x x To this fundamental aim of our
Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which
life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society
will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then
the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty
and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be
established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. 29
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue
deprivation of freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a
living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by
the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public
interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of
the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more
rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property,
the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.32 How justify then the allegation of a
denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by
invoking the principles of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the
petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the
provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners, however,
point to the requirement that a guest should give the name, relationship, age and sex of the
companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for determining
whether the companion or companions referred to are those arriving with the customer or
guest at the time of the registry or entering the room With him at about the same time or
coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast
doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the
discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso which from their standpoint would
require a guess as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease
thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these allegations
suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask
the question is to answer it. From Connally v. General Construction Co.33 to Adderley v.
Florida,34 the principle has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to
such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is
this the situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We
agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there
is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously
mean."35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments
pressed with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged
ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for constitutional law
principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a
reversal of the appealed decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted
forthwith. With costs.
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR
TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON,
ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO
MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as
PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino
Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo
Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be
participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the
regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M.,

5|Page
respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed
demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of
the respondent Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the parties — parties —
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected
mass demonstration at Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig Police Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00
PM) workers as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00
PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about
11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and those present were: for the
Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all
department and section heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2)
Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio
Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said
projected mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru
Benjamin Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the
planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be
cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu
explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the
Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager,
informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal
operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S.
de Leon warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the
first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by
the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the
demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March
4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing
CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked
Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was
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composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and
Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company
reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers
may join the Malacañang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular
shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the demonstration and
should report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts
in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: NO
LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the
Company shall be dismiss; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that
the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass
demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather too late to
change their plans inasmuch as the Malacañang demonstration will be held
the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to
the Company which was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of
which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT
EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex
"F", pp. 42-43, rec.)
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers
should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second
and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4,
1969, respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with
the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the
first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14,
as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and
No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was accompanied by the joint
affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a
corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio
T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the
existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass
demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of
their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen;
and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed
against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge
Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO
guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas,
Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino
and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and
were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent
Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p.
11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on
Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969,
on the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days
within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the
CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent
Company averred that herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the order dated
September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the amended Rules
of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days from September 22,
1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and
that because their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly
dismissed, invoking Bien vs. Castillo,1 which held among others, that a motion for extension
of the five-day period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed before the
said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated
October 11, 1969, in support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the motion for
reconsideration of herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the
reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein
petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on
October 24, 1969 and addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the
requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five (5) days from receipt of
its decision or order and that an appeal from the decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R.,
sitting en banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
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On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for relief
from the order dated October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their motion for
reconsideration on time was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by
the president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto
the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October 9,
1969, herein petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of
appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues
posed by the case at bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the
human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization.
The inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible
extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person." 2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security
"against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of
small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general
principles."3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to
withdraw "certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free press,
freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." 4 Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of
the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to
be judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to
exercise."5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included
among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice
Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as
Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the
majority who refuse to listen.6 And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one
are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are
protected.7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also
political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and
complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the
periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The
citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental
officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful
sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over
property rights is recognized.8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well
as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise
almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to
survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." 9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of
Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious
shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of
oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a
preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and
political institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction
not permitting dubious intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere
reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or
purpose — that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive — would suffice
to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the other hand, a
constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion,
namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has
the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando
in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It
should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices
Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of
speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation
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to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed," 15 even as Mr.
Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the
improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. — whether the gravity
of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is
necessary to avoid the danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was
not a declaration of strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence
temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence
violated the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine Blooming
Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing principles governing a democratic society,
such conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969
before Malacañang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their
employer, herein private respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an
exercise of their freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for
redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief
Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and
political rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police excesses. As
matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner
Union and its members fro the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest
herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its
employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as
consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well
as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with
the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at the expenses of its workers? Was it also
intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its
workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the more weakened the position of its
laborers the alleged oppressive police who might have been all the more emboldened
thereby subject its lowly employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and
of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of
herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons
afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human
rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the
absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea
for the preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would
not spell the difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its
management. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment
and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As
above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local
police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as
that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The
debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully
evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his
dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on
bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been
sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon — at once the shield
and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our
enlightened civilization — becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning
at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate
happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the
employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the
collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the
demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining
agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as
mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and
of petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees,
according to the respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the
"duty ... to observe regular working hours." The strain construction of the Court of Industrial
Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to stage mass
demonstration against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over
the mind and life the workers and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the
freedom should not be predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been
legally enjoined by any court, such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom
expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or strike. 20 The
respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass
demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any industrial
dispute although there is concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage work."
(Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the
demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from
9|Page
6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage to the firm will be
averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration
especially by a labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as their
total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum sympathy for the
validity of their cause but also immediately action on the part of the corresponding
government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police.
Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by
one-third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is
diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of
the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a
substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet
continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the company two days
in advance of their projected demonstration and the company could have made
arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the
absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union requested it to
excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which
request the Union reiterated in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the
morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a
lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request
of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass
demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against
the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the
employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the
part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass
demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of
expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the
respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities
for ... mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for
an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights
guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the
respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged
police abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of the
employees to engage in such common action to better shield themselves against such
alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers
for the morning and regular shift should not participate in the mass demonstration, under
pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at least equal
protection as the concerted action of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint
charging bank president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism an discrimination in the
appointment and promotion of ban employees. 23 We further ruled in the Republic Savings
Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come within the protective mantle of Section 3 in
relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that union activity be
involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is
for the furtherance of their interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent
Court dated September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution,"
nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice
the normal operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO representatives that workers
who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved
by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the
demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall
be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be
amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal tended
to coerce the employees from joining the mass demonstration. However, the issues that the
employees raised against the local police, were more important to them because they had
the courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most
that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on
the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he
has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that
their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But
management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of
free speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the
workers proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it
thereby concedes that the evidence of such abuses should properly be submitted to the
corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such
complaint may be referred by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation and
action with a view to disciplining the local police officers involved.
10 | P a g e
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the
demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company," the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of loss
actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did
not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether it lost expected
profits for failure to comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were exacted
from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that day of the demonstration; or that
purchase orders were cancelled by the customers by reason of its failure to deliver the
materials ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products were damaged due to
absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable
amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric
consumption that day. Such savings could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or
damages it might have sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the
right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8)
leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent
from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to
these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the
people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of
the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of
Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give meaning
and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise
these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter."
Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the
policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting
the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective
bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most
unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very
governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed to keep
faith with its avowed mission — its raison d'etre — as ordained and directed by the
Constitution.
V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of
jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief
from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained
through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. Thus,
habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted by final
judgment through a forced confession, which violated his constitutional right against self-
incrimination; 25 or who is denied the right to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation
of his liberty without due process of law, 26 even after the accused has already served
sentence for twenty-two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these
constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and
aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected
by the municipal police. Having violated these basic human rights of the laborers, the Court
of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the
instant case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on all
public offices including the courts 28 as well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise
and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by mere procedural rule promulgated by the
Court Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegate legislative power, when even a law
enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights.
There is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not
exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one
demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and
expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to
be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on
procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for
time. And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses
because he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with
the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay
for competent legal services. 28-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of its order
or writ should filed within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support
of said motion shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such motion for
reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of procedure were promulgated by
the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from
notice on September 22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late.
Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.
11 | P a g e
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the
rights of the petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent
omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the
period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant
to a legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in
the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of
Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only
incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the Constitution is
superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence to natural
reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid
Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of
Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen
the constitutional rights affected,' but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the
enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule,
promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and
therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five
(5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the
aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses
therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15)
days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10,
Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of
the motion for reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not
a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial are
concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is
based on the ground that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law,
evidence and facts adduced during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of ten
(10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of
the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were
actually filed by the herein petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long
after the 10-day period required for the filing of such supporting arguments counted from the
filing of the motion for reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October 28, 1969
the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being pro
forma since it was filed beyond the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time,
or where the arguments in suppf such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary
period provided for by the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision subject
of29-a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. But in all these cases, the
constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly and petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available
must be specifically raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense
not raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue can be raised
any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it appears that the determination of the
constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis mota of the case
without the resolution of which no final and complete determination of the dispute can be
made. 30 It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way
to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial
Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by
herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against
them and in their defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the
organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations
rule which impinges on such human rights. 30-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its
own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice
require." 30-b Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30-
c reiterated this principle and added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all situations without
concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need
to do justice, in any case, without further loss of time, provided that the
right of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired. Thus,
this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In other words,
when all the material facts are spread in the records before Us, and all the
parties have been duly heard, it matters little that the error of the court a
quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction. We can then and there render the
appropriate judgment. Is within the contemplation of this doctrine that as it
is perfectly legal and within the power of this Court to strike down in an
appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or committed with grave
abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond the admit of its authority, in
appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceed in any error of judgment
of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of
jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether
or not the errors this Court has found in the decision of the Court of Appeals
are short of being jurisdiction nullities or excesses, this Court would still be
on firm legal grounds should it choose to reverse said decision here and
now even if such errors can be considered as mere mistakes of judgment or
only as faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary
12 | P a g e
return of this case to the lower court for the sole purpose of pursuing the
ordinary course of an appeal. (Emphasis supplied). 30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial Relations rule in this
particular case at bar would an unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies
justice to the herein laborers, whose basic human freedoms, including the right to survive,
must be according supremacy over the property rights of their employer firm which has been
given a full hearing on this case, especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual material
damage has be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution
renders more imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash with
the human rights sanctioned and shielded with resolution concern by the specific guarantees
outlined in the organic law. It should be stressed that the application in the instant case
Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm is
unreasonable and therefore such application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the
human rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the peculiar facts and
circumstances revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with
reference to the case at is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the
C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice
Barredo, speaking for the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et.
