(1)TAÑADA V.

TUVERA
No. L-63915136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
Facts
: In procuring the enforcement of public duty, a petition was sought by Tañada,Sarmiento, and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity
and Nationalism, Inc(MABINI) seeking a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,and or cause the publication in the
Official Gazette of various presidential decrees,letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation
and administrative orders. There is a need for Publication of Laws tostrengthen its binding force and effect: giving access to legislative records,
givingawareness to the public of the law promulgated. The Official Gazette, however, does notcontain publications of administrative and
executive orders that affect only a particular class of persons. The Official Gazette, as mandated by law, presents all presidentialissuances “of a
public nature” or “of general applicability.” Also, Article 2 of the CivilCode expressly recognized that the rule as to laws takes effect after 15
days unless it isotherwise (for some do specify the date of effectivity) following the completion of thepublication in the Official Gazette.
However, the decree has been misread by many; for ithas no juridical force, but a mere legislative enactment of RA 386.
Issue
: WON to provide publications of the law elsewhere, aside from the Official Gazette, as itwould be essential to the effectivity of the said
legislative or executive act that regulatesthe acts and conduct of people as citizens.
Held
: Respondents were granted petition to publish all unpublished issuances in the OfficialGazette, serving as a response to the maxim “ignorance as
an excuse for noncompliance.” The effectivity of laws shall follow the notice to parties concerned, for such is a public right. There will be no
retroactive effect for laws with dates which appliedthe 15-day rule of publication in the Official Gazette.

(2)MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ v. COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, et al.

Here's a more detailed case digest for G.R. No. 193459: http://lawphils.blogspot.com/2017/05/gutierrez-v-committee-on-justice-gr-no.html.

FACTS: Before the 15th Congress opened its first session, private respondents known as the Baraquel group filed an impeachment complaint
against petitioner, upon the endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.

A day after the opening of the 15th Congress, the Secretary General of the House of Representatives transmitted the impeachment complaint to
House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. who directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.
Private respondents collectively known as the Reyes group filed another impeachment complaint against petitioner with a resolution of endorsement
by Party-List Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, et al.

The Secretary General transmitted the Reyes group’s complaint to Speaker Belmonte who also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the
Order of Business.

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution, found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of
public trust, sufficient in substance.

Petitioner filed with this Court the present petition with application for injunctive reliefs. The Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance
of a status quo ante order and to require respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days.

Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They argue that public respondent was not exercising any judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was exercising a political act that is discretionary
in nature, and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary investigation.

Petitioner invokes the Court’s expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles.
ISSUES: [1] Is petition premature and not yet ripe for adjudication? [2] Do the simultaneous complaints violate the one-year bar rule?

HELD: The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial
power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one
impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one year.
Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: “No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.” However, the term “initiate” means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. The initiation starts with
the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of
the complaint to the Committee on Justice. DISMISSED.
 DOE v. PILIPINAS SHELL

FACTS: Respondent is a corporation duly organized existing under the laws of the Philippines. It is engaged in the business of refining oil,
marketing petroleum, and other related activities.
The Department of Energy (DOE) is a government agency under the direct control and supervision of the Office of the President. The
Department is mandated by Republic Act No. 7638 to prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs, projects and
activities of the Government relative to energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution and conservation.
On 10 October 1984, the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) was created under Presidential Decree No. 1956 for the purpose of
minimizing frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustments and/or increase in world market prices of crude oil and imported
petroleum products

the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA), now the DOE, informed the respondent that respondents contributions to the OPSF for foreign

exchange risk charge for the period December 1989 to March 1991 were insufficient. OEA Audit Task Force noted a total underpayment of

P14,414,860.75 by respondent to the OPSF. As a consequence of the underpayment, a surcharge of P11,654,782.31 was imposed upon respondent.

The said surcharge was imposed pursuant to MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended by Department of Finance (DOF) Circular No. 2-94,[9] which provides

tha

2. Remittance of payment to the OPSF as provided for under Section 5 of MOF Order No. 11-85 shall be made not later than 20th of the
month following the month of remittance of the foreign exchange payment for the import or the month of payment to the domestic producers in the
case of locally produced crude. Payment after the specified date shall be subject to a surcharge of fifteen percent (15%) of the amount, if
paid within thirty (30) days from the due date plus two percent (2%) per month if paid after thirty days. [10] (Emphasis supplied.)

respondent filed a Notice of Appeal before the Office of the President. The Office of the President affirmed the conclusion of the DOE, contained
in its letters dated 15 March 1996 and 11 July 1996. While it admitted that the implementation of MOF Circular No. 1-85 is contingent upon its
publication and filing with the ONAR, it noted that respondent failed to adduce evidence of lack of compliance with such requirements.

ISSUE:
MOF Circular No. 1-85 valid

RULING:
This petition is without merit. As early as 1986, this Court in Taada v. Tuvera[23] enunciated that publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules that
are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and effect

Facts:

August 4, 2003: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo Matillano filed an affidavit-complaint with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) which contains the following in part:

o July 27, 2003: crime of coup d’ etat was committed by military personnel who occupied Oakwood and
Senator Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan, II

o On or about 11 p.m. June 4,2003: A meeting was held and presided by Senator Honasan in a house
located in San Juan, Metro Manila

o Early morning of July 27, 2003: Capt. Gerardo Gambala, in behalf of the military rebels occupying
Oakwood, made a public statement aired on national television, stating their withdrawal of support to
the chain of command of the AFP and the Government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
 Willing to risk their lives to achieve the National Recovery Agenda (NRA) of Senator Honasan which
they believe is the only program that would solve the ills of society.

Sworn statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil stated that:

o June 4, 2003 about 11 pm: Senator Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan arrived with Capt. Turinga to hold the
NRP meeting where they concluded the use of force, violence and armed struggle to achieve the
vision of NRP where a junta will be constituted which will run the new government. They had a blood
compact and that he only participated due to the threat made by Senator Honasan when he said
“Kung kaya nating pumatay sa ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating pumatay sa mga kasamahang
magtataksil.”

o July 27, 2003: He saw on TV that Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes, Captain Gerardo Gambala, Captain
Alejano and some others who were present during the NRP meeting he attended, having a press
conference about their occupation of the Oakwood Hotel. He saw that the letter "I" on the arm bands
and the banner is the same letter "I" in the banner is the same as their blood compact wound.

August 27, 2003: Senator Honasan appeared with counsel at the DOJ to file a a Motion for
Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case since the imputed acts were committed in
relation to his public office by a group of public officials with Salary Grade 31 which should be
handled by the Office of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan

Senator Honasan then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the
DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V.
Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the
aforequoted Order of September 10, 2003 directing him to file his respective counter-affidavits and
controverting evidence on the ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation

Issues:

1. Whether the Ombudsman-DOJ Joint Circular no. 95-001 is ineffective on the ground that it was not
published

Held: Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit
2. No.

In the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954). The only circulars and regulations which
prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective.

In the case of Taňada V. Tuvera, 146 Scra 453 (1986), The Honorable Court rules that:

o Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required
of the so called letters of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules on
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in performance of their duties.

 OMB-DOJ Joint Circulars no. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the DOJ and the office of
the Ombudsman, Outlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the
office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. It does not regulate the conduct
of persons or the public, in general.

G.R. No. 100776, October 28, 1993

Chief Justice Narvasa

FACTS: Petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the
Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited
on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being:
"CLOSED ACCOUNT." A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage
company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction
of the crime charged.

He argued on appeal that at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years
prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or
"bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official
pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice.

ISSUE: whether the decision issued by the Court be applied retroactively to the prejudice of the accused.
HELD: No. Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law
of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit,
the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive
application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract
and hence, is unconstitutional

The weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's decision of September 21, 1987 in
Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an
obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 — should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of
the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a
check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.

PEOPLE VS PATALIN 311 SCRA 186

Tuesday, January 20, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Criminal Law

Facts: Alfonso Patalin and Alex Mijaque, herein accused were convicted of Robbery with Multiple
Rape committed in the evening of August 11, 1984 against the Aliman family. They were meted
the supreme penalty of death. At the time the crimes charged were committed in 1984, robbery
with rape was punishable by death, however, by virtue of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
the death penalty was abolished and all death penalties already imposed were reduced to reclusion
perpetua. The decision for the present case was promulgated on June 14, 1995, after the effectivity
of RA 7659 which restored the death penalty. Appellants now contend that the trial court erred in
imposing the death penalty as the same was suspended upon ratification of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: When the death penalty was abolished in 1987 and was retroactively applied to herein
accused, did they gain a vested right thereto so that any future law restoring the death penalty
would no longer cover them?

Held: Although at the time of the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution the present case was still its
trial stage, it is clear that the framers intended the provision to have a retroactive effect on pending
cases without any penalty of death having been imposed yet. The retroactive effect may be given
during three possible stages of a criminal prosecution: a) when the crime has been committed and
the prosecution began; b) when sentence has been passed but service has not begun; and c) when
the sentence is being carried out. The abolition of the death penalty benefits herein accused by
virtue of Art 22 of the RPC which provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as
they favor the person guilty of the felony who is not a habitual criminal. Hence, they are subject
to a reduction of penalty from death to reclusion perpetua. A subsequent statute cannot be applied
retroactively as to impair a right that accrued under the old law.

Oriental Assurance v. Solid Bank

FACTS: PetitionerOriental Assurance Corporation issued Fire Insurance Policy

No. F-92/22733-D, insuring the stock of finished and/or unfinished products
including raw materials, machinery and equipment belonging to Wear Me
Garments Manufacturing, Inc. (Wear Me). The policy insured against loss and/or
damage by fire from March 20, 1991 to March 20, 1992. The policy was
subsequently renewed for another year from March 20, 1992 to March 20, 1993
under Renewal Receipt No. 40948. A Memorandum stating that the policy was
"[m]ade further subject to MORTGAGEE CLAUSE in favor of SOLIDBANK
CORPORATION"' was typewritten on the face of the receipt.
On April 27, 1993, petitioner issued another Fire Insurance Policy (No. F-93-
40690-D) insuring the same items of Wear Me from March 20, 1993 to March 20,
1994.
On July 12, 1993, a fire broke out at the factory of Wear Me, destroying a major
portion of the insured properties. Wear Me submitted to petitioner and its co-
insurers[3] a Notice of Loss for the value of the damaged properties. The claims were denied.
As holder of trust receipts over the burned goods, Solidbank Corporation sent an
undated telegram to petitioner, asking the latter to pay the proceeds of Fire
Insurance Policy No. F-92/22733-D. Petitioner refused to comply, because the
Policy did not contain a mortgagee clause in favor of Solidbank.
Solid bank sued the petitioner RTC favored Solid bank
ISSUE:W]hether or not the Court of Appeals x x x committed reversible error in giving
retroactive effect to Section 1 (c) of Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
[dismissing] petitioner's appeal for failure of the petitioner to pay the appellate court
docket and other lawful fees
RULING:Petitioner contends that these Rules cannot be given retroactive effect
because such action would impair its "vested" rights under the old Rules. [11] The latter
required an appellant to pay the docket fees within fifteen days from the receipt of notice from the CA clerk of court that the record on appeal has been received.

The retroactive application of procedural rules to pending cases is undoubtedly

well settled.[12] Petitioner even admits this in its efforts to reason out its case.[13] For this reason alone, the present Petition should be dismissed.
Even assuming that it is entitled to the aforecited right, the CA's dismissal of the
appeal still stands.
BPI vs. Intermediate Appellate Court GR# L-66826, August 19,
1988
CORTES, J:

Facts:

Rizaldy T. Zshornack and his wife maintained in COMTRUST a dollar savings account and a peso current
account. An application for a dollar drat was accomplished by Virgillo Garcia branch manager of COMTRUST
payable to a certain Leovigilda Dizon. In the PPLICtion, Garcia indicated that the amount was to be charged to
the dolar savings account of the Zshornacks. There wasa no indication of the name of the purchaser of the dollar
draft. Comtrust issued a check payable to the order of Dizon. When Zshornack noticed the withdrawal from his
account, he demanded an explainaiton from the bank. In its answer, Comtrust claimed that the peso value of the
withdrawal was given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, brother of Rizaldy. When he encashed with COMTRUST a
cashiers check for P8450 issued by the manila banking corporation payable to Ernesto.

Issue: Whether the contract between petitioner and respondent bank is a deposit?

Held: The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was received by the bank for
safekeeping. The subsequent acts of the parties also show that the intent of the parties was really for the bank
to safely keep the dollars and to return it to Zshornack at a later time. Thus, Zshornack demanded the return of
the money on May 10, 1976, or over five months later.

The above arrangement is that contract defined under Article 1962, New Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another, with the
obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the
principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some other contract.

MARCOS v. COMELEC

https://www.scribd.com/document/204676949/Romualdez-Marcos-vs-Comelec-Digest
FAR EAST

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jan2004/147964.htm