Information Control Problems in Manufacturing

Proceedings,16th IFAC Symposium on

Bergamo, Italy, June
Proceedings,16th 11-13,
IFAC 2018
Symposium on
Information Control Problems in Manufacturing
Information Control
Proceedings,16th Problems
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in Manufacturing
Symposium on
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Proceedings,16th June 11-13,
IFAC 2018
Symposium on
Bergamo, Italy,
Information June
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Problems2018
in Manufacturing
Information Control Problems in Manufacturing
Bergamo,
Bergamo, Italy,
Italy, June
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11-13, 2018
2018 ScienceDirect
Environmental AuditIFAC
improvements in industrial
PapersOnLine 51-11 (2018) 1155–1161 systems through FRAM
Environmental
Environmental Audit
Audit improvements
improvements in
inDiindustrial
industrial systems
systems through
through FRAM
FRAM
Francesco Costantino*. Giulio Gravio*. Massimo Tronci*.
Environmental Audit
Environmental Audit improvements
improvements
Francesco Costantino*. Giulio
in industrial
inDiindustrial systems
systems
Gravio*. Massimo
through
through FRAM
Tronci*. FRAM
Francesco Costantino*. Giulio Di Gravio*. Massimo Tronci*.
Francesco
Francesco Costantino*.
* Department Giulio
Giulio Di
of Mechanical
Costantino*. andGravio*.
Di Massimo
Aerospace
Gravio*. Tronci*.
Engineering
Massimo Tronci*.
Sapienza University of
* Department of Rome, Via Eudossiana
Mechanical 18, 00184,
and Aerospace Rome, Italy
Engineering
* Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering
Sapienza University of Rome, Via Eudossiana 18, 00184, Rome, Italy
Sapienza University of
** Department
Department of Rome, Via Eudossiana
Mechanical
Mechanical and 18, 00184,
and Aerospace
Aerospace Rome, Italy
Engineering
Engineering
Sapienza
Sapienza University of Rome, Via Eudossiana 18, 00184, Rome, Italy
University of Rome, Via Eudossiana 18, 00184, Rome, Italy
Abstract: Environmental risk management requires specific methodologies to focus audit activities on the
most critical
Abstract: elements of production
Environmental risk management systems. Limited
requires resources
specific require a clear
methodologies motivation
to focus to put attention
audit activities on the
Abstract:
on specific Environmental
technological, risk
human,management requirescomponents,
organizational specific methodologies
and often to focus
should audit activities
address theput monitoron theof
most critical elements of production systems. Limited resources require a clear motivation to attention
most critical
Abstract:
interactions
Abstract: elements
Environmental
among of
these production
risk
elements.management systems.
Recent Limited
requires
research inresources
specific
environmentalrequire
methodologies a
riskclearto motivation
focus
looks at audit
methods to put
activities
to attention
deal on the
with
on specificEnvironmental
technological,risk human,management requirescomponents,
organizational specific methodologies
and often should to focus audit activities
address the monitor on theof
on specific
most criticaltechnological,
complexity elements
as interesting human,
of production
production
tools organizational
systems.
to reduce realLimited components,
impacts resources
on pollution and
requireoften
and should
aa clear
clear address
motivation
consumption. the
to
In to put
this monitor
attention of
most critical
interactions elements
among of
these elements. systems.
Recent Limited
research inresources
environmentalrequire risk looksmotivation
at methods to paper,
put attention
deal we
with
interactions
on specific
provide among these
technological,
evidence elements.
of the advantage human, Recent research
organizational in environmental
components, and risk
often looks
should at methods
address the to deal
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on specific
complexity technological,
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reduce the Functional
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pollution Analysis
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complexity
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Recent real impacts
research
production
research in on pollution
environmental
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environmental and
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risk consumption.
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Elsevier
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Keywords: list
presents andthethe successful
evolution of application
environmental of FRAM
audit intoa refocus
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case study presents the evolution of environmental audit in a sinter plant, proving the need for a review of the control
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Technologies.
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Keywords:
Keywords: Risk-based list successful
audit; application
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environmental control
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resonance; Best Available
Technologies.
Technologies.
Keywords: Risk-based audit; risk-management; environmental audit; functional resonance; Best Available
Keywords: Risk-based audit; risk-management; 
environmental audit; functional resonance; Best Available
Technologies. combination with technological improvement choices.
Technologies. 1. INTRODUCTION 
 Thus,
combinationconsidering with production
technological as aimprovement
complex systems, choices.a
1. INTRODUCTION combination
methodological with technological improvement choices.
Recently, environmental assessment has increasingly
1. INTRODUCTION

Thus, considering production as a complex systems,(ana
shift moves from a causality credo
Thus,
combination
accident
combinationconsidering
or with
incident production
technological
happen as
because a complex
improvement
something systems,
goes choices.
wrong, a
shifted
Recently, to theenvironmental
field of1.risk INTRODUCTION
management
assessment(Boiral
1. INTRODUCTION has and Gendron,
increasingly methodologicalwith shifttechnological
moves from improvement
a causality credo choices.(an
Recently, environmental assessment has increasingly methodological
Thus,
with
Thus, theconsidering
possibility shift to moves
production
find and from
as
treat aa
its complex
causes)
causality tosystems,
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credo (ana
2011;
shifted to Knechel,
the field of 2007; Power, 2003)
risk management (Boiral andand resilience
Gendron, accident or incident happen because something goes wrong,a
considering production as a complex systems,
systemic
shifted
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2018), control
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treat its (Hollnagel,
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FRAM
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accident analysis to model presents
(De complex applications
Carvalho,systems 2011;
composite
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and al., 2006)
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et al.,Carvalho,
2010; 2011;
Sawaragi
and Halman, 2016). Since auditmodern when plants its scope considers
are commonly especially
and
Nouvel develop et focused
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al., on safety
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2007). in several
(Herrera
Literature et al.,
presents sectors,
2010; (e.g.)
Sawaragi
applications
and
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composite
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composite real
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(Hollnagel,
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case scenarios
scenarios
2012) modern
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complex plants are
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2006) al.,
and 2007).
accident Literature
analysis presents
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et al., (Steen
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2008),
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on
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in
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several
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STAMP EA.
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(Leveson,
in the
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2004),
of
2004), Bergström,
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(Patriarca and
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railway 2013).
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and
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EA.
criticalities Moreover, (Patriarca
in the domain recent
of 2008),
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Bergström,
et al.,
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2013).
2017),
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2017), other
FRAM
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nuclear
approaches,
nuclear is
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power (Lundblad
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continuously
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Shirali
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2016;paths
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of
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2405-8963 method
© 2018, IFAC in the
the fieldfield of
in (International EA,
EA, specifically
ofFederation specifically in
in
of Automatic Control) Hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Copyright © 2018 IFAC 1175
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Peer review©under
2018 responsibility
IFAC 1175Control.
of International Federation of Automatic
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IFAC INCOM 2018
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Bergamo, Italy, June 11-13, 2018 Francesco Costantino et al. / IFAC PapersOnLine 51-11 (2018) 1155–1161
al., 2015), to reduce the complexity of its representation
(Patriarca et al., 2017b).
2.2 The FRAM principles
The four principles of FRAM are (Hollnagel, 2012):
 Equivalence of failures and successes. Failures and
successes come from the same origin, i.e. everyday
work variability. Both should be considered in the
analysis of the processes.
 Principle of approximate adjustments. The human
factor adjusts everyday activities and
performances to match the unexpected situations
and conditions in complex systems.
 Principle of emergence. It is not possible to
identify the deterministic causes of any specific
event because some of these are emergent rather
than resultant from a specific combination of fixed
conditions. Some events emerge due to a
combination of time and space conditions, which
could be transient, not leaving any traces.
 Functional resonance. The variabilities in the
processing of activities sometimes interact causing
resonance in the final performances and risks.
These interactions could be recognized and
analyzed.
2.3 The FRAM building steps
Firstly, a FRAM analysis requires the clarification of the
scope of the analysis, i.e. risk assessment or accident
analysis. For the purpose of this paper, it is relevant only to
discuss the risk assessment, because the goal is to integrate
a risk-based approach in the EA. Then, this process requires
4 steps, as described below.
Step 1: Identification and description of system’s functions.
A FRAM function represents the activities required to
produce a certain outcome. Every function should consider
and possibly indicates input (I), output (O), Precondition
(P), Resource (R), Control (C), Time (T). These six aspects
are generally represented as corners of a hexagon and links
represent the relationships among functions. Functions aim
to describe daily system work as really done and not as
imagined. The recent evolution of FRAM introduced
hierarchical decompositions of processes (Patriarca et al.,
2017a).
Step 2: Identification of performance variability. The
functions’ variability must be defined precisely. The
technological functions consider the machinery and the
probability of failures, usually because of specific
conditions, (e.g.) sensors subjected to unexpected
temperature conditions, machinery with inadequate
maintenance. Human functions are tasks made by an
individual or a small group of individuals, and their
performances change rapidly and with high frequency. We
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should consider physiological, psychological and working
conditions. Lastly, organizational functions consider the
system rules, regulations or policies, which foresee big
differences in the change (and thus a high amplitude).
Hollnagel (2012) classifies the different causes of
performance variability in simple case, considering only the
variability in timing and precision, or multiple case where
more issues should be analyzed (e.g. speed, distance,
sequence, object, force, duration, direction). In this paper,
the so-called simple solution is sufficient to identify
criticality and suggestions for EA. The timing variability
can be too early, on time, too late or not at all (useless for
its purposes or even not produced at all). Precision
variability can be precise, acceptable, imprecise or wrong.
If the output is precise, it satisfies entirely the needs of its
downstream function. If it is acceptable, it requires some
adjustment in the downstream function, even bigger in case
it is imprecise.
A simple numerical score permits to apply a semi-
quantitative score instead of a qualitative judgment
(Patriarca et al., 2017c) like in Table 1, where the higher the
score, the more critical the output variability.
Table 1. Variability scores
VARIABILITY SCORE
Too early 2
On time 1
TIMING
Too late 3
Not at all 4
Precise 1
PRECISION Acceptable 2
Imprecise 4
The variability of the upstream output ݆, ܱܸ௝ is the product
of these two scores, as in (1):
ܱܸ௝ ൌ ܸ௝் ή ܸ௝௉ (1)
where:
ܸ௝் represents the score of the upstream output ݆ score in
terms of timing;
ܸ௝௉ represents the score of the upstream output ݆ score in
terms of precision.
Step 3: Aggregation of variability. Because of the functional
resonance principle, a specific step measures the potential
variability of each function that can become resonant and
lead to unexpected results. The aggregation of variability is
a combination of the function variability and the variability
deriving from the outputs of the upstream functions,
considering the linked aspects’ type. The effects of a
coupling variability ‫ܸܥ‬௜௝ of the upstream output ݆ and the
downstream function ݅ is expressed as (2):
் ௉
‫ܸܥ‬௜௝ ൌ ܱܸ௝ ή ܽ௜௝ ή ܽ௜௝ 1
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where:
்
ܽ௜௝ represents the amplifying factor for the upstream output
݆ and the downstream function ݅, in terms of timing;
௉ of external activities.
ܽ௜௝ represents the amplifying factor for the upstream output
݆ and the downstream function ݅, in terms of precision.
Step 4: Managing the variability. Step 3 provide evidence
about the critical couplings, that FRAM links to explicit
functions and variabilities to be changed or prevented. The
critical couplings can be filtered by a threshold CV* and a
confidence level P*, and then defining critical only the
couplings whose cumulative distribution over the threshold
is lower than (1- P*). This classification defines priorities
for the mitigating actions. Moreover, the analysis highlights
critical paths in case other critical couplings, backward or
afterward, link the same functions, in multiple upstream-
downstream relationship functions of the process.
3. APPLICATION SCOPE
The paper focuses on the assessment of technical
improvement in terms of environmental impact, through the
implementation of FRAM as a tool for RBA. The
application field is a real case of sinter plant, where iron
minerals dust agglomerates with other fine materials using
high temperature, to produce a porous mass that can be used
in blast furnaces. The typical application of sinter process is
the conversion of iron into steel (Van Wortswinkel and Nijs,
2010). Specific attention is given to blast furnace/basic
oxygen furnace (BF/BOF) where the input materials i.e.
sinter, iron pellets, limestone, and cokes, enter to be
converted into molten pig iron (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Sintering process with BF/BOF.
3.1 The phases of the process
The sinter plant under analysis processes the downdraft
sintering on continuous traveling grates, as detailed by EU
BREF for Iron and Steel Production (Remus et al., 2013).
The main phases of the production are the following:
1177
- Raw materials preparation. Iron ore fines, fuel,
fluxes, return fines of the sinter plant and in-plant
metallurgical waste materials. Coke breeze, i.e.
coke with a diameter less than 5 mm, is an output
- Mixing. A rotating drum mixes the raw materials,
the coke breeze and water forming agglomerated
micro-pellets.
- Sinter strand. The sintering machine levels the
micro-pellets into a 30-50 mm hearth layer. This is
ignited by gas (or oil) burners.
- Hot crushing. The sintered cake is discharged into
the roll crusher to a maximum particle size.
- Hot screening. Pellets whose size is less than 5 mm
are dismissed to a recycle process.
- Cooling. The sinter is discharged onto a circular
sinter cooler, whose diameter is 25m. The sinter
layer’s height is approximately 1 m and it is cooled
by air.
- Cold Screening. The cold screening filter separates
product by size, the product sinter (5-50 mm),
bedding (10-20 mm) and return fines (0-5 mm).
The analysis of this specific process can be explained in
terms of main equipment, operators, control points, and
emission (Patriarca et al., 2017d). In the paper presents a 56
functions model of sinter plant under RBA, with the
identification and aggregation of variabilities, a Monte
Carlo analysis to calculate the criticality of couplings, and
the identification of critical couplings paths. With this
approach, the available indications from BATC (EU
Commission, 2012) are enhanced by adding specific
activities to be focused in EA (e.g. purchase material and
monitor availability, transfer coke to the crusher, crush
coke, transfer coke to BF, collect and gas purification from
coke crushing and coke transfer).
Since the critical paths point to specific environmental risks
and prevention opportunities, Best Available Technique
(BAT) are available to act on these paths. The process
designer can thereby consider available technologies to
improve environmental performances, control, stabilization
of activities involved in the critical paths, previously
discovered. To understand the impact of improvements in
techniques while using FRAM model, the real case
considers improving the critical path “collect and gas
purification from coke crushing and coke transfer” by
adding a Bag Filter solution, as suggested in BATC.
4. BAT BAG FILTER IMPROVEMENT
The Bag Filter MEROS (Maximized Emission Reduction
Of Sintering) technique is a highly efficient dry gas
filtration process for the treatment of gases coming out of
agglomeration plants. The process works by applying,
downstream of the ESP, a high performance sleeve filter.
The MEROS process operates on dust and polluting
components still present in the off-gases after treatment in
electrostatic filters, reducing to the emission levels of dust
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to <10 ݉݃Ȁܰ݉ଷ (Siemens VAI Metals Technologies,
2008).
4.1 Environmental improvements of the filter bag
The installation of a bag filter is highly effective in reducing
dust and heavy metal emissions. Moreover, filter bag with
additive injection allows a significant reduction of PCDD/F
(of which sintering plants are the main source within an
integrated steelwork) and acid gases such as HF, HCl, and
SO2. A reduction of VOC and PAH is also reported.
Table 2 shows the emission concentration values achieved
for emissions from three sintering grids with bag filter
systems.
Table 2. Emissions off sintering grids with bag filters
3) Conditioning reactor. The gas flow passes to a
conditioning reactor where it is humidified and cooled to a
temperature of about 100 °C by injection from two water
and air nozzles.
4) Remove dust by a high-performance bag filter. The flow
of gas exiting the conditioning reactor passes through the
high-performance bag filter in which dust with pollutants
are removed.
5) Recirculate dosing. In order to increase the efficiency of
the cleaning gas and reduce the additive costs, a portion of
the dust is recirculated and injected into the flow of gas
coming out of the conditioning reactor.
Table 3. Costs of bag filters from real applications

4.2 Costs of the bag filter

The investment is in the range 16-35 ݁‫݋ݎݑ‬Ȁܰ݉ଷ Ȁ݄ (for

new and existing plants). The operating cost is about 0.3-
0.6 euro /t sinter and depends mainly on the costs of
supplying active carbon, limestone and extra energy. Table
3 shows examples of the cost of sleeve filters installed in
some sintering plants.
4.3 FRAM model of sinter process with Bag Filter
The improvement through the insertion of bag filter requires
new functions inside the FRAM model, thus 8 new
functions are added (Fig. 2), analyzing the operative process
of bag filters.
1) Additive dosing. The absorbent and desulphurizing
agents (calcium hydroxide and lignite) are dosed and
injected into the flow of gases exiting from the ESP.
2) Additive injection. The prepared additives are injected
into the flow of gases exiting from the ESP in the opposite
direction to fix heavy metals and organic components.
6) Convey removed dust. Dust removed from the system is
conveyed to storage silos for later use in other applications.
7) Conditioning reactor maintenance. The conditioning
reactor, as well as other plant equipment, must be kept in
good condition and eventually replaced when no longer
functioning or obsolete.
8) Bag Filter maintenance. The bag filter, as well as other
equipment of the system, must be kept in good condition
and replaced if necessary when no longer working or
obsolete.
To better understand how FRAM is applied to this part of
the system I-O-P-R-C-T elements and their relations from a
function to the others is explicated in table 4.

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Table 4. I-O-P-R-C-T elements (excerpt)

Downstream function  Upstream function  Downstream function  Upstream function 
Name of function  Aspect  Name of function  Name of function  Aspect  Name of function 
Purchase materials and  Ignite coke breeze in the 
Blend ore beds  Input  Resource  Cool sinter 
monitor availability  mixture 
Calculate stacking for ore  Control ignition furnace 
   Control     Control 
bed blending  temperature, pressure and hood 
Calculate stacking for  Purchase materials and  Place material to sinter on the 
Input     Time 
ore bed blending  monitor availability  heart layer 
Control ignition furnace 
Provide SIMETAL software  Provide SIMETAL software 
   Resource  temperature, pressure and  Resource 
package  package 
hood 
Calculate geometry of  Provide materials  Provide SIMETAL software 
Input  BTP Control  Resource 
ore beds  information  package 
Provide SIMETAL software 
   Resource  Fine particles sintering  Input  Ignite coke breeze in the mixture 
package 
Calculate raw mix 
Input  Plan sinter target quality     Resource  Sintering machine maintenance 
composition 
Provide SIMETAL software 
   Resource     Control  BTP Control 
package 
Plan sinter target  Dedust gas from sinter 
Resource  Manage HR  Input  Fine particles sintering 
quality  strand 
Transfer ore blend to 
Time  Blend ore beds     Resource  ESP maintenance  
storage bins 
Transfer coke to  Purchase materials and  Monitor emissions from  Remove dust by high‐
Input  Time 
crusher  monitor availability  sinter strand  performance bag filter 
Crush coke   Resource  Roll crusher maintenance Collect solid emissions Input Dedust gas from sinter strand
   Time  Transfer coke to crusher  Discharge sinter cake   Input  Fine particles sintering 
Collect and purificate 
Shredding management and 
gas from coke crushing  Input  Crush coke   Crush the sinter cake   Precondition 
supervision 
and coke transfer 
Transfer coke breeze to 
Time  Crush coke      Resource  Roll crusher maintenance 
storage bins 
Transfer coke to BF  Time  Crush coke   Time Discharge sinter cake 
Collect and purificate gas 
Transfer limestone  Purchase materials and 
Input  from hot sinter crusher and  Input  Crush the sinter cake  
fines to storage bins  monitor availability 
sinter transfer 
Transfer return fines to 
Input  Screen hot sinter  Screen hot sinter  Input  Crush the sinter cake  
storage bins 
Transfer additives to  Purchase materials and 
Input     Resource  Screen maintenance 
storage bins  monitor availability 
Transfer waste 
Blast furnace and Coke 
materials to storage  Input  Cool sinter  Resource  Rotating cooler maintenance 
oven operations 
bins 
Transfer raw materials  Transfer ore blend to 
Input     Control  Control cooler speed 
to mixing drum  storage bins 
Raw materials charging 
   Precondition  management and     Time  Screen hot sinter 
supervision 
Control raw materials feed  Provide SIMETAL software 
   Control  Control cooler speed  Resource 
rate  package 
Control raw materials 
Input  Control hopper level  Screen cold sinter  Resource  Screen maintenance 
feed rate 
Provide SIMETAL software 
   Resource     Time  Cool sinter 
package 
Mix materials  Resource  Mixing drum maintenance  Move sinter to BF  Input  Screen cold sinter 
   Control  Manage water supply  Collect and threat water   Input  Dedust gas from sinter strand 
Transfer raw materials to  Collect and purificate gas 
   Time  Input  Cool sinter 
mixing drum  from cooling 
Raw materials charging 
Manage water supply  Input  Plan sinter target quality  management and  Resource  Manage HR 
supervision 
Sinter strand operations 
Provide SIMETAL software 
   Resource  management and  Resource  Manage HR 
package 
supervision 

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Fig. 2. FRAM modelling of Bag Filter MEROS (full model extraction)
Also for the newly defined functions, the two most
representative parameters of each have been chosen and the
probability values in probabilistic terms. The variability
aggregation is then calculated considering an increased
number of couplings (from 109 to 119) and a new criticality
path is identified. In fact, in this second scenario, that risk
manager could consider environmentally better than before,
the FRAM model suggests a new criticality arises in the
control of variabilities of functions Purchase material and
monitor availability, Additive dosing, Additive injection.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The FRAM modeling of a sinter plant permitted to identify the
critical path to be monitored in Environmental Audit,
considering risk-oriented perspective. The BAT regulations
suggest adding specific technical solution (e.g. filter bag) to
reduce environmental risks, acting on the critical path.
Nevertheless, the paper proved that FRAM used for risk
assessment as part of the auditing process, introduces new
critical paths, that is an important insight to manage auditing
activities, monitor and investment. It is not trivial or self-
evident to verify that the introduction of an improved technical
solution could generate new critical issues. The main result of
the paper is to prove how an environmental improvement
should be accompanied by a modified environmental audit.
Moreover, the FRAM modeling is a valuable method to keep
on updating the list of criticalities to reduce environmental
risks.
6. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors acknowledge Isabelle Pietroletti for her support in
the development of the case study. The authors used a VBA
1180
code provided by Riccardo Patriarca, to execute the semi-
quantitative analysis conducted in this study and they interface
it with the FRAM Model Visualizer (FMV), a software, based
on the method designed by prof. Erik Hollnagel, and written
and developed by Rees Hill: authors greatly acknowledge
these collegues.
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