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Instructions 5
PART ONE 6
I. General Provisions 6
A. Rule 128 6
Cases: 6
(1) Knapp v. State, 79 N.E. 1076 (1907) 6
(2) State v. Ball, 339 S.W. 2nd 783 (1960) 7
B. Rules of Exclusion 9
Cases: 9
(1) Mamba v. Garcia, 359 SCRA 426 (2001) 9
(2) Marquez v. Desierto, 359 SCRA 772 (2001) 11
(3) Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan, 509 SCRA 190 (2006) 13
Cases: 14
(1) Manufacturers Hanover Trust v. Guerrero, 397 SCRA 709 (2003) 14
(2) Pigao v. Rabanillo, 488 SCRA 546 (2006) 15
(3) BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. CTA, 330 SCRA 507 (2000) 18
(4) Land Bank v. Yatco Agriculture Enterprises, G.R. No. 172551, 15 January 2015 18
(6) Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152375, 13 December 2011 22
B. Judicial Admissions 25
b) § 8, Rule 10 25
Cases: 25
(1) Herrera-Felix v. Court of Appeals, 436 SCRA 87 (2004)- Galacio, Ellah 25
(2) Heirs of Pedro Clemeña v. Heirs of Irene Bien, 501 SCRA 405 (2006) 27
(3) Luciano Tan v. Rodil Enterprises, 511 SCRA 162 (2006) 28
(4) Atillo III v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 596 (1997) 31
(5) People v. Lacson, 413 SCRA 20 (2003) 35
(6) Dimaguila v. Monteiro, 314 SCRA 565 (2014) 35
Cases: 36
(1) Sison v. People, 250 SCRA 58 (1995) [cf. § 1, Rule 11 of Rules of Electronic Evidence] 36
(2) People v. Rullepa, 398 SCRA 567 (2003) 41
Case: 43
(1) Yap v. Inopiquez, Jr., 403 SCRA 141 (2003) 43
Cases: 46
(1) Consolidated Bank v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., 465 SCRA 117 (2006) 46
(2) Lee v. People, 440 SCRA 662 (2004) 48
(3) Citibank, N.A. Mastercard v. Teodoro, 411 SCRA 577 (2003) 48
(5) Vila Rey Transit, Inc. v. Ferrer, 25 SCRA 845 (1968) 51
(6) Compania Maritima v. Allied Free Workers Union, 77 SCRA 24 (1977) 53
(7) Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, 423 SCRA 272 (2004) 54
(8) Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, G.R. No. 171701, 8 February 2012 56
Cases: 56
(1) Financial Building Corporation v. Rudlin, G.R. No. 164186, 4 October 2010 56
(2) Palanca v. Fred Wilson & Co., 37 Phil. 506 (1918) 56
(3) Maulini v. Serrano, 28 Phil. 640 (1914) 58
(4) Woodhouse v. Halili 93 Phil. 526 (1953) 60
(5) Land Settlement Development Corp. v. Garcia Plantation Co., Inc., 7 SCRA 750 (1963) 60
(6) Robles v. Lizarraga Hermanos 50 Phil. 387 (1927) 63
(7) Philippine National Railways v. CIR of Albay, Br. I, 83 SCRA 569 (1978) 65
(8) Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 421 SCRA 328 (2004) 67
(9) Baluyot v. Poblete, 514 SCRA 370 (2007) 67
(10) Heirs of Ureta v. Heirs of Ureta, G.R. No. 165748, 14 September 2011 67
(11) Lechugas v. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 335 (1986) 68
(12) Inciong v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 578 (1996) 71
Case: 71
(1) Recto v. Republic, 440 SCRA 79 (2004) 71
Cases: 71
(1) People v. Deauna, 386 SCRA 136 (2002) 71
(2) People v. Macapal, Jr., 463 SCRA 387 (2005) 71
(3) People v. Santos, 501 SCRA 325 (2006) 71
Cases: 71
(1) Lezama v. Rodriguez, 23 SCRA 1166 (1968) 71
(2) Alvarez v. Ramirez, 473 SCRA 72 (2005) 73
Cases: 73
(1) Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698 (1927) 73
(2) Lichauco v. Atlantic Gulf, 84 Phil. 330 (1949) 73
(3) Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho, 96 Phil. 622 (1955) 75
(4) Asturias v. Court of Appeals, 9 SCRA 131 (1963) 75
(5) Guerrero v. St. Claire’s Realty & Co., 124 SCRA 553 (1983) 75
(6) Razon v. IAC, 207 SCRA 234 (1992) 77
(7) Sunga-Chan v. Chua, 363 SCRA 249 (2001) 80
(8) Zeigler v. Moore, 75 Nev. 91 335 P2d S. 425 (1959) 80
Cases: 80
(1) United States v. Antipolo, 37 Phil. 726 (1916) 80
(2) People v. Carlos, 47 Phil 626 (1925) 82
(3) Zuleta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107383, 20 February 1996 82
(4) People v. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694 (1947) 82
(5) Lacurom v. Jacoba, 484 SCRA 206 (2006) 82
Cases: 82
(1) Barton v. Leyte Asphalt & Mineral Oil Co., 46 Phil. 938 (1924) 82
(2) Orient Insurance v. Revilla, 54 Phil. 919 (1930) 86
(3) Upjohn Company v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383 (1981) 86
(4) People v. Sandiganbayan, 275 SCRA 505 (1997) 86
(5) Mercado v. Vitriolo, 459 SCRA 1 (2005) 86
(6) Regala v. Sandiganbayan, 262 SCRA 124 (1996) 86
Cases: 86
(1) Lim v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 273 (1992) 86
(2) Krohn v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 146 (1994) 88
Case: 90
(1) People v. Invencion, 398 SCRA 592 (2003) 90
g) Newsman’s Privilege (See R.A. No. 53, as amended by R.A. 1477) 90
Case: 90
Case: 90
(1) Air Phil Corp. v. Pennswell, Inc. (13 December 2007) 90
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Instructions
1. Look for your assigned case title from the table of contents.
2. Click the link to go to the page.
3. Copy and paste your digest below the case title.
NOTE: Do not edit the table of contents.
PART ONE
I. General Provisions
A. Rule 128
Cases:
B. Rules of Exclusion
Cases:
Cases:
(3) BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. CTA, 330 SCRA 507 (2000)
(4) Land Bank v. Yatco Agriculture Enterprises, G.R. No. 172551, 15 January 2015
EUPENA, Ron Christian
Bar Q:
Y is an owner of an agricultural land that was put under the CARP coverage of the government.
Pursuant to E.O. 405, LBP valued the property at ₱1,126,132.89 but Y did not find this valuation
acceptable and thus elevated the matter to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). The PARAD computed the value of the property at
₱16,543,800.00;10 The LBP filed with the RTC- Special Agrarian Court a petition for the judicial
determination of just compensation which fixed the just compensation for the property at
₱200.00 per square meter.13 The RTC-SAC arrived at this valuation by adopting the valuation
set by the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 35 which, in turn, adopted the valuation that the RTC of
Calamba City, Branch 36 (Branch 36) arrived at.
Is the RTC-SAC’s decision in adopting only the valuation set by branch 35 and 36 proper?
Answer:
No. Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 explicitly vests the RTC-SAC the original and exclusive power to
determine just compensation for lands under CARP coverage. The law likewise empowers the
DAR to issue rules for its implementation. Thus, RTC-SAC must consider Section 17 of R.A. No.
6657, and the basic formula by the DAR, in determining just compensation. RTC-SAC, however,
are not strictly bound to apply the DAR formula, they may, in the exercise of their discretion, relax
the formula’s application to fit the factual situations before them.
Generally, courts are not authorized to "take judicial notice of the contents of the records of
other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before
the same judge." They may, however, take judicial notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in
another case sitting in the same court if: (1) the parties present them in evidence, absent any
opposition from the other party; or (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do so. In either
case, the courts must observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules
of Court.
We note that Y offered in evidence copies of the decisions in the civil cases, which offer the LBP
opposed. These were duly noted by the court. Even assuming, however, that the order of the
RTC-SAC constitutes sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section 3, Rule 129,
RTC-SAC’s valuation is legally erroneous because the RTC-SAC fully disregarded Section 17 of
R.A. No. 6657 and DAR AO 5-98 and thus acted outside the contemplation of the law.
Case digest:
Facts:
Yatco is the registered owner of a 27 hectare agricultural land. On April 30, 1999, the
government placed the property under the coverage of its Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). Pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) No. 405, the LBP valued the property at
₱1,126,132.89. Yatco did not find this valuation acceptable and thus elevated the matter to the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of San
Pablo City. The PARAD computed the value of the property at ₱16,543,800.00; The LBP did not
move to reconsider the PARAD’s ruling. Instead, it filed with the RTC-SAC a petition for the
judicial determination of just compensation. The RTC-Special Agrarian Court fixed the just
compensation for the property at ₱200.00 per square meter. The RTC-SAC arrived at this
valuation by adopting the valuation set by the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 35 (Branch 35) in
Civil Case No. 2326-96-C, which, in turn, adopted the valuation that the RTC of Calamba City,
Branch 36 (Branch 36) arrived at in Civil Case No. 2259-95-C. CA thus affirmed the RTC-SAC’s
valuation which was founded on factual and legal bases. The LBP filed the present petition after
the CA denied its motion for reconsideration in the CA’s May 3, 2006 resolution.
Issue:
Whether the RTC-SAC’s determination of just compensation for the property was proper.
Held:
No.
The determination of just compensation is fundamentally a judicial function. Section 57 of R.A.
No. 6657 explicitly vests the RTC-SAC the original and exclusive power to determine just
compensation for lands under CARP coverage.
To guide the RTC-SAC in the exercise of its function, Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the
factors required to be taken into account to correctly determine just compensation. The law
(under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657) likewise empowers the DAR to issue rules for its
implementation. The DAR thus issued DAR AO 5-98 incorporating the law’s listed factors in
determining just compensation into a basic formula that contains the details that take these
factors into account.
That the RTC-SAC must consider the factors mentioned by the law (and consequently the DAR’s
implementing formula) is not a novel concept. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal,30
we said that the RTC-SAC must consider the factors enumerated under Section 17 of R.A. No.
6657, as translated into a basic formula by the DAR, in determining just compensation.
In other words, in the exercise of the Court’s essentially judicial function of determining just
compensation, the RTC-SACs are not granted unlimited discretion and must consider and apply
the R.A. No. 6657-enumerated factors and the DAR formula that reflect these factors.
When acting within the parameters set by the law itself, the RTC-SACs, however, are not strictly
bound to apply the DAR formula to its minute detail, particularly when faced with situations that
do not warrant the formula’s strict application; they may, in the exercise of their discretion, relax
the formula’s application to fit38 the factual situations before them.
This use of considerations that were completely outside the contemplation of the law is the
precise situation we find in the present case, as fully explained below.
The rules allow the courts to take judicial notice of certain facts; the RTC-SAC’s valuation is
erroneous
The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the purpose
that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof. Generally,
courts are not authorized to "take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases
even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same
judge." They may, however, take judicial notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in another
case sitting in the same court if: (1) the parties present them in evidence, absent any opposition
from the other party; or (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do so. In either case, the
courts must observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
We note that Yatco offered in evidence copies of the decisions in the civil cases, which offer the
LBP opposed. These were duly noted by the court. Even assuming, however, that the April 21,
2004 order of the RTC-SAC (that noted Yatco’s offer in evidence and the LBP’s opposition to it)
constitutes sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court, still we find the RTC-SAC’s valuation – based on Branch 36’s previous ruling – to be
legally erroneous because The RTC-SAC fully disregarded Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and DAR
AO 5-98 and thus acted outside the contemplation of the law.
(5) Land Bank of the Philippines v. Banal, 434 SCRA 543 (2004)
Evardo, Benny Boy P.
X = Petitioner Landbank of the Philippines
Y=Respondent Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal
BAR Qs
Y is the registered owner of agricultural land. A portion of the land was compulsorily acquired
by the Department of Agrarian Reform pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, as amended.
Y rejected the valuation of X hence a summary administrative proceeding was conducted before
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the land.
Eventually, the PARAD rendered its Decision affirming the X’s valuation. Dissatisfied with the
Decision of the PARAD, Y filed with the RTC a petition for determination of just compensation. In
determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the facts established in
another case pending before it and applying the same to the present case without conducting a
hearing and without the knowledge or consent of the parties.
“SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its own
initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
“After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on
request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.”
The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.
b) § 8, Rule 10
Cases:
Galacio, Ellah
BAR Q:
X filed a complaint for sum of money against Y with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
attachment. The trial court granted the writ and the Sheriff levied and took custody of the
personal properties of Y. The copy of the writ, summons and complaint were served to her
residence but was received by her sister A since Y was out of the country. The counsel of Y,
Atty. B filed for a motion for an extension of time to file her answer to the compliant. The trial
court rendered a decision in favor of X. Did the court acquire jurisdiction over her person
through the service of the complaint and summons on her sister?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Later, the court a quo rendered a decision in favor of SJRD, Inc. ordering the Felix Sps. to pay.
Copies of the said decision were mailed through registered mail but returned to the court after
two notices for having been Unclaimed. However, the counsel for the Felix Spouses received his
copy of the decision. The court thereafter issued an order granting the motion and directing the
issuance of a writ of execution. Thereafter, the personal properties of Felix Sps. were levied
upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction to SJRD, Inc. as the winning bidder. Ofelia
Herrera-Felix filed a petition with the Court of Appeals for the nullification of the trial courts
judgment by default, the writ of execution and the sale of her properties at public auction
alleging that the complaint and summons were handed over to her sister, Ma. Luisa Herrera,
who was merely a visitor in her house and, as such, was not a valid substituted service. CA
dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court acquire jurisdiction over her person through the service of the complaint and
summons on her sister and her counsel.
RULING:
Yes. The court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of the
complaint and summons on him, either by personal service or by substituted service or by
extra-territorial service thereof or by his voluntary personal appearance before the court or
through counsel. In this case, the petitioner appeared before the court, through counsel, and filed
a motion for extension of time to file her answer to the complaint which the trial court granted.
She even admitted in the said motion that she was served with a copy of the complaint as well
as the summons. The admissions made in a motion are judicial admissions which are binding
on the party who made them. Such party is precluded from denying the same unless there is
proof of palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. By filing the said motion,
through counsel, the petitioner thereby submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
(2) Heirs of Pedro Clemeña v. Heirs of Irene Bien, 501 SCRA 405 (2006)
Licayan, Abby
BAR Q:
B filed a case against C for payment of compensatory damages for depriving them of
owner’s share of the harvest from a tract of land. B claims that he is the absolute owner
of the land in question and that he acquired it from a person who in turn acquired it from
the administrator of the estate of X. C alleged that the land was his by sale from estate
of X and that it was in his exclusive possession. CA awarded damages to B. C’s heirs
later did not dispute B’s ownership but insisted that they cannot be held liable for the
harvest because they never took possession of the harvest.
Can the contention of C’s heirs that the land was never in their possession be
admissible?
Answer:
No. The statement in so far as it confirmed the allegation in the complaint that C had the
possession of the land took on the character of a judicial admission under Sec4 Rule
129 of the Rules of Court. A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He
cannot thereafter contradict it. As substituting defendants the heirs of C are bound by
the admission of C. Without any showing that the admission was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made, petitioners cannot now contradict it.
Detailed digest:
Facts:
Irene Bien filed a case for recovery of possession against Pedro Clemeńa y Zurbano.
Irene Bien claims that she is the absolute owner of a parcel of land situated in Albay. She
claims that she acquired the land by purchase from Victoriano Napa who in turn
acquired it from Francisco Barrameda who also bought it from the administrator of the
estate of Pedro Clemeńa y Conde. That Zurbano ever since he was removed as
administrator of the estate of Conde deliberately continued to occupy and usurp the
possession and use of the land and refused to relinquish the possession of the same.
That by the reason of this unlawful occupation, Bien suffered damages for the harvest. In
his answer, Zurbano alleged that the land was his and that it was in his exclusive
possession. His claim of ownership was based on a sale by the estate of Conde to his
predecessor-in-interest. The parties were later substituted by their heirs.
RTC declared the Heirs of Zurbano as the owners. RTC later held that both parties failed
to prove their claims of ownership and therefore the land still belongs the estate of
Conde. CA reversed the ruling of ownership in favor of the Heirs of Bine rewarded them
damages. Heirs of Zurbano filed MR but was denied. Hence this petition. Petitioners no
longer dispute respondents’ ownership but they insist that they cannot be held liable to
respondents for damages as they never took possession of the property.
Issue:
Whether or not the contention of the petitioners that they never took possession of the
property is admissible.
Ruling:
No. Petitioners’predecessor Zurbano alleged in his answer that the land was in his
exclusive possession. The statement in so far as it confirmed the allegation in the
complaint that C had the possession of the land took on the character of a judicial
admission under Sec4 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court:
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of proceedings in
the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made.
A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter
contradict it. The exception is found only in those rare instances when the trial court, in
the exercise of its discretion and because of string reasons to support its stand, may
relieve a party from the consequences of his admission. As substituting defendants they
were bound by the admission of Zurbani, their predecessor in the litigation. Without any
showing that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made, petitioners cannot now contradict it.
A. Object Evidence
Cases:
(1) Sison v. People, 250 SCRA 58 (1995) [cf. § 1, Rule 11 of Rules of Electronic Evidence]
Andrew M. Navarrete
BAR Question:
Two groups of loyalists converged where tension and animosity broke into violence between the
groups which resulted in the murder of X.
Informations for murder were filed and these cases were consolidated. The prosecution
presented twelve witnesses including A and B. In support of their testimonies, the prosecution
also presented documentary evidence consisting of newspaper accounts of the incident and
various photos. However, Witness A mistook in identifying one of the accused.
For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the mauling.
The CA found them guilty of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength.
Is the court correct in giving evidentiary weight to the photographs of the mauling incident?
Suggested Answer:
Yes
Witness A's mistake in identifying one of the accused does not make his whole testimony a
falsity. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from persons with imperfect senses. In the
court's discretion, the testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts and disbelieved
with respect to others.
The rule is that when Photos are presented in evidence, they must be identified by the
photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were
produced. Value lies in it being a correct representation or reproduction of the original.
Admissibility determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime.
The correctness of the photo can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person
who made it or by other competent witnesses. After which it can be admitted subject to its
impeachment as to its accuracy. Therefore, the photographer or another competent witness can
testify as to the exactness and accuracy of the photograph.
The SC ruled that the use of the photographs by the attorney for the appellants is an admission
of the exactness and accuracy of such. That the photos were faithful representations of the
mauling incident was affirmed when appellants identified themselves in the pictures and
explained their presence in said pictures.
B. Documentary Evidence
Case:
Bar question:
Y issued an order of release to the accused arrested by X on the basis of cash bond posted on
March 8, 1999 as shown by the corresponding official receipt number 9215725. Y issued
another order of release based on a property bond which bond was subscribed and sworn to
before him, evidenced by a Jurat executed on March 10, 1999. However, this date was changed
to March 6.
Suggested Answer:
Yes.
Jurisprudence dictates that as a general rule, testimonial evidence cannot prevail over
documentary evidence. It is an elementary rule in evidence that between documentary and oral
evidence, the former carries more weight as decided in the case of Romago Electric Co. Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals.
The cash bond was posted on March 8, (Monday) not March 6, 1999 as shown by OR No.
9215725. The property bond, in substitution of the cash bond, was filed, not on March 6, but on
March 10 (Wednesday) as shown by the Jurat. Both orders of release were issued on March 6,
Saturday. Therefore, there is no doubt that Y ordered the release the accused despite the fact
that there was yet no bail filed and approved for provisional liberty.
Case Digest
Facts:
SPO2 Jose Yap arrested Antonio Luarente Jr. Respondent Judge Aquilino Inopiquez Jr.
issued an Order of Release on the basis of a cash bond posted on March 8, 1999 as shown by
the corresponding Official Receipt No. 9215725. Also on March 6, respondent judge issued
another Order of Release, this time based on a property bond, subscribed and sworn to before
him on March 10, 1999 although there was no cash bond or property bond, for actually the cash
bond was posted on March 8, while the property bond was filed on March 10. Laurente filed a
complaint against Inopiquez for grave abuse and for acts unbecoming of a judge for having
issued the order of release prematurely. He also alleged that the issuance of the release order
was a help extended the accused who is allegedly a relative of the judge’s wife.
On October 27, 1999, respondent judge filed his comment. He denied the charges, asserting that
the relationship of his wife to the accused has no bearing to his judicial duties of approving the
bail and issuing the Order of Release. On March 6, 1999, when accused Laurente, Jr. was
arrested, his brother Silverio Laurente and one Salvador Almoroto went to respondents
residence and presented O.R. No. 9215725 showing that on that date, a cash bond was posted
with the office of respondents Clerk of Court Servando O. Veloso, Jr. The money in the amount
of P18,000.00 belonged to Almoroto. Silverio Laurente also handed to respondent judge, for his
signature, the Order of Release dated March 7, 1999 prepared by Clerk of Court Veloso. The
latter placed the date March 7 instead of March 6 because he thought respondent judge would
only be available on that date.
Also on the same day, March 6, minutes after Silverio Laurente and Almoroto left, Antonio
Laurente, Sr., accuseds father, and Court Interpreter Pedro M. Beltran arrived. Laurente, Sr.
presented to respondent judge a property bond and an Order of Release, also dated March 6,
1999, both prepared by Beltran. Respondent judge told them that he had already approved the
cash bond and signed the corresponding Order of Release. However, Laurente, Sr. pleaded to
him to approve the property bond in order that the money utilized as cash bond could be
returned to Almoroto to avoid paying interest thereon. After examining the property bond,
respondent judge approved the same and signed another Order of Release
Respondent Judge claimed that O.R. No. 9215725 was actually issued to Almoroto on
March 6 after he had posted the cash bond that same day. Respondent Judge insisted though
that it was Clerk of Court Veloso who altered the date appearing thereon, from March 6 to March
8, 1999, since Complainant angrily protested that Veloso, the clerk of court, should not issue the
official receipt dated March 6, 1999 as it was a Saturday, a non-working day.
The case was referred to Executive Judge Madrona who declared that there was no
substantial basis for the complaint. Afterwhich, it was referred to the office of the Court
Administrator who declared that the respondent Judge should be held administratively liable.
Issue
Ruling
Yes.
Jurisprudence dictates that as a general rule, testimonial evidence cannot prevail over
documentary evidence. It is an elementary rule in evidence that between documentary and oral
evidence, the former carries more weight as decided in the case of Romago Electric Co. Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals.
It is observed that the property bond was subscribed and sworn to by bondsman Antonio
Laurente, Sr. before respondent judge on March 10, 1999 (Wednesday). However, very clear to
the naked eye is that 6 was superimposed on 10th (day of March) to make it appear that the bail
was accomplished and filed on March 6. The jurat positively shows that the property bond, in
lieu of the cash bond, was filed, not on March 6, but on March 10, 1999, or four (4) days after
respondent judge issued his second Order of Release on March 6, 1999. It is a basic rule of
evidence that between documentary and oral evidence, the former carries more weight. The
cash bond was posted on March 8 (Monday), not on March 6, 1999, as shown by O.R. No.
9215725. The property bond, in substitution of the cash bond, was filed, not on March 6, but on
March 10 (Wednesday), as shown by the jurat. Both Orders of Release were issued on March 6
(Saturday). Therefore, there is no doubt that respondent judge ordered the release of the
accused despite the fact that there was yet no bail filed and approved for his provisional liberty.
That respondent judge issued the release orders prematurely is not difficult to understand. He
admitted that accused Antonio Laurente, Jr. is his wifes relative. And in his desire to help the
accused and please his wife, he would even involve his Clerk of Court and Interpreter.
Considering the facts of this case, it is safe to conclude that they were constrained to comply
with his instructions. Hence, they should have been spared from any administrative sanction.
Cases:
(1) Consolidated Bank v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., 465 SCRA 117 (2006)
Gladys Viranda
Consolidated Bank v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., 465 SCRA 117
Topic: Best Evidence Rule ( §3-8, Rule 130)
X bank - Petitioner
Y - Respondent
BAR Q
X bank filed a complaint against Y in which X alleges that it loaned 1 million to Y evidence by a
promissory note. In his answer, Y interpose as a defense that he has never signed the
promissory note. During the trial, X sought admission of the duplicate original of the promissory
note as Exhibit E as it could no longer found the original copy (Exhibit A). Y opposed the
admission because Exhibit E was not the original of Exhibit A which was the foundation of the
claim. The trial court ordered the exclusion of Exhibit A and E and then granted the motion to
dismiss filed by Y on the ground that X no longer possessed any proof of Y’s alleged
indebtedness.
Is it essential that the best evidence rule must be applied to establish the promissory note which
was the basis of the recovery of the money allegedly loaned by Y?
ANSWER:
No.
The best evidence rule accepts exceptions one of which is when the original of the subject
document is in the possession of the adverse party. Significantly, Y failed to deny specifically the
execution of the promissory note. This being the case, there was no need for X to present the
original of the promissory note in question. Y’s judicial admission with respect to the
genuineness and execution of the promissory note sufficiently established their liability to X
regardless of the fact that X failed to present the original of said note. X need not prove that fact
as it is considered admitted by Y.
LONG VERSION:
FACTS:
Petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for recovery of money against respondents.
Petitioner alleges it extended a 1 million pesos loan in favor of respondents as evidence by a
promissory note. Under the promissory note, respondent corporation and Morales bound
themselves jointly and severally to pay petitioner through installments.
Respondents defaulted on their installments making the full amount of the loan due and
demandable. Petitioner alleges that they made demands but were unheeded. Petitioner
attached to its complaint as Annexes A, B and C respectively a photocopy of the promissory
note executed by respondents, demand letter and statement of account.
In his answer, respondent Morales admits the paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the complaint and
interpose as special and affirmative defense that he has never signed the promissory note
attached to the complaint and said documents is void for lack of valid consideration.
During trial, petitioner made its formal offer of evidence. However, as the original copy of
Exhibit A could no longer be found, petitioner sought the admission of the duplicate original of
the promissory note as Exhibit E. Respondents claim that Exhibit E should not have been
admitted as it was immaterial, irrelevant and hearsay evidence and that Exhibit E was not the
original of Exhibit A which was the foundation of the complaint.
The trial court ordered the exclusions of Exhibit A and E and with this, respondents move to
dismiss the case on the ground that petitioner no longer possessed any proof of respondent’s
alleged indebtedness. Later, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case. On appeal, CA
affirmed the trial court decision.
ISSUE:
Whether CA erred when it upheld the exclusions of Exhibit E, the second original of the
promissory note.
HELD:
Yes.
The best evidence rule is encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office.
The best evidence rule as stated in our Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is not absolute. The rule
accepts of exceptions one of which is when the original of the subject document is in the
possession of the adverse party.
Significantly, respondents failed to deny specifically the execution of the promissory note. This
being the case, there was no need for petitioner to present the original of the promissory note in
question. Their judicial admission with respect to the genuineness and execution of the
promissory note sufficiently established their liability to petitioner regardless of the fact that
petitioner failed to present the original of said note.
Indeed, when the defendant fails to deny specifically and under oath the due execution and
genuineness of a document copied in a complaint, the plaintiff need not prove that fact as it is
considered admitted by the defendant.
In the case at bar, at the time of the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum, the originals were
already missing, therefore, V, Inc. was no longer in possession of the same. However, it is not
necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary evidence to show that the original is in the
actual possession of his adversary. It is enough that the circumstances are such as to indicate
that the writing is in his possession or under his control. Neither is it required that the party
entitled to the custody of the instrument should, on being notified to produce it, admit having it
in his possession. Hence, secondary evidence is admissible where he denies having it in his
possession. The party calling for such evidence may introduce a copy thereof as in the case of
loss. For, among the exceptions to the best evidence rule is "when the original has been lost,
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court." The originals of the vouchers in question must be
deemed to have been lost, as even the Corporation admits such loss. Viewed upon this light,
there can be no doubt as to the admissibility in evidence.
Bar Question:
X was an operator of a bus transportation and he sold two certificates of public
convenience to P Company with the condition, among others, that X shall not for a period of 10
years from the date of sale, apply for any TPU service identical or competing with P. Thereafter,
V, Inc. was organized and Y, the wife of X, was one of the incorporators and the treasurer. It
bought five certificates of public convenience from Z. Before the approval of sale, two of the five
certificates of public convenience were levied by the sheriff in favor of A, the judgment creditor
of Z. Thereafter, A sold the two certificates of public convenience to P. P therein prayed that it be
authorized provisionally to operate the service involved in the said two certificates. P argued
that it has a better right to the certificate since the sale between X and P is subject to the
condition that X shall not for a period of 10 years from the date of sale, apply for any TPU
service identical or competing with P. P presented to the court photocopies of the ledger entries
and vouchers of V Inc. to prove that the corporation is the alter ego of X. Are the photocopies of
the documents admissible in evidence?
Suggested Answer:
Yes. Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the requisites for the
admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in the custody of the adverse party,
thus: (1) opponent's possession of the original; (2) reasonable notice to opponent to produce
the original; (3) satisfactory proof of its existence; and (4) failure or refusal of opponent to
produce the original in court. It is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary
evidence to show that the original is in the actual possession of his adversary. It is enough that
the circumstances are such as to indicate that the writing is in his possession or under his
control. Neither is it required that the party entitled to the custody of the instrument should, on
being notified to produce it, admit having it in his possession. The party calling for such
evidence may introduce a copy thereof as in the case of loss. For, among the exceptions to the
best evidence rule is "when the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court."
Cases:
(1) Financial Building Corporation v. Rudlin, G.R. No. 164186, 4 October 2010
Y is a broker and part of his business consisted in looking up and ascertaining persons who had
money to loan as well as those who desired to borrow money and, acting as a mediary,
negotiate a loan between the two. The broker delivered the money personally to the borrower,
took note in his own name and immediately transferred it by indorsement to the lender. The only
payment that the broker received was for his services in negotiating the loan. Y was paid
absolutely nothing for becoming responsible as an indorser on the paper nor did the indorsee
lose, pay or forego anything, or alter his position thereby. The debtor was not able to pay. X
sought the enforcement of the indorser’s liability.
The trial court, although it received parol evidence on the subject provisionally, held, that such
evidence was not admissible to alter, vary, modify or contradict the terms of the contract of
indorsement, and, refused to consider the evidence provisionally received. Is the Trial court
erred in its decision?
Suggested Answer
Yes.
The prohibition does not apply where the purpose of the Parol evidence is to show that no
written contract ever existed, that the minds of the parties never met on the terms of such a
contract, that they never mutually agreed to enter into such a contract, and that there never
existed any consideration upon which such an agreement could be founded. In this case, there
was never a moment that Y was the real owner of the note. It was always the note of the
indorsee, X, having furnished the money which was the consideration for the note directly to the
maker. Hence, Parol Evidence should be considered.
Detailed Digest
Facts:
Serrano is a broker and that part of his business consisted in looking up and ascertaining
persons who had money to loan as well as those who desired to borrow money and, acting as a
mediary, negotiate a loan between the two. According to the method usually followed in these
transactions, and the procedure in this particular case, the broker delivered the money
personally to the borrower, took note in his own name and immediately transferred it by
indorsement to the lender. In the case at bar this was done at the special request of the
indorsee and simply as a favor to him, the latter stating to the broker that he did not wish his
name to appear on the books of the borrowing company as a lender of money and that he
desired that the broker take the note in his own name, immediately transferring to him title
thereto by indorsement. This was done, the note being at once transferred to the lender.
The only payment that the broker received was for his services in negotiating the loan. He was
paid absolutely nothing for becoming responsible as an indorser on the paper, nor did the
indorsee lose, pay or forego anything, or alter his position thereby.
The debtor was not able to pay. Maulini sought the enforcement of the indorser’s liability.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred to consider parol evidence, that the indorsement was wholly
without consideration and that, in making it, the indorser acted as agent for the indorsee, as a
mere vehicle of transfer of the naked title from the maker to the indorsee, for which he received
no consideration whatever.
Held:
Yes.
The prohibition in section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to a case like the
one before us. The purpose of that prohibition is to prevent alternation, change, modification or
contradiction of the terms of a written instrument, admittedly existing, by the use of parol
evidence, except in the cases specifically named in the section. The case at bar is not one where
the evidence offered varies, alters, modifies or contradicts the terms of the contract of
indorsement admittedly existing. The evidence was not offered for that purpose. The purpose
was to show that no contract of indorsement ever existed; that the minds of the parties never
met on the terms of such contract; that they never mutually agreed to enter into such a
contract; and that there never existed a consideration upon which such an agreement could be
founded. The evidence was not offered to vary, alter, modify, or contradict the terms of an
agreement which it is admitted existed between the parties, but to deny that there ever existed
any agreement whatever; to wipe out all apparent relations between the parties, and not to vary,
alter or contradict the terms of a relation admittedly existing; in other words, the purpose of the
parol evidence was to demonstrate, not that the indorser did not intend to make the particular
indorsement which he did make; not that he did not intend to make the indorsement in the
terms made; but, rather, to deny the reality of any indorsement; that a relation of any kind
whatever was created or existed between him and the indorsee by reason of the writing on the
back of the instrument; that no consideration ever passed to sustain an indorsement of any
kind whatsoever.
The contention has some of the appearances of a case in which an indorser seeks prove
forgery. Where an indorser claims that his name was forged, it is clear that parol evidence is
admissible to prove that fact, and, if he proves it, it is a complete defense, the fact being that
the indorser never made any such contract, that no such relation ever existed between him and
the indorsee, and that there was no consideration whatever to sustain such a contract. In the
case before us we have a condition somewhat similar. While the indorser does not claim that his
name was forged, he does claim that it was obtained from him in a manner which, between the
parties themselves, renders the contract as completely inoperative as if it had been forged.
(5) Land Settlement Development Corp. v. Garcia Plantation Co., Inc., 7 SCRA 750 (1963)
Gamao, Arthelly D.
P- Land Settlement and Development Corp.
D- Garcia Plantation Co., Inc.
Question:
D Company purchase two tractors on credit from P Company and executed two promissory
notes in favor of the latter. On due date, D failed to pay P the unpaid balance of the notes, thus
resulting to the institution of specific performance case filed by P. On their answer, D and other
co-defendants admitted the execution of the promissory notes but contended that the same had
been novated by a subsequent agreement contained in the letter sent by D’s Manager, K. D on its
reply and answer to the counterclaim, admitted the due execution and the genuineness of the
letter but contended that the same did not express the true intent and agreement of the parties.
The court admitted all the documentary evidence presented by the parties but prevented the
testimony of the legal officer of P, which will testify on the true agreement and intention of the
parties at the time the letter was drafted and prepared, because of the parole evidence rule.
Thereafter, the court dismissed the case. Is the exclusion of the court of the testimony of P’s
legal officer because of the parole evidence rule proper?
Answer:
No.
Jurisprudence provides that, when operation of contract depends on occurrence of an event
which is a condition precedent, such may be established by parol evidence.
In the case at bar, the lower court should have admitted the parol evidence sought to be
introduced to prove the failure of the document in question to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties. It should not have improvidently and hastily excluded said parol
evidence, knowing that the subject matter treated therein, was one of the exceptions to the parol
evidence rule. When the operation of the contract is made to depend upon the occurrence of an
event, which, for that reason is a condition precedent, such may be established by parol
evidence.
LAND SETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. GARCIA PLANTATION CO., INC
G.R. No. L-17820 || April 24, 1963 || Paredes J.
Petitioner: LAND SETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (LSDC hereinafter),
plaintiff-appellant
Respondent: GARCIA PLANTATION CO., INC., and/or SALUD GARCIA and VICENTE B. GARCIA,
defendant-appelle
FACTS:
· LSDC filed a specific action case against Garcia Plantation (Salud and Vicente Garcia) for
the recovery of P5,955.30, as unpaid balance of 2 tractors bought by respondents.
· Salud was made a co-defendant because of two promissory notes executed by her ,
whereby she personally assumed the account of the company and her husbad Vicente.
§ Defendants contended that it has been novated by a subsequent agreement contained in a
letter (Exh. L) sent by Filomeno C. Kintanar, Manager, Board of Liquidators of the LSDC allowing
an extension to pay (Until May 31, 1957).
§ Furthermore, since the complaint was filed on February 20, 1957, they claimed that the action
was premature and prayed that the complaint be dismiss.
· LSDC admitted the genuiness of the letter but contended that the same did not express
the true and intent agreement of the parties, thereby placing the fact in issue.
· The parties requested for more time to settle the case but the court ordered a trial on the
merits.
· At the trial, the defendant admitted defendant admitted the documentary evidence of its
debt.
· When the plaintiff presented Atty. Lucido A. Guinto, Legal Officer of the Board of
Liquidators, to testify on the true agreement and the intention of the parties at the time the letter
(Exh. L) was drafted and prepared, the lower court judge, upon the objection of the counsel for
defendants, ruled out said testimony and prevented the introduction of evidence under the parol
evidence rule (Sec. 22, Rule 123).
· Since the court ruled out Atty. Guinto’s testimony, writer of the letter in question, the
plaintiff rested its case. Lower court dismissed the case. CA certified the case to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court erred in excluding parol evidence. Yes.
HELD:
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the case remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings. Costs against the appellees.
RATIO:
· The parol evidence consisted of the testimony of Attys. Guinto and Kintanar.
§ Atty. Kintanar gave the defendants up to May 31, 1957, to coincide with their ramie harvest
"provided that they will make a substantial down payment immediately, with the understanding
that upon non-payment of the substantial amount, the extension shall be deemed as not granted
and the LASEDECO shall feel free to seek redress in court"
· That there was such condition precedent as manifested by the second paragraph of the
letter Exhibit L:
Mrs. Salud de Garcia Tacurong, Cotabato
Dear Madam;
Please be advised that the Board has granted you an extension up to May 31, 1957, within which
to pay your account.
This matter has been the subject of agreement between your husband and this office.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.) FILOMENO C. KINTANAR
§ The subject of the contention was the condition to be complied with or the consideration
given for the extension of time, within which the Garcia spouses pay their account.
· The lower court should have admitted the parol evidence
§ The parol evidence sought to be introduced to prove the failure of the document in question
to express the true intent and agreement of the parties.
§ When the operation of the contract is made to depend upon the occurrence of an event,
which, for that reason is a condition precedent, such may be established by parol evidence. This
is an exception to parol evidence rule. *
§ This is not varying the terms of the written contract by extrinsic agreement, for the simple
reason that there is no contract in existence; there is nothing to which to apply the excluding
rule.
§ This rule does not prevent the introduction of extrinsic evidence to show that a supposed
contract never became effective by reason of the failure of some collateral condition or
stipulation, pre-requisite to liability" (Peabody & Co. v. Bromfield & Ross, 38 Phil. 841).
· The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing does not preclude
admission of extrinsic evidence, to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parol
agreements between the parties
§ Such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains
reference to such collateral agreement (Robles v. Lizarraga Hnos., 50 Phil. 387)
§ In the case at bar, reference is made of a previous agreement, in the second paragraph of
letter Exhibit L, and although a document is usually to be interpreted in the precise terms in
which it is couched, Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may admit evidence of
surrounding circumstances, in order to arrive at the true intention of the parties
· Re: prematurity of the case
§ If the court allowed the plaintiff to prove the intention of the parties, then it could have proved
that there was a breach of the letter.
§ So that, although the complaint was filed on February 20, 1957, three months before the
deadline of the extension on May 31, 1957, there would be no premature institution of the case.
(7) Philippine National Railways v. CIR of Albay, Br. I, 83 SCRA 569 (1978)
Maamo, Rexis Jun M.
ABC = Respondent-Plaintiff Carmen Myrick, Salvacion Myrick, and Celso, Josefina and Celerina,
all surnamed Millabas
X = Petitioner-Defendant Philippine National Railways (PNR)
Bar Q:
ABC filed a complaint to annul a supposed conditional donation of two parcels of land, a
donation which they had allegedly made to X. The Deed of Donation did not contain conditions
alleged by ABC; thus, during trial, ABC tried to prove the conditions by oral evidence, which X
objected to.
Yes.
Section 7 of Rule 130 requires that in order that parol or extrinsic evidence may be admitted to
vary the terms of the writing, the mistake or imperfection thereof or its failure to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties should be put in issue by the pleadings.
In the instant case, ABC did not expressly plead that the deed of donation was incomplete or
that its execution was vitiated by mistake or that it did not reflect the intention of the donor and
the donee.
Digest:
Facts: ABC filed a complaint to annul a supposed conditional donation of two parcels of land, a
donation which they had allegedly made to X. The ground for the annulment was the alleged
non-fulfillment of the five conditions of the donation. The plaintiffs in paragraph four of their
complaint merely alleged that the donation was subject to five conditions. Then, they prayed
that the donation should be annulled or rescinded for noncompliance with those conditions. At
the trial they tried to prove those conditions by parol evidence.
Issue: W/N parol evidence is admissible in this case?
Ruling: No.
That rule is found in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 7. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement have been reduced
to writing, it is to be considered as containing all such terms and. therefore, there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms The agreement
other than the contents of the writing, except in the following case:
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or it failure to express The true intent and
agreement of the parties, or the of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;
(b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing,
The term 'agreement' includes wills.
Section 7 requires that in order that parol or extrinsic evidence may be admitted to vary the
terms of the writing, the mistake or imperfection thereof or its failure to express the true intent
and agreement of the parties should be put in issue by the pleadings. In the instant case, the
plaintiffs did not expressly plead that the deed of donation was incomplete or that its execution
was vitiated by mistake or that it did not reflect the intention of the donor and the donee.
At the trial they tried to prove those conditions by parol evidence. Obviously, they could not
introduce parol evidence to vary the terms of the agreement because they did not plead any of
the exceptions mentioned in the parol evidence rule. Their case is covered by the general rule
that the contents of the writing constitute the sole repository of the terms of the agreement
between the parties. Thus, it was held that where there is no allegation in the complaint that
there was any mistake or imperfection in the written agreement or that it failed to express the
true intent of the parties, parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of the agreement
(Villanueva vs. Yulo, 106 Phil. 1170).
(8) Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 421 SCRA 328 (2004)
(10) Heirs of Ureta v. Heirs of Ureta, G.R. No. 165748, 14 September 2011
By Febeh Marikit
A = Alfonso Ureta (Alfonso)
A.1 = Heirs of Alfonso
AA = Amparo Castillo, Grandchild of A
P = Policronio, son of A
C = Conrado, son of P
P.1 = Heirs of P
BAR QUESTION:
A executed 4 Deeds of Sale to his 3 children (including P) and his commonlaw wife to reduce
the inheritance taxes. When A died, his heirs executed a Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition with C,
P’s eldest son, signing the Deed in behalf of his coheirs. Believing that the six parcels of land
belonged to P, and, excluded from the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition, P.1 filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of Possession, Annulment of Documents, Partition, and
Damages against A.1 before the RTC.
The RTC declared the Deed of Sale null and void for being absolutely simulated but declared
the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition valid as all the heirs of A were represented.
CA affirmed the RTC ruling as to the Deed of Sale. It considered the testimony of AA one of the
grandchildren with regard to the simulation of the Deed of Sale.
On MR, P.1 argue that RTC violated the best evidence rule in giving credence to the testimony
of W with regard to the simulation of the Deed of Sale. P.1 argued that based on the parol
evidence rule, A.1 and, specifically, AA were not in a position to prove the terms outside of the
contract because they were not parties nor successorsininterest in the Deed of Sale in
question. Is P.1 correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No.
Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides as exceptions to the parol evidence rule
that, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement if
he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement. The term “agreement” includes wills.
In the case at bar, both the P.1 and A.1 are successorsininterest of the parties to the Deed of
Sale as they claim rights under P and A, respectively. The parol evidence rule excluding
evidence aliunde, however, still cannot apply because the present case falls under two
exceptions to the rule, paragraphs (b) and (c). Considering that the Deed of Sale has been
shown to be void for being absolutely simulated and for lack of consideration, the Heirs of A are
not precluded from presenting evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement.
C. Testimonial Evidence
Case:
Cases:
Cases:
Cases:
(5) Guerrero v. St. Claire’s Realty & Co., 124 SCRA 553 (1983)
EUPENA, Ron Christian ,
Bar Q
Andres owns a lot which he acquired as an inheritance from his deceased father. Shortly after
the Japanese occupation, Andres entrusted the land to his sister, Cristina Guerrero. Cristina
continued as trustee of the deceased. At about 1971, the petitioners discovered that the land
was titled in the name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero, on the basis of a “Deed of Sale of Land”
dated 1948 purportedly executed by their Aunt Cristina. Manuel subsequently sold this lot in
favor of the defendants Guerrero’s, also cousins of the petitioners. The defendants Guerrero’s
later sold the disputed lot to a St. Clare’s Realty, a partnership constituted by them. During trial,
Laura Cervantes, a daughter of Cristina, was presented as witnesses for the petitioners. This
was objected to by the counsel of the defendants based on Sec. 20 (a), Rule 130(now, Sec.23,
Rule 130).
Rule on the issue
Laura can be presented as witness. Sec. 20(a), r130 (now, sec. 2, R130) provides:
"Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship. — The following persons
cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly as herein
enumerated:
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person,
or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such
deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of
fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such became of unsound
mind."
Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the present case, and neither are they
assignors of the parties nor "persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." Mere witnesses
who are neither parties’ plaintiff, nor their assignors, nor persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted, are not included in the prohibition." Moreover, the present case is not a claim or
demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero. The defendants Guerrero’s are not
the executors or administrators or representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as
claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of
the estate of Manuel Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of the dead man’s rule.
Case digest
Facts:
The disputed lot was formerly owned by Andres Guerrero, father of the petitioners. Andres
physically possessed and cultivated the land through a tenancy agreement. Shortly after the
beginning of the Japanese occupation, Andres entrusted the land to his sister, Cristina Guerrero,
who was to enjoy the owner’s share in the produce of the land. After the death of Andres in
1943, Cristina continued as trustee of the deceased.
Petitioners alleged that the land was surveyed by the Bureau of Lands for and in the name of
Andres Guerrero as early as 1957. Then, at about 1971, the petitioners discovered that the land
was titled in the name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero, on the basis of a “Deed of Sale of Land”
dated 1948 purportedly executed by their Aunt Cristina. They further alleged that
notwithstanding the opposition of the heirs of Cristina, Manuel was successful in his application
of the registration of the land in his favor.
Manuel subsequently sold this lot in favor of the defendants Guerreros, also cousins of the
petitioners. The defendants Guerreros later sold the disputed lot to a St.Clare’s Realty, a
partnership constituted by them.
According to the complaint, the Deed of Sale in favor of Manuel was fraudulently obtained and
that the subsequent deeds of sale were likewise fraudulent and ineffective since the defendants
allegedly knew that the property belonged to Andres Guerrero.
During trial, Laura Cervantes, a daughter of Cristina, was presented as witnesses for the
petitioners. She testified that the money used for the illness of her mother was obtained from
Manuel by mortgaging the land as security for the loans obtained. This was objected to by the
counsel of the defendants based on Sec. 20 (a), Rule 130(now, Sec.23, Rule 130). Initially, the
trial court allowed the witness to continue, but upon a written motion to disqualify on the same
basis, the trial court declared Laura and Jose Cervantes disqualified from testifying in the case.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a “Motion for the Judge to Inhibit and/or to Transfer the case to
another Branch.” This was denied. Petitioners then failed to appear at the set schedule for trial,
and the trial court judge issued an order stating that petitioners “are deemed to have waived
their right to further present or formally offer their evidence in court” as a consequence of their
non-appearance.
Petitioners filed a “Manifestation” that they did not waive their rights to present further evidence,
to cross-examine defendants’ witnesses, and to present rebuttal evidence. They added that they
reserved such right upon the decision of the CA in a petition for certiorari which they were
preparing to file.
Despite this, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the defendants Guerreros, even
ordering the petitioners to pay damages in the amount of more than P2M. This was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
Whether the witnesses Laura and Jose Cervantes were correctly disqualified from testifying in
the case and their testimonies excluded on the basis of the “dead man’s rule”?
Whether the exclusion of petitioners’ evidence and their preclusion from presenting further
proof was correctly sustained by the CA?
Ruling:
Laura and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the present case, and neither is they assignors of
the parties nor persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. They are mere witnesses by
whose testimonies the petitioners aimed to establish that it was not Cristina who owned the
disputed land at the time of the alleged sale to Manuel, and that Cristina merely mortgaged the
property to Manuel.
The present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero.
The defendants Guerreros are not the executors or administrators or representatives of such
deceased. They are being sued as claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the
disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of Manuel Guerrero. Thus, the dead man’s rule is
clearly inapplicable.
Aside from the disqualified witnesses, other witnesses testified and it was error to hold that the
testimonial evidence should have been formally offered, or that without such offer, such
evidence was waived. The offer of testimonial evidence is affected by calling the witness to the
stand and letting him testify before the court upon appropriate questions.
The trial court rendered its decision solely on the basis of defendants’ evidence and without
regard to the proofs that petitioner has presented. Therefore, exclusion of petitioners’ evidence
and their preclusion from presenting further proof was incorrect.
Y administrator of Z’s estate filed a complaint for the delivery of the certificates of stocks
against X in the E. Razon, Inc. Y argued that stock certificate of defendant’s corporation was
issued in the name of Z. X had not questioned Z’s ownership of the shares and had not brought
any action to have the certificate of stock over the said shares cancelled.
X’s in his answer and in his oral testimony said that he distributed shares, previously placed in
the names of the withdrawing nominal incorporators, to some friends including Z. The shares of
stock were registered in the name of Z only as nominal stockholder and with the agreement that
the said shares were owned and held by the X as he was the one who paid for all the
subscription. Z was given the option to buy the same but did not do so.
CFI (RTC) declared that X is the owner of the said shares. IAC (CA) reversed and ruled that Z is
the owner. IAC excluded the testimony of X under the Dead Man’s Statute rule (DMS), although
such testimony was not objected to during trial. Is X’s testimony is within the prohibition under
DMS Rule.
Suggested Answer
No. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims
against the estate.
The purpose of DMS Rule is that “if persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased
or his properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him the
deceased person, many would be tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as
the latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their properties or rights to
false or unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law is to 'guard against the
temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the
surviving party.”
In this stance, the case was filed by Y the administrator of the estate of the late Z to recover
shares of latter’s allegedly owned, it is the estate which instituted the action or initiated the
attack. Hence, the testimony of the X is not within the prohibition of the rule.
FACTS:
Vicente Chuidian (administrator of the estate of his deceased father) filed a complaint for the
delivery of the certificates of stocks representing the 1,500 share holdings of his deceased
father, Juan Chuidian, in the E. Razon, Inc. (organized for the purpose of bidding for the arrastre
services in South Harbor, Manila). In the answer, Razon alleged that he owned the shares and
the same remained in his possession. It was alleged that the late Juan Chuidan did not pay any
amount whatsoever for the 1,500 shares in question.
CHUIDIAN’s EVIDENCE: On April 23, 1966, stock certificate No. 003 for 1,5000 shares of stock of
defendant corporation was issued in the name of Juan Chuidian (Juan). Razon had not
questioned (not until the demand was made) Juan’s ownership of the shares and had not
brought any action to have the certificate of stock over the said shares cancelled.
RAZON’s EVIDENCE (In the answer and in his oral Testimony): After organizing E. Razon, Inc.,
Razondistributed shares, previously placed in the names of the withdrawing nominal
incorporators, to some friends including Juan. The shares of stock were registered in the name
of Juan only as nominal stockholder and with the agreement that the said shares were owned
and held by the Razon (as he was the one who paid for all the subscription). Juan was given the
option to buy the same but did not do so.
CFI (RTC) declared that Enrique Razon is the owner of the said shares. IAC (CA) reversed and
ruled that Juan Chuidian is the owner. IAC excluded the testimony of Razon under the dead
man’s statute rule (DMS) under Section 20 (a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, although such
testimony was not objected to during trial.
ISSUE: WON Razon’s testimony is within the prohibition under DMS Rule.
HELD: No. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon
claims against the estate.
The purpose of DMS Rule is that “if persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased
or his properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him (deceased
person), many would be tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the latter
can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their properties or rights to false or
unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law is to 'guard against the temptation to
give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party.”
Records also show that Razon’s testimony was not objected to. It was subjected to
cross-examination. Granting that it is within the prohibition under DMS, Chuidian is deemed to
have waived the rule. The court cannot disregard evidence which would ordinarily be
incompetent under the rules but has been rendered admissible by the failure of a party to object
thereto.
SC’s DECISION: Juan was the owner of the shares. Razon’s testimony, though admitted, is not
sufficient to prove his ownership. Records show that during his lifetime Juan was elected
member of the Board of Directors which clearly shows that he was a stockholder of the
corporation. From the point of view of the corporation, Juan was the owner. For Razon to claim
ownership, he must show that the shares were transferred to him.
Corporation Code provides that in order for a transfer of stock certificate to be effective, the
certificate must be properly indorsed and that title to such certificate of stock is vested in the
transferee by the delivery of the duly indorsed certificate of stock. However, since the certificate
of stock covering the questioned 1,5000 shares of stock registered in the name of the late Juan
Chuidian was never indorsed to the Razon, the inevitable conclusion is that the questioned
shares of stock belong to Juan. Indorsement of the certificate of stock is a mandatory
requirement of law for an effective transfer of a certificate of stock and Razon’s asseveration
that he did not require an indorsement in view of his intimate friendship with the late Juan
Chuidian cannot overcome the failure to follow the procedure required by law or the proper
conduct of business even among friends.
There is also preponderance of evidence that would show that the shares were given to Juan for
value. Juan was the legal counsel who handled the legal affairs of the corporation and the
shares were payment for his legal services to the corporation.
Cases:
b) Attorney-Client Privilege
Cases:
(1) Barton v. Leyte Asphalt & Mineral Oil Co., 46 Phil. 938 (1924)
Navarrete
X = Plaintiff Barton
Y = Defendant Leyte Asphalt & Mineral Oil Co.
BAR Question:
X and Y entered into an agreement or sales agency whereby Y authorized X to be the sole and
exclusive sales agent of the latter’s limestone.
X filed an action against Y to recover from Y damages for breach of contract.
One of the exhibits offered in evidence by the defendant was a carbon copy of a letter written by
the plaintiff to his attorney. The authenticity of this document is admitted and the counsel for
the plaintiff announced that he had no objection to the introduction of this carbon copy in
evidence if counsel for the defendant would explain where this copy was secured.
The attorney for the plaintiff proposed to object to its admission on the ground that it is a
confidential communication between client and lawyer." No further information was then given
by the attorney for the defendant as to the manner in which the letter had come to his hands and
the trial judge thereupon excluded the document, on the ground that it was a privileged
communication between client and attorney.
Is the trial judge correct in excluding the document on the ground that it was a privileged
communication between client and attorney?
Suggested Answer:
No
The trial judge erred; for even supposing that the letter was within the privilege which protects
communications between attorney and client, this privilege was lost when the letter came to the
hands of the adverse party. And it makes no difference how the adversary acquired possession.
The law protects the client from the effect of disclosures made by him to his attorney in the
confidence of the legal relation, but when such a document, containing admissions of the client,
comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches the adversary, it is admissible in evidence.
Barton v. Leyte Asphalt & Mineral Oil Co., Ltd.
046 Phil 938
Case Digest Version
Doctrine:
EVIDENCE; PRIVILEGE OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; LOSS OF PRIVILEGE. — The privilege which
protects communications between attorney and client does not extend to a copy of a letter
written by the client to his attorney which comes to the hands of the adverse party. Where the
authenticity of such a document is admitted, the court will take no notice of the manner in which
it was obtained.
Facts:
James Barton is a US citizen residing in Manila while Leyte Asphalt is a Philippine company
which has its principal office in Cebu. Barton sought to recover the sum of $318,563.30 in
damages from Leyte Asphalt due to breach of contract along with a judicial pronouncement that
he was entitled to an extension of the terms of the sales agencies specified in the contract
(Exhibit A).
Leyte Asphalt appears to be the owner of the Lucio Mine in Leyte, a valuable deposit of
bituminous limestone and other asphalt products. William Anderson, the general manager of
Leyte Asphalt, wrote a letter to Baron authorizing the latter to sell the products of the Lucio Mine
in the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand upon a scale of prices indicated in said
letter.
Exhibit A, the authorization Baron relies on, contained the following stipulations (among others):
-Baron is given the sole and exclusive sales agency for the bituminous limestone and other
asphalt products of the Leyte Asphalt in Australia, Saigon, Java, New Zealand, India, China,
Tasmania, Sumatra, Siam, the Strait Settlements, USA and Hongkong until May 1, 1921.
- No orders for less than one thousand (1,000) tons will be accepted except under special
agreement with Leyte Asphalt. It also contained a breakdown of the prices per ton.
- If “the sales in the above territory equal or exceed ten 10,000 tons in the year ending October 1,
1921 then in that event the price of all shipments made during the above period shall be ten
pesos (P10) per ton, and any sum charged to any of your customers or buyers in the aforesaid
territory in excess of ten pesos (P10) per ton” shall be rebated to Baron.
- Baron also had full authority to sell the Lucio mine products for any sum he saw fit in excess of
the prices quoted above and such excess in price was to be his extra and additional profit and
commission.
- All ships, steamers, boats or other carriers were to be loaded promptly with not less than 1,000
tons each 24 hours after March 1, 1921, unless there was to be prior notice. It was also
stipulated that Leyte Asphalt shall not be required to ship orders of 5,000 tons except on 30
days notice and 10,000 tons except on 60 days notice.
Baron entered into subagency agreements in San Francisco and Australia. In San Francisco, he
entered into an agreement with Ludvigsen & McCurdy. Ludvigsen & McCurdy was instituted as a
subagent and given the sole selling rights for the bituminous limestone products of Leyte
Asphalt for 1 year.
Baron had also gone to Australia where he instituted Frank Smith as his sales agent.
February 5, 1921 – Ludvigsen & McCurdy advised Baron of an order of 6,000 tons of bituminous
limestone which Baron accepted.
Anderson (GM of Leyte Asphalt) informed Baron that Leyte Asphalt was behind construction so
it could not handle big contracts as of the moment. The two met in Manila on March 12 and
Baron told Anderson about the San Francisco order. Anderson said that, owing to lack of
capital, adequate facilities had not been provided by the company for filling large orders and
suggested that Baron had better hold up in the matter of taking orders.
Despite Anderson’s response, Baron wrote a notification to Leyte Asphalt for the company to be
prepared to ship five thousand tons of bituminous limestone to San Francisco. He also made
additional orders for Smith in Australia.
Leyte Asphalt acknowledged the orders for Australia and San Francisco but stated that no
orders would be entertained without a cash deposit.
The CFI absolved Leyte Asphalt from four of the six causes of action. The CFI allowed Barton to
recover $202,500 from the first cause of action and $405,000 from the fourth cause of action.
Among the evidence presented was a carbon copy of a letter written by Baron to Atty. Ingersoll,
his lawyer. In the said letter, Baron wrote that his profit from the San Francisco contract would
have been at the rate of 85 cents per ton.
When the letter was offered in evidence by the attorney for the defendant, the counsel for the
plaintiff announced that he had no objection to the introduction of this carbon copy in evidence
if counsel for the defendant would explain where this copy was secured.
The attorney for the defendant informed the court that he received the letter from the former
attorneys of the defendant without explanation of the manner in which the document had come
into their possession.
Baron’s lawyer then made an announcement that unless the defendant’s counsel explained how
the letter came to the defense’s possession, he proposed to object the letter’s admission on the
ground that it was a confidential communication between client and lawyer.
The trial judge excluded the letter.
Issue:
Whether or not the letter should be excluded
Ruling:
NO
Ratio When papers are offered in evidence a court will take no notice of how they were obtained,
whether legally or illegally, properly or improperly; nor will it form a collateral issue to try that
question.
Rationale:
Even supposing that the letter was within the privilege which protects communications between
attorney and client, this privilege was lost when the letter came to the hands of the adverse
party and it makes no difference how the defense acquired possession.
The law protects the client from the effect of disclosures made by him to his attorney in the
confidence of the legal relation, but when such a document, containing admissions of the client,
comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches the adversary, it is admissible in evidence.
According to Wigmore: “Since the means of preserving secrecy of communication are entirely in
the client's hands, and since the privilege is a derogation from the general testimonial duty and
should be strictly construed, it would be improper to extend its prohibition to third persons who
obtain knowledge of the communications. One who overhears the communication, whether
with or without the client's knowledge, is not within the protection of the privilege. The same rule
ought to apply to one who surreptitiously reads or obtains possession of a document in original
or copy.”
Disposition Judgment reversed
Cases:
e) State Secrets
Case:
Case:
h) Trade Secrets
Case: