Aristotle's Concept of Praxis in the Poetics

Author(s): Elizabeth Belfiore

Source: The Classical Journal, Vol. 79, No. 2 (Dec., 1983 - Jan., 1984), pp. 110-124
Published by: The Classical Association of the Middle West and South
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3297245 .
Accessed: 17/06/2014 17:44

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

The Classical Association of the Middle West and South is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to The Classical Journal.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.40 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 17:44:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ARISTOTLE'SCONCEPTOF PRAXISIN THEPOETICS

In Poetics 6 (1449b24) Aristotle defines tragedy as mimesis praxeos,

"imitationof action." Praxis, "action," in this context is often taken to refer
to the deliberate action of a rational being, a technical sense the term
sometimes has in Aristotle's ethical writings. Fergusson, for example, writes
that "Action(praxis) does not mean deeds, events, or physical activity: it
means, rather, the motivation from which deeds spring."' But a study of
Aristotle's use of praxis in the Poetics shows that this view is wrong. When
used of the actions imitated by tragedy, epic and comedy, the term praxis
never means "a morally (or ethically) qualifiedaction," that is, an action for
which one may appropriatelybe praised or blamed.2Praxis refers to a mere
event, a killing, for example, and not to heroic self-defense or vicious murder.
Whenevera poet representsa characteras havingcertainmoralqualitiesor as
acting in a morally qualifiedway, he does so by using ethos or dianoia rather
than by imitatinga praxis.
A brief look at the ethical works of Aristotle will help to clarify our
distinctionbetween the two senses of praxis. In the NicomacheanEthics, as
Joachim observes, praxis has two meanings. In one sense, a praxis is "the
subject of moral predicates."9 "By doing just acts," writes Aristotle, "we

'E Fergusson, introductionto Aristotle'sPoetics, translatedby S. H. Butcher(New York1961)

8. The view that a praxis is not merely an event is very widely held. Some representative
statements are those of D. W. Lucas, Aristotle's Poetics (Oxford 1968) 96 (hereafterLucas):
Praxis "means,not any randomact like opening one's mouthor crossing the street, but an action
initiatedwith a view to an end and carriedon in pursuitof it"; G. Else, Aristotle'sPoetics: The
Argument (Cambridge, Mass. 1967) 256 (hereafter Else): "It is not merely an action but a
transaction, a decisive change in the whole postureof a life. For a 7rp&fts is not a mere act or
event"; S. H. Butcher,Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art (London 1895; 4th edition,
London 1932) 123 (hereafterButcher): "The 7rp&ft that art seeks to reproduceis mainly an
inwardprocess, a psychical energy workingoutwards;deeds, incidents, events, situations, being
included under it so far as these spring from an inward act of will, or elicit some activity of
thoughtor feeling"; G. Gresseth, "TheSystem of Aristotle'sPoetics," TAPA89 (1958) 314: "This
[sc. thatof theNicomacheanEthics] is the conceptionof action and of man's life, which is in this
sense an action, and therefore the conception of drama and plot and related matters which
dominatesthe Poetics" (emphasisadded).
The idea thatpraxis in the Poetics has a technical, ethical sense is often assumed ratherthan
arguedfor, and the question has received very little attention.To my knowledge, there has been
only one full-length study of the problem:J. Hitt, "A Study of IPAI in the Major Works
Attributedto Aristotle. .. ," Diss., Princeton1954. This very inadequatework is typical in that
it assumes that praxis in the Poetics can be explained by reference to the ethical writings of
Aristotle (e.g. p. 212).
2The term "moral"has unfortunatenon-Aristotelianconnotations, but "ethical"has equally
unsatisfactoryassociations with ethos. As used here, both "moral"and "ethical"describe any
predicatesthat confer praise or blame such as "just," "unjust," "brave,""cowardly."
3H. Joachim, comm., The NicomacheanEthics (Oxford 1955) 78 (hereafterJoachim).

110

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.40 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 17:44:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 CONCEPTOFPRAXIS
ARISTOTLE'S 111

become just" (EN 1105al7-18). Again, using praxis in this morally qualified
sense, Aristotlesays in the EudemianEthics that only rationalbeings, and not
children or animals, are capable of "acting" (EE 1224a28-30; cf. EN
1139a20).
In a second sense, however, praxis refers to an event without moral
qualifications. As Joachim again explains: "The mere praxis-the external
movements resulting in a man's death-is morally colourless, the material
equally, for example, of legitimate self-defense, heroic patriotism, or
murder."4 In the ethical writings, of course, the way in which an action is
performedby an agent is the primaryconsiderationin any assessment of the
moral qualities of the action. In most cases, the moral qualities of an action
are determinedby the way in which it was done by an agent. Thus, when
Aristotle says that "By doing just acts we become just, " he goes on to explain
that the acts we do to become just are not just in the same, full sense of the
word as applied to acts done by someone who is alreadyjust. They are only
"such as a just person might do" (EN 1105b5-7). To be just in the full sense,
he writes, an act must be done by an agent with knowledge, choosing
(proairoumenos)the act, choosing it for its own sake, and having a stable
hexis, disposition (EN 2.1105a28-33). The exceptions prove the rule. For
even when Aristotle allows that an act can have moralqualitiesapartfrom the
agent's doing of it, the focus is still on the agent ratherthanthe act. InEN 5.8,
for example, he allows that an act can be just or unjust apart from any
assessment of the agent. But he is also careful to distinguish between acts
done justly and acts done justly only "accidentally"(Kar' (TUE'8 o K'KO).
An agent, he writes, cannotbe praisedor blamed for doing an action•that is in
fact just or unjust if he acts out of ignorance, under compulsion, or in some
other "accidental"way.5
Praxis, then, in the ethical works, can mean either:(1) the subjectof moral
predicates, or (2) an event that is not the subjectof moral predicates.In both
cases, the agent is the primaryconsideration.
In the Poetics, however, Aristotle's focus is on the action and not on the
agent: tragedy is imitationof action and not of humanbeings (50a16-17).6 A
poet must imitate an action, if he can be said to write a tragedyat all. But he
need not always give us enough informationabout how this action is done to
allow us to determine whether the agent deserves praise, blame or neither.