al., 30-e thus:
As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the
motion for new trial is not "newly discovered," as such term is understood in
the rules of procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion is
not binding upon the Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt
its, rules or procedure and shall have such other powers as generally pertain
to a court of justice: Provided, however, That in the hearing, investigation
and determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any
duties and power under this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or
legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence
but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable.' By this provision the industrial court is disengaged from the
 rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is not
even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue
such orders as may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of
settling the dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future
disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila
Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We
believe that this provision is ample enough to have enabled the respondent
court to consider whether or not its previous ruling that petitioners constitute
a minority was founded on fact, without regard to the technical meaning of
newly discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong
v. Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578). (emphasis supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the
instant case is to rule in effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent
lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary of human freedoms secured to them by the
fundamental law, simply because their counsel — erroneously believing that he received a
copy of the decision on September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969 - filed his
motion for reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day late
considering that September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they ceased to be
instruments of justice, for the attainment of which such rules have been devised.
Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a
unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:
As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil.
315 [1910]. The Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register of
Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of
Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA
675.), decided as far back as 1910, "technicality. when it deserts its proper-
office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy,
deserves scant consideration from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this
Court has remained committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe,
(63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind. For him the interpretation of
procedural rule should never "sacrifice the ends justice." While "procedural
laws are no other than technicalities" view them in their entirety, 'they were
adopted not as ends themselves for the compliance with which courts have
organized and function, but as means conducive to the realization the
administration of the law and of justice (Ibid., p.,128). We have remained
steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a
sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in altar of sophisticated
13 | P a g e
technicalities with impairment of the sacred principles of justice."
(Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly put
by Justice Makalintal, they "should give way to the realities of the situation."
(Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In the
latest decision in point promulgated in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA
citing McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice
Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation of Justice Labrador that rules of
procedure "are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense"; but are
intended "to help secure substantial justice." ( Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given effect,
the dismissal or termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the
Union is harsh for a one-day absence from work. The respondent Court itself recognized the
severity of such a sanction when it did not include the dismissal of the other 393 employees
who are members of the same Union and who participated in the demonstration against the
Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the Union
members who are not officers, were not dismissed and only the Union itself and its thirteen
(13) officers were specifically named as respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed
against them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30,
rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates that not all the 400 or so employee participated
in the demonstration, for which reason only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were
specifically named in the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were
so, then many, if not all, of the morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4,
1969 and that, as a consequence, the firm continued in operation that day and did not
sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty — if it deserves any penalty at all — should have been simply to
charge said one-day absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8)
leaders of the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union leaders
depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as well as that of their respective families
aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time strengthening
the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who
consciously seek to destroy our system of Government, but from men of
goodwill — good men who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the
fact that what they propose to accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.
 ... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must
remember, however, is thatpreservation of liberties does not depend on
motives. A suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppress
or be a reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is
a constant alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained
in our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment
makes easier another, larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a
never ending one.
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are
protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we
feel secure because we belong to a group that is important and respected,
we must recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less
fortunate that we in all honor and good conscience must be observe . 31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of
sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being
subjected to indignities by the local police, It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its
income or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms and security
against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such
opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the
immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure and implement selfishness, if not
greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the
petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8) employees for having written and published "a patently
libelous letter ... to the Bank president demanding his resignation on the grounds of
immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in the
promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents.
Assuming that the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote
the letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in
concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self organization that
includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the
14 | P a g e
Industrial Peace Act ...) This is the view of some members of this Court. For,
as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small
group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a
concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary
that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated .
(Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
xxx xxx xxx
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to
air their grievances.
xxx xxx xxx
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls
the respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be
sure, the right of self-organization of employees is not unlimited (Republic
Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer
to discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ.
Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act
does not touch the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select his
employees or to discharge them. It is directed solely against the abuse of
that right by interfering with the countervailing right of self organization
(Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S. 177 [1941])...
xxx xxx xxx
In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's
conduct, identified as an interference with the employees' right of self-
organization or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain
collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and
intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis
supplied.) 33
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the
Republic Savings case, supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the
bank president no less, such recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly and
right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar,
where the mass demonstration was not against the company nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations
dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from
the date of their separation from the service until re instated, minus one day's pay and
whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during their separation from
the service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.
G.R. No. L-59234 September 30, 1982
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE
TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND
TRANSPORTATION, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This Petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order" filed by the Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo
Cabigao and Ace Transportation, seeks to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-
42, dated October 10, 1977, of the Board of Transportation, and Memorandum Circular No.
52, dated August 15, 1980, of the Bureau of Land Transportation.
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation
composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to
operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to
vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of
the members of TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public
convenience.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum
Circular No. 77-42 which reads:
15 | P a g e
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of
Old and Dilapidated Taxis
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to insure that only safe and
comfortable units are used as public conveyances;
WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in Metro-Manila, has, time and
again, complained against, and condemned, the continued operation of old
and dilapidated taxis;
WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort,
convenience, and safety, a program of phasing out of old and dilapidated
taxis should be adopted;
WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board of Transportation,
the latter believes that in six years of operation, a taxi operator has not only
covered the cost of his taxis, but has made reasonable profit for his
investments;
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this policy, the Board hereby declares that
no car beyond six years shall be operated as taxi, and in implementation of
the same hereby promulgates the following rules and regulations:
1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are ordered
withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered
and operated as taxis. In the registration of cards for 1978, only taxis of
Model 1972 and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for
operation;
2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 are ordered withdrawn
from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated
as taxis. In the registration of cars for 1979, only taxis of Model 1973 and
later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for operation; and every
year thereafter, there shall be a six-year lifetime of taxi, to wit:
1980 — Model 1974
1981 — Model 1975, etc.
 All taxis of earlier models than those provided above are hereby ordered
withdrawn from public service as of the last day of registration of each
particular year and their respective plates shall be surrendered directly to the
Board of Transportation for subsequent turnover to the Land Transportation
Commission.
For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein
shall immediately be effective in Metro-Manila. Its implementation outside
Metro- Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been
implemented in Metro-Manila and only after the date has been determined
by the Board. 1
Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land
Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980,
instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the
National Capitol Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out
of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. To quote said
Circular:
Pursuant to BOT Memo-Circular No. 77-42, taxi units with year models over
six (6) years old are now banned from operating as public utilities in Metro
Manila. As such the units involved should be considered as automatically
dropped as public utilities and, therefore, do not require any further dropping
order from the BOT.
Henceforth, taxi units within the National Capitol Region having year models
over 6 years old shall be refused registration. The following schedule of
phase-out is herewith prescribed for the guidance of all concerned:
Year Model Automatic
Phase-Out
Year
1980
1974 1981
1975 1982
1976 1983
16 | P a g e
1977
etc. etc.
Strict compliance here is desired. 2
In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those
of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981.
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-
7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration
and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of
earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are
roadworthy and fit for operation.
On February 16, 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion",
praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case was heard on February 20, 1981.
Petitioners presented testimonial and documentary evidence, offered the same, and
manifested that they would submit additional documentary proofs. Said proofs were
submitted on March 27, 1981 attached to petitioners' pleading entitled, "Manifestation,
Presentation of Additional Evidence and Submission of the Case for Resolution." 3
On November 28, 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a "Manifestation and Urgent
Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition" praying that the case be resolved or decided not
later than December 10, 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of whatever remedy
they may have under the law for the protection of their interests before their 1975 model
cabs are phased-out on January 1, 1982.
Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was
later informed that the records of the case could not be located.
On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was instituted wherein the following queries
were posed for consideration by this Court:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in
accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby
safeguarding the petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due process?
B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural
requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the
 implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars
violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and
unreasonable classification and standard?
On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:
Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power
4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices,
measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed
by operators of public utility motor vehicles.
Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the
exercise of its powers:
Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. — In the exercise of the powers granted in the
preceding section, the Board shag proceed promptly along the method of
legislative inquiry.
Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion, may
require the cooperation and assistance of the Bureau of Transportation, the
Philippine Constabulary, particularly the Highway Patrol Group, the support
agencies within the Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications, or any other government office or agency that may be able
to furnish useful information or data in the formulation of the Board of any
policy, plan or program in the implementation of this Decree.
The Board may also can conferences, require the submission of position
papers or other documents, information, or data by operators or other
persons that may be affected by the implementation of this Decree, or
employ any other suitable means of inquiry.
17 | P a g e
In support of their submission that they were denied procedural due process, petitioners
contend that they were not caged upon to submit their position papers, nor were they ever
summoned to attend any conference prior to the issuance of the questioned BOT Circular.
It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway accorded the Board
gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation
of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or
require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or persons who
may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide
discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were deprived
of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had
not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. operators of
public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data and information that may be
desired by the BOT.
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is neither violative of
procedural due process. As held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA
307 (1972):
Pevious notice and hearing as elements of due process, are constitutionally
required for the protection of life or vested property rights, as well as of
liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or
quasi-judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event
which has to be established or ascertained. It is not essential to the validity
of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a
class or persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioners further take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and
oppressive because the roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of maintenance
and the use to which they are subjected, and, therefore, their actual physical condition
should be taken into consideration at the time of registration. As public contend, however, it
is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of
the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion,
and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an
vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable
standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated,
their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally
dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially
considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts
of eight hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness,
the requirement of due process has been met.
On Equal Protection of the Law:
Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to equal protection of the
law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards
the taxi industry. At the outset it should be pointed out that implementation outside Metro
Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. To repeat the pertinent portion:
For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein
shall immediately be effective in Metro Manila. Its implementation outside
Metro Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been
implemented in Metro Manila and only after the date has been determined
by the Board. 4
In fact, it is the understanding of the Court that implementation of the Circulars in Cebu City
is already being effected, with the BOT in the process of conducting studies regarding the
operation of taxicabs in other cities.
The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this
city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more
constant use. This is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the
same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection
clause can hardly be successfully claimed.
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding
consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old
and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe regulations
to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people.
It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. 5 It may also
regulate property rights. 6 In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to
regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded". 7
In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is
concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the
same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons Identically or
similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided
classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real
18 | P a g e
differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. 8 What is required
under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons
under Identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in
privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. 9 The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing
criteria.
Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any
constitutional infirmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional
right must be clear, categorical and undeniable. 10
WHEREFORE, the Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988
CARLOS BALACUIT, LAMBERTO TAN and SERGIO YU CARCEL, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, Branch
11, and the CITY OF BUTUAN, respondents-appellees.
Romeo B. Sanchez, Eduardo Deza Mercado and Wilfred D. Asis for petitioners.
The City Legal Officer for respondents-appeliees.
GANCAYCO, J.:
At issue in the petition for review before Us is the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance
No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, the title and
text of which are reproduced below:
ORDINANCE--640
ORDINANCE PENALIZING ANY PERSON, GROUP OF PERSONS, ENTITY OR
CORPORATION ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF SELLING ADMISSION
TICKETS TO ANY MOVIE OR OTHER PUBLIC EXHIBITIONS, GAMES,
CONTESTS OR OTHER PERFORMANCES TO REQUIRE CHILDREN BETWEEN
SEVEN (7) AND TWELVE (12) YEARS OF AGE TO PAY FULL PAYMENT FOR
 TICKETS INTENDED FOR ADULTS BUT SHOULD CHARGE ONLY ONE-HALF IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby adjudges in favor
OF THE SAID TICKET of the respondents and against the petitioners, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx 1. Declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan constitutional and valid:
Provided, however, that the fine for a single offense shall not exceed TWO
Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan in session HUNDRED PESOS, as prescribed in the aforequoted Section 15 (nn) of Rep.
assembled, that: Act No. 523;

SECTION 1—It shall be unlawful for any person, group of persons, entity, or 2. Dissolving the restraining order issued by this Court; and;
corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie
or other public exhibitions, games, contests, or other performances to 3. Dismissing the complaint, with costs against the petitioners.
require children between seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full
payment for admission tickets intended for adults but should charge only 4. SO ORDERED. 7
one-half of the value of the said tickets.
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration 8 of the decision of the court a quo which
SECTION 2—Any person violating the provisions of this Ordinance shall upon was denied in a resolution of the said court dated November 10, 1973.9
conviction be punished by a fine of not less than TWO HUNDRED PESOS
(P200.00) but not more than SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00) or an Hence, this petition.
imprisonment of not less than TWO (2) MONTHS or not more than SIX (6)
MONTHS or both such firm and imprisonment in the discretion of the Court.
Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that
it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power.
If the violator be a firm or corporation the penalty shall be imposed upon the
Manager, Agent or Representative of such firm or corporation.
Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the power of' the Municipal Board to
enact as provided for in Section 15(n) of Republic Act No. 523, the Charter of the City of
SECTION 3—This ordinance shall take effect upon its approval. Butuan, which states:

Petitioners are Carlos Balacuit Lamberto Tan, and Sergio Yu Carcel managers of the Maya Sec. 15. General powers and duties of the Board — Except as otherwise
and Dalisay Theaters, the Crown Theater, and the Diamond Theater, respectively. Aggrieved provided by law, and subject to the conditions and limitations thereof, the
by the effect of Ordinance No. 640, they filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:
of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as Special Civil Case No. 237 on June 30, 1969
praying, inter alia, that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore,
xxx xxx xxx
void and unenforceable. 1
(n) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following; . . .
Upon motion of the petitioners, 2 a temporary restraining order was issued on July 14, 1969
theaters, theatrical performances, cinematographs, public exhibitions and all
by the court a quo enjoining the respondent City of Butuan and its officials from enforcing
other performances and places of amusements ...
Ordinance No. 640. 3 On July 29, 1969, respondents filed their answer sustaining the validity
of the ordinance.4
xxx xxx xxx
On January 30, 1973, the litigants filed their stipulation of facts. On June 4, 1973, the
5

respondent court rendered its decision, 6 the dispositive part of which reads:

19 | P a g e
Respondent City of Butuan, on the other hand, attempts to justify the enactment of the
ordinance by invoking the general welfare clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the cited
law, which provides:
(nn) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the
sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion
of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary
to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
Act, and to fix the penalties for the violation of the ordinances, which shall
not exceed a two hundred peso fine or six months imprisonment, or both
such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense.
We can see from the aforecited Section 15(n) that the power to regulate and fix the amount
of license fees for theaters, theatrical performances, cinematographs, public exhibitions and
other places of amusement has been expressly granted to the City of Butuan under its
charter. But the question which needs to be resolved is this: does this power to regulate
include the authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of admission to these places of
exhibition and amusement whether under its general grant of power or under the general
welfare clause as invoked by the City?
This is the first time this Court is confronted with the question of direct interference by the
local government with the operation of theaters, cinematographs and the like to the extent of
fixing the prices of admission to these places. Previous decisions of this Court involved the
power to impose license fees upon businesses of this nature as a corollary to the power of
the local government to regulate them. Ordinances which required moviehouses or theaters
to increase the price of their admission tickets supposedly to cover the license fees have
been held to be invalid for these impositions were considered as not merely license fees but
taxes for purposes of revenue and not regulation which the cities have no power to
exact, 10 unless expressly granted by its charter. 11
Applying the ruling in Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, 12 where the word "regulate" was
interpreted to include the power to control, to govern and to restrain, it would seem that
under its power to regulate places of exhibitions and amusement, the Municipal Board of the
City of Butuan could make proper police regulations as to the mode in which the business
shall be exercised.
While in a New York case, 13 an ordinance which regulates the business of selling admission
tickets to public exhibitions or performances by virtue of the power of cities under the
General City Law "to maintain order, enforce the laws, protect property and preserve and
care for the safety, health, comfort and general welfare of the inhabitants of the city and
20 | P a g e
visitors thereto; and for any of said purposes, to regulate and license occupations" was
considered not to be within the scope of any duty or power implied in the charter. It was
held therein that the power of regulation of public exhibitions and places of amusement
within the city granted by the charter does not carry with it any authority to interfere with
the price of admission to such places or the resale of tickets or tokens of admission.
In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and
other places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the
exercise of delegated police power by the local government. 14 Thus, in People v. Chan, 15 an
ordinance of the City of Manila prohibiting first run cinematographs from selling tickets
beyond their seating capacity was upheld as constitutional for being a valid exercise of police
power. Still in another case, 16 the validity of an ordinance of the City of Bacolod prohibiting
admission of two or more persons in moviehouses and other amusement places with the use
of only one ticket was sustained as a valid regulatory police measure not only in the interest
of preventing fraud in so far as municipal taxes are concerned but also in accordance with
public health, public safety, and the general welfare.
The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to enact the ordinance in
question under its power to regulate embodied in Section 15(n), now invokes the police
power as delegated to it under the general welfare clause to justify the enactment of said
ordinance.
To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public
generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. 17 The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest,
arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions
upon lawful occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of
its police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts. 18
Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due process clause of the
Constitution for being oppressive, unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of
trade, and violative of the right of persons to enter into contracts, considering that the
theater owners are bound under a contract with the film owners for just admission prices for
general admission, balcony and lodge.
In Homeowners' Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Municipal Board of the City of
Manila, 19 this Court held:
The authority of municipal corporations to regulate is essentially police
power, Inasmuch as the same generally entails a curtailment of the liberty,
 the rights and/or the property of persons, which are protected and even
guaranteed by the Constitution, the exercise of police power is necessarily
subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the regard,
the respect and the obedience due to the prescriptions of the fundamental
law, particularly those forming part of the Constitution of Liberty, otherwise
known as the Bill of Rights — the police power measure must be reasonable.
In other words, individual rights may be adversely affected by the exercise of
police power to the extent only — and only to the extent--that may be fairly
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
What is the reason behind the enactment of Ordinance No. 640?
A reading of the minutes of the regular session of the Municipal Board when the ordinance in
question was passed shows that a certain Councilor Calo, the proponent of the measure, had
taken into account the complaints of parents that for them to pay the full price of admission
for their children is too financially burdensome.
The trial court advances the view that "even if the subject ordinance does not spell out
its raison d'etre in all probability the respondents were impelled by the awareness that
children are entitled to share in the joys of their elders, but that considering that, apart from
size, children between the ages of seven and twelve cannot fully grasp the nuance of movies
or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances, the admission prices with
respect to them ought to be reduced. 19a
We must bear in mind that there must be public necessity which demands the adoption of
proper measures to secure the ends sought to be attained by the enactment of the
ordinance, and the large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislative authority to
determine not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary
for the protection of such interests. 20 The methods or means used to protect the public
health, morals, safety or welfare, must have some relation to the end in view, for under the
guise of the police power, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitralily invaded by the legislative department. 21
We agree with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public
interest. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare,
and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. 22 The evident purpose of
the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to shell out
the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for themselves,
A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents;
however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance
does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes them
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for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be difficulty in its
implementation because as already experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of the
ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order
to avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against
this undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth
certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of children. This is,
however, not at all practicable. We can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not
unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation
between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general
welfare.
Respondent City of Butuan claims that it was impelled to protect the youth from the
pernicious practice of movie operators and other public exhibitions promoters or the like of
demanding equal price for their admission tickets along with the adults. This practice is
allegedly repugnant and unconscionable to the interest of the City in the furtherance of the
prosperity, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and the general well-being of its
inhabitants.
There is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both children and adults. The
petitioners are merely conducting their legitimate businesses. The object of every business
entrepreneur is to make a profit out of his venture. There is nothing immoral or injurious in
charging the same price for both children and adults. In fact, no person is under compulsion
to purchase a ticket. It is a totally voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if he buys a
ticket to such performances.
Respondent City of Butuan claims that Ordinance No. 640 is reasonable and necessary to
lessen the economic burden of parents whose minor children are lured by the attractive
nuisance being maintained by the petitioners. Respondent further alleges that by charging
the full price, the children are being exploited by movie house operators. We fail to see how
the children are exploited if they pay the full price of admission. They are treated with the
same quality of entertainment as the adults. The supposition of the trial court that because
of their age children cannot fully grasp the nuances of such entertainment as adults do fails
to convince Us that the reduction in admission ticket price is justifiable. In fact, by the very
claim of respondent that movies and the like are attractive nuisances, it is difficult to
comprehend why the municipal board passed the subject ordinance. How can the municipal
authorities consider the movies an attractive nuisance and yet encourage parents and
children to patronize them by lowering the price of admission for children? Perhaps, there is
some ,truth to the argument of petitioners that Ordinance No. 640 is detrimental to the
public good and the general welfare of society for it encourages children of tender age to
frequent the movies, rather than attend to their studies in school or be in their homes.
Moreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie house and theater operators will
be discouraged from exhibiting wholesome movies for general patronage, much less
children's pictures if only to avoid compliance with the ordinance and still earn profits for
themselves. For after all, these movie house and theater operators cannot be compelled to
exhibit any particular kind of film except those films which may be dictated by public demand
and those which are restricted by censorship laws. So instead of children being able to share
in the joys of their elders as envisioned by the trial court, there will be a dearth of
wholesome and educational movies for them to enjoy.
There are a number of cases decided by the Supreme Court and the various state courts of
the United States which upheld the right of the proprietor of a theater to fix the price of an
admission ticket as against the right of the state to interfere in this regard and which We
consider applicable to the case at bar.
A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license, revocable at the will of the
proprietor of the theater or it may be evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable
consideration, the purchaser has acquired the right to enter the theater and observe the
performance on condition that he behaves properly. 23 Such ticket, therefore, represents a
right, Positive or conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms of the original
contract of sale. This right is clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that right
is also, necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any
condition to the contrary in the contract by which he obtained it, has the clear right to
dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases and at such price as he can obtain. 24 So that an
act prohibiting the sale of tickets to theaters or other places of amusement at more than the
regular price was held invalid as conflicting with the state constitution securing the right of
property. 25
In Collister vs. Hayman, 26
it was held:
The defendants were conducting a private business, which, even if clothed
with a public interest, was without a franchise to accommodate the public,
and they had the right to control it, the same as the proprietors of any other
business, subject to such obligations as were placed upon them by statute.
Unlike a carrier of passengers, for instance, with a franchise from the state,
and hence under obligation to transport anyone who applies and to continue
the business year in and year out, the proprietors of a theater can open and
close their place at will, and no one can make a lawful complaint. They can
charge what they choose for admission to their theater. They can limit the
number admitted. They can refuse to sell tickets and collect the price of
admission at the door. They can preserve order and enforce quiet while the
performance is going on. They can make it a part of the contract and
22 | P a g e
condition of admission, by giving due notice and printing the condition in the
ticket that no one shall be admitted under 21 years of age, or that men only
or women only shall be admitted, or that a woman cannot enter unless she
is accompanied by a male escort, and the like. The proprietors, in the control
of their business, may regulate the terms of admission in any reasonable
way. If those terms are not satisfactory, no one is obliged to buy a ticket or
make the contract. If the terms are satisfactory, and the contract is made,
the minds of the parties meet upon the condition, and the purchaser
impliedly promises to perform it.
In Tyson and Bro. — United Theater Ticket Officers, Inc. vs. Banton , 27
the United States
Supreme Court held:
... And certainly a place of entertainment is in no legal sense a public utility;
and quite as certainly, its activities are not such that their enjoyment can be
regarded under any conditions from the point of view of an emergency.
The interest of the public in theaters and other places of entertainment may
be more nearly, and with better reason, assimilated to the like interest in
provision stores and markets and in the rental of houses and apartments for
residence purposes; although in importance it fails below such an interest in
the proportion that food and shelter are of more moment than amusement
or instruction. As we have shown there is no legislative power to fix the
prices of provisions or clothing, or the rental charges for houses and
apartments, in the absence of some controlling emergency; and we are
unable to perceive any dissimilarities of such quality or degree as to justify a
different rule in respect of amusements and entertainment ...
We are in consonance with the foregoing observations and conclusions of American courts.
In this jurisdiction, legislation had been passed controlling the prices of goods commodities
and drugs during periods of emergency, 28limiting the net profits of public utility 29 as well as
regulating rentals of residential apartments for a limited period, 30as a matter of national
policy in the interest of public health and safety, economic security and the general welfare
of the people. And these laws cannot be impugned as unconstitutional for being violative of
the due process clause.
However, the same could not be said of theaters, cinematographs and other exhibitions. In
no sense could these businesses be considered public utilities. The State has not found it
appropriate as a national policy to interfere with the admission prices to these performances.
This does not mean however, that theaters and exhibitions are not affected with public
interest even to a certain degree. Motion pictures have been considered important both as a
medium for the communication of Ideas and expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects
on the perceptions by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the
prevailing cultural traits are considerable. 31People of all ages flock to movie houses, games
and other public exhibitions for recreation and relaxation. The government realizing their
importance has seen it fit to enact censorship laws to regulate the movie industry. 32 Their
aesthetic entertainment and even educational values cannot be underestimated. Even police
measures regulating the operation of these businesses have been upheld in order to
safeguard public health and safety.
Nonetheless, as to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police
power, the same must be resolved in the negative. While it is true that a business may be
regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is,
the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive
amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A
lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered
with even by the exercise of police power.33 A police measure for the regulation of the
conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and
lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights.34 The right of the owner to fix a price
at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and,
as such, within the protection of the due process clause."" Hence, the proprietors of a
theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of
admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not
approve could stay away. 36
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ [152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164; 31 July 1987]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the
Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing
Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series
of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a
condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting
applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April
1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was
conducted and administered as previously scheduled.

Respondent City of Butuan argues that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of
the ordinance. This maybe the rule but it has already been held that although the
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical
presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such
presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:
on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence. 37 The exercise of
police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of
the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, "SECTION 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and
oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. 38
regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c)
Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines."
We could assume that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing
considerations, it has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of
the property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as
of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:

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"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of
medicine;
xxx
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a
register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of
twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical
Education;”
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:
"Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any student who has not been
convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and
who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a
certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education;
(c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former professors in the college of
liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any
college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance
requirements that may be deemed admissible.”
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports
and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility
for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-
1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an
instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical
24 | P a g e
cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be
determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the
Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with
the other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a
basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical
colleges.
Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.
Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores
therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute
an unconstitutional imposition.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and
authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs — in
a word, the public order — of the general community. An important component of that public
order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of
which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable
relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical
school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community,
on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the
regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public.

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the
improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by
upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That
upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among
other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude
for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the
difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical
schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely
known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the
NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants
into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the
country. We are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the
ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the
protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in
those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial
court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. (G.R. No. 111097)
Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a
building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same,
and prepared to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.
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Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the casino’s opening
and enacted Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and canceling
existing business permit to the establishment for the operation of the casino, and Ordinance
No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of the casino and providing a penalty for its violation.
Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they both violated
Presidential Decree No. 1869. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local Government
Code, they have the police power authority to prohibit the operation of casino for the general
welfare.
Issue:
Whether the Ordinances are valid.
Ruling:
No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact
ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested
with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in
Section 16 as follows:Sec. 16.
General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of
the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units
shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture,
promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage
and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote
full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort
and convenience of their inhabitants.
Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress,
among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision
excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to plates on week-ends and holidays, was assailed for being allegedly violative of the due
be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements: process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution.

1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is
obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute
that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body.
The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of
Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere
ordinance the mandate of the statute. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of
buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation
of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and
the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.
Petitioners also contends that Memorandum Circular No. 39 issued by herein respondents
imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license of owners of
the above specified vehicles found violating such LOI, is likewise unconstitutional, for being
violative of the doctrine of “undue delegation of legislative power.”
Respondents denied the above allegations.
ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular
No. 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights.
HELD: No, the disputed regulatory measure is an appropriate response to a problem that
presses urgently for solution, wherein its reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus due
process is not ignored, much less infringed. The exercise of police power may cut into the
rights to liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. Those adversely
affected may invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show a factual foundation
for its invalidity.
Moreover, since LOI No. 869 and MC No. 39 were adopted pursuant to the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code which contains a specific provision as to penalties, the
imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is
valid with the exception of the impounding of a vehicle.

Wherefore, the petition is denied.

BAUTISTA VS. JUNIO

GR # L-50908 January 31, 1984 (Constitutional Law – Police Power, LOI, No Violation of
Equal Protection Clause)

FACTS: The constitutionality of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 869, a response to protracted
oil crisis, banning the use of private motor vehicles with H (heavy) and EH (extra heavy)

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