4Joachim, 91.
51Itis difficult to be more precise about Aristotle'sdistinctionbetween mere actions and actions
done in a certainway.J. L. Ackrill, in "Aristotleon Action," Mind 87 (1978) 595-601, discusses
some of the problemsinvolved. On the relevanceof EN 5.8 to the questionof Oedipus'hamartia
see R. Sorabji,Necessity, Cause, and Blame (Ithaca 1980) 295ff., and below, note 21.
6This difference in focus of the ethical works and of the Poetics is corrrectlynoted by R.
Dupont-Roc and J. Lallot, Aristote. La Poetique (Paris 1980) 196: the Poetics, they write,
"renversela perspectivede l'ethique. Ce qui est au premierplan ici, c'est non plus l'agent, mais
l'action. ... " However, they fail to realize that the theoreticalbasis of both the Poetics and the
ethical works is the same. They continue: "et, parce que cette action doit ^etrequalificeen termes
ethiques, les actantsdoivent 1 etre egalement .. "

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.40 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 17:44:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
112 BELFIORE
ELIZABETH

Hence, praxis in the Poetics does not mean "a morally qualified action." I
argue below that several considerationssupportthis view: (1) the distinction
in the Poetics between praxis and ethos, (2) a survey of the occurrencesof
praxis and cognates in the Poetics, (3) Greek usage of praxis and cognates,
and (4) examples of dramaticaction.
1. Praxis and Ethos
Aristotle's distinctionbetweenpraxis and ethos is strongevidence in favor
of the view thatpraxis does not mean "a morally qualified action" in the
Poetics. Whatethos means, in this work and elsewhere, is of course a major
problem in itself.7 For our present purposes, however, it is sufficient to
recognize that when and if moralqualitiesenter into the drama,they do so by
means of ethos (and/ordianoia), and not by means of praxis alone. I do not
mean to imply that ethos is always, or even usually, associated with moral
qualities. That it can have some moralaspects, however, is clear from the two
definitionsof ethos (ethe) given in the Poetics.
1. 50a4-6: "I mean by ethe thataccordingto which we say thatthose acting
are qualified" (Xhyw yap ... Tra 8 r, Ka 0' TroLoYUrtvaq E~vat
Prov 7ip&arrovraq).
4aLVE
2. 50b8-9: "Ethosis thatwhichindicateschoice"(o'Vrw8~\1o / Eiv 7rb
'
70otoWov 8Xrl4ott'v iTpoatpEo-wv).8
It wouldbe a mistaketo assumethatthe qualitiesof the firstdefinitionare
exclusivelymoral,orthatproairesisshouldbe translated"moralpurpose," as
Butchertranslatesit.9 On the otherhand,thereis no evidenceto justifythe
conclusionthatmoralqualitiesand choicesare meantto be excludedfrom
ethos in the Poetics. Aristotleseems to be sayingthatethos can indicate
(moral)choice and confer (moral)qualities.And he never suggeststhat
anythingelse (exceptdianoia),whichis also to be connectedwiththe agent
ratherthanwiththe action,10does this.
Aristotlestates, then, that these propertiesdefine ethos, but he never
suggeststhattheycanenterintoanaccountofpraxisalone.Further, he insists
thatpraxisis distinctfromethosandthatpraxis,butnotethos, is essentialto
tragedy:praxisdoesnotimplyethos.Wemayreasonablyconclude,then,that
praxisdoes nothavethepropertiesthatdefineethos, thatit does not indicate
choiceor serveto qualifythe agent.

7Among the recent works on this controversialtopic are: E. Sch'iutrumpf, Die Bedeutungdes
Wortesithos in der Poetikdes Aristoteles (Munich 1970);J. Pollitt, TheAncient Viewof GreekArt
(New Haven 1974), 184-89; E. Keuls, Plato on Greek Painting (Leiden 1978) 95-109. Keuls'
view thatethos in the Poetics means "dramaticpassage indicativeof character"(97) is surely the
correctone, though I cannot agree with her thatethos lacks a moral factor (97, note 28).
81 follow the text of R. Kassel's OCT (1965) unless otherwise noted. All translationsare my
own.
9Butcheruses this translationof proairesis at 50b9 and at 54a17-18. The term does not have a
narrowlymoralsense even at EN 3.2 (111lb4-1112a17),where it is used in a technicalsense which
we are not justified in importinginto the Poetics.
'0Poetics49b36-50a3 states thatdianoia, as well as ethos, serves to qualify those acting and
(in a passage bracketedby Kassel) that it is a cause of action.

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.40 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 17:44:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 CONCEPTOFPRAXIS
ARISTOTLE'S 113

Aristotle draws a distinction between ethos and praxis in several ways.

First, he tells us repeatedlythatpraxis, or, strictlyspeaking, themythos (plot)
which is the systasis pragmaton (50a4-5), is the most importantaspect of
tragedy: "The structureof the actions is the first and most importantpart of
the tragedy."11Moreover,he insists that there can be tragedieswithoutethos
(ethe): "Theydo not act in orderto imitate the ethe, but they include the ethe
within [the outline of] the actions;12 so thatthe actions and the plot are the end
of tragedy, and the end is the most importantof all. Again, without action
therecould be no tragedy;withoutethe therecould be; the tragediesof most of
the modem poets are without ethe . . .; the first principle and as it were the
soul of tragedyis the mythos; the second is the ethe" (50a20-26, 50a38-39).
Thus, while a tragedywithoutethos is certainlyinferior(ethos is "second"),it
is neverthelessa tragedy.
The statement that there can be tragedies without ethos should be taken
literally: there can be tragedies in which choice is not indicatedand qualities
of those acting are not given.13 Aristotle's repeated insistence thatpraxis is
primaryand ethos inessential to tragedy indicates thatpraxis never implies
ethos.
Since ethos is associated with the agent, and not with the action, as
Aristotle's definitionsof ethos make clear, those passages in which he insists
that tragedyis imitationof actions and not of agents also make the point that
praxis never implies ethos: "Tragedyis imitationnot of humanbeings but of
actions and [the events] of a life" (50al6-17);14 "it is imitationof action and

"150b22-23; cf. 50al5, 50a22-23, 50a29-b3.

a
120KKOVV O17(Or 77tq /Al/ irpaTTovrLv, &Xa a
hh i' 7it lvArEpLXaavoovLrL
•LY7••(vatoL
a'ra
8th Trp(4etL (50a20-22). L. Pearson, "Characterizationin Drama and Oratory-Poetics
1450a20," CQ 18 (1968) 76-83, presents a good survey of the textual problems of this passage
and of the difficultiesof interpretation,thoughI do not agree with his conclusions. I would like to
think that Aristotle has in mind the comparisongiven at 50a39-b3, which I take to be between
plot and outline on the one hand and ethos and color on the other: the outline of the plot is
"colored in" by ethos, as in a child's coloring book. I have not, however, been able to find an
instance in which is used in this sense.
OV.l1T•EpL•ap4a,&vELv
13avEv
"LtEvrpV
o(
4EoW LKWyVOiTO Tpay
OVrv po "8tpa, aVEV 8bE
"tov ' LWLv y•atp tratwv
yivOL,
E'Tiv (50a23-26), has been
VEWV 7r&v 'TXEITh
tv 7rpayq8tIat particularly subject to
&•LaC"
misinterpretation.Many, for example A. Gudeman, Aristoteles. Peri Poietikes (Berlin and
Leipzig 1934) 180; I. Bywater, Aristotle on the Art of Poetry (Oxford 1909) 167, believe that
"without character"should be taken in only a relative sense. A. Dale, "Ethos and Dianoia:
'Character'and 'Thought'in Aristotle'sPoetics," AUMLA 11(1959) 8, followed by Sch'iutrumpf
(above, note 7) 92, wants to blur the distinctionbetween ethos andpraxis by means of a theoryof
"implicit"and "explicit"ethos. Otherstry to makeethos an essential partof praxis in some other
way. Pearson, for example (above, note 12) 79-80, states that "it is by representingpeople's
actions that one shows what kind of people they are. " H. House, Aristotle's Poetics (London
1956) 74 correctly interpretsthe passage, though he misunderstandsthe relationshipbetween
ethos and action. Some additionalsupportfor my view is 50a12: o01Kb6XiyoL a&PTiv, incorrectly
put in obeli by Kassel. A new defense of 50a12 and of the literal interpretationof 50a23-26 is
given by R. Janko,Aristotle, Poetics II on Comedy:An Epitome, now in press. I wish to thank
Prof. Jankofor allowing me to read his unpublishedmanuscript.
V ~
14•g ithPElpse (7r th) at, rarTe K XXctonEoVKalchht p V iov. I cannot
agree with Else (257) that fLioqhere has implications of conscious purpose.

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.40 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 17:44:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
114 BELFIORE
ELIZABETH

most of all because of this it is imitationof those acting" (50b3-4); "since it is

imitationof action and is acted by people acting . . . " (49b36-37).
Finally,at 61a4-9, Aristotleexplicitly states thatthe qualitiesof actions are
not inherent in them, but are derived from the agents. We cannot tell, he
writes, whetheran action is o-rrov6aiov or 4aicvov without consideringthe
agent:
In deciding whether something was well or not well said or done by a
person, one must not only consider whether the thing itself which was
said or done was noble or base (orrTov8aiov" awAXov)but one must
also consider the doer or sayer, to whom or when or how or for what
reasonhe acted or spoke, for example, to bringabouta greatergood or to
preventa greaterevil.•5
It might be objected that severalpassages in the Poetics seem to imply that
praxis at least sometimes entails ethos. For example, Aristotle writes at
54a17-19 that speech andpraxis can haveethos: "Itwill haveethos if, as was
said, the speech or praxis makes clear what some choice is." And again,
Aristotlewrites that "by means of these [sc. ethos anddianoia] we say thatthe
actions also are qualified; for there are two causes of actions, dianoia and
ethos . .." (49b38-50a2).'6 These passages, however, simply indicate that
ethos or dianoia can be added to praxis. A praxis that may be said to "make
clear what some choice is" is a combinationof praxis and ethos, and it is
ethos and notpraxis thatdoes the indicating. A similar accountmay be given
of 49b38-50a2. If it were a general rule that every praxis has a cause, this
passage would indicate thatpraxis entails ethos. But if a tragedy can lack
ethos a tragicpraxis can certainly lack a cause. Thus, a praxis that may be
said to be qualified is also a combinationof praxis and the ethos or dianoia
that alone indicate what caused the action.
50a16-20, the passage in which Aristotle associates praxis with eu-
daimonia, presentsspecial problems. Kassel's text reads:
Yap Ai'qroi ixv Ov'K&v l EpcWEovKaL
" [Kai
/3'iov Tpay,6"a
EV'aL/LOvUY Ka'LT(.'TToVoVaXXa&I&v T(JC4EL
KaKO8a4LuovLa iOwTV, KaC rb
rTXo~rrpc i~ Loo-r
V, oi- 1Todjrq~ ECULV8' Kara LV r
roLOLTWVE9, KaTra i Tp4~ELEV6aqALoVEq
6ETaq TroiVvaVTioV].
There are excellent reasons for following Kassel in bracketingthe passage as
he does. 17 e68aovia, EvaigovEg occur nowhere else in the Poetics, and,
15Thepassage is cited by L. Golden, "Is Tragedythe 'Imitationof a Serious Action'?" GRBS6
(1965) 285, note 7, as evidence in favor of his view that "Aristotleconceives of noble action as
conditionedby and dependenton nobility of character." I disagree with Golden, however, about
the meaning of spoudaion in this passage, on which see below, section 2, discussion of #6.
'650al-2: a Tir r0 TWoov rp64Eov Eiva, btivota KaYL may not be genuine. It
7T•rOvKEV (00o Lucas, Else, and was
disrupts the sequence of ideas in this passage, is bracketedby Kassel,
moved by T. Gomperz,Aristoteles'Poetikitbersetztund eingeleitet (Leipzig 1897) 101.
'7The text is corruptand has been much amendedand discussed. For a defense of the passage
bracketedby Kassel and a discussion of the controversy surroundingit see H.-J. Horn, "Zur
Begrindung des Vorrangsder rrp&cf t vor dem 10og in der AristotelischenTragodientheorie,"
Hermes 103 (1975) 292-299.

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.40 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 17:44:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ARISTOTLE'S
CONCEPT
OFPRAXIS 115

as Lucas notes, KaKO8aL.LOVia is not Aristotelian.18Nevertheless, even if the

entire passage is genuine, we are not forced to conclude that it indicates that
praxis means "a morally qualified action." The term ev6Satqovia should, if
the passage is genuine, be read in a non-ethical sense, as a synonym of

In 50a16-20 Eii8aLpovia and KaKO8aL/.LovaR are the two endpointsof the

tragic change.'9 Other passages use terms related to rviXr to describe this
change: Kar&u7TraTa [sc. Tpg4EI] Ka TrYXavVVOUtLV Kat &lrorvtyX-
-
&vovovwrwavrE (50a2-3); ovipaLvELEL'; EvbrvXUiav K 8vo-riXta q
ETbrvX'a KvorvX'iav tLErafahXXEvhw (51a13-14); E5 E o6 /ETaJaiLvEL E~i
-E•i•
EIbrvXtav qEiL larvXtav (55b27-28).
Now it is clear from Aristotle'sexample of a tragicchange in Poetics 13 that
rvXrb,"luck," and its cognates do not have ethical implications.20The best
tragedy,Aristotle writes, shows someone "not excelling in arete andjustice,
nor changing to 8vo-rvXia because of evil or vice, but because of some
hamartia,21 someone who is one of those with great good reputationand
Ei-rvXla, such as Oedipus and Thyestes and famous men of such families"
(53a8-12). Butcher rightly translates [Ev] E1YrvuXias "prosperous."In this
passage, the social advantagesof good reputation,fame and nobility of birth
are associatedwith iYrvxua.And the term is explicitly dissociatedfromarete
and justice: the person with EirrvXUashould not excel in these qualities if the
tragedy is to be good. Tragedy,in Aristotle's view, should deal with people
who are conspicuously in possession of those things the Greeks traditionally
considered to be advantages.This is not a moral requirement.It is simply an
observationthat the misfortunesof a person who "has everything"are more

'8Lucas, 102. The phrase Kal KaKoGLMOLva 'v iEoriv appearsto be a

distortionof EN 6.1139a34-35: E•6attL/ovLca 1"rp4EtL
y ap rb evOavTov Ev a'vEv &avoiac' Kal
Kt• n7•p4Et
Wiov obrK nUTLV.Just above,Ebnrpa',ao
at EN 6.1139a31, rp4E~rc i v oiv axpX,)rTpoatploaq.,is
remarkablysimilar to the suspected passage Poetics 50al-2 (note 16, above). It is possible that
this passage in the Ethics influencedthe intrusionof both Poetics passages.
19Else (256) rightly connects the passage with the account of the tragic change later in the
Poetics, though he misinterpretsthe change itself.
"
207vrb, "luck, has been thought, like to have ethical implications:A. Neschke,
Die Poetikdes Aristoteles (Frankfort1980)EbSatLLovi•a,
1.132-133 cites Ar. Physics 197a36ff. to show thatthe
term ri'Xqcan be used of what happens to moral agents alone. M. Schofield, "Aristotelian
Mistakes," Proc. CambridgePhilological Soc. n.s. 19 (1973) 66-70, offers some good evidence
against interpretingxirvxia in this way in the EN.
21Hamartia of course cannotbe dealt with adequatelyhere. Briefly,I take the fact of the change
from good to bad fortuneto be central, and the exact natureof the agent's "error"that brings it
about to be relatively unimportant.As Adkins notes, commentingon hamartiain Greektragedy:
"Whatis importantin all these actions is that a characteror charactershave passed from good
fortune to ill. . . . Before such a change of condition can take place there must have been an
'error,' &xapria, of some kind . . . but the exact nature of the 'error' is of ... small
importance, compared with the change of condition . . ." ("Aristotle and the Best Kind of
Tragedy," CQ 16 [1966] 89). Sorabji (above, note 5) gives some excellent reasons against
interpretinghamartia in the Poetics in the light of the Ethics, and rightly remarksthat "Greek
tragedies were not always portrayalsof a weakness punished, but were sometimes studies of the
sheer pity and horrorof humansituations"(296).

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.40 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 17:44:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
116 ELIZABETH
BELFIORE

impressive, produce more pity and fear, than those of an ordinaryhuman

being.22
In ordinaryGreek ELbaLLgoviawas often synonymous with EbrvX'Lain the
sense of "prosperity,"and had, in Adkins' words, "the strongest possible
flavourof 'wealth.' "23 Aristotle, even in the Nicomachean Ethics, empha-
sizes the external goods that go to make up EibSaLgovia,24and Oedipus
himself was called by Euripides.25
E•b6ailwov
There is, then, every reason to interpretEab8atgLovaiain 50a16-20 in a non-
ethical sense, as synonymous with EbrvXta, meaning "prosperity."The
passage must, if genuine, mean: "Tragedyis imitation not of human beings
but of events and of [the events of a human] life. Prosperityand adversity
result from events and the result is an event, not a quality.Humanbeings are
qualifiedby theirethe, and are prosperousor the opposite because of events."
2. Occurrencesof Praxis and Cognates in the Poetics
A second reason for believing thatpraxis does not have an ethical sense in
the Poetics is provided by a survey of the occurrences of praxis and its
cognates in this work. These words are never modified by specifically ethical
terms (e.g. dikaios, andreios), and the actions they describe are never
consideredto have ethical propertiesof their own.
In the following section, all occurrences of praxis and cognates in the
Poetics are grouped in tables according to usage or context. I follow the
rubrics of Kassel's index: rrp&y/pa, Tp&'KTLKOV, rpa~ , Trp&TTErr , po-
TErlpay.giva. His index is incomplete, however, and I supplementit with
other occurrences I have found. A discussion of each heading follows the
tables. Two or more occurrencesin the same line are listed separately:e.g.
51a37, 51a37. [ ] designates occurrencesbracketedby Kassel. * designates
words listed under more than one heading.26The totals of each heading and
subheading(1, 2, 2a, etc.) include cross-listed occurrences;the total of all
headings (1-7) counts cross-listings only once.

22See R. Lattimore, "The Legend in Greek Tragedy," in Literaturein WesternCivilization. I:

The Classical World,D. Daiches and A. Thorlbyeds., (London 1972) 173-91, for an excellent
discussion of Aristotle's requirementthat tragedydeal with humanbeings of high social status.
He notes Euripides' Hipp. 1465-6: r&v yarp p/.ya'Xcv &asorrE0-ELdg/IqEaL XXoV
a•L Ka•TE-
Xov~rv. See also Lucas, 63-64.
23A. W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility (Oxford 1960) 254; cf. 257-258, note 12 on
eudaimonia.
24SeeEN 1.1099a31-b8, where Aristotlealso notes the popularconnectionof eudaimoniawith
eutychia, andRhetoric 1.5 (1360b).
25Sv Oii0 To Ev8atgwv av-qp ...E.L'
E.yevETo a&, &XYAufrao09 /3porWv.
Eur.Antigone fr., cited
rrpov; in AristophanesFrogs 1182, 1187 (=Nauck, fr. 157, 158). This use of
rrp&rrov
eudaimon as a synonym of EbrvX-v is noted by J. T. Sheppard, The Oedipus Tyrannusof
Sophocles (Cambridge1920) xxix and note 2. Sheppardnotes anotherinterestinguse of eudaimon
in OT 1190ff.
26Forconvenience, I limit the numberof cross-listings included.

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.40 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 17:44:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ARISTOTLE'S
CONCEPTOFPRAXIS 117

Tables
1. Uses irrelevantto imitation:48bl, 50b35, 51a10
Total: 3
2. "Technical"uses
2a. 7rp&ytLa:51b22, 54a14, 54b6, 55a17, 56a20
Total: 5
2b. Tp&aKTKOV : 60al
Total: 1
2c. rrpa&tq: 47a28, 51b29, 51b33, 52a13, 52a37, 52bll
Total: 6
2d. Trp&rrEtv : 48a23, 49b31, 52a36, 52a36, 55a25, 59a15, 59b24,
60a14
Total: 8
2e. 7rpolTErTpay/
vaa : 55b30
Total: 1
Total2a-e: 21
3. Associated with aVayKIq: *51a28, 51b9, 51bl11,52a22, 52a29,
54a35, *56b2 E•KO'.,
Total: 8
4. Associated with "one," "whole," or "complete:"*49b24, 50b24, 51a18,
51a19, *51a28, 51a31, 51a33, *52a2, 52a14, 59a19, 59a22, 59bl, 62b8,
62bll
Total: 14
5. Associated with pity and fear: *52a2, 52bl, 53b2, 53b5, 53b13, *53b16,
*56b2
Total:7
6. Associated with KaX0q or
or7TovU8daio: 48al, 48a27, 48b25, *49b24,
*61a5, *61a6, *61a7
Total:7
7. Passages particularlyrelevantto Aristotle's theory of praxis:
7a. Poetics 14: kinds of praxeis: *53b16, 53b27, 53b30, 53b30, 53b36,
53b38, 54a2, 54a3, 54a3
Total: 9
7b. Praxis most importantaspect of tragedy:50a15, 50a22, 50a32, 50a37,
50b22
Total: 5
7c. 49b36-50a6: 49b36, 49b36, 49b37, 50al, [50a2], 50a4, 50a5, 50a6
Total: 8
7d. 50a16-22: 50a16, [50a18], [50a18], [50a20], 50a21, 50a22
Total: 6
7e. Other:50a24, 50b3, 50b4, 54a18, *61a5, *61a6, *61a7
Total:7
Total7a-e: 35
Total1-7 (cross-listings counted only once): 87

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.40 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 17:44:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
118 BELFIORE
ELIZABETH

Discussion
#1. 48bl says that prattein is the Attic for poiein; in the other two
occurrencespragma means "thing."
#2. In the passages in which these instancesoccur, tragedyis called mime-
sis praxeos, the plot is called the systasis pragmaton, or some similar
reference is made to action as the sphere of drama, and nothing relevantto
ethics is said.
#3. The rule of probabilityor necessity is a formalrequirement,havingno
bearingon ethical questions.
#4. The rule that a praxis should be one, whole and complete is closely
connected with the "norm of length" within which the tragic change is
comprised(51al2-15). I argueabove, in the discussion of 50a16-20, that this
change should not be thoughtof in ethical terms.
#5. Pity and fear are primarilya response to the plot (53bl-7) and we will
see below, in the discussion of #7a, that the actions which make up plots are
described in non-ethical terms. Aristotle does say that pity is felt for the
and fear for the i4lows~(53a5-6), but a&vrao6 and 6/owgo do not
&v&eo•
have narrowlyethical senses27and in any case they describethe agent, not the
action. What Aristotle means is that a persona without these qualities will
interferewith the audience's tragic response to the plot.28
#6. In seven instancespraxis is associated with spoudaios or kalos. At
48al and 48a27 spoudaios describespeople who happento be acting, and not
the actions themselves. And, as we have seen, 61a4-9, where three other
instances occur, states that we cannot tell whether or not an action is
spoudaion orphaulon without consideringthe agent.
At 48b25-27 Aristotle states that when poetry originated,the bettersort of
poets imitated 7Ya' . .. 7Tpa0EL' Ka't 7 oV roo'rWoV,writing
KaXh• •r'
hymns and encomia, while the inferior sort imitated ratq [Trp&a6Et] i70V
hov, writing invectives (ftf6yot).Since encomia are writtento praise, as
a•ai
invectives are written to blame, kalas must attributean ethical quality to
praxeis, in this one instance. However, Aristotle is now discussing a stage of
poetry that precedes and differs from that of epic, tragedy and comedy.29
Comedy, Aristotle tells us, only appears when the earlier invectives are
replacedby "the laughable"(48b37), which is "some defect or ugliness that
is painless and not destructive"such as the comic mask (49a34-37). That is,
while the objects of invective are blameworthy,and hence morally qualified,
those of comedy are merely laughable. The developmentof epic and tragedy

27Thiswas convincingly demonstratedby Adkins, "Aristotleand the Best Kind of Tragedy"

(above, note 21).
28T.Stinton, "Hamartiain Aristotle and GreekTragedy,"CQ 25 (1975) 238-39, rightly notes
that Aristotle is concerned with proscribingthe charactertraits that interfere with our tragic
pleasure, causing us to feel "outrage,"mairon,(Po. 13.52b36) insteadof pity and fear. I take this
same concern to govern Aristotle's requirementsthat charactersbe "better"(53a16) and "good"
(54a17).
29Thismuch, at least, is clear, whetheror not we follow Else (137ff.) in assigning everything
before 48b32 to the pre-poeticstage of improvisation.

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.40 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 17:44:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 CONCEPTOFPRAXIS
ARISTOTLE'S 119

from encomia may be analogous to the development of comedy from

invective, thoughour corrupttext does not describeit in detail. Aristotledoes,
however, tell us that Homer's Margites is to comedy what his Iliad and
Odyssey are to tragedy (48b38-49a2) and he replaces the kalas praxeis
imitated by the earlier encomia with ta spoudaia when he discusses epic
(48b34). It is possible, then, that just as comedy replaces the blameworthy
with the laughable, so epic and tragedy replace the praiseworthy with
spoudaia thatare not objects of praise. Whetheror not this is a correctaccount
of the development of epic, we are certainly not justified in simply equating
the kalas praxeis of a pre-epic stage with the spoudaia of the Homericstage of
poetry,especially since kalas praxeis are nowherein the Poetics said to be the
objects of epic, tragedyor comedy.
This brings us to Aristotle'sdefinitionof tragedyas imitationof a spoudaia
praxis at 6.49b24. It might be arguedthat, since in Poetics 2 Aristotletells us
that tragedy imitates people who are spoudaioi or "better"in some moral
sense, spoudaia must also have a moral sense at 6.49b24.30 Even if we grant
the premise, however, 61a4-9 proves that Aristotle does not hold that every
action of a morally good person must itself be morally good.
On the otherhand, there is good evidence thatspoudaia in Poetics 6 means
"worthserious attention"and that it describes the formal structureof a plot.
In his definition at 49b24 Aristotle states that "tragedy is imitation of a
spoudaia and teleia praxis, having magnitude." Then, in Chapter7.50b23-
25, he substitutes hole for spoudaia, writing that tragedy was defined as
"imitationof a teleia andhole praxis, havingmagnitude." This substitutionis
no accident. The holon, Aristotle writes, is something that has a beginning,
middle and end, according to probability or necessity (50b27ff.). Then, in
Chapter 9, he states that what happens according to what is probable or
necessary is the katholou, "the universal" (51a6-11), and that because poetry
is more concerned with the universal, history with the particular,poetry is
more philosophical and spoudaioteron than history (51b5-6). Poetry is
spoudaioteron,then, because it imitates a hole praxis, and a spoudaiapraxis
is a hole praxis, one that follows probabilityor necessity.31
Since, then, spoudaia describes the formal structureof a tragedy,it is best
translated"worthserious attention." Spoudazesthaiis used to mean "to take
seriously" at 49bl, where Aristotlewrites thatcomedy has no history because
it was not "takenseriously";it was not, for example, given a chorusuntil late.
And as Else has shown, spoudaioi people in the Poetics are "those who take
themselves and life seriously and thereforecan be taken seriously."32It may
be that we cannot say of someone that he or she takes life seriously without
making a positive moral judgment. However, there is no reason to suppose

30Foran argumentalong these lines see Golden (above, note 15) 283-89.
310n the connection between the spoudaion and the probable or necessary see M. Weitz,
"Tragedy," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, P. Edwards, ed. (New York1967) 8.155 and the
excellent remarksof H. D. E Kitto, "Catharsis,"in The Classical Tradition,L. Wallace, ed.
(Ithaca 1966) 144.
32Else, 77. See also Lucas, 63-64, on the social connotationsof spoudaios.

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.40 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 17:44:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
120 ELIZABETH
BELFIORE

that an action worth taking seriously must be a praiseworthyaction. All

serious studentsof ethics, including Aristotle himself, consider blameworthy
actions to be worthconsideringat least as seriously as praiseworthyacts.
#7a. This category is particularlyinterestingbecause all of these instances
occur withinthe context of an exhaustivelist of kinds of actions which tragedy
may imitate (Poetics 14). Aristotle begins by asking what sorts of events
53b15) are pitiableand fearful. Suchpraxeis, he continues,
(orvurrttvreov:
would have to be those of philoi, enemies, or of those who are neither
(53b15-17). And again, he writes, (53b27-37) the actions would have to be
done or not done, and by those with knowledge or without knowledge of the
relationship (Ivayvwpio-at rlvy thXiav:53b31). "And there is no other
possibility besides these, " Aristotle remarks(53b36).
In all of these cases, certain facts about the agent-his relationship to
someone else and his knowledge or ignoranceof this relationship-are a part
of the action. These facts alone, however, are not sufficient to give moral
qualitiesto the actions. Someone, for example, who killed a relativeknowing
of this relationship,might not be culpable, if he acted undercompulsionor for
the sake of a greatergood. Again, someone who killed a relative would not
necessarily be absolved from blame if he did not know of the relationship.
This act might be vicious murderregardlessof the relationship,or the agent
might himself be responsiblefor his ignorance. We cannotpraise or blame on
the basis of such scant knowledge.33 As if to underline this fact, praxis at
53b16 is used as a synonym of in the previous line: a word with
fewer ethical connotationscouldor1,vuir7Tnov
hardly have been found.34
#7b-#7e. These occurrenceshave been discussed in section 1, above.
3. Greek Usage of Praxis and Cognates
If praxis apartfrom ethos never refers to a morally qualified action in the
Poetics, this is entirely in line with the usage of Aristotle and of other Greek
writers. Bruno Snell showed long ago that the verbdran is used of actions in
which guilt or innocence is in question, while prattein "nowheretouches on
this question of good and evil. "35 In Ag. 1467, for example, Helen, as cause
of the Trojan War, is said to have "brought to pass incurable pain"

33J. Jones, On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy(Oxford 1962) 48-49, rightly argues against a
tendencyto read psychological implicationsintoPoetics 14 when he tells us thatmellei, at 53b21,
for example, should not be translated"intends"(Butcher)but "on the point of."
34Compare53b4-6, where thepragmata are identifiedwith symbainonta:&(TE TOViKOU ra
T srpaypLara Kat 4pPiTTELKaCL •b
•EXEEV K 7•V oTvUpawvrtVOV .
yw6o•LEva
35 "Das irpajrTet ruhrtnirgends an diese Frage nach Gut und B'ose";B. Snell, "Aischylos
und das Handelnim Drama,"Philologus suppl. 20 (1928) 14. (Snell, however, fails to apply his
findings correctly to the Poetics, p. 16.) Those who cite Snell's article do not mention this
importantconclusion, concentratingsolely on what Snell says aboutprattein's connection with
completion:Else, 241, note 73; J. Redfield,Natureand Culturein the Iliad (Chicago 1975) 64-65
and note 49, 236: and J. H. Schmidt, Synonymikder griechischen Sprache (Leipzig 1876, rpt.
Amsterdam1967) 1.#23: who is wrong when he states that a
"Ap&valrpaccEwv,r,ropoViELVw,"
praxis is always the activity of a person (399). A good counterexampleis Aristotle, De Caelo
292bl-3: 86e voA/t4EV KaL T7*V OarTppov Trp4wPvaL'aLTOLairrVVOa 7TEp7 TdV T XWV Ka.L
(This passage is noted by7•TV
D. S. Margoliouth,ThePoetics of Aristotle [London 1911]40).
4•vr&v.

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.40 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 17:44:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ARISTOTLE'S OFPRAXIS
CONCEPT 121

(&eY4crarov &ayog ETrpaeEv): "it happened by means of her." Snell

contrastsIsmene's confession of guilt in Antigone 536: 8ESpaKa 70ropyov.36
In legal contexts also, the pragmata can be the undisputedfacts of a case as
distinct from the disputed correct legal interpretation.A good example is
Antiphon'sSecond Tetralogy,where the defendant, while admittingthat his
son threw a javelin (the pragmata), nevertheless argues that his son did not
kill the personhe struck "accordingto the truthof the things he did" (KaTr yE
T•7v &aXh•EaV E0Tpa4Ev).37 Aristotle himself uses prattein in this sense
i••in Rhetoric 1.13: a person may admit that he did
in a legal context something
(QE7Trpax(vat) but deny that his act should be describedin a certain way; for
example, he may admit that he took something but deny that he stole it; he
may admit that he struckbut deny that that he committedhybris.38Plato uses
praxis in a similar way in the Euthyphro: Ip Tvwo' 7riptL 8a-
acXr &?E•jw
OEpO/.LEVOL Ot /.LEV6LKaUi O&68E•6LKW.39
•TLVOaiT-iiv 7TEITp&XXCXL,
Even in the ethical works, Aristotle frequently uses praxis in a completely
non-moralsense. Sorabjinotes that in Aristotle's view "the same action can
belong to one category under one description, and to another under an-
other,"40 and cites EE 2.9 and EN 5.8. In the latter passage prattein is not
distinguishedfrom : yap KtC 7r)v boUELinrapX6vrcov
K 7o'yXEM 7TOhhXX
KaL 7pa77TTo0l , V OlOEVov0 0
EL~'iTE' Kc O KOb(TULOOvoT'
aKOVroWVaoLVW,o07v bTrp&vy
oLKaITXOI.EV
p (1135a33-b2). Mar-
7aroiTv47oUKELw
goliouth gives many other examples of this usage in which prattein is not
distinguishedfrom
7"rI&XEW•.41
4. Examples of DramaticActions
Finally, some examples of dramaticpraxeis supportthe view thatapraxis is
not a morally qualifiedevent, while ethos, that which gives (moral) qualities
and indicates(moral)choice is somethingaddedon to the tragedyby means of
specific speeches and descriptionsof attendantcircumstances.
In distinguishingplot from episode, Aristotlegives an outline of the plot of
the Odyssey and of theIphigeneia in Tauris.He describesthe latteras follows:
A certain girl after being sacrificed and disappearingfrom the view of
those sacrificingher was settled in anotherland where the custom was to
sacrifice strangersto the goddess, and she came to hold that priesthood.

36Snell(above,note35) 13. P. Chantraine,Dictionnaireetymologique de la languegrecque1

(Paris1968)297, notesthat6p&vis usedto emphasize"laresponsabilite priseplut6tque . . . la
realisation
d'unacte."Oniromev,6p&vandirp&rr'E see also B. Snell, "DasBewusstsein von
eigenenEntscheidungen im fruhenGriechentum, "Philologus85 (1930)141-58,esp. 152-58;A.
Braun,"Iverbedel 'fare'nelgreco," StudiItalianidi FilologiaClassica15(1938)243-96.
372.3,followingthems. readingi3ahXep•Ev,obiK aTErKTELVE 8E Oiiva. I owe thisexample
to M. Gagarin,"TheTruthof Persuasionin Antiphon'sSecondTetralogy," paperreadat the
annualmeetingof the PhilologicalAssociationof the Pacific Coast, StanfordUniversity,
November,1981.
38Rhetoric1.73b38ff.;cf. Rhet.58b30ff.Fora discussionof thelegalquestionsAristotlerefers
to, see W.Grimaldi,
Aristotle,RhetoricI. A Commentary (New York1980)294.
39Euthyphro 8e6-8. Thispassageis notedby Grimaldi(above,note38) 294.
40Sorabji(above,note5) 279;cf. 295.
41Margoliouth(above,note35) 37-41.

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.40 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 17:44:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
122 BELFIORE
ELIZABETH

A while later, the brotherof the priestess happenedto arrive. That the
god orderedhim to go there and for what purposehe came is outside the
plot (rb86 E(TtL 7VEL XEV0'&%
1EWMb EEL KEL
Ka•L f'6"
0 r E CET70o
He arrived, was seized, and when on the point of being
pinOov).42he made himself known, either as
sacrificed, Euripidesor as Polyidus
wrote it, saying, as he was likely to do, that not only his sister but
himself also had to be sacrificed, and because of this he was saved
(Poetics 17.55b3-12).
This plot outline explicitly excludes any indication of proairesis: "Thatthe
god ordered him to go there and for what purpose he came is outside the
plot." Also excluded are not only the names of the characters,but also any of
their individual qualities. Without this ethos, the bare action has no moral
qualities of its own.
Aristotle's outline of the Odyssey plot also excludes ethos:
A certainman is away from home for many years, carefully watched by
Poseidonand alone. Moreover,things at home are in such a state thathis
possessions are wasted by the suitors and his son is plotted against. He
himself arrives, storm-tossed,and making himself recognized by some,
attacksand is himself saved while he destroys his enemies. This is what
is properto the plot; the rest is episode (Poetics 17.55b17-23).
In this example also, ethos, anything indicative of choice or descriptive of
individual qualities, is excluded.43 Aristotle avoids using ethically loaded
words, such as KXho'Tr, avvpo•Ovita4 to describe the actions,
oLtOLXELa,
thoughhe could well have used them all. Gomperzremarksperceptivelyabout
Aristotle's two plot outlines: "Forour philosopher,the daughterof Agamem-
non, the most powerful among the Greek princes, is thus merely a 'maiden';
Ulysses is not a hero and a mighty warrior before Troy, but simply a
'man.' "45
An excellent way of illustratingand testing our interpretationof Aristotle's
concept of praxis is to apply it to three plays with the same basic plot:
Aeschylus' Libation Bearers, Sophocles' Electra and Euripides'Electra. If
we base a plot outline of all threeplays on Aristotle'sexamples of the Odyssey
and the Iphigeneia in Taurisplots, we will get somethinglike this:
A woman has killed her husband, a king, and now rules in his stead,
along with her lover, who helped in the killing. She has, by her dead
husband, a son, living in exile, and a virgin daughter.The son returns

42Thetext reads thus with the deletion of the words bracketedby Kassel. The textualquestions
have no bearingon my point.
43Theimportanceof these two plot outlines for understandingAristotle'sview thattherecan be
tragedy withoutethos is noted by C. Lord, "TragedyWithoutCharacter:Poetics VI. 1450a24,"
Journalof Aestheticsand Art Criticism 28 (1969-70) 55-62.
44EN1107a9ff. lists these as names for actions that include baseness;cf. Rhetoric 1374a11-15.
45T. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers (Griechische Denker, Leipzig 1896), trans. G. G. Berry
(London 1912)4.414.

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.40 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 17:44:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ARISTOTLE'S
CONCEPT OFPRAXIS 123

from exile, makes himself known to his sister by means of tokens, gains
access to his motherand her lover by means of craft and kills them.
This plot, common to each of the plays, tells us absolutely nothing about
the ethical qualityof the act of Orestesin killing his mother.In fact, the plot is
such that we cannot in principle determine this ethical quality from the act
alone. As a general rule, it is right to avenge one's father. And, again, as a
generalrule it is wrong to kill one's mother.But what may be said of avenging
one's fatherby killing one's mother?Each play solves this ethical dilemmain
a differentway, by attributingdifferentmotives and qualitiesto the agent;that
is, by the use of ethos.46
In the Libation Bearers, Orestes is made to give his reasons for the
matricideearly in the play.They are:the oracle, grief for his father,and loss of
his patrimony,which, he says, entails the servitude of the very men who
sacked Troy (297-305). Of these, all noble motives, the oracle is by far the
most important. When about to act, Orestes hesitates and asks Pylades,
"What shall I do?" (rt 6p&oro;).47 Pylades answers, "Whatof the oracle?
Count all men enemies except the god." Orestes answers, "Youare right,"
and does the deed (899-904). These passages have ethos, for they indicate
why something is chosen. And they clearly show that the choice is a noble
one. Orestes is never given any unworthymotives at other times; he is never
given a reason to distrustthe god, and he is never shown to be the sort of
person who would take advantage of a divine oracle for selfish purposes.
Orestes, therefore, is shown by the poet's use of ethos to be morallyjustified
and is vindicatedby the gods in the Eumenides.
The motives of Orestes in Sophocles' Electra are very different. He also
gives them in a speech early in the play: (1) desire to win fame, (2) desire to
destroy his enemies, and (3) to regain his patrimony(59-72). He does not
give as reasons the oracle, love of his father, desire to free the land from
tyranny. We conclude, and other speeches in the play bear this out, that
Orestes' motives in the Sophocles play do not justify a matricide.Here, ethos
shows that Orestes is blameworthy.
In Euripides'Electra, Orestes'motives are shown not by speech so much as
by the circumstancesattendinghis action: anotherform of ethos. Oresteskills
Aigisthus duringa sacrifice, and he kills Clytemnestrawhile she is preparing
for a sacrifice.48 He brings Aigisthus' corpse to Electra and asks her to
maltreatit as she wishes (896 ff.). He doubts the oracle (971) but does the

46There is some indicationthat Aristotle would have looked at the three plays in this way. In
Poetics 14.53b20-26, he includes a matricide in his list of plots and mentions the murderof
Clytemnestraby Orestes as one of the received legends the poet cannot change (Tobiqp ev oiVV
pJiOovi XV•EL oi'K TLwv) but should handleskillfully. This passage makes no
trape*X-Tlqpj•vov
that the bare plot
suggestion representsan action of any specific ethical quality. On the other
hand, when Aristotlementionstwo actualtreatmentsof the matricide,he does condemnthe son's
action:Rhet. 2.1401a35-b3 (Theodectes'Orestes) andEN 3.1110a26-29 (Euripides'Alcmaeon).
47This and Eur.El. 1244 (page 00, below) are good examples of the typical Greek preference
for dran overprattein when ethically qualifiedactions are in question. See above, section 3.
48An interestingparallelto this kind of ethos is providedby an example given by Pollitt(above,

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.40 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 17:44:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
124 BELFIORE
ELIZABETH

deed anyway. All this shows a lack of concern for the gods, and for human
standardsof decency. Such a man can have no motive for matricidethat can
justify this act. This is in fact what the Dioscuri tell Orestes: "She has
receivedjustice, but you did not act justly " (8WKataux
EV VV, 8o'EXEL,T) 86'
obi'v86p&, 1244).
These three plays, then, do seem to have a bare plot that imitates an action
without moral qualifications. The agent is, in each case, given a different
quality by ethos.
We have found, then, that in Aristotle's dramatictheory, action, a mere
event, is primary and that ethos, that which indicates choice and confers
quality,is of secondaryimportanceand is not a necessarypartof all tragedies.
Plot is the "firstprincipleand soul of tragedy"(50a38-39), while psychology
and ethics are of much less importance.49 We have also found that Aristotle's
concept of praxis can be appliedfruitfullyto the Greekplays themselves. The
playwright, if our examples are typical, begins with a bare action that is a
given and "colors"it, as an artistpaints a statue, with readily distinguishable
and identifiable ethos. It would require a much more detailed study to
determinewhetherthe Greekplays also justify Aristotle'sview thatthe action
is a greatdeal more importantthanthe ethos. If he is right, however, many of
our questions about the characterizationand motivation of the personae of
these plays may be irrelevantas well as unanswerable.50

ELIZABETHBELFIORE
Universityof Minnesota

note 7) of ethos in painting. A paintingof Polygnotuswas said to depict Ajax swearingat an altar
while Cassandrasat holding the image of Athena to which she clung as a suppliantwhen Ajax
draggedher away(188). Here also, attendantcircumstances,the altarand the image, clearly show
the quality of Ajax' act of sacrilege.
49See P. Turner, "The Reverse of Vahlen," CR 9 (1959) 214, for a good criticism of our
tendency to interpretAristotle in the light of our modern interest in psychology, a subject with
which the Poetics has little concern.
50Anearlier versionof this paperwas read at the annualmeeting of the AmericanPhilological
Association, San Francisco, Dec. 1981. I wish to thankProfs. George Sheets and KathleenWilkes
for their helpful criticisms of an earlier draftof this paper.

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.40 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 17:44:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